v Mison
December 17, 1987
oup 3
lpiano P. Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcilla
Salvador Mison, capacity as Commissioner of Bureau of
d Guillermo Carague, as Sec. of Budget
Commission on Appointments
ovision:
TION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
he Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
e departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
fficers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
n, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
onstitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
se whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
ay, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
resident alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
, agencies, commissions, or boards.
nt shall have the power to make appointments during the
e Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
s shall be effective only until after disapproval by the
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
or prohibition seeking to enjoin Mison from performing
as Customs Commissioner, and Carague from effecting
ments in payment for Misons salaries and emoluments.
n ground that Mison was appointed w/o confirmation of
ommission on Appointments
Petition dismissed
Holding:
on by the Commission on Appointments needed for
ointment? NO
Constitutional construction should not be not in accord
how exec. or legis. dept may want them construed, bu
accordance to what they say and provide
From Sec. 16, Art VII of 1987 Consti
o 4 groups of officers President shall appoint
heads of exec depts., ambassadors, oth
ministers and consuls, officers of the ar
from rank of colonel or naval captain, an
officers whose appointments are vested
Consti
all other officers whose appointment no
provided by law
those whom the President may be auth
law to appoint
officers in lower rank whose appointme
Congress may by law vest in the Presid
o 1st group is clearly appointed by with consent o
Appointments.
o For 2nd to 4th groups, need to check historical b
and intent of framers
Historical background
o 1935 Consti almost all appointments required
Commission on Appointments
Commission on Appointments transform
venue of horse-trading and similar ma
o 1973 Consti, as remolded by successive amen
placed absolute power to appoint in President w
any check
o So 1987 Consti struck middle ground
1st group needed confirmation, other 3 n
anymore.
Debates of ConCom
o Original text almost verbatim copy of 1935 Con
o Went to 2 major changes
Exclusion of appointments of heads of b
from req. of confirmation
Because position is quite low in
dept.
Exclusion of appointments made under
sentence from same requirement.
 rs: claim that the word also in the 2nd sentence President
o appoint all other officers means in like manner, so
ds confirmation/consent of Comm. on Appt.
ourt: also can also mean: in addition; as well; besides,
oo
w/c means that Pres. in addition to nominating w/
consent of Comm on Appt., can appoint w/o their
Comm. on Appt. the other officers mentioned in the
2nd sentence.
But instead of focusing on this, court derives
significance that 1st sentence speaks of nomination
by Pres and appointment by Pres. w/ consent of
Comm. on Appt.
While 2nd sentence speaks only of
appointment by Pres.
Use of diff. language underscores the diff. in
message conveyed.
there are officers of higher rank that dont need
tion, compared to those that need confirmation
uch as Central Bank Gov. vs colonel in AFP or consul in
onsular Services
ontrasts underscore the purposive intention and
eliberate judgement of framers, that except to those
fficers whose appointments req. consent/confirmation as
ated in Art VII, Sec 16, appointments of other officers are
ft to Pres. w/o need for confirmation.
appoint is fundamentally executive in character.
ns on such power should be strictly construed against
mitations must be clearly stated to be recognized.
is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is
early stated that appointments by the President to the
ositions therein enumerated require the consent of the
ommission on Appointments
group of officers
ntervenor (COA) - law is needed to vest the appointment
f lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies
hat, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers
ave to be appointed by the President subject to
onfirmation by the Commission on Appointments; if lower
anked officers are subject, higher rank must also be
o SC: The word alone after President in 3rd sente
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads o
departments) is merely a slip in draftsmansh
Since in 1935 Consti, general rule is all
appointments are subj. to confirmation b
on Appt.
1935 Consti as way of exception
may provide by law appointmen
officers in the President alone, in
or in heads of depts.
