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** As expressed in the literal reading of the text

Get Homework/Assignment 1. Verba legis (literal or plain meaning rule)

IBAA Empl oyees Union v. Inciong

Done GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663)

Facts:

On June 20, 1975, the Uni on filed a complaint against the bank for the payment of holiday pay

Homeworkping.com before the then Department of Labor, National La bor Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in
Ma ni la. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the case was certified for
a rbi tration on 7 July 1975. On 25 Augus t 1975, La bor Arbiter Ri carte T. Soriano rendered a decision
i n the a bove-entitled ca se, granting petitioners complaint for payment of holiday pay.
Res pondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of the
La bor Arbi ter by paying their holiday pay up to and i ncluding January 1976.

Homework Help On 16 December 1975, Pres idential Decree 850 wa s promulgated amending, among others, the
provi sions of the Labor Code on the ri ght to holiday pay. Accordingly, on 16 February 1976, by
a uthority of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department o f La bor (now Mi nistry of Labor)
https://www.homeworkping.com/ promulgated the rules and regulations for the i mplementation of holidays with pay. The
controversial section thereof reads a s Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who
a re uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a s alary
of not l ess than the s tatutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for a ll
da ys i n the month whether worked or not. On 23 Apri l 1976, Pol icy Instruction 9 wa s issued by
the then Secretary of La bor (now Mi nister) i nterpreting the above-quoted rule. The bank, by
Research Paper help rea s on of the ruling laid down by the rule implementing Arti cle 94 of the La bor Code a nd by Pol icy
Ins truction 9, s topped the payment of holiday pay to a n its employees.

https://www.homeworkping.com/ On 30 Augus t 1976, the Union filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiters
deci sion of 25 August 1975, whi ch the bank opposed. On 18 October 1976, the La bor Arbi ter,
i ns tead of issuing a writ of execution, i ssued an order enjoining the bank to continue paying its
empl oyees their regular holiday pa y. On 17 November 1976, the bank appealed from the order of
the La bor Arbi ter to the NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRC promulgated its resolution en banc
di s missing the banks a ppeal, and ordering the issuance of the proper wri t of execution. On 21
Online Tutoring February 1979, the ba nk filed with the Office of the Mi nister of Labor a motion for
reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to s tay execution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC
i s sued an order directing the Chief of Research and Information of the Commission to compute
https://www.homeworkping.com/ the holiday pay of the IBAA employees from April 1976 to the present in accordance with the
La bor Arbi ter dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November 1979, the Office of the Mi nister of La bor,
through Deputy Mi nister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order setting aside the resolution en banc of
the NLRC da ted 20 June 1978, a nd dismissing the case for lack of merit. Hence, the petition for
certi orari charging Inciong with a buse of discretion amounting to l ack or excess of jurisdiction.
click here for freelancing tutoring sites Issue:
Whether the Mi nistry of La bor i s correct i n determining that monthly paid employees
a re excl uded from the benefits of holiday pay.

1. Ratio Legis: Spirit of the law/Legislative Intent as the Primary Object


Held:

1
From Arti cl e 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, a nd Arti cle 82 of the SUBJECT: PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS The rules i mplementing PD 850 ha ve clarified the policy
s a me Code, it is cl ear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday i n the i mplementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays. Before PD 850, the number of
pa y. However, the i mplementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of La bor worki ng days a year in a firm was considered i mportant i n determining entitlement to the
excl udes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by i nserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the benefit.
i mplementing rules, Section 2, which provi des that: employees who a re uniformly paid by the
month, i rrespective of the number of working days therein, with a s alary of not less than the Thus , where an employee was working for a t least 313 days , he was considered
s ta tutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for a ll days i n the month defi nitely a l ready paid. If he wa s working for less than 313, there was no certainty
whether worked or not. Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by whether the ten (10) paid l egal holidays were a lready pa i d to him or not.
executive officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great weight by the courts, s till if such
cons truction i s so erroneous, the s ame must be declared a s null a nd void. So long, a s the The ten (10) paid l egal holidays law, to start with, i s intended to benefit principally daily
regul ations relate s olely to ca rryi ng into effect the provisions of the l aw, they a re va lid. Where an empl oyees. In the case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet i nclude payment
a dministrative order betrays i nconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the for the ten (10) paid l egal holidays are entitled to the benefit. the rules implementing PD 850, this
ma ndate of the Act must prevail a nd must be followed. A rul e is binding on the Courts s o long as pol icy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement of monthly paid
the procedure fixed for i ts promulgation i s followed and i ts s cope is wi thin the statutory a uthority empl oyees. The new determining rule is this: 'If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less
gra nted by the legislature, even if the courts a re not i n agreement with the policy s tated therein tha n P240, the ma ximum monthly mi nimum wage, and his monthly pay i s uniform from Ja nuary
or i ts i nnate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretation of the law is a t best merely a dvisory, to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if
for i t i s the courts that finally determine what the l aw means. deductions a re made from his monthly s alary on a ccount of holidays i n months where they occur,
The Supreme Court gra nted the petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Mi nister of La bor, and then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid l egal holidays. These new i nterpretations must be
rei nstated the 25 August 1975 decision of the La bor Arbiter Ri carte T. Soriano. uni formly a nd consistently upheld.

Power to construe Issue:

THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION Whether or not the Secretary of La bor erred a nd a cted contrary to l aw i n promulgating Sec. 2,
vs . Rul e IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as the Incumbent Secretary of Labor, and THE CHARTERED BANK
Held:
G.R. No. L-44717 August 28, 1985Facts: Ye s . The Se cre tary (Mi nister) of La bor ha d e xce e ded
h i s s ta tu tory a uth ori ty g ra nted b y Arti cl e 5 o f th e La b or Co d e a u thori z i ng him to
On Ma y 20, 1975, the Cha rtered Bank Employees Association, in re pres enta ti on o f i ts promulgate the necessary i mplementing rules a nd regulations. While it is true that the Mi nister
m o n th l y p a i d em pl oye es/ m embers , i ns ti tuted a co mpl a i nt w i th th e R egi o na l ha s the authority i n the performance of his duty to promulgate rules and regulations to
Of f i ce N o . I V, D e pa rtmen t o f La bo r, n ow Mi ni s try o f La bo r a n d Em pl o ym ent i mplement, construe and clarify the La bor Code, s uch power i s limited by provisions of the s tatute
( MOLE) a g a i ns t Ch a rtere d B a nk , f or th e pa ym en t o f te n ( 10) u n wo rked l eg a l s ought to be i mplemented, construed or clarified.
h o l i da ys , a s w el l a s f o r p re mi um a n d o verti m e d i ff erenti a l s f o r w o rk ed l eg a l
h o l i da ys f ro m N o vem ber 1, 1974.
**a. Dura lex sed lex
Th e Mi n i ster o f La bor d i s mi s s ed th e Ch a rtere d B a nk Em pl oye es As s o ci ati on s
cl a i m f o r l a ck o f m e ri t ba s i ng i ts d eci si o n o n S ecti o n 2,R ul e I V, B oo k I l l o f th e Pascual vs. pascual-Bautista
I n te g ra ted R u l es a nd
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL a nd HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.
Po l i cy I ns tru cti on N o . 9, which respectively provide: ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-
BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO
Sec. 2. Sta tus of employees paid by the month. Employees who a re uniformly paid T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA
by the month, i rres pective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not l ess PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT,
tha n the s tatutory or es tablished minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid a nd THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pa s ig, Metro
for a l l days i n the month whether worked or not. Ma ni la, respondents.
G.R. No. 84240
POLICY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 TO: Al l Regional Directors Ma rch 25, 1992

2
PARAS, J.: HELD:
(1) No s i nce the petitioner does not seek to do a way with the rule of res judicata but merely
FACTS: proposes to undo a gra ve and serious wrong perpetuated i n the name of justice. As a ma tter of
fa ct, he was not denied the opportunity to submit evidence which the due process guarantees.
Peti ti oners Olivia a nd Hermes Pascual a re the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Records show that he did not have the ooprtunity to be heard because of the gross ineptitude of
Pa s cual, the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pa scual, who died peti tioners original counsel.
i ntestate without any i ssue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children..
Adel a Soldevilla Pascual the surviving s pouse of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC (3) No. The l aw on reconveyance is cl ear, and jurisprudence thereon is well-settled. This remedy
Bra nch 162, a s pecial proceeding case no.7554 for administration of the intestate estate of her i s a vailable i n cases where, as a result of mistake or fraud, property i s registered in the name of a
l a te husband. Olivia a nd Hermes are illegitimate children of Eligio Pascual (although they contend pers on not i ts owner. However, i t cannot be employed to negate the effects of a va lid decision of
tha t the term illegitimate children a s described in art 992 s hould be construed as spurious a court of jus tice determining the conflicting cl aims of ownership of the parties in an a ppropriate
chi l dren). proceeding, as in Ci vil Case No. 1562. The decision in that ca se was a valid resolution of the
question of ownership over the disputed properties a nd ca nnot be reversed now through the
ISSUE: remedy of reconveyance.
Whether or not Arti cle 992 of the Ci vil Code of the Philippines, ca n be i nterpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased. Equi ty i s described as justice outside legality, which s imply means that i t ca nnot s upplant although
i t ma y, a s often happens, supplement the law. All abstract a rguments based only on equity s hould
HELD: yi el d to positive rules, which pre-empt a nd prevail over such persuasions. Emotional a ppeals for
Arti cl e 992 of the Ci vil Code provi des a barrier or i ron curtain in that i t prohibits a bsolutely a jus ti ce, while they may wri ng the heart of the Court, ca nnot justify disregard of the mandate of
s uccession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the l a w as l ong as i t remains in force. The a pplicable maxim is "aequetas nunquam contravenit
the fa ther or mother of said l egitimate child. They may ha ve a natural ti e of blood, but this is not legis.
recognized by l aw for the purposes of Article 992.
El i gio Pascual i s a legitimate child but petitioners a re his i llegitimate children. **Inapplicability in criminal cases
Appl yi ng the a bove doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err i n holding that
peti tioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual i n the succession of the latter to the People v. Santayana
i ntestate estate of the decedent Andres Pa scual, full blood brother of their father. GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phi l 25)Second Division, Concepcion Jr. (p): 4 concur, 1 took
no pa rt, 1 designated to sit i n 2nd division
Aguila v. CFI of Batangas Facts:
G.R. No. L-48335. April 15, 1988 On 19 February 1962, Jesus Santayana y Es cudero, was a ppointed as Special Agent by
then Col onel Jose C. Ma ristela, Chief of the CIS. On 9 Ma rch 1962, Col . Ma ristela issued an
FACTS: unda ted certification to the effect that the a ccused was an accredited member of the CIS and the
Jul iana Ma tienzo had two husbands i n s uccession, namely, Es colastico Al abastro and, after his pi s tol described i n the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by vi rtue of his appointment
dea th, Daniel Aguila. The petitioner is cl aiming the disputed property a s the only s urviving child of a s s pecial a gent and that he was authorized to ca rry a nd possess the same i n the performance of
the s econd marriage. The private respondents a re resisting this claim as the children of Ma ria hi s official duty and for his personal protection. On 29 October 1962, the accused was found i n
Al a bastro, the sole offspring of the first marriage and had sued for partition and damages against Pl a za Mi randa i n possession of the firearms and ammunition without a license to possess them.
the petitioner, a lleging that some properties held by them pertained to the first marriage as An i nvestigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the
Jul iana a nd her second husband had not a cquired anything during their marriage. a ccus ed. The case underwent trial a fter which the a ccused was convicted of the crime charged.
Hence, the case was appealed to Supreme Court.
On moti on of the plaintiffs, the tri al court then issued a wri t of execution pursuant to which the Issue:
properties held by the defendants were levied upon and sold a t public a uction to the plaintiffs as Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for i llegal possession of firearms
the hi ghest bidders. The defendants filed a complaint for reconveyance of the properties acquired Held:
by the defendants in the earlier action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. In The a ppointment of a civilian as s ecret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace a nd order
thei r a nswer, the defendants a lleged res judicata a s one of their affirmative defenses. ca mpaigns and detection of cri mes s ufficiently puts him within the ca tegory of a peace officer
equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879 (People
ISSUE: v.Ma ca ra ndang). In the present ca se, Santayana was appointed as CIS s ecret agent with the
(1) Whether or not the petitioner may ri ghtfully alleged res judicata i n this ca se. a uthority to ca rry a nd possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance of his official
(2) Whether or not the Court s hould allow reconveyance of the properties in the exercise of its duti es a nd for his personal protection. Application of l icense was unnecessary, a ccording to Col.
equity jurisdiction. Ma ri s tela, as the firearm is government property. No permit was i ssued, according to Ca pt. Adolfo
3
Bri ng a s as he was a lready a ppointed as a CIS a gent. Even i f the ca se of People vs . Ma pa revoked a pprove of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, a mending for the purpose
the doctri ne in the Ma carandang case, this was made only on 30 August 1967, yea rs after the Secti ons 4 ) a nd 7 of Arti cle VI, Section 4 of Arti cle VII, and Section 8 of Arti cle 8 of Arti cle X of the
a ccus ed was charged. Under the Ma carandang rule therefore obtaining a t the time of a ppellants 1987 Phi l ippine Constitution? Said Petition for Initiative will first be s ubmitted to the people, a nd
a ppointment as secret a gent, he incurred no cri minal liability for possession of the pistol in a fter i t is signed by a t least 12% tota l number of registered voters i n the country, i t will be formally
question. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, conformably wi th the fi l ed wi th the COMELEC.
recommendation of the Solicitor General, and acquitted Jesus Santaya na, canceling the bond for
hi s provisional release; with costs de oficio. COMELEC i n turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved
for di s missal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that i t is not the i nitiatory petition properly
Peopl e of the Philippines vs . M. Ma pa cogni zable by the COMELEC.

Facts: a . Cons titutional provision on peoples i nitiative to amend the Constitution ca n only be
The a ccused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 i n connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised i mplemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed.
Admi nistrative Code as a mended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 a nd further a mended by R.A. 4. b. Republic Act No. 6735 provi des for 3 s ys tems on i nitiative but failed to provi de any subtitle on
On Augus t 13, 1962, the a ccused was discovered to have i n i ts possession and control a home- i ni tiative on the Constitution, unlike i n the other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission
ma de revolver ca l. 22 wi th no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that i ndicates matter of peoples initiative was left to some future l aw.
he owns the gun and affirmed that i t has no license. The accused further s tated that he i s a secret c. COMELEC ha s no power to provide rules a nd regulations for the exercise of peoples initiative.
a gent appointed by Gov. Levi ste of Batangas a nd showed evidences of a ppointment. In his Onl y Congress i s authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing l aw.
defense, the accused presented the ca se of People vs . Ma carandang, s tating that he must d. Peopl es i nitiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
a cquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to Extending or l ifting of term l imits constitutes a revision.
muni cipal police which is covered by Art. 879. e. Congress nor a ny government a gency has not yet a ppropriated funds for peoples initiative.
ISSUE:
Issue: Whether or not the people ca n directly propose a mendments to the Constitution through the
Whether or not holding a position of secret a gent of the Governor i s a proper defense to illegal s ys tem of initiative under Section 2 of Arti cle XVII of the 1987 Cons titution.
pos session of fi rearms.
HELD:
Ruling: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
The Supreme Court i n i ts decision affirmed the l ower courts decision. It stated that the law is
expl icit that except as thereafter specifically a llowed, "it shall be unlawful for a ny person to . . . It wa s intended to i nclude or cover peoples initiative on a mendments to the Constitution but, as
pos sess a ny fi rearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any i nstrument or worded, it does not adequately cover s uch intiative. Arti cle XVII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
i mplement used or i ntended to be used i n the manufacture of fi rearms, parts of firearms, or provi ding for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the Constitution has
a mmunition." The next s ection provides that "firearms a nd a mmunition regularly a nd lawfully recognized or gra nted the ri ght of the people to directly propose a mendments to the Constitution
i s sued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the vi a PI, the people ca nnot exercise i t if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
Phi l ippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Pri sons, municipal police, i mplementation.
provi ncial governors, l ieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
ma yors , and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," a re not covered "when such firearms are i n FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Secti on 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
pos session of s uch officials and public serva nts for use i n the performance of their official duties. a mendments to the Constitution. The i nclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed
The Court construed that there is no provision for the s ecret agent; i ncluding i t in the list therefore a fterthought. The word is not relevant to the s ection which is silent as to a mendments of the
the a ccused is not exempted. Cons ti tution.

As determined through Construction SECOND: Unl ike in the case of the other sys tems of initiative, the Act does not provi de for the
**General Rule: Statute must be capable of construction, otherwise inoperative contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not i nclude the provisions of
the Cons titution s ought to be a mended, i n the case of initiative on the Constitution.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, Ma rch 19, 1997 THIRD: No s ubtitle is provided for i nitiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the
l a tter simply means that the main thrust of the Act i s initiative a nd referendum on national a nd
FACTS: l oca l laws. The a rgument that the i nitiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to
In 1996, Atty. Jes us Delfin filed wi th COMELEC a petition to a mend Co nstitution, to lift term limits be s ubsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it i s national i n
of el ective officials, by peoples i nitiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control a nd s upervise said s cope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the s cope of the i nitiative
peoples i nitiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is: Do you i nvol ved, but on its nature a nd character.
4
Na ti onal i nitiative what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress The Delfin Petition does not contain s ignatures of the required number of voters. Wi thout the
ca n pa ss. requi red signatures, the petition ca nnot be deemed validly i nitiated. The COMELEC requires
Loca l initiative what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a l aw, ordinance or resolution juri s diction over a petition for i nitiative only a fter i ts filing. The petition then is the initiatory
whi ch only l egislative bodies of the governments of the auto nomous regions, provi nces, cities, pl eading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, s itting en banc.
muni cipalities, and barangays ca n pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest Si nce the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 a nd COMELEC Res olution No.
2300, i t ca nnot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was merely
Wha t has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule a re: [1] entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which
Del egation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the President; s hould not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December
[3] Del egation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to l ocal governments; and [5] Delegation to 1996, a nd the order directing Delfin a nd the oppositors to file their memoranda to file their
a dministrative bodies. memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC a cted without jurisdiction or with
gra ve a buse of discretion and merely wasted i ts time, energy, a nd resources.
COMELEC Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 di d not a pply to constitutional amendment.

Empowering the COMELEC, a n administrative body exercising quasi judicial fu nctions, to ** 2. Specific Rules
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of l egislative a uthority. In every ca se of a. Mens Legislatoris: Ascertain spirit/intent/purpose of the law
permi ssible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation i tself is va lid. It i s valid only i f
the l a w Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines
(a ) i s complete i n i tself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, ca rried out, or G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)
i mplemented by the delegate; a nd
(b) fi xes a standard the limits of which are s ufficiently determinate and determinable to which FACTS:
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Republic Act No. 6735 fa iled to Peti ti oner s eeks to a dopt four children which he claims to be his and Pa z Vasquez children
s a tisfy both requirements in s ubordinate l egislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC wi thout the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposed this s tating that Art. 338 of the
i s then invalid. Ci vi l Code allows a natural child to be a dopted by his father refers only to a child who
ha s not been acknowledged as natural child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 be a dopted by his natural fa ther or mother there should not be a n a cknowledgment of the status
of the na tural child for i t will go a gainst Art. 335.
Ins ofar as i t prescri bes rules a nd regulations on the conduct of initiative on a mendments to the
Cons ti tution is voi d. COMELEC ca nnot va lidly promulgate rules a nd regulations to implement the ISSUE:
exerci se of the right of the people to directly propose a mendments to the Constitution through W/N the Ci vi l Code allows for the a doption of acknowledged natural children of the father or
the s ys tem of i nitiative. It does not have that power under Republic Act No. 6735. mother.
Whether the COMELEC ca n ta ke cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition s olely i ntended
to obta in an order: HELD:
(a ) fi xing the time and dates for signature gathering; The l aw intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If the intention were to
(b) i nstructing municipal election officers to assist Delfins movement a nd vol unteers in a l low a doption only to unrecognized children, Article 338 would be of no useful purpose. The
es tablishing signature s tations; and ri ghts of a n a cknowledged natural child are much l ess than those of a l egitimated child.
(c) di recting or ca using the publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Contending that this is unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to a cquire
Cons ti tution. thes e ri ghts. The trend when it comes to a doption of children tends to go toward the liberal. The
l a w does not prohibit the adoption of a n acknowledged natural child which when compared to a
DELFIN PETITION na tural child is equitable. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the
words of the law, they should be a llowed adoption.
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 i s a full
compl iance with the power of Congress to i mplement the ri ght to initiate constitutional CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES
a mendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate l egislation L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)
a nd that COMELEC Res olution No. 2300 i s va lid, the COMELEC a cted without jurisdiction or with Ma rch 31, 1971
gra ve a buse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition. FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Ma tabuena donated a piece of l ot to his
common-law spouse, herein a ppellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only i n
5
1962 or s i x yea rs after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, w h i ch s eek s "to p u ni s h a cts o f eva s i on o f th e l a w s o f na ti o na li z a ti o n o f ce rta i n
1962, Fel ix died. Thereafter, a ppellant Cornelia Ma tabuena, by reason of being the only sister and ri g h ts ,f r a n c h i s e s o r p r i v i l e g e s . " R e a d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h
nea rest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by vi rtue of a a n t h e R e t a i l T r a d e L a w , t h e A n t i - Dummy La w would punish acts i ntended to circumvent
a ffi davit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, ha d the land declared in her name a nd paid the provi sions of the former law which nationalize the retail business.
the es tate a nd inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation
wa s va lid inasmuch as i t was made at the ti me when Felix a nd Petronila were not yet s pouses, Itchong Case
rendering Article 133 of the Ci vil Code i napplicable.
ISSUE: ISSUE
Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-
l a w relationship. I s th e em pl oym en t o f a l iens i n n o n - contro l p os iti on i n a re ta il e s ta bl i s hm ent o r
HELD: tra d e prohibited by the Anti-Dummy La w?
Whi l e Arti cle 133 of the Ci vil Code considers as void a donation between the s pouses
duri ng marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character a s well as the dictates of RULING
mora lity requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common -law relationship.
As s ta ted in Buenaventura vs . Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), i f the policy of the law is to Yes , i t is prohibited. Against retail tra de law and Anti-dummy l aw(X )unconsti-right of employer to
prohi bit donations i n favor of the other consort a nd his descendants because of fear of undue a nd choos e Th e na ti on a li z a ti o n o f a n e co nom i c m ea su re w hen f ou nded o n g ro unds o f
i mproper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to a pply the s ame p u b l i c p o l icy c a n n o t b e b r a n d e d a s u n j u s t , a r b i t r a r y o r o p p r e s s i v e o r
prohi bitive policy to persons living together as husband a nd wife without the benefit of nuptials. c o n t r a r y t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n because i ts a im is merely to further the material progress
The l a ck of va lidity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily a nd welfare of the citizens of a country. I nd eed, i n na ti o na li z i ng em pl oym en t i n re ta i l
res ult in appellant having exclusive ri ght to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is tra d e th e ri g ht o f ch oi ce o f a n e m pl oyer i s n ot i mpa i red b u t i ts s p here i s m e rel y
enti tled to one-half of the i nheritance, and the survi ving sister to the other half. l i m i ted to th e ci ti zens to th e e xcl us i on o f th os e o f other nationalities. f a l l s w i thi n the
Arti cl e 1001, Ci vi l Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children s urvive with the s co p e o f p ol i ce p ow er, th ru w hi ch a nd b y w h i ch th e S ta te i ns ures i ts existence a nd
wi dow or widower, the latter s hall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and s ecurity a nd the supreme welfare of its citizens
s i sters or their children to the other half. W H E R E F O R E , th e d e ci s i on a p pea l ed f ro m i s re ve rs ed. T h i s p rel i m i na ry
i n j u n c ti o n i ssued by the trial court on December 6, 1958 i s hereby lifted. The petition for
KING vs HERNAEZ ma ndamus is dismissed, with costs against a ppellees.
MACARIO KING, ET AL., peti tioners-appellees, vs . PEDRO S. HERNAEZ, ETC., ETAL., res pondents-
a ppellants. Bus tamante vs . NLRC, 1996

FACTS Peti ti oner


Os ma lik S. Bustamante, Pa ulino A. Ba ntayan, Fernando L. Bustamante, Ma rio D. Sumonod, and
Ma ca ri o Ki ng, a naturalized Filipino ci tizen Import Meat a nd Produce" Philippine Col d Stores, Sa bu J. La maran
Inc permission from the President of the Philippines(Secretary of Commerce
a nd Industry)DENIED petition for declaratory relief, injunction and mandamus(Court of First Res pondent
Ins tance of Ma nila) Na ti onal La bor Relations Commission, Fifth Division and Evergreen Farms, Inc.
Ponente
wri t of preliminary Pa di lla, J.

a ppeal __ Docket Number a nd Date of Decision


G.R. No. 111651, November 28, 1996
(RETAIL TRADE LAW)Section 1, Republic Act No. 1180 Significance of the Case
N o p e rs on w h o i s n o t a ci ti zen o f th e Ph i l i ppi nes , a nd n o a s so ci ati o n, In thi s landmark case, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that backwages due an employee on account
p a rtn e rs hi p , o r corporation the ca pital of which is not wholly owned by ci tizens of the of hi s i llegal dismissal s hould not be diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him
Phi l ippines, s hall engage directly or i ndirectly i n the retail business: . ." emphasis supplied)(x) el sewhere during the period of his i llegal dismissal.
merely to ba n them from i ts ownership and not from i ts management control or operation. Thi s case finally abandoned the Mercury Drug rule a nd deduction of earnings elsewhere rule
then prevailing a t that ti me.
( Anti- D um m y Law ) Com m onwealth Act No. 108, as am end ed by R epublic Act Hi s torical Backdrop
No.134) Pri or to the present case, SC ha d applied different methods i n the computation of backwages.

6
Ba ckwages under RA 875. Under RA 875, the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) was given wide Ruling
di s cretion to gra nt or disallow payment of backpay (backwages) to an employee, it also had the
i mplied power of reducing the backpay where backpay wa s allowed. In the exercise of i ts Conforma bly with the evident legislative i ntent of RA 6715, ba ckwages to be a warded to an
juri s diction, the CIR ca n increase or diminish the award of backpay, depending on several i l legally dismissed employee, s hould not, as a general rule, be diminished or reduced by the
ci rcums tances, among them, the good faith of the employer, the employees employment in other ea rnings derived by hi m elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal.
es tablishments during the period of i llegal dismissal, or the probability that the employee could The underlying reason for this ruling is that the emplo yee, while litigating the l egality (illegality) of
ha ve realized net earnings from outside employment if he had exercised due diligence to s earch hi s dismissal, must still earn a living to s upport himself and family, while full backwages have to be
for outs ide employment. pa i d by the employer as part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally dismissing his
Thi s method caused undue delay i n the disposition of illegal dismissal cases. Cases are usually held empl oyee.
up i n the determination of whether or not the computation of the a ward of backwages is correct. The cl ear l egislative intent of the amendment i n RA 6715 i s to gi ve more benefits to workers than
Mercury Drug Rul e . In order prevent undue delay i n the disposition of i llegal dismissal cases, the wa s previously gi ven them under the Mercury Drug rul e or the deduction of earnings elsewhere
SC found occasion in the ca se of Mercury Drug Co vs . CIR, 1974, to rul e that a fixed amount of rul e.
ba ckwages without further qualifications should be awarded to an i llegally dismissed employee. Thus , a closer a dherence to the legislative policy be hind RA 6715 poi nts to full backwages as
In s ubsequent cases (adopting the proposal of Justice Teehankee), backwages equivalent to three mea ning exactly that, i .e., without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by
yea rs (unless the case i s not terminated sooner) was made the base figure for s uch a wards the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. In other words, the provision
wi thout deduction, s ubject to deduction where there a re mitigating ci rcumstances i n favor of the ca l ling for full backwages to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain and free from a mbiguity
empl oyer but subject to increase by wa y of exemplary da mages where there a re aggravating a nd, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi sermo
ci rcums tances (e.g. oppression or dilatory a ppeals) on the employers part. est (literally s peech is the i ndex of i ntention).
On 1 November 1974, the La bor Code of the Philippines took effect. Arti cle 279 of the said code
provi des: US v. Toribio
[...] An empl oyee who i s unjustly dismissed from work s hall be entitled to reinstatement without
l oss of s eniority ri ghts and to his back wages computed from the ti me his compensation was was Ful l Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1910/jan1910/gr_l-5060_1910.html
wi thheld from him up to the ti me of his reinstatement.
The a bove provision nothwithstanding, the rule generally a pplied by the Court a fter the Facts:
promulgation of theMercury Drug case, a nd during the effectivity of P.D. No. 442 wa s still
the Mercury Drug rul e. In effect, this qualified the provision under P.D. No. 442 by l i miting the The a ppellant slaughtered or ca used to be slaughtered for human consumption the carabao
a wa rd of backwages to 3 yea rs. des cribed in the i nformation, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality
Deduction of Ea rnings Elsewhere Rule. When RA 6715 took effect on 21 Ma rch 1989, the wherein i t was slaughtered, in vi olation of the provisions of sections 30 a nd 33 of Act No. 1147, a n
perti nent portion of Article 279 of the Labor Code was a mended to read a s follows: Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
[...] An empl oyee who unjustly dismissed from work s hall be entitled to reinstatement without It a ppears that in the town of Ca rmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the a nimal was
l oss of s eniority ri ghts and other privileges a nd to his full backwages, i nclusive of allowances, a nd s l aughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for a ppellant contends that under
to hi s other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was s uch ci rcumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of
wi thheld from him up to the ti me of his actual reinstatement. l a rge ca ttle without a permit of the municipal treasure.
In a ccordance with the a bove provision, an i llegally dismissed employee is entitled to his full
ba ckwages from the time of his illegal dismissal up to the ti me of his a ctual reinstatement. Issue:
Des pite the a mendment, however, i n a s ubsequent case, Pi nes Ci ty Educational Center vs . NLRC,
1993, the Court returned to the rule prior to the Mercury Drug rule that the total amount derived Whether or not the proper construction of the language of these provisions limit the prohibition
from employment elsewhere by the employee from the date of dismissal up to the date of conta ined in Section 30 a nd the penalty i mposed i n Section 33 to ca ses:
rei nstatement, if any, s hould be deducted from backwages. (1) of s l aughter of large ca ttles for human consumption in a municipal s laughter house without a
The ra ti onale for s uch ruling was that, the earning derived elsewhere by the dismissed employee permi t duly s ecured from the municipal treasurer, a nd
whi le l itigating the legality of his dismissal, s hould be deducted from the full a mount of backwages (2) ca s es of killing of large cattle for food i n a municipal slaughter-house without a permit duly
whi ch the law grants him upon reinstatement, so as not to unduly or unjustly enrich the employee s ecured from the municipal treasurer.
a t the expense of the employer.
Held:
Issue The prohibition contained in section 30 refers
Whether or not the i ncome derived by the employee elsewhere during the period of his illegal (1) to the s laughter of large cattle for human consumption, a nywhere, without a permit duly
di s missal should be deducted from the award of backwages. s ecured from the municipal treasurer, a nd
(2) expressly a nd s pecifically to the killing for food of l arge ca ttle at a municipal slaughterhouse
wi thout s uch permit; a nd that the penalty provided in s ection 33 a pplies generally to the slaughter
7
of l a rge ca ttle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly s ecured from the 2) Beneficiaries under P.D. No. 621 onl y. (In milling districts where the annual gross production is
muni cipal treasurer, a nd specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal l ess than 150,000 pi culs)
s l aughterhouse without s uch permit. On Ma y 24, 1991, Republic Act No. 6982 took effect. It i mposed a l ien of P5.00 per picul on the
Secti ons 30 a nd 33 prohibit a nd penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food gros s production of sugar beginning sugar crop year 1991-1992, wi th a n a utomatic a dditional lien
a t a municipal slaughterhouse of s uch a nimals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, of P1.00 for every two (2) yea rs for the s ucceeding ten (10) years from the effectivity of the Act
a nd s ection 32 provi des for the keeping of detailed records of a ll s uch permits in the office of the s ubject to the discretion of the Secretary of La bor a nd Employment a nd upon recommendation of
muni cipal and also of the provincial treasurer. the Sugar Tri partite Council.[9]
Where the language of a s tatute is fairly s usceptible of two or more constructions, that Di rectly a ddressing the effect of the new P5.00 per pi cul lien vi s--vis the two previously existing
cons truction s hould be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the l a ws, Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982, provi des:
l a wmaker a nd promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should Section. 12. Benefits under Republic Act No. 809 and P.D. 621, as Amended. - All liens and other
be rejected which would tend to render a bortive other provisions of the s tatute and to defeat the forms of production sharing in favor of the workers in the sugar industry under Republic Act No.
object which the l egislator sought to attain by i ts enactment. Therefore, sections 30 a nd 33 of the 809 and Presidential Decree No. 621, as amended, are hereby substituted by the benefits under
Act prohi bit and penalize the slaughtering or ca using to be slaughtered for human consumption of this Act: Provided, That cases arising from such laws pending in the courts or administrative bodies
l a rge ca ttle at a ny place without the permit provided for in s ection 30. at the time of the effectivity of this Act shall not be affected thereby.
In connection therewith, Section 14 of the same Act further s tates:
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN NEGROS INC., petitioner, vs. HON. BERNARDO T. Section 14. Non-Diminution of Benefits.-The provisions of Section 12 hereof notwithstanding,
PONFERRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH nothing in this Act shall be construed to reduce any benefit, interest, right or participation enjoyed
42; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT; BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR by the workers at the time of the enactment of this Act, and no amount received by any beneficiary
COMPANY, INC., and NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE under this Act shall be subject to any form of taxation.
PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP),respondents. Pri va te respondent Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company (BISCOM) i s engaged i n the business of,
DE CISION a mong others, milling ra w s ugar ca ne of va rious s ugar plantations i n their milling district. For the
PURISIMA, J.: crop yea r 19911992, the s ugar fa rm workers share i n BISCOM, under R.A. No. 809 a mounted
Nowhere is the economic disparity between labor and capital so evident than in the sugar to P30, 590,086.92.[10]
industry. While it is the lowly farm worker who must toil in the field under the harshness of Under P.D. No.621, the workers benefit for the same crop year a mounted to P2,233,285.26,
conditions, it is the planter who gets to enjoy more the fruits of production. While the planter lives computed as follows:
in the comfort of his palatial home, the living condition of the sugar farm worker more often than Gros s production of BISCOM 1,595,184.46
not defies the basic tenets of human dignity.[1] (In Pi culs)
At ba r i s a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court s eeking to Les s: 30% BISCOM Share 478,555.33
revi ew and set a side the August 8, 1993 Deci sion[2] a nd January 21, 1994 Res olution[3] of the 70% Pl a nter Share 2,116,626.13
Regi onal Trial Court of Negros Occi dental, Branch 42, [4] Ba colod Ci ty, i n Ci vil Ca se No. 6894 for Mul ti plied by P2.00 l i en x P2.00
Decl aratory Relief. TOTAL P2,233,258.26[11]
The a ntecedent facts that matter ca n be culled as follows: But cons idering that the P2.00 l ien under P.D. No.621 i s obviously l esser than the P5.00 l ien under
Pri or to the passage of Republic Act No. 6982, entitled An Act Strengthening the Sugar R.A. No.6982, the s a me was no longer i mposed by BISCOM pursuant to R.A. No.6982.
Amelioration Program in the Sugar Industry, Providing the Mechanics for its Implementation, and Hence, before R.A. No.6982 took effect, the total farm workers benefit was:
for other Purposes, there were two principal laws providing additional financial benefits to sugar Under R.A. No. 809 P30,590,086.92
fa rm workers, namely: Republic Act No. 809 a nd Presidential Decree No. 621. Under P.D. No. 621 2,233,258.16
Republic Act No. 809[5] (i mplementable in milling districts with an a nnual gross production of P32,823,345.18
150,000 pi culs or more), institutionalized production sharing scheme, i n the a bsence of any Upon the effectivity of R.A. No.6982, the total workers benefit in BISCOMs milling district was
pri va te a greement between the planters a nd farm workers, depending on the mills total computed as follows:
production for each immediately preceding crop year; a nd s pecifically providing that any increase Gros s Production of BISCOM 1,595,184.46
i n the planters share s hall be divided in the following manner: 40% of the increase shall accrue to (In Pi culs)
the pl anter a nd 60% to the farm workers.[6] Les s: 30% BISCOM s hare 478,555.34
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 621, [7] a s amended, charged a lien of P2.00 per pi cul 70% Pl a nter Share 1,116,629.12
on a l l sugar produced, to be pooled i nto a fund for subsequent distribution as bonuses to sugar Multiplied by P5.00 lien x P5.00
workers.[8] TOTAL FARMWORKERS BENEFIT P5,583,145.61[12]
Thus , before R.A. No.6982, there were two sets of beneficiaries under the s ocial amelioration Mea nwhile, pending a definite ruling on the effect of R.A. No. 6982 to R.A. No. 809 a nd P.D. No.
progra m in the sugar i ndustry: 621, res pondent Secretary of Labor issued Department Order No.2 (1992), [13] di recting, inter alia,
1) Beneficiaries under R.A. No. 809 a nd P.D. No. 621; a nd the three milling districts in Negros Occi dental, namely: SONDECO, Sa n Ca rlos and herein private

8
res pondent BISCOM, to continue implementing R.A. No.809 per recommendation of the Sugar i n a ddition to R.A. No. 6982. Applying this interpretation, the share of the sugar farm workers
Tri pa rtite Council. woul d a mount toP30,590,086.92.
Cons equently, the petitioner, Pl anters Association of Southern Negros Inc. (PASON), a n On the other hand, under the interpretation espoused by the public respondent (that the benefits
orga nization of sugar farm plantation owners milling with private respondent BISCOM, fi led with conferred by R.A. No.6982 s hould complement those granted by R.A. No. 809 whi ch ca nnot be
the res pondent court a Petition for Declaratory Relief a gainst the i mplementation of the said D.O. s uperseded by the former Act s ince Section 14 thereof prohibits diminution of benefits), the total
No. 2. It theori zed that in vi ew of the s ubstitution of benefits under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982, workers benefit would be as follows:
wha tever monetary rewards previously gra nted to the sugar farm workers under R.A. No. 809 a nd R.A. No. 809 P30,590,086.92
P.D. No. 621 were deemed totally a brogated a nd/or sup erseded.[14] R.A. No. 6982 __,583,145.61
On Augus t 18, 1993, the respondent Court came out with the assailed Decision; the dispositive P36,173,232.53
porti on of which held: It i s a well-settled rule of legal hermeneutics that each provision of law should be construed i n
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby declares: connection wi th every other part so as to produce a harmonious whole and every meaning to be
1. That the benefits under RA 6982 do not and cannot supersede or substitute the benefits under gi ven to each word or phrase is a scertained from the context of the body of the statute. [19] Ut
RA 809 in milling districts where the latter law was already in implementation at the time of the magis valeat quam pereat.[20]Cons equently, l aws are given a reasonable construction such that
effectivity of RA 6982; and a pparently conflicting provisions are a llowed to stand a nd gi ven effect by reconciling them,
2. That the sugarcane workers in the BISCOM milling district shall continue to enjoy the benefits reference being had to the moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute. [21]
under RA 809 in addition to the benefits that will henceforth be provided for by RA 6982 now being Appl yi ng the a bovestated doctrine, Section 12 therefore, which a pparently ma ndates a total
implemented by private respondent. s ubstitution by R. A. No. 6982 of a l l the benefits under R.A. No. 809 a nd P.D. No. 621 existing a t
SO ORDERED.[15] the ti me of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982, ca n not be construed apart from Section 14 whi ch
Wi th the denial of i ts motion to reconsider the aforesaid Decision, petitioner found its way to this prohi bits such substitution if the effect thereof would be to reduce any benefit, interest, right or
Court via the present petition. pa rti cipation enjoyed by the worker a t the time R.A. No. 6982 took effect. The Court finds as
The petition is not visited by merit. untenable the interpretation of the petitioner based a n unqualified substitution of the benefits
From a curs ory rea ding of Section 12[16] of R.A. No. 6892, the i nevitable conclusion would be that under R.A. No. 809 a nd P.D. No. 621 by the monertary rewards conferred by R.A. No. 6982 i n the
the benefits under R.A. No.809 a nd P.D. No. 621 ha ve been superseded by those gra nted under a mount of P5,583,145.61 a s a gainst the P36,173,232.53 previ ously enjoyed by the sugar farm
the new law. This substitution, however, a ppears to be qualified by Section 14 [17] whi ch disallows workers under the former laws.
s ubstitution if its effect would be to diminish or reduce whatever financial benefits the s ugar fa rm It bea rs stressing that the primordial objective behind the enactment of R.A. No. 6982 wa s to
workers a re receiving under existing laws a t the time of the effectivi ty of R.A. No. 6289. a ugment the income of sugar workers by establishing a s ocial a melioration program i n cases
How then should Section 12 of R.A. No. 6982 be i nterpreted i n light of the qualification under where sugar farm workers had none, a nd a t the same ti me, to i mprove whatever amelioration
Secti on 14 of the same Act? s chemes a lready existing i n the sugar districts concerned. [22] In recognition of the a vowed
Peti ti oner i nsists that the word s ubstitution i n Section 12 s hould be ta ken i n i ts l iteral s ense gua ra ntee under Section 3, Arti cl e 13 of the Constitution to uphold the ri ght of workers to a just
cons idering that the i ntention of Congress to effect a substitution of benefits is cl ear and s ha re in the fruits of production, the policy of R.A. No. 6982 s ta tes:
unequivocal. Under this interpretation of unqualified substitution, the s ugar fa rm workers in Section 1. Policy. It is the policy of the State to further strengthen the rights of workers in the
the s ubject milling district will receive onlyP5,583,145.61 under R.A. No.6289, a s a gainst sugar industry to their just share in the fruits of production by augmenting their income and,
the P32,823,345.18 to whi ch the workers were entitled under P.D. 621 a nd R.A. No. 809. among other schemes, institutionalizing the mechanism among the partners in the sugar
So a l so, i nvoking the Opinion[18] It i s believed that the benefits conferred upon l abor by RA 809 industry to enable the workers and their families to enjoy a decent living. (Emphasis supplied)
ha ve been superseded by those granted to it under RA 6982. Thi s conclusion is i nescapable from a The foregoing studiedly considered, there can be no other construction that would best promote
rea ding of Section 12 of the latter l aw, as well as i ts repealing clause (Sec. 16). Indeed, the the welfare of the sugar farm workers, than the i nterpretation of the public respondent,
production-sharing s cheme decreed i n RA 809 ca nnot remain in force upon the effectivi ty of the i mplementing R.A. No. 6982 a s a complement to R.A. No. 809.
new production-sharing procedure prescribed in RA 6982; otherwise, s ugar workers would be Ci ti ng the floor deliberations of Congress,[23] petitioner insists that the non-diminution of benefits
recei ving two kinds of financial benefits simultaneously. referred to i n Section 14 pertains only to pending claims of the workers at the ti me of the
The s ubstitution, however, of sugar workers benefits under RA 809 by RA 6982 i s qualified by effectivity of the Act. Sta ted differently, i t is contended that the benefits to which the workers are
Secti on 14 of the latter. This section provi des that i f the effect of s uch substitution will be to enti tled under R.A. No. 809 a nd P.D. No. 601 ca n be va lidly di minished by vi rtue of the application
di minish or reduce whatever monetary rewards sugar i ndustry l aborers are receiving under RA of R.A. No. 6982, beca use the non-diminution provision in Section 14 thereof refers to pending
809, then s uch workers shall continue to be entitled to the benefits provided i n such cl a ims accruing under P.D. 621 a nd R.A. No. 809, a nd not to the very benefits previously enjoyed
l a w. Expressed otherwise the production-sharing scheme i n RA 6982 does not apply to sugar by the workers under the said laws. With this construction, from a total benefit of P32,823,345.18
i ndustry workers i n milling districts where i ts a pplication would be financially disadvantageous to conferred by R.A. No. 809 a nd P.D. No. 621, the sugar workers would only be entitled to a meager
them, i n which ca se the existing production-sharing agreement based on RA 809 s hall still govern. a mount of P5,583,145.61.
(Opi nion No. 115, S. 1992 da ted September 2, 1992, s i gned by Justice Secretary Fra nklin The contention is barren of sustainable merit. To l imit the a pplication of the non-diminution
Dri l on.)18 of the Secretary of Justice, petitioner contends, i n the alternative, that the application pri nciple only to pending cl aims would be repulsive not only to the policy of the Act but also to the
of R.A. No. 809 ca n be maintained but i n no case should the benefits thereunder be implemented s a lutory provisions of the Constitution. Verily, the glaring disparity
9
of P27,240,199.57 between P32,823,345.18 a ndP5,583,145.61 would not warra nt such an Villanueva v. COMELEC
i nterpretation. As aptly ra tiocinated[24] by the respondent Court, the evolution of l egislation in the No. L 54718 (December 4, 1986)
s ugar i ndustry had a lways had for i ts foremost concern the advancement of the lot of the s ugar FACTS:
fa rm worker. Hence, through the years every law or decree enacted pursuant thereto had always On Ja nuary 25, 1980, Peti ti oner filed a certificate of ca ndidacy for Vi ce Mayor of Dolores for the
provi ded for a n i ncrease in wa ges and benefits. The reason is obvi ous. Amidst the ra pidly Ja nuary 30 el ections i n substitution for his companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy
cha nging, if not worsening, economic conditions prevalent in the industry, the sugar worker ca n wi thout oath upon filing on Ja nuary 4. Peti tioner won in the election but Respondent Board
ha rdly cope with his meager income to lean on. di s regarded all his votes and proclaimed Respondent Ca ndidate as the winner on the
Equa lly wanting of merit is the a lleged double recovery under the i nterpretation subscribed by the pres umption that Petitioners ca ndidacy was not duly a pproved by Respondent. Petitioner filed
public respondent. Note that had not R.A. No. 6982 been enacted, sugar farmworkers would be a peti tion for the annulment of the proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission
enti tled to a total a share of P32,823,345.18 under R.A. No. 809 a nd P.D. No. 621; whereas under on the
the a l ternative vi ew of the petitioner, maintaining the benefits (P30, 509,086.92) gra nted by R.A. grounds that Mendozas unsworn withdrawal had no l egal effect, and tha t assuming i t was e
No. 809 to the exclusion of the benefits provided by R.A. No. 6982, s ugar fa rm workers stand to ffecti ve, Petitioners ca ndidacy wa s not va lid since Mendoza did not withdraw a fter Ja nuary 4.
l os e the difference of P2,233,258.56, from a tota l of P32,823,345.18 whi ch they were entitled
before RA 6982 took effect. Certainly, s uch a disadvantageous construction ca nnot be ISSUE:
countenanced, being vi olative of the non-diminution principle under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6982. W/N Peti ti oner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical defects.
In vi ew of the foregoing, the a ddition of the monetary rewards under R.A. No. 6982 to the benefits
gra nted by R.A. No. 809, i s what is ca lled for i n the ca se under consideration. While it i s true that HELD:
a ddition is different from substitution, the ci rcumstances i nvolving subject milling districts No. The fa ct that Mendozas withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which should not be used
(where the sugar farm workers are enjoying benefits both from R.A. No. 809 a nd P.D. No. 621 to frus tra te the peoples will in favor of Petitioner as the
pri or to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982), necessitate the grant of pecuniary a dvantage under R.A. s ubstitute ca ndidate. Also, his withdrawal ri ght on the very s ame day that he filed his ca ndi
No. 809 a s a complement to R.A. No. 6982. Otherwise, the workers would suffer a diminution of da cy s hould be considered as having been made substantially a nd i n truth after the last day, even
benefits. Therefore, the increase of monetary a dvantage in fa vor of the s ugar fa rm workers, as a goi ng by the literal reading of the provision by Respondent Commission. The spirit of the law
cons equence of such i nterpretation, is merely i ncidental to the a pplication of the non -diminution ra ther than i ts l iteral reading should have
pol icy of R.A. No. 6982, a l abor provision which should be liberally construed to further its gui ded Respondent Commission i n resolving the issue of l ast-
purpose.[25] mi nute wi thdrawal a nd s ubstitution of other persons as ca ndidates.
Nei ther does the Court find convincing the i nterpretation proposed by pri vate respondent
BISCOM. Whi le maintaining the application of R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 (where the total **When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases
s ha re of the workers is P32,823,345.18), a nd disregarding R.A. No. 6892, woul d be beneficial to
the s ugar fa rm workers, to the mind of the Court, the assailed construction of the public COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991]
res pondent (where the total s hare of the workers is P36,173,232.53), would be more i n keeping Thurs day, February 12, 2009 Pos ted by Coffeeholic Writes
wi th the spirit of R.A. No. 6982 which is: to improve the livi ng condition of workers i n the sugar La bels: Case Digests, Political La w
i ndustry. Between two s tatutory i nterpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law
s hould prevail.[26] Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 a nd 96948 who a re officers of the AFP were directed to
Premi ses studiedly considered, the Court is of the ineluctable conclusion, a nd s o holds, that the a ppear i n person before the Pre -Trial Investigating Officers for the a lleged participation the failed
res pondent Court ventured not in any judicial l egislation but merely ga ve life to the a vowed policy coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Peti ti oners now claim that there was no pre-trial i nvestigation of
of the Sta te under Section 18, Arti cle 2 of the 1987 Cons titution, which s tates: the cha rges as mandated by Arti cle of War 71. A moti on for dismissal was denied. Now, their
Sec. 18. The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall guarantee the rights moti on for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.
of workers and promote their welfare.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED; a nd the assailed Decision i n Ci vil Case No. 6894, da ted In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Ja ci nto Ligot a pplied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the a pplication was denied
Augus t 18, 1993, of the Regional Tri al Court of Negros Occi dental, Branch 42, Ba colod City, by GCM No.14. He fi l ed with the RTC a petition for certiorari a nd mandamus with prayer for
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. provi sional liberty a nd a wri t of preliminary i njunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional
SO ORDERED. l i berty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, a nd Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. fa ci ng court martial proceedings can a vail the right to bail.

