1

RAMON GONZALES VS RUFINO HECHANOVA TAN SIN vs DEPORTATION BOARD

9 SCRA 230 Political Law Constitutional Law Treaty vs Executive 104 Phil. 868 Political Law Constitutional Law Executive Order
Agreements Statutes Can Repeal Executive Agreements Power to Deport an Undesirable Alien

FACTS: During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he
entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for
the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of
securing a certification from the National Economic Council showing
that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive
Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000
tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters.
Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred
that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn
by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive
agreements entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may
not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the
latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one
which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the
case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the
contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be
given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous
legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation
of powers and the system of checks and balances which are
fundamental in our constitutional set up.
FACTS: Tan Sin was a Chinese residing in Pasay. In December 1953,
he was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was sentenced to jail.
When he finished serving his sentence, he learned that an order to
detain him was issued by the Deportation Board because apparently,
a special prosecutor filed with the Deportation Board an action to
deport Tan Sin because by reason of the crime he had committed,
he became an undesirable alien. The Deportation Board after
hearing, recommended to the President of the Philippines that Tan
Sin be deported. In his defense, Tan Sin averred that he cannot be
deported by the Deportation Board (an entity under the executive
department) or by the President because only Congress has the
absolute and inherent power to deport aliens.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tans Sin can be deported by the President.
HELD: Yes. The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President. As
an act of state, it is vested in the Executive by virtue of his office,
subject only to the regulations prescribed in Sec 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code or to such future legislation as may be
promulgated on the subject. There is no provision in the
Constitution nor act of the legislature defining the power, as it is
evident that it is the intention of the law to grant to the Chief
Executive full discretion to determine whether an aliens residence
in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security,
welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which
deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive
whose decision is final and executory.

As regards the question whether an executive or an international

agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that
the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the
affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal,
certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases
in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In other
words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not
only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it
runs counter to an act of Congress.
 2

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS VS LAO ICHONG VS JAIME HERNANDEZ

EASTERN SEA TRADING
FACTS: Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws
imports from Japan onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, in the Exercise of Police Power
the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of
FACTS: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the
the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central
country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound
Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to
(then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his
Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the
fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local
implementing law of the Trades and Financial Agreements, an
market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA
executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and
1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is
Japan. The said executive agreement states, among others, that all
to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business.
import transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be
Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the
invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from
ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP
Japan were not invoiced in dollar.
which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive
sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in
agreement that the EO was implementing was never concurred
the business here in the country who helps in the income generation
upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax
of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner
appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or
generally accepted principles.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the
concurrence by the Senate.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted
principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised
HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection
subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the
of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst
Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
no less common in our scheme of government than are the more
conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection
formal instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
formal documents denominated agreements or protocols.
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other distinction between those who fall within such class and those who
governments ends and agreements whether denominated do not.
executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise begin,
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty
may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be
would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld
useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive
because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being
agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of
inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the
executive agreements, other than those entered into under the
medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to
trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign
operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.
governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show
that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous
in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements
heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of
the Senate.

They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation

dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft,
customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international
claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and
copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific
congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared
in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such
as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the
settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded
independently of any legislation.

Section 23. Article VII.
ERNESTO HIDALGO VS PRESIDENT FERDINAND MARCOS
80 SCRA 538 Political Law Constitutional Law Presidents
Immunity From Suit
FACTS: In December 1977, a referendum was scheduled to be held.
The purpose of which was to merge the office of the Prime Minister
and the Office of the President. At that time, Marcos was serving as
the president and at the same time he was wielding legislative
powers. The referendum was to ask the people whether or not they
still want Marcos to serve as the president (and at the same time
Prime Minister) after an interim Batasan Pambansa will be
organized. Ernesto Hidalgo filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus before the Supreme Court to enjoin COMELEC and the
president from proceeding with the said referendum as he averred
that the referendum will effectively amend the C0nstitution, which
he says is unconstitutional and improper.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president can be sued and compelled
through a mandamus by the SC.
HELD: The Supreme Court did not pass upon the issue of the
suability of the Presisent in thsi case considering that the COMELEC,
the body tasked to implement the referendum, was impleaded.
The SC however ruled that the referendum is valid and that the
same will merely ask the people if they want Marcos to stay in
power or not and that the referendum will not amend the
Constitution as Hidalgo avers.
**CARILLO VS MARCOS
3
SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR
167 SCRA 393 Political Law Constitutional Law Presidents
Immunity From Suit Must Be Invoked by the President
FACTS: Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He,
together with others, was charged with libel by the then president
Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him
and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint
affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He
grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be
sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would
allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and
conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also,
considering the functions of a president, the president may not be
able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be
liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a
person other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-
holders time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by
virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the
office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an
accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is
the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense
to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and
submit to the courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise
the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a
decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