In 1987 Consti since it was alrea
that the intent was to exclude pr
appointments from req. of confir
except those listed in 1st group,
reason for the word alone after
The power to appoint officers wh
may be authorized by law to app
already vested in the Pres. w/o n
confirmation.
o Its just a redundancy of
sentence
The Commissioner of the Customs Bureau is not inclu
1st group
o In the debates, the heads of bureaus were eve
deliberately excluded from the req. of confirma
o Pres. is auth. by law to appoint the Commission
Under Sec. 601 of RA 1937 (Tariff and
Code), am. by PD 34
These laws have to be read in harmony
Art VII
They no longer need confirmatio
Comm. on Appt.
So Pres. acted w/in her constitutional auth. and power
Mison, w/o submitting nomination to Comm. on Appt. f
confirmation.
Dissents:
Gutierrez, J.
Legislature through Comm. on Appt. gives assurance
those who pass scrutiny of both Pres. and Congress w
country as officers in high appointive positions
 s may vest by law the appointment of other officers lower
n the Pres. alone (3rd sentence)
s only for officers lower in rank.
the confirmation requirement is limited to the officers in
he 1st sentence, the clear intent of the 3rd sentence is lost.
sions in Consti must be read together.
n providing that appointment of members of SC and
dges of lower courts (Sec 9, Art VIII), Ombudsman and
eputies (Sec 9, Art XI), and VP as member of cabinet
Sec 3, Art VII), clearly provides no confirmation req.
Can only mean that all others need confirmation
g the logic of the majority opinion:
FA Usec, not head of dept. so no need for confirmation,
ut ordinary consul whos under his jurisdiction, would req.
onfirmation
olonel by any standard is lower in rank that Chairman of
HR, but colonel is subject to confirmation, but CHR
hairman is not.
He does not think these discrepancies were intended b
so interpreting Consti to allow such should be avoided
If enumeration in the 1st sentence are only ones that re
confirmation, no reason for still having 2nd sentence.
o Since all other appointees not listed would alre
need confirmation
What if Congress does not see fit to vest in the Preside
appointment of other officers lower in rank, then lower
3rd sentence will still need confirmation while higher off
sentence will not?
Purpose of the ConCom was to restrict the powers of t
Presidency, a measure to implement this was the resto
the Comm. on Appt.
So only officers who are not subj. to confirmation are:
o Members of Judiciary and the Ombudsman and
deputies, who are nominated by JBC
o VP when appointed to the cabinet
o Other officers lower in rank, but only when vest
the President alone.
es v. CA
oner and three others were appointed Sectoral
esentatives by the President pursuant to Article VII,
on 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the
titution
able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as
bers of Congress due to the opposition of some
ressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments,
nsisted that sectoral representatives must first be
rmed by the respondent Commission before they could
their oaths and/or assume office as members of the
e of Representatives
sition compelled house speaker to suspend oath taking of
ectoral representatives
utive Secretary transmitted a letter from the Pres
essed to CA submitting confirmation
ker informed petitioner that the president had submitted
ppointment to CA for confirmation and that the CA now
urisdiction over her appointment
Invited to attend CA meeting for deliberation
Questioned jurisdiction
uled against her appointment
intment does not require confirmation by CA
ppointment of petitioner Deles was not acted upon by the
mission on Appointments when Congress went into
ss as required by the Constitution
and academic
Sec 23 of Rules of Commission
g petitioner
VIII Sec 7
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by
appointment from a list of nominees by the respective
sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation
in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of th
Constitution
Art VII Sec 16
Sarmiento v Mison
o only appointments to offices mentioned in t
sentence of the said Section 16, Article VII
confirmation by the Commission on Appoin
heads of the executive departments
ambassadors, other public ministers
consuls officers of the armed forces
rank of colonel or naval captain, and
officers whose appointments are ve
in this Constitution
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representativ
paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by app
the President by express provision of Section 7, Ar
the Constitution, it is definite that sectoral represen
the House of Representatives are among the "othe
whose appointments are vested in the President in
Constitution
o there are appointments vested in the Presid
Constitution which, by express mandate of
Constitution, require no confirmation such a
appointments of members of the Supreme
judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and
Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art.
such exemption from confirmation had been
to appointments of sectoral representatives
Constitution.
