Marbury v.

Madison
Facts
On his last day in office, President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court
justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take
control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later
became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this opinion), but they were not delivered before the
expiration of Adamss term as president. Thomas Jefferson
refused to honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of
Adamss term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly to
the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretary of State, James
Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to any courts
appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the same Court has jurisdiction to issue the mandamus, given the circumstances of the case

COURT RULING:

The US Supreme Court, through the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, denied Marbury's petition for mandamus on the
argument that the said Court has no jurisdiction on the case, and that the law on which Marbury based the said
petition is unconstitutional.

As a general rule, the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, and shall have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. In the
case at bar, the Court made it clear that Marbury had already attained the five year legal right ti the commission
because of the fact that the commission document has been completed the moment it was officially sealed,
obliterating any doubt as to the authenticity of the signature affixed by the US President himself. However, Marbury
failed to show that the mandamus he prays for is an exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, not its original
jurisdiction, which led to the denial of his petition.

"It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it reviews and corrects the proceedings in a case already
instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed ot courts, yet to issue
such a writ to an officer to deliver a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original jurisdiction, Neither is it
necessary in such a case as this, to enable the Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction"

Another general rule is that any law repugnant to the Constitution is void. The Courts, as well as other departments,
are bound by the instrument, as repeatedly emphasized by Chief Justice Marshall. He further reiterated that the
written Constitution should be upheld and protected at all times, and that the Court has a duty to ensure that such
reverence is given to the written Constitution. It must remain above all laws.

The power of the legislative department to create laws cannot ever exceed the written Constitution which itself is the
source of such power. The power remains to the legislature to assign original jurisdiction to that Court in other cases;
provided those cases belong to the jurisdictional power of the US. As to the power of the President over the officer
whom he appoints, it is limited by the written Constitution and is deemed completed the moment he affixed his
signature unto the commission document and "to withhold the commission x x x is an act deemed by the Court not
warranted by law but violative of a vested right."

The action for mandamus in this case filed by the petitioner is in excess of the Court's jurisdiction, and any law
enacted by the legislature which diminish or increase the Court's jurisdiction without the Court's prior consent is
unconstitutional and must be discharged.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and
Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.

On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and
on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election
protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying,
among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of
said position be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on
Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as
regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case

(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not through a single
provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the
three powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.

In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectability, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression
of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances and subject to the specific limitations and restrictions
provided in the said instrument.

The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned
to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution.

Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota
presented. Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives
in the executive and legislative departments of government.

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting wihtin the limits of its authority, it does not
follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it
were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as
"the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."

Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs Secretary of Education

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of private
schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of
Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary
of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the
Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.

PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law
requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to
censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such
power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said
discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury
from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.

Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for
state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to
wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and
instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.

Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of
the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.

RATIO DECIDENTI:The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief inthe form they seek to
obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is an established principle that to
entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely
invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and legislativeaction he must show that he has
sustained common interest to all members of thepublic. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law
unconstitutional arises onlywhen the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protectionagainst
actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actualcases and controversies and the
authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidentalto the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under
the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in thelast
resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy betweenlitigants. Thus, actions like this are
brought for a positive purpose to obtain actualpositive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic
question tosatisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to besufficiently
sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulationnot to invalidate the law because it needs
no argument to show that abuse by officialsentrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate
theunconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude thatthere has been no undue
delegation of legislative power even if the petitionersappended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the
Department of Educationthey fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionablefor
being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibition.

Whether the Court should take cognizance of the petition? - YESSolicitor General argues that:oThere is no justiciable
controversy because the petitioners have suffered no wrong under the terms of law and thus, not entitled to any
relief.oAll of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits. They do not assert
thatthe Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits
 Joya vs Presidential Commission on Good Governance
Facts: The PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote on 09 August 1990 to President Corazon Aquino regarding the
scheduled sale between the Republic of the Philippines and Christies of 82 Old Masers Painting housed in
Metropolitan Museum of Manila and 7 boxes of antique silverware in the custody of Central Bank. This was approved
on 14 August 1990 and the consignment was signed the following day. On 26 October 1990 the Commission on Audit
submitted audit findings to the President the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural
significance and thereby prohibited by law. As Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists, petitioners Dean Jose Joya et al
contended that they have legal personality to restrain respondent from acting contrary to preserving artistic creations
pursuant to Sec 14-18 Article XIV of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.

Decision: Petition for prohibition and mandamus dismissed for lack of merit. Legal standing means a personal and
substantial interest ion the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The paintings legally belongs to the foundation or the members of thereof
and the silverware are gifts to the Marcos couple. When the Marcos administration was toppled and the said objects
were confiscated it did not mean that ownership has passed to the government without complying with constitutional
and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these were already acquired, any defect in the
acquisition must be raised by the true owners. Petitioners failed to show that they are the legal owners of the said
objects that have become publicly owned.The taxpayers suit cannot prosper as well since the items in question were
acquired from private sources and not with public money.