Vi l lanueva v. COMELEC Ca s e Digest The pri vate respondents i n G.R. No. 97454 fi led with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the
ground that they were being detained in Ca mp Cra me without charges. The petition was referred
to RTC. Fi nding a fter hearing that no formal charges had been filed a gainst the petitioners after
**When literal import must yield to spirit/intent more tha n a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

10
December, 1963, i n Muoz, Nueva Ecija the accused being tenants of Ma rgarita Fernando i n her
Issues: ri celand, without notice to her or wi thout her consent, pre -threshed a portion of their respective
ha rvests of five (5) ca vans of palay each to her damage i n the a mount of P187.50 a t P12.50 a
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process. ca va n (Cri minal Ca se No. SD-179, Court of First Instance of Nueva Eci ja, Sto. Domingo Branch
VI).cha nrobles vi rtual law library
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the a ccused ri ght to bail. Upon a rraignment the accused pleaded not guilty. They filed motion for a bill of particulars as to
the exa ct date of the commission of the offense charged. The l ower court denied their motion
beca use they had already entered their plea.chanrobles vi rtual law library
Held: Thereafter, they -filed a motion to quash the information on that grounds
NO deni al of due process. Petitioners were given s everal opportunities to present their side at the (1) tha t i t does not allege facts sufficient to constitute the cri me charged;
pre-tri al investigation, first a t the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, a nd then a gain after the (2) tha t there i s no law punishing it, a nd
denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until Ma rch 7, 1990, to s ubmit (3) tha t the court has, no jurisdiction over the a lleged ti me
thei r counter-affidavits. On that date, they fi led instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which
they were a gain asked to submit i n writing. They had been expressly wa rned in the s ubpoena that The fi scal opposed the motion.
"fa i lure to s ubmit counter-affidavits on the date s pecified s hall be deemed a waiver of their right The l ower court gra nted the motion a nd dismissed the information in i ts order of August 11, 1966.
to s ubmit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a ri ght to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to It hel d that the information is basically deficient because i t does not describe l ie ci rcumstances
cha l lenge validity of members of G/SCM) under which the cava ns of palay were found i n the possession of the a ccused tenants; it does not
s pecify the date agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not a llege that the
It i s a rgued that since the priva te respondents a re officers of the Armed Forces a ccused of pa l ay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net s hare based on the last
vi ol ations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release norma l harvest.The prosecution a ppealed from the order of dismissal. The Solicitor General
a nd otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional a rgues in his brief that the i nformation in this case a lleges all the elements of the offense defined
Tri a l Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over i n s ection 39 of Republic Act No. 1199, a s a mended of Republic Act No. 2263. Secti ons 39 a nd 57
peti tions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus a gainst inferior courts a nd other bodies and on of the s ame law reads as follows:
peti tions for habeas corpus a nd quo warranto. SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. - It s ha ll be unlawful for either the tenant or landholder,
wi thout mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop a t any ti me previ ous to the date
The ri ght to bail i nvoked by the private respondents has tra ditionally not been recognized and is s et for i ts threshing- That if the tenant n food for his family a nd the landholder do es not or ca nnot
not a va ilable in the military, a s an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The furni sh s uch a nd refuses to allow the tenant to reap or thresh a portion of the crop previous to the
ri ght to a s peedy tri al is given more emphasis in the military where the ri ght to bail does not exist. da te set for i ts threshing, the tenant can reap or thresh not more than ten percent of his net share
i n the last normal harvest after giving notice thereof to the landholder or his representative. Any
On the contention that they had not been charged a fter more than one year from their a rrest, vi ol ation of this situation by either party s hall be treated and penalized in a ccordance with this Act
there was s ubstantial compliance with the requirements of due process a nd the ri ght to a speedy a nd/or under the general provisions of law applicable to that act committed.
tri a l. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation SEC. 57. Penal Provision. - Vi olation of the provisions of ... s ections thirty-nine a nd forty-nine of
onl y a fter one year because hundreds of officers a nd thousands of enlisted men were in volved in thi s Act s hall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or i mprisonment not
the fa iled coup. exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court. ... *
We hol d that the order of dismissal should be a ffirmed because as held i n People vs. Adillo, L-23M,
Accordi ngly, i n G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the November 27, 1975, a ca s e similar to the i nstant case, s ection 99 wa s impliedly repealed by the
peti tion i s granted, and the respondents a re directed to a llow the petitioners to exercise the ri ght Agri cul tural Land Reform Code of 1963, a s a mended by Republic Act No. 6389 168 O.G. 915) a nd
of peremptory cha llenge under a rticle 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 a nd 97454, the a s i mplemented by Presidential Decrees Nos. 2, 27 a nd 316. That Code was already i n force when
peti tions a re also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private the a ct complained of was committed. The repeal may be rationalized in this manner:
res pondents a re hereby reversed a nd s et aside. No costs. The prohibition a gainst pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in s ection 39 of the Agricultural
Tena ncy La w of 1954 i s premised on the existence of the ri ce share tenancy s ystem. The evident
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WENCESLAO ALMUETE FERNANDO purpose is to prevent the tenant a nd the l andholder from defrauding each other in the division of
FRONDA, FAUSTO DURION and CIPRIANO FRONDA, defendants-appellees. the ha rvests.chanrobles vi rtual law library
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor The Agri cultural Land Reform Code s uperseded the Agricultural Tenancy La w (except as qualified
Vicente A. Torres for a ppellant. i n s ections 4 a nd 35 of the Code). The Code i nstituted the leasehold system and abolished share
Emiliano D. Castellanes for a ppellees. tena ncy s ubject to certain conditions i ndicated i n section 4 thereof. It is significant that s ection 39
AQUINO, J.: i s not reproduced i n the Agri cultural Land Reform Code whose s ection 172 repeals "all laws or part
Wenceslao Almuete Fernando Fronda, Ci priano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a of a ny l aw inconsistent with" i ts provisions.chanrobles virtual l aw l ibrary
vi ol ation of s ection 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy La w. It was alleged in the information that i n
11
Under the l easehold sys tem the prohibition a gainst pre-threshing has no, more raison d'etre Endnotes:
beca use the l essee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed i n section 34 of the Agricultural * Appellees' contention that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the offense
La nd Reform Code, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms, as redesignated i n Republic Act No. 6389 beca use i nferior courts have jurisdiction over offense i n which the penalty is i mprisonment for not
whi ch took effect on September 10, 1971. Thus , the legal maxim, cessante ra tione l egis, cessat more tha n three years, or a fine of not more three thousand pesos, or both such fine a nd
i ps a lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the l aw i tself also ceases). applies to this ca se.chanrobles i mprisonment and that it is the Muoz municipal court that has jurisdiction i s wrong. The Court of
vi rtua l law library Fi rs t Instance has concurrent jurisdiction with the i nferior court in mm in which the penalty
Secti on 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural s hare tenancy throughout the provi ded by law is imprisonment for more than s ix months, or a fi ne of-more than two hundred
country a s contrary to public policy a nd automatically converted it to a gricultural leasehold. pes os (Sec. 44[f], Judiciary La w).
Pres i dential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire country "a s a land reform area". Presidential
Decree No. 27 emancipated the tenant from the bondage of the s oil. And Presidential Decree No. Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
316 i nterdicted the ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer from his farmholding until the
promulgation of the rules and regulations i mplementing Presidential Decree No. 27. (See People TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
vs . Adi llo, supra).chanrobles vi rtual law library CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
The l egislative i ntent not to punish a nymore the tenant's a ct of pre- reaping and pre-threshing
wi thout notice to the landlord is i nferable from the fact that, as already noted, the Code of FACTS:
Agra ri an Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy La w a nd that it a bolished
s ha re tenancy which is the basis for penalizing cl andestine pre-reaping and pre- Imelda, a little over 8 yea rs old, i n or a bout 1938, established her domicile i n Tacloban, Leyte
thres hing.chanrobles vi rtual law library where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Aca demy from 1938 to 1949. She
Al l i ndications point to a deliberate and manifest l egislative design to replace the Agricultural then pursued her college degree, education, i n St. Pa uls College now Divine Word University a lso
Tena ncy La w with the Code of Agrarian Reforms, formerly the Agri cultural Land Reform Code, at i n Ta cloban. Subsequently, s he taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Ta cloban. She went to
l east as far a s ricelands a re concerned.chanrobles vi rtual law library ma nila during 1952 to work wi th her cousin, the l ate speaker Daniel Romualdez i n his office in the
As held in the Adillo case, the a ct of pre-reaping a nd pre-threshing wi thout notice to the landlord, Hous e of Representatives. In 1954, s he married late President Ferdinand Ma rcos when he was
whi ch is a n offense under the Agricultural Tenancy La w, had ceased to be an offense under the s ti ll a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Ma rcos was
s ubsequent law, the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as a n offense when the Code of el ected as Senator i n 1959, they l ived together i n San Juan, Rizal where s he registered as a voter.
Agra ri an Reforms is a lready i n force would be repugnant or a bhorrent to the policy a nd s pirit of In 1965, when Ma rcos won presidency, they l ived i n Ma lacanang Pa lace a nd registered as a voter
tha t Code and would subvert the manifest legislative i ntent not to punish a nymore pre -reaping i n Sa n Mi guel Ma nila. She s erved as member of the Batasang Pa mbansa a nd Governor of Metro
a nd pre-threshing without notice to landholder.chanrobles vi rtual law library Ma ni la during 1978.
It i s a rule of l egal hermeneutics that "an a ct which purports to set out i n full a ll that i t intends to
conta in operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was contain i n the old a ct and not Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of
i ncl uded in the amendatory a ct" (Cra wford, Construction of Statutes, p. 621 ci ted i n the Adillo Leyte for the 1995 El ections. Ci rilo Roy Montejo, the i ncumbent Representative of the First
ca s e).chanrobles vi rtual law library Di s trict of Leyte and also a candidate for the s ame position, filed a Petition for Ca ncellation and
A s ubsequent statute, revising the whole s ubject matter of a former s tatute, and evidently Di s qualification" with the Commission on El ections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
i ntended as a substitute for i t, operates to repeal the former s tatute" (82 C.J.S. 499). 'The revising cons titutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote
s ta tute is in effect a 'legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new s tatute shall s even months under residency, which s he sought to rectify by a dding the words "since childhood"
preva il, a nd whatever is excluded therefrom shall be discarded" (82 C.J.S. 500).cha nrobles vi rtual i n her Amended/Corrected Certi ficate of Ca ndidacy filed on Ma rch 29, 1995 a nd that "she has
l a w library a l ways maintained Ta cloban Ci ty a s her domicile or residence. She a rrived at the s even months
The repeal of appeal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a res i dency due to the fact that s he became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in s aid months.
vi ol ation of the old penal law prior to i ts repeal (People vs . Tamayo, 61 Phi l. 225; People vs.
Si ndiong and Pastor, 77 Phi l. 1000; People vs . Binuya, 61 Phil. 208; U.S. vs . Re yes, 10 Phil. 423; U.S. ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible i n running
vs . Aca demia, 10 Phi l. 431. See dissent i n La grimas vs . Director of Pri sons, 57 Phi l. 247, 252, a s representative of the First District of Leyte.
254).cha nrobles vi rtual law l ibrary
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal i s affirmed with costs de oficio.chanrobles vi rtual law l ibrary HELD:
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.chanrobles virtual law Res idence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court a re in favor of a
library concl usion supporting petitoners claim of l egal residence or domicile i n the First District of Leyte
Barredo, J., took no part.chanrobles virtual law library des pite her own declaration of 7 months residency i n the district for the following reasons:
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
1. A mi nor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by
opera tion of law when her fa ther brought them to Leyte;
12
a nd-a half (1 1/2) month of their basic salary. From 1989 to 1993, however, the said benefit was
2. Domi cile of origin is only l ost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide reduced to one (1) month of the basic salary due to fi nancial/budgetary constraints. In May, 1993,
i ntention of a bandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which the nomenclature of s ubject social amelioration benefit was changed to educational assistance i n
corres pond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin order to reflect the ra tionale behind the same, which is to encourage its beneficiaries to pursue
s hould be deemed to continue. gra duate studies a nd to finance the s chooling of their children.
Sometime in February, 1994, Mi s s Dalisay E. Ara can, Resident Auditor of NTA, i ssued a Notice of
3. A wi fe does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Di s allowance of the payment of the educational assistance for calendar year 1993, opining that
La w does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda ma rried late President Ma rcos the NTA ha s no statutory authority to gra nt the incentive. In January, 1995, the s ame Resident
i n 1954, s he kept her domicile of origin a nd merely ga ined a new home a nd not domicilium Audi tor caused the disallowance of the same benefit paid i n 1994, for the same reason.
necessarium. On Apri l 25, 1994, the petitioners appealed to the Commission on Audit, prayi ng for the lifting of
the di sallowance i n question, pointing out that: (1) Benefits received by employees as of July 1,
4. As s uming that Imelda gained a new domicile a fter her ma rriage a nd a cquired right to choose a 1989 not i ntegrated i nto the standardized s alary ra tes shall continue to be authorized, pursuant to
new one only a fter the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country cl early Secti on 12 of R.A. 6758; (2)the benefit having been received for s o many years, even prior to the
i ndicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, effectivity of the Salary Sta ndardization La w of 1989, has been a vested ri ght, on the part of the
peti tioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 i n Ta cloban, Leyte while l iving in her reci pients a nd (3) s uch a llowance regularly granted, forms part of the total compensation package
brothers house, a n a ct, which s upports the domiciliary i ntention clearly ma nifested. She even of NTA Offi cers and employees, and, therefore, the disallowance thereof a mounts to unathorized
kept cl ose ti es by establishing residences i n Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other di minution of pay.
i mportant milestones. On February 7, 1995, the Commi ssion on Audit ca me out with its questioned Decision the
perti nent portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications After a thorough evaluation, this Office believes and so holds that the disallowance of the Auditor
to run for a s eat i n the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's on the payment of the mid-year social amelioration benefits or the educational assistance benefits
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, Ma y 7, Ma y 11, a nd Ma y 25, 1995 a re hereby SET ASIDE. is in order. It bears stress that Sec. 5.6 of CCC No. 10 (Implementing R.A. 6758) is so explicit when
Res pondent COMELEC i s hereby directed to order the Provi ncial Board of Ca nvassers to proclaim it provides that:
peti tioner a s the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte. Payment of other allowances/fringe benefit and all other forms of compensation granted on top
of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not mentioned in Sub-Paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 above
shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowance/fringe
**b. ut magis valeat quam pereat: construe statute as a whole benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public Funds.
i. Harmonize and give effects to all provisions whenever possible; reconcile apparently conflicting Since the educational assistance or the mid- year social amelioration is not among those
provisions allowances mentioned in Sub-pars. 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10, the same shall be discontinued
effective November 1, 1989 and considering that NTA paid its officials/employees this type of
NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION represented herein by Administrator AMANTE SIAPNO, allowance, such payment shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds.
EVANGELISTA A. GARCIA, RICARDO BRIONES, CLARITA B. CASTRO, CRISTINA LOPEZ, JESUS C. The provision of Sec. 12 second sentence thereof as invoked by the Administrator should be read in
BONDOC and ROSALINA C. CARINO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. conjunction with the first sentence thus -
DE CISION Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation - All allowances except for representation and
transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subistence [sic] allowance of marine
PURISIMA, J.: officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of
At ba r i s a petition for revi ew on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court to review foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise
a nd s et aside the decision of the Commission on Audit[1]dated February 7, 1995 i n COA Deci sion specified herein as may be determined by the DBMshall be deemed included in the standardized
No. 95-108.[2] salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind,
The Na tional Tobacco Administration (NTA, for short), under Executive Order No. 116, as amended being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary
by Executi ve Order No. 245,[3] i s a government-owned a nd controlled corporation (GOCC, for rates shall continue to be authorized. xxx
brevity) ta s ked to supervise and improve the vi ability of the tobacco i ndustry i n this country. xxx xxx xxx
On Augus t 9, 1989, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6758, [4] enti tled An Act Prescribing a Premises considered and for lack of legal basis, the herein request of the Administrator, NTA for
Revised Compensation and Position Classification in the Government and for Other Purposes. On the lifting of the disallowance in question, may not be given due course.[5] [Underscoring;
October 2, 1989, purs uant to Section 23 of s aid law, the Department of Budget a nd supplied]
Ma na gement (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (CCC No. 10) to s erve as the Unda unted, petitioners found their wa y to this Court vi a the present Petition for Review
Impl ementing Rules a nd Regulations of R.A. No. 6758. on Certiorari, fi l ed on April 24, 1995, s eeking the a nnulment of the said COA Decision; theorizing
Perti nent records s how that even prior to the effectivi ty of Republic Act No. 6758, offi cials a nd tha t the respondent Commission on Audit erred:
empl oyees of the NTA have been enjoying Mid-Year Social Amelioration Benefit equivalent to one- I.
13
IN HOLDING THAT THE PAYMENT OF SUBJECT SOCIAL AMELIORATION /EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE 4.1.2 Amelioration Allowance equivalent to ten percent (10%) of basic salary or P150.00 per
BENEFIT - A BENEFIT CONTINUOUSLY BEING RECEIVED BY INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS AND OTHER month, which ever is higher;
NTA EMPLOYEES STARTING WAY BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE SALARY STANDARDIZATION 4.1.3 COLA granted to GOCCs/GFIs covered by the Compensation and Position Classification
LAW (R.A. 6758) ON 1 JULY 1989 - IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THE SAME LAW (R.A. 6758) OR IS Plan for the regular agencies/offices of the National Government and to GOCCs/GFIs following the
OTHERWISE WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS; Compensation and Position Classification Plan under LOImp. No. 104/CCC No. 1 and LOImp. No.
II. 97/CCC No. 2, in the amount of P550.00 per month for those whose monthly basic salary is
IN FAILING TO REALIZE AND CONSIDER THAT THE DISALLOWANCE OF THE PAYMENT OF SUBJECT P1,500.00 and below, and P500.00 for those whose monthly basic salary is P1,501.00 and above,
SOCIAL AMELIORATION/EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE BENEFIT IS CONSTITUTIVE OF DIMINUTION OF granted on top of the COLA/BEP mentioned in Item 4.1.1 above;
COMPENSATION PROSCRIBED UNDER EXISTING LAWS AND IN VIOLATION OF THE GENERAL 4.1.4 Stabilization Allowance; and
WELFARE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION; 4.1.5 Allowance/fringe benefits converted into Transition Allowance pursuant to
III. Memorandum Order No. 177, as implemented by Corporate Budget Circular No. 15, both series of
IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED NTA 1988.
EMPLOYEES HAVE ACQUIRED A VESTED RIGHT OVER SAID SOCIAL AMELIORATION/EDUCATIONAL 4.2 Allowances enumerated above are deemed integrated into the basic salary for the
ASSISTANCE BENEFIT AND COAs DISALLOWANCE THEREOF IS AN ILLEGAL VIOLATION OF SUCH position effective July 1, 1989.
RIGHT. 4.3 Transition allowance, for purposes of this circular shall mean the excess of the present
Peti ti oners ra ise the pivotal i ssues: (1) whether or not the social amelioration or educational salary of the incumbent defined in Item 4.1 hereinabove, over the eighth step of the Salary Grade
a s sistance benefit gi ven to the i ndividual petitioners prior to enactment of R.A. 6758 i s authorized to which his position is allocated.
under the law, (2) whether or not the disallowance of the said benefit is ta ntamount to diminution C. Sub-Pa ragraphs 5.4, 5.5 a nd 5.6 of CCC. No. 10:
of pa y, a nd (3) whether or not the i ndividual petitioners have a cquired a vested ri ght thereover. 5.0 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
First Issue: xxx xxx xxx
Proper Interpretation of Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. 6758 in Relation to Sub-paragraphs 4.1, 5.4 The rates of the following allowances/fringe benefits which are not integrated into the
5.4 and 5.5 of Corporate Compensation Circular No.10, the Implementing Rules and Regulation of basic salary and which are allowed to be continued after June 30, 1989 shall be subject to the
R.A. 6758. condition that the grant of such benefit is covered by statutory authority.
A. Secti ons 12 a nd 17 of R. A. 6758, rea d: 5.4.1 Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA) of incumbent of the position
Section 12: Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation - All allowances, except for authorized to receive the same at the highest amount legally authorized as of June 30, 1989 of the
representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence level of his position within the particular GOCC/GFI;
allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; 5.4.2 Uniform and Clothing Allowance at a rate as previously authorized;
hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional 5.4.3 Hazard Pay as authorized by law;
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed 5.4.4 Honoraria/additional compensation for employees on detail with special projects of inter-
included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, agency undertakings;
whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into 5.4.5 Honoraria for services rendered by researchers, experts and specialists who are of
the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized. acknowledged authorities in their field of specialization;
Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local 5.4.6 Honoraria for lecturers and resource persons/speakers;
funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or employee 5.4.7 Overtime Pay in accordance to Memorandum Order No. 228;
and shall be paid by the National Government. 5.4.8 Clothing/laundry allowances and subsistence of marine officers and crew on board
whi le GOCCs/GFIs owned vessels and used in their operations, and of hospital personnel who attend
Secti on 17. Salaries of Incumbents - Incumbents of positions presently receiving salaries and directly to patients and who by nature of their duties are required to wear uniforms;
additional compensation/fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units and 5.4.9 Quarters Allowance of officials and employees who are presently entitled to the same;
other emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein 5.4.10 Overseas, Living Quarters and other allowances presently authorized for personnel
prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred to as stationed abroad;
transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary 5.4.11 Night Differential of personnel on night duty;
adjustment that the incumbent shall received [sic] in the future. 5.4.12 Per Diems of members of governing Boards of GOCCs/GFIs at the rate as prescribed in
B. Secti on 4.1 of CCC No. 10: their respective Charters;
4.0 DEFINITION OF TERMS 5.4.13 Flying Pay of personnel undertaking aerial flights;
4.1 The present salary of an incumbent for purposes of this Circular shall refer to the sum total 5.4.14 Per Diems/Allowances of Chairman and Members/Staff of collegial bodies and
of actual basic salary including allowances enumerated hereunder, being received as of June 30, Committees; and
1989 and certified and authorized by the DBM. 5.4.15 Per Diems/Allowances of officials and employees on official foreign and local tra vel
4.1.1 Cost-of-Living Allowance (COLA)/Bank Equity Pay (BEP) equivalent to forty percent (40%) outs ide of their official station;
of basic salary or P300.00 per month, whichever is higher;
14
5.5 Other allowances/fringe benefits not likewise Integrated into the basic salary and allowed to Under the fi rst sentence of Section 12, all a l lowances are i ntegrated into the prescribed s alary
be continued only for incumbents as of June 30, 1989 subject to the condition that the grant of the ra tes , except:
same is with appropriate authorization either from the DBM, Office of the President or legislative (1) representation and transportation a llowances (RATA);
issuances are as follows: (2) cl othing and laundry a llowances;
5.5.1 Rice Subsidy; (3) s ubsistence allowances of marine officers a nd crew on board government vessels;
5.5.2 Sugar Subsidy; (4) s ubsistence allowance of hospital personnel;
5.5.3 Death Benefits other than those granted by the GSIS; (5) ha zard pay;
5.5.4 Medical/Dental/Optical Allowances/Benefits; (6) a l lowance of foreign s ervice personnel stationed abroad; a nd
5.5.5 Childrens Allowance; (7) s uch other additional compensation not otherwise specified in Section 12 as may be
5.5.6 Special Duty Pay/Allowance; determined by the DBM.
5.5.7 Meal Subsidy; Ana l yzing No. 7, whi ch is the last clause of the first s entence of Section 12, i n relation to the other
5.5.8 Longevity Pay; and benefits therein enumerated, i t can be gleaned unerringly that i t is a catch-all proviso. Further
5.5.9 Tellers Allowance. refl ection on the nature of s ubject fri nge benefits indicates that all of them have one thing in
5.6 Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation granted on common - they belong to one category of privilege called allowances which are usually granted to
top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not mentioned in Sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 above offi cials a nd employees of the government to defray or reimburse the expenses i ncurred i n the
shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowances/fringe performance of their official functions. In Philippine Ports Authority vs. Commission on
benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds. Audit,[8] thi s Court ra tionalized that if these a llowances a re consolidated with the standardized
Peti ti oners maintain that since they have been receiving the s ocial a melioration or educational ra te, then the government official or employee will be compelled to spend h is personal funds in
a s sistance benefit before July 1, 1989, when R.A. No. 6758 took effect, a nd the benefit was not a ttending to his duties.
integrated i nto their s tandardized salary ra te, they a re entitled to receive it even after the The conclusion - that the enumerated fringe benefits are i n the nature of allowance - fi nds support
effectivity of the s aid Act.[6] They base their claim on the s econd sentence of Section 12 a nd on i n s ub-paragraphs 5.4 a nd 5.5 of CCC No. 10.
Secti on 17 of the Salary Sta ndardization La w which, for the sake of thoroughness a nd clarity of Sub-paragraph 5.4 enumerates the a llowance/fringe benefits which are not i ntegrated i nto the
di s cussion, we deem it expedient to quote again, to wi t: ba s ic salary a nd which may be continued a fter June 30, 1989 s ubject to the condition that the
Second Sentence of Section 12, R.A. 6758 - xxx. Such other additional compensation, whether in gra nt of s uch benefit i s covered by statutory a uthority, to wit:
cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the (1) RATA;
standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized; (2) Uni form and Cl othing allowances;
xxx (3) Ha za rd pay;
Secti on 17: Sa laries of Incumbents - Incumbents of positions presently receiving salaries and (4) Honoraria/additional compensation for employees on detail with special projects or i nter-
additional compensation /fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units a gency undertakings;
and other emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein (5) Honoraria for servi ces rendered by researchers, experts and specialists who are of
prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred as a cknowledged a uthorities i n their fields of specialization;
transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary (6) Honoraria for lectures and resource persons or s peakers;
adjustment that the incumbent shall received in the future. (7) Overti me pay i n accordance to Memorandum Order No. 228;
It i s the s ubmission of the Commission on Audit that payment of the educational a ssistance in (8) Cl othi ng/laundry a llowances and subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board
question is not a uthorized under Republic Act No. 6758, a rguing that the provision of Sec. 12, GOCCs /GFIs owned vessels and used in their operations, and of hospital personnel who attend
s econd sentence thereof as i nvoked by the Administrator [representing the petitioner herein] di rectly to patients a nd who by nature of their duties a re required to wear uniforms;
s hould be read in conjunction with the first s entence...; [7] a nd if the entire Section 12 i s further (9) Qua rters Allowance of officials a nd employees who a re presently entitled to the same;
cons idered in relation to s ub-paragraphs 5.4, 5.5 a nd 5.6 of CCC No. 10, res pondent concluded (10) Overs eas, Livi ng Quarters a nd other allowances presently a uthorized for personnel stationed
tha t the grant of s ubject educational a ssistance would have no l egal basis at a ll. a broad;
Confusion as to the proper i nterpretation of Section 12 s prings from two seemingly contradictory (11) Ni ght differential of personnel on night duty;
provi sions. The l ast cl ause of the first s entence of Section 12, reads: (12) Per Di ems of members of the governing Boards of GOCCs /GFIs at the ra te as prescribed i n
[A]nd such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by thei r respective Cha rters;
the DBM shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed; (13) Fl yi ng pay of personnel undertaking aerial flights;
whi le the s econd sentence of Section 12 i s to the following effect: (14) Per Di ems/Allowances of Chairman and Members or Staff of collegial bodies and Committees;
Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents a nd
only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be (15) Per Di ems/Allowances of officials a nd employees on official foreign and local tra vel outside of
authorized. thei r official station.
Before proceeding to rule on the proper i nterpretation of the two provisos a forecited, the salient In a ddition, sub-paragraph 5.5 of the same Implementing Rules provi des for the other
fea tures of the provision as a whole should first be pondered upon and tackled. a l lowances/fringe benefits not likewise integrated i nto the basic salary a nd allowed to be
15
conti nued only for i ncumbents as of June 30, 1989 s ubject to the condition that the grant of the tha t i t i s not mentioned i n the Implementing Rules of the Statute is consequently fallacious. It is a
s a me is with appropriate a uthorization either from the DBM, Offi ce of the President or l egislative s ettled rule of l egal hermeneutics that the implementing rules a nd regulations (CCC No. 10, in this
i s suances, as follows: case) ca nnot amend the a ct of Congress (R.A. 6758). The second s entence of R.A. No. 6758
(1) Ri ce Subsidy; expressly provides that such additional compensation ... being re ceived by i ncumbents ... not
(2) Suga r Subsidy; i ntegrated into the s tandardized salary ra tes shall continue to be a uthorized. To be sure, the said
(3) Dea th Benefits other than those granted by the GSIS; Ci rcul ar ca nnot go beyond the terms a nd provisions of the statute as to prohibit something
(4) Medi cal/Dental/Optical Allowances/Benefits; permi tted a nd allowed by l aw.[13] The Circular ca nnot extend the law or expand i ts coverage as the
(5) Chi l drens Allowances; power to a mend or repeal a s tatute is vested i n the legislature. [14]
(6) Special Duty Pa y/Allowance; Conforma bly, as mandated by the s econd sentence of Section 12, i n relation to Section 17 of the
(7) Mea l Subsidy; Republic Act under i nterpretation, the mid-year educational assistance should continue to be
(8) Longevi ty Pa y; a nd a uthorized.
(9) Tel lers Allowance. THE SECOND AND THE THIRD ISSUES:

On the other hand, the challenged financial incentive is a warded by the government in order to That the Disallowance of the Payment of Subject Educational Assistance Constitutes Diminution of
encourage the beneficiaries to pursue further s tudies and to help them underwrite the expenses Compensation; That the NTA Employees Have Already Acquired a Vested Right Over the Same.
for the education of their children and dependents. In other words, subject benefit is in the Gl eanable from the wordings of the second s entence of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 i s the
na ture of financial assistance a nd not of an allowance. For the former, reimbursement is not i ntention of Congress to prevent a ny diminution of the pay a nd benefits being received by
necessary while for the latter, reimbursement is required. Not only that, the former i s basically i ncumbents a t the time of the enactment of the Salary Standardization Law. Verily, disallowing
a n incentive wage whi ch is defined as a bonus or other payment made to employees i n addition a ny s uch benefit is a gainst the s pirit of the Statute and is inconsistent with the principle of equity
to gua ra nteed hourly wages[9] while the latter ca nnot be reckoned with a s abonus or additional whi ch regards the spirit and not the l etter...[15] of the law. Hence, while i t cannot be said that
income, s tri ctl y speaking. the NTA employees have a cquired a vested ri ght over the educational assistance i n dispute as i t is
It i s i ndeed decisively cl ear that the benefits mentioned i n the first sentence of Section 12 a nd a l ways subject to availability of funds, [16] nevertheless, disallowing the same, where funds a re
s ub-paragraphs 5.4 a nd 5.5 of CCC No. 10 a re entirely di fferent from the benefit in dispute, a va ilable as i n the case under consideration, would be vi olative of the principle of equity.
denominated as Educational Assistance. The distinction elucidated upon is material in a rriving a t WHEREFORE, the petition i s hereby GRANTED; the assailed COA Decision No. 95 - 108 i s SET
the correct i nterpretation of the two seemingly contradictory provisions of Section 12. ASIDE, a nd the disallowance in question LIFTED. No pronouncement a s to costs.
Ca rdi nal is the rule i n s tatutory construction that the particular words, cl auses a nd phrases SO ORDERED.
s hould not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but thewhole and every part of the Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
s ta tute must be considered in fixing the meaning of a ny of i ts parts a nd i n order to produce a Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, a nd Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
ha rmonious whole. A s tatute must s o construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its
provi sions whenever possible.[10] And the rule - that s tatute must be construed as a whole -
requi res that a pparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized, if at all
pos sible.[11] It i s likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the l egislature
i s the controlling factor i n the interpretation of the subject statute. [12] Wi th these rules a nd the
foregoing distinction elaborated upon, it i s evident that the two seemingly i rreconcilable REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and
propositions are susceptible to perfect harmony. Accordingly, the Court concludes that under the LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ACIL
a foresaid catch-all proviso, the l egislative i ntent i s just to i nclude the fri nge benefits which are in CORPORATION,respondents.
the na ture of allowances a nd since the benefit under controversy is not i n the same ca tegory, i t is DE CISION
s a fe to hold that s ubject educational a ssistance is not one of the fri nge benefits within the MENDOZA, J.:
contemplation of the first s entence of Section 12 but ra ther, of the second s entence of Section 12, Pri va te respondent Aci l Corporation owned several hectares of La nd Linoan, Montevista, Davao
i n relation to Section 17 of R.A. No. 6758, considering that (1) the recipients were incumbents del Norte, which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A.
when R.A. No. 6758 took effect on July 1, 1989, (2) were, i n fact, receiving the same, at the ti me, No. 6657). Pri va te respondents certificates of title were ca ncelled a nd new ones were issued and
a nd (3) s uch additional compensation i s distinct a nd s eparate from the s pecific allowances above- di s tributed to farmer-beneficiaries.
l i sted, as the former is not integrated into the standardized s alary ra te. Simply s tated, the The l ands were va lued by the Land Bank of the Philippines a t P19,312.24 per hectare for the
cha l lenged benefit is covered by the s econd sentence of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758, the ri celand a nd P4,267.68 per hectare for brushland, or for a total of P439,105.39. It a ppears,
a pplication of sub-paragraphs 5.4 a nd 5.5 of CCC No. 10 bei ng only confined to the fi rst s entence however, that in the Statement of Agricultural La ndholdings (LISTASAKA) which priva te
of Secti on 12, particularly the last clause thereof which amplifies the catch-all proviso. res pondent had earlier filed with the Department of Agra rian Reform (DAR), a lower Fair Value
Furthermore, the non-inclusion by the Department of Budget a nd Ma nagement of the Accepta ble to La ndowner was stated and that based on this statement, the Land Bank of the
controverted educational assistance in Sub-paragraphs 5.4 a nd 5.5 of CCC No. 10 i s expected since Phi l ippines va lued private respondents l ands uniformly a t P15,311.79 per hectare a nd fixed the
the term allowance does not i nclude the questioned benefit which belongs to a a mount of P390,557.84 a s the total compensation to be paid for the l ands.
di fferent genus. The a rgument that the s aid fringe benefit should be disallowed on the ground
16
Pri va te respondent rejected the governments offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the (2) the prosecution of all cri minal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657].[2] The provisions of 50 must
s a me crops were valued at the higher price of P24,717.40 per hectare. The matter was brought be construed i n harmony wi th this provision by considering cases involving the determination of
before the Provi ncial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, on October 8, 1992, s us tained jus t compensation a nd cri minal cases for vi olations of R.A. No. 6657 a s excepted from the
the i nitial va luation made by the LBP. pl enitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR
On December 12, 1992, pri va te respondent filed a Petition for Just Compensation i n the Regional i s a n a dministrative a gency which cannot be gra nted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain
Tri a l Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, sitting as a Special Agra rian Court. Pri vate respondent (for s uch are takings under R.A. No. 6657) a nd over cri minal cases. Thus, in EPZA v.
pra yed that DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed its Dulay[3] a nd Sumulong v. Guerrero[4] we hel d that the valuation of property i n eminent domain is
peti tion on the ground that priva te respondent should have a ppealed to the Department of es sentially a judicial function which ca nnot be vested in administrative agencies, while i n Scotys
Agra ri an Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to the latters Revised Rules of Procedure, Department Store v. Micaller[5] we s truck down a law granting the then Court of Industrial
before recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In addition the RTC found that, in violation of the Rel ations jurisdiction to try cri mi nal cases for vi olations of the Industrial Peace Act.
DARABs rules of procedure the petition had been filed more than fifteen (15) days a fter notice of Peti ti oners also ci te Rule II, 5 a nd Rule XIII, 1 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure in s upport of
the decision of the PARAD. thei r contention that decisions of agrarian reform a djudicators may only be a ppealed to the
Pri va te respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied on October 13, DARAB. These rules provide:
1994. Pri va te respondent therefore filed a petition for certiorari wi th the Court of Appeals, Rul e II 5. Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review,
contending that a petition for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 56-57 fa lls under the revers e, modify, alter or a ffirm resolutions, orders, decisions, a nd other dispositions of i ts
excl usive a nd original jurisdiction of the RTC. His contention was sustained by the Court of [regi onal a nd provincial agrarian reform adjudicators].
Appeals which, i n i ts decision[1] of October 4, 1995, s et a side the order of dismissal of the Rul e XIII, 1. Appeal to the Board. a ) An a ppeal may be taken from a n order or decision of the
RTC. Accordi ngly, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. Regi onal or Provi ncial Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both, by gi ving or s tating
In turn the government, represented by the Department of Agra rian Reform, filed this petition for a wri tten or oral a ppeal within a period of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the resolution,
revi ew on certiorari, ra ising as the issue whether i n cases involving cl aims for just compensation order or decision a ppealed from, a nd serving a copy thereof on the opposite or adverse party, i f
under R.A. No. 6657 a n appeal from the decision of the provincial a djudicator to the DARAB must the a ppeal is in writing.
fi rs t be made before a landowner ca n resort to the RTC under 57. Petitioners s ustain the b) An ora l a ppeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by the appellant,
a ffi rmative proposition. They ci te 50 of R.A. No. 6657 whi ch in pertinent part provi des: a nd a copy thereof shall be served upon the opposite or adverse party within ten (10) days from
50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the Dar. The DAR i s hereby ves ted with primary jurisdiction to the ta king of oral a ppeal.
determine a nd a djudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction Apa rt from the fact that only a statute ca n confer jurisdiction on courts a nd a dministrative
over a l l matters involving the i mplementation of a grarian reform, except those falling under the a gencies rul es of procedure cannot i t is noteworthy that the New Rules of Procedure of the
excl usive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) a nd the Department of Environment DARAB, whi ch was adopted on Ma y 30, 1994, now provi de that in the event a l andowner i s not
a nd Na tural Resources (DENR). s a tisfied with a decision of a n agrarian adjudicator, the l andowner ca n bring the matter directly to
a nd a rgue that the fixing of just compensation for the ta king of lands under R.A. No. 6657 i s a the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. Thus Rule XIII, 11 of the new rules
[ma tter] involving the i mplementation of a grarian reform within the contemplation of this provi des:
provi sion. They i nvoke 16(f) of R.A. No. 6657, which provides that any party who disagrees to 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. The
the decision [of the DAR] may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final deci sion of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
determination of just compensation, as confirming their construction of 50. compensation s hall not be appealable to the Board but s hall be brought directly to the Regional
The contention has no merit. Tri a l Courts designated a s Special Agra rian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
It i s true that 50 gra nts the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian noti ce thereof. Any pa rty s hall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis
reform ma tters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the i mplementation s upplied)
of a gra rian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Thi s is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the decision of just compensation cases for the
Agri cul ture a nd the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. It is a lso true, however, ta ki ng of lands under R.A. No. 6657 i s a power vested in the courts.
tha t 57 provi des: Thus , under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of
57. Special jurisdiction. The Special Agra rian Court s hall have original and exclusive jurisdiction determining the value of l ands placed under land reform a nd the compensation to be paid for
over a l l petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, a nd the prosecution thei r ta king.[6] Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to 16(a ) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR
of a l l cri minal offenses under this Act. the Rules of Court s hall a pply to a ll proceedings before the ma kes a n offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary a dministrative proceeding i s
Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. hel d[7] a nd a fterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB)
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their s pecial jurisdiction a djudicator a s the case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for
wi thin thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision. the l a nd. If the l andowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC
Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original a nd exclusive a cti ng as Special Agrarian Court.[8]This i n essence is the procedure for the determination of
juri s diction over two categories of ca ses, to wi t: compensation ca ses under R.A. No. 6657. In a ccordance with it, the priva te respondents case was
(1) a l l petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and properly brought by i t i n the RTC, a nd it was error for the l atter court to have dismissed the
ca s e. In the terminology of 57, the RTC, s itting a s a Special Agrarian Court, has ori ginal and
17
excl usive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to mus t be so construed a nd harmonized with other s tatutes a s to form a uniform s ystem of
l a ndowners.[9] It would subvert this original a nd exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to juri s prudence.[17]In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting
ves t ori ginal jurisdiction i n compensation ca ses i n administrative officials a nd make the RTC a n l a ws. It is only when harmonization is i mpossible that resort must be made to choosing which law
a ppellate court for the review of a dministrative decisions. to a pply.
Cons equently, a lthough the new rules s peak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to In the i nstant case, Art. 36 of the Ci vil Code a nd Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court a re
the RTCs s itting a s Special Agra rian Courts, i t is clear from 57 tha t s us ceptible of an i nterpretation that would harmonize both provisions of l aw. The phrase
the ori ginal and exclusive jurisdiction to determine s uch cases i s in the RTCs . Any effort to transfer previ ously i nstituted ci vil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 i s plainly worded and is not s usceptible of
s uch jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs i nto a l ternative interpretations. The clause before any cri minal prosecution may be i nstituted or may
a ppellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57 a nd therefore would be void. What adjudicators proceed i n Art. 36 of the Ci vil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to
a re empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary ma nner the reasonable compensation s us pend the criminal action ma y be filed during the preliminary i nvestigation with the public
to be pa id to landowners, l eavi ng to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question. pros ecutor or court conducting the i nvestigation, or during the tri al with the court hearing the
WHEREFORE the petition for review on certiorari i s DENIED a nd the decision of the Court of ca s e.
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Thi s interpretation would harmonize all the mentioned laws. Thus, under the principles of
SO ORDERED. s ta tutory construction, it i s this i nterpretation of Art. 36 of the Ci vi l Code that s hould govern i n
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno, a nd Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. order to gi ve effect to all the relevant provisions of law.