The invocation of Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Const
authority for the appointment of petitioner places sa
appointment within the ambit of the first sentence o
16, Art. VII
o Further made pursuant to Art VII Sec 16 (2)
If appointments of sectoral representatives need no
confirmation, the President need not make any refe
the constitutional provisions above-quoted in appo
o the President in a letter dated April 11, 198
expressly submitted petitioner's appointmen
confirmation by the Commission on Appoin
Pet:
 here in the Constitution nor in Executive Order No. 198 is
ion made of the need for petitioner's appointment to be
mitted to the Commission on Appointments for
rmation
Providing for the Manner of Nomination and
Appointment of Sectoral Representatives to the House
of Representatives.

cutive Order No. 1 98 confines itself to specifying the

rs to be represented, their number, and the nomination of
sectoral representatives
oner Deles' appointment was issued not by virtue of
utive Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16,
graph 2 and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution which
re submission to the confirmation process
 CALDERON V. CARALE
G.R. No. 91636 | April 23, 1992
Group 7: Chua, Dela Cruz, Mahinay
R: Peter John D. Calderon
T: Bartolome Carale as Chairman of National Labor
ommission; et al.
preme Court, En Banc
Padilla, J.
16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution
TION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
ent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
s of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
c ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
e appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
intments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
m he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
rtments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amendment of the Labor
e (P.D. 442)
TION 13. The Chairman, the Division Presiding
missioners and other Commissioners shall all be
inted by the President, subject to confirmation by the
mission on Appointments. Appointments to any
ncy shall come from the nominees of the sector which
nated the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and
r Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon
mmendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and
ations.
eld that Congress cannot pass a law requiring
for inferior officers. Thus, a section of RA 6715,
e Labor Code and requiring confirmation for the
appointments of the Chairman and Commissioners of the
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is unconstitutional.
Facts and Procedural History:
There are 3 precedent cases:
Sarmiento III v. Mison: Power of Commissio
Appointments (CA) to confirm appointments
In the 1987 Constitution, the clear a
expressed intent of its framers was
presidential appointments from conf
the CA, except appointments to o
expressly mentioned in the first s
Sec. 16, Art. VII.
Heads of bureaus exempt from the
consent (confirmation) of CA
President acted within her consti au
Mary Conception Bautista v. Salonga: Case
appointment of CHR Chairman
Appointment by the President of the
Chairman is to be made without the
participation of the CA, as it is not s
provided for in the Constitutionun
Chairmen and Members of the CSC
COMELEC, and COA whose appoin
expressly vested.
Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Comm
Constitutional Commissions, et al.: Powe
confirmation of CA by President of Congres
representatives
Since seats reserved for sectoral
representatives in paragraph 2, Se
may be filled by appointment by the
by express provision of Sec. 7, Art.
Constitution, it is indubitable that s
representatives to the House of
Representatives are among other o
whose appointments are vested in t
 President in this Constitution, referred to in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, whose
appointments are subject to confirmation by
the CA.
ines deducible from the 3 cases
. Confirmation by the CA is required only for
presidential appointees mentioned in first sentence
of Sec. 16, Art. VII:
Officers whose appointments are expressly
vested in the Consti itself
Sectoral reps to Congress, members of
constitutional commissions: Audit, Civil Service
and Election
. Confirmation by the CA is not required when President
appoints government officers whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law or officers whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint (e.g. Chairman
and Members of CHR). Also, as observed in Mison,
when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to
provide for appointment or provides unconstitutional
manner for such appointments, officers are included
among those whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law.
89, RA 6715, amending the Labor Code (PD 442), was
oved.