ARTICLE VIII THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
What is judicial power?
BADUA vs CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION
194 SCRA 101 Political Law Constitutional Law Judicial Power Tribal
Court Has No Judicial Power
FACTS: Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua were occupying a parcel of land in
Abra. The said land is being claimed by David Quema. Quema said he sold the
land to a certain Dra. Erotida Valera but then he was able to repurchase the
land later from the same doctor. The Baduas however contend that they
were the ones who bought the land from Valera but that they cannot
produce the deed of sale because it was with the vice governor. Quema sued
the Baduas not before the regular courts but rather before the Maeng Tribal
Court. The said tribal court is composed of elders respected in the
community and that it is alleged that their decision is likewise respected. The
tribal court is also a branch of the Cordillera Bodong Administration. Non-
compliance to the tribal courts decision would result to community
ostracism. The tribal court resolved the issue by granting the land to Quema.
The Baduas were then ordered to vacate the land. The Baduas refused.
Thereafter the Baduas received a warning order from the Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army (CPLA) the military branch of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration. This brought fear to the couple which led to Leonors running
away and Rosas arrest. They were threatened by the CPLA hence they
appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Maeng Tribal Court is a competent court.
HELD: No, the Maeng Tribal Court is not a competent court. The Cordillera
AUTONOMOUS Region never came into existence. Hence, the Cordillera
Bodong Council which would have received judicial power, granted CARs
autonomy never possessed judicial power. What we currently have is the
Cordillera ADMINISTRATIVE Region. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Council, its
supposed branch, likewise never received judicial power. Therefore, it cannot
validly decide on cases, neither can it enforce its decision.
Political Question Doctrine
JOSUE JAVELLANA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
50 SCRA 30 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question Validity
of the 1973 Constitution Restriction to Judicial Power
FACTS: In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new
1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to
enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said
constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the
same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o
power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed
constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free
election there being intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of
the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the
ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his
political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show
such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the
people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of
the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to
the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the
same had shown such acquiescence.
4
GUALBERTO DE LA LLANA VS MANUEL ALBA
112 SCRA 294 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question if
there is no question of law involved BP 129
FACTS: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was
passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity
because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed
because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure
of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove
judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed
by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is
empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least
eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested
with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to
a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case
of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is
one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and
the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases
to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed
legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord
respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory
opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this
Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case
where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into
who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization.
That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs.
There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is
to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded
power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the
present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The
challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one
not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic
principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save
and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

ALEX ALMARIO VS MANUEL ALBA
27 SCRA 69 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Political
Question
FACTS: In January 1984, a plebiscite was to be held to allow the voters to
either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by the
Batasang Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4)
separate questions to be answered by simple YES or NO answers.
Alex Almario and some other concerned groups seek to enjoin the
submission in the said plebiscite of Questions No. 3 (grant as an additional
mode of acquiring lands belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the
undertaking by the government of a land reform program and a social reform
program) to the people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there
has been no fair and proper submission following the doctrine laid down in
Tolentino v. COMELEC.
However, unlike in the case of Tolentino vs COMELEC, Almario et al do not
seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more time for
the people to study the meaning and implications of the said
questions/proposals until the nature and effect of the proposals are fairly
and properly submitted to the electorate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on
a later date.
HELD: No. This is a political question. The necessity, expediency, and wisdom
of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of the courts to
adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not grant of public land and urban land
reform are unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed
amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide.
The questions are presented for their determination.
Assuming that a member or some members of the Supreme Court may find
undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land or an urban land
reform program, the remedy is to vote NO in the plebiscite but not to
substitute his or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to
the millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes.
Further, Almario et al have failed to make out a case that the average voter
does not know the meaning of grant of public land or of urban land
reform.
PABLITO SANIDAD VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
73 SCRA 333 Political Law Constitutional Law Amendment to the
Constitution
FACTS: On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to
resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly,
its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present
powers. Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD
No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of
PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16,
1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991.
On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the
questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on
October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the
peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru
a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body,
5
which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite
of October 16.
On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without
force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No.
1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control,
hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16,
1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there
is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The
Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court
cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the
Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a
judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the
Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a
function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under
the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to
the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period
of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the
regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose
amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National
Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal
course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent
President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the
proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the
procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very
Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which
commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as
invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable
one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X
of the new Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of
a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the
Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. .
. .. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of
treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like
all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and
hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that
authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its
limits.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments
to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people
in sufficient time. The President at that time also sits as the legislature.

LORENZO TAADA VS MARIANO CUENCO
103 Phil. 1051 Political Law Constitutional Law Political Question
Defined Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
FACTS: After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was
overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition
senator was Lorenzo Taada who belonged to the Citizens Party. Diosdado
Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but
was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a
decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the
SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices
of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators
from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the
other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in
by the NP. Taada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did
Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP
senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any
chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of
the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose
the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for
Taada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but
rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a
justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is
not being asked by Taada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The
issue being raised by Taada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP
members to the SET are valid which is a judicial question. Note that the SET
is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform
legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat
of the minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this
case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that
would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the
majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET
(referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the
SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply
with the Constitution.
6
RAMON GONZALES VS COMELEC
21 SCRA 774 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Political
Question vs Justiciable Question
FACTS: In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the
Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held
on the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November
14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned
groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper
submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in
the issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues involving
the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress
when they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA
4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the
defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because
it is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political
question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general
election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to
amend as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is
not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such
powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such
powers are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a
republican state. That being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes
amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as
a constituent assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a
legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has
the final say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within
constitutional limitations.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be
held on a special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of
the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a
special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous
amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to
do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general
elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. Plebiscite should
be scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate Fair submission, intelligent
consent or rejection. They should be able to compare the original
proposition with the amended proposition.