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS CLEOFE JANIOLA AND HON. ARTHUR FAMINI, GR NO Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
184861, JUNE 30, 2009 Pos ted on November 18, 2012
G.R.No. 120865-71
FACTS December 7, 1995

Peti ti oner, filed a Complaint Affidavit a gainst private respondent with the Office of the Ci ty Facts:
Pros ecutor of Las Pi as Ci ty for vi olation of Batas Pa mbansa Bilang 22. Afterwards, private
res pondent, together wi th her husband, filed a complaint a gainst petitioner for the rescission of The La guna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 i n order to
a n a lleged construction a greement between the parties, a s well a s for damages. Thereafter, execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so a s to
pri va te respondent filed for a Motion to Suspend proceedings alleging that for the rescission of a n a ccel erate the development a nd balanced growth of the Laguna La ke a rea and the surrounding
a l leged construction a greement between the parties, as well as for damages. provi nces a nd towns.
ISSUE PD No. 813 a mended certain sections of RA 4850 s i nce water quality s tudies have shown that the
WON the court s eriously erred i n not perceivi ng gra ve a buse of discretion on the part of the l a ke will deteriorate further i f s teps are not taken to check the same.
i nferior court when the latter ruled to s uspend proceddings i n Cri minal Ca se Nos. 55554-61 on the EO 927 further defined a nd enlarged the functions a nd powers of the LLDA and enumerated the
ba s is o f prejudicial question in Ci vil Ca se No. LP-06-0197.[ towns , cities and provinces encompassed by the term La guna de Bay Region.
RULING Upon i mplementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed
Pri va te respondent ci tes Article 36 of the Ci vil Code. The Court does not a gree with private excl usive jurisdiction & a uthority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since
res pondents a rgument that a prejudicial question exists when the ci vil action i s filed either before Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the a uthority to gra nt fishery
the i nstitution of the cri minal action or during the pendency of the cri minal a ction a nd that there pri vi leges i n the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore
i s a n a pparent conflict i n the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Ci vil Code in that the latter Bi g fi shpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fi sh cages to the
cons iders a civil ca se to have presented a prejudicial question even i f the cri minal case preceded cons ternation of the LLDA.
the fi ling of the civil case. The i mplementation of separate i ndependent policies in fish cages & fi sh pen operation and the
i t i s a basic precept i n statutory construction that a change in phraseology by a mendment of a i ndiscriminate gra nt of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake
provi sion of law indicates a l egislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that i t wi th fishpens, thereby aggravating the current envi ronmental problems and ecological stress of
ori gi nally had.In the i nstant case, the phrase, previously i nstituted, was i nserted to qualify the La guna Lake.
na ture of the ci vil action involved in a prejudicial question i n relation to the cri minal action. This The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, ca ges & other a qua-culture
i nterpretation is further buttressed by the i nsertion of subsequent directly before the term s tructures unregistered with the LLDA as of Ma rch 31, 1993 a re declared illegal; (2) those declared
cri mi nal a ction. There is no other l ogical explanation for the a mendments except to qualify the i l legal s hall be s ubject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen a nd Illegal
rel a tionship of the civil a nd cri minal a ctions, that the civil a ction must precede the cri minal action. Fi s hing; a nd (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be cri minally charged with vi olation of
Addi tionally, i t is a principle in s tatutory construction that a s tatute should be construed not only Sec.39-A of RA 4850 a s a mended by PD 813.
to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other l aws on the same subject matter, as A month later, the LLDA sent notices a dvising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens,
to form a complete, coherent and intelligible s ystem.This principle i s consistent wi th the fi s hcages and other a qua-culture s tructures advising them to dismantle their respective s tructures
ma xi m, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every s ta tute otherwise demolition shall be effected.
18
of Appeals, where i t was joined by PAGCOR a s intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their
Issues: cha l lenge succeeded. On Ma rch 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid
1.Whi ch a gency of the government the LLDA or the towns a nd municipalities comprising the a nd i ssued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement
regi on s hould exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance
of permi ts for fishery pri vileges is concerned? ISSUE: WON Ordi na nce 3353 a nd 3375-93 va lid
2. Whether the LLDA i s a quasi-judicial agency?
HELD: No
Held: Loca l Government Code, l ocal government units are a uthorized to prevent or suppress, among
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,a nd Sec.2 of EO No.927, others , "gambling and other prohibited ga mes of chance." Obvi ously, this provision excludes
s pecifically provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all ga mes of chance which a re not prohibited but are i n fact permitted by l aw.The rationale of the
s urfa ce water for any projects or a ctivities i n or a ffecting the said region. On the other hand, RA requi rement that the ordinances should not contravene a s tatute is obvious.Casino gambling i s
7160 ha s granted to the municipalities the exclusive a uthority to grant fishery privileges on a uthorized by P.D. 1869. Thi s decree has the status of a statute that ca nnot be amended or
muni cipal waters.The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the nul lified by a mere ordinance. Hence, i t was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
LLDA a nd granting the l atter water ri ghts a uthority over Laguna de Bay a nd the lake region. Ca ga ya n de Oro Ci ty to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since opera tion of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be pra i seworthy motives, these ordinances a re contrary to P.D. 1869 a nd the public policy a nnounced
taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary therein and are therefore ultra vi res a nd void.
conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored a nd, as much a s possible, effect must be given to a ll
ena ctments of the l egislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a Gaerlan vs Catubig
subsequent general law by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other Facts:
ha nd, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fish ca ges, and other a qua-culture In the 1963 el ections, among the registered candidates for councilors in the eight -seatCity Council
s tructures i s for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring a ctivities i n the La guna de Bay of Da gupan were Gregorio Gaerlan a nd Luis Ca tubig. The latter obtained the third highest number
regi on a nd for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police power whi ch is of votes a nd was proclaimed one of the elected councilors while the former lost his bid. Gaerlan
the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers i ncl uding the power went to the Court to challenge Ca tubigs eligibility for officeon the a verment of non-age. Catubig
of ta xa tion. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power wa s born in Dagupan Ci ty on Ma y 19, 1939. At the ti me he presented his certificate of candidacy
should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. on September 10, 1963, he wa s 24 yea rs, 3 months a nd
2. The LLDA ha s express powers as a regulatory a nd quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution
ca s es with authority to i ssue a cease a nd desist order a nd on matters affectin g the construction 22 da ys ; on election day, November 12, 1963, he wa s 24 years, 5 months a nd 24 da ys; a nd a t the
of i l legal fishpens, fish cages and other a qua-culture s tructures i n La guna de Bay. ti me he took his oath of office as councilor on January 1, 1964,3 he wa s 24 yea rs, 7 months a nd 13
Sec.149 of RA 7160 ha s not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, a s da ys . Whether his age be reckoned as of the date of the filing of certificate of candidacy, or the
a mended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery el ection date, or the date set by l aw for the assumption of office the - result is the same.
privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein a nd the authority to Whi chever date i s adopted, s till, respondent was below 25 years of age. The judgment held
exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. Ca tubi g i neligible and declared his s eat va cant. Ca tubig appealed a nd alleged that the question of
a ge eligibility should be governed not by R.A.170, a nd not by R.A. 2259. Republic Act No. 484
Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties a mending, inter a lia, Section 12 of the Dagupan Ci ty Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950;
whereas, Republic Act No. 2259 beca me law on June 19, 1959 - ni ne years later.
G.R. No. 111097 Jul y 20, 1994 R .A . 170, a s a mended
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, peti tioners,
vs . Sec. 12 x xx the el ective members of the Municipality Board shall be qualified
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,
el ectors of the city, residents therein for a t least one year, a nd not less than twenty- three
FACTS:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR a nnounced the opening of a ca sino in Ca gayan de yea rs of age. xxx"
Oro Ci ty. Ci vi c orga nizations a ngrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when i n 1992, fl ush
wi th i ts tremendous s uccess i n s everal cities, PAGCOR decided to expand i ts operations to R .A .2 2 5 9
Ca ga ya n de Oro Ci ty.he reaction of the Sangguniang Pa nlungsod of Ca gayan de Oro Ci ty was s wift
a nd hostile. On December 7, 1992, i t enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this a ll. On Ja nuary 4, Sec. 6.No person shall be a Ci ty Ma yor, Vi ce-Mayor, or Councilor unless he is a t least
1993, i t a dopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce a ssailed the ordinances before the Court
19
twenty-five years of a ge, resident of the ci ty for one year prior to his election a nd is a qualified HELD:
voter. Yes . It is true that i n case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law; that the charter of
Ma ni la is a s pecial law a nd that the Ci vil Code i s a general l aw. However, looking a t the particular
Issue: provi sions of each l aw concerned, the provision of the Ma nila Charter exempting i t from liability
Whether or not Sec. 12 of R.A. 170 of the Dagupan Ci ty Charter, a s amended, has been repealed ca us ed by the negligence of i ts officers is a general law i n the s ense that i t exempts the ci ty from
by Sec. 6 of R.A. 2259 negligence of i ts officers i n general. There is no particular exemption but merely a general
exemption. On the other hand, Arti cle 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription to
Decision: the effect that i t makes provi nces, cities, and municipalities liable for the damages caused to a
Yes . The judgment a ppealed from was a ffirmed. The question of whether or not a special law has certa i n person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
been repealed or amended by one and other-public works under their control or supervision.
or more s ubsequent general laws i s dependent mainly on the i ntent of the Congress i n enacting The a llegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only ra ised for the first time
the l a tter. The discussions on the floor of Co ngress show beyond doubt that i ts members i n the Ci tys motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, hence it ca nnot be given due
i ntended to amend o r repeal all provisions of s pecial l aws inconsistent with the provisions of wei ght. At a ny ra te, even though it i s a national highway, the law contemplates that regardless i f
Republic Act No. 2259, except those which are expressly excluded from the operation thereof. whether or not the road is national, provincial, ci ty, or municipal, so long as it is under the Ci tys
control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason of the defective conditions
In fa ct, Section 9 of R.A. 2259 s ta tes that thereof. In the case at bar, the Ci ty a dmitted they have control a nd s upervision over the road
Al l Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations i n consistent with the provisions where Teotico fell when the Ci ty alleged that it has been doing constant a nd regular inspection of
of thi s Act, a re hereby repealed. the ci tys roads, P. Burgos i ncluded.
Secti on 1of R.A. 2259 ma kes reference to "all chartered ci ties i n the Philippines, City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes
whereas Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act "the ci ties of Ma nila, Ca vite, Trece FACTS: Sec. 1 PD 551 provi des that a ny provision of law or l ocal ordinance to the contrary, the
fra nchise tax payable by a ll grantees of franchise to generate, distribute, and sell electric current
Ma rti res and Tagaytay", a nd Section 4 contains a proviso exclusively for the Ci ty of Baguio, for l i ght, heat, a nd power s hall be 25 of their gross receipts.
thus showing clearly that a ll ci ties not particularly excepted from the provisions of said Act a re Sec. 137 of the LGC s ta tes: Notwithstanding a ny exemption granted by a ny l aw or other special
l a w, the province may i mpose a ta x on business enjoying a franchise a t a ra te not exceeding 50%
s ubject thereto. The only reference to Dagupan Ci ty i n R.A. 2259 i s found in Section 2 s tating that of 1% of the gross a nnul receipts.
voters i n s aid city, a nd in the City of Iloilo, a re expressly precluded to vote for provincial officials. RULING: the phrase is all-encompassing a nd cl ear that the l egislature intended to withdraw all tax
Si nce Dagupan Ci ty is removed from the exceptions of R.A. 2259, i t s tands to reason itself that i ts exemptions enjoyed by fra nchise holders a nd this intent is made more manifest by Sec. 193 of the
cha rter provision on the age limit i s thereby repealed. Until Congress decrees otherwise, we a re Code, when it provides that unless otherwise provi ded i n this code tax exemptions or i ncentives
not to ta mper with the present statutory s et-up. Rather, we should go by what the legislative body gra nted to or presently enjoyed by all persons, except local water districts, cooperatives, a nd non -
ha s expressly ordained.It i s accordingly held that respondent is disqualified on the ground of non - s tock a nd non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, a re withdrawn upon the effectivi ty of
a ge because a t the time he filed his certificate of ca ndidacy, a t the ti me of the election, and at the the Code.
ti me he took his oath of office, he was below the a ge of 25 yea rs. La gma n v Ci ty of Ma nila (QUICO)
Lagman vs. City of Manila 17 SCRA 579 (1966) (Quico's version)
City of Manila vs Genaro Teotico
Facts:
22 SCRA 267 Civil Law - Torts and Damages Liability of municipal corporations in certain cases Peti ti oner was gra nted a certificate of public convenience by the Public s ervice Commission to
In Ja nuary 1958, a t a bout 8pm, Genaro Teotico was about to board a jeepney in P. Burgos, Ma nila opera te for public service fi fteen (15) auti trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the
when he fell into a n uncovered manhole. This caused i njuries upon him. Thereafter he sued for tra ns portation of passengers and freight. Pursuant to the said certificate, petitioner who is doing
da mages under Arti cle 2189 of the Ci vil Code the Ci ty of Ma nila, the mayor, the city engineer, the bus iness under the name and styl e of Ma rco Transit, began operating twelve (12) passenger
ci ty hea lth officer, the ci ty treasurer, a nd the chief of police. CFI Ma nila ruled against Teotico. The bus es along his authorized l ine.
CA, on a ppeal, ruled that the Ci ty of Ma nila should pay damages to Teotico. The Ci ty of Manila On june 17, 1964, the Muni cipal Board of respondent Ci ty of Ma nila, i n pursuance to section 18,
a s sailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Ma nila states that i t shall not be pa ra graph hh, of RA no. 409, a s amended (otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of
l i able for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in enforcing the charter; that the Ma ni la), enacted ordinance no. 4986, entitled a n ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and
cha rter i s a s pecial law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law; and that the Streets within the Ci ty of Ma nila, a nd for other purposes, which the ci ty mayor approved. The
a cci dent happened i n national highway. perti nent provisions of said ordinance includes;
Secti on 1. As a positive measure to relieve the critical congestion in the Ci ty of Manila, which has
ISSUE: grown to a larming and emergency proportions, and i n the best interest of public welfare and
Whether or not the Ci ty of Ma nila i s liable in the ca se at bar. convenience, xxx
Peti ti oner La gman cl aims that the enactment a nd enforcement of ordinance no. 4986 i s
20
unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vi res, and null and void. He contends that regulation and control
rel a ting to the use of and tra ffic of which a re vested, under Commonwealth Act no. 548, i n the HELD:
Di rector of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and The SC rul ed against Pa ras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly
Communications. He a lso contends that the public Service Commission has the only ri ght to enact the a ssailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC ha d s tressed reasonableness, consonant
Ordi nance amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience gra nted by the said office. In wi th the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, a s well a s consistency wi th the
compl iance with Sec. 16(m), public service Act. l a ws or policy of the State. It cannot be s aid that s uch a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power
by Boca ue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a
Issue: worthy a nd desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field.
WON R.A. no. 409, a s a mended (Revised charter of the Ci ty of Ma nila) prevails over Certa i nly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be
Commonwealth Act no. 598 a nd Public Servi ce law (C.A. no. 146, a s amended)? a chi eved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions ra ther than by a n absolute
prohi bition. Purs uant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should a nd ca n only regulate not
Held: prohi bit the business of ca barets.
Republic act no. 409 prevails. The s aid act is a special law and of l ater enactment than C.A. no 548
a nd the Public Service law (C.A. no 146, a s a mended) so that even if a conflict exist between the Vda de Urbano v GSIS (2001)
provi sions of the former a nd the latter a cts, Republic Act no. 409 s hould prevail. Vda De Urbano v Gs is
Al though the Public Service Commission is empowered, under Sec. 16(m) of C.A. no 146 to a mend, 2001
modi fy or revoke certificates of public convenience a fter notice and hearing, there is no provision
whi ch ca n be found in this statute vesting power in the Public Service Commission to superintend, Facts
regul ate or control the streets of the city of manila or s uspend i ts power to license or prohibit the In 1971, peti tioners mortgaged their 200 s qm property i n Q.C. to Gs is to secure a housing l oan.
occupa ncy thereof. On the other hand, this a uthority is conferred upon the ci ty of manila. The Si nce they were unable to pay the loan, GSIS foreclosed the mortgage in 1988. GSIS bid 154k on
power vested i n the public s ervice commission under section 16(m) is, therefore, subordinate to the property a nd emerged as the highest bidder.
the a uthority granted to the said ci ty under s ection 18(hh) of its revised charter. In 1984, the petitioners tri ed to reclaim their property. They wrote to the GSIS Acquired Assets
Furthermore, C.A. no. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or a uthority upon the Director of Department s ignifying their i ntent to reclaim. On October 16, GSIS told them to pay the
public works------to promulgate rules a nd regulations relating to the use of a nd tra ffic on national redemption price of 154k i n full before Nov 18, 1984.
roa ds a nd s treets. This being the case, section 18(m) of the revised charter of the ci ty of manila is The petitioners asked for more time to recover the property while the Acq uired Assets
deemed enacted as a n exception to the provisions of C.A. no. 548, for repeals by i mplication a re Department s ubsequently told them to pay 174k i n cash with a n extension of 30 da ys to the
not fa vored, and special law must be ta ken a s intended to constitute an exception to the general November date. Failure to do so forfeited the reclamation of the property a nd sold i n a public
l a w, i n the absence of s pecial ci rcumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. bi dding.
Wherefore, petition for prohibition i s hereby dismissed. With cost a gainst petitioner Benedicto C. The petitioners wrote again requesting for remortgage through repurchase of the property. The
La gma n. Gs i s AAD declined.
The petitioners wrote to the Board for an approval to file a l oan worth 240,000 wi th the GSIS real
DELA CRUZ VS PARAS es tate department to repurchase their foreclosed property. Despite a ttempts from Vice Governor
Ma tha y to a djust to a more liberal arrangement for the petitioners, the the petitioners were
De La Cruz et a l were club & ca baret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, una ble to pay. GSIS then i ssued a TCT i n its favor.
Ser. of 1975 or the Prohi bition and Cl osure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz a verred that The res pondent De La Cruz entered the picture and offered to purchase the property for 250,000
the s aid Ordinance vi olates their ri ght to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would s pot ca sh. Without knowledge of the ri val offer, the petitioners then offered a 50,000
cl os e out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy a nd are not allowed downpayment with the 124k balance to be paid i n 5 yea rs. He also enclosed 10k i n check as
to go out wi th customers. Judge Pa ras however lifted the TRO he earlier i ssued against Ord. 84 ea rnest money. The Board informed them that i t had adopted reolution 881 tha t declined their
a fter due hearing declaring that Ord 84. i s constitutional for i t is pursuant to RA 938 whi ch reads offer to repurchase.
AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE At the s ame time, GSIS negotiated with Dela Cruz for the purchase of the property. They accepted
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN her offer of purchase. A new TCT wa s issued to her.
THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Pa ras ruled that the prohibition is a valid The petitioners, on the other hand, had their l oan request rescinded because a certificate of
exerci se of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they a wa rd or sale was not issued i n favor of the applicant. Moreover, the applicant, Urbano the
were deprived of due process. peti tioner, was 81 yea rs old a nd no longer a member of the GSIS. It wasnt given due
cons ideration.
ISSUE: Ha vi ng l earned a bout the transaction with dela Cruz, the petitioners requested the formal
Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan ca n, prohibit the exercise of a l awful i nvestigation with the GSIS regarding the sale. Not satisfied, they filed a case with the RTC of QC
tra de, the operation of night cl ubs, a nd the pursuit of a lawful occupation, s uch cl ubs employing bra nch 102.
hos tesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further i n pursuant to RA 938. The petition was dismissed. The s ame vi ew was upheld by the court of appeals.
21
Hence this petition. govt fi na ncial i nstitutions of foreclosed assets or collaterals a cquired in the regular course of
bus iness and not tra nsferred to the Govt under proclamation no 50.
Issues: The modes of disposal included Public a uction and sale thru negotiation.
1. Do petitioners have a ri ght to repurchase the s ubject property? Doctrine: With regard to these 2 laws, the Court held the question whether the subject
2. Does GSIS have a duty to dispose of the subject property through public bidding? property was covered by the said Circular or falls under its exception. It held that 89-296 was to
3. Wa s Gsis i n bad faith i n dealing wi th petitioners? be interpreted with 86-264 in adherence with stat con wherein statutes that relate to the same
thing ought to be taken in consideration in construing any one of them, and it is an established
Ruling: Peti ti on Dismissed rule of law that all acts in pari material are to be taken together as if they were one law.
Moreover, the court l ooked i nto the i ntent of both laws a nd held that these were used to
Ra ti o: generate more revenue for GOCCS through the disposition of i ts non-preforming assets. (Look
1. No i nto PD 50 or the a sset privatization trust i n the ca se) According to the court, the policy i ntent on
Cha rter of the GSIS was PD 1146 which stipulated the power of the GSIS to acquire, utilize, and the di sposition of acquired a ssets then governed the case a t bar.
di s pose of real or personal properties in the Philippines or elsewhere. It was a mended by PD 1981 Wa s the property covered by the public bidding exceptions in these laws? The court said yes,
whi ch gave the GSIS the power to compromise or release any claim or settled l iability to the whi ch meant that their sale negotiation fell under the regular course of business, and thus did not
s ys tem. offend the requirements of the said coa ci rculars.
SC- The l a ws granted the GSIS Board the power to exercise discretion in determining the terms 3. No.
a nd condition of financial accommodations to i ts members with the dual purpose of making the GSIS denial of petitioners further requests for repurchase of s ubject property was based on a
GSIS more responsive to the needs of GSIS members. The laws also stipulated that the Board fa ctual determination of the petitioners financial capacity a nd the GSIS charter, PD 1146. Al s o,
coul d exercise discretion on whether to accept or reject petitioners offer to repurchase the GSIS s old the property to dela Cruz only a fter giving them one year to repurchase.
s ubject property ta king i nto account the dual purpose enunciated i n the whereas cl ause of PD The petitioners, on the strength of the Valmonte ca se, cant a lso impute bad faith on GSIS when i t
1981 whi ch made the GSIS more responsive to the needs of its members. wa s secretly negotiating with Dela Cruz. In the Valmonte case, the court held that the
Wi th regard to the Boards exercise of discretion, in Natino v IAC, the Court also held that cons titutional ri ght to i nformation was limited to ma tters of public concern to tra nsactions
repurchase of foreclosed property a fter redemption period i mposes no such obligation on the i nvol ving public interest.The sale of the property wa s not imbued by public interests as i t was a
purcha ser (the board in this case) to re -sell the property since the property belongs to him (the purel y private tra nsaction. Pets. Ca nt demand to be informed of s uch public negotiation s ince
boa rd as well) they ha d no i nterest on the s ubject property s ince they failed to comply wi th the GSIS terms of
The boards denial of petitioners request to purchase the s ubject property was not based on repurchase and the denial to repurchase under the GSIS terms.
whi m but on a fa ctual a ssessment of the financial ca pacity of the petitioners to make good their
repeated offers to purchase the s ubject property. Based on the circumstances, the petitioners DECLARADOR VS. GUBATON G.R. No. 159208, August 18, 2006
were repeatedly unable to fulfill their obligations to pay. In the comments of the AAD manager,
the observa tion was that the petitioners lacked the capacity to pa y up. Facts:
The petitioners a re not entitled to a request for repurchase as a matter of right. The Board A 17 yea rs old minor was proven to have committed a cri me of murder wi th evident
exerci sed i ts discretion i n a ccordance with law in denying their requests and the GSIS ca nt be premeditation a nd a buse of strength of s tabbing 15 ti mes a teacher, wife of the petitioner, in
fa ulted for their fa ilure to repurchase as i t acted under the petitioners application under Ca bug-Cabug National High School in President Roxas, Ca piz but the sentenced is s uspended by
Opera tion Pabahay. The sale to respondent cant be annulled on s uch i nvoked right. the Judge a utomatically. A petition that the suspension of sentenced was not proper because the
2. No. The a greement with de l a Cruz was valid. mi nor is disqualified a s provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, a s a mended, and Section 32 of
Pets .- a ver that Sec. 79 of PD 1445 a nd the COA Ci rcular 86-264 ma ndated the GSIS to dispose of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.
the a ssets through public bidding and only upon its failure, through a public s ale.
GSIS contended that SEC 79 of PD 1445 di d not apply because it covered unservi ceable govt Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave a buse of discretion amounting to
property a nd not a cquired assets. exces s of jurisdiction i n s uspending the s entence of a mi nor of a crime committed punishable by
SC- Gs i s was right. Why? The provision (SEC 79) a pplies only to unservi ceable govt property or dea th.
thos e no longer needed. The house was obvi ously not unserviceable. And i t was s till used by
peti tioners. Held: Cri me committed by mi nor, below 18 yea rs old a t the time of the commission of the cri me,
Wi th regard to COA Ci rcular 86-264 or the General guidelines on the divestment or disposal of wi l l be automatically s uspended wi thout a need for a pplication except when the youthful offender
a s sets of government owned corporations the law stipulated that it availed of an exception to wa s disqualified on a ny one of the following grounds: (1) the youthful offender has once availed or
the requirement of disposition through public bidding and such exception applied to sales of enjoyed s uspension of sentence under its provisions, (2) to one who is convicted for an offense
merchandise held for sale in the regular course of business. The Court read it i n relation to Coa punishable by death or life i mprisonment, (3) to one who is convicted for a n offense by the
ci rcul ar 89-296 which provided for Audit Guidelines on the Disposal of Property a nd other Assets Mi l i tary Tri bunals. In the case at bar, the youthful offenders cri me of murder is punishable, not
of Government Agencies, which also did not apply the public bidding disposal requirement to the a ctual sentence, by death or l ife i mprisonment thus the benefit of a utomatic suspension of
mercha ndise or i nventory held for s ale i n the regular course of business nor to the disposal by s entence is not applicable.
22
In i ts decision of 24 Ma rch 1995, the NAPOLCOM, through Commi s s i oner Al exi s Ca noni za do,
Li a bility denied due course to the petitioners a ppeal and peti ti on for revi ew for l a ck of juri s di cti on i t
The pa rents (father a nd mother of juvenile Fra nk) and his teacher-in-charge at the Ca bug-Cabug a ppearing x x x tha t both the Decision a nd the Resolution of the Regi ona l Appel l a te Boa rd ha d
Na ti onal High School of President Roxas, Ca piz, a re jointly s ubsidiarily l iable i n case of i nsolvency, l ong become final and executory a nd there bei ng no s howi ng tha t the RAB fa i l ed to deci de
a s the cri me was established to have been committed inside the classroom of Ca bug-Cabug res pondents a ppeal within the reglementa ry peri od of s i xty (60) da ys . [15] In s upport thereof,
Na ti onal High School a nd during school hours. the NAPOLCOM ci ted Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memora ndum Ci rcul a r No. 91-002 a nd
Secti on 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Ci rcul a r No. 91-006, whi ch provi de a s fol l ows :
SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. HON. RAFAEL M. Secti on 23. Effect of Failure to Decide Appeal. Fa i l ure of the Regi ona l Appel l a te Boa rd to
ALUNAN III, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government & Chairman, deci de the a ppeal within the reglementary period shall render the deci s i on fi na l a nd executory
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM); HON. ALEXIS CANONIZADO, Commissioner, wi thout prejudice, however, to the filing of an a ppeal by ei ther pa rty wi th the Secreta ry of the
NAPOLCOM, Manila; Chairman LEODEGARIO ALFARO, Regional Appellate Board VIII; Regional Depa rtment of the Interi or a nd Loca l Government.
Director EDMUNDO LAVILLA LARROZA, Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Command VIII; xxx xxx xxx
and MARIO VALDEZ,respondents. Secti on 5. Finality of Decision/Resolution. The decision of the Regional Appel l a te Boa rd on a n
DECISION a ppealed case s hall become final a nd executory a fter ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof
DAVIDE, JR., J.: by the a ppel l a nt, i f no Moti on for Recons i dera ti on i s fi l ed wi thi n s a i d peri od.
Thi s is a s peci a l ci vi l a cti on for certiorari under Rul e 65 of the Rul es of Court [1] to s et a s i de A moti on for Reconsidera ti on ma y be fi l ed by ei ther pa rty from a Deci s i on rendered by the
the decision (i n the form of a letter) of 24 Ma rch 1995[2] of publ i c res pondent Na ti ona l Pol i ce Regi onal Appellate Board on an a ppealed ca se, provided that the same i s filed within ten (10) days
Commi ssion (NAPOLCOM), which denied due course for l ack of juris di cti on the a ppea l a nd the from recei pt of a copy of the deci s i on i n ques ti on. However, onl y one (1) Moti on for
peti tion for review filed by peti ti oners SPO3 Noel Ca ba da a nd SPO3 Rodol fo G. de Guzma n, Recons i dera ti on ma y be a l l owed.
res pectively. Challenged i n the said a ppeal and petition for review were the decision of 15 August Hence, the i ns ta nt peti ti on.
1994[3] a nd resolution of 25 October 1994[4] of the Regional Appellate Board of the Ei ghth Regional The Offi ce of the Solicitor General s eeks to dismiss thi s peti ti on on the ground of prema turi ty
Comma nd (RAB 8), whi ch a ffi rmed thei r di s mi s s a l from the s ervi ce. beca use the petitioners failed to exhaust a dmi ni s tra ti ve remedi es ; they s houl d ha ve i ns tea d
The pl eadings a nd a nnexes filed by the parties di s cl os e the fol l owi ng fa ctua l a nd procedura l a ppealed to the Ci vil Servi ce Commission (CSC) pursuant to Section 47, Cha pter 6, Subtitle A, Ti tl e
ba ckdrop of thi s ca s e: I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), whi ch vests upon the CSC a ppel l a te
On 29 October 1993, a compl a i nt a ga i ns t the peti ti oners for Gra ve Mi s conduct, Arbi tra ry juri s diction over disciplinary ca ses of government personnel where the penal ty i mpos ed i s , inter
Detention, a nd Dishonesty wa s fi l ed wi th the Offi ce of the Commi s s i on on Huma n Ri ghts i n alia, di s mi s s a l from offi ce. The s a i d provi s i on rea ds :
Ta cl oban Ci ty by pri vate respondent Ma rio Valdez. [5] The complaint was referred to the Philippine Secti on 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commi s s i on s ha l l deci de upon a ppea l a l l
Na ti onal Pol i ce Ei ghth Regi ona l Comma nd (PNP-RECOM 8) whi ch, a fter conducti ng i ts own a dministrative disciplinary ca ses involving the i mposition of a penalty of s uspension for more than
i nvestigation, filed an administrative charge of Gra ve Mi s conduct a ga i ns t the peti ti oners a nd thi rty da ys , or fine i n a n a mount exceedi ng thi rty da ys s a l a ry, demoti on i n ra nk or s a l a ry or
i ns ti tuted s umma ry di s mi s s a l proceedi ngs . tra ns fer, or remova l or di s mi s s a l from offi ce. x x x
On 7 Apri l 1994, the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 ha nded down a deci s i on [6] fi ndi ng the (2) The Secretaries x x x s ha l l ha ve juri s di cti on to i nves ti ga te a nd deci de ma tters i nvol vi ng
peti ti oners gui l ty of gra ve mi s conduct a nd orderi ng thei r di s mi s s a l from the pol i ce di s ciplinary a ction a gainst officers and employees under their jurisdiction. x x x In ca se the decision
s ervi ce. Pursuant to thi s deci s i on, Speci a l Order No. 174, da ted 23 Apri l 1994, [7] wa s i s s ued rendered by a bureau or office head is a ppealable to the Commission, the sa me ma y be i ni ti a l l y
orderi ng, a mong other thi ngs , the di s mi s s a l of the peti ti oners from the s ervi ce. a ppealed to the Department a nd finally to the Commission and pending a ppeal, the same shall be
The petitioners claimed that they were not formally furnished with a copy of the decision and that executory except when the penalty i s removal, in which ca se, the s a me s ha l l be executory onl y
they were a ble to secure a copy thereof thru thei r own effort a nd i ni ti a ti ve onl y on 13 June a fter confi rma ti on by the Secreta ry concerned.
1994.[8] However, they recei ved a copy of Speci a l Order No. 174 on 26 Apri l 1994. The Offi ce of the Solicitor General opi nes tha t thi s provi s i on covers PNP pers onnel , l i ke the
Al though they i ns i s t tha t the ba s i s of the a ppea l before RAB 8 wa s Speci a l Order No. peti tioners; consequently, they s hould have appealed to the CSC. It also a dva nces the vi ew tha t
174,[9] peti tioner Ca bada stated under oath in his Appeal [10] fi led with the Department of Interi or the i nstant petition should ha ve been fi l ed wi th the proper forum, the Regi ona l Tri a l Court.
a nd Local Government (DILG) that he i n fact s easonably filed a motion for reconsidera ti on of the The core i s s ues tha t pres ent thems el ves for our determi na ti on a re whether
deci sion of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however, failed or refused to a ct on the (1) the NAPOLCOM commi tted gra ve a bus e of di s creti on i n denyi ng due cours e, for l a ck of
s a id moti on, a nd tha t he a s ked tha t the s a i d moti on be trea ted a s a n a ppea l to the RAB. juri s diction, the petitioners a ppeal from a nd petition for revi ew of the decision and resoluti on of
In i ts decision of 15 August 1994,[11] the RAB 8 a ffirmed the decision of the Regional Director. In its the RAB 8; a nd
res olution of 25 October 1994,[12] i t denied the peti ti oners moti on for recons i dera ti on of i ts (2) thi s s peci a l ci vi l a cti on wa s prema turel y fi l ed for fa i l ure of the peti ti oners to exha us t
deci s i on. The peti ti oners recei ved a copy of thi s res ol uti on on 26 Ja nua ry 1995. a dmi ni s tra ti ve remedi es .
Peti ti oners Ca bada a nd De Guzman then fi l ed wi th the Honora bl e Secreta ry of the DILG a nd I
Cha i rma n of the NAPOLCOM thei r Appea l [13]da ted 5 Februa ry 1995 a nd Peti ti on for Secti on 45 of the DILG Act of 1990[16] provi des for the fi na l i ty of di s ci pl i na ry a cti ons a ga i ns t
Revi ew[14] da ted 4 Februa ry 1995, res pecti vel y. members of the PNP a s fol l ows :

23
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. The di sciplinary a ction i mposed upon a member of the SEC. 31. Except a s otherwise provided by the Constitution or by l aw, the Commis s i on s ha l l ha ve
PNP s hall be final a nd executory: Provided, That a di sci pl i na ry a cti on i mpos ed by the regi ona l the fi nal a uthority to pass upon the remova l , s epa ra ti on a nd s us pens i on of a l l offi cers a nd
di rector or by the PLEB involving demotion or dismissal from the servi ce may be a ppea l ed to the empl oyees i n the ci vi l s ervi ce a nd upon a l l ma tters rel a ti ng to the conduct, di s ci pl i ne a nd
regi onal appellate board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the noti ce of deci s i on: effi ci ency of s uch offi cers a nd empl oyees .
Provi ded, further, That the disciplinary a ction i mposed by the Chi ef of the PNP i nvolving demotion SEC. 32. The Secretaries a nd heads of a genci es a nd i ns trumenta l i ti es , provi nces , ci ti es a n d
or di s missal may be appealed to the National Appellate Board withi n ten (10) da ys from recei pt muni cipalities shall have jurisdiction to i nvestigate a nd decide matters i nvolving disciplinary a ction
thereof: Provided furthermore, That, the regional or National Appellate Board, as the ca se may be, a ga inst officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be fi na l i n ca s e the
s ha ll decide the a ppeal within s ixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of a ppeal: Provided, finally, penalty i mposed i s s us pens i on for not more tha n th i rty (30) da ys or fi ne i n a n a mount not
That failure of the regional appellate board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the exceeding thirty (30) da ys salary. In case the decision rendered by a burea u or offi ce hea d i s
decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party a ppealable to the Commission, the same may be i nitially a ppealed to the department, then to the
with the Secretary. (Ita l i cs s uppl i ed) Meri t Sys tems Protection Board, and finally to the Commission a nd pending a ppeal, the same shall
The l ast proviso of this section is res ta ted i n Secti on 23, Rul e IV of NAPOLCOM Memora ndum be executory except when the penalty i s removal, in which ca se the same s hall be executory onl y
Ci rcul ar No. 91-002. And Secti on 3, Rul e III of NAPOLCOM Memora ndum Ci rcul a r No. 92-006 a fter confi rma ti on by the Secreta ry concerned.
provi des : Under Section 7 of E.O. No. 262,[20] the Secretary of the DILG has the power of s upervi s i on a nd
Secti on 3. Period Within Which to Decide Appealed Cases; Finality of RAB/NAB Decisions . The control of his Department. His powers and functions thereunder a re recognized a nd a ffi rmed i n
NAPOLCOM a ppellate board concerned shall decide the appealed cases within sixty (60) da ys from Secti on 10 of the DILG Act of 1990.[21]
recei pt of the entire records of the case from the PNP s ummary di s mi s s a l a uthori ty. However, In vi ew then of the aforementioned gap i n Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990, the provi s i ons of
fa i lure of the NAPOLCOM Regional Appellate Board (RAB) to a ct on the a ppeal within s ai d peri od the Ci vi l Servi ce Law and the rules and regulations i mplementing it must be taken into a ccount i n
renders the decision final a nd executory wi thout prejudi ce to the fi l i ng of a n a ppea l by the l i ght of the maxim interpretare concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or every s ta tute must
res pondent-a ppel l a nt wi th the Secreta ry of the Depa rtment of the Interi or a nd Loca l be s o cons trued a nd ha rmoni zed wi th other s ta tutes a s to form a uni form s ys tem of
Government. The decision rendered by the NAPOLCOM Na tional Appellate Board (NAB) disposing juri s prudence.[22]
a n a ppealed case s hall be final and executory unless a ti mely Moti on for Reconsiderati on i s fi l ed As thus construed and harmonized, it follows that if a RAB fails to decide an a ppealed case wi thi n
wi thin ten (10) days from receipt thereof, i n which case, i t shall become final and executory upon s i xty da ys from receipt of the noti ce of a ppea l , the a ppea l ed deci s i on i s deemed fi na l a nd
recei pt by the respondent-appellant of the resolution of the a foresaid board denyi ng, modifying or executory, a nd the a ggri eved pa rty ma y forthwi th a ppea l therefrom to the Secreta ry of
a ffi rmi ng the deci s i on. theDILG. Li kewise, i f the RAB has decided the appeal within the sixty-day period, i ts decision ma y
Secti on 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 s pecifically provides tha t i f a RAB fa i l s to deci de a n a ppea l s ti l l be a ppea l ed to the Secreta ry of th e DILG.
wi thin the reglementary period of sixty days, the a ppealed decision becomes final a nd executo ry In the i ns ta nt ca s e, Ca ba da s a ppea l wa s a ddres s ed to the Honora bl e Secreta ry of the
wi thout, however, prejudice to the ri ght of the a ggri eved pa rty to a ppea l to the Secreta ry of Department of the Interior and Local Government x x x a s Cha irman and Presi di ng Offi cer of the
the DILG. The said provision is, however, silent as regards the a va i l a bi l i ty of a n a ppea l from a Na ti onal Police Commission,[23] whi le De Guzmans petition for revi ew wa s a ddres s ed to the
deci s i on rendered by a RAB wi thi n the regl ementa ry peri od. Honorable Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government and Chai rma n, Na ti ona l
Thi s gap i n Section 45 ca nnot be construed to prohibit appeals from decisions of the RAB rendered Pol i ce Commi s s i on, Ma ka ti Ci ty, Metro Ma ni l a .[24]
wi thin the regl ementa ry peri od, for whi l e the epi gra ph of the s ecti on i s worded Finality of We cons ider the appeal and the petition for review a s appeals to the Secretary of the DILG under
Disciplinary Action, there is nothing therein that explicitly bars a ny further a ppeal. Complementary Secti on 45 of the DILG Act of 1990.
l a ws on discipline of government officials and employees must then be i nquired into cons i deri ng Onl y the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one wa y or the other. The NAPOLCOM di d not
tha t i n conformity with the mandate of the Constitution that the PNP must be na ti ona l i n s cope ha ve a uthority over the appeal a nd the petition for revi ew, a nd just because both mentioned the
a nd ci vilian in character,[17] i t i s now a part, a s a bureau, of the reorganizedDILG. [18] As s uch, it falls Secretary of the DILG as Cha i rma n or Pres i di ng Offi cer of the NAPOLCOM di d not bri ng them
wi thin the definition of the civil service i n Section 2(1), Arti cle IX-B of the Constituti on.[19] For thi s wi thin the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The l atter does not ha ve s uch juri s di cti on beca us e
rea s on, Secti on 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provi des : Secti on 14 of the DILG Act of 1990 perti nentl y provi des a s fol l ows :
SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. The Ci vi l Servi ce Law and its implementing rul es a nd SEC. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. x x x
regul a ti ons s ha l l a ppl y to a l l pers onnel of the Depa rtment. xxx xxx xxx
The Ci vi l Servi ce Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 i s Subtitle A, Ti tl e I, Book V (j) Affi rm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel discipl i na ry a cti on
of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of Cha pter 6 thereof provides , inter i nvol ving demotion or dismissa l from the s ervi ce i mpos ed upon members of the Phi l i ppi ne
alia, tha t i n ca ses where the deci s i on rendered by a burea u or offi ce i s a ppea l a bl e to the Na ti ona l Pol i ce by the Chi ef of the Phi l i ppi ne Na ti ona l Pol i ce;
Commi ssion, the s ame may i nitially be appealed to the department and finally to the Commission. (k) Exerci se a ppellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over a dministrative cases
The rul es a nd regul a ti ons i mpl ementi ng the Ci vi l Servi ce La w referred to i n Secti on 91 of a ga i ns t pol i cemen a nd over deci s i ons on cl a i ms for pol i ce benefi ts . x x x
the DILG Act of 1990 i s the Omni bus Rul es Impl ementi ng Book V of Executi ve Order No. 292 Thi s s ecti on cl ea rl y s hows tha t the NAPOLCOM exerci s es appellate juri s di cti on onl y on the
known a s the Admi ni s tra ti ve Code of 1987 promul ga ted by the CSC. Secti ons 31 a nd 32, fol l owing cases a nd THROUGH (a) the NAB i n personnel disciplinary a ctions involving demotion or
Rul e XIV of the s a i d Rul es provi de a s fol l ows : di s missal from the service i mposed by the Chi ef of the PNP, a nd (b) the RAB i n a dmi ni s tra ti ve

24
ca s es a gainst policemen and over decisions on cl aims for pol i ce benefi ts . It ha s no a ppel l a te MARTIN, J.:
juri s di cti on over deci s i ons rendered by the NAB a nd the RAB. Peti ti on for review on certiorari, which We treat as s pecial ci vil action, of the decision of the Court
Cons equentl y, the NAPOLCOM di d not ha ve the power or a uthori ty to i s s ue, through of Fi rs t Instance of Ca marines Sur i n Ci vil Case No. 7084, entitled Agna, et al. versus Ci ty of Na ga,
Commi ssioner Al exis Ca nonizado, the 24 Ma rch 1995decision denyi ng due cours e to the a ppea l et a l ., declaring Ordinance No. 360 of the City of Na ga enforceable i n 1971 the year following its
a nd petition for review filed by peti ti oners Ca ba da a nd De Guzma n, res pecti vel y, for l a ck of a pproval and requiring petitioners to pay to priva te respondents the a mounts s ought for i n their
juri s diction because of Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memora ndum Ci rcul a r No. 91-006 a nd compl aint plus attorney's fees and costs. Included i n the present controversy a s proper parties a re
Secti on 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOMMemorandum Ci rcular No. 91-002. The reference to these rules Vi cente P. Si bulo and Joaquin C. Cl eope, the City Ma yor a nd Ci ty Treasurer of the City of Na ga,
s uggest that the NAPOLCOM believes it has jurisdiction over a ppeals from decisions of the RAB i f res pectively.
the l a tter has not decided the a ppea l wi thi n the regl ementa ry peri od of s i xty da ys . Such a On June 15, 1970, the Ci ty of Na ga enacted Ordinance No. 360 cha nging and amending the
s uggestion i s flawed because i t would allow a ri dicul ous s i tua ti on where the NAPOLCOM ves ts gra duated ta x on quarterly gross sales of merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordi nance No. 4 of
upon i tself an appellate jurisdiction from a decision rendered by i t in the exercise of its a ppel l a te the Ci ty of Na ga to percentage tax on gross sales provi ded for i n Section 2 thereof. Pursuant to
juri s diction through the RAB, per Section 14(k) of the DILG Act of 1990. Moreover, Commissi oner s a id ordinance, private respondents paid to the Ci ty of Naga the following taxes on their gross
Ca nonizado ca nnot, s ingly, a ct for the NAPOLCOM beca us e i t i s a collegial body compos ed of a s a les for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970, a s follows:
Cha i rma n a nd four Commi s s i oners , purs ua nt to Secti on 13 of theDILG Act of 1990. Ca ta lino Agna paid P1,805.17 a s per Official Receipt No. 1826591;
In l i ght of the foregoing, the petitioners could properly i nvoke our original jurisdiction to i ssue the Fel ipe Agna paid P625.00 a s per Official Receipt No. 1826594; a nd
extra ordinary wri t of certiorari under Rul e 65 of the Rul es of Court to a nnua l a nd s et a s i de Sa l ud Velasco paid P129.81 a s per Official Receipt No. 1820339.
the NAPOLCOMs decision of 24 Ma rch 1995. It bei ng a patent nullity, the filing of a motion for its On February 13, 1971, pri va te respondents filed with the Ci ty Treasurer of the Ci ty of Naga a claim
reconsideration before the i ns ti tuti on of thi s s peci a l ci vi l a cti on ma y be di s pens ed wi th. [25] for refund of the following a mounts, together with i nterests thereon from the date of payments:
II To Ca ta lino Agna, P1,555.17; to Fel ipe Agna, P560.00; a nd to Salud Velasco, P127.81, representing
The pl ea of the Office of the Sol i ci tor Genera l tha t the i ns ta nt a cti on i s prema ture for non- the di fference between the amounts they paid under Section 3, Ordi nance No. 4 of the Ci ty of
exha ustion of a dministrative remedies is thus untena bl e. We woul d ha ve s us ta i ned i t i f the Na ga , i.e., P250.00; P65.00 a nd P12.00 res pectively. They alleged that under existing law,
Secretary of the DILG was the one who denied due course to or dismissed the a ppeal of petitioner Ordi nance No. 360, whi ch a mended Section 3, Ordinance No. 4 of the Ci ty of Naga, did not ta ke
Ca ba da a nd the petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. By then, purs ua nt to Secti on 91 of effect i n 1970, the year i t was approved but i n the next s ucceeding year a fter the year of i ts
the DILG Act of 1990; Secti on 47, Cha pter 6, Subtitle A, Ti tle I, Book V of the Admini s tra ti ve Code a pproval, or i n 1971, a nd that therefore, the ta xes they paid in 1970 on their gross sales for the
of 1987; a nd Sections 31 a nd 32 of the Omnibus Rules Implementi ng Book V of Executi ve Order qua rter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 were illegal a nd s hould be refunded to them by
No. 292, the a ppeal would have to be filed with the CSC. And futi l e woul d be the peti ti oners the petitioners.
cl a im in their Reply to the Comment of theOSG that their case falls wi thi n the excepti ons to the The Ci ty Trea surer denied the claim for refund of the a mounts i n question. So private respondents
rul e on exha us ti on of a dmi ni s tra ti ve remedi es . fi l ed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Naga (Civil Ca se No. 7084), s eeking to have
In vi ew of a ll the foregoing, a discussion on the other issues raised by the peti ti oners rel a ti ng to Ordi nance No. 360 declared effective only i n the year following the year of its approval, that is, i n
the meri ts of the ca s e a nd on the i s s ue of due proces s i s unneces s a ry. 1971; to ha ve Sections 4, 6 a nd 8 of Ordinance No. 360 declared unjust, oppressive a nd a rbitrary,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision (in the form of a a nd therefore, null and void; a nd to require petitioners to refund the s ums being cl aimed with
l etter) of the Na tional Police Commi s s i on of 24 Ma rch 1995 i s ANNULLED a nd SET ASIDE. The i nterests thereon from the date the taxes complained of were paid and to pay a ll l egal costs a nd
Secretary of the Depa rtment of Interi or a nd Loca l Government i s DIRECTED to RESOLVE wi th a ttorney's fees i n the s um of P1,000.00. Pri va te respondents further prayed that the petitioners
rea s ona bl e di s pa tch the a ppea l a nd peti ti on for revi ew of peti ti oners SPO3 NOEL be enjoined from enforcing Ordinance No. 360.
CABADA a nd SPO3RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN, respectively, from the deci s i on of 15 Augus t 1994 In their a nswer, the petitioners among other things, claimed that private respondents were not
a nd resolution of 25 October 1994 of the Regional Appellate Board, Eighth Regional Comma nd, i f "compelled" but voluntarily ma de the payments of their ta xes under Ordinance No. 360; tha t the
the s a me were fi l ed on ti me. s a id ordinance was published i n a ccordance with law; that in accordance with Republic Act No.
No pronouncement a s to cos ts . 305 (Cha rter of the Ci ty of Naga) a n ordinance takes effect after the tenth day following i ts
SO ORDERED. pa ssage unless otherwise stated i n said ordinance; that under existing law the Ci ty of Naga i s
a uthorized to impose certain conditions to secure and accomplish the collection of sales ta xes in
the mos t effective manner. As s pecial a nd a ffirmative defenses, the petitioners allege that the
G.R. No. L-36049 May 31, 1976 pri va te respondents have no cause of action against them; that gra nting that the collection of
CITY OF NAGA, VICENTE P. SIBULO, as Mayor, and JOAQUIN C. CLEOPE, as Treasurer of the City ta xes can be enjoined. the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to justify the issuance of a
of Naga, peti tioners, wri t of preliminary i njunction; that the refund prayed for by the private respondents is untenable;
vs . tha t petitioners Vicente P. Si bulo a nd Joaquin C. Cl eope, the Ci ty Ma yor a nd Treasurer of the Ci ty
CATALINO AGNA, FELIPE AGNA and SALUD VELASCO, res pondents. of Na ga , respectively a re not proper parties i n i nterest; that the private respondents are estopped
Ernesto A. Miguel for petitioners. from questioning the va lidity a nd/or constitutionality of the provisions of Ordinance No. 360.
Bonot, Cledera & Associates for respondents. Peti ti oners counterclaimed for P20,000.00 a s exemplary da mages, for the alleged unlawful a nd
ma l icious filing of the cl aim against them, i n such a mount as the court may determine.
25
Duri ng the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary i njunction and a t the Secti on 2309. Imposition of tax and duration of license.A municipal license tax a lready i n
pre-tri al conference as well as a t the trial on the merits of the case, the parties agreed on the exi s tence shall be subject to change only by ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of December
fol l owing s tipulation of facts: That on June 15, 1970, the Ci ty Board of the Ci ty of Naga e nacted of a ny yea r a fter the next succeeding year, but a n entirely new tax may be created by a ny
Ordi nance No. 360 entitled "An ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 4, a s a mended, i mposing a ordi nance enacted during the quarter year effective a t the beginning of a ny s ubsequent quarter.
s a les tax on the quarterly s ales or receipts on a ll businesses in the Ci ty of Na ga," which ordinance They s ubmit that since Ordinance No. 360, s eries of 1970 of the Ci ty of Naga, is one which changes
wa s tra nsmitted to the Ci ty Ma yor for a pproval or veto on June 25, 1970; tha t the ordinance was the exi sting gra duated s ales tax on gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise a nd sari-sari
dul y posted i n the designated places by the Secretary of the Municipal Board; that private mercha nts provi ded for i n Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Na ga to a percentage tax on their gross
res pondents voluntarily paid the gross sales tax, pursuant to Ordinance No. 360, but that on s a les prescribed i n the questioned ordinance, the same s hould take effect in the next succeeding
February 15, 1971, they fi l ed a claim for refund with the Ci ty Treasurer who denied the same. yea r a fter the year of i ts approval or i n 1971.
On October 9, 1971, the res pondent Judge rendered judgment holding that Ordinance No. 360, Evi dently, the divergence of opinion as to when Ordinance No. 360 took effect and became
s eri es of 1970 of the Ci ty of Naga was enforceable i n the year following the date of i ts approval, enforceable is mainly due to the s eemingly apparent conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised
tha t i s, i n 1971 a nd required the petitioners to reimburse the following sums, from the date they Admi nistrative Code a nd Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Loca l Autonomy Act). Is there really
pa i d their ta xes to the City of Na ga: to Ca talino Agna, the sum of P1,555.17; to Felipe Agna, s uch a conflict i n the a bove -mentioned provisions? It will be easily noted that Section 2309 of the
P560.00; a nd to Salud Velasco, P127.81 a nd the corresponding i nterests from the filing of the Revi sed Administrative Code contemplates of two types of municipal ordinances, namely: (1) a
compl aint up to the reimbursement of the amounts plus the s um of P500.00 a s attorney's fees muni cipal ordinance which changes a municipal l icense tax already i n existence and (2) an
a nd the costs of the proceedings. ordi nance which creates a n entirely new tax. Under the first type, a municipal license ta x already
Peti ti oners' submit that Ordinance No. 360, s eries of 1970 of the Ci ty of Naga, took effect i n the i n existence shall be subject to change only by a n ordinance enacted prior to the 15th day of
qua rter of the year of i ts a pproval, that is in July 1970, i nvoking Section 14 of Republic Act No. December of a ny year a fter the next succeeding year. This means that the ordinance enacted prior
305, 1 a s a mended, otherwise known a s the Charter of the Ci ty of Naga, which, a mong others, to the 15th da y of December cha nging or repealing a municipal license tax a lready i n existence will
provi des that "Each a pproved ordinance ... s hall ta ke effect a nd be enforced on a nd a fter the 10th ha ve to ta ke effect i n next s ucceeding year. The evident purpose of the provision is to enable the
da y fol lowing i ts passage unless otherwise stated in said ordinance ... ". They contend that ta xpa yers to a djust themselves to the new charge or burden brought about by the new ordinance.
Ordi nance No. 360 wa s enacted by the Municipal Board of the Ci ty of Na ga on June 15, 1970 2 a nd Thi s is different from the second type of a municipal ordinance where an entirely new ta x may be
wa s tra nsmitted to the Ci ty Ma yor for his approval or veto on June 25, 1970 3 but i t wa s not a cted crea ted by a ny ordinance enacted during the quarter year to be effective at the beginning of any
upon by the Ci ty Ma yor until August 4, 1970. Ordi narily, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act s ubsequent quarter. We do not fi nd a ny s uch distinction between a n ordinance which changes a
No. 305, s a id ordinance should have taken effect after the 10th day following its passage on June muni cipal license tax a lready i n existence and an ordinance creating an entirely new ta x i n Section
15, 1970, or on June 25, 1970. But because the ordinance itself provides that i t shall take effect 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Loca l Autonomy Act) which merely refers to a "tax ordinance" without
upon i ts a pproval, it becomes necessary to determine when Ordinance No. 360 wa s deemed a ny qualification whatsoever.
a pproved. According to the same Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, "i f within 10 days after Now to the meat of the problem in this petition. Is not Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative
recei pt of the ordinance the Mayor does not return it with his veto or a pproval 4 the ordinance is Code deemed repealed or abrogated by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Loca l Autonomy Act)
deemed a pproved." Since the ordinance i n question was not returned by the Ci ty Ma yor with his i n s o far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned? An examination of Republic Act No. 2264
veto or a pproval within 10 da ys after he received i t on June 25, 1970, the s a me was deemed (Loca l Autonomy Act) fa ils to s how any provision expressly repealing Section 2309 of the Revised
a pproved after the lapse of ten (10) days from June 25, 1970 or on Jul y 6, 1970. On thi s date, the Admi nistrative Code. All that is mentioned therein is Section 9 which reads:
peti tioners cl aim that Ordinance No. 360 became effective. They further contend that even under Secti on 9 Al l acts, executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations or parts thereof,
Secti on 2, of Republic Act No. 2264 (Loca l Autonomy Acts ) 5 which expressly provides: "A ta x i nconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act a re hereby repealed a nd modified accordingly.
ordi nance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day a fter i ts passage unless the ordinance shall The foregoing provision does not amount to an express repeal of Section 2309 of the Revised
provi de otherwise', Ordinance No. 360 could have ta ken effect on June 30, 1970, whi ch is the Admi nistrative Code. It is a well established principle in statutory construction that a s tatute will
fi fteenth day a fter i ts passage by the Municipal Board of the Ci ty of Naga on June 15, 1970, or a s not be construed as repealing prior a cts on the same subject in the absence of words to that effect
ea rlier explained, it could have taken effect on July 6, 1970, the da te the ordinance was deemed unl ess there is a n irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is evidently
a pproved because the ordinance i tself provides that i t shall take effect upon its approval. Of the i ntended to supersede all prior a cts on the matter i n hand and to comprise i tself the sole and
two provi sions i nvoked by petitioners to s upport their s tand that the ordinance i n question took compl ete sys tem of legislation on that s ubject. Every new statute s hould be construed in
effect i n the year of its a pproval, it is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Loca l Autonomy Act) that connection wi th those already existing in relation to the same s ubject matter a nd all should be
i s more relevant because i t is the provision that s pecifically refers to effectivi ty of a tax ma de to harmonize a nd s tand together, i f they ca n be done by a ny fair a nd reasonable
ordinance a nd being a provision of much later l aw i t is deemed to have s uperseded Section 14 of i nterpretation ... . 6 It wi l l also be noted that Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and
Republic Act No. 305 (Cha rter of the Ci ty of Na ga) in so far a s effectivity of a ta x ordinance is Secti on 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Loca l Autonomy Act) refer to the same subject matter-
concerned. ena ctment and effectivity of a tax ordinance. In this respect they ca n be considered in pari
On the other hand, private respondents contend that Ordinance No. 360 became effective and materia. Sta tutes are said to be i n pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or
enforceable i n 1971, the year following the year of its approval, invoking Section 2309 of the to the s a me class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object. 7 When statutes are
Revi sed Administrative Code which provides: i n pari materia, the rul e of statutory construction dictates that they should be construed together.
Thi s is because enactments of the same l egislature on the s ame s ubject matter a re supposed to
26
form pa rt of one uniform system; that later s tatutes a re supplementary or complimentary to the W/N the Anti -Wiretapping Act a pplies i n recordings by one of the parties i n the conversation
ea rlier enactments and i n the passage of i ts a cts the legislature is s upposed to have i n mind the
exi s ting l egislation on the same subject and to have enacted i ts new a ct with reference Held:
thereto. 8 Ha ving thus in mind the previ ous statutes relating to the same subject matter, Yes. Secti on 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohi bit a nd Penalized Wire Ta pping and Other
whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in Rel ated Vi olations of Pri vate Communication and Other Purposes, provides:
a ccordance with the l egislative policy embodied i n those prior s tatutes unless there is a n express Sec. 1. It s hall be unlawful for a ny person, not being authorized by a ll the parties to a ny priva te
repeal of the old and they a ll s hould be construed together. 9 In construing them the old statutes communication or s poken word, to ta p a ny wire or cable, or by us ing any other device or
rel a ting to the s ame s ubject matter s hould be compared with the new provisions and if possible a rra ngement, to secretly overhear, i ntercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
by rea s onable construction, both s hould be so construed that effect may be given to every us i ng a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or
provi sion of each. However, when the new provision and the old relating to the same subject ta pe recorder, or however otherwise described.
ca nnot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it i s the latter expression of the legislative The a forestated provision cl early and unequivocally makes i t illegal for any p erson, not authorized
wi l l. 10 Actually we do not s ee any conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative by a l l the parties to a ny priva te communication to s ecretly record s uch communication by means
Code a nd Section 2 of the Republic Act No. 2264 (Loca l Autonomy Act). The conflict, if a ny, is more of a ta pe recorder. The law makes no distinction a s to whether the party s ought to be penalized by
a pparent than real. It is one that is not incapable of reconciliation. And the two provisions can be the s tatute ought to be a party other than or different from those i nvolved i n the private
reconciled by a pplying the first cl ause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code when communication. The statutes i ntent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make s uch recording
the problem refers to the effectivity of a n ordinance changing or repealing a municipal license tax i s underscored by the use of the qualifier any. Consequently, a s respondent Court of Appeals
a l ready i n existence. But where the problem refers to effectivi ty of an ordinance creating an correctl y concluded, even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
enti rely new tax, l et Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Loca l Autonomy Act) govern. convers ation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify a s a violator under
In the ca se before Us, the ordinance in question is one which changes the gra duated s ales ta x on thi s provision of R.A. 4200.
gros s sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise a nd sari-sari merchants prescribed in Section 3 of A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent courts
Ordi nance No. 4 of the Ci ty of Naga to percentage tax on their gross sale-an ordinance which concl usion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our l awmakers i ndeed contemplated to make i llegal,
defi nitely falls within the clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. Accordingly it una uthorized ta pe recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the
s hould be effective and enforceable i n the next succeeding year after the year of i ts a pproval or in pa rti es themselves or by third persons.
1971 a nd priva te respondents s hould be refunded of the ta xes they have paid to the petitioners The na ture of the conversations is immaterial to a vi olation of the s tatute. The s ubstance of the
on their gross sales for the quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 pl us the s a me need not be specifically a lleged i n the i nformation. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the a cts of
corres ponding i nterests from the filing of the complaint until reimbursement of the a mount. s ecretly overhearing, intercepting or recording pri va te communications by means of the devices
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the i nstant petition is hereby dismissed. enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an i ndividual made a s ecret recording of a private
SO ORDERED. communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section
1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out i n his COMMENT before the respondent court:
Facts: Nowhere (in the said law) is i t required that before one can be regarded as a vi olator, the nature
A ci vi l ca se damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon Ci ty RTC a lleging that of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person s hould be professed.
the pri vate respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation i n the latters office, allegedly vexed, Peti ti oners contention that the phrase private communication i n Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
i ns ulted a nd humiliated her i n a hostile a nd furious mood and in a mann er offensive to not i nclude private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication
peti tioners dignity a nd personality, contrary to morals, good customs a nd public policy. to a poi nt of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin wo rd communicare, meaning
In s upport of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought to s ha re or to i mpart. In its ordinary s ignification, communication connotes the a ct of s haring or
da mages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the i mparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or i mparting, a s in
confrontation made by petitioner. a conversation, or s i gnifies the process by which meanings or thoughts a re shared between
As a res ult of petitioners recording of the event a nd alleging that the s aid act of secretly ta ping i ndividuals through a common s ystem of s ymbols (as language s igns or gestures)
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a cri minal case before the Pa say RTC for Thes e definitions a re broad enough to i nclude verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
vi ol ation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping a nd other communications of meanings or thoughts which are l ikely to i nclude the emotionally-charged
rel a ted vi olations of priva te communication, and other purposes. excha nge, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner a nd private respondent, i n the privacy of the
Peti ti oner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground l a tters office. Any doubts about the l egislative bodys meaning of the phrase private
tha t the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. communication a re, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms conversation and
The CA decl ared the RTCs decision null a nd void and denied the petitioners MR, hence the communication were interchangeably used by Senator Ta ada in his Explanatory Note to the
i ns tant petition. Bi l l.