Aquino appointed Chairman and Members of NLRC and
Labor Sec. Frankiln Drilon issued Administrative Order,
nating places of assignment of the newly appointed
missioners.
ition for prohibition that questions the constitutionality and
ty of the permanent appointments extended by the
dent to the Chairman and Members of the National Labor
ions Commission (NLRC) without submitting to the CA for
rmation pursuant to Art. 215, Labor Code as amended by
715.
Petitioner insists on a mandatory complianc
6715, which is not, according to him, an en
of appointing power of the executive.
Petitioner claims that Mison and Bautista ru
not decisive of the issue, for President did n
them to CA for confirmation despite passag
(RA 6715) which requires CA confirmation.
SolGen:
contends that RA 6715 which amended the
Code transgresses Sec 16 Art. VII of Const
by expanding the confirmation powers of th
constitutional basis
Mison and Bautista issue laid to rest
Confirmation by CA is required excl
heads of exec. Depts, ambassadors
ministers, consuls, officers of armed
other consti commissions
No confirmation by CA required whe
provided by the law
Consti would have specified and other offic
required by law or with the consent of the
the framers wanted to allow congress to ex
officers to be confirmed by CA
Issue: Whether Congress may, by law, require confirmatio
CA of appointments extended by the President to governm
additional to those expressly mentioned in the first senten
16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
Judgment:
Petition dismissed.
Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 671
declared unconstitutional
Ratio:
Mison doctrine will be used to resolve the issue.
e are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
int and needs confirmation by the CA:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the president may be authorized by
law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other
rs of the government whose appointments are not
wise provided for by law and those whom the President
be authorized by law to appoint. Confirmation of CA not
ssary.
NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the 3rd
group of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the
officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16,
Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments
unconstitutional for requiring CA confirmation of Chairman
s of NLRC.
ends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of
Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring
rmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
ends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII
e Constitution, by simposing the confirmation of the
mission on Appointments on appointments which are
wise entrusted only with the President.
e of functions between legislative and judiciary
ding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative but
mining their constitutionality is a judicial function.
Supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting t
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of th
Philippines
The rulings in Mison, Bautista and Quintos-
interpreted Art. VII, Sec. 16 consistently in o
Legislation cannot expand a constitutional p
after the Supreme Court has interpreted it
As ruled in Endencia and Jugo vs. David: le
cannot pass any declaratory act, or act dec
what the law was before its passage. A legi
definition of a word as used in a statute wou
usurping a judicial function in defining a term
It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution was deliberately, not unconsciously, in
the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a depart
system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where th
Commission on Appointments exercised the power
confirmation over almost all presidential appointme
to many cases of abuse of such power of confirma
Dicta:
The solution to the apparent problem is not judicial
legislative but constitutional.
Separate Opinions:
GUTIERREZ, JR., J, concurring
Joined Justices Cruz in a dissent in Mison becaus
Jr. felt that the majoritys interpretation of Sec. 16,
results in absurd or irrational consequences. Gutie
reiterated the dissent in Bautista and urged a re-ex
of the Mison doctrine.
But thought it was time to finally accept majority op
Courts ruling on the matter to avoid repetition.
CRUZ, J., dissenting
Reiterating the dissent in Mison, Cruz believed Mis
be re-examined instead of being automatically re-a

Matibag v. Benipayo
. No. 149036| April 2, 2002 | Ponente: J. Carpio
Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag
ts: Alfredo L. Benipayo, Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino
r., Velma J. Cinco, and Gideon C. De Guzman in his
Officer-in-Charge of the Finance Services Department of
petitioner in this case questions the constitutionality of the
intment and right to hold office of Alfredo Benipayo,
rreccion Borra and Florentino Tuason, Jr.
ebruary 2, 1999, COMELEC en banc appointed the
oner as Acting Director IV of COMELECs Education
nformation Department (EID). Her appointment to the
e position was renewed twice, on February 15, 2000 and
uary 15, 2001, both on temporary capacity.
