Aquino vs Enrile

Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the
arrest of a number of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them.
Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer
contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos
declaration of Martial Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.

HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger
against the state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the
state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent
danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid exercise pursuant to the Presidents order.

Enrile vs Salazar
Facts:

In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by
law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch
103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors
composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and
Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant.
The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City
where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen.
Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas
corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he
was deprived of his constitutional rights.

Issue:

(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an offense
being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code?

Held:

There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be
applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never
exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the
absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single
aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the
prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with
other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of
rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a
crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of
Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the
appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the
respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty
pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent.
The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to
bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after
that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned
information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio
must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional
in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Enrile v. Sandiganbayan GR 213847

Doctrines:

Primary objective of bail The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of
bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987
Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.

FACTS:

On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the
basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially,
Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014,
a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only
be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and physical
condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.

a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be
punishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

HELD:

1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of innocence.

Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional
right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than
what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court.

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for
bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it
has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court
convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application
for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty
during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused,
of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions
of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional
Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua
subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: [S]uch discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of
whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice is indispensable
(Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
2. YES.

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community arising
from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and for
detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from
Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: The State values
the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court,
to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified.
In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during
the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of
Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It
acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

LEONEN DISSENT

Justice Leonen criticized the decision for having a very weak legal basis the grant of bail over mere
humanitarian grounds. He also claims that the court has no authority to use humanitarian grounds.
Leonen argues that [Petitioner's] release for medical or humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his
prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail before the Sandiganbayan, nor were these grounds raised in the
petition in the Supreme Court.

Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in
any statute or provision of the Constitution.

Leonen theorized that the Supreme Court only granted bail as a special accomodation for the petitioner
and he goes on to criticize the decision to wit:

[This decision] will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on their legal provisions, but one
that is unpredictable, partial and solely grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion.
xxx

Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged with
motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian considerations. The lower courts will have to decide,
without guidance, whether bail should be granted because of advanced age, hypertension, pneumonia,
or dreaded diseases. They will have to decide whether this is applicable only to Senators and former
Presidents charged with plunder and not to those accused of drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape,
and other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment...

Procedure for granting bail

Leonen's dissent also examines the procedure outlined for the lower courts in bail cases in order to
demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying Petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail. In Cortes vs.
Catral the Supreme Court held:

It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with a number of
administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of
jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its
Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars
conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in case an
application for bail is filed:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to
study them as well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an
erroneous decision rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited even if not
applicable. A number of cases on bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably expects judges
to discharge their duties assiduously. For judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only be engendered if litigants are convinced that
the members of the Bench cannot justly be charge with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

Petitioner in this case, insisted that the Sandiganbayan grant his bail without any hearing for the
purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong. At the Motion to Fix Bail, the
prosecution had no opportunity to present any evidence because of the prematurity of Petitioner's
Motion [to Fix Bail]. Thus, the dissent asserts that the Sandiganbayan was correct in denying the Motion
based on prematurity.

Medical or humanitarian grounds inappropriate

Petitioner did not ask for bail to be granted based on humanitarian reasons at the Sandiganbayan.
Neither petitioner nor the prosecution were able to develop their arguments as to this point to
establish legal and factual basis for this kind of bail.

The dissent argues that it was inappropriate for the court to grant bail merely on the basis of the
certification of the attending physician, Dr. Gonzales, stating that the Petitioner was suffering from
numerous debilitating conditions. The dissent states that:

Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor's
certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away with cross-
examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales' findings on petitioner's health in a hearing whose main
purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.

xxx

The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched, long-standing, and canonical
procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This
is to be examined when a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after petition for bail is filed by
accused. The medical condition of the accused, if any, should be pleaded and heard.

Version of the decision submitted by Ponente was not the version deliberated upon

This section of the dissent reveals that the Justices voted to grant bail based on a substantially different
version of the opinion, one which did not use humanitarian considerations as a ground for the granting
of bail. The dissent explains that the Justices voted 8-4 solely on the issue of whether or not bail is a
matter of right and reveals that the copy offered for signature was substantially similar to an earlier
draft which used humanitarian considerations as the basis for the granting of bail. The dissent makes it
clear that this was an irregularity.

The majority opinion offers no guidance

The dissent argues that the main opinion is unclear whether the privilege (humanitarian considerations,
right to bail, etc.) will apply to those who have similar conditions. Whether or not this privilege will only
apply to those undergoing trial for plunder or whether or not this privilege can be granted to those of
advanced age only. The majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard for the
special grant of bail on the ground of medical conditions.
There is also no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to if, when and how bail can then be canceled.

Reliance on HK vs Olalia misplaced

The reliance of the majority on the case of Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia is misplaced
because this case referred to extradition cases, hence its increased emphasis on international law. As
applied to crimes charged under Philippine law, the remedies under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights must be qualified by the Constitution's rules regarding bail.

Furthermore, in the above case, the SC disposed of it by remanding the case back to the lower court for
factual determination of whether or not the accused was a flight risk.

BLOGGER'S COMMENTS

The majority opinion and the dissent both make for a very interesting treatise on Criminal Procedure.
These will likely be quoted again and again in bail hearings and in classrooms.

The majority opinion is very strained, it had to rely on motherhood statements regarding a person's
right to liberty and right to bail. The decision used no compelling legal reasoning apart from our
commitment to international laws.

Here comes Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, seeing himself as CJ Claudio Teehankee reborn, comes to
the rescue claiming that the decision will:

will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on their legal provisions, but one that is
unpredictable, partial and solely grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion.

Factual Milieu is Important

We must note however the factual milieu. At the time Senators Enrile, Revilla and Estrada were charged
with plunder, the public perception was that these Senators were the target of a campaign to eliminate
the Administration's political enemies.

The perception of some circles critical of the current administration that these three senators, (the trio
known colloquially as Pogi, Tanda and Sexy) were hastily charged and unfairly detained. The
accusation that the administration was quick to charge its enemies while defending its allies is a valid
one. No discussion of the grant of bail will overlook the highly politicized nature of the 3 Senator's
incarceration.

That is not to say that this trio and particularly Enrile are innocent. Indeed, the Supreme Court's
decision drew a slew of criticism and a few defenders. Below are just a few links to articles criticizing or
defending the decision.
Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748
FACTS:

On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-INP and
detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of National
Defense. On that same day, fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan. Thereafter,
two other petitioners were arrested for the same cause.

This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested lawyers
hereinafter referred to as the detained attorneys on the ground that their arrests were illegal and
violative of the Constitution, since arrests cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders. and that
there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers involved in national security cases.

On May 16, 1985, the Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the petition for hearing on May
23, 1985. Respondents contend that the lawyers were arrested due to basis of a PDA issued by the
President on January 25, 1985 and that the lawyers played active roles in organizing mass actions of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners herein were denied of their constitutional right to due process and the benefit
of a preliminary investigation.

HELD:

If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary
investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a
Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and /or the Information on grounds
provided by the Rules or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would
not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed
against the accused. So is it explicitly provided for by Section. 14, Rule of 102 of the Rules of Court.

The right to a preliminary investigation, being waivable, does not argue against the validity of the
proceedings, the most that could have been done being to remand the case in order that such
investigation could be conducted.

... The proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation should be ventilated is the Court
of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.
It could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the
trial court, not an appellate Court.

Section 7, Rule 112, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure above referred to provides:

SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant.- When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed
by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without preliminary investigation having been first
conducted on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arrested officer or person.

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer
and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such
waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

Brocka vs Enrile
After jeepney strike, petitioners were arrested on the grounds of Illegal Assembly, then later charged
with a second offense of Inciting to Sediton