Ramirez vs. CA GARVIDA VS. SALES

Issue:
27
n 1996, Lynette Ga rvida filed her ca ndidacy to the position of Chairman of the Sangguniang SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
Ka ba taan (SK) of a barangay i n Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her candidacy was opposed by her ri val
Fl orencio Sales, Jr. on the ground that s he is over 21 yea rs old (21 years old, 9 months at the ti me Facts:
of the fi ling). Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that s he be a dmitted a s a ca ndidate a nd the SK On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring all Employers
el ections went on. Sales, i n the meantiume, filed a petition to cancel the certificate of ca ndidacy i n computing premiums to i nclude in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses a nd overtime pay,
of Ga rvi da. When the elections results ca me in, Garvi da won with a vote of 78, while Sales got 76. a s well as the ca sh va lue of other media of remuneration. Upon receipt of a copy thereof,
Ga rvi da was eventually proclaimed as winner but had to face the petition filed by Sales. peti tioner Vi ctorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission
Ga rvi da, in her defense, a verred that Section 424 of the Local Government Code (LGC) provides i n effect protesting a gainst the circular a s contradictory to a previous Ci rcular No. 7 da ted October
tha t ca ndidates for the SK must be a t least 15 yea rs of a ge a nd a maximum a ge of 21 yea rs. 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay a nd bonus i n the computation of the employers' and
Ga rvi da states that the LGC does not specify that the maximum age requirement is exactly 21 empl oyees' respective monthly premium contributions. Counsel further questioned the va lidity of
yea rs hence s aid provision must be construed as 21 yea rs a nd a fraction of a year but s till l ess than the ci rcular for lack of a utho
22 yea rs s o l ong as s he does not exceed 22 s he is s till eligible because s he is s till, technically, 21 ri ty on the pa rt of the Social Security Commission to promulgate i t without the approval of the
yea rs of age (although she exceeds i t by 9 months). Pres i dent a nd for l ack of publication i n the Official Gazette. Overruling the objections, the Social
ISSUE: Whether or not Garvi da met the a ge requirement. Securi ty Commission ruled that Ci rcular No. 22 i s not a rule or regulation that needed the approval
HELD: No. Secti on 424 of the Local Government Code provides that candidates for SK must be: of the Pres ident a nd publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative
Fi l ipino ci tizen; i nterpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law
a n a ctual resident of the barangay for at l east six months; s hould be construed. Petitioner comes to Court on appeal.
15 but not more than 21 years of age; a nd
dul y registered i n the list of the Sangguniang Ka bataan or i n the official barangay l ist. Issue:
Whether or not Ci rcular No. 22 i s a rule or regulation as contemplated i n Section 4(a) of Republic
The provi sion is cl ear. Mus t not be more than 21 yea rs of a ge. The said phrase i s not equivalent to Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission.
l ess than 22 yea rs old. The law does not s tate that the ca ndidate be l ess than 22 yea rs on
el ection day. If such was the intention of Congress in framing the LGC, then they s hould have Held:
expressly provided such. There ca n be no doubt that there i s a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and
Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence he should be declared as a n a dministrative i nterpretation of a law whose enforcement i s entrusted to a n administrative
the SK Chairman, is this a valid contention? body. When a n a dministrative a gency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law
No. Appl ying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a defeated ca ndidate, though obtaining the second wi th the force and effect of a va lid law, while when i t renders a n opinion or gives a statement of
hi ghest number of vote, is not deemed to have been elected by reason of the winners eventual pol icy, i t merely i nterprets a pre -existing law. Rules a nd regulations when promulgated in
di s qualification/ineligibility. He ca nnot be declared as successor s imply because he did not get the purs uance of the procedure or a uthority conferred upon the ad ministrative agency by l aw,
ma jority or the plurality of votes the electorate did not choose him. It would have been different pa rta ke of the nature of a statute, a nd compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal s anction
i f Sa les was able to prove that the voters s till voted for Ga rvida despite knowing her i neligibility, provi ded therein. The details and the manner of ca rrying out the law are often ti mes left to the
thi s would have rendered her votes s tray. a dministrative a gency entrusted with i ts enforcement. In this sense, i t has been said that rules and
Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by the SK member who regul ations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that
obtained the highest number of votes, should the SK member obtaining such vote succeed ha ve the effect of law. Therefore, Ci rcular No. 22 purports merely to a dvise employers-members
Garvida?** of the Sys tem of what, i n the light of the amendment of the law, they s hould include in
(**Not to be confused with Sales situation Sales was a candidate for SK chairmanship not SK determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security
membership.) contri butions s hould be based, and that s uch circular did not require presidential approval a nd
The a bove argument ca nt be considered in this case because Section 435 only a pplies when the publication in the Official Gazette for i ts effectivity. The Resolution a ppealed from is hereby
SK Cha i rman refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, i s convi cted of a felony, vol untarily resigns, a ffi rmed, with costs against a ppellant. So ordered .
di es, is permanently i ncapacitated, is removed from office, or has been a bsent witho ut leave for
more tha n three (3) consecutive months. Garvi das ca se i s not what Section 435 contemplates.
Her removal from office by reason of her a ge i s a question of eligibility. Being eligible means Mataguina Integrated Wood vs. CA
bei ng legally qualified; ca pable of being l egally chosen. Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to
the l a ck of the qualifications prescribed i n the Constitution or the s tatutes for holding public FACT:
offi ce. Ineligibility i s not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for s uccession of the SK In 1973, l i cense was i ssued to Milagros Ma tuguina to operate l ogging businesses under her group
Cha i rman. Ma tuguina Logging Enterprises. MIWPI was established in 1974 wi th 7 s tockholders. Milagros
Ma tuguina became the majority s tockholder l ater on. Mi lagros later petitioned to have MLE be
G.R. No. L-16704 tra ns ferred to MIWPI. Pending a pproval of MLEs petition, Dava o Enterprises Corporation filed a
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC vs. compl aint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao) a lleging that MLE has encroached upon
28
the a rea allotted for DAVENCORs ti mber concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE s a me day, the team s eized from the lumberyard narra s horts, tri mmings and slabs, narra l umber,
gui lty a s charged a nd had recommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE a nd va rious species of l umber a nd s horts. On 4 Apri l 1990, team returned to lumber ya rd a nd
a ppealed the case to the Mi nistry of Natural Resources. During pendency, Mi lagrosa withdrew pl a ced under administrative seizure (owner retains physical possession of s eized articles, only a n
her s hares from MIWPI. La ter, MNR Mi nister Ernesto Ma ceda found MLE gu ilty a s charged. i nventory i s taken) the remaining lumber because Mustang Lumber failed to produce required
Purs uant to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co requested Ma ceda to order MLE a nd/or MIWPI documents upon demand. Upon recommendation of SAID Chi ef Robles, DENR Sec Factoran
to compl y wi th the ruling to pay the va lue in pesos of 2352.04 m 3worth of timbers. The Mi nister s us pended Mustang Lumbers permit and confiscated in favor of the govt the seized articles.
then i ssued a writ of execution a gainst MIWPI. MIWPI filed a petition for prohibition before the Mus ta ng Lumber filed for a TRO against Factoran and Robles,and questioned the va lidity of the
Da va o RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of MIWPI a nd has ordered to enjoin the Mi nister from pursuing Apri l 1 a nd 4 s eizure. RTC held that the warra ntless seizure on April 1 i s va lid as i t comes within
the execution of the writ. DAVENCOR a ppealed a nd the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. MIWPI the exceptions where warra ntless seizure i s justified (search of a moving vehicle), and April
a verred that it is not a party to the original case (as it was MLE tha t was sued a separate entity). 4s ei zure was a lso valid pursuant to the search warrant issued on April 3. CA a ffirmed. Mustang
Tha t the issuance of the order of execution by the Mi nister has been made not only without or i n l umber filed a petition for review on certiorari.
exces s of his authority but that the same was issued patently without a ny factual or l egal basis,
hence, a gross vi olation of MIWPIs constitutional ri ghts under the due process cl ause. ISSUES:
a ) WON the s earch and seizure on April 4 wa s va lid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MIWPIs right to due process has been vi olated. HELD:
Yes . The s earch a nd s eizures made on April 1, 3, 4 were a ll va lid.
HELD: (1) Apri l 1 s earch was conducted on a moving vehicle, which could be lawfully conducted without
The SC rul ed in favor of MIWPI. Generally a ccepted is the principle that no man shall be affected a s earch wa rrant. (2*) The search on April 4 was a continuation of the s earch on April 3 done
by a ny proceeding to which he i s a stranger, a nd strangers to a case not bound by judgment under a nd by vi rtue of the search warra nt issued on 3 April 1990 by Exec Judge Os orio. Under ROC
rendered by the court. In the s ame manner an execution ca n be issued only a gainst a party a nd Rul e 126Sec 9, a s earch warrant ahs a l ifetime of 10 da ys. Hence, it could be served
not a gainst one who did not have his day i n court. There is no basis for the issuance of the Order
of Executi on against the MIWPI. The same was i ssued without giving MIWPI a n opportunity to
defend itself a nd oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance of a wri t of execution a gainst a t a ny ti me within the s aid period, a nd i f its object or purpose ca nnot be accomplished i n 1 da y,
i t. In fa ct, i t does not appear that MIWPI was a t all furnished with a copy of DAVENCORs letter the s ame may be continued the following day or da ys until completed, provided i t is still within
requesting for the Execution of the Mi nisters decision against i t. MIWPI was s uddenly made liable the 10-da y period.
upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretarys expedient conclusions that MLE a nd
MIWPI a re one a nd the same, apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCORs l etter requesting for DISPOSITIVE: Petition i s denied. CA di d not commit any reversible error i n a ffirming RTC judgment.
the Order, a nd without hearing or i mpleading MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, Sea rch and seizure done was valid
MIWPI wa s not i ncluded or mentioned i n the proceedings a s havi ng a ny participation in the .CASE DIGEST BY Agee Romero***There were other issues in the case: the owner of Mustang
encroa chment in DAVENCORs timber concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most Lumber was charged with violation of the Forestry Reform Code. Mustang lumber movedto quash
ba s ic tenets of due process a nd elementary fa irness. The liberal atmosphere which perva des the the i nformation on the ground that the facts comprising the charge did not a mount to a cri minal
procedure in a dministrative proceedings does not empower the presiding officer to make offense (subject matter of the i nformation islumber, which i s neither timber nor other forest
concl usions of fact before hearing a ll the parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24) product under Forestry Reform Code and hence, possession thereof w/o the required legal
documents is not prohibited) and to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the formal
cha l lenge of Mustang Lumber regarding the legality of the s eizure. Lengthy discussion on the
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC VS. CA mea ning of l umber. But SC held that the information va lidly charged a n offense because lumber
(Davide, Jr., 1996) i s i ncluded in the term timber.
A s ea rch warra nt has a lifetime of 10 days. It could be served a t any ti me within 10 da ys. If i ts
object or purpose cannot be a ccomplished in 1 day, the same may be continued the following day Gatchalian v. COMELEC,
or da ys until completed, provided it is within the 10 day period.
G.R. No. 32560, 22 October 1970General words construed generally
FACTS:
On 1 Apri l 1990, Special Acti ons a nd Investigation Division (SAID),acting on information that a Facts:
huge pile of narra flitches, s horts, a nd s labs were seen i nside the lumberyard of Mustang Lumber,
conducted a s urveillance at Mustang l umberyard. The team s aw a truck l oaded with lauan and Purs uant to the request of the advertising firms and associations of the Philippines, COMELEC
a l maciga l umber coming out of the l umberyard. Since the driver could not produce the required promulgated Resolution No. RR
i nvoi ces a nd tra nsport documents, the team s eized the truck together with its ca rgo and 707 whi ch states that donations of billboards to the Commission by foreigners or companies or
i mpounded them at DENR compound. On 3 April 1990,RTC Va lenzuela issued a search warrant. On corpora tions owned a nd
29
control led partially or wholly by foreigners a re not covered by Section 56 of the Revised Election
Code. Where general terms are used, the terms a re to be understood in their general meaning, unless i t
i s expressed that they ha ve acquired a special and restricted meaning. Hence, i n
The body also i ssued Resolution RR-731 which states that the ban in Section 46 of the Revised thi s case, generalia verba s unt generaliter i ntelligenda applies.
El ection Code, as amended, does not cover ca mpaign funds and other contributions by the The bi llboard contributions may not s pecifically favor a single ca ndidate, but the effect that all
Adverti sing Council of the Philippines a nd other contributions by the Advertising Council of the ca ndidates benefit from the contribution amounts to a n assistance greater than the aid that ma y
Phi l ippines a nd others s imilarly s ituated, during the 120 days i mmediately preceding a regular or be gi ven to one ca ndidate. Al lowing s uch undesirable a lien influence will i nevitably l ead to a
s pecial election. Petitioner, a s a ca ndidate i n the election for delegates to the Constitutional ci rcumvention of the laws protecting our national interest. The practice a llegedly condoned by the
Conventi on, filed a complaint with the COMELEC a ssailing the va lidity of the both resolutions, COMELEC i n the subject resolutions, therefore, constitute a vi olation of the Revised Election Code.
a l leging that both a re vi olative of Section 56 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, which The l aw penalizing corrupt election practices should be given a reasonable construction i n the
provi des that: i nterests of the purity of the elections. The resolutions of the Commission on Elections Nos. RR-
No forei gner shall aid a ny ca ndidate, directly or i ndirectly, or to ta ke part i n or to i nfluence i n a ny 707 a nd 731 promulgated respectively on August 13, 1970 a nd September17, 1970 a re therefore
ma nner a ny elections.The prohibited a ctive intervention of foreigners there under may consist decl ared i llegal a nd null a nd voi d.
of:(1) a i ding any ca ndidate, directly or i ndirectly, i n any election;(2) ta king part in any election; and
(3) i nfl uencing in any ma nner any election.
The COMELEC, however, denied the petitioners motion, declaring "that contributions by G.R. No. L-28360 January 27, 1983
forei gners to the COMELEC Bi llboards Committee for the purpose of financing costs of COMELEC
bi l lboards a re not made i n aid or support of any pa rticular ca ndidate in a particular district a nd
C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, pl aintiff-appellee,
tha t the allocation of s pace for its ca ndidate is allowed by l ottery, nor would it i n any way
vs .
i nfluence the result of the election, ... .He then filed an appeal with the Court, contending that said
ANTONIO C. MENOR, as Acting General Manager of the National Waterworks and Sewerage
order of the COMELEC i s null a nd voi d as contrary to l aw or having been issued in excess of the
Authority, and MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRE-QUALIFICATION, NAWASA, defendants-
powers of the Commission on El ections or i n grave abuse of its discretion, a nd prayi ng for a writ of
a ppellants.
prel iminary a s well as permanent i njunction. No restraining order was issued as COMELEC i ts elf
di d not implement the said resolution.
Nicolas T. Benedicto, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee.
Issue:
Whether or not the term any elections, foreigner, a nd a ny ca ndidate; a s well as the terms Gov't. Corporate Counsel for defendants-appellants.
a i d, take part, andinfluence, as contemplated In Section 56 of the Revised Election Code,
ha d other meanings

Held:
The term a ny elections definitely comprehends or a pplies to election of delegates Constitutional AQUINO, J.:
Conventi on. Foreigner, on
the other hand, refers to both natural a nd juridical persons or associations or organized groups, as Thi s case is about the requirement of a tax cl earance certificate as a prerequisite for taking part i n
provi ded by Section 39 of Arti cle 3 of the Revised Election Code, broadening the application of the public biddings or contracts to sell supplies to a ny government agency.
term a nd not limiting the prohibition to natural
pers ons only. Any ca ndidate l ikewise comprehends some ca ndidates or all ca ndidates. The Judge Cl oribel of the Court of First Instance of Ma nila i n his decision dated March 1, 1967 i n Ci vil
terms a id, to ta ke part, a ndinfluence, were also construed in their general sense with aid Ca s e No. 66750, a mandamus case, ordered the Acting General Ma nager of the National
referri ng to to support, to help, to assist or to s trengthen or Wa terworks and Sewerage Authority a nd the members of the Committee on Pre -Qualification to
to a ct i n cooperation with; "to ta ke part" means to participate or to engage in; and "influence" a l low C & C Commerci al Corporation to participate as a qualified bidder i n the public bidding for
mea ns to use the party's endeavors, though he may not be able to carry his point, or to exert or the s upply of a sbestos cement pressure pipes to the Nawasa i n spite of the fact that i t had a
ha ve a n effect on the nature or behaviour of, or a ffect the a ction or thought of, or modify; or to pending tax ca se and had no ta x clearance certificate.
s wa y; to persuade; to a ffect; to have an effect on the condition or development of; to modify or
a ct upon physically, especially in some gentle, s ubtle, or gra dual way; or to exert or maintain a
By vi rtue of that judgment, which became final because the Nawasa did not appeal, C & C
mental or moral power upon or over; to effect or s way by modifications, feelings or conduct.
Commerci al Corporation took part in the bidding. When the bids were opened on Ma y 18, 1967, i t
There is nothing in the Revised Election Code which i mpliedly or expressly prescribes a different
wa s found to be the lowest bidder.
mea ning to the a forementioned terms. Hence, they s hould be understood in their general sense.
There was likewise no manifest or expressed intention that the meaning of the words were to be
res tri cted or l imited.
30
In a l etter dated July 25, 1967, Antoni o C. Menor, the a cting general manager of the Na wasa, Tha t ca se, Ci vil Ca se No. 71346, wa s assigned to Judge Francisco Geronimo. In his order dated
requi red C & C Commerci al Corporation to submit the ta x cl earance certificate required i n Ja nuary 8, 1968, he denied the motion of C & C Commerci al Corporation for a preliminary
Pres i dential Administrative Order No, 66 da ted June 26, 1967, 63 0. G. 6391, whi ch reads a s i njunction. He said that the i njunction would be i nimical to the public interest (p. 37, Rollo).
fol l ows:
The Government Corporate Counsel i n a ma nifestation dated January 15, 1968 a pprised the l ower
Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Ma rcos, President of the Philippines, by vi rtue court tha t the Nawasa board of directors i n i ts resolution dated January 11, 1968 a wa rded the
of the powers vested in me by l aw, do hereby order the disqualification of any contra ct to Regal Tra ding Corporation a s the "lowest complying bidder" (p. 38, Rol lo).
pers on, natural or juridical, with a pending casebefore the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Bureau of Customs or cri minal or ci vil case in court pending or Menor i n his l etter of January 16, 1968 forwa rded to the President of the Philippines for
fi nally decided against him or i t involving non-payment of a ny ta x, duty or exa mination and review the contract entered i nto between the Na wasa a nd Regal Trading
undertaking with the Government, to participate in public biddings or i n a ny Corpora tion, acting i n behalf of the Sumitomo Shoji Kaisha, Ltd., for the supply of asbestos cement
contra ct wi th the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches or pres sure pipes worth $387,814.72 (p. 41, Rol lo). The Presidential Economic Staff and the Office of
i ns trumentalities. including government-owned or controlled corporations, the Pres ident a pproved the contract (p. 64, Rollo).
unti l a fter s uch case or cases are terminated i n his or i ts favor, or unless the
Secretary of Fi nance s hall certify that such cases are pending and not decided
Una ble to get a n injunction from Judge Geronimo, C & C Commercial Corporation sought recourse
wi thout fault on the part of the taxpayer and the ta xpayer s ubmits bond for
i n thi s Court. In its ex parte moti on of January 28, 1968, i t a s ked this Court to enjoin the
pa yment of ta xes that may be assessed a gainst him.
i mplementation of the said contract (p. 16, Rollo).

Government offices entities and instrumentalities a nd local governments shall


The Na wasa opposed the motion on the ground that there was nothing more to be enjoined. Its
i mpose this condition a nd s hall require, in a ddition, the latest certified copy of
couns el revealed in i ts opposition what C & C Commercial Corporation had suppressed: the fact
BIR Letter of Confirmation Form No. 19.65-E-I a nd BIR ta x clearance Form
tha t a fter Judge Geronimo had denied i ts petition for i njunction C & C Commerci al Corporation
No. 1761 a s prerequisites to participation i n any public bidding orexecution of
i ns tituted a nother action (the third case) in the Court of First Instance at Pa sig, Rizal (presided
any contract with them. Vi ol ation of this order shall be a ground for
over by Judge Pedro Navarro), docketed as Ci vil Case No. 10572, wherein it s ought a declaration of
a dministrative a ction. (pp. 8-9, Bri ef for defendants-appellants).
the nullity of the a ward to Regal Trading Corporation.

Menor s aid that the requirement a s to the tax cl earance certificate was mandatory a s held by the
Judge Navarro i n his order dated February 7, 1968 res tra ined Menor, the Nawasa, the Committee
Government Corporate Counsel i n his Opinion No. 159, Series of 1967.
of Awa rds a nd Regal Trading Corporation "from going through" with the said contract a nd from
opening the corresponding letter of credit until the i njunction incident is resolved (pp. 58-59 a nd
On tha t s ame date, July 25, 1967, or l ong a fter Judge Cloribel's judgment had been executed and 80-81, Rol lo).
when he had no more jurisdiction to a mend i t, C & C Commercial Corporation filed a motion i n
Ci vi l Ca se No. 66750 wherein i t prayed that the Na wasa officials be ordered to award to the said
In contrast, this Court in its resolution of Ma rch 18, 1968 denied C & C Commerci al Corporation's
corpora tion the contract for the supply of asbestos cement pressure pipes, that they be restrained
a forementioned motion for the i ssuance of a n i njunction. As the parties herein had already
from a wa rding the contract to a nother bidder a nd that they be required to show ca use why they
s ubmitted their briefs, the a ppeal was submitted for decision. The issue is the propriety of Judge
s hould not be held i n contempt of court. In effect, that motion was a nother petition
Cl ori bel's order compelling the Nawasa officials to award the said contract to C & C Commerci al
for mandamus.
Corpora tion.

Judge Cl oribel i n his order of August 23, 1967 gra nted the motion a nd ordered Menor a nd the
It ma y be a rgued that the issue had become moot because the contract had already been
other Na wasa officials to a ward within ten days from notice the contract to C & C Commercial
a wa rded to Regal Trading Corporation i n 1968 a nd at this late hour i t can be presumed that the
Corpora tion as the l owest bidder. From that order, the Nawasa appealed to this Court. Judge
contra ct ha d been fully performed and i mplemented. Nevertheless, a ruling on the contentions of
Cl ori bel a pproved its record on a ppeal in his order of November 9, 1967.
C & C Commerci al Corporation is necessary, a ccording to the Government Corporate Counsel, "i f
onl y to ma ke the a ppellee-corporation s top playing around with our courts" (p. 70, Rollo). For the
Rea lizing that the a ppeal would delay the award and that another bidder might be given the gui dance of the bench and bar, we have to resolve the l egal issues raised by the Na wasa.
contra ct, C & C Commercial Corporation filed in the lower court another petition for ma ndamus
da ted November 21, 1967 wherein i t prayed that the Na wasa Board of Directors, i ts Committee of
We hol d that Judge Cl oribel acted without jurisdiction and with gra ve abuse of discretion in issuing
Awa rds a nd Menor, i ts acting general manager, be restrained from a warding the contract to
hi s erroneous order, directing that the Nawasa officials s hould award the contract to C & C
a nother bidder a nd that they be ordered to award the contract to C & C Commercial Corporation
Commerci al Corporation. The order i s erroneous and void for the following reasons:
(pp. 29-30, Rol lo).

31
1. The s aid order was an a mendment of a judgment that had already been satisfied. The case was SO ORDERED.
cl os ed a nd terminated. Judge Cl oribel had no ri ght and authority to i ssue such a n order a fter he
ha d l ost jurisdiction over the case. The award of the contract to C & C Commerci al Corporation Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ., concur.
wa s not the lis mota i n the mandamus case before Judge Cl oribel. It was an extraneous matter
tha t could not have been i njected i nto that ca se nor resolved therein. What was in issue was
Separate Opinions
whether C & C Commerci al Corporation s hould be allowed to take part in the bidding even if it had
no ta x cl earance certificate.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurri ng:
2. The Na wasa was justified in not awarding the contract- to C & C Commerci al Corporation
beca use i t had no tax cl earance certificate. It had a pending tax ca se in the Bureau of Internal I concur. I wi sh to add that the rehabilitation of the waterworks system in Metro Ma nila was
Revenue. The a ward to C & C Commercial Corporation would be in gross contravention of cons iderably delayed because contractors filed baseless s uits and they were a ided by judges who
Admi nistrative Order No. 66. s hould have known better.

Tha t wa s the ruling i n Nawasa vs. Reyes, L-28597, February 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 905, where the DE CASTRO, J., di ssenting:
bi dder was also the appellee herein, C & C Commerci al Corporation. It was held therein that C & C
Commerci al Corporation was disqualified under the said order to ta ke part i n the bidding to supply In a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Ma nila i n Ci vil Ca se No. 66750 fi led by the
the Na wasa with steel pipes because i t had "tremendous tax liabilities". C & C Commerci al Corporation principally a gainst the NAWASA on September 7, 1966, the court
ordered the NAWASA to allow the plaintiff corporation to enter as a mong the qualified bidders i n
Under Administrative Order No. 66, the Nawasa officials would be subject to administrative the bi dding for the s upply of a sbestos cement pressure pipes on September 23, 1966. 1 The
di s ciplinary a ction i f they a warded the contract to C & C Commercial Corporation in s pite of its compl aint was filed because of the i mposition of a requirement by NAWASA for the bidders to
uns ettled ta x liabilities. s ubmit a certificate to the effect that they have paid all taxes due with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, which the plaintiff questioned as illegal. 2
The tri al court erred i n holding that Administrative Order No. 66 could not be given a retroactive
effect to the bid of C & C Commerci al Corporation which allegedly had been a llowed to bid in prior Choos ing not to a ppeal the decision which thus became final and executory, a nd i n compliance
tra ns actions with the Na wasa i n spite of i ts pending tax ca se, therewith, the defendant NAWASA pre-qualified the plaintiff corporation which thereupon
s ubmitted its bid. However, before NAWASA could make any a ward of the corresponding contract,
the Pres ident of the Philippines promulgated Administrative Order No. 66 "disqualifying a ny
It erred because Administrative Order No. 66 (promulgated after Judge Cl oribel had rendered his
pers on, natural or juridical, with a pending ca se before the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
deci sion of Ma rch 1, 1967) covers not only the bidding but a lso the "execution of any contract
Burea u of Customs, or criminal or civil ca se in court, pending or fi nally decided a gainst him or
wi th" the l owest bidder. In this case, at the ti me the s aid order was issued, no award had as yet
i nvol ving non-payment of a ny ta x, duty or undertaking with the government, to participate i n
been made and when the award was to be made, the said order was already i n force.
public bidding or in any contract with the government or a ny of i ts subdivision, branches or
i ns trumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporation ... by reason of which
3. Moreover, i t was not the ministerial duty of the Nawasa officials to a ward the contract to C & C NAWASA refused to award the contract to plaintiff corporation, prompting the latter to file a
Commerci al Corporation even i f it was the lowest bidder, The Nawasa i n i ts a ddendum No.1 to the moti on praying that defendants a ward the contract called for to s aid plaintiff being the lowest
i nvi tation to bid dated July 6, 1966 res erved the ri ght "to reject the bid of a ny b idder" (p. 35, res ponsible bidder. 3 Gra nting the motion, the court ordered the defendants to award the
Record on Appeal). contra ct i n favor of the plaintiff, the court observing i n its Order dated August 23, 1967, tha t the
pl a intiff is "the lowest bidder a nd practically the only one who ca n furnish a Filipino or local
Therefore, a bidder whose bid is rejected has no ca use for complaint nor a ri ght to dispute the product under the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 138." 4
a wa rd to another bidder (Esguerra & Sons vs . Aytona, 114 Phil. 1189; Suri gao Mi neral Reserva tion
Boa rd vs . Cl oribel, L-27072, Jul y 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 491). In the motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned order, defendants contended that the
ma tter of a ward of the contract was not included i n the Decision dated Ma rch 1, 1967; tha t
It s hould be noted that "advertisements for bidders a re simply i nvitations to make proposals, and Admi nistrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines dated June 26, 1967 a pplies to the
the a dvertiser is not bound to a ccept the highest or lowest bidder, unless the contrary a ppears" contra ct ca lled for; a nd that the matter of the a ward of the contract in question rests on the
(Art. 1326, Ci vi l Code). No such contrary i ntention a ppears i n this ca se. a bs olute discretion of the defendants, ta king into consideration a ll the ci rcumstances attendant
thereto. 5 This motion having been denied, defendants took the present recourse to have the
WHEREFORE, the tri al court's order is reversed and set aside with costs a gainst C & C Commercial Order da ted August 23, 1967 of th l ower court s et aside.
Corpora tion.

32
The only i ssues raised by the defendants-appellants (appellants for s hort) a re: (1) whether or not i ts fa vor. To the motion, appellants filed a n opposition, despite which, the l ower court i ssued the
the a ward of the contract in question may be deemed to have been included i n the judgment of questioned Order of August 23, 1967.
the Court of Fi rst Instance dated Ma rch 1, 1967, or i nferred therefrom; a nd (2) whether or not
Admi nistrative Order No. 66 dated June 26, 1967 of the President of the Philippines a pplies i n the The ma in contention of a ppellants i n s eeking the setting aside of the aforementioned questioned
i ns tant case. order i s that the subject thereof is not included i n, or i nferred from, the judgment of Ma rch 1,
1967 whi ch merely "ordered appellants to allow the plaintiff to enter as among the qualified
The decision of the Court of First Instance of Ma nila dated Ma rch 1, 1967 di sposed as follows: bi dders." Appellants claim that the Judgment, was already s atisfied when appellants pre-qualified
the a ppellee and allowed i t to tender i ts bid, a nd that nothing more i s to be done under the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment i s hereby rendered granting the judgment.
rel i ef prayed for by ordering the defendants to allow the plaintiff corporation
to enter as among the qualified bidders to supply the materials cons isting of It i s a t this point that Section 49 of the Revised Rules of Court on the "Effect of judgment" comes
l oca lly ma nufactured asbestos cement pressure pipes of different sizes from i nto play, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:
12" to 24" di a meter, without costs or damages.
SECTION 49. Effect of Judgments.- The effect of a judgement or fi nal order
In a ccordance with the foregoing decision, plaintiff-appellee (appellee for short) submitted its rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
bi d. However, despite that it was found on May 18, 1967 to have been the lowest responsible pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
bidder, a ppellee was not forthwith given the fi nal a ward of the corresponding contract because, as
s ta ted earlier, the President of the Philippines promulgated on June 26, 1967 Admi nistrative Order (a ) . . .
No. 66 perti nent provisions of which reads:
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Pres ident of the Philippines, by a djudged or a s to any other ma tter that could have been raised i n relation
vi rtue of the powers vested i n me by l aw, do hereby order the disqualification thereto, conclusive between the parties and their s uccessors in interest by title
of a ny person, natural or juridical, with a pending ca se before the Bureau of s ubsequent to the commencement of a ction or s pecial proceeding, litigation
Internal Revenue of the Bureau of Customs, or cri minal or civil ca se in court for the s ame thing and under the same ti tle and in the s ame ca pacity;
pending or finally decided a gainst him or i t i nvolvi ng non-payment of any ta x,
duty, or undertaking with the Government, to participate in public biddings
(c) In a ny other litigation between the same parties or their s uccessors in
or in any contract with the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, or
i nterest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgement
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
unti l a fter s uch case or cases are terminated i n his or i ts favor, or unless the
and necessarily included therein or necesarry thereto.
Secretary of Fi nance s hall certify, that such cases are pending and not decided
'wi thout fault on the part of the ta xpayer a nd the taxpayer submits bond for
pa yment of ta xes that may be assessed a gainst him. Appellants contend that the matter of the award of the contract i n question was not "s o
a djudged" i n the judgment of March 1, 1967 whi ch l imited i ts dispositive portion to a djudging only
the pre-qualification of a ppellee. Appellee contends otherwise and maintains that the a warding of
Government offices, entities and instrumentalities a nd local governments,
the contra ct to it i s necessarily i mplied from a nd included i n the order i n the judgment declaring it
s ha ll i mpose this condition a nd s hall require i n a ddition, the latest certified
qua lified to take part i n the bidding.
copy of BIR Letter of Confirmation Form -No. 19.65 E-I a nd BIR Ta x Cl earance
Form No. 17.61 a s prerequisite to participation in any public biddings
orexecution of any contract with them. Vi olation of this Order s hall be a I fi nd merit in the contention of appellee. In bringing the action to compel appellants to allow it to
ground for administrative action. (Emphasis s upplied) ta ke part i n the bidding i n question, a ppellee necessarily meant to be also awarded the
corres ponding contract if i ts bid is found to be the l owest within the meaning of the term "lowest
bi dder" under the l aw a nd jurisprudence. The judgment, ordering a ppellants to allow appellee to
Wha t a ppellant Antonio C. Menor, Acti ng General Manager of NAWASA did was to a ddress a letter
enter i ts bid would be empty a nd meaningless if despite the fact that appellee i s found to be the
to a ppellee on July 25, 1967, requesting i t to comply wi thin ten (10) days from receipt of the letter
"l owest bidder", the award of the contract is not made in its favor, without any va lid re ason to
wi th the requirements of the presidential administrative order, a nd to submit to his office proof of
reject a ny or a ll bids as i s generally s et forth in all invitations to bid. No va lid reason is i ntimidated
s a id compliance. 6
by a ppellants other than the promulgation of Presidential Administrative Order No. 66, a fter the
judgment has become fi nal a nd even already e xecuted, a t least insofar as i t ordered appellants to
On the s ame date, July 25, 1967, pl a intiff filed a "Motion" with the court below for the issuance of a l low a ppellee to enter its bid. This is evi dent from the fact that appellants gave appellee ten (10)
a n order to compel appellants to "award the contract ca lled for in the aforementioned bidding" in
33
da ys within which to comply wi th i ts provision, indicating that i f the requirement thereof is s ubmit a certificate to the effect that they have paid all taxes due with the Bureau of Internal
compl ied with by a ppellee, the contract would be awarded to it as the l owest bidder. Revenue, which the plaintiff questioned as illegal. 2

For obvi ous reason, appellee could not comply with the aforementioned requirement, for i t is an Choos ing not to a ppeal the decision which thus became final and executory, a nd i n compliance
a dmitted fact that it has pending ta x cases before the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It is precisely therewith, the defendant NAWASA pre-qualified the plaintiff corporation which thereupon
for thi s reason that a ppellee went to court a nd filed Civil Ca se No. 66750 when appellants s ubmitted its bid. However, before NAWASA could make any a ward of the corresponding contract,
i mposed on i t (appellee) the same or s imilar requirements as those found in Administrative Order the Pres ident of the Philippines promulgated Administrative Order No. 66 "disqualifying a ny
No. 66, i n order to have itself declared qualified to take part i n the bidding. When the lower court pers on, natural or juridical, with a pending ca se before the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
deci ded in fa vor of a ppellee by declaring it to be qualified to so ta ke part i n the public bidding i n Burea u of Customs, or criminal or civil ca se in court, pending or fi nally decided a gainst h im or
question, the judgment must take precedence over Administrative Order No. 66 promulgated i nvol ving non-payment of a ny ta x, duty or undertaking with the government, to participate i n
a fter the judgment has become final. public bidding or in any contract with the government or a ny of i ts subdivision, branches or
i ns trumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporation ... by reason of which
As ma y be s een, the presidential a dministrative order disqualified a person, natural or juri dical, NAWASA refused to award the contract to plaintiff corporation, prompting the latter to file a
who ha s a pending ta x case, a dministrative or judicial, from participating in public biddings or any moti on praying that defendants a ward the contract called for to s aid plaintiff being the lowest
contra ct wi th the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches or i nstrumentalities, i ncluding res ponsible bidder. 3 Gra nting the motion, the court ordered the defendants to award the
government-owned or controlled corporation. The judgment in question, on the other contra ct i n favor of the plaintiff, the court observing i n its Order dated August 23, 1967, tha t the
ha nd, qualified appellee to participate in the public bidding, which necessarily i ncludes the award pl a intiff is "the lowest bidder a nd practically the only one who ca n furnish a Filipino or local
to hi m of the corresponding contract, i f found to be the lowest bidder, otherwise ta king part i n product under the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 138." 4
the bi dding would be a meaningless exercise and the judgment, a n empty vi ctory for
a ppellee.1wph1.t The judgment has become the "law of the case," a nd i n a true sense, the In the motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned order, defendants contended that the
judgment has become "property" of which it ma y not be deprived without due process of l aw. ma tter of a ward of the contract was not included i n the Decision dated Ma rch 1, 1967; tha t
Thi s is exactly what Administrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines would do if it is Admi nistrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines dated June 26, 1967 a pplies to the
ma de to apply to the i nstant case, for while the Court, by final judgment, qualified a ppellee to contra ct ca lled for; a nd that the matter of the a ward of the contract in question rests on the
pa rti cipate in the bidding, the Administrative Order would disqualify s aid party. This would be an a bs olute discretion of the defendants, ta king into consideration a ll the ci rcumstances attendant
i l legal i nterference on the power of the judiciary. thereto. 5 This motion having been denied, defendants took the present recourse to have the
Order da ted August 23, 1967 of th l ower court s et aside.
I, therefore, vote to dismiss the a ppeal and the order a ppealed from, affirmed, i f only on reliance
of the provision of Section 11, Arti cl e X of the New Constitution for reasons I have set forth a t The only i ssues raised by the defendants-appellants (appellants for s hort) a re: (1) whether or not
l ength in Malacora vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51042, September 30, 1982, thi s case having the a ward of the contract in question may be deemed to have been included i n the judgment of
been submitted more than eighteen (18) months before the i nstant case could be decided. the Court of Fi rst Instance dated Ma rch 1, 1967, or i nferred therefrom; a nd (2) whether or not
Admi nistrative Order No. 66 dated June 26, 1967 of the Pre sident of the Philippines a pplies i n the
Separate Opinions i ns tant case.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurri ng: The decision of the Court of First Instance of Ma nila dated Ma rch 1, 1967 di sposed as follows:

I concur. I wi sh to add that the rehabilitation of the waterworks system in Metro Ma nila was WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment i s hereby rendered granting the
cons iderably delayed because contractors filed baseless s uits and they were a ided by judges who rel i ef prayed for by ordering the defendants to allow the plaintiff corporation
s hould have known better. to enter as among the qualified bidders to supply the materials cons isting of
l oca lly ma nufactured asbestos cement pressure pipes of different sizes from
12" to 24" di a meter, without costs or damages.
DE CASTRO, J., di ssenting:

In a ccordance with the foregoing decision, plaintiff-appellee (appellee for short) submitted its
In a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Ma nila i n Ci vil Ca se No. 66750 fi led by the bi d. However, despite that it was found on May 18, 1967 to have been the lowest responsible
C & C Commerci al Corporation principally a gainst the NAWASA on September 7, 1966, the court
bidder, a ppellee was not forthwith given the fi nal a ward of the corresponding contract because, as
ordered the NAWASA to allow the plaintiff corporation to enter as a mong the qualified bidders i n s ta ted earlier, the President of the Philippines promulgated on June 26, 1967 Admi nistrative Order
the bi dding for the s upply of a sbestos cement pressure pipes on September 23, 1966. 1 The
No. 66 perti nent provisions of which reads:
compl aint was filed because of the i mposition of a requirement by NAWASA for the bidders to

34
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Pres ident of the Philippines, by (b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly
vi rtue of the powers vested i n me by l aw, do hereby order the disqualification a djudged or a s to any other ma tter that could have been raised i n relation
of a ny person, natural or juridical, with a pending ca se before the Bureau of thereto, conclusive between the parties and their s uccessors in interest by title
Internal Revenue of the Bureau of Customs, or cri minal or civil ca se in court s ubsequent to the commencement of a ction or s pecial proceeding, litigatio n
pending or finally decided a gainst him or i t i nvolvi ng non-payment of any ta x, for the s ame thing and under the same ti tle and in the s ame ca pacity;
duty, or undertaking with the Government, to participate in public biddings
or in any contract with the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, or (c) In a ny other litigation between the same parties or their s uccessors in
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, i nterest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgement
unti l a fter s uch case or cases are terminated i n his or i ts favor, or unless the which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually
Secretary of Fi nance s hall certify, that such cases are pending and not decided and necessarily included therein or necesarry thereto.
'wi thout fault on the part of the ta xpayer a nd the taxpayer submits bond for
pa yment of ta xes that may be assessed a gainst him.
Appellants contend that the matter of the award of the contract i n question was not "s o
a djudged" i n the judgment of March 1, 1967 whi ch l imited i ts dispositive portion to a djudging only
Government offices, entities and instrumentalities a nd local governments, the pre-qualification of a ppellee. Appellee contends otherwise and maintains that the a warding of
s ha ll i mpose this condition a nd s hall require i n a ddition, the latest certified the contra ct to it i s necessarily i mplied from a nd included i n the order i n the judgment declaring it
copy of BIR Letter of Confirmation Form -No. 19.65 E-I a nd BIR Ta x Cl earance qua lified to take part i n the bidding.
Form No. 17.61 a s prerequisite to participation in any public biddings
orexecution of any contract with them. Vi olation of this Order s hall be a
I fi nd merit in the contention of appellee. In bringing the action to compel appellants to allow it to
ground for administrative action. (Emphasis s upplied)
ta ke part i n the bidding i n question, a ppellee necessarily meant to be also awarded the
corres ponding contract if i ts bid is found to be the l owest within the meaning of the term "lowest
Wha t a ppellant Antonio C. Me nor, Acti ng General Manager of NAWASA did was to a ddress a letter bi dder" under the l aw a nd jurisprudence. The judgment, ordering a ppellants to allow appellee to
to a ppellee on July 25, 1967, requesting i t to comply wi thin ten (10) days from receipt of the letter enter i ts bid would be empty a nd meaningless if despite the fact that appellee i s found to be the
wi th the requirements of the presidential administrative order, a nd to submit to his office proof of "l owest bidder", the award of the contract is not made in its favor, without any va lid reason to
s a id compliance. 6 reject a ny or a ll bids as i s generally s et forth in all invitations to bid. No va lid reason is i ntimidated
by a ppellants other than the promulgation of Presidential Administrative Order No. 66, a fter the
On the s ame date, July 25, 1967, pl a intiff filed a "Motion" with the court below for the issuance of judgment has become fi nal a nd even already executed, a t least insofar as i t ordered appellants to
a n order to compel appellants to "award the contract ca lled for in the aforementioned bidding" in a l low a ppellee to enter its bid. This is evi dent from the fact that appellants gave appellee ten (10)
i ts fa vor. To the motion, appellants filed a n opposition, despite which, the l ower court i ssued the da ys within which to comply wi th i ts provision, indicating that i f the requirement thereof is
questioned Order of August 23, 1967. compl ied with by a ppellee, the contract would be awarded to it as the l owest bidder.