March 22, 2001, PGMA appointed ad interim Benipayo as
ELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC
missioners, each for a term of seven years, expiring on
uary 2, 2008. The said appointments were submitted
e CA, but the CA did not act on the said
intments. The said appointments were also renewed
, on June 1 and 8 of 2001, with the terms still to expire on
2, 2008.
pril 11, 2001, Benipayo issued a memorandum
essed to petitioner designated Velma Cinco, director III of
as Officer-in-Charge of EID, while Matibag was transferred
e Law Department.
bag sought for the reconsideration of her relief as Director
d her reassignment to the Law Department. She claims
he said transfer is prohibited during election period (citing
Memorandum Circular No. 7). Her request was denied by
payo. Her subsequent request for reconsideration before
OMELEC en banc was denied as well citing COMELEC
ution stating that the COMELEC may transfer or reassign
onnel when necessary within the 30 day period before
on day provided that it shall be effected after due notice
hearing
While also filing a complaint before the Law Depar
Matibag filed the present petition.
In the meantime, on September 6, 2001, PGMA re
again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo as
Chairman, and of Borra and Tuason as Commissio
the seven-year terms still expiring on February 2, 2
ISSUES / HELD:
WON the instant petition satisfies all the requirements fo
review
1. YES. Petitioner complied with all of the requisit
judicial review.
The real issue that needs to be resolved is the con
of Benipayos assumption of office.
Matibags personal and substantial injury, if Benipa
the lawful COMELEC Chairman, gives her the lega
to raise the constitutional issue in the petition.
Respondents argue that Matibag belatedly questio
constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of B
Borra and Tuason, because the first ad interim app
were issued as early as March 22, 2001 while the p
filed on August 3, 2001. The Court held that it is no
filing that determines whether the constitutional iss
raised at the earliest opportunity. Rather, the earlie
opportunity to raise the issue is to raise it in the ple
Unless the constitutionality of Benipayos ad interim
appointment is resolved, the legality of Matibags
reassignment cannot be determined, thus making t
of the case a very constitutional issue.
In any case, the issue is of transcendental importa
resolution puts into question the legality of COMEL
conduct during the May 14, 2001 elections.
WON the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra,
are temporary appointments, thus prohibited by Section
IX-C of the Constitution.
2. NO. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Tuason do not constitute temporary or acting
appointments prohibited by Section 1(2), Articl
the Constitution.

oner argues that an ad interim appointment is temporary
aracter and thus prohibited by Section 1(2), Article IX-C of
onstitution. This is because of her view that ad interim
intments can be withdrawn or revoked by the President
disapproved or by-passed by the CA. Petitioner also
ves that only upon the approval of CA can an
intment be permanent.
The Court held that an ad interim appointment is a
permanent appointment. It takes effect immediately,
and contrary to the claim of the petitioner, the President
can no longer withdraw the appointment once the
appointee has qualified into office.
The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
provides for the permanent character of an ad interim
appointment. An ad interim appointment remains
effective until the disapproval of CA or the next
adjournment of the Congress. Thus, it cannot be
revoked by the President.
The appointee can at once assume office and exercise
all the powers pertaining to the said office.
oner also argued that ad interim means in the
ntime or for the time being, thus supporting the claim
t is of temporary character.
The Court, citing the decision in Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
clarified that ad interim refers to the manner in which
the said appointments were made by the President,
that is, in the meantime that Congress is in recess.
It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be
withdrawn or revoked at any time. The term, although
not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a
definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.
d interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office
mes at that moment a government employee and
fore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional
ction that no officer or employee in the civil service shall
moved or suspended except for cause provided by law.
o ad interim appointment becomes complete
irrevocable once the appointee has qualifie
office. The withdrawal or revocation of an a
interim appointment is possible only if it is
communicated to the appointee before the
qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation
tantamount to removal from office.
An ad interim appointment can only be terminated
causes expressly provided in the Constitution: (1) d
by the CA, and (2) adjournment of Congress witho
on his appointment.
An appointment in a temporary or acting capacity i
appointment that the Constitution prohibits.