Mariano vs COMELEC

Facts: This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya Bautista,Teresita
Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero,Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba
and Perfecto Alba filed
Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, assailing unconstitutional
sections in RA 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Makati). Petitioners contend that (1) Section 2 Article I of RA 7854 failed to delineate the land areas of Makati
by metes and bounds with technical descriptions, (2) Section 51 Article X of RA 7854 collides with Section 8 Article X
and Section 7 Article VI of the Constitution, that the new corporate existence of the new city will restart the term of
the present municipal elective making it favourable to incumbent Mayor Jejomar Binay, and (3) Section 52 Article X of
RA 7854 for adding a legislative district is unconstitutional and cannot be made by special law.
ection 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
RA no. 7854 provisions
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of theMunicipality of Makati
shall continue as theofficials of the City of Makati and shall exercisetheir powers and functions until such time that
anew election is held
and the duly elected officialsshall have already qualified and assume their offices:Provided, The new city will acquire a
new corporate

petitioners pointed out that sec 51 were crafted to suit political ambitions incumbent Mayor Jejomar Binay as he could
possibly run for the same position and seek another 3 year consecutive term. The Court cannot entertain the
challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality
of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.

This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many
contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical
issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a
resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

Oposa vs. Factoran

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a
taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial
Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR).
Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is
the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the
ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action.

Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruledthat the children had the legal standing to file the casebased on
the concept of intergenerationalresponsibility. Their right to a healthy environmentcarried with it an obligation to
preserve that environmentfor the succeeding generations. In this, the Courtrecognized legal standing to sue on behalf
of futuregenerations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of
the police power of the state in the interest of publicwelfare

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the
Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature
and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the
requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the
complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy.
He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well
as future generations.
Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law
The Court does not agree with the trial courts conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which,
for the first time in our nations constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing
less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement
of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need
not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.

KILOSBAYAN VS. GUINGONA

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the
authority to hold and conduct "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO decided to
establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds.
After learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, "a
multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia, and who has been long engaged in
lottery operations in Asia, became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya
Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine
corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the
medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and
delivered to PCSO.

Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery
system for the PCSO. The bids submitted by PGMC were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards
Committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the President.
On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that respondent PGMC may finally operate the country's
on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted for final clearance and
approval by the Chief Executive.

On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up
to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Petitioners also submit that the
PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the
PCSO would hold and conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in
violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and
conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." Petitioner seeks to prohibit and restrain
the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on- line lottery system, also known as
"lotto."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the oppositions made by the petitioner was valid.

Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing)

HELD:

The Court agrees with the petitioners and the challenged Contract of Lease executed by respondent PCSO and
respondent PGMC is declared to be contrary to law and invalid. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the
petitioners which was raised by the respondents should be resolved in their favor. The Court finds this petition to be of
transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even
higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it
is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.

On the substantive issue regarding the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amending by B.P. Blg. 42, is
indisputably clear with respect to its franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries
and other similar activities." Meaning, the PCSO cannot exercise it "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with
any other party. Thus, the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1
of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law.

Francisco Tatad vs Jesus Garcia, Jr.

In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. No bidding was made but certain
corporations were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to qualify was the EDSA LRT Consortium which was
obviously formed for this particular undertaking. An agreement was then made between the government, through the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT Consortium. The agreement was based on
the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law (RA 6957, amended by RA 7718). Under the agreement, EDSA
LRT Consortium shall build the facilities, i.e., railways, and shall supply the train cabs. Every phase that is completed
shall be turned over to the DOTC and the latter shall pay rent for the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years, it was
projected that the government shall have fully paid EDSA LRT Consortium. Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium shall sell
the facilities to the government for $1.00.

However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmea, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the implementation of said agreement
as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as
such, it cannot own a public utility such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the nationalized areas of
activities. The petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his capacity as DOTC Secretary.

Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato

GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract between Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) for the operation of a
nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from
holding and conducting lotteries through a collaboration, association, or joint venture.
Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and accessories on
January 25, 1995. The agreement are as follow:
Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less than an annual rental computed at
P35,000 per terminal in commercial operation.
Rent is computed bi-weekly.
Term is 8 years.
PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities.
Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at P25M.
Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because:
It is the same as the old contract of lease.
It is still violative of PCSOs charter.
It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been approved by the President and it is not most
advantageous to the government.
PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior contract.
ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception provided in EO No. 301.
Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board of Directors of PCSO.
Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery equipment.
Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.

Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal standing to sue.

Rulings:

Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.

STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the
settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same
one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as
the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not.
RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and
determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving
a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are
involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable
from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent
examination of the legal matters at issue.
Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioners standing.
Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more
appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are real parties of interest.
Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either
principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment
which would positively result to them from the contract.
Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of public contracts maybe
made before COA or before the Ombudsman.

petitioners are not the real parties to the contract. Petitioners allege that their standing in the
previous suit was sustained, however, the court held that the previous suit is different from the
present case. ELA is different from the 1993 Contract of Lease. The Law of the case does not
apply, so the ruling in the first case does not apply to the case now. Moreover, petitioners did not
show what particular interest they have for bringing this suit. There was no allegation of misuse
of public funds to make this action a public one.
Since the petitioners have no substantial interest in the ELA that would entitle them to bring this
suit, they are not the real parties to the agreement. The real parties are the ones who can claim a
right or are prejudiced in their rights.
ELA is a lease contract and contains none of the features of the former contract which were
considered badges of a joint venture agreement. The petitioners invoked EO No. 301 but this
doesnt apply to Contracts of Lease of equipment. EO No. 301 only applies to contracts for
purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. Heavy equipment is not a supply.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers
of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as,
among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the
subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional
challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of
Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which
shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television
stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to
provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers
and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it
contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with
the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required
to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the
sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each
day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at
least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

GONZALES VS. NARVASA

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus
filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of
Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to
the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same. Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the
PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 43

HELD:

The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has
sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only
Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has
encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by
forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury.

Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be
subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his
locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that
public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. It is readily apparent that
there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of
E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for
its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. Being that case, petitioner
must show that he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he
will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a
representation.
The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the
Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution.

MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO

FACTS:
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID. On February 15,
2000, then Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a
"Temporary" capacity. On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as
COMELEC Chairman together with other commisioners in an ad interim appointment.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner
as Director IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and
reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to
petitioners reassignment in a Memorandum dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the COMELEC en banc. Specifically,
Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayos failure to consult the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the
reassignment of petitioner.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law
Department.
Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of
government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January
2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution
No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, Exempting the Comelec from the coverage of the said memo circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc in a Memorandum dated
April 23, 2001. Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against
Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution
No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws,
rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the
COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution.

RULING:
We find petitioners argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim
appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress.

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. COMELEC

Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of R.A.
No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioners right to file
the instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of
transcendental significance to the Filipino people, considering that public funds are to be used and appropriated for
the implementation of said law.

Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seek... declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003)... suffer from constitutional infirmity.

R.A. No. 9189, entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the
Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes," appropriates funds under Section 29
thereof which provides that a supplemental... budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment
into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have
the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an... unconstitutional statute.

The Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds[3] because expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional... act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds.

The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number of citizens. The Court has adopted
the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue
of transcendental significance to the Filipino people.

he need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is... buttressed by the fact that it is now more
than fifteen years since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos... abroad.

Thus, strong reasons of public policy demand that the Court resolves the instant petition... and determine whether
Congress has acted within the limits of the Constitution or if it had gravely abused the discretion entrusted to it.

Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution
which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
proposes to vote for at least six... months immediately preceding an election.

He claims that the right of suffrage... should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not
possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

Objections to taxpayers suit for lack of sufficient personality standing, or interest are, however, in the main procedural
matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the
1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has
brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.[6]

Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional right of suffrage of a considerable
number of Filipinos is involved.

The question of propriety of the instant petition which may appear to be visited by the vice of prematurity as there are
no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal, board or before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions as required by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dims in light of the importance of the constitutional
issues raised by the petitioner. In Taada vs. Angara,[7] the Court held:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised
before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide.

White Light Corp., vs City of Manila

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law and ordinance entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting
Short-time Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and Wash-up Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses,
and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila.

On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory
relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) with the RTC of Manila
and prayed that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta.Mesa Tourist Development
Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the RTC. MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which
was also granted by the RTC.

On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance.

On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.

The City then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court referred
the same to the Court of Appeals. The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Local government code and the Revised Manila charter. Operators of drive-in hotels and motels argued that the
ordinance is unconstitutional since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise
of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
RULING

We must address the threshold issue of petitioners standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments offering
wash-up rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that
the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not
these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the
law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is
built on the principle of separation of powers,[26] sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the
judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution.[27] The
constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise
definition.[28] In this jurisdiction, the extancy of a direct and personal interest presents the most obvious cause, as well
as the standard test for a petitioner's standing.[29] In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and
elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in
Allen v. Wright.[30]
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits,
third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.[31]

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are
appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,[32] the United States Supreme Court wrote that: We have recognized the right of
litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have
suffered an injury-in-fact, thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute;
the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability
to protect his or her own interests."[33] Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise
injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to
be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special
interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a
hindrance for customers to bring suit.

American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke
the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In
Griswold v. Connecticut,[35] the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a
reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections
available to their patients. The Court held that:

The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are
considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them."[36]

An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,[37] wherein the United States Supreme Court held
that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a
statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The
United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties
who seek access to their market or function.

Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of
the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in
effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the
overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.[39] In this
case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We
can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.

We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their
establishments for a wash-rate time frame.