The ma in contention of a ppellants i n s eeking the setting aside of the aforementioned questioned For obvi ous reason, appellee could not comply with the aforementioned requirement, for i t is an
order i s that the subject thereof is not included i n, or i nferred from, the judgment of Ma rch 1, a dmitted fact that it has pending ta x cases before the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It is precisely
1967 whi ch merely "ordered appellants to allow the plaintiff to enter as among the qualified for thi s reason that a ppellee went to court a nd filed Civil Ca se No. 66750 when appellants
bi dders." Appellants claim that the Judgment, was already s atisfied when appellants pre-qualified i mposed on i t (appellee) the same or s imilar requirements as those found in Administrative Order
the a ppellee and allowed i t to tender i ts bid, a nd that nothing more i s to be done under the No. 66, i n order to have itself declared qualified to take part i n the bidding. When the lower court
judgment. deci ded in fa vor of a ppellee by declaring it to be qualified to so ta ke part i n the public bidding i n
question, the judgment must take precedence over Administrative Order No. 66 promulgated
It i s a t this point that Section 49 of the Revised Rules of Court on the "Effect of judgment" comes a fter the judgment has become final.
i nto play, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:
As ma y be s een, the presidential a dministrative order disqualified a person, natural or juri dical,
SECTION 49. Effect of Judgments.- The effect of a judgement or fi nal order who ha s a pending ta x case, a dministrative or judicial, from participating in public biddings or any
rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to contra ct wi th the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches or i nstrumentalities, i ncluding
pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows: government-owned or controlled corporation. The judgment in question, on the other
ha nd, qualified appellee to participate in the public bidding, which necessarily i ncludes the award
to hi m of the corresponding contract, i f found to be the lowest bidder, otherwise ta king part i n
(a ) . . .
the bi dding would be a meaningless exercise and the judgment, a n empty vi ctory for appellee. The
judgment has become the "l aw of the case," and in a true s ense, the judgment has become

35
"property" of which it may not be deprived without due process of law. This is exactly what bus iness
Admi nistrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines would do i f i t is made to a pply to , whi ch madit legally i mpossiblefrom ISB to furnish the P63,000 of the l oan.Resolution No. 1049
the i nstant case, for while the Court, by fi nal judgment, qualified a ppellee to participate in the ca nnot interrupt the default of ISBin complyi ng with its obligation to release the P63,000 ba lance
bi dding, the Administrative Order would disqualify s aid party. This would be a n illegal i nterference beca use i t merely prohibited ISB from making new l oans andinvestments, not from releasing the
on the power of the judiciary. ba l ance of loanagreements previously contracted.The mere pecuniary i nability to fulfill an
enga gementdoes not discharge the obligation of the contract, nor does itconstitute any defense
I, therefore, vote to dismiss the a ppeal and the order a ppealed from, affirmed, i f only on reliance to a decree of specific performance; andthe mere fact of insolvency of a debtor i s never a n excuse
of the provision of Section 11, Arti cl e X of the New Constitution for reasons I have set forth a t for the nonfulfillment of a n obligation, but instead, i s taken as a breach of contract.The fact that
l ength in Malacora vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51042, September 30, 1982, thi s case having Tol entino demanded and accepted the refundof the pre-deducted interest ca nnot be taken as a
been submitted more than eighteen (18) months before the i nstant case could be decided. wa i ver of hisright to collect the P63,000 balance. The a ct of ISB i n askingfor the advance i nterest
wa s improper considering that onlyP17,000 out of the P80,000 l oan was released.The alleged
di s covery by ISB of the overvaluation of theloan collateral ca nno t exempt i t from complying with
Central Bank of the Philippines v. CA (1985)Ponente: Makasiar, C.J.Topic: Delay (Art. 1169)
i ts obligation to furnish the entire P80,000 l oan because bank officials/employees have the
obl igation to i nvestigate theexistence a nd va luation of the properties being offered as aloan
Facts:
s ecurity before approving the l oan a pplication.
Apri l 28, 1965 - Is land Savings Bank (ISB) a pprovedthe l oan application for P80,000 of Sul picio
Tol entino, who, asa s ecurity for the loan, a lso executed a real estate mortgageover his 100-ha Issues/Held/Ratio
l a nd. The approved l oan a pplication called for P80,000 l oan, repaya ble in s emi-annual installments
1)
for a peri od of 3 yea rs, wi th 12% i nterest.May 22, 1965 a mere P17,000 pa rtial release of WON the a cti on of Tolenitno for s pecific performance ca n prosper.
thel oan was made by ISB, and Tolentino a nd his wife Editasigned a promissory note for P17,000 a t
12% a nnual interest, payable within 3 years from the date of execution of thecontract a t semi-
NO.Si nce ISB was in default under the agreement, Tolentinomay choose between specific
a nnual i nstallments of P3,459.An a dvance i nterest for the P80,000 l oan covering a 6-mo period
performance or rescission, butsince ISB is now prohibited from doing further business, theonly
a mounting to P4,800was deducted from the partial release of P17,000, but this was refunded to
remedy l eft is Rescission only for the P63,000 ba lance of the l oan.
Tol entinoon July 23, 1965, a fter being i nformed by ISB that there wasno fund yet a vailable for the
2)
rel ease of the P63,000 ba lance.Aug. 13, 1965 the Monetary Board of the CentralBank issued WON Tol entino is liable to pay the P17,000 debtcovered by the promissory note.
Res olution No. 1049, which prohibited ISB frommaking new loans and investments, a fter fi nding
tha t i t wassuffering liquidity problems.June 14, 1968 the Monetary Board i ssuedResolution No.
YES.The bank was deemed to have complied with itsreciprocal obligation to furnish a P17,000
967, whi ch prohibited ISB from doing business in the Philippines, a fter finding that it failed to put l oa n. The promissory note gave rise to Tolentinos reciprocal obligationto pay s uch loan when it
upthe required capital to restore its s olvency.Aug. 1, 1968 ISB, i n vi ew of non-payment of
fa l ls due and his failure to pay theoverdue a mortizations under the promissory note made him a
theP17,000 covered by the promissory note, filed a n applicationfor the extra-judicial foreclosure
pa rty i n default, hence not entitled to rescission (Art. 1191,CC). ISB has the ri ght to rescind the
of the real estate mortgagecovering the 100-ha land; and the sheriff scheduled a uction.Tolentino
promi ssory note, beingthe aggrieved party.Since both parties were in default i n the performance
fi l ed a petition with the CFI for i njunction,specific performance or rescission and damages with
of thei r reciprocal obligations, both a re liable for damages. Incase both parties have committed a
prel iminary i njunction, alleging that since ISB failed to deliver the P63,000 rema ining balance of
brea ch of their reciprocalobligations, the liability of the first infractor shall be equirablytempered
the l oan, he is entitled tospecific performance by ordering ISB to deliver i t with i nterestof 12% per by the courts (Art. 1192, CC). The l iability of ISBfor damages in not furnishing the entire loan i s
a nnum from April 28, 1965, a nd i f said balancecannot be delivered, to rescind the real estate
offs et by theliability of Tolentino for damages (penalties a nd s urcharges)for not paying his
mortga ge.CFI issued a TRO enjoining ISB from continuingwith the foreclosure of the mortgage, overdue P17,000 debt. Since Tolentinoderived some benefit for his use of the P17,000, he
however, after findingTolentinos petition unmeritorious, ordered the latter to payISB P17,000 s houldaccount for the i nterest thereon (interest was not i ncluded inthe offsetting).
pl us l egal interest a nd l egal charges a nd l iftingthe TRO s o the s heriff may proceed wi th the
3)
forecl osure.CA, on a ppeal by Tolentino, modified CFIs decision byaffirming dismissal of WON Tol entinos real estate mortgage can beforeclosed to satisfy the P17,000 i f his liability to
Tol entinos petition for s pecific performance, but ruled that ISB can neither foreclose themortgage
pa ytherefor s ubsists.
nor col lect the P17,000l oan.
SC: The pa rties, i n the P80,000 l oan a greement,undertook reciprocal obligations, wherein NO.
theobligation/promise of each party i s the consideration for thatof the other; a nd when one party
ha s performed or is ready a ndwilling to perform his part of the contract, the other party whohas
not performed or is not ready and willing to performincurs in delay (Art. 1169, CC).When The fa ct that when Tolentino executed his real estatemortgage, no consideration was then i n
Tol entino executed a real estate mortgage, hesignified his willingness to pay the P80,000 loan, and
exi s tence, as there wasno debt yet because ISB had not made any release on the l oan,does not
froms uch date, the obligation of ISB to furnish the l oan accrued.Thus, ISBs delay started on April
ma ke the real estate mortgage void for l ack of consideration.It is not necessary tha t any
28, 1965 a nd l asted 3 yearsor when Resolution No. 967 wa s issued prohibiting ISB fromdoing
cons ideration should pass a tthe ti me of the execution of the contract of real mortgage.When the
further
cons ideration is subsequent to the mortgage, thelatter ca n ta ke effect only when the debt secured
36
by i t i s created as a binding contract to pay. And when there is partialfailure of consideration, the
mortga ge becomes unenforceableto the extent of such failure. Where the indebtedness Issue:
a ctua llyowing to the holder of the mortgage is less than the sumnamed i n the mortgage, the W/N newspaper publication of the notice of Initial Hearing in an origina l l a nd regi s tra ti on ca s e
mortga ge ca nnot be enforced for more than the actual s um due.Since ISB failed to furnish the
P63,000 ba l ance, the realestate mortgage of Tolentino became unenforceable to s uchextent. ma nda tory or di rectory.
P63,000 i s 78.75% of P80,000, hence the mortgagecovering 100 ha is unenforceable to the extent
of 78.75 ha .The mortgage covering the remainder of 21.25 ha subsists as asecurity for the P17,000
Hel d:
debt.Judgment:1)Tolentino is ordered to pay ISB P17,000 pl us P41,210 (12% i nterest p er
a nnum)2)In case Tolentino fails to pay, his real estate mortgagecovering 21.25 ha shall be It i s mandatory. The word sha l l denotes a n i mpera ti ve a nd thus i ndi ca tes the ma nda tory
forecl osed to s atisfy histotal i ndebtedness3)The real estate mortgage covering 78.75 ha
i s unenforceable a nd ordered released in favor of Tolentino cha ra cter of a statute. The law used the term s hall i n pres cri bi ng the work to be done by the

Commi ssioner of La nd Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order s etting the ti me for
Director of Lands vs Court of Appeals
Ini tial Hearing. While concededl y s uch l i tera l ma nda te i s not a n a bs ol ute rul e i n s ta tutory
Di rector of Lands vs . CA cons truction, a s its import ultimately depends upon i ts context i n the enti re provi s i on, we hol d
276 SCRA 276 tha t i n the pres ent ca s e the term mus t be unders tood i n i ts norma l ma nda tory mea ni ng.
G. R. No. 102858
Sta t Con Pri nciple: When the l aw is cl ear, it is not susceptible of i nterpretation. It must be appli ed
Jul y 28 1997
rega rdl es s of who ma y be a ffected, even i f the l a w ma y be ha rs h or erroneous .
Facts:
Lega l Ma xi ms : Verba Legi s a nd Dura Lex Sed Lex
Pri va te Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his ti tl e under P.

D. No. 1529. However, during the pendency of hi s peti ti on, a ppl i ca nt di ed. Hence hi s hei rs
CAPATI vs . OCAMPO
represented by their a unt Josefa Abistado, who wa s a ppoi nted thei r gua rdi a n a d l i tem, were G.R. No. L-28742 Apri l 30, 1982
Di rectory s tatute.
s ubs ti tuted a s a ppl i ca nts .
It i s permissive or discretionary i n nature a nd merely outlines the act to be done in such a way
tha t no i njury ca n result from ignoring it or that i ts purpose ca n be a ccomplished in a manner
The La nd Registration Court in its deci s i on di s mi s s ed the peti ti on for wa nt of juri s di cti on. other tha n that prescribed a nd s ubstantially the same result ca n be obtained.

However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interes t ha d been i n open, Facts:
conti nuous, exclusive a nd peaceful posses s i on of the s ubject l a nd s i nce 1938. The tri a l court
Pl a intiff Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor, Pa mpanga, was the contractor of the Feati Bank for
di s missed the petition for the reason that the applicants fa i l ed to publ i s h the noti ce of Ini ti a l the construction of i ts building i n Iriga, Ca marines Sur. He entered into a s ub-contract with the
defendant Jesus Ocampo, a resident of Naga Ci ty where he undertook to construct the va ult
Hea ri ng i n a news pa per of genera l ci rcul a ti on i n the Phi l i ppi nes . wa l ls, exterior walls a nd columns of the said Feati building in a ccordance with the s pecifications
i ndicated therein. Defendant further bound himself to complete said construction on or before
Pri va te Respondents a ppealed to CA, whi ch s et aside the decision of the tri a l court a nd ordered June 5, 1967. To emphasize this ti me frame Oca mpo a ffixed his signature below the following
s ti pulation in bold l etters: TIME IS ESSENTIAL, TO BE FINISHED 5 JUNE 67.
the regi s tra ti on of the ti tl e i n the na me of Teodoro Abi s ta do. At the ba ck of the contract which reads:
14. Tha t a ll actions a rising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted i n the Court of First
The Di rector of La nds represented by the Sol i ci tor Genera l , brought the ca s e to the Supreme Ins tance of the Ci ty of Naga.
Cl a i ming that defendant finished the construction in question only on June 20, 1967, pl aintiff
Court. fi l ed i n the Court of First Instance of Pa mpanga a n a ction for recovery of consequential damages.
Oca mpo (defendant) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action
wa s improperly l aid. Ca pati (plaintiff) filed an opposition to the motion, cl aiming that their
37
a greement to hold the venue in the Court of First Instance of Naga Ci ty was merely optional to HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
both contracting parties.
CFI of Pa mpanga decided that it i s an i mproper venue. Before us a re consolidated petitions s eeking the review a nd reversal of the decision 1 of the
res pondent Court of Appeals 2 declaring the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter,
Issue: NTC) to be a col legial body under Executive Order No. 546 3 a nd ordering the NTC to heretofore sit
a nd a ct en banc, i.e., wi th the concurrence of at l east two commissioners, for a valid dispensation
WON the venue of action was improper (CFI of Pa mpanga)? NO, i t made use of the word may, of i ts quasi-judicial functions.
hence only directory.
Es ta blished by evi dence a re the following facts:
Held:
It i s well settled that the word may i s merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon
a pa rty. Under ordinary ci rcumstances, the term may be connotes possibility; i t does not On October 19, 1993, pri va te respondent Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc. (hereafter,
connote certainty. Ma y i s an auxillary verb indicating l iberty, opportunity, permission or Bel lTel) filed with the NTC a n Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience a nd Necessity to
pos sibility. Procure, Install, Operate a nd Ma intain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to
The s tipulation as to venue in the contract i n question is s imply permissive. By the s aid Cha rge Rates Therefor a nd with Further Request for the Issuance of Provi sional Authority. This
s ti pulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits s olely a nd exclusively with the Court of a pplication was docketed as NTC Ca se No. 93-481. At the ti me of the filing of this a pplication,
Fi rs t Instance of Naga. They merely a greed to submit their disputes to the said court, without pri va te respondent BellTel had not been granted a legislative fra nchise to engage in the business
wa i ving their ri ght to seek recourse i n the court s pecifically i ndicated i n Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of of tel ecommunications s ervice.
the Rul es of Court.
Si nce the complaint has been filed i n the Court of First Instance of Pa mpanga, where the plaintiff Si nce private respondent BellTel was, at that ti me, a n unenfranchised applicant, i t was excluded in
res i des, the venue of action is properly l aid in a ccordance with Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules the deliberations for servi ce area assignments for l ocal exchange carrier s ervice 4. Thus, only
of Court. peti tioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. a nd
International Communications Corporation, a mong others, were beneficiaries of formal awards of
Republ i c of the Phi l i ppi nes s ervi ce a rea a ssignments in April a nd Ma y, 1994.
SUPREME COURT
Ba gui o Ci ty On Ma rch 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 wa s enacted granting private respondent BellTel a
congressional franchise which gave priva te respondent BellTel the ri ght, privilege a nd a uthority to
FIRST DIVISION
ca rry on the business of providing telecommunications s ervices in and
between provinces, cities, and municipalities i n the Philippines a nd for this
purpose, to establish, operate, manage, l ease, maintain and purchase
tel ecommunications systems, i ncluding mobile, cellular a nd wired or wireless
G.R. No. 126496 April 30, 1997
tel ecommunications systems, fi ber optics, satellite tra nsmit a nd receive
s ys tems, a nd other telecommunications sys tems and their va lue-added
GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.; ISLA s ervi ces such as, but not limited to, transmission of voice, data, facsimile,
COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC., peti tioners, control signals, a udio a nd video, i nformation servi ce bureau, a nd all other
vs . tel ecommunications systems technologies as a re a t present available or be
BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ma de available through technical a dvances or i nnovations i n the future, or
COMMISSION and HON. SIMEON L. KINTANAR in his official capacity as Commissioner of the cons truct, acquire, l ease and operate or ma nage tra nsmitting a nd receiving
National Telecommunications, res pondents. s ta tions and switching stations, both for l ocal and international servi ces, l ines,
ca bl es or systems, as is, or a re convenient or essential to efficiently ca rry out
COMMISSIONER SIMEON L. KINTANAR, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS the purposes of this franchise. 5
COMMISSION, peti tioner,
vs . On Jul y 12, 1994, pri va te respondent BellTel filed with the NTC a s econd Application 6 praying for
BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC., res pondent. the i ssuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience a nd Necessity for the installation, operation
a nd maintenance of a combined nationwide l ocal toll (domestic a nd i nternational) and ta ndem
tel ephone exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave ra dio, satellites a nd fiber optic
ca bl e with Public Ca lling Offices (PCOs ) a nd very s mall a perture antennas (VSATs) under a n
38
i ntegrated system. This s econd application was docketed as NTC Ca se No. 94-229. In this s econd In vi ew of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD a nd two members of the NTC,
a pplication, BellTel proposed to install 2,600,000 tel ephone l ines in ten (10) years using the most the Legal Department thereof prepared a working draft 10 of the order gra nting
modern and latest state-of-the-art facilities a nd equipment a nd to provide a 100% digital l ocal provi sional authority to priva te respondent BellTel. The said working draft was initialed
excha nge telephone network by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by
Commi ssioner Si meon Ki ntanar.
Pri va te respondent BellTel moved to withdraw i ts earlier application docketed as NTC Ca se No. 93-
481. In a n Order dated July 11, 1994, thi s earlier a pplication was ordered withdrawn, without Whi le ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three members composing a quasi-
prejudice. judi cial body i s entitled to promulgation, petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing policy
a nd the corresponding procedure and practice in the NTC, the exclusive a uthority to sign, va lidate
The s econd application of private respondent BellTel which was docketed as NTC Ca s e No. 94-229 a nd promulgate any a nd all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC i s lodged in the Chairman,
wa s assigned to a Hearing Officer for reception of priva te respondent BellTel's evidence. Written i n thi s case, Commissioner Simeon Ki ntanar, a nd, thus, s ince only Commissioner Simeon Ki ntanar
opposition a nd other pertinent pleadings were filed by petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart i s recognized by the NTC Secretariat as the sole a uthority to sign a ny a nd all orders, resolutions
Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications a nd decisions of the NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez have
Corpora tion as oppositors. Other oppositors to private respondent BellTel's application were a l legedly no voting power and both their concurrence which actually constitutes the ma jority is
Ca pi tol Wireless, Inc., Eastern Mi samis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, Liberty Broadcasting i nutile without the assent of Commissioner Ki ntanar.
Network, Inc., Mi dsayap Communication, Northern Te lephone, PAPTELCO, Pi lipino Telephone
Corpora tion, Philippine Global Communications, Inc., Philippine Long Distance Telephone Anxi ous over the i naction of the NTC i n the ma tter of i ts petition praying for the issuance of a
Compa ny, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Radio Communications of the provi sional authority, priva te respondent BellTel filed on May 5, 1995 a n Urgent Ex-Parte Moti on
Phi l ippines, Inc. a nd Extelcom and Telecommunications Office. to Res olve Application and for the Issuance of a Provi sional Authority 11. Reference was explicitly
ma de to the findings of the CCAD a nd recommendations of Deputy Commissioners Dumlao a nd
On December 20, 1994, pri va te respondent BellTel completed the presentation of i ts evidence-in- Perez tha t were a ll favorable to private respondent BellTel. Mention was also ma de of the
chi ef. In the course of the proceedings, the witnesses of BellTel were cross-examined by the a forementioned working draft of the order gra nting a provisional authority to BellTel, which draft
a forementioned oppositors. On December 21, 1994, Be l lTel filed its Formal Offer of Evidence wa s made by the Legal Department of the NTC a nd i nitialed by the said deputy commissioners.
together wi th all the technical, financial a nd l egal documents i n s upport of its application.
Purs uant to its rules, the application was referred to the Common Ca rriers Authorization No a cti on was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus, on May 12, 1995, pri va te
Department (CCAD) for s tudy and recommendation. res pondent BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Pa rte Motion 12 rei terating its earlier prayer.

On February 6, 1995, the CCAD, through Engr. Ma rle Rabena, submitted to Deputy Commissioner Peti ti oners-oppositors filed an Opposition 13 to the a forestated two motions of private respondent
Fi delo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum dated February 6, 1995 7 ma nifesting his findings a nd Bel lTel.
recommending that "based on technical documents submitted, BellTel's proposal is technically
fea sible." 8 In a n Order dated Ma y 16, 1995, s i gned solely by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, the NTC, instead
of res olving the two pending motions of private respondent BellTel, set the said motions for a
Subs equently, Mr. Ra ulito Suarez, the chief of the Rates a nd Regulatory Di vision of CCAD, hea ring on Ma y 29, 1995. On Ma y 29, 1995, however, no hearing was conducted as th e same was
conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of priva te respondent BellTel. On Ma rch res et on June 13, 1995.
29, 1995, Mr. Sua rez made the finding that BellTel has the financial capability to s upport i ts
proposed project at l east for the i nitial two (2) years. On June 13, 1995, the da y of the hearing, private respondent BellTel filed a Motion to Promulgate
(Amending the Moti on to Resolve) 14. In said motion, priva te respondent prayed for the
Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC Deputy Commissioners Fidelo promulgation of the working draft of the order granting a provisional a uthority to private
Duml ao a nd Consuelo Perez adopted the same a nd expressly signified their approval thereto by res pondent BellTel, on the ground that the said working draft had already been signed or i nitialed
ma ki ng the following notation on the a forestated Memorandum of the CCAD dated February 6, by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together, constitute a majority out of the three
1995: commi ssioners composing the NTC. To s upport i ts prayer, private respondent BellTel asserted that
the NTC wa s a collegial body a nd that as such, two favorable votes out of a maximum three votes
Wi th the finding of financial capability a nd technical feasibility, the application by the members of the commission, a re enough to validly promulgate a n NTC decision.
meri ts due/favorable consideration. 9
On June 23, 1995, peti tioners-oppositors filed their Joint Opposition 15 to the a forecited motion.
Bel ow this notation, Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez a ffixed
thei r signatures a nd the date, "4/6/95."
39
On Jul y 4, 1995, the NTC denied the said motion in a n Order s olely signed by Commissioner a re hereby enjoined a nd prohibited from implementing or enforcing the same;
Si meon Ki ntanar. [a nd]

On Jul y 17, 1995, pri va te respondent BellTel filed with this court a Petition 2. Peti ti oner's petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED in that the
for Certiorari, Mandamus a nd Prohibition s eeking the nullification of the aforestated Order dated Res pondent NTC, composed of Ki ntanar a nd deputy commissioners Perez a nd
Jul y 4, 1995 denyi ng the Motion to Promulgate. Duml ao, a re hereby directed to meet en banc a nd to consider a nd act on the
dra ft Order, Annex "B" of the Petition, wi thi n fifteen (15) days from the finality
On Jul y 26, 1995, we i ssued a Resolution referring said petition to the respondent Court of of thi s Decision. Wi thout pronouncement a s to costs.
Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant to Section 9, pa r. 1 of B.P. Bl g. 129.
SO ORDERED. 18
In the i nterim, the Solicitor General filed with the respondent a ppellate court a Ma nifestation In
Li eu of Comment 16in which the Solicitor General took a l egal position a dverse to that of the NTC. The herein a ssailed decision being unacceptable to petitioner Simeon Ki ntanar
The Solicitor General, after a close examination of the l aws creating the NTC a nd i ts predecessors a nd petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications
a nd a studious analysis of certain Department of Tra nsportation and Communications (DOTC) Co., Inc. a nd International Communications Corporation as oppositors in the
orders , NTC ci rculars, and Department of Justice (DOJ) l egal opinions pertinent to the issue of a pplication of private respondent BellTel for a provisional a uthority, they filed
col l egiality of the NTC, ma de the following recommendations: wi th this court separate petitions for review.

WHEREFORE, the Solicitor General respectfully pra ys that this Honorable Commi ssioner Ki ntanar's petition, docketed as G.R No. 126526, a s cribes to the
Court: res pondent a ppellate court the following assignment of errors:

(a ) declare respondent National Telecommunications Commission a s a 1. The Court of Appeals i n setting aside NTC MC 1-1-93 a nd MC 3-1-93 a nd the
col l egial body; Order of the Commission dated July 4, 1995, ma de a collateral a ttack on a law
whi ch was nowhere called for i n the pleadings of the parties nor is a uthorized
(b) res train respondent Commissioner Si meon Ki ntanar from a rrogating unto by the Rul es of Court.
hi mself alone the powers of the said a gency;
2. The Court of Appeals erred i n assuming and imposing that the Commission
(c) order NTC, a cti ng as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner Bell Telecom's i s a collegial body s imply by rea son of the fact that other bodies which were a
a pplication under NTC-94-229; s pi n off from the defunct Public Service Commission were created as a
col l egial body. The law that created EO 546 era sed the collegial character of
the proceeding before the NTC.
(d) declare NTC Memorandum Ci rculars 1-1-93 a nd 3-1-93 as void; [and]

3. The Court of Appeals' decision contains serious contradiction; worse, it


(e) uphold the l egality of DOTC Department Order 92-614. 17
cons idered evidence not formally offered or incorporated i nto the records of
the ca s e; yet failed to consider evidence submitted by petitioner- appellant
On September 23, 1996, res pondent Court of Appeals promulgated the herein assailed decision nor on the prejudicial issue on non-joinder of i ndispensable parties.
the di spositive portion of which reads as follows:
3.1 CA erred i n a ssuming that the NTC i s collegial by the
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment i s hereby rendered a s fa ct tha t Cha rters of other regulatory a gencies expressly
fol l ows: ma de them collegial while this express provision was
a bs ent i n NTC's charter.
1. Peti ti oner's petition for a writ of Certiorari a nd Prohibition is hereby
gra nted. Accordingly, NTC Memorandum Ci rcular No. 1-1-93, Annex "J" of the 3.2 CA contra dicts itself by holding that DOTC MC 92-614
Petition, Memora ndum Ci rcular No. 3-1-93, Annex "K" of the Petition a nd the preva ils and [requires] collegiality.
Order of Ki ntanar, Annex "L" of the Petition, a re hereby SET ASIDE for being
contra ry to l a w. The Respondents a nd all those a cting for a nd in their behalf
3.3 The decisions by Undersecretary Li chauco signed by
her a nd her 2 deputies are i n no way i ndicative of

40
col l egiality and s hould not be considered as havi ng any unl awful i nterference in a nd ca nalization of the discretionary functions of the
pers uasive effect . . . Commi ssion a s a quasi-judicial entity; a nd

3.4 The Court of Appeals erred in a pplying the Board of 7. The Decision condones the illegal a nd unethical a ct of BellTel of
Communications Rules of Pra ctice and Procedures. s urreptitiously s ecuring a draft decision, a nd encourages a nd places premium
on future similar illegal a cts-all i n vi olation of the ruling and the mandate of
4. The Court of Appeals erred when i t granted mandamus, directing and in the Supreme Court in In Re Jurado: Adm. Ma tter No. 90-5-383 (July 12,
effect controlling Commissioner Ki ntanar and deputy Commissioners Dumlao 1990). 20
a nd Perez, to meet en banc to cons ider and act on a "draft Order" only which
the Court i tself recognized no l onger had the a pproval of two (2) On December 16, 1996, pri va te respondent BellTel filed a n Omnibus Motion 21 pra ying for, a mong
Commi ssioners while i n the same token the Court of Appeals had set a side a others , the consolidation of G.R Nos. 126496 a nd 126526.
dul y promulgated Order of July 4, 1995 a l l egedly because i t did not ca rry the
a pproval of 2 commissioners. 19 On December 18, 1996, res pondent BellTel filed its Comment. 22 On the same day, the NTC a nd
Commi ssioner Ki ntanar fi led a Ma nifestation/Motion 23 echoing the prayer for the consolidation of
On the other hand, petitioners-oppositors, in their petition docketed as G.R No. 126496, a ssail the the G.R Nos . 126496 a nd 126526.
deci sion of respondent a ppellate court on the following grounds:
On December 19, 1996, the Offi ce of the Solicitor General filed a
1. The Court of Appeals erred i n not dismissing the instant Petition outright for Ma ni festation/Motion 24 rei terating that i ts l egal stance in this case is a dverse to that of the NTC
i ts failure to implead indispensable parties, in violation of Section 5, Rule 65 a nd prayi ng that i t be excluded from filing a ny comment i n behalf of the NTC.
a nd Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court;
In a Resolution dated February 5, 1997, we res olved, a mong others, to excuse the Solicitor
2. The Court of Appeals seriously erred i n ta king cognizance o f a nd passing General from filing any comment i n behalf of the NTC, require the NTC to file i ts own comment in
upon BellTel's Petition, which on i ts face i s premature since the Order of July 4, G.R No. 126496 a nd to consolidate G.R Nos. 126496 a nd 126526.
1996 a s sailed was not a find decision of the Commission;
On Ma rch 6, 1997, the NTC a nd Commissioner Ki ntanar filed a Ma nifestation/Motion 25 pra ying
3. Even a ssuming arguendo that the Court of Appeals ca n ta ke cognizance of tha t the latter's petition i n G.R No. 126526 be a dopted a s their comment i n the consolidated
the Peti tion, the disposition i n Decision therein which nullifies NTC ca s es.
Memora ndum Circulars 1-1-93 a nd 3-1-93 i tself constitutes a collateral a ttack
on the s aid laws, the va lidity of which were never put i n issue by a ny of the Upon the joinder of issues in these consolidated ca ses, we perceive the fundamental i ssue to be
pa rti es, contrary to the clear l egal requirement that the va lidity of l aws ca n be tha t of the collegiality of the NTC a s a quasi-judicial a gency.
a tta cked only i n direct proceedings instituted for that purpose;
We fi nd the consolidated petitions wanting of merit.
4. It wa s in fa ct improper for the Court of Appeals to pass on the validity of
NTC Ci rcul ar No. 1-1-93 a nd Memorandum Ci rcular No 3-1-93 since the same
Fi rs t. We hereby declare that the NTC i s a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three
wa s absolutely unnecessary for the resolution of the Petition;
members of the commission in order to va lidly decide a case or a ny i ncident therein. Corollarily,
the vote a lone of the chairman of the commission, as i n this case, the vote of Commissioner
5. Even a ssuming that the Court of Appeals correctly defined the prime issues Ki nta nar, a bsent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the
a s being that of collegiality, nonetheless the Court of Appeals committed a commi ssion to a t least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render a n NTC order,
s eri ous error of law i n declaring the NTC a s a collegial body despite the cl ear res olution or decision.
i ntent of E.O. No. 546 a nd the provisions of DOTC MC 95-640, a nd the obvious
i mplications of pending bills i n Congress on the reorganization of the NTC;
Si mply put, Commissioner Ki ntanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone
does not speak for a nd in behalf of the NTC. The NTC a cts through a three-man body, and the
6. The Decision, in mandating that the NTC Commissioner and Deputy three members of the commission each has one vote to cast i n every deliberation concerning a
Commi ssioners sit to consider the draft-and only the draft-in rendering its ca s e or a ny incident therein that is s ubject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider the
Deci sion i n BellTel's application constitutes a n unwarranted, unauthorized and hi s torical milieu i n which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency i t is now under Executive
Order No. 146 whi ch organized the NTC a s a three-man commission and expose the illegality of all

41
memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No. 146, The a forementioned Executive Order took effect on September 24, 1979 . . .
we a re l eft with only one logical conclusion: the NTC i s a collegial body a nd was a collegial body However, the NTC did not promulgate any Rules of Procedure and Pra ctice.
even during the time when it was a cting a s a one-man regime. Cons equently, the then existing Rules of Procedure a nd Pra ctice promulgated
by the BOC wa s a pplied to proceedings i n the NTC. In the meantime, the
We thus quote with approval the encompassing l egal ruminations of the respondent Court of Deci sions of the NTC were signed by the Chairman a lone o f the NTC which
Appeals in disposing of the issue of the collegiality of the NTC: rendered the two (2) deputy Commissioners "non-participative" i n the task of
deci sion-making. This prompted the then Mi nister of Tra nsportation and
Communication Jose P. Da ns, Jr. to s eek the legal opinion of the then Mi nister
In res olving the issue, We recall that, on November 17, 1936, the Na tional
of Jus tice Ricardo C. Puno, as to whether the NTC wa s a collegial body or not.
As s embly passed Commonwealth Act No. 146 which created the Public Service
On Ja nuary 11, 1984, Mi ni ster Puno sent a l etter-opinion . . . to the effect that
Commi ssion (PSC). While provi ding that the PSC s hall consist of a Public the NTC wa s not a collegial body but a single entity a nd thus the then practice
Servi ce Commissioner a nd a Deputy Commissioner, the law made i t clear that
of onl y the Chairman of the NTC s igning the Decisions of the NTC was
the PSC wa s not a collegial body by s tating that the Deputy Commissioner
a uthorized by law. . . .
coul d act only on matters delegated to him by the Public Service
Commi ssioner. As amended by RA 2677, the Public Service Commission was
tra ns formed into a nd emerged as a collegial body, composed of one Public Admi ttedly, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to great weight . .
Servi ce Commissioner a nd five (5) Associate Commissioners. The amendment . . However, the s ame is not controlling or conclusive on the courts . . . . We
provi ded that contested cases and all cases involving the fixing of ra tes shall be fi nd and declare, in the present recourse, that the Puno Opinion i s not correct.
deci ded by the Commission en banc. Admi ttedly, EO 546 does not specifically s tate that the NTC was a collegial
body. Nei ther does i t provide that the NTC s hould meet En Banc i n deciding a
ca s e or i n exercising its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. But the
On September 24, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Ma rcos signed, i nto l aw,
a bs ence of such provisions does not militate a gainst the collegial nature of the
Pres i dential Decree No. 1 a dopting and approvi ng the Integrated NTC under the context of Section 16 of EO 546 a nd under the Rules of
Reorganization Pl an which, in turn, created the Board of Communications
Procedure and Practice a pplied by the NTC i n i ts proceedings. Under [Rule 15]
(BOC) i n place of the PSC. This ti me, the new regulatory board was composed
of s a id Rules, the BOC (now the NTC) s i ts En Banc.
of three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions:

. . . In every ca se heard by the Board en banc, the orders,


. . . The Boa rd of Communications shall be composed of a
rul i ngs, decisions a nd resolutions disposing of the merits of
ful l ti me Chairman who s hall be of unquestioned i ntegrity the ma tter wi thin its jurisdiction s hall be reached with the
a nd recognized prominence in previous public and/or
concurrence of at least two regular members a fter
pri va te employment; two full-time members who s hall be
del iberation a nd consultation and thereafter assigned to a
competent on all aspects of communications, preferably member for the writing of the opinion. Any member
one of whom shall be a l awyer a nd the other a n economist
di ssenting from the order, ruling, decision or resolution
. ..
s ha ll s tate i n writing the reason for his dissent.

On Ja nuary 25, 1978, the BOC promulgated its "Rules of Procedure and
In a ll other cases, a duly a ssigned Member s hall issue all
Pra cti ce" in connection with a pplications and proceedings before i t.
orders , rulings, decisions and resolutions pertinent to the
ca s e a ssigned to him. Copy of the decision on the merit of
On Jul y 23, 1979, Pres i dent Ma rcos i ssued Executive Order No. 546, crea ting the ca s e so assigned s hall be furnished the Chairman of the
the Mi nistries of Public Works, a nd of Tra nsportation and Communications, Boa rd.
merged the defunct Board of Communications and the Telecommunications
Control Bureau i nto a single entity, the National Telecommunications
xxx xxx xxx
Commi ssion (NTC). The said law was issued by then President Ma rcos i n the
exerci se of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O. 546 provi des that
Ins crutably, a ca se before the BOC may be assigned to and heard by only a
member thereof who is tasked to prepare a nd promulgate his Decision
. . . The Commission shall be composed of a Commissioner thereon, or heard, En Banc, by the full membership of the BOC i n which case
a nd two Deputy Commissioners, preferably one of whom
the concurrence of at least two (2) of the membership of the BOC is necessary
s ha ll be a lawyer a nd a nother an economist. . . .
for a va l id Decision . . . . Whi l e it may be true that the aforesaid Rules of

42
Procedure was promulgated before the effectivity of Executive Order No. 546, In i nterpreting a statute, every part thereof s hould be given effect on the
however, the Rules of Procedure of BOC governed the rules of practice a nd theory tha t i t was enacted a s an i ntegrated law and not as a combination of
procedure before the NTC when i t was established under Executive Order No. di ssonant provisions. As the a phorism goes, "that the thing ma y ra ther have
546. Thi s was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of "Philippine effect than be destroyed" . . . If i t wa s the i ntention of President Ma rcos to
Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission, cons titute merely a single entity, a "one-man" governmental body, instead of a
131 SCRA 200" when it declared that: commi ssion or a three-man collegial body, he would not have constituted a
commi ssion a nd would not have specifically decreed that the Commission is
The Rules of Pra ctice and Procedure promulgated on composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner a nd the
Ja nuary 25, 1978 by the Board of Communications, the two (2) deputy commissioners. Irrefragably, then, the NTC i s a commission
i mmediate predecessor of respondent NTC . . . govern the composed not only of Ki ntanar, but Perez a nd Dumlao as well, a cting together
rul es of practice a nd procedure before the BOC then, now i n the performance of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions,
res pondent NTC. . . . conformably wi th the Rules of Procedure a nd Pra ctice promulgated by the
BOC a nd applicable to the NTC.
In the ca se of "Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company versus National
Telecommunications, et al., 190 SCRA 717", the Supreme Court a pplied a nd The ba refaced fact that . . . of Executi ve Order 546 us ed the word "deputy" to
ci ted Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Pra ctice of BOC . . . . des ignate the two (2) other members of the Commission does not militate
a ga inst the collegiality of the NTC. . . . The col legiality of the NTC ca nnot be
di s paraged by the mere nominal designation of the membership thereof.
Hence, under i ts Rules of Procedure and Pra ctice, the Respondent NTC, a s its Indeed, We a re convinced that such nominal designations are wi thout
predecessor, the BOC, had consistently been and remains a collegial body. functi onal i mplications a nd a re designed merely for the purpose of
a dministrative s tructure or hierarchy of the personnel of the NTC. . . .
Res pondents Ki ntanar's and NTC's pose that Respondent Ki ntanar, a lone, is
ves ted with authority to s ign and promulgate a Decision of the NTC i s
In hi ndsight, even Secretary Garcia was in accord with the collegiality of the
a nti thetical to the nature of a commission as envisaged in Executive Order No.
NTC when he promulgated and issued Department Order No. 92-614 . . . Even
546. It mus t be borne i n mind that a Commission is defined as:
then Commissioner Ma riano Benedicto openly expressed his vehement
opposition to the Department Order of Secretary Garcia a nd opted to seek
[a ] body composed of s everal persons acting under lawful refuge in the opinion of the then Mi nister of Justice Puno . . . . It wa s only
a uthority to perform s ome public senica (City of Louisville when Commissioner Benedicto resigned a nd Respondent Kintanar was
Muni cipal Housing Commission versus Public Housing des ignated to replace Commissioner Benedicto that Secretary Ga rcia flip-
Admi nistration, 261 Southwestern Reporter, 2nd, page fl a pped [sic], and suddenly found i t expedient to recall his Department Order
286). No. 92-614 a nd authorize Ki ntanar to decide, a ll by hi mself, all cases pending
wi th the NTC i n frontal vi olation of the Rules of Procedure and Pra ctice before
A Commi ssion is a lso defined as a board or committee of officials appointed the NTC, more s pecifically Rule 15 thereof . . . .
a nd empowered to perform certain a cts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a
public nature or servi ce . . . (Black, Law Dictionary, page 246). There is xxx xxx xxx
pers uasive a uthority tha t a "commission" is synonymous with "board" (State
Ex. Rel . Johnson versus Independent School District No. 810, Wa bash County, The Respondents ca nnot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to buttress their
109 Northwestern Reporter 2nd, page 596). Indeed, as can be easily discerned
a rgument . . . beca use under the House Bill, the NTC i s transformed i nto a
from the context of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 546, the Commission is
col l egial body. Indeed, We find Respondents' pose tenuous. For, it can likewise
composed of a Commissioner and two (2) deputy commissioners . . . not the be a rgued, with justification, that House Bill No. 10558 i ndeed confirms the
commi ssioner, alone, a s pontificated by Ki ntanar. The conjunctive word "and"
exi s ting collegial nature of the NTC by s o expressly reaffirming the same.
i s not without any l egal significance. It is not, by a ny chance, a surplusage i n
the l a w. It means "in addition to" (McCaull Webster Elevator Company vers us
Ada ms, 167 Northwestern Reporter, 330, pa ge 332). The word "a nd", whether xxx xxx xxx
i t i s used to connect words, phrases or full sentence[s], must be a ccepted as
bi nding together a nd as relating to one a nother . . . . In s um, then, We find a nd s o declare that NTC Ci rcular No. 1-1-93 . . .
Memora ndum Circular No. 3-1-93 . . . a nd the Order of Ki ntanar . . . decl aring

43
the NTC a s a single entity or non-collegial entity, a re contrary to l aw and thus juri s diction. Al l that respondent Court of Appeals passed upon was the question of whether or not
nul l a nd void and should be, as they a re hereby, s et aside. 26 the NTC a nd Commissioner Ki ntanar committed grave abuse of discretion, a nd s o we must revi ew
a nd a scertain the correctness of the findings of the respondent appellate court on this s core, a nd
Second. Petitioners ta ke us to task with their vi gorous contention that respondent appellate thi s score alone.
court's a ct of nullifying NTC Memorandum Ci rcular No. 1-1-93 i ssued by then Commissioner
Ma ri a no Benedicto, Jr. a nd NTC Memorandum Ci rcular No. 3-1-93 i ssued also by then Thus , the claim of petitioners that there is here a ca se of non-joinder of i ndispensable parties i n
Commi ssioner Benedicto on January 6, 1993, wa s a collateral a ttack a gainst the aforecited the persons of all of the oppositors in NTC Ca s e No. 94-229, i s untenable.
ci rcul ars and an unnecessary a nd a busive exercise of the court's power to nullify a dministrative
regul ations. Fourth. Petitioners, in a pparent paranoia, argue that what the respondent a ppellate court has
a ctua lly ordered, was that the NTC s it a nd meet en banc a nd forthwith gra nt private respondent
It mus t be remembered by petitioners, however, that administrative regulations derive their Bel lTel's application for a provisional a uthority. Petitioners, however, have obviously over-read
va l i dity from the statute that they were, in the first place, i ntended to i mplement. Memorandum the s econd part of the dispositive portion of the herein assailed decision rendered by respondent
Ci rcul ars 1-1-93 a nd 3-1-93 are on their face null and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary Court of Appeals.
to l a w. They were nullified by respondent Court of Appeals because they a re absolutely illegal and,
a s s uch, are without a ny force a nd effect. The fa ct that i mplementation of these illegal regulations There is no dispute that jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety of mandamus i n causing a
ha s resulted in the i nstitutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, i s not and ca n never be a qua si-judicial a gency to exercise its discretion in a case a lready ri pe for a djudication a nd l ong-
ra ti fication of such a n illegal practice. At the least, these illegal regulations are a n erroneous a wa iting the proper disposition. As to how this discretion is to be exercised, however, is a realm
i nterpretation of E.O. No. 546 a nd i n the context of a nd i ts predecessor laws. At the most, these outs ide the office of the s pecial ci vil action ofmandamus. It is elementary l egal knowledge, a fter
i l legal regulations are a ttempts to validate the one-man rule in the NTC a s executed by persons a l l, that mandamus does not lie to control discretion.
wi th the selfish i nterest of maintaining their illusory hold of power.
When the respondent Court of Appeals directed Commissioners Ki ntanar, Dumlao and Perez to
Si nce the questioned memorandum ci rculars a re i nherently a nd patently null a nd void for being meet en banc a nd to consider and act on the working draft of the order granting provisional
tota l ly vi olative of the spirit a nd l etter of E.O. No. 546 tha t constitutes the NTC a s a collegial body, a uthority to BellTel, s aid court was simply ordering the NTC to s it and meet en banc a s a collegial
no court ma y s hirk from i ts duty of striking down such illegal regulations. body, a nd the s ubject of the deliberation of the three-man commission would be the s aid working
dra ft which embodies one course of action that may be taken on priva te respondent BellTel's
Thi rd. In i ts certiorari a ction before the respondent Court of Appeals, private respondent BellTel a pplication for a provisional authority. The respondent Court of Appeals, however, did not order
wa s proceeding against the NTC a nd Commissioner Ki ntanar for the former's a dherence and the NTC to forthwi th grant said application. This is understandable since every commissioner of
defense of its one-man rule a s enforced by the latter. Thus, only the NTC a nd Commissioner the three-man NTC has a vote each to cast i n disposing of private respondent BellTel's application
Ki nta nar may be considered a s indispensable parties. After all, i t is they whom private respondent a nd the respondent a ppellate court would not pre-empt the exercise by the members of the
Bel lTel seek to be chastised and corrected by the court for havi ng acted i n gra ve abuse of their commi ssion of their individual discretion i n private respondent BellTel's case.
di s cretion a mounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Res pondent appellate court i ntends, however, for the NTC to promptly proceed wi th the
The oppositors in NTC Ca se No. 94-229 a re not a bsolutely necessary for the final determination of cons ideration of priva te respondent BellTel's a pplication for provisional a uthority, for the same
the i ssue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC a nd of Commissioner Ki ntanar i n his ha s been ri pe for decision since December, 1994. Wi th the marked propensity of Commissioner
ca pa city as chairman of NTC because the task of defending them primarily l ies i n the Office of the Ki nta nar to delay a ction on the said application and his i nsistent a rrogation of s ole power to
Sol icitor General. Furthermore, were the court to fi nd that certiorari l ies against the NTC a nd promulgate any a nd all NTC decisions, respondent Court of Appeals' order for the NTC to s it and
Commi ssioner Ki ntanar, the oppositors' ca use could not be s ignificantly affected by s uch ruling meet en banc to cons ider private respondent BellTel's application for a provisional a uthority,
beca use the issue of grave abuse of discretion goes not into the merits of the case in which the a tta ins deep significance.
oppositors are interested but into the issue of collegiality that requires, regardless of the merits of
a ca s e, that the same be decided on the basis of a majority vote of a t least two members of the Fi fth. The a ccusation of petitioners that the working draft of the order gra nting provisional
commi ssion. a uthority to private respondent BellTel, was obtained by the l atter through illegal means, is a
s eri ous charge. However, not a single piece of evidence has been proffered by petitioners to prove
The i ssue i n this case is, it bears repeating, not the merits of the application of private respondent thi s charge.
Bel lTel for a provisional a uthority to operate what promises to be the most technologically
a dva nced telephone service i n the country. This court i s not i n any way concerned with whether Pri va te respondent BellTel makes no s ecret of the source of the said working draft. In private
or not pri va te respondent BellTel's project proposal is technically feasible or fi nancially vi able, a nd res pondent BellTel's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application a nd For Issuance of
thi s court s hould not, i n fact, delve i nto these matters which are patently outside of its review Provi s ional Authority, i t is alleged that said working draft was prepared by Atty. Ba silio Bolante of
44
the Legal Department of the NTC. 27 Sa id working draft was i nitialed by the CCAD Head, Engr. (2) Admi nistrative Case No. 05-92 for dishonesty a nd a buse of authority for
Edga rdo Ca barios a nd by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez. 28 The working draft is i ns talling a water pipeline which is being operated, maintained and paid for by
a tta ched to the records of NTC Ca s e No. 94-229 which may be borrowed by any person for a ny the municipality to s ervi ce respondent's private re sidence a nd medical cl inic.
s ta ted purpose. 29
On Jul y 1, 1993, the Sa ngguniang Panlalawigan disposed the two Administrative cases in the
Si gnificantly, no one a mong the aforementioned persons has renounced the working draft or fol l owing manner:
decl ared i t to be spurious. More importantly, petitioners have utterly failed to offer proof of a ny
i l legality i n the preparation or procurement of said working draft. (1) Admi nistrative Case No. 02-92

The more cri tical point that matters most, however, is that we ca nnot be diverted from the ACCORDINGLY, respondent Ma yor Na omi C. Corra l of Tiwi, Al bay, is hereby
pri ncipal issue i n this case concerning the collegiality of the NTC. In the ultimate, the issue of the ordered to pay Achilles Costo Berces, Sr. the sum of THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND
procurement of the working draft is more apropos for a criminal or a dministrative investigation AND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE PESOS a nd TWO CENTAVOS
tha n i n the i nstant proceedings largely a ddressed to the resolution of a purely l egal question. (P36,779.02) per Voucher No. 352, pl us legal i nterest due thereon from the
ti me i t was approved in audit up to final payment, it being l egally due the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED for Compl ainant representing the money va lue of his leave credits a ccruing for
l a ck of merit. s ervi ces rendered in the municipality from 1988 to 1992 a s a duly elected
Muni cipal Councilor. IN ADDITION, respondent Ma yor NAOMI C. CORRAL i s
Cos ts a gainst petitioners. hereby ordered SUSPENDED from office as Municipal Ma yor of Ti wi, Albay, for
a peri od of two (2) months, effective upon receipt hereof for her blatant abuse
of a uthority coupled with oppression as a public example to deter others
SO ORDERED.
s i milarly i nclined from using public office as a tool for personal vengeance,
vi ndi ctiveness a nd oppression a t the expense of the Taxpayer (Rollo, p. 14).
G.R. No. 112099 February 21, 1995
(2) Admi nistrative Case No. 05-92
ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., peti tioner,
vs .
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Ma yor NAOMI C. CORRAL of
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL
Ti wi , Albay, i s hereby s entenced to s uffer the penalty of SUSPENSION from
ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, res pondents.
offi ce a s Municipal Mayor thereof for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS
begi nning after her s ervice of the first penalty of suspension ordered i n
Admi nistrative Ca se No. 02-92. She is l ikewise ordered to reimburse the
Muni cipality of Ti wi One-half of the amount the latter have paid for electri c
QUIASON, J.: a nd water bills from July to December 1992, i nclusive (Rollo, p. 16).