Exercise of constitutional power to make ad interim
appointments (2 modes)
o While congress is in session
o President may extend an ad interim appoin
recess of congress
Long standing practice to avoid interruptions in vita
government services which could arise from prolon
vacancies in government offices, including the thre
constitutional commissions.
Does not compromise comelec
o vacancies in the COMELEC are precisely s
insure that the majority of its members hold
appointments and not one Pres will appoint
COMELEC members
WON the renewal of their ad interim appointments vio
prohibition on reappointment under Section 1(2), Article
Constitution.
3. NO. The ad interim appointments and subseque
renewals of appointments of Benipayo, Borra a
do not violate the prohibition on reappointment
were no previous appointments that were confi
the CA.
Petitioner
Ad interim appointment can no longer be renewed
violate Artivle IX-C Sec 1 (2) prohibiting reappointm
o True for permanent appointments
 In the case, Banipayo, Borra, and Tuasons
appointments are deemed permanent in character
ad interim appointment is disapproved by the CA, then it
no longer be extended, not because of the constitutional
bition but because CA already gave its final decision to
old consent.
terim appointment that is by-passed because of the
e of CA to act upon it is a different case. The President
enew the appointments of by-passed ad interim
intees.
By-passed appointment: one that has not been finally
acted upon by the CA at the close of the session of the
Congress.
Absent of a final decision by the CA, the President is
free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-
passed appointee. This finds support in Section 17 of
the Rules of Commission on Appointments, which
provides that unacted appointments shall be returned
to the President unless new appointments are made.
By passed appointment can be considered again if the
President renews the appointment
he prohibition on reappointment in Section 1(2), Article IX-
he Constitution: the prohibition is not applicable to
proved appointments nor to ad interim appointments.
A disapproved appointment, cannot be revived as a
final decision has already been made.
A by-passed appointment can be revived because
there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article
VII.
A by-passed appointment does not constitute a
term of office. To hold otherwise would mean that the
confirmation of CA is useless.
The prohibition only covers those appointed by the
President AND confirmed by the CA, whether or not
the term was completed.
to prevent a reappointment of any kind
to ensure that members do not serve beyond
the fixed term of seven years.
e appointments and renewals of appointments of
payo, Borra and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on
uary 2, 2008. The renewals did not extend their terms.
Thus, there was no violation of the prohibition unde
1(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
WON Matibags removal from her position as Director IV o
her reassignment to the Law Department were illegal, as t
done without the approval of COMELEC as a collegial bod
4. NO. Benipayos order reassigning the petitione
to Law Department is legally unassailable.
Benipayo as the de jure COMELEC Chairman has
authority to exercise all the powers of his office for
his ad interim appointment remains effective.
The power to transfer or reassign COMELEC perso
accordance with the Civil Service Law is provided i
7(4), Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Book V of the Revise
Administrative Code.
She was appointed merely on a temporary or actin
o she did not possess the necessary qualifica
hold the position of Director IV (she is not a
Executive Service officer and she does not
Eligibility), Matibag has no legal basis in cla
her reassignment was contrary to Civil Serv
Matibag also assailed her reassignment which was
during election period, arguing that it is prohibited u
Section 261(h) of the Omnibus Election Code. T
provision states that the approval of COMELEC en
be secured to effect transfer of employees and offi
service.
o The Court noted that COMELEC issued CO
Resolution No. 3300 exempting the COME
the said provision in the Omnibus Election C
the said resolution, the requirement of notic
hearing is only required for transfers of COM
field personnel.
Nowhere in the COMELEC Resolution was it state
COMELEC as a collegial body must concur to ever
reassignment of COMELEC personnel.
o argument renders as useless the COMELE
which already gives approval to effect trans
reassignments without the need to secure a
approval from COMELEC en banc.
 e Officer-in-Charge of COMELECs Finance Services
ment, in continuing to make disbursements in favor of
ayo, Borra and Cinco, is acting in excess jurisdiction.