Thi s is a petition for certiorari a nd prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with Cons equently, respondent Ma yor a ppealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision
pra yer for ma ndatory preliminary i njunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as a nd a t the same time prayed for the s tay of execution thereof i n a ccordance with Section 67(b) of
ha vi ng been i ssued with gra ve abuses of discretion. Said Orders directed the stay of execution of the Loca l Government Code, which provi des:
the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending the Mayor of Tiwi, Albay from office.
Admi nistrative Appeals. Decision in a dministrative ca ses may, wi thin thirty
I (30) da ys from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:

Peti ti oner filed two a dministrative ca ses a gainst respondent Naomi C. Corra l, the i ncumbent xxx xxx xxx
Ma yor of Ti wi, Al bay with the Sangguniang Pa nlalawigan of Albay, to wit:
(b) The Office of the President, i n the case of decisions of
(1) Admi nistrative Case No. 02-92 for a buse of authority a nd/or oppression for the s angguniang panlalawigan a nd the s angguniang
non-payment of accrued l eave benefits due the petitioner amounting to pa nglungsod of highly urbanized ci ties a nd i ndependent
P36,779.02. component ci ties.

45
Acti ng on the prayer to s tay execution during the pendency of the a ppeal, the Office of the Hence, this petition.
Pres i dent i ssued an Order on July 28, 1993, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
II
xxx xxx xxx
Peti ti oner cl aims that the governing law in the instant case i s R.A. No. 7160, which contains a
The s tay of the execution is governed by Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 a nd ma ndatory provision that a n a ppeal "shall not prevent a decision from becoming final a nd
Secti on 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated 12 February 1987, quoted executory." He argues that administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitle
bel ow: "Pres cri bing the Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to Office the President") authorizing the
Pres i dent to s tay the execution of the appealed decision a t any time during the pendency of the
Sec. 68. Executi on Pending Appeal. An a ppeal s hall not prevent a decision a ppeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which took effect on January 1, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 5-6).
from becoming fi nal or executory. The respondent shall be considered a s
ha vi ng been placed under preventive s uspension during the pendency of a n The petition is devoid of merit.
a ppeal in the events he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an
exoneration, he s hall be paid his s alary a nd such other emoluments during the Peti ti oner i nvokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f), R.A. No. 7160, whi ch provides:
pendency of the a ppeal (R.A. No. 7160).
Al l general and special laws, a cts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
Sec. 6 Except a s otherwise provided by special laws, the execution of the a dministrative regulations, part or parts thereof, which are i ncosistent with
deci sion/resolution/order a ppealed from i s stayed upon filing of the appeal a ny of the provisions of this Code, are hereby repealed or modified
wi thin the period prescribed herein. However, in a ll ca ses, a t any ti me during a ccordingly.
the pendency of the a ppeal, the Office of the President may direct or s tay the
execution of the decision/resolution/order a ppealed from upon such terms
The a forementioned cl ause is not a n express repeal of Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18
a nd conditions as i t may deem just a nd reasonable (Adm. Order No. 18).
beca use i t failed to i dentify or designate the laws or executive orders that a re intended to be
repealed (cf. I Sutherland, Statutory Construction 467 [1943]).
xxx xxx xxx
If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by R.A. No. 7160, i t i s through implication
After due consideration, and in the l ight of the Petition for Review filed before though such kind of repeal is not fa vored (The Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. The
thi s Office, we find that a stay of execution pending a ppeal would be just a nd Phi l ippine American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 [1973]). There is even a
rea s onable to prevent undue prejudice to public interest. pres umption against i mplied repeal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby orders the An i mplied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a s ubstantial conflict
s us pension/stay of execution of: mus t be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of a n express repeal, a subsequent
l a w ca nnot be construed as repealing a prior law unless a n irrecon cible i nconsistency a nd
a ) the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay repugnancy exists i n the terms of the new and old laws (Iloilo Palay a nd Corn Pl anters Association,
i n Administrative Ca se No. 02-92 dated 1 Jul y 1993 Inc. v. Fel iciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]). The two laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compania
s us pending Ma yor Naomi C. Corra l from office for a period General de Tabacos v. Col lector of Cus toms, 46 Phi l. 8 [1924]). There must be such a repugnancy
of two (2) months, and between the laws that they ca nnot be made to stand together (Cra wford, Construction of Statutes
631 [1940]).
b) the Resolution of the Sangguniang Pa nlalawigan of
Al ba y i n Administrative Ca se. No. 05-92 dated 5 Jul y 1993 We fi nd that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 a nd Section 6 of Administrative Order
s us pending Ma yor Naomi C. Corra l from office for a period No. 18 a re not irreconcillably i nconsistent a nd repugnant and the two l aws must i n fact be read
of three (3) months (Rollo, pp. 55-56). together.

Peti ti oner then filed a Moti on for Reconsideration questioning the a foresaid Order of the Office of The fi rst s entence of Section 68 merely provides that an "a ppeal shall not prevent a decision from
the Pres ident. becoming final or executory." As worded, there is room to construe said provision as givi ng
di s cretion to the revi ewing officials to stay the execution of the a ppealed decision. There is
On September 13, 1990, the Moti on for Reconsideration was denied. nothi ng to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay

46
of the a ppealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order DECISION
No. 18, i t coul d have used more direct language expressive of s uch intention.
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

The execution of decisions pending a ppeal is procedural a nd i n the absence of a clear l egislative
i ntent to remove from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of execution, such Before us a re consolidated petitions s eeking the review a nd reversal of the decision [1] of the
a uthority ca n provided i n the rules and regulations governing the appeals of elective officials i n res pondent Court of Appea l s [2] decl a ri ng the Na ti ona l Tel ecommuni ca ti ons Commi s s i on
a dministrative ca ses. (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under Executive Order No. 546 [3] a nd orderi ng the NTC to
heretofore sit a nd a ct en banc, i.e., with the concurrence of a t least two commissioners, for a valid
di s pens a ti on of i ts qua s i -judi ci a l functi ons .
The term "s hall" may be read either a s mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of
the entire provisions in which i t is found, its object and the consequences that would follow from Es ta bl i s hed by evi dence a re the fol l owi ng fa cts :
cons truing it one wa y or the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case a t
bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory. On October 19, 1993, pri va te res pondent Bel l Tel ecommuni ca ti on Phi l i ppi nes , Inc.
(hereafter, BellTel) filed with the NTC a n Application for a Certificate of Publ i c Conveni ence a nd
Necessity to Procure, Install, Operate a nd Ma intain Nationwide Integrated Tel ecommuni ca ti ons
The Offi ce of the President made a finding that the execution of the decision of the Sagguniang
Servi ces and to Charge Rates Therefor a nd with Further Request for the Is s ua nce of Provi s i ona l
Pa nl alawigan s uspending respondent Ma yor from office might be prejudicial to the public interest.
Authori ty. This a pplication was docketed as NTC Ca s e No. 93-481. At the ti me of the filing of thi s
Thus , i n order not to disrupt the rendition of servi ce by the mayor to the public, a stay of the a pplication, private respondent BellTel had not been gra nted a legislative franchis e to enga ge i n
execution of the decision is in order.
the bus i nes s of tel ecommuni ca ti ons s ervi ce.

WHEREFORE, the petition i s DISMISSED. Si nce private respondent BellTel was, at tha t ti me, a n unenfra nchi s ed a ppl i ca nt, i t wa s
excl uded i n the del i bera ti ons for s ervi ce a rea a s s i gnments for l oca l excha nge ca rri er
s ervi ce[4]. Thus, only petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications , Inc., Is l a Communi ca ti ons
SO ORDERED.
Co., Inc. a nd International Communications Corporation, a mong others , were benefi ci a ri es of
forma l a wa rds of s ervi ce a rea a s s i gnments i n Apri l a nd Ma y, 1994.
FIRST DIVISION
On Ma rch 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 wa s enacted granting private respondent Bell Tel
a congressional fra nchise which ga ve private respondent BellTel the right, privilege and a uthori ty
to
[G. R. No. 126496. April 30, 1997]
ca rry on the business of providing telecommunications s ervices in and between provinces, ci ties,
a nd municipalities in the Philippines and for this purpose, to establish, operate, manage, lease,
ma i ntain a nd purchase telecommunications sys tems, including mobile, cellular a nd wired or
GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.; ISLA wi reless telecommunications systems, fiber optics, satellite transmit and receive systems, and
COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC., petitioners, vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION other telecommunications s ystems and their va lue-added s ervices such as, but not limited to,
PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and HON. tra ns mission of voice, data, facsimile, control signals, a udio and vi deo, i nformation servi ce bureau,
SIMEON L. KINTANAR in his official capacity as Commissioner of the National a nd a ll other telecommunications s ystems technologies as a re at present a vailable or be made
Telecommunications, respondents. a va ilable through technical advances or innova tions in the future, or construct, acquire, lease and
opera te or manage transmitting a nd receiving s tations a nd switching s tations, both for l ocal and
i nternational s ervices, lines, cables or s ystems, as i s, or are convenient or essential to efficiently
ca rry out the purposes of this franchise. [5]

[G. R. No. 126526. April 30, 1997]


On Jul y 12, 1994, pri va te res pondent Bel l Tel fi l ed wi th the NTC a s econd
Appl ication[6] pra ying for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience a nd Necessi ty for the
i ns tallation, operation and maintena nce of a combi ned na ti onwi de l oca l tol l (domes ti c a nd
i nternational) and tandem telephone exchanges and facilities us i ng wi re, wi rel es s , mi crowa ve
COMMISSIONER SIMEON L. KINTANAR, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ra di o, satellites a nd fiber optic ca ble with Public Ca lling Offi ces (PCOs ) a nd very s ma l l a perture
COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, a ntennas (VSATs) under an integrated s ystem. This s econd application was docketed as NTC Ca s e
INC., respondent. No. 94-229. In thi s s econd application, BellTel proposed to install 2,600,000 telephone lines in ten

47
(10) yea rs using the most modern a nd l atest s ta te -of-the-a rt fa ci l i ti es a nd equi pment a nd to Whi le ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three memb ers compos i ng a
provi de a 100% di gi ta l l oca l excha nge tel ephone network. qua si-judicial body is entitled to promulgation, petitioners cl aim that purs ua nt to the preva i l i ng
pol icy a nd the corresponding procedure a nd practice i n the NTC, the exclusi ve a uthori ty to s i gn,
Pri va te respondent BellTel moved to withdraw i ts earlier application docketed a s NTC Ca s e va l i date and promulgate a ny a nd all orders, resolutions a nd decisions of the NTC is l odged i n the
No. 93-481. In a n Order dated July 11, 1994, thi s ea rl i er a ppl i ca ti on wa s ordered wi thdra wn, Cha i rman, i n this ca se, Commissi oner Si meon Ki nta na r, a nd, thus , s i nce onl y Commi s s i oner
wi thout prejudi ce. Si meon Ki ntanar i s recognized by the NTC Secretariat a s the s ol e a uthori ty to s i gn a ny a nd a l l
The s econd application of private respondent BellTel which was docketed a s NTC Ca s e No. orders , resolutions and decisions of the NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao
94-229 wa s a s s i gned to a Hea ri ng Offi cer for recepti on of pri va te res pondent Bel l Tel s a nd Perez have a llegedly no voting power a nd both their concurrence which actual l y cons ti tutes
evi dence. Wri tten opposition a nd other pertinent pleadings were filed by petitioners GMCR, Inc., the ma jori ty i s i nuti l e wi thout the a s s ent of Commi s s i oner Ki nta na r.
Sma rt Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Interna ti ona l Communi ca ti ons Anxi ous over the i naction of the NTC i n the ma tter of i ts petition praying for the issuance of
Corpora tion as oppositors. Other oppositors to priva te respondent Bel l Tel s a ppl i ca ti on were a provi sional a uthority, pri vate respondent BellTel filed on Ma y 5, 1995 a n Urgent Ex-Pa rte Motion
Ca pi tol Wireless, Inc., Eastern Mi samis Oriental Tel ephone Coopera ti ve, Li berty Broa dca s ti n g to Res olve Application and for the Issuance of a Provi sional Authority[11]. Reference was explici tl y
Network, Inc., Mi dsayap Communication, Northern Tel ephone, PAPTELCO, Pi l i pi no Tel ephone ma de to the findings of the CCAD a nd recommendations of Deputy Commissi oners Duml a o a nd
Corpora tion, Philippine Gl oba l Communi ca ti ons , Inc., Phi l i ppi ne Long Di s ta nce Tel ephone Perez tha t were a ll favorable to pri va te res ponde nt Bel l Tel . Menti on wa s a l s o ma de of the
Compa ny, Philippine Tel egra ph a nd Tel ephone Corpora ti on, Ra di o Communi ca ti ons of the a forementioned working draft of the order gra nting a provisional authority to BellTel, which dra ft
Phi l i ppi nes , Inc. a nd Extel com a nd Tel ecommuni ca ti ons Offi ce. wa s made by the Legal Department of the NTC a nd i nitialed by the sa i d deputy commi s s i oners .
On December 20, 1994, pri va te res pondent Bel l Tel compl eted the pres enta ti on of i ts No a cti on was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus , on Ma y 12, 1995, pri va te
evi dence-in-chief. In the course of the proceedings, the witnesses of BellTel were cross-examined res pondent Bel l Tel fi l ed a Second Urgent Ex-Pa rte Moti on [12] rei tera ti ng i ts ea rl i er pra yer.
by the a forementioned oppos i tors . On December 21, 1994, Bel l Tel fi l ed i ts Forma l Offer of
Evi dence together wi th a l l the techni ca l , fi na nci a l a nd l ega l documents i n s upport of i ts Peti ti oners-oppositors filed an Oppos i ti on [13] to the a fores ta ted two moti ons of pri va te
a ppl i ca ti on. Purs ua nt to i ts rul es , the a ppl i ca ti on wa s referred to the Common Ca rri ers res pondent Bel l Tel .
Authori za ti on Depa rtment (CCAD) for s tudy a nd recommenda ti on.
In a n Order dated Ma y 16, 1995, s i gned solely by Commissioner Simeon Ki nta na r, the NTC,
On Februa ry 6, 1995, the CCAD, through Engr. Ma rl e Ra bena , s ubmi tted to Deputy i ns tead of resolving the two pending motions of private respondent BellTel, s et the sa i d moti ons
Commi ssioner Fidelo Q. Duml a o, a Memora ndum da ted Februa ry 6, 1995 [7] ma ni fes ti ng hi s for a hearing on May 29, 1995. On Ma y 29, 1995, however, no hea ri ng wa s conducted a s the
fi ndings a nd recommending that based on technical documents s ubmitted, BellTels propos a l i s s a me wa s res et on June 13, 1995.
techni ca l l y fea s i bl e.[8]
On June 13, 1995, the da y of the hea ri ng, pri va te res pondent Bel l Tel fi l ed a Moti on to
Subs equently, Mr. Ra ulito Suarez, the chief of the Rates a nd Regul a tory Di vi s i on of CCAD, Promul gate (Amending the Motion to Resolve) [14] In said motion, private res pondent pra yed for
conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of priva te respondent BellTel . On Ma rch the promulgation of the working draft of the order gra nti ng a provi s i ona l a uthori ty to pri va te
29, 1995, Mr. Sua rez made the finding that Bel l Tel ha s the fi na nci a l ca pa bi l i ty to s upport i ts res pondent BellTel, on the ground that the said working draft had already been signed or i nitialed
propos ed project a t l ea s t for the i ni ti a l two (2) yea rs . by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together, constitute a majority out of the three
commi ssioners composing the NTC. To s upport its prayer, private respondent Bel l Tel a s s erted
Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC Deputy Commissi oners tha t the NTC wa s a collegial body a nd that as such, two fa vorable votes out of a ma xi mum three
Fi delo Dumlao a nd Consuelo Perez a dopted the s a me a nd expres s l y s i gni fi ed thei r a pprova l votes by the members of the commission, are enough to va l i dl y promul ga te a n NTC deci s i on.
thereto by making the following notation on the a fores ta ted Memora ndum of the CCAD da ted
Februa ry 6, 1995: On June 23, 1995, peti tioners-oppositors filed thei r Joi nt Oppos i ti on [15] to the a foreci ted
moti on.
With the finding of financial capability and technical feasibility, the application merits On Jul y 4, 1995, the NTC denied the said motion in a n Order s olely signed by Commiss i oner
due/favorable consideration.[9]
Si meon Ki nta na r.

Bel ow this notation, Deputy Commissioners Fi del o Duml a o a nd Cons uel o Perez a ffi xed thei r On Jul y 17, 1995, pri va te respondent BellTel filed with thi s court a Peti ti on for Certi ora ri ,
s i gna tures a nd the da te, 4/6/95. Ma ndamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of the afores ta ted Order da ted Jul y 4, 1995
denyi ng the Moti on to Promul ga te.
In vi ew of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD a nd two members of the NTC, the
Lega l Department thereof prepared a working draft [10] of the order granting provisional a uthori ty On Jul y 26, 1995, we i ssued a Resolution referring said petition to the res pondent Court of
to pri va te respondent BellTel. The said working draft wa s i ni ti a l ed by Deputy Commi s s i oners Appeals for proper determination and resoluti on purs ua nt to Secti on 9, pa r. 1 of B .P. Bl g. 129.
Fi delo Q. Dumlao a nd Consuelo Perez but was not s i gned by Commi s s i oner Si meon Ki nta na r.

48
In the i nteri m, the Sol i ci tor Genera l fi l ed wi th the res pondent a ppel l a te court a Commi ssioner Ki ntanars petition, docketed as G.R. No. 126526, a scribes to the respondent
Ma ni festation In Lieu of Comment[16] i n which the Solicitor General took a l egal position a dvers e a ppel l a te court the fol l owi ng a s s i gnment of errors :
to tha t of the NTC. The Solicitor General, after a close examination of the l a ws crea ti ng the NTC
a nd i ts predecessors a nd a s tudi ous a na l ys i s of certa i n Depa rtment of Tra ns porta ti on a nd 1. The Court of Appeals, i n setting aside NTC MC 1-1-93 a nd MC 3-1-93 a nd the Order of the
Communications (DOTC) orders, NTC ci rculars, a nd Department of Jus ti ce (DOJ) l ega l opi ni ons Commi ssion dated July 4, 1995, ma de a collateral a ttack on a law which was nowhere called for in
perti nent to the i s s ue of col l egi a l i ty of the NTC, ma de the fol l owi ng recommenda ti ons : the pl eadings of the parties nor is a uthorized by the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the Solicitor General respectfully pra ys that this Honorable Court: 2. The Court of Appeals erred i n assuming a nd i mposing that the Commission is a collegial body
s i mply by reason of the fact that other bodies which were a spin off from the defunct Public
(a ) declare respondent National Telecommunications Commission as a collegial body; Servi ce Commission were created as a collegial body. The l aw that created EO 546 era sed the
col l egial character of the proceedings before the NTC.
(b) res tra in respondent Commissioner Simeon Kintanar from a rrogating unto himself alone the
powers of the said agency; 3. The Court of Appeals decision contains serious contradiction; worse, it considered evidence
not forma lly offered or incorporated i nto the records of the ca se; yet failed to consider evidence
(c) order NTC, a cti ng as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner Bell Telecoms a pplication under s ubmitted by petitioner-appellant nor on the prejudicial issue on non-joinder of i ndispensable
NTC-94-229; pa rti es-

(d) decl are NTC Memorandum Ci rculars 1-1-93 a nd 3-1-93 as void; [a nd] 3.1 CA erred i n assuming that the NTC i s collegial by the fact that Charters of other regulatory
a gencies expressly made them collegial while this express provision was a bsent i n NTCs charter.
(e) uphold the l egality of DOTC Department Order 92-614.[17]
3.2 CA contra dicts itself by holding that DOTC MC 92-614 preva ils and [requires] collegiality.
On September 23, 1996, res pondent Court of Appeal s promul ga ted the herei n a s s a i l ed
deci s i on the di s pos i ti ve porti on of whi ch rea ds a s fol l ows : 3.3 The decisions by Undersecretary Li chauco s igned by her a nd her 2 deputies are i n no way
i ndicative of collegiality a nd should not be considered as having a ny persuasive effect xxx.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment i s hereby rendered a s follows:
3.4 The Court of Appeals erred in applying the Board of Communications Rules of Pra ctice
a nd Procedures.
1. Peti ti oners peti ti on for a wri t of Certi ora ri a nd Prohi bi ti on i s hereby
gra nted. Accordingly, NTC Memorandum Ci rcul a r No. 1-1-93, Annex J of the Petition,
Memora ndum Ci rcul a r No. 3-1-93, Annex K of the Petition a nd the Order of 4. The Court of Appeals erred when it gra nted mandamus, directing a nd i n effect controlling
Ki nta nar, Annex L of the Petition, a re hereby SET ASIDE for bei ng contra ry to l a w. The Commi ssioner Ki ntanar a nd deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Pe rez, to meet en banc to
Res pondents a nd all thos e a cti ng for a nd i n thei r beha l f a re hereby enjoi ned a nd cons ider a nd act on a draft Order only which the Court i tself recognized no l onger had the
prohi bi ted from i mpl ementi ng or enforci ng the s a me; [a nd] a pproval of two (2) Commissioners while i n the same token the Court of Appeals had set aside a
dul y promulgated Order of July 4, 1995 a l l egedly because i t did not ca rry the approval of 2
2. Peti tioners petition for mandamus i s hereby GRANTED i n tha t the Res pondent NTC, commi ssioners.[19]
composed of Ki nta na r a nd deputy commi s s i oners Perez a nd Duml a o, a re hereby
di rected to meet en banc a nd to consider a nd a ct on the dra ft Order, Annex B of the On the other hand, petitioners-oppositors, in their peti ti on docketed a s G.R. No. 126496,
Petition, wi thi n fi fteen (15) da ys from the fi na l i ty of thi s Deci s i on. Wi thout a s s a i l the deci s i on of res pondent a ppel l a te court on the fol l owi ng grounds :
pronouncement a s to cos ts .
1. The Court of Appeals erred i n not dismissing the i nstant Petition outright for i ts failure to
SO ORDERED.[18] i mplead i ndispensable parties, i n vi olation of Section 5, Rule 65 a nd Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the
Revi s ed Rul es of Court;
The herein a ssa i l ed deci s i on bei ng una ccepta bl e to peti ti oner Si meon Ki nta na r a nd 2. The Court of Appeals seriously erred in taking cognizance of and passing upon Bel l Tel s
peti ti oners GMCR, Inc., Sma rt Commun i ca ti ons , Inc., Is l a Communi ca ti ons Co., Inc. a nd Peti ti on, which on i ts face is premature since the Order of July 4, 1996 a s sailed was not a
International Communications Corporation as oppositors in the application of private respondent fi na l deci s i on of the Commi s s i on;
Bel lTel for a provi s i ona l a uthori ty, they fi l ed wi th thi s court s epa ra te peti ti ons for revi ew.

49
3. Even a ssuming arguendo that the Court of Appeals ca n take cogniza nce of the Peti ti on, therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of
the di sposition i n Decision therein which nullifi es NTC Memora ndum Ci rcul a rs 1-1-93 Commi s s i oner Ki nta na r, a bs ent the requi red concurri ng vote comi ng from the res t of the
a nd 3-1-93 i tself constitutes a collateral attack on the sa i d l a ws , the va l i di ty of whi ch membership of the commission to a t least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to l ega l l y
were never put in i ssue by any of the parties, contrary to the cl ea r l ega l requi rement render a n NTC order, res ol uti on or deci s i on.
tha t the va lidity of laws ca n be a ttacked only i n direct proceedi ngs i ns ti tuted for tha t
purpos e; Si mply put, Commissioner Ki ntanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He
a l one does not s peak for a nd i n behalf of the NTC. The NTC a cts through a three -ma n body, a nd
4. It wa s i n fact i mproper for the Court of Appeals to pass on the va lidity of NTC Ci rcular No. the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast i n every deliberation concerni ng
1-1-93 a nd Memora ndum Ci rcul a r No. 3-1-93 s i nce the s a me wa s a bs ol utel y a ca s e or a ny i ncident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider the
unneces s a ry for the res ol uti on of the Peti ti on; hi s torical milieu i n which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency i t is now under Executi ve
Order No. 146 whi ch organized the NTC a s a three-man commission and expose the illegality of all
5. Even a ssuming that the Court of Appeals correctly defined the prime issues as being tha t memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executi ve Order No. 146,
of col l egiality, nonetheless the Court of Appeal s commi tted a s eri ous error of l a w i n we a re l eft with only one logical conclusion: the NTC i s a collegial body a nd was a col l egi a l body
decl aring the NTC a s a collegial body despi te the cl ea r i ntent of E.O. No. 546 a nd the even duri ng the ti me when i t wa s a cti n g a s a one-ma n regi me.
provi sions of DOTC MC 95-640, a nd the obvi ous implications of pending bills in Congress
on the reorga ni za ti on of the NTC; We thus quote with approval the encompassing l egal ruminations of the res pondent Court
of Appea l s i n di s pos i ng of the i s s ue of the col l egi a l i ty of the NTC:
6. The Decision, in ma ndating that the NTC Commissioner a nd Deputy Commissioners si t to
cons ider the draft-and only the draft-in rendering its Decision i n Bel l Tel s a ppl i ca ti on
In res olving the issue, We recall that, on November 17, 1936, the Na tional Assembly passed
cons titutes a n unwarranted, unauthorized a nd unlawful interference in and canalization
Commonwealth Act No. 146 whi ch created the Public Service Commission (PSC). While providing
of the di s creti ona ry functi ons of the Commi s s i on a s a qua s i -judi ci a l enti ty; a nd
tha t the PSC s hall consist of a Public Service Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, the law
7. The Decision condones the illegal and unethical act of BellTel of s urreptitiously s ecuring a ma de it cl ear that the PSC wa s not a collegial body by s tating that the Deputy Commissioner could
dra ft decision, and encourages and places premium on future similar i ll ega l a cts -a l l i n a ct onl y on matters delegated to him by the Public Servi ce Commissioner. As a mended by RA
vi ol ation of the ruling and the mandate of the Supreme Court i n In Re Jura do: Adm. 2677, the Public Service Commission was tra nsformed into and emerged as a collegial body,
Ma tter No. 90-5-383 (Jul y 12, 1990).[20] composed of one Public Service Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners. The
a mendment provi ded that contested ca ses a nd a ll ca ses i nvolving the fixing of ra tes shall be
On December 16, 1996, pri va te respondent BellTel filed a n Omnibus Motion [21] pra yi ng for, deci ded by the Commission en banc.
a mong others , the cons ol i da ti on of G.R. Nos . 126496 a nd 126526.

On December 18, 1996, res pondent BellTel filed its Comment. [22] On the same da y, the NTC On September 24, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Ma rcos signed, i nto l aw, Presidential Decree
a nd Commi s s i oner Ki nta na r fi l ed a Ma ni fes ta ti on/Moti on [23] echoi ng the pra yer for the No. 1 a dopting a nd a pproving the Integrated Reorganization Plan which, i n turn, created the
cons ol i da ti on of the G.R. Nos . 126496 a nd 126526. Boa rd of Communications (BOC) in place of the PSC. This time, the new regulatory board was
composed of three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions:
On December 19, 1996, the Offi ce of the Sol i ci tor Genera l fi l ed a
Ma ni festation/Motion[24] rei terating that i ts legal s tance in this case is a dverse to tha t of the NTC
x x x The Boa rd of Communications shall be composed of a full time Chairman who s hall be of
a nd pra yi ng tha t i t be excl uded from fi l i ng a ny comment i n beha l f of the NTC.
unquestioned integrity a nd recognized prominence i n previous public and/or private employment;
In a Resolution dated February 5, 1997, we res olved, a mong others, to excuse the Sol i ci tor two ful l-time members who s hall be competent on all aspects of communications, preferably one
General from filing any comment i n behalf of the NTC, require the NTC to file i ts own comment i n of whom s hall be a lawyer a nd the other an economist x x x
G.R. No. 126496 a nd to cons ol i da te G.R. Nos . 126496 a nd 126526.
On Ja nuary 25, 1978, the BOC promulgated its Rules of Procedure a nd Pra ctice in connection
On Ma rch 6, 1997, the NTC a nd Commi s s i oner Ki nta na r fi l ed a
wi th a pplications a nd proceedings before it.
Ma ni festation/Motion[25] pra ying that the latters petition in G.R. No. 126526 be a dopted a s thei r
comment i n the cons ol i da ted ca s es .
On Jul y 23, 1979, Pres i dent Ma rcos i ssued Executive Order No. 546, crea ting the Ministries of
Upon the joinder of issues in these consolidated ca ses, we perceive the fundamenta l i s s ue Publ ic Works, a nd of Tra nsportation and Communications, merged the defunct Board of
to be tha t of the col l egi a l i ty of the NTC a s a qua s i -judi ci a l a gency. Communications a nd the Telecommunications Control Bureau i nto a single entity, the National
Tel ecommunications Commission (NTC). The said l aw was issued by then President Ma rcos i n the
We fi nd the cons ol i da ted peti ti ons wa nti ng of meri t.
exerci se of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O. 546 provi des that --
Fi rs t. We hereby declare that the NTC i s a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the
three members of the commi s s i on i n order to va l i dl y deci de a ca s e or a ny i nci dent
50
x x x The Commission shall be composed of a Commissioner and two Deputy Commissioners, The Rules of Pra ctice and Procedure promulgated on January 25, 1978 by the Board of
preferably one of whom s hall be a lawyer and another a n economist. x x x Communications, the i mmediate predecessor of respondent NTC x x x govern the rules of practice
a nd procedure before the BOC then, now respondent NTC. x x x
The a forementioned Executive Order took effect on September 24, 1979 x x x. However, the NTC
di d not promulgate a ny Rules of Procedure a nd Practice. Consequently, the then existing Rules of In the ca se of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company versus Na tional Telecommunications,
Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC was a pplied to proceedings i n the NTC. In the et a l ., 190 SCRA 717, the Supreme Court applied and cited Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure a nd
mea ntime, the Decisions of the NTC were signed by the Chairman alone of the NTC which Pra cti ce of BOC x x x.
rendered the two (2) deputy Commissioners non-participative i n the task of decision-
ma ki ng. This prompted the then Mi nister of Tra nsportation and Communication Jose P. Da ns, Jr. Hence, under i ts Rules of Procedure and Pra ctice, the Respondent NTC, a s its predecessor, the
to s eek the l egal opinion of the then Minister of Justice Ricardo C. Puno, as to whether the NTC BOC, ha d consistently been a nd remains a collegial body.
wa s a collegial body or not. On Ja nuary 11, 1984, Mi ni ster Puno s ent a l etter-opinion x x x to the
effect that the NTC wa s not a collegial body but a single entity and thus the then practice of only
Res pondents Ki ntanars a nd NTCs pose that Respondent Ki ntanar, alone, is vested with a uthority
the Cha irman of the NTC s igning the Decisions of the NTC was a uthorized by law. x x x
to s i gn a nd promulgate a Decision of the NTC i s a ntithetical to the nature of a commission as
envi saged in Executive Order No. 546. It must be borne in mi nd that a Commission is defined as:
Admi ttedly, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to great weight x x x. However, the
s a me is not controlling or conclusive on the courts x x x. We fi nd and declare, in the present
[a ] body composed of s everal persons acting under lawful authority to perform s ome public
recours e, that the Puno Opinion is not correct. Admittedly, EO 546 does not s pecifically s tate that
s ervi ce. (City of Louisville Municipal Housing Commission versus Public Housing Administration,
the NTC wa s a collegial body. Neither does i t provide that the NTC s hould meet En Banc i n
261 Southwestern Reporter, 2nd, page 286).
deci ding a case or i n exercising i ts a djudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. But the absence of such
provi sions does not militate against the collegial nature of the NTC under the context of Section 16
of EO 546 a nd under the Rules of Procedure a nd Pra ctice a pplied by the NTC i n its A Commi ssion is a lso defined as a board or committee of officials appointed and empowered to
proceedings. Under [Rule 15] of s aid Rules, the BOC (now the NTC) s its En Banc: perform certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or servi ce x x x (Bl a ck, La w
Di cti onary, pa ge 246). There is persuasive authority that a commission is synonymous with
boa rd (State Ex. Rel. Johnson versus Independent School District No. 810, Wa bash County, 109
x x x In every ca se heard by the Board en banc, the orders, rulings, decisions a nd resolutions
Northwestern Reporter 2nd, page 596). Indeed, as ca n be easily discerned from the context of
di s posing of the merits of the matter wi thin its jurisdiction s hall be reached with the concurrence
Secti on 16 of Executive Order No. 546, the Commission is composed of a Commissioner a nd two
of a t l east two regular members after deliberation a nd consultation and thereafter a ssigned to a
(2) deputy commissioners x x x not the commissioner, alone, as pontificated by Ki ntanar. The
member for the writing of the opinion. Any member dissenting from the order, ruling, decision or
conjunctive word and is not without a ny l egal significance. It is not, by any chance, a surplusage
res olution shall state in writing the reason for his dissent.
i n the law. It means i n a ddition to (McCa ull Webster Elevator Company vers us Adams, 167
Northwestern Reporter, 330, pa ge 332). The word a nd, whether i t is used to connect words,
In a ll other cases, a duly a ssigned Member s hall issue all orders, rulings, decisions a nd resolutions phra ses or full s entence[s], must be accepted as binding together a nd a s relating to one a nother x
perti nent to the case assigned to him. Copy of the decision on the merit of the ca se so assigned x x.
s ha ll be furnished the Chairman of the Board.
In i nterpreting a statute, every part thereof s hould be given effect on the theory tha t it was
x x x ena cted a s an i ntegrated law and not as a combination of dissonant provisions. As the a phorism
goes , that the thing may ra ther have effect than be destroyed x x x. If i t wa s the i ntention of
Ins crutably, a ca se before the BOC may be assigned to and heard by only a member thereof who is Pres i dent Ma rcos to constitute merely a single entity, a one-man governmental body, i nstead of
ta s ked to prepare and promulgate his Decision thereon, or heard, En Banc, by the full membership a commi ssion or a three-man collegial body, he would not have constituted a commission and
of the BOC i n which case the concurrence of at l east two (2) of the membership of the BOC is woul d not have specifically decreed that the Commission is composed of, not the commissioner
necessary for a va lid Decision x x x. Whi l e it may be true that the aforesaid Rules of Procedure a l one, but of the commissioner a nd the two (2) deputy commissioners. Irrefragably, then, the NTC
wa s promulgated before the effectivity of Executive Order No. 546, however, the Rules of i s a commission composed not only of Kintanar, but Perez and Dumlao as well, acting together i n
Procedure of BOC governed the rules of practice and procedure before the NTC when i t was the performance of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, conformably wi th the Rules of
es tablished under Executive Order No. 546. Thi s was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC a nd a pplicable to the NTC.
ca s e of Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus Na tional Telecommunications Commission,
131 SCRA 200 when i t declared that: The ba refaced fact that x x x of Executi ve Order 546 us ed the word deputy to designate the two
(2) other members of the Commission does not militate against the collegiality of the NTC. x x
x The collegiality of the NTC ca nnot be disparaged by the mere nominal designation of the
membership thereof. Indeed, We are convinced that s uch nominal designations a re without
51
functi onal i mplications a nd a re designed merely for the purpose of administrative structure or Si nce the questioned memorandum ci rculars a re i nherently a nd patentl y nul l a n d voi d for
hi erarchy of the personnel of the NTC. x x x bei ng totally vi olative of the s pirit and letter of E.O. No. 546 tha t constitutes the NTC a s a collegial
body, no court ma y s hi rk from i ts duty of s tri ki ng down s uch i l l ega l regul a ti ons .
In hi ndsight, even Secretary Garcia was in accord with the collegiality of the NTC when he Thi rd. In i ts certiorari a ction before the respondent Court of Appea l s , pri va te res pondent
promulgated a nd issued Department Order No. 92-614 x x x. Even then Commissioner Ma riano Bel lTel was proceeding against the NTC a nd Commissioner Kintanar for the formers a dherence
Benedicto openly expressed his vehement opposition to the Department Order of Secretary
a nd defense of its one-man rule a s enforced by the latter. Thus, only the NTC a nd Commis s i oner
Ga rci a a nd opted to seek refuge i n the opinion of the then Mi nister of Justice Puno x x x. It wa s Ki nta nar may be considered a s indispensable parties. After all, it is they whom priva te respondent
onl y when Commissioner Benedicto resigned and Respondent Ki ntanar was designated to replace
Bel lTel seek to be chastised and corrected by the court for havi ng a cted i n gra ve a bus e of thei r
Commi ssioner Benedicto that Secretary Garcia flip-flapped [sic], and suddenly found i t expedient di s creti on a mounti ng to l a ck or exces s of juri s di cti on.
to reca l l his Department Order No. 92-614 a nd a uthorize Ki ntanar to decide, all by himself, a ll
ca s es pending with the NTC i n frontal vi olation of the Rules of Procedure and Pra ctice before the The oppos i tors i n NTC Ca s e No. 94-229 a re not a bs ol utel y neces s a ry for the fi na l
NTC, more s pecifically Rule 15 thereof x x x. determi na ti on of the i s s ue of gra ve a bus e of di s creti on on the pa rt of the NTC a nd of
Commi ssioner Ki ntanar i n his capacity a s chairman of NTC because the ta s k of defendi ng them
xxx pri ma rily l ies in the Office of the Sol i ci tor Genera l . Furthermore, were the court to fi nd tha t
certi orari lies a gainst the NTC a nd Commissioner Ki ntana r, the oppos i tors ca us e coul d not be
s i gnificantly a ffected by s uch ruling because the issue of grave abuse of dis creti on goes not i nto
The Respondents ca nnot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to buttress their a rgument x x x
the meri ts of the case i n which the oppositors a re interested but i nto the i ssue of collegia l i ty tha t
beca use under the House Bill, the NTC i s transformed into a collegial body. Indeed, We fi nd
requi res, regardless of the merits of a case, that the same be decided on the ba s i s of a ma jori ty
Res pondents pose tenuous. For, i t ca n likewise be argued, wi th justification, that House Bill No.
vote of a t l ea s t two members of the commi s s i on.
10558 i ndeed confirms the existing collegial nature of the NTC by s o expressly reaffirming the
s a me. The i ssue i n this case is, it bears repea ti ng, not the meri ts of the a ppl i ca ti on of pri va te
res pondent Bel l Tel for a provi s i ona l a uthori ty to opera te wha t promi s es to be the mos t
xxx technologically a dvanced telephone service i n the country. This court is not i n a ny wa y concerned
wi th whether or not private respondent Bel l Tel s project propos a l i s techni ca l l y fea s i bl e or
fi nancially vi able, and this court s hould not, in fact, delve i nto these ma tters whi ch a re pa tentl y
In s um, then, We find a nd s o declare that NTC Ci rcular No. 1-1-93 x x x Memora ndum Circular No.
3-1-93 x x x a nd the Order of Kintanar x x x decl aring the NTC a s a single entity or non-collegial outs ide of i ts review jurisdiction. Al l that res pondent Court of Appea l s pa s s ed upon wa s the
question of whether or not the NTC a nd Commi s s i oner Ki nta na r commi tted gra ve a bus e of
enti ty, a re contrary to law and thus null and void and should be, as they a re hereby, s et aside. [26]
di s cretion, a nd s o we must review a nd ascertain the correctness of the findings of the respondent
a ppel l a te court on thi s s core, a nd thi s s core a l one.
Second. Petitioners ta ke us to task with their vi gorous contention that respondent appellate
courts a ct of nullifying NTC Memora ndum Ci rcul a r No. 1-1-93 i s s ued by then Commi s s i oner Thus , the claim of petitioners that there is here a ca s e of non -joi nder of i ndi s pens a bl e
Ma ri a no Benedi cto, Jr. a nd NTC Memora n dum Ci rcul a r No. 3-1-93 i s s ued a l s o by then pa rti es i n the pers ons of a l l of the oppos i tors i n NTC Ca s e No. 94-229, i s untena bl e.
Commi ssioner Benedi cto on Ja nua ry 6, 1993, wa s a col l a tera l a tta ck a ga i ns t the a foreci ted
ci rcul ars and an unnecessary a nd a busive exercise of the courts power to nul l i fy a dmi ni s tra ti ve Fourth. Petitioners, i n a pparent paranoia, a rgue that what the respondent a ppel l a te court
ha s a ctua l l y ordered, wa s tha t the NTC s i t a nd meet en banc a nd forthwi th gra nt pri va te
regul a ti ons .
res pondent BellTels a pplication for a provisional authority. Peti tioners, however, have obviousl y
It mus t be remembered by petitioners, however, that a dmi ni s tra ti ve regul a ti ons deri ve over-read the second part of the dispositive portion of the herein assailed deci s i on rendered by
thei r va l i di ty from the s ta tute tha t they were, i n the fi rs t pl a ce, i ntended to res pondent Court of Appea l s .
i mplement. Memorandum Ci rculars 1-1-93 a nd 3-1-93 a re on their face null and voi d ab initio for
There is no dispute that jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety of mandamus i n causi ng
bei ng unabashedly contrary to l aw. They were nullified by respondent Court of Appeals beca us e
a qua si-judicial agency to exercise i ts discretion i n a case already ri pe for a djudi ca ti on a nd l ong-
they a re a bs ol utel y i l l ega l a nd, a s s uch, a re wi thout a ny force a nd effect. The fa ct tha t
i mplementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the institutionalization of the one-ma n a wa iting the proper disposition. As to how this discretion is to be exercised, however, i s a rea l m
outs ide the office of the s pecial ci vil action of ma ndamus. It is elementary l egal knowledge, a fter
rul e i n the NTC, i s not a nd ca n never be a ra tification of such a n illegal practice. At the l east, these
i l legal regulations are a n erroneous i nterpretation of E.O. No. 546 a nd i n the context of a nd i ts a l l , tha t mandamus does not l i e to control di s creti on.
predecessor laws. At the most, these i llegal regulations are attempts to va l i da te the one -ma n When the respondent Court of Appeals directed Commissioners Ki ntanar, Dumlao and Perez
rul e i n the NTC a s executed by persons with the selfish i nterest of maintaining their illusory hold of to meet en banc a nd to consider and a ct on the working draft of the order gra nti ng provi s i ona l
power. a uthority to BellTel, s aid court was simply ordering the NTC to s it and meet en banc a s a coll egi a l
body, a nd the s ubject of the deliberation of the three-man commission would be the s aid working
dra ft which embodies one course of action that may be ta ken on pri va te res pondent Bel l Tel s

52
a pplication for a provisional authority. The respondent Court of Appeals, however, di d not order HLIs Stock Distribution Pl a n (SDP) a nd pl a ci ng the s ubject l a nds i n Ha ci enda Lui s i ta under
the NTC to forthwi th grant said application. This is understandable since every commi s s i oner of compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
the three-man NTC has a vote each to cast i n disposing of private respondent BellTels a pplication
a nd the respondent a ppellate court woul d not pre -empt the exerci s e by the members of the The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted
commi s s i on of thei r i ndi vi dua l di s creti on i n pri va te res pondent Bel l Tel s ca s e. tha t there a re operative facts that occurred i n the i nteri m a nd whi ch the Court ca nnot va l i dl y
Res pondent appellate court i ntends, however, for the NTC to promptl y proceed wi th the i gnore. Thus, the Court decl a red tha t the revoca ti on of the SDP mus t, by a ppl i ca ti on of the
cons ideration of priva te respondent BellTels application for provisiona l a uthori ty, for the s a me opera tive fa ct pri nci pl e, gi ve wa y to the ri ght of the ori gi na l 6,296 qua l i fi ed fa rmworkers -
ha s been ri pe for decision since December, 1994. Wi th the marked propensity of Commiss i oner beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they wa nt to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual
Ki nta nar to delay a ction on the said application a nd hi s i ns i s tent a rroga ti on of s ol e power to l a nd distribution]. It thus ordered the Depa rtment of Agra ri a n Reform (DAR) to immediately
promulgate any a nd all NTC decisions, respondent Court of Appeals order for the NTC to s i t a nd
schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and
meet en banc to cons ider private respondent BellTels a ppl i ca ti on for a provi s i ona l a uthori ty,
legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in
a tta i ns deep s i gni fi ca nce.
secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as
Fi fth. The accusation of petitioners that the working draft of the order gra nting provisi ona l the case may be, over their printed names.
a uthority to private respondent BellTel, was obtained by the l a tter through i l l ega l mea ns , i s a
s eri ous charge. However, not a s ingle piece of evidence ha s been proffered by peti ti oners to The pa rties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
prove thi s cha rge.

Pri va te respondent BellTel makes no s ecret of the s ource of the s a i d worki ng dra ft. In II. THE ISSUES
pri va te respondent BellTels Urgent Ex-Pa rte Motion to Resolve Application a nd For Is s ua nce o f
Provi s ional Authority, i t is alleged that said working draft was prepared by Atty. Ba silio Bola nte of (1) Is the opera ti ve fa ct doctri ne a va i l a bl e i n thi s ca s e?
the Legal Department of the NTC.[27] Sa i d working dra ft wa s i ni ti a l ed by the CCAD Hea d, Engr.
Edga rdo Ca barios a nd by Deputy Commi s s i oners Duml a o a nd Perez. [28] The worki ng dra ft i s (2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 uncons ti tuti ona l ?
a tta ched to the records of NTC Ca s e No. 94-229 which ma y be borrowed by a ny pers on for a ny
s ta ted purpos e.[29] (3) Ca nt the Court order that DARs compulsory a cquisition of Ha ci enda Lus i ta cover the ful l 6,443
hecta res allegedly covered by RA 6657 a nd previously held by Ta rl a c Devel opment Corpora ti on
Si gnificantly, no one a mong the aforementioned persons has renounced the w orki ng dra ft
(Ta deco), a nd not jus t the 4,915.75 hecta res covered by HLIs SDP?
or decl ared it to be s purious. More importantly, petitioners have utterly fa i l ed to offer proof of
a ny i l l ega l i ty i n the prepa ra ti on or procurement of s a i d worki ng dra ft.
(4) Is the date of the ta king (for purposes of determi ni ng the jus t compens a ti on pa ya bl e to HLI)
The more cri tical point that matters most, however, is that we ca nnot b e diverted from the November 21, 1989, when PARC a pproved HLIs SDP?
pri ncipal issue i n this case concerning the collegiality of the NTC. In the ultimate, the i ssue of the
procurement of the working draft is more apropos for a cri minal or a dministra ti ve i nves ti ga ti on (5) Ha s the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded l ands under RA 6657 l apsed on Ma y
tha n i n the i nstant proceedings largely a ddressed to the res ol uti on of a purel y l ega l ques ti on. 10, 1999 (s i nce Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP covera ge through the SDOA s cheme on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant consolidated petitions a re hereby DISMISSED Ma y 11, 1989), a nd thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to s ell their land i nteres ts i n
for l a ck of meri t. Ha ci enda Lui s i ta to thi rd pa rti es , whether they ha ve ful l y pa i d for the l a nds or not?

Cos ts a ga i ns t peti ti oners . (6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Deci sion that the qualified FWBs be gi ven
SO ORDERED. a n opti on to rema i n a s s tockhol ders of HLI be recons i dered?

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. III. THE RULING
171101, November 22, 2011
VELASCO, JR., J.: [The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et
al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda
I. THE FACTS Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE.
It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
On Jul y 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified
the petition filed by HLI a nd AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resoluti ons of the PARC revoki ng
FWBs.]
53
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park
since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government,
unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered
agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the
they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]
operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the 4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP.
application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact
favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots [For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November 21,
they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose f or 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were
themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.] considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands
became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional. the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of
coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is,
Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court
resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution
academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing
clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by
of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action
that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.] with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the
right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
function.]
full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP,
which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is 5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT
constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land
not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly
not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears [Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed
too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of
that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the
decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders its Decision and qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started.
resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the
number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would
strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons
jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]
FWB will be awarded.
54
2. R.B.H. No. 2: Ca l ls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, whi ch wi l l be
composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative di s tri ct, to be "el ected i n the
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be giv en an option to remain genera l el ecti ons to be hel d on the s econd Tues da y of November 1971.
as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control 3. R.B.H. No. 3: Propos es that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be a mended s o a s to a uthori ze
[over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that Sena tors a nd Members of the Hous e of Repres enta ti ves to become del ega tes to the
the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this a forementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit thei r res pecti ve s ea ts i n
33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in Congres s .
the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the
common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the
number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI
Subs equently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, provi ding that the amendments
capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP
to the Cons titution proposed i n the a forementioned Resoluti ons No. 1 a nd 3 be s ubmi tted, for
approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the F WBs to
a pproval by the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. Thi s act fi xes the date a nd
acquire control over HLI.]
ma nner of el evti on for the propos ed a mendments to be voted upon by the peopl e , a nd
Gonzales vs COMELEC a ppropri a tes funds for s a i d el ecti on.
G.R. No. L-28196
Peti ti oners assai l the va l i di ty/cons ti tuti ona l i ty of RA No. 4913 a nd for the prohi bi ti on wi th
21 SCRA 774 prel iminary i njunction to restrain COMELEC from i mplementing or complyi ng wi th the s a i d l a w.
PHILCONSA a l s o a s s a i l s R.B.H No. 1 a nd 3.
November 9, 1967
ISSUE:
Petitioner: Ra mon A. Gonza l ez / Phi l i ppi ne Cons ti tuti on As s oci a ti on (PHILCONSA)
1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 i s uncons ti tuti ona l .
Respondent: Commi s s i on on El ecti ons (COMELEC)
2.) Whether or not the i s s ue i nvol ves a pol i ti ca l ques ti on.

FACTS: Thi s ca se is composed of consolidated cases filed s eparately by Peti ti oner Gonza l ez a nd
PHILCONSA a ssailing for the decl a ra ti on of nul l i ty of RA. No. 4913 a nd R.B.H. No. 1 a nd 3. On HELD:
Ma rch 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the fol l owi ng res ol uti ons
1.) Purs ua nt to Arti cle XV of the 1935 Cons titution, SC held that there is nothing i n thi s provi s i on
(Res ol uti on of Both Hous es /R.B.H.):
tha t s tates that the electi on referred to i s s peci a l , di fferent from the genera l el ecti on. The
Congress deemed i t best to s ubmi t the a mendments for ra ti fi ca ti on i n a ccorda nce wi th the
provi sions of the Constitution. It does not negate i ts a uthority to s ubmit propos ed a mendments
1. R.B.H No. 1: Propos es that Sec 5, Art VI of Cons ti tuti on be a mended s o a s to i ncrea s e the for ra ti fi ca ti on i n genera l el ecti ons . Peti ti on i s therefore DENIED.
membership of the House of Representatives from a ma xi mum of 120 i n a ccorda nce wi th the
pres ent Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be a pportioned a mong several provinces a nd tha t 2.) SC a l so noted that the issue is a political question because i t attacks the wisdom of the a cti on
ea ch provi nce s ha l l ha ve a t l ea s t one (1) member. ta ken by Congress and not the a uthority to ta ke i t. A political question is not subject to revi ew by
the Court.

Constitutional Law 1: CH 2: Constitution; Political vs Justiciable Question (Textbook: Cruz,


Professor: Atty. Usita)

55
s he used the name Es trella S. Al fon. She attended her first grade up to fourth
yea r hi gh school a t Stella Ma ris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon
G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980 (Exhi bits E, E-1, E-2 a nd E-3). After gra duating from high school s he enrolled a t
the Arel lano University and finished Bachelor of Science i n Nursing (Exhibit E-
4). Her s cholastic records from elementary to col lege s how that she was
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA
regi stered by the name of Es trella S. Al fon. Petitioner has exercised her right of
PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON, peti tioner,
s uffrage under the same name (Exhibit D). She has not committed any felony
vs . or mi s demeanor (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2, G-3 a nd G-4).
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, res pondent.

Peti ti oner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition:

1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;
ABAD SANTOS, J.:+.wph!1

2. She has been enrolled in the gra de school a nd i n college using the same
Thi s is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to revi ew a n Order of the Court of First
na me;
Ins tance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, dated December 29, 1978, whi ch partially denied petitioner's
pra yer for a change of name. Only a question of law is involved and there is no controversy over
the fa cts which are well-stated in the questioned Order a s follows: t.hqw 3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon s ince her i nfancy a nd
a l l her fri ends a nd a cquaintances know her by this name;
Thi s is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by peti tioner Ma ria Estrella
Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Al varez, praying 4. She has exercised her ri ght of s uffrage under the same name.
tha t her name be changed from Ma ria Estrella Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte to
Es trella S. Al fon. Secti on 5, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides:

The notice s etting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 a t 8:30 Upon s atisfactory proof i n open court on the date fi xed i n the order that s uch
o'cl ock in the morning was published i n the Ti mes Journal i n its issues of July order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition
28, Augus t 5 a nd 11, 1978 a nd a copy thereof together with a copy of the a re true, the court shall if proper and reasonable cause a ppears for changing
peti tion was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2 the na me of the petitioner adjudge that s uch name be changed in accordance
a nd C-3). wi th the prayer of the petition.

At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Ros auro Alva rez The evi dence submitted s hows that the change of name from Ma ria Es trella
a ppeared for the petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suya t, Jr. represented the Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon i s not proper and reasonable with
offi ce of the Solicitor General, Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner, res pect to the s urname. The fact that petitioner has been using a different
wi thout objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Cl erk of Court was s urname and has become known with s uch surname does not constitute
a ppointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit the same for proper a nd reasonable ca use to legally a uthorize and change her s urname to
res olution of the Court. Al fon. The birth certificate cl early s hows that the father of petitioner i s
Fi l omeno Duterte. Petitioner l ikewise a dmitted this fact i n her testimony. To
From the testimonial a nd document evidence presented, it a ppears that a l low petitioner to change her s urname from Duterte to Al fon is equivalent to
peti tioner Ma ria Estrella Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte was born on Ma y 15, 1952 a l lowing her to use her mother's s urname. Arti cle 364 of the Ci vil Code
a t the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibit A). She was registered a t the local Ci vil provi des:
Regi strar's Office as Ma ria Es trella Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte On June 15,
1952, s he was baptized as Ma ria Es trella Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte at the St. Legi timate and legitimated children s hall principally use the surname of the
Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila (Exhibit B). Her parents are fa ther.
Fi l omeno Duterte a nd Estrella Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte has been ta ken
ca red of by Mr. a nd Mrs . Hector Al fon. Petitioner a nd her uncle, Hector Al fon, If a nother purpose of the petitioner is to ca rry the surname of Alfon because
ha ve been residing a t 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, her uncl e who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the
Metro Ma nila for twenty-three (23) years. When petitioner s tarted s chooling, remedy i s not a petition for change of name.

56
WHEREFORE, the petition i nsofar as the first name i s granted but denied with vs .
res pect to the s urname. Petitioner is a uthorized to change her name from REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, res pondent.
Ma ri a Estrella Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.

Let copy of thi s order be furnished the Local Ci vil Registrar of Pasig, Metro
Ma ni la pursuant to Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. ABAD SANTOS, J.:+.wph!1

The l ower court s hould have fully gra nted the petition. Thi s is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to revi ew a n Order of the Court of First
Ins tance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, dated December 29, 1978, whi ch partially denied petitioner's
The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her s urname is that pra yer for a change of name. Only a question of law is involved and there is no controversy over
a s l egitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon s he s hould principally use the s urname the fa cts which are well-stated in the questioned Order a s follows: t.hqw
of her fa ther invoking Art. 364 of the Ci vi l Code. But the word "principally" as used i n the codal
provi sion is not equivalent to "excl usively" s o that there i s no legal obstacle i f a legitimate or Thi s is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by peti tioner Ma ria Estrella
l egitimated child s hould choose to use the s urname of i ts mother to which i t is equally entitled. Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Al varez, praying
Moreover, this Court i n Haw Li ong vs . Republic, G.R. No. L-21194. Apri l 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677, tha t her name be changed from Ma ria Estrella Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte to
679, s a id: t.hqw Es trella S. Al fon.

The following may be considered, a mong others, as proper or reasonable The notice s etting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 a t 8:30
ca us es that may wa rrant the gra nt of a petitioner for change of name; (1) o'cl ock in the morning was published i n the Ti mes Journal i n its issues of July
when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to 28, Augus t 5 a nd 11, 1978 a nd a copy thereof together with a copy of the
wri te or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a peti tion was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2
cha nge of' s tatus, such as when a natural child is a cknowledged or l egitimated; a nd C-3).
a nd (3) when the change is necessary to a void confusion Tolentino, Ci vil Code
of the Phi lippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).
At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Ros auro Alva rez
a ppeared for the petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suya t, Jr. represented the
In the ca se at bar, it has been s hown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella offi ce of the Solicitor General, Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner,
S. Al fon although her birth records a nd baptismal certificate show otherwise; s he was enrolled i n wi thout objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Cl erk of Court was
the s chools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Al fon; a ll her friends ca ll her a ppointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit the same for
by thi s name; she fi nished her course i n Nursing in college and was gra duated a nd gi ven a diploma res olution of the Court.
under this name; a nd s he exercised the right of s uffrage likewise under this name. There is
therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary
From the testimonial a nd document e vidence presented, it a ppears that
i s based on a solid and reasonable ground, i .e. to avoid confusion.
peti tioner Ma ria Estrella Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte was born on Ma y 15, 1952
a t the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibit A). She was registered a t the local Ci vil
WHEREFORE, the Order a ppealed from is hereby modified i n that, the petitioner is a llowed to Regi strar's Office as Ma ria Es trella Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte On Ju ne 15,
cha nge not only her first name but also her s urname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No 1952, s he was baptized as Ma ria Es trella Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte at the St.
cos ts . Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila (Exhibit B). Her parents are
Fi l omeno Duterte a nd Estrella Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte has been ta ken
SO ORDERED. ca red of by Mr. a nd Mrs . Hector Al fon. Petitioner a nd her uncle, Hector Al fon,
ha ve been residing a t 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong,
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.1wph1.t Metro Ma nila for twenty-three (23) years. When petitioner s tarted s chooling,
s he used the name Es trella S. Al fon. She attended her first grade up to fourth
yea r hi gh school a t Stella Ma ris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon
G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980 (Exhi bits E, E-1, E-2 a nd E-3). After gra duating from high school s he enrolled a t
the Arel lano University and finished Bachelor of Science i n Nursing (Exhibit E-
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA 4). Her s cholastic records from elementary to col lege s how that she was
PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON, peti tioner, regi stered by the name of Es trella S. Al fon. Petitioner has exercised her right of

57
s uffrage under the same name (Exhibit D). She has not committed any felony Let copy of thi s order be furnished the Local Ci vil Registrar of Pasig, Metro
or mi s demeanor (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2, G-3 a nd G-4). Ma ni la pursuant to Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

Peti ti oner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition: The l ower court s hould have fully gra nted the petition.

1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood; The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her s urname is that
a s l egitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon s he s hould principally use the s urname
2. She has been enrolled in the gra de school a nd i n college using the same of her fa ther invoking Art. 364 of the Ci vi l Code. But the word "principally" as used i n the codal
na me; provi sion is not equivalent to "excl usively" s o that there i s no legal obstacle i f a legitimate or
l egitimated child s hould choose to use the s urname of i ts mother to which i t is equally entitled.
Moreover, this Court i n Haw Li ong vs . Republic, G.R. No. L-21194. Apri l 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677,
3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon s ince her i nfancy a nd
679, s a id: t.hqw
a l l her fri ends a nd a cquaintances know her by this name;

The following may be considered, a mong others, as proper or reasonable


4. She has exercised her ri ght of s uffrage under the same name.
ca us es that may wa rrant the gra nt of a petitioner for change of name; (1)
when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to
Secti on 5, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides: wri te or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a
cha nge of' s tatus, such as when a natural child is a cknowledged or l egitimated;
Upon s atisfactory proof i n open court on the date fi xed i n the order that s uch a nd (3) when the change is necessary to a void confusion Tolentino, Ci vil Code
order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition of the Phi lippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).
a re true, the court shall if proper and reasonable cause a ppears for changing
the na me of the petitioner adjudge that s uch name be changed in accordance In the ca se at bar, it has been s hown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella
wi th the prayer of the petition. S. Al fon although her birth records a nd baptismal certificate show otherwise; s he was enrolled i n
the s chools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Al fon; a ll her friends ca ll her
The evi dence submitted s hows that the change of name from Ma ria Es trella by thi s name; she fi nished her course i n Nursing in college and was gra duated a nd gi ven a diploma
Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon i s not proper and reasonable with under this name; a nd s he exercised the right of s uffrage likewise under this name. There is
res pect to the s urname. The fact that petitioner has been using a different therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary
s urname and has become known with s uch surname does not constitute i s based on a solid and reasonable ground, i .e. to avoid confusion.
proper a nd reasonable ca use to legally a uthorize and change her s urname to
Al fon. The birth certificate cl early s hows that the father of p etitioner i s WHEREFORE, the Order a ppealed from is hereby modified i n that, the petitioner is a llowed to
Fi l omeno Duterte. Petitioner l ikewise a dmitted this fact i n her testimony. To cha nge not only her first name but also her s urname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No
a l low petitioner to change her s urname from Duterte to Al fon is equivalent to cos ts .
a l lowing her to use her mother's s urname. Arti cle 364 of the Ci vil Code
provi des: SO ORDERED.

Legi timate and legitimated children s hall principally use the surname of the
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
fa ther.

If a nother purpose of the petitioner is to ca rry the surname of Alfon because Floresca vs. Phillex Mining
her uncl e who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the
remedy i s not a petition for change of name.
Fl oresca et al a re the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mi ning Corporation (herei na fter
WHEREFORE, the petition i nsofar as the first name i s granted but denied with referred to a s Philex), who, while working a t its copper mines underground opera ti ons a t Tuba ,
res pect to the s urname. Petitioner is a uthorized to change her name from
Benguet on June 28, 1967, di ed as a result of the ca ve-in that buried them i n the tunnel s of the
Ma ri a Estrella Veronica Pri mitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.
mi ne. Specifical l y, the compl a i nt a l l eges tha t Phi l ex, i n vi ol a ti on of government rul es a nd

58
i mportance of private s ectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino
regul ations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection
procl aimed MO 415 a pplying RA 6957 to SMDRP, a mong others. The same MO a lso established
of the l ives of i ts men working underground. Floresca et a l moved to claim their benefits pursuant EXECOM a nd TECHCOM i n the execution and evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted
by the Publ ic Estates Authority (PEA).
to the Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also
Noti ces of public bidding to become NHAs venture partner for SMDRP were published in
peti tioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for a dditional dama ges . Phi l ex i nvoked tha t news papers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. Then-President
Ra mos authorized NHA to enter i nto a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.
they ca n no longer be sued because the petitioners have already cl aimed benefits under the WCA.
Under the JVA, the project i nvolves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual d evelopment
ISSUE: Whether or not Fl ores ca et a l ca n cl a i m benefi ts a nd a t the s a me ti me s ue. i nto a low cost housing complex a nd i ndustrial/commercial s ite. RBI is expected to fully fi nance
the development of Smokey Mountain a nd reclaim 40 hectares of the land a t the Ma nila Bay
HELD: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they fi led for benefi ts under the
Area . The l atter together with the commercial a rea to be built on Smokey Mountain will be
WCA then they wi ll be estopped from proceedi ng wi th a ci vi l ca s e before the regul a r courts . owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the
Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government s hall compensate
Convers ely, i f they sued before the ci vil courts then they would also be es topped from cl a i mi ng
RBI for i ts a ctual expenses i ncurred i n the Project plus a reasonable ra te of return not exceeding
benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al a re excused fro m this deficiency tha t s tated in the feasibility study a nd in the contract as of the date of s uch revocation,
due to i gnorance of the fa ct. Had they been aware of s uch then they may have not a vailed of s uch ca ncellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.
To s ummarize, the SMDRP s hall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves
a remedy. However, i f in case theyll win i n the lower court whatever award may be gra nted, the cl ea ring, l evelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current
res i dents on the cl eared and l evelled site. Phase II i nvolves the construction of a fenced
a mount given to them under the WCA s hould be deducted. The SC emphasized that i f they woul d
i nci neration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage a t the dumpsite.
go s tri ctly by the book i n this case then the purpos e of the l a w ma y be defea ted. Idol a trous Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended
a nd restated (now ARJVA) to a ccommodate the design changes a nd additional work to be done
reverence for the letter of the l aw sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law i nsures ma ns
to s uccessfully i mplement the project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were
s urvi val a nd ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the l etter of the law kil l eth but i ts s pi ri t gi veth decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was i ncreased from 40 hectares
to 79 hecta res, which was s upported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by Pres ident
l i fe.
Ra mos. The revision also provi ded for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase
II of the project.
Justice Gutierrez dissenting Subs equently, the Cl ean Air Act wa s passed by the legislature which made the establishment of
a n i ncinerator i llegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1,
No ci vi l suit should prosper a fter cl aiming benefits under the WCA. If employers a re already l iabl e 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada i n MO No. 33.
to pa y benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of damage s ui ts or On Augus t 27, 2003, the NHA a nd RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both
pa rti es agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA
get i nsurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by the WCA ca n only be properly removed reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been
by the l egi s l a ture NOT the SC. turned over by RBI.
ISSUES:
Whether respondents NHA a nd RBI have been gra nted the power a nd auth ority to reclaim l ands
Ca s e Digest: Chavez v. Na tional Housing Authority of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively i n PEA a s claimed by petitioner
G.R. No. 164527 15 August 2007 Whether respondents NHA a nd RBI were gi ven the power a nd a uthority by DENR to reclaim
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J. fores hore and submerged l ands
FACTS: Whether respondent RBI ca n a cquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as
On Augus t 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Cha vez, filed an instant petition ra ising a l ienable a nd outside the commerce of man
cons titutional i ssues on the JVA entered by Na tional Housing Authority a nd R-II Builders, Inc. Whether respondent RBI ca n a cquire reclaimed l ands when there was no declaration that said
On Ma rch 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 l a nds are no longer needed for public use
a pproving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Whether there is a law a uthorizing sale of reclaimed lands
Ma ni la Waste Ma nagement Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland i n Tondo, Whether the tra nsfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding
Ma ni la, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a s ubhuman state. Whether RBI, being a priva te corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public
As presented i n MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility s tudies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost doma in
housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development a nd Reclamation Project (SMDRP), ca me Whether respondents ca n be compelled to disclose all i nformation related to the SMDRP
i nto place. RA 6957 (Bui ld-Operate-Transfer La w) was passed on July 1990 declaring the Whether the operative fact doctri ne applies to the i nstant position
59
HELD: 31, 1962. In a ccordance with the provisions of s ection 8, s ub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fi xes
Executi ve Order 525 rea ds that the PEA s hall be primarily responsible for i ntegrating, directing, the term of office of the i ncumbent general manager until march 31, 1962. Peti ti oner file a
a nd coordinating all reclamation projects for a nd on behalf of the National Government. This ma ndamus with preliminary i njunction with the first instance court. The petition pray for the
does not mean that it s hall be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid a nd l egal reclamation a nnulment of the resolution of NARRA board.
project a re a pproval by the President (which were provided for by MOs ), favourable
recommendation of PEA (which were seen a s a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM),
a nd undertaken either by PEA or enti ty under contract of PEA or by the Na tional Government Issue:
Agency (NHA i s a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with
PEA i s derived under PD 727 a nd RA 7279). Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of petitioner wi thout cause.
Notwi thstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted the
a uthority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the members of the
EXECOM whi ch provides reviews for the project. ECCs a nd Special Pa tent Orders were given by Held:
the DENR which a re exercises of its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, i t was
the Pres ident vi a the a bovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It must It wa s affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on Ma rch 31, 1962. It i s necessary i n
be noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine ea ch case to i nterpret the word "Term" with the purview of the s tatutes s o as to effectuate the
Pres i dent. s ta tutory s cheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the ca se at bar, the term of
The recl aimed lands were classified a lienable a nd disposable vi a MO 415 i ssued by President offi ce i s not fixed by law. However, the power to fi x the term is rested in the board of directors
Aqui no and Proclamation Nos. 39 a nd 465 by Pres ident Ramos. s ubject to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the approval of the
Des pite not having a n explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer needed pres ident of the philippines. Resolution No. 24 s peaks of no removal b ut a n expiration of the
for public use as s tated in Proclamation No. 39 tha t these are to be disposed to qualified term of offi ce of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably cl ear. "It is the rule i n s tatutory
beneficiaries. Furthermore, these lands have already been necessarily reclassified a s alienable cons truction that i f the words a nd phrases of a statute are not obscure or a mbiguous. Its
a nd disposable lands under the BOT l aw. mea ning a nd i ntention of the legislative must be determined from the language employed a nd
Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 cl early s tates that the NHA ca n acquire property ri ghts and interests where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for construction.
a nd encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem a ppropriate.
There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become i ts The petitioner i n this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his ri ght to
joi nt venture partner i n the Smokey Mountain Project. It was noted that notices were published hol d office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of hi s term to hold such office.
i n na tional newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards Committee on
Ma y 18, 1992.
RA 6957 a s a mended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor ca n be paid a portion as G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985
percentage of the reclaimed land subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino
ci ti zens or corporation with a t least 60% Filipino equity ca n acquire the same. In a ddition, when
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, peti ti oner,
the l a nds were tra nsferred to the NHA, these were considered Pa trimonial lands of the s tate, by
vs .
whi ch it has the power to s ell the same to any qualified person.
BENJAMIN JUCO AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, res pondents .
Thi s relief must be granted. It i s the right of the Filipino people to i nformation on matters of
public concerned as stated i n Arti cle II, Sec. 28, a nd Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
When the petitioner fi led the case, the JVA had a lready been terminated by vi rtue of MOA Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner.
between RBI and NHA. The properties and ri ghts i n question after the passage of a round 10
yea rs from the start of the projects implementation ca nnot be disturbed or questioned. The Amante A. Pimentel for respondents.
peti tioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample
opportunity to question the said project, but did not do so. The moment to challenge has
pa ssed.
Apa rri vs CA GR L-30057
Facts: GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

On Ja nuary 15, 1960, pri va te respondent approved the following resolution # 13, hereby Are employees of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) covered by the Labor Code or by l a ws
a ppointing Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general manager o f NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives a nd a nd regul a ti ons governi ng the ci vi l s ervi ce?
compensations to ta ke effect on January 116, 1960.
On Ma rch 15, 1962, the boa rd of directors a pproved resolution # 24 whi ch stating thereat that The ba ckground facts of this case a re s ta ted i n the res pondent-a ppel l ee's bri ef a s fol l ows :
the i ncumbent general manager shall perform his duty up to the close of office hour on Ma rch
60
The records reveal that private respondent (Benjamin C. Juco) was a s mooth operation of an office, Idolatrous reverence for precedents
project engineer of the Na tional Hous i ng Corpora ti on (NHC) from whi ch have outlived their validity a nd useful nes s reta rds progres s
November 16, 1970 to Ma y 14, 1975. For ha vi ng been implicated in a a nd s hould therefore be a voi ded. I n fa ct, even courts do revers e
cri me of theft and/or mal vers a ti on of publ i c funds i nvol vi ng 214 thems elves for reasons of justice a nd equity. This Commission a s a n
pi eces of s cra p G.I. pi pes owned by the corpora ti on whi ch wa s Admi ni s tra ti ve body performi ng qua s i judi ci a l functi on i s no
a l l egedl y commi tted on Ma rch 5, 1975. Juco's s ervi ces were excepti on.
termi nated by (NHC) effective as of the cl os e of worki ng hours on
Ma y 14, 1975. On Ma rch 25, 1977 he fi l ed a compl a i nt for i l l ega l WHEREFORE, i n the light of the foregoi ng, the deci s i on a ppea l ed
di s mi s s a l a ga i ns t peti ti oner (NHC) wi th Regi ona l Offi ce No. 4, from i s hereby, s et aside. In view, however, of the fact that the Labor
Depa rtment of La bor (now Mi ni s try of La bor a nd Empl oyment) Arbi ter did not resolve the issue of illegal dismissal we have opted to
docketed a s R04-3-3309-77 (Annex A, Petition). The sai d compl a i nt rema nd this case to the La bor Arbi ter a quo for res ol uti on of the
wa s certified by Regional Branch No. I V of the NLRC for compul s ory a forementi oned i s s ue.
a rbi tration where i t was docketed as Ca s e No. RB-IV-12038-77 a nd
a s signed to La bor Arbiter Ernilo V. Pealos a . The l a tter conducted
The NHC i s a one hundred percent (100%) government-owned corpora ti on orga ni zed i n
the hearing. By a greement of the parties, the case was submitted for
a ccordance with Executi ve Order No. 399, the Uni form Cha rter of Government Corpora ti ons ,
res olution upon submiss i on of thei r res pecti ve pos i ti on pa pers .
da ted Ja nuary 5, 1951. Its s hares of stock a re owned by the Government Servi ce Insurance System
Pri va te respondent (Juco) submitted his pos i ti on pa per on Jul y 15,
the Social Security Sys tem, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment a nd
1977. He professed i nnocence of the cri minal acts i mputed a ga i ns t
Devel opment Corporation, and the People's Homes i te a nd Hous i ng Corpora ti on. Purs ua nt to
hi m contending "that he was dismissed based on purel y fa bri ca ted
Letter of Instruction No. 118, the ca pital stock of NHC was i ncrea s ed from P100 mi l l i on to P250
cha rges purposely to harass him because he s tood a s a wi tnes s i n
mi l lion with the five government institutions a bove mentioned s ubscribing in equal proporti on to
the theft case filed a gainst certain high officials of the respondent's
the i ncreased ca pital s tock. The NHC has never had any private s tockholders. The government has
es tablishment" (NHC) and prayed for 'his i mmediate reins ta tement
been the onl y s tockhol der from i ts crea ti on to the pres ent.
to hi s former position in the (NHC) without l os s of s eni ori ty ri ghts
a nd the consequent payment of hi s wi l l ba ck wa ges pl us a l l the
benefits appertaining thereto. On July 28, 1977, the NHC also filed its There s hould no l onger be any question at this ti me tha t empl oyees of government-owned or
pos ition paper alleging that the Regional Offi ce Bra nch IV, Ma ni l a , control l ed corpora ti ons a re governed by the ci vi l s ervi ce l a w a nd ci vi l s ervi ce rul es a nd
NLRC, "i s wi thout a uthori ty to enterta i n the ca s e for l a ck of regul a ti ons .
juri s diction, considering that the NHC i s a government owned a nd
control led corporation; that even assuming that this case falls within Secti on 1, Arti cl e XII -B of the Cons ti tuti on s peci fi ca l l y provi des :
the juri sdiction of thi s Offi ce, res pondent fi rm (now peti ti oner)
ma i ntains that res pondent (Juco), now pri va te res p ondent, wa s The Ci vi l Servi ce embraces every branch, a gency, s ubdi vi s i on, a nd
s eparated from the s ervice for va lid and jus ti fi ed rea s ons , i .e., for i ns trumentality of the Government, i ncl udi ng every government-
ha vi ng s old company properties consisting of 214 pi eces of s crap G.I. owned or control l ed corpora ti on. ...
pi pes a t a junk shop in Al a ba ng, Munti nl upa , Metro Ma ni l a , a nd
thereafter a ppropriating the proceeds thereof to hi s own benefi t."
The 1935 Cons ti tuti on ha d a s i mi l a r provi s i on i n i ts Secti on 1, Arti cl e XI I whi ch s ta ted:

The pertinent portion of the decision of respondent National La bor Relations Commiss i on (NLRC)
rea ds : A Ci vi l Servi ce embra ci ng a l l bra nches a nd s ubdi vi s i ons of the
Government s ha l l be provi ded by l a w.

The fa ct that i n the early ca se of Fernandez v. Cedro (NLRC Ca s e No.


201165-74, Ma y 19, 1975) the Commission, (Second Divisi on) rul ed The i nclusion of "government-owned or controlled corporations" within the embra ce of the ci vi l
tha t the respondent National Housing Corporation is a government- s ervi ce shows a delibera te effort of the fra mers to pl ug a n ea rl i er l oophol e whi ch a l l owed
owned or controlled corporation does not precl ude us from l a ter government-owned or control l ed corpora ti ons to a voi d the ful l cons equences of the a n
ta ki ng a contrary s tand i f by doing so the ends of justice could better encompassing coverage of the ci vil s ervi ce s ys tem. The s a me expl i ci t i ntent i s s hown by the
be s erved. a ddition of "a gency" a nd "instrumentality" to branches a nd subdivisions of the Government. Al l
offi ces a nd fi rms of the government a re covered.

For a l though a dherence to precedents (s ta re deci s i s ) i s a s um


formul a for a chi evi ng uni formi ty of a cti on a nd conduci ve to the
61
The a mendments i ntroduced in 1973 a re not Idle exercises or a meaningless gestures . They ca rry i ncl usion would put a s under the ri ght of workers i n government
the s trong message that t ci vil s ervice coverage is broad and an - embracing insofar as employment corpora ti ons , recogni zed i n juri s prudence under the 1935
i n the government i n a ny of i ts governmenta l or corpora te a rms i s concerned. Cons ti tution, to form and join labor unions for purposes of collective
ba rgaining with their employers in the same manner as i n the private
The constitutional provision has been implemented by s ta tute. Pres i denti a l Decree No. 807 i s s ecti on (s ee: records of 1971 Cons ti tuti ona l Conventi on).
unequivocal that personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations bel ong to the ci vi l
s ervi ce a nd a re s ubject to ci vi l s ervi ce requi rements . In contra s t, other l a bor experts a nd del ega tes to the 1971
Cons ti tuti ona l Conventi on enl i ghtened the members of the
It provi des : Commi ttee on La bor on the di vergent s i tua ti on of government
workers under the 1935 Cons titution, a nd ca lled for i ts rectificati on.
Thus , i n a Position Paper dated November 22, 197 1, s ubmi tted to
SEC. 56. Government-owned or Controlled Corporations Personnel.
the Commi ttee on La bor, 1971 Cons ti tuti ona l Conventi on, then
Al l perma nent pers onnel of government-owned or control l ed
Acti ng Commissioner of Ci vil Service Epi Rey Pa ngramuyen declared:
corpora tions whose positions are now embraced i n the ci vi l s ervi ce
s ha ll continue i n the servi ce until they have been gi ven a cha nce to
qua lify in an appropriate examination, but in the mea nti me, thos e It i s the s tand, therefore, of this Commission that
who do not possess the a ppropriate civil s ervice eligibi l i ty s ha g not by rea s on of the nature of the publ i c empl oyer
be promoted unti l they qua l i fy i n a n a ppropri a te ci vi l s ervi ce a nd the peculiar character of the publi c s ervi ce,
exa mination. Services of temporary personnel ma y be termi na ted i t mus t necessary regard the right to s trike gi ven
a ny ti me. to uni ons in private industry a s not a ppl yi ng to
public employees a nd ci vil servi ce employees . It
ha s been s ta ted tha t the Government, i n
The very La bor Code, P. D. No. 442 a s amended, which the respondent NLRC wants to a ppl y i n i ts contra st to the pri va te empl oyer, protects the
enti rety to the pri va te res pondent provi des :
i nterests of a ll people in the publi c s ervi ce, a nd
tha t a ccordingly, s uch conflicting interests as a re
ART. 277. Government employees. The terms a nd condi ti ons of pres ent i n private l abor relations could not exi s t
empl oyment of all government employees, i ncluding empl oyees of i n the relations between government and thos e
government-owned and controlled corporations sha l l be governed whom they empl oy.
by the Ci vi l Service La w, rules and regulations. Their salaries shall be
s ta ndardized by the National Assembly a s provi ded for i n the New
Moreover, determi na ti on of empl oyment
Cons ti tution. However, there s hall be reduction of exi s ti ng wa ges ,
condi ti ons a s wel l a s s upervi s i on of the
benefits a nd other terms a nd condi ti ons of empl oyment bei ng ma nagement of the public servi ce is in the hands
enjoyed by them a t the ti me of the a dopti on of the Code.
of l egislative bodies. It is further emphasized that
government agencies in the performance of their
Our deci s i on i n Al l i a nce of Government Workers, et al v. Honorable Minister of Labor and duti es ha ve a ri ght to dema nd undi vi ded
Employment et all. (124 SCRA 1) gi ves the ba ckground of the a mendment whi ch i ncl udes a l legiance from their workers a nd mus t a l wa ys
government-owned or control l ed corpora ti ons i n the embra ce of the ci vi l s ervi ce. ma i ntain a pronounced es pri t de corps or fi rm
di s cipline among their staff members . It woul d
We s ta ted: be hi ghly i ncompatible with these requirements
of the public s ervi ce, i f pers onnel took orders
from uni on l ea ders or put s ol i da ri ty wi th
Records of the 1971 Cons ti tuti ona l Conventi on s how tha t i n the
del iberation held relative to wha t i s now Secti on 1(1), Arti cl e XII - members of the working class a bove s ol i da ri ty
wi th the Government. This would be i ni mi ca l to
B, supra, the i s s ue of the i ncl us i on of government-owned or
the publ i c i nteres t.
control l ed corpora ti ons fi gured promi nentl y.

Moreover, i t is asserted that public employees by


The l a te del ega te Roberto S. Oca , a recogni zed l a bor l ea der,
vehementl y objected to the i ncl us i on of government-owned or joi ni ng l a bor uni ons ma y be compel l ed to
control led corporations i n the Ci vi l Servi ce. He a rgued tha t s uch s upport objectives which a re politica l i n na ture
a nd thus jeopardize the fundamenta l pri nci pl e
62
tha t the governmenta l ma chi nery mus t be the i ntegration cooperati on a nd a s s i s ta nce of a l l governmenta l
i mpartial and non-political in the sens e of pa rty a genci es concerned, through the ca rryi ng on of a ny or a l l the
pol iti cs . (See: Records of 1971 Cons ti tuti ona l fol l owi ng a cti vi ti es :
Conventi on).
l ) The a cquisiti on, devel opment or recl a ma ti on of l a nds for the
Si milar, Delegate Leandro P. Ga rcia, expressing for the i ncl us i on of purpose of construction and buildi ng therei n p refera bl y l ow-cos t
government-owned or controlled corporations i n the Ci vi l Servi ce, hous i ng s o a s to provi de decent a nd dura bl e dwel l i ng for the
a rgued: grea tes t number of i nha bi ta nts i n the country;

It i s meretri ci ous to contend tha t beca us e 2) The promotion a nd development of physical social and economi c
Government-owned or controlled corpora ti ons community growth through the establishment of genera l phys i ca l
yi el d profi ts , thei r empl oyees a re enti tl ed to pl a ns for urba n, s uburba n a nd metropol i ta n a rea s to be
better wa ges and fringe benefits than employees cha ra cteri zed by effi ci ent l a nd us e pa tterns ;
of Government other than Government-owned
a nd control l ed corpora ti ons whi ch a re not 3) The coordi na ti on a nd i mpl ementa ti on of a l l projects of the
ma ki ng profits. There is no ga i ns a yi ng the fa ct government for the establishment of nationwide a nd ma s s i ve l ow
tha t the ca pital they use i s the peopl e's money. cos t hous i ng;
(s ee: Records of the 1971 Cons ti tuti ona l
Conventi on).
4) The undertaking a nd conducting of research and technical studies
of the development and promotion of constructi on of hous es a nd
Summa ri zi ng the del i bera ti ons of the 1971 Cons ti tuti ona l bui ldings of sound s tandards of design l i a bi l i ty, dura bi l i ty, s a fety,
Conventi on on the inclusion of Government-owned or control l ed comfort a nd s i ze for i mprovement of the a rchi tectura l a nd
corpora tion Dean Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ., of the Ateneo de Ma ni l a engi neering designs and utili ty of hous es a nd bui l di ngs wi th the
Uni versity Profes s i ona l School of La w, s ta ted tha t government- uti l ization of new and/or native materials economics in material a nd
owned corporations ca me under a ttack as g cows of a privileged few cons tructi on, di s tri buti on, a s s embl y a nd cons tructi on a nd of
enjoyi ng salaries far higher than thei r counterpa rts i n the va ri ous a ppl yi ng a dva nced hous i ng a nd bui l di ng technol ogy.
bra nches of government, while the ca pi ta l of thes e corpora ti ons
bel ongs to the Government a nd government money i s pumped i nto
5) Cons tructi on a nd i nstallation i n these projects of low-cost housing
them whenever on the brink of disaster, a nd they s houl d therefore
pri va tely or cooperatively owned wa ter a nd s ewera ge s ys tem or
come under the s tri ct s urvei l l a nce of the Ci vi l Servi ce Sys tem.
wa s te di s pos a l fa ci l i ti es , a nd the formul a ti ons of a uni fi ed or
(Bernas, The 1973 Phi lippine Consti tuti on, Notes a nd Ca s es , 1974
offi cially coordinated urban tra ns porta ti on s ys tem a s a pa rt of a
ed., p. 524).
comprehens i ve devel opment pl a n i n thes e a rea s .

Appl yi ng the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, the La bor Code as a mended, a nd the Ci vi l
The petitioner points out that it was esta bl i s hed a s a n i ns trumenta l i ty of the government to
Servi ce Decree as a mended a nd the precedent i n the Alliance of Government Workers decisi on, i t
a ccomplish governmental policies and objectives a nd extend essential s ervi ces to the peopl e. It
i s cl ear that the petitioner National Housing Corporation comes under the jurisdiction of the Ci vi l
woul d be i ncongruous i f employees di s cha rgi ng es s enti a l l y governmenta l functi ons a re not
Servi ce Commi s s i on, not the Mi ni s try of La bor a nd Empl oyment.
covered by the same l aw a nd rules which govern those performing other governmental functions .
If government corporations discharging proprietary functions now belong to the civil s ervi ce wi th
Thi s becomes more a ppa rent i f we cons i der the fa ct tha t the NHC performs governmenta l more reason should those performing governmental functions be governed by ci vi l s ervi ce l a w.
functi ons a nd not propri eta ry ones .
The res pondent NLRC ci tes a 1976 opi nion of the Secretary of Justice which holds that the phra s e
The NHC wa s orga ni zed for the governmenta l objecti ves s ta ted i n i ts a mended a rti cl es of "government-owned or controlled corporations" i n Secti on 1, Arti cl e XII -B of the Cons ti tuti on
i ncorpora ti on a s fol l ows : contemplates only those government-owned or control l ed corpora ti ons created by special law.
The opinion states that since the Cons ti tuti on provi des for the orga ni za ti on or regul a ti on of
SECOND: Tha t the purpose for which the corporation is organized i s pri va te corporations only by "general law", expressly excluding government-owned or control l ed
to a s sist and carry out the coordinated massive housing progra m of corpora ti ons , i t fol l ows tha t whenever the Cons ti tuti on menti ons government-owned or
the government, principally but not limited to l ow-cost housing with control led corporations, i t must refer to those created by s pecial law. P.D. No. 868 whi ch repea l s
63
a l l charters, laws, decrees, rules, a nd provisions exempting a ny bra nch, a gency, s ubdi vi s i on, or SO ORDERED.
i ns trumentality of the government, i ncluding government- owned or controlled corporations from
the ci vi l servi ce law a nd rules is also cited to s how tha t corpora ti ons not governed by s peci a l Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
cha rters or l aws are not to be brought wi thi n ci vi l s ervi ce covera ge. The di s cus s i ons i n the Relova, De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Cons ti tutional Conventi on a re a l s o menti oned. It a ppea rs tha t a t the ti me the Conventi on
di s cussed government-owned or controlled corporations, a ll s uch corpora ti ons were orga ni zed
Separate Opinions
onl y under s peci a l l a ws or cha rters .

ABAD SANTOS, J., di s s enti ng:


The fa ct that "private" corporations owned or controlled by the government ma y be crea ted by
s pecial charter does not mean that such corporations not created by special law a re not covered
by the ci vi l s ervice. Nor does the decree repealing all charters and special laws granting exemption It wa s I, as Secretary of Justice, who issued Opinion No. 62, s eries of 1976, for the Commi s s i oner
from the ci vil s ervice law imply that government corpora ti ons not crea ted by s peci a l l a w a re of Ci vi l Service who wanted to know the s cope of the constitutional provisions on the Ci vil Servi ce
exempt from civil servi ce coverage. These charters a nd s tatutes are the o nl y l a ws gra nti ng s uch i n res pect of government-owned or controlled corporations. In response I opined, for the reasons
exemption a nd, therefore, they a re the only ones which could be repealed. There was no s i mi l a r s ta ted therei n, tha t onl y thos e corpora ti ons crea ted by s peci a l l a w a re contempl a ted.
exempting provision in the general la w whi ch ca l l ed for repea l . And fi na l l y, the fa ct tha t the
Cons ti tutional Convention discussed only corporations created by s pecial law or charter ca nnot be In the ca se at bar the Na ti ona l Hous i ng Corpora ti on wa s not crea ted by s peci a l l a w; i t wa s
a n a rgument to exclude petitioner NHC from ci vil service coverage. As stated i n the ci ted s peech orga nized pursuant to the Corpotation La w Act No. 1459 enti tled, AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
del ivered during the convention s essions of Ma rch 9, 1972, a l l government corpora ti ons then i n FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATIONS, DEFINING THEIR POWERS, FIXING THE
exi s tence were organized under special laws or cha rters . The conventi on del ega tes coul d not DUTIES OF DIRECTORS AND OTHER OFFICERS THEREOF, DECLARING THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
pos sibly discuss government-owned or controlled corporations which were s ti l l non -exi s tent or OF SHAREHOLDERS AND MEMBERS, PRESCRIBING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SUCH
a bout whos e exi s tence they were una wa re. CORPORATIONS MAY TRANSACT BUSINESS. [Act No. 1459 ha s been replaced by Ba tas Pa mba ns a
Bl g. 68 known as The New Corporation Code.] In the fight of my opi ni on, the Na ti ona l Hous i ng
Secti on I of Arti cle XII-B, Constitution uses the word "every" to modify the phra s e "government- Corpora tion is not covered by the Ci vil Service provisions of the Cons ti tuti on. Hence I di s s ent.
owned or control l ed corpora ti on."
Is the National Housing Corporation covered by the La bor Code? I am not prepared to answer this
"Every" mea ns each one of a group, without exception It means a ll possible and a l l ta ken one by question at this time. I do wish to emphasize that whether or not a corporati on i s "government-
one. Of course, our decision in this case refers to a corporation created a s a government-owned or owned or control l ed" depends upon the purpos e of the i nqui ry. A corpora ti on ma y be
control led entity. It does not cover cases i nvolvi ng priva te firms ta ken over by the government i n "government-owned or controlled" for one purpose but not for a nother. In other words , i t i s not
forecl os ure or s i mi l a r proceedi ngs . We res erve judgment on thes e l a tter ca s es when the pos s i bl e to broa dl y ca tegori ze a corpora ti on a s government-owned or control l ed."
a ppropri a te controvers y i s brought to thi s Court.
It ma y be a sked, i f the National Housing Corporation is not covered by the Civi l Servi ce s houl d i t
The i nfirmity of the respondents' position lies in i ts permitting a ci rcumvention or emasculation of not be covered instead by the Labor Code? My a nswer is, not necessarily. For i t may wel l be tha t
Secti on 1, Arti cl e XII -B of the Cons ti tuti on It woul d be pos s i bl e for a regul a r mi ni s try of the Na ti ona l Hous i ng Corpora ti on i s i n l i mbo.
government to create a host of subsidiary corporatio ns under the Corporation Code funded by a
wi l ling legislature. A government-owned corporation could create several s ubsidiary corporations. The following corporations (the l i s t i s not exha us ti ve) a ppea r to be "government-owned or
Thes e subsidiary corporations would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials a nd empl oyees control l ed" not by vi rtue of forecl os ure or s i mi l a r proceedi ngs :
woul d be privileged i ndividuals, free from the strict a ccountabi l i ty requi red by the Ci vi l Servi ce
Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their i ncomes woul d not be s ubject to Huma n Settl ements Devel opment Corpora ti on
the competitive restraints of the open market nor to the terms a nd condi ti ons of ci vi l s ervi ce
empl oyment. Conceivably,all government-owned or controlled corporations could be created, no
l onger by s pecial charters, but through incorporation under the general l a w. The cons ti tuti ona l Na yon Fi l i pi no Founda ti on, Inc.
a mendment including such corporations in the embrace of the civil s ervice woul d cea s e to ha ve
a ppl i ca ti on. Certa i nl y, s uch a s i tua ti on ca nnot be a l l owed to exi s t. Phi l i ppi ne Ae ro Spa ce Devel opment Corpora ti on

WHEREFORE, the peti ti on i s hereby GRANTED. The ques ti oned deci s i on of the res pondent Phi l i ppi ne As s oci a ted Smel ti ng a nd Refi ni ng Corpora ti on
Na ti onal La bor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision o f the Labor Arbiter dismissing the
ca s e before i t for l a ck of juri s di cti on i s REINSTATED. Petrophi l Corpora ti on Petron TBA Corpora ti on

64
Phi l i ppi ne Na ti ona l Oi l Co. Food Termi na l Inc. Phi l i ppi ne Aero Spa ce Devel opment Corpora ti on

Republ i c Pl a nters Ba nk Phi l i ppi ne As s oci a ted Smel ti ng a nd Refi ni ng Corpora ti on

QUARE: Is this Court ready to hold that each and eve ryone of the a bove -na med corpora ti on i s Petrophi l Corpora ti on Petron TBA Corpora ti on
government-owned or control l ed for Ci vi l Servi ce purpos es ?
Phi l i ppi ne Na ti ona l Oi l Co. Food Termi na l Inc.

Republ i c Pl a nters Ba nk

QUARE: Is this Court ready to hold that each and everyone of the a bove -na med corpora ti on i s
Separate Opinions government-owned or control l ed for Ci vi l Servi ce purpos es ?

ABAD SANTOS, J., di s s enti ng: THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. VICTOR SANTO NIO, Defendant-Appellee.