As the ad interim appointments and subsequent

Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are valid, the OIC of the
vices Department of COMELEC did not act in excess
in paying their salaries.
ndriga
w: PD 15 creating Cultural Center of the PH
os issued EO 30 creating CCP as a trust governed by a
d of trustees of 7 members
the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued
5, CCP Charter increasing members from 7 to 9
converted CCP into a non municipal public corporation
further increased by EO 1058 to 11
People Power, President Corazon C. Aquino asked for
ourtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees
appointed new trustees to the Board
dent Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees
no Group) to the CCP Board for a term of four years to
ce the Endriga group
ga group questioned new appointments
under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP
Board "shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority
of the trustees held at the next regular meeting
when Estrada appointed, only one seat was vacant
under the CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed four-year
term could only be terminated "by reason of
resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause."
ranted
Only when the Board is entirely vacant, which is not the
situation in the present case, may the President
exercise his power to appoint.
o group filed MR
law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to
appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the
Board
The law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees the
authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the
latter would be officers of equal rank and not of
lower rank.
Assails constitutionality of Sec 6(b)
: departments, agencies, commissions, o
s who are vested by law with the power to
apable of repetition, yet evading review
o if compromises are resorted every time
controversy erupts and the constitutiona
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is not res
II. Interpretation of Sec 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
filled by election by a vote of a majority of th
held at the next regular meeting following o
of such vacancy
Trustees may not be reelected for more than
consecutive terms
vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by
vote of the remaining trustees. Should only o
survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the su
trustee acting in consultation with the ranki
of the CCP. Should the Board become
entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be filled
President of the Philippines
III. Power of Appointment
Power to appoint is found in Sec 16 Art VII of the C
Case falls under the 4th group mentioned in said pr
o fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose
appointments Congress may by law vest in
of departments, agencies, commissions, or
The President appoints the third group of officers if
silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law
the head of a department, agency, commission, or
appoint is declared unconstitutional.
o if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found
unconstitutional, the President shall appoin
trustees of the CCP Board because the trus
under the third group of officers
IV. The Scope of the Appointment Power of the Heads
Departments, Agencies, Commissions, or Boards
Intent of framers
o Congress may diffuse authority to appoint o
lower in rank than the courts or heads of de
agencies, commissions or boards
o intent remained that these inferior or lowe
officers are the subordinates of the head
Congress May Vest the Authority to Appoint
Only in the Heads of the Named Offices
 "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions o Falls under the Office of the President purs
or boards and not to their members provision in Revised Administrative Code
The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of its Board The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts
(b) and (c) of PD 15 Repugnant to government office in the Executive branch outside
6, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution of the President in the guise of insulating that office
owers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill politics or making it independent.
ncies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow o Destroy system of checks and balances
ees. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board, runs
allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, the President's power of control under Section 17,
or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) an
on 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence an
lates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution specifically from the President.
es not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the C
ining trustees to "elect" and not "appoint" their fellow enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x."45 Th
ees for the effect is the same, which is to fill vacancies in does not free the CCP from the President's control
CP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional Constitution empowers the President not only to i
tions on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a but even to control all offices in the Executive bra
c office through election by the co-workers in that including the CCP. Control is far greater than, an
e. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public office has subsumes, influence.
onstitutional basis.
on 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the
pendent appointing power of their fellow trustees.
The creation of an independent appointing power
inherently conflicts with the President's power to
appoint.
become irreconcilable
President appointed the Endriga group as trustees,
while the remaining CCP trustees elected the same
Endriga group to the same positions. This has been
the modus vivendi in filling vacancies in the CCP
Board, allowing the President to appoint and the CCP
Board to elect the trustees.
sident's Power of Control Art VII Sec 17
President shall have control of all the executive
rtments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
aws be faithfully executed.
CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial
ches of government. The CCP is also not one of the
pendent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-
al body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must
nder the Executive branch.