It wa s I, as Secretary of Justice, who issued Opinion No. 62, s eries of 1976, for the Commi s s i oner
of Ci vi l Service who wanted to know the s cope of the constitutional provisions on the Ci vil Servi ce DECISION
i n res pect of government-owned or controlled corporations. In response I opined, for the reasons WILLARD, J.:
s ta ted therei n, tha t onl y thos e corpora ti ons crea ted by s peci a l l a w a re contempl a ted.
Act No. 1780 i s enti tl ed a s fol l ows : cha nrobl es vi rtua l a wl i bra ry An Act to regul a te the
In the ca se at bar the Na ti ona l Hous i ng Corpora ti on wa s not crea ted by s peci a l l a w; i t wa s i mportation, a cquisition, possession, use, a nd tra nsfer of firearms, a nd to prohibit the possess i on
of s a me except i n compl i a nce wi th the provi s i ons of thi s Act.
orga nized pursuant to the Corpotation La w Act No. 1459 enti tled, AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATIONS, DEFINING THEIR POWERS, FIXING THE Secti on 26 of thi s Act i s i n pa rt a s fol l ows : cha nrobl es vi rtua l a wl i bra ry
DUTIES OF DIRECTORS AND OTHER OFFICERS THEREOF, DECLARING THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
OF SHAREHOLDERS AND MEMBERS, PRESCRIBING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SUCH It s hall be unlawful for a ny person to carry concealed a bout his person any bowie knife,
CORPORATIONS MAY TRANSACT BUSINESS. [Act No. 1459 ha s been replaced by Ba tas Pa mba ns a di rk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: chanrobles vi rtual a wl i bra ry Provi ded, Tha t
Bl g. 68 known as The New Corporation Code.] In the fight of my opi ni on, the Na ti ona l Hous i ng thi s prohibition shall not a pply to fi rearms i n possession of persons who have s ecured a
Corpora tion is not covered by the Ci vil Service provisions of the Cons ti tuti on. Hence I di s s ent. l i cense therefor or who a re entitled to carry s a me under the provi s i ons of thi s Act.
The a mended compl a i nt i n thi s ca s e i s a s fol l ows : cha nrobl es vi rtua l a wl i bra ry
Is the National Housing Corporation covered by the La bor Code? I am not prepared to answer this
The undersigned accuses Victor Santo Ni no of the vi olation of Act No. 1780, commi tted
question at this time. I do wish to emphasize that whether or not a corporati on i s "government-
a s fol l ows : cha nrobl es vi rtua l a wl i bra ry
owned or control l ed" depends upon the purpos e of the i nqui ry. A corpora ti on ma y be
"government-owned or controlled" for one purpose but not for a nother. In other words , i t i s not Tha t on or a bout the 16th day of August, 1908, i n the city of Ma nila, Philippine Islands ,
pos s i bl e to broa dl y ca tegori ze a corpora ti on a s government-owned or control l ed." the s aid Victor Santo Nino, voluntarily, unlawfully, and cri minally, had i n his posses s i on
a nd concea l ed a bout hi s pers on a dea dl y wea pon, to wi t: cha nrobl es
It ma y be a sked, i f the National Housing Corporation is not covered by the Civi l Servi ce s houl d i t vi rtua lawlibrary One (1) iron bar, a bout 15 i nches i n l ength provi ded with an i ron ball on
not be covered instead by the Labor Code? My a nswer is, not necessarily. For i t may wel l be tha t one end and a s tring on the other to tie to the wrist, which weapon had been des i gned
the Na ti ona l Hous i ng Corpora ti on i s i n l i mbo. a nd ma de for us e i n fi ghti ng, a nd a s a dea dl y wea pon.
Wi th vi ol a ti on of the provi s i ons of s ecti on 26 of Act No. 1780 of the Phi l i ppi ne
The following corporations (the l i s t i s not exha us ti ve) a ppea r to be "government-owned or Commi s s i on.
control l ed" not by vi rtue of forecl os u re or s i mi l a r proceedi ngs :
A demurrer to this complaint was s ustained in the court below the Government ha s a ppea l ed.

Huma n Settl ements Devel opment Corpora ti on The ba s i s for the hol di ng of the court bel ow wa s tha t

Na yon Fi l i pi no Founda ti on, Inc.

65
The words or other deadly weapon only s ignify a kind of weapon i ncluded wi thi n the
preceding classification. In other words, the rule of ejusdem generis must be appl i ed i n determined a t the time of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the
the i nterpretation of this law, which rul e i s a s fol l ows : cha nrobl es vi rtua l a wl i bra ry
bus iness of s teel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the a ward to petitioners of the
The most frequent application of this rule is found where s pecific and generic
terms of the same nature a re employed i n the same act, the l a tter fol l owi ng s a me benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of l egal and factual basis.
the former. While i n the abstract, general terms are to be given thei r na tura l
a nd full signification, yet where they follow specific words of a like nature they
ta ke their meaning from the latter, a nd a re presumed to embrace onl y thi ngs The l aw on the matter i s Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that they a re
or pers ons of the ki nd des i gna ted by them.
regul ar employees of NSC because: (i ) their jobs a re necessary, desirable a nd work -related to
In s hort, the court below held that the carryi ng of a revolver concealed a bout the pers on woul d
not be a vi olation of this Act. The rule of construction above referred to is resorted to only for the pri va te respondents main business, steel-making; a nd (ii) they have rendered s ervice for six (6)
purpose of determining what the intent of the legislature was in enacti ng the l a w. If tha t i ntent
cl ea rly a ppears from other parts of the law, and such intent thus cl early ma nifested is contra ry to or more yea rs to private respondent NSC.
the res ult which would reached by a pplication of the rule of ejusdem generis, the l atter must gi ve
wa y. In this ca se the proviso of the Act cl early i ndicates tha t i n the vi ew of the l egi s l a ture the
ca rryi ng of a n unlicensed revolver would be a vi olation of the Act. By the proviso it manifested i ts ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners a re considered permanent employees as opposed to being
i ntention to include i n the prohibition weapons other than the a rmas blancas therei n s peci fi ed.
onl y project employees of NSC.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, a nd the case is remanded for further proceedi ngs .
No cos ts wi l l be a l l owed to ei ther pa rty i n thi s court. SO ORDERED.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur. HELD: NO. Peti tion for Certiorari dismissed for l ack of merit. NLRC Resolutions affirmed.

ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC and NSC


RATIO: Functi on of the proviso. Petitioners a re not considered permanent employees. However,
[G.R. No. 109902. Augus t 02, 1994]
contra ry to petitioners a pprehensions, the designation of named employees as project

empl oyees a nd their assignment to a s pecific project a re effected and implemented in good faith,

a nd not merely a s a means of eva ding otherwise a pplicable requirements of l abor l aws.
FACTS: Peti ti oners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed

s eparate complaints for unfair l abor pra ctice, regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC,
On the cl aim that petitioners servi ce to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as
Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan Ci ty. The complaints were consolidated a nd a fter
regul ar employees, the Supreme Court believed this claim i s without legal basis. The simple fact
hea ring, the Labor Arbiter declared petitioners regular project employees who s hall continue
tha t the employment of petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not
thei r employment as s uch for a s long as s uch [project] a ctivity exists, but entitled to the salary of
detra ct from, or legally dissolve, their s tatus as project employees. The second paragraph of
a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining a greement. It also
Arti cl e 280 of the La bor Code, quoted a bove, provi ding that a n employee who has served for at
ordered payment of salary differentials.
l east one (1) year, s hall be considered a regular employee, relates to ca sual employees, not to

project employees.
The NLRC i n i ts questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiters decision. It affirmed the La bor

Arbi ters holding that petitioners were project employees since they were hired to perform work
G.R. No. L-34024 April 5, 1978
i n a s pecific undertaking the Five Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had been
66
ISIDRO G. ARENAS, peti tioner, In their a nswer dated February 10, 1971, the respondents admitted a nd denied the allegations i n
vs . the petition a nd alleged that Republic Act No. 5967 further provides, among other things, that the
CITY OF SAN CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL OF SAN CARLOS CITY, JUAN C. LOMIBAO, s a lary of the ci ty judge s hall a t least be one hundred pesos per month l ess than that of a ci ty
BENJAMIN POSADAS, DOUGLAS D. SORIANO, BASILIO BULATAO, CATALINA B. CAGAMPAN, ma yor; tha t the ci ty judge receives an annual salary of P12,000.00 whi ch is P100.00 per month less
EUGENIO RAMOS, FRANCISCO CANCINO, ALFREDO VINLUAN, MARCELO LAPEA, LEOPOLDO C. tha n the s alary being received by the ci ty mayor which is P13,200.00 yea rl y; that assuming the
TULAGAN and TORIBIO PAULINO, in their official capacities as City Mayor, City Vice Mayor, City exi s tence of a salary difference, in vi ew of the provision of Republic Act No. 5967, tha t the
Councilors and City Treasurer, respectively, and Honorable Presiding Judge, COURT OF FIRST pa yment of the salary difference shall be subject to the implementation of the respective ci ty
INSTANCE OF SAN CARLOS CITY (PANGASINAN), BRANCH X, res pondents. government, which is discretionary on the part of the ci ty government as to whether it would or
woul d not implement the payment of the s alary di fference, a nd i n vi ew of the fi nancial difficulties
Daniel C. Macaraeg and Alfredo P. Arenas for petitioner. of the ci ty which has a big overdraft, the payment of the salary di fference of the ci ty judge cannot
be ma de; and that the petitioner s hould pay his lawyer a nd should not charge the a ttorney's fees
to the res pondents who have not vi olated any ri ghts of the petitioner. 3
Abelardo P. Fermin & Antonio Ruiz for respondents.

The Court of Fi rst Instance of San Carlos Ci ty (Pa ngasinan), Branch X, rendered its decis ion dated
Ma y 31, 1971 di s missing the petition, without pronouncement as to costs.

FERNANDEZ, J.: The pertinent portion of Section 7, Republic Act No. 5967 rea ds:

Thi s is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan at
Sec. 7. Unl ess the Ci ty Cha rter or a ny s pecial law provides higher salary, the
Sa n Ca rlos Ci ty, Bra nch X, dismissing the petition for ma ndamus in Ci vil Ca se No. SCC-182. 1 ci ty judge i n chartered ci ties s hall receive a basic salary which s hall not be
l ower than the sums as provided thereinbelow:
In Ja nuary 1971, Is idro G. Arenas, a Ci ty Judge of San Ca rlos Ci ty (Pa ngasinan), instituted against
the Ci ty of Sa n Carlos (Pa ngasinan), Ci ty Council of San Ca rlos Ci ty a nd the Ma yor, Vice-Mayor, City xxx xxx xxx
Counci lors a nd Ci ty Treasurer of San Ca rlos Ci ty, a petition for mandamus i n the Court of First
Ins tance of Pa ngasinan.
(c) For s econd and third class cities, eighteen thousand pesos per annum;
The petition a lleged that the petitioner, Isidro G. Arenas, is the i ncumbent Ci ty Judge of San Ca rlos
Ci ty (Pa ngasinan, that the respondent Ci ty of San Ca rlos, from the ti me of its creation i n 1966 up xxx xxx xxx
to the present, has been cl assified a s a third cl ass ci ty; that Republic Act No. 5967 whi ch became
effective on June 21, 1969 provi des that the basic salaries of city judges of second a nd third class For the ci ties of Baguio, Quezon, Pa say a nd other fi rst cl ass ci ties, the ci ty
ci ti es s hall be P18,000.00 per a nnum; that the petitioner was then a ctually receiving a monthly judge s hall receive one thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district
s a lary of P1,000.00 of whi ch P350.00 wa s the s hare of the national government and P650.00 i s the judge, a nd for second a nd third class cities, the city judge s hall receive one
s ha re of the city government, which salary was P500.00 below the basic monthly s alary of a Ci ty thousand five hundred pesos less than that fi xed for the district judge, a nd for
Judge of a third class ci ty; that under Republic Act No. 5967, the difference between the salary other ci ties, the city judge shall receive two thousand pesos less than that
a ctua lly being received by a Ci ty Judge and the basic s alary established in said act s hall be paid by fi xed for the district judge: Provi ded, however, That the salary of a ci ty judge
the ci ty government; that from June 21, 1969 up to the fi ling of the petition on January 21, 1971, s ha ll be a t least one hundred pesos per month less than that of the ci ty mayor.
the petitioner was entitled to a salary di fferential of P9,500.00 wi th the respondent City of Sa n
Ca rl os (Pangasinan); that the petitioner had repeatedly requested the respondents to enact the The petitioner contends that "... i f the last proviso of said Section 7 of Republic Act No. 5967
necessary budget a nd to pay hi m the said differential but the respondents, without a ny woul d be i nterpreted as the controlling measure for fi xing the salary of the city judges, then the
jus ti fication, whatsoever, refused a nd s till refuse to do the same; that it is the cl ear duty of the pri ncipal provision of Section 7 fi xing the salaries of Ci ty Judges a t rate very much higher than that
res pondent to enact the necessary budget providing for the payment of the salary of the of a Ci ty Ma yor (pa rticularly i n the case of second a nd third class ci ties) would be rendered totally
peti tioner a s provi ded for in Republic Act No. 5967; tha t petitioner has no other plain, a dequate us eless." The petitioner s ubmitted "that s ince the principal intention of the l egislature in enacting
a nd s peedy remedy except the present a ction for mandamus; a nd that because of the refusal of Secti on 7 of Republic Act 5967 i s to i ncrease the salary of the city judges, then the last proviso of
the res pondent to comply wi th their obligation as provi ded i n Republic Act No. 5967, the s a id Section 7 s hould gi ve way to the provisions of said section preceding said proviso."
peti tioner was forced to engage the services of a l awyer to file this a ction for which he was to pay
the s um of P2,000.00 a s attorney's
The record shows that when Republic Act No. 5967 took effect on June 21, 1969, Sa n Ca rlos Ci ty
fees. 2
(Pa ngasinan) was a third cl ass city; tha t the petitioner a s city judge received an a nnual s alary of

67
P12,000.00; a nd that the city ma yor of San Ca rlos Ci ty received an a nnual salary of P13,200.00 s o tha t no city judge will be receiving more than the city mayor. So they wi ll be
whi ch was exactly P100.00 a month more than the salary of the city judge. receiving less than wha t i s proposed i n this Bill. (Vol. IV, No. 61, Senate
Congressional Records, pages 2773-2787. (Emphasis s upplied .) 4
Duri ng the deliberation in the Senate on House Bill No. 17046, which became Republic Act No.
5967, the fol lowing discussion took place: It i s cl ear from the deliberation of the Senate that the i ntention of Congress i n enacting Republic
Act No. 5967 wa s that the salary of a ci ty judge should not be higher than the salary of the city
SENATOR GANZON Because with the bill as drafted, I recall that there will ma yor. The savi ng cl ause "Provided, however, That the salary of a ci ty judge s hall be a t least
be s ome cities where the ci ty judges will receive s alaries higher than those of P100.00 per month l ess than that of the city ma yor" qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the
the ma yors. And i n all charters, Your Honor, the city judge is considered a s a lary of ci ty judges for second a nd third cl ass ci ties a t P18,000.00 per a nnum.
department head theoretically, a t least, under the mayor. It would not be
fa i r for the purposes of public administration that a ci ty department head The pri mary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When there is
s hould receive a salary higher than that of the chief executive of the city. i rreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the statute the former is given
precedence over the latter on the ground that i t is the latest expression of the intent of the
SENATOR LAUREL. Tha t point i s very well ta ken, a nd I would like to l egislature.
congra tulate Your Honor.
Ina smuch as the ci ty mayor of San Ca rlos Ci ty (Pa ngasinan) was receiving a n a nnual salary of
SENATOR LAUREL. No. Mr. Pres i dent, I understand the concern of th e P13,200.00, the respondents cannot be compelled to provide for an annual salary of P18,000.00
di s tinguished gentleman from Davao. But i n this particular a mendment for the petitioner a s city judge of the said ci ty.
prepa red by the distinguished lady from La Union, this will not require the
counci l to pay i t a t P100.00 exa ctly l ess than the salary of the mayor. It is just WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed and the decision appealed from is
the l i mit the maximum but they may fi x i t at much less than that. Tha t i s a ffi rmed, without pronouncement as to cost.
why the words "at l east" were suggested by the Committee. It need not be
exa ctl y just P100.00 l ess. It may be P500.00 l ess. SO ORDERED.

SENATOR ALMENDRAS. Your Honor, ta ke for example the ci ties of Iloilo, Cebu, Teehankee, (Chairman) Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Ba colod or Ma nila for that matter. The Ma yors are receiving a t least P1,500 a
month. Now, under the amendment of the lady from La Union, Nueva Ecija
a nd
Da va o which has a lready been accepted by the s ponsor does i t mean
tha t i f the salary of the ci ty mayor is P1,500, the ci ty judges will receive TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY
P1,400?

xxx xxx xxx Tol entino et a l is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known a s the Expanded
Va l ue Added Tax (EVAT) La w. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate
from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Arti cl e 6 of the Constitution. Even
SENATOR ANTONINO I would l ike to call his attention to lines 13 to 20. We
though RA 7716 ori ginated as HB 11197 a nd that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did
pres ented this a mendment because it says here: "For the ci ties of Baguio,
not complete the 3 rea dings in Senate for a fter the 1 st reading i t was referred to the Senate Ways
Quezon, Pasay a nd other first class cities, the city judge s hall receive one
& Mea ns Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630.
thousand pesos less than that fi xed for the district judge". So it will happen,
Tol entino averred that what Senate could have done is a mend HB 11197 by s tri king out its text
a nd my a ttention was called by the gentlemen from Iloilo tha t the city judge
a nd s ubstituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 i n that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate
wi n be receiving more salary than the city ma yor. Hence the a mendment, Mr.
vers i on just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. Tolentino and co -petitioner Roco
Pres i dent.
[however] even signed the said Senate Bill.

xxx xxx xxx


ISSUE:
I conferred with the gentlemen from Iloilo and Batangas, and this was their Whether or not EVAT ori gi na ted i n the HoR.
objection. We have proposed this a mendment to at l east s olve this problem,

68
HELD: YES. Peti ti on was dismissed, status quo l ifted a nd set aside.
By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that s uch consolidation was consis tent wi th RATIO:
the power of the Senate to propose or concur wi th amendments to the version origi na ted i n the
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power to recommend the suspension of a
HoR. Wha t the Constitution simply means, a ccording to the 9 jus tices, is tha t the i ni ti a ti ve mus t
public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), i t referred to s uspension, a s a punitive measure. All the
come from the HoR. Note a lso that there were several i nstances before where Senate pa s s ed i ts
words associated with the word suspension in said provision referred to penalties i n
own vers ion rather tha n ha vi ng the HoR vers i on a s fa r a s revenue a n d other s uch bi l l s a re
a dministrative ca ses, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the
concerned. Thi s pra cti ce of a mendment by s ubs ti tuti on ha s a l wa ys been a ccepted. The
proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There i s no showing that i t would ma ke word s uspension should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated.

a s i gni fi ca nt di fference i f Sena te were to a dopt hi s over wha t ha s been done. Where a particular word is equally s usceptible of va rious meanings, its correct construction may

be ma de specific by considering the company of terms in which i t is found or wi th which it is


Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs. Sec. Juan Flavier et. al. [G.R. No. 106719. September 21, 1993
a s sociated.

Secti on 24 of R.A. No. 6770, whi ch gra nts the Ombudsman the power to preventively s uspend
Ponente: QUIASON, J.
public officials and employees facing a dministrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a
FACTS:
penal s tatute. The preventive suspension is imposed a fter compliance with the requisites therein
The petition for Certiorari, Prohi bition a nd Mandamus, wi th Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
s et forth, as a n aid i n the i nvestigation of the a dministrative charges.
Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, s eeks to nullify the

Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S.

Buenaseda et.al. The questioned order was issued i n connection with the administrative complaint
Peopl e vs . Ma ga l l a nes G.R. Nos . 118013-14 October 11, 1995FACTS:
fi l ed wi th the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the priva te respondents a gainst the

peti tioners for vi olation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Pra ctices Act. The Supreme Court required In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas, under the direction and coopera ti on of
P/Col .
res pondent Secretary to comply wi th the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, i n
Ni colas Torres who took advantage of his position as station commander of the PNP, wi th Pol i ce
hi s comment, s tated that (a) The a uthority of the Ombudsman i s only to recommend s uspension
Ins pector Abetos
a nd he has no direct power to s uspend; and (b) Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to
cooperation, i nduced other police officers, namely: Ca nuday, Pa hayupan, La mis , ci vi l i a n a gents :
di rectly s uspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the
Ferna ndez,Divinagracia, Delgado a nd Gargallano, to a bduct kidnap a nd detain, Rufino Garga r a nd
exerci se of such powers; [a nd] said conditions have not been met i n the instant ca se Da nilo Lumangyao, with theuse of a motor vehi cl e a nd then s hot a nd ki l l ed the vi cti ms wi th
evi dent premeditation, treachery a nd nocturnity.The other a ccused secretly buried the victims in a
ISSUE: ma keshift s hallow grave to conceal the cri me of murder for a feeof P500.00 ea ch.The ca s es were
cons olidated and the accused pleaded not gui l ty a nd fi l ed moti ons for ba i l . Thepros ecuti on
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to s uspend government officials a nd employees
pres ented Moises Grandeza, the a lleged l one eyewitness and co -conspirator i n the offens e. After
worki ng i n offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the theprosecution rested i ts case, the trial court received evidence for the a ccused, b ut the reception
of evi dence wassuspended because of the motions for i nhibition of judge Garvilles filed by s everal
a dministrative complaints filed against s aid officials and employees. a ccus ed. Garvill es vol unta ri l yi nhi bi ted hi ms el f a nd the ca s e wa s re -ra ffl ed. However, the
pros ecution moved for the transmittal of the recors tothe Sandiganbaya n beca us e the offens es
cha rged were committed i n relation to the office of the accused PNPofficers. The trial court rul ed
HELD: tha t the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction because the i nformations do notstate tha t the
69
offenses were committed i n relation to the offi ce of the a ccus ed PNP offi cers a nd deni ed the hi gher, be4cause the courts retain i ts jurisdiction until the end of l itigation. Hence, cas es a l rea dy
Moti onfor the Tra nsfer of Records to Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to recons i der but under the jurisdiction of the courts a t the time of the enactment of R.A. 7975 a re only referred to
the s ame was denied.The recepti on of evi dence wa s res umed but the judge l a ter i nhi bi ted the proper courts if trial has not yet begun a t that ti me. Petition i s DENIED a nd the cha l l enged
hi mself. The cases were then re -raffled to Branch 49 of tne Regional Tri a l Court of Ba col od. The orders a re AFFIRMED
pros ecution filed a petition for certiorari,prohibition a nd mandamus with a prayer for a temporary
res tra ining order, challenging the refusal of the judge totransfer the cases to the Sandi ga nba ya n.
The pri vate respondents were requi red to comment on the peti ti on a ndi s s ued a tempora ry Republic vs Mi grino
res tra ining order enjoining the res pondent judge to des i s t from proceedi ng wi th the tri a l of
Vera vs Cuevas
theca s e.
Peopl e vs Echaves
ISSUE:

Whether the offenses were commi tted i n rel a ti on to the offi ce of the a ccus ed PNP offi cers
Expres sio Unius Es t Exclusio Al terius
HELD: -express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others

The juri s di cti on of a court ma y be determi ned by the l a w i n force a t the ti me of the
Sa n Pa bl o Ma nufa cturi ng Co. vs Commi s s i on of Interna l Revenue
commencement of theaction. When the informations i n the cases were fil ed, the l a w governi ng
the juri sdiction of the Sandiganbayan wasP.D. 1861 , whi ch provides that the Sandiganbayan shal l
ha ve exclusive original jurisdiction over cases i nvolvi ng: 1)violations of the Anti-Graft a nd Corrupt
Pra cti ces Act; 2) offenses committed by public officers i n relation to theiroffice, where the penalty
pres cribed is higher than prision correcci ona l or i mpri s onment of s i x (6) yea rs , or a fi ne of P Nos ci tor a Soci i s
6,000.00.If the penalty for the offense charged does not exceed i mprisonment of six (6) years or a -where a particular word is equally s usceptible of various meanings, i ts correct cons tructi on ma y
fi ne of P6,000.00, i t s hall be tri ed by the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Muni ci pa l
Tri a l Court or theMunicipal Ci rcuit Trial Court.Jurisdiction i s also determined by the a llegati ons i n be ma de specific by considering the company of terms i n whi ch i t i s found or wi th whi ch i t i s
the complaint or i nformation and not by the result of the evidence after the tri a l . In the pres ent
a s s oci a ted
ca s e, the Sa ndi ga nba ya n ha s not yet a cqui red juri s di cti on over the

Col ga te-Palmolive Phils. Inc. vs . Hon. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-14787 Ja nuary 28 1961
ca s es. The allegations in the complaint or i nformation of taking a dvantage of his position i s not
s ufficient to bringthe offenses within the definition of offenses committed i n rel a ti on to publ i c
offi ce. It i s cons i dered merel y a s a n
Ponente: GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.
a ggra vating circumstance.Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly l ost its jurisdiction over ca s es
FACTS:
i nvol ving vi olations of R.A. 3019, a s amended in R.A. 1379 beca use it only retains juri s di cti on on
ca s es enumera ted i n s ubs ecti on (a ) when the publ i c offi cers ra nk i The petitioner Col gate-Palmolive Philippines i mported from abroad va rious materials such as irish

mos s extract, s odium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated ca lcium ca rbonate and
s cl a ssified as Grade 27 or higher. In the case at bar, none of the PNP officers involved occupy a
pos ition classified as Grade 27 or hi gher. Accus ed Torres , who i s hi ghe s t i n ra nk a mong the di ca lcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers a nd flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For
a ccus ed, onl y ha s a ra nk cl a s s i fi ed a s Gra de 18.
every i mportation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Cen tral Bank of the
La s tly, the courts cannot be dives ted of juri s di cti on whi ch wa s a l rea dy a cqui red before the Phi l ippines the 17% s pecial excise ta x on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost,
s ubs equent
tra ns portation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, a s amended,
ena ctment of R.A. 7975 which limited the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to offi cers whos e ra nk i s commonly known as the Exchange Tax La w. The petitioner filed with the Central Bank three
Gra de 27 or
a pplications for refund of the 17% s pecial excise tax i t had paid. The auditor of the Central Bank,

70
refus ed to pass i n a udit its claims for refund fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax The rul e of construction that general a nd unlimited terms are restrained a nd l imited by particular

Admi nistration, on the theory tha t toothpaste s tabilizers and flavors a re not exempt under section reci ta ls when used i n connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms

2 of the Excha nge Tax La w. enti rely. It is i ntended merely a s an aid i n ascertaining the intention of the l egislature and is to be

ta ken in connection wi th other rules of construction.

Peti ti oner a ppealed to the Auditor General, but the latter a ffirmed the ruling of the a uditor of the

Centra l Bank, maintaining that the term s tabilizer and flavors mentioned in section 2 of the

Excha nge Tax La w refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture of food or food Roma n Ca tholic Archbishop of Ma nila v Social Security Commision

products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court thru the present
Roma n Ca tholic Archbishop of Ma nila vs. Social Security Commission
peti tion for review.
Ca s e No. 263

ISSUE: G.R. No. L-15045 (Ja nuary 20, 1961)

Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the i mportation of dental cream Cha pter V, Pa ge 221, Footnote No.175
s ta bilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% s pecial excise tax i mposed by the Exchange Ta x Law FACTS:
Peti ti oner filed with Respondent Commission a request that Ca tholic Charities, and all religious
(Republic Act No. 601).
a nd charitable institutions and/or organizations, which are directly or i ndirectly, wholly or
pa rti ally, operated by the Roman Archbishop of Manila be exempted from compulsory coverage
of RA 1161, otherwise known a s the Social Security La w of 1954.
HELD:
Peti ti oner contends that the term employer as defined i n the law should following the
YES. The decision under review was reversed. pri nciple of ejusdem generis--- be limited to those who carry on undertakings or a ctivi ties which
ha ve the element of profit or ga in, or which are pursued for profit or gain, because the phrase
a cti vi ty of any kind in the definition i s preceded by the words any tra de, business, i ndustry,
RATIO: undertaking.
General and special terms. The rul ing of the Auditor General that the term stabilizer a nd flavors ISSUE:
W/N the rul e of ejusdem generis ca n be a pplied i n this ca se.
a s used i n the law refers only to those materials a ctually us ed in the preparation or ma nufacture HELD:
of food a nd food products is based, apparently, on the principle of s tatutory construction that No. The rul e of ejusdem generis a pplies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where
the pl ain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered a nd defeated. The
general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will
defi nition of the term employer i s sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious a nd
be limited by the specific language which indicates the statutes object and purpose. The rul e, cha ri table institutions or entities not organized for profit. This i s made more evi dent by the fact
tha t i t contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included.
however, is applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the items in a n

enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class (ejusdem generis). In the ca se at bar, it i s

true tha t the term stabilizer a nd flavors is preceded b y a number of a rticles that may be G.R. No. L-55130 January 17, 1983

cl a ssified a s food or food products, but it is l ikewise true that the other items i mmediately PEDRO SANTOS TO, peti tioner,
fol l owing i t do not belong to the s ame classification. vs .

71
HON. ERNANI CRUZ-PAO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch (c) thos e who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
XVIII, and JUAN Y. OCAMPO, res pondents. punished by i mprisonment of not less than one month and one day a nd/or a
fi ne of not less than two hundred pesos;
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for petitioner.
(d) thos e who have been once on probation under the provisions of the
Abundio J. Macaraas for private respondent. decree; a nd

(e) those who were already s erving s entence a t the time the substantive
provi sions of the decree became a pplicable, pursuant to Section 33.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Under the a bovequoted provision, petitioner may not be disqualified from being entitled to the
benefits of probation. Some other provisions have to be sought, if any, upon which to deny
Peti ti oner was convicted by respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon Ci ty
peti tioner the benefits of probation which, from a reading of the law in i ts entirety, should with
Bra nch) of the crime of estafa for having issued a bouncing check for P5,000.00, a nd sentenced to l i berality, ra ther than undue strictness, be extended to anyone not listed as disqualified. In
a n i ndeterminate penalty of from s even years and eight months of prision mayor a s minimum, to
expressly enumerating offenders not qualified to enjoy the benefits of probation, the cl ear i ntent
ni ne years a nd four months of prision mayor, a s maximum. 1 He a ppealed to the Court of Appeals
i s to a llow s aid benefits to those not included i n the enumeration.
whi ch reduced the penalty to one year a nd one day of prision correccional a s mi nimum, to one
yea r a nd eight months as maximum. 2
If onl y for the a bove observation a s to how the law s hould be applied in order that its objective
coul d be realized and achieved, We cannot but find respondent judge's reasons for his denial of
Upon the Court of Appeals' decision becoming final, petitioner not having appealed therefrom, he the petition for probation i nsufficient to justify a deviation from a policy of liberality with which
fi l ed a petition for probation 3 wi th respondent judge, who, despite the favorable
the l a w s hould be applied.
recommendation of the Probation Office, denied the petition on July 24, 1980, on the following
grounds:
The fi rst reason given by the judge is that "probation win depreciate the s eriousness of the
offense committed." According to him, the State has s hown serious concern with the a bove of
(a ) to gra nt probation to petitioner will depreciate the seriousness of the checks as a commercial paper, as s hown by va ri ous measures taken to curb the pernicious practice
offense committed, and
of i s suing bouncing checks.

(b) petitioner is not a penitent offender. For purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to is the offender, not the crime.
The i nquiry i s more on whether probation will help the offender along the lines for which the
A moti on for reconsideration filed by petitioner having been denied by the respondent judge, the proba tion s ystem has been established, s uch as giving the first-time offender a second chance to
pres ent proceeding was resorted to, petitioner a verri ng that th e respondent judge erred in ma i ntain his place i n society through a process of reformation, which is better achieved, at least as
denyi ng his petition for probation despite the recommendation for i ts a pproval by the Probation to one who has not committed a very s erious offense, when he is not mixed with hardened
Offi ce. cri mi nals in an a tmosphere not conducive to soul-searching as within prison walls. The
cons ciousness of the State's benignity i n givi ng him that second chance to continue i n peaceful
We fi nd for the petitioner. a nd cordial association with his fellowmen will a dvance, rather than retard, the process of
reforma tion i n him.
At the outset, i t might be stated that the Solicitor General whose comment was required by this
Court, recommends the granting of probation. As he points out, petitioner is not among the If, therefore, reformation is what the l aw is more, i f not solely, concerned with, not the prevention
offenders enumerated i n the probation law (Presidential Decree No. 968) from a vailing of the by mea ns of punitive measures, of the commission of the offense, it is readily seen that the
benefits of probation. Under Section 9 of s aid law, the disqualified offenders are the following: res pondent judge has fallen into a wrong obsession. He would, in effect, disqualify a ll those who
commi t estafa through bouncing cheeks from enjoyi ng the benefits of probation. He would
(a ) those sentenced to s erve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than thereby a dd to the cri mes expressly mentioned in the l aw which are not subject to probation.
Thus , the only cri mes mentioned in the law based on the nature thereof a re those against national
s i x yea rs;
s ecurity (Section 9, paragraph b), the other crimes being those punished by more than s ix years
i mprisonment. Respondent judge would thus be writing i nto the l aw a new ground for
(b) thos e convicted of a ny offense against the security of the State; di s qualifying a first-offender from the benefits of probation, based on the nature of the cri me, not
on the penalty i mposed as is the main cri terion l aid down by the l aw i n determining who may be
72
gra nted probation. That cri me would be estafa only by i ssuing bouncing check, but not all forms of Aquino and Escolin, JJ., concur in the result.
es tafa, which, incidentally, i s one offense the cri minal liability for which is generally s eparated by a
thi n l ine from mere civil l iability. Samson v. CA [Nov. 25, 1986]

For thos e who would commit the offense a second ti me or oftener, or commit a n offense of
ma nifest gravity, i t is the l ong prison term which must be served that will act as deterrent to
24SEP
protect s ociety. In protecting s ociety, the family of the offender which might be dependent or the
l a tter to a greater or lesser extent for support or other necessities of life should not be lost sight
of, i t being the basic unit of that s ociety. By the relative l ightness of the offense, a s measured by Sa ms on v. Court of Appeals
the penalty i mposed, more than by i ts nature, as the law so ordains, the offender is not s uch a
s eri ous menace to s ociety a s to be wrested a way therefrom, as the more dangerous type of Fa ct:
cri mi nals should be.
AO No. 3, i s sued by Ma yor Samson of Caloocan Ci ty, s ummarily terminated the servi ces of

The s econd reason of respondent judge for denyi ng petition petitioner's bid for probation, i s that res pondent Talens who held position of Asst. Sec. to the Ma yor on the ground of l ack a nd l oss of
peti tioner i s allegedly not a penitent offender, as s hown by his protestation of i nnocence even
a fter his convi ction by the trial court a nd the affirmance of his conviction by the Court of Appeals. confi dence and appointing Li wag to the position.

We fi nd the respondent judge, l ikewise, in error i n assuming that petitioner has not shown
RA No. 2260 decl ares the position of secretaries to city ma yors non-competitive a nd this was
repentance in committing the cri me of which he has been found guilty by both the tri al and
a ppellate courts. If petitioner appealed the decision of the respondent judge to the Court of i nterpreted by Ma yor Samson as to i nclude the position of Asst. Sec. to the Ma yor.
Appeals, he cannot be blamed for i nsisting on his version by which he could hope either to be
a cquitted or at l east given a l ighter penalty that would entitle him to the benefits of
proba tion.1wph1.t The recourse he took has, indeed, proved to be well worth the effort. His Is sue:
penalty was reduced on a ppeal which placed him within the benign purpose of the Probation Law.
By the move he took by which to a chieve this objective, a cquittal not quite being within reach, Lega lity of Administrative Order No. 3
peti tioner ca nnot be said to be a non-penitent offender, under servi ng of probation benefits. Once
the opportunity was laid open to him, he grasped it; for i nstead of appealing further to the
Supreme Court, he promptly a pplied for probation, made possible only by the reduced penalty Hel d:
i mposed by the Court of Appeals. The penalty i mposed by respondent court placed petitioner
beyond the pale of the Probation Law. How ca n he be said to be a non-penitent offender, as the Secretary to the Ma yor and Asst. Secretary to the Ma yor a re two separate a nd distinct positions.
l a w would judge one to be s o, just because he a ppealed, as he could not have them a pplied for
One i s of higher ca tegory a nd ra nk than the other. The functions s trictly attributable to a
proba tion even if he wanted to? Who knows but that i f the penalty i mposed by the trial court is
tha t i mposed by the Court of Appeals petitioner would have applied for probation forthwith? s ecretary, i s not automatically ves ted or tra nsferred to a n assistant s ecretary, because the

Under the ci rcumstances as just pointed out, We find no sufficient justification for respondent l a tter simply assists or aids the former i n the accomplishment of his duties.
judge's holding petitioner to be a non-penitent offender. We find, instead, that the liberality wi th
whi ch the Probation Law should be a pplied i n favor of the applicant for i ts benefits a ffords the
better means of a chieving the purpose of the law, as i ndicated i n Our decision i n the case CATU VS RELLOSA
of Balleta Jr. vs. Hon. Leviste, G.R. No. L-49907, Augus t 21, 1979, 92 SCRA 719, ci ted by the
Sol icitor-General who, as earlier s tated, recommends granting of the instant petition for FACTS: Peti ti oner i nitiated a complaint a ga i ns t El i za beth Ca tu a nd Antoni o Pa s tor who were
proba tion. occupyi ng one of the units i n a buildi ng i n Ma l a te whi ch wa s owned by the former. The s a i d
compl aint was filed in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Ba rangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th Di s tri ct of
WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge denying probation is s et aside, and petitioner is Ma ni la where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been s ummoned for
conci liation proceedings and failing to a rri ve a t a n a mi ca bl e s ettl ement, were i s s ued by the
hereby declared a dmitted to probation, subject to the terms and conditions as are prescribed by
the l a w, a nd recommended by the probation officer. res pondent a certification for the filing of the appropriate a ction i n court. Petitioner, thus, fi l ed a
compl aint for ejectment a gainst Elizabeth a nd Pa stor i n the Metropol i ta n Tri a l Court of Ma ni l a
where respondent entered his a ppea ra nce a s couns el for the defenda nts . Beca us e of thi s ,
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Abad Santos, JJ., concur. peti tioner fi led the instant a dministrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he
73
commi tted an a ct of impropriety as a lawyer a nd a s a public officer wh en he s tood as couns el for For not l i ving up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical s tandards of the
the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedi ngs between the l ega l profes s i on, res pondent fa i l ed to compl y wi th Ca non 7 of the Code of Profes s i ona l
l i tigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed tha t a s punong ba ra nga y, he Res pons i bi l i ty:
performed his task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeths request to handle the ca s e for
free a s she was fi nancially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Phi l ippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they found s ufficient ground to di s ci pl i ne res pondent. CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE
Accordi ng to them, respondent vi olated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibi l i ty a nd, LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
a s a n elective official, the prohibition under Secti on 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Cons equentl y, for the
vi ol ation of the latter prohibition, respondent committed a b reach of Ca non 1. Cons equentl y, for
the vi olation of the latter prohibition, respondent was then recommended s us pens i on from the A l a wyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In s o doing, he disregards l egal ethics a nd dis gra ces
pra cti ce of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or s imilar a ct the di gnity of the legal profession. Every lawyer s hould act a nd comport himself in a ma nner tha t
wi l l be dea l t wi th more s everel y. promotes public confidence i n the integrity of the l egal profession. A member of the ba r ma y be
di s barred or s uspended from his office a s an a ttorney for vi olation of the lawyer's oatha nd/or for
brea ch of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as
the recommenda ti on on the i mpos a bl e pena l ty of the res pondent were proper. WHEREFORE, res pondent Atty. Vi cente G. Rel l os a i s hereby found GUILTY of profes s i ona l
mi s conduct for vi olating his oath a s a lawyer a nd Ca nons 1 a nd 7 a nd Rul e 1.01 of the Code of
Profes sional Responsibility. He is thereforeSUSPENDED from the practice of law for a peri od of six
HELD: No. Fi rs t, respondent ca nnot be found l i a bl e for vi ol a ti on of Rul e 6.03 the Code of months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is s ternly WARNED that a ny repeti ti on of
Profes sional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left government s ervice a nd i n s i mi l a r a cts s ha l l be dea l t wi th more s everel y.
connection to former government lawyers who a re prohibited from a ccepti ng empl oyment i n
connection wi th any matter i n which [they] had intervened while in thei r s ervi ce. In the ca s e a t Res pondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
ba r, res pondent was a n incumbent punong bara nga y. Appa rentl y, he does not fa l l wi thi n the
purvi ew of the s a i d provi s i on. G.R. No. L-32441 March 29, 1930
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 whi ch governs the pra cti ce
of profession of elective l ocal government officials. While RA 6713 generally a pplies to all publ i c DOMINADOR GOMEZ, pl a i nti ff-a ppel l a nt,
offi cials a nd empl oyees , RA 7160, bei ng a s peci a l l a w, cons ti tutes a n excepti on to RA 6713 vs .
.Moreover, whi l e under RA 7160,certa i n l oca l el ecti ve offi ci a l s (l i ke governors , ma yors , HONORIO VENTURA, Secretary of the Interior of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and
provi ncial boa rd members a nd counci l ors ) a re expres s l y s ubjected to a tota l or pa rti a l the
pros cri ption to pra ctice their profession or engage in a ny occupa ti on, no s uch i nterdi cti on i s BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defenda nts -a ppel l ees .
ma de on the punong barangay a nd the members of the s angguniang barangay. Expressio uni us
es t exclusio alterius since they a re excluded from a ny prohibition, the presumption is that they are Jose Varela Calderon for appellant.
a l lowed to practice their profession. Res pondent, therefore, i s not forbi dden to pra cti ce hi s Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellees.
profes s i on.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Thi rd, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still s hould have procured a pri or permi s s i on or
a uthorization from the head of his Department, as required by ci vil s ervice regulations. The failure
of res pondent to comply with Section 12, Rul e XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a In thi s ca us e, the pl a i nti ff pra ys for judgment, a s fol l ows :
vi ol ation of his oath as a l awyer: to obey the laws. In a cting a s couns el for a pa rty wi thout fi rs t
s ecuring the required written permission, res pondent not onl y enga ged i n the una uthori z ed 1. Annulling and setting aside the a forementioned investigation proceedi ngs ,
pra cti ce of law but also vi olated a civil s ervice rules which i s a breach of Rul e 1.01 of the Code of a nd pa rti cul a rl y the deci s i on of the Boa rd of Medi ca l Exa mi ners of the
Profes s i ona l Res pons i bi l i ty: Phi l ippine Islands dated March 30, 1926, forever revoking the plaintiff's license
to pra cti ce medi ci ne a nd s urgery.

Rul e 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, di s honest, i mmoral or deceitful conduct.
2. Orderi ng the defendants to restore the pl a i nti ff to hi s s ta tus before the
i nvestigation and the decision of Ma rch 30, 1926, tha t i s, as if there had never
been a n i nves ti ga ti on a nd a n a dvers e deci s i on.

74
3. Orderi ng said defendants to i ssue in fa vor of the plainti ff a l i cens e for the Proceedings for revocation of a certificate of regis tra ti on s ha l l be begun by
pra cti ce of medicine a nd s urgery i n the Philippine Islands, such as he had prior fi l ing a wri tten charge or charges a gainst the accused. These cha rges ma y be
to the i nves ti ga ti on a nd a dvers e deci s i on. preferred by a ny pers on or pers ons , fi rm or corpora ti on, or the Boa rd of
Medi cal Examiners i ts el f ma y di rect i ts executi ve offi cer to prepa re s a i d
4. Gra nting the pl a i nti ff a ny proper l ega l remedy. (Pa ges 5 a nd 6, bi l l of cha rges. Said charges shall be filed with the executive offi cer of the Boa rd of
exempti ons .) Medi cal Examiners and a copy thereof, together wi th wri tten noti ce of the
ti me a nd place when they will be hea red a nd determi ned, s ha l l be s erved
upon the a ccused or his counsel, a t least two weeks before the da te a ctua l l y
The defendants a nswered with a general denial a nd pra yed tha t the compl a i nt be di s mi s s ed.
fi xed for s a i d hea ri ng. (Sec. 12, Act No. 3111.)

After tri a l the Court of First Instance of Ma nila dismissed the compl a i nt wi th cos ts a ga i ns t the The l aw does not require that the charges be preferred by a publ i c offi cer or by a ny s peci fi ed
pl a i nti ff.
pers on; it even permits the Board of Medical Exa miners i tself to requi re i ts exe cuti ve offi cer to
prefer said charges. From the wording of the law we i nfer tha t a ny pers on, i ncl udi ng a publ i c
Couns el for pl a i nti ff contends tha t the court bel ow erred: offi cer, ma y prefer the charges referred to in the above-quoted provi s i on. Wherefore, the fa ct
tha t the charges were filed by As sistant Fiscal Al fonso Felix of the Ci ty of Ma nila, does not depri ve
1. In holding that Ass i s ta nt Fi s ca l Al fons o Fel i x of the Ci ty of Ma ni l a wa s the Boa rd of Medical Exa miners of jurisdiction to hear said charges and to take the proper a cti on
a uthorized to appear and institute a dmi ni s tra ti ve proceedi ngs a ga i ns t Dr. a ccordi ng to l a w.
Domi nador Gomez before the Board of Medical Exa miners of the Philippi nes .
The a ppellant contends in his third a nd fourth assignments of error that section 9 of Act No. 2381
2. In not holding that As sistant Fiscal Al fonso Felix, of the Ci ty of Ma ni l a , ha d i s null a nd voi d on the ground of unconstitutionality, s ince said section i s foreign to the s ubject of
pers onality nor power to i nstitute a dmi ni s tra ti ve proceedi ngs a ga i ns t Dr. s a id Act, i n vi olation of section 3 of the Jones La w prohibiting the enactment of a ny bill embracing
Domi nador Gomez before the Board of Medical Exa miners of the Philippi nes . more tha n one s ubject a nd provi di ng tha t the s ubject be expres s ed i n the ti tl e of the bi l l .

3. In a dmitting i n its deci s i on tha t s ecti on 9 of Act No. 2381, known a s th e Our opi nion is that the matter contained i n s ecti on 9 of Act No. 2381 i s not forei gn to the end
Opi um La w, i s va l i d. purs ued i n said Act, a nd that in view in the provision of said s ection i t cannot be mainta i ned tha t
Act No. 2381 i ncl udes more tha n one s ubject. The pena l ty provi ded i n s a i d s ecti on for the
4. In not holding that s ection 9 of Act No. 2381, known a s the Opi um La w, i s phys i cian or dentist who prescribes opium for a patient whose physical condition does not require
the us e of said drug, is one of the means employed by the Legislature to a ttain the purpose of Act
uncons ti tuti ona l , a nd therefore nul l a nd voi d.
No. 2381, whi ch is, to prohibit unnecessary use of opium; it i s one of the details subordinate to the
purpose i n vi ew. Such punishment is not the end contemplated in Act No. 2381, but, a s we ha ve
5. In holding that section 9 Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is i n force. jus t s a i d, i t i s a mea ns empl oyed to regul a te the us e of opi um.

6. In not holding that s ection 9 Act No. 2381 ha s been repea l ed, even on the In pa ssing said Act No. 2381, the Legislature merely exercised the police power expressl y gra nted
s uppos i ti on tha t i t wa s va l i d. by the Act of Congress of Ma rch 3, 1905, for the protection of the hea l th, comfort, a nd genera l
wel fa re of the peopl e of the Phi l i p pi ne Is l a nds .
7. In renderi ng the judgment a ppea l ed from.
ID.; ID.; POWER OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO LEGISLATE UPON THE
8. In denyi ng the motion for a voidance, and for a new trial, filed by a ppel l a nt. SUBJECT. The Phi lippine Legislature is expres s l y a uthori zed by the Act of
Congress of Ma rch 3, 1905, to a dopt legislation upon the i mportation a nd sale
The fi rst two assignments of error rel a te to the va l i di ty of the cha rges a ga i ns t the pl a i nti ff, of opi um in the Philippine Islands . The purpos e of s uch l egi s l a ti on wa s to
preferred by Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the Ci ty of Ma nila, who, according to the pl a i nti ff i s protect the hea l th, comfort, a nd genera l wel fa re of the peopl e of the
not a uthorized by l aw to file cha rges wi th the Boa rd of Medi ca l Exa mi ners , whi ch therefore Phi l ippine Islands. Such legislation was an exercise of the police power of the
a cqui red no juri s di cti on over the ma tter. Sta te. (Uni ted Sta tes vs. Wa yne Shoup, 35 Phi l ., 56.)

Accordi ng to section 780 of Administrative Code, as a mended by Act No. 3111, the procedure to And, a s we have s tated, the provi s i ons conta i ned i n s ecti on 9 of Act No. 2381 rel a ti ve to the
be obs erved i n revoki ng a certi fi ca te of regi s tra ti on i s the fol l owi ng: phys i cians a nd dentist are simply detailes and means conducive to the ultima te purpos e of s a i d

75
Act, whi ch details and means need not be stated in the ti tl e of the Act for the very rea s on tha t Act No. 310 provi ded tha t the Boa rd of medi ca l Exa mi ners coul d revoke
properl y s pea ki ng, they a re not forei gn ma tter. l i censes for "unprofessional conduct," without defining the term. Act No. 1761
(the Opi um Law) provided that i llegaly prescribing opium should be ca us e for
The general purpose of these provisions is a ccomplished when a l a w ha s but revoca ti on of medical licenses. Cl early, the Opium La w did not repea l Act No.
one general object, which is fairly i ndicated by i ts ti tl e. To requi re every end 310. Act No. 2381 a l s o a n Opi um La w i n i ts s ecti on 9, repea ted the
a nd means necessary or convenient for the accompli s hment of thi s genera l provi sion as to doctors and dentists. The repetition did not repeal Act No. 310.
object to be provided for by a separate a ct relating to tha t a l one, woul d not Act No. 2493, s ection 11 (Ad. Code, s ec. 780), provi ded tha t certi fi ca tes of
onl y be unreasonable, but woul d a ctua l l y render l egi s l a ti on i mpos s i bl e. phys i cians a re revocable for "unprofessional conduct," wi thout defi ni ng the
(Cool ey on Cons ti tuti ona l Li mi ta ti ons , pp. 296-297.) phra se. In other words, so fa r as revocation of l icenses i s concerned, Act No.
2493 i s mere reenactment of Act No. 310. The reenactment of the said portion
of Act No. 310 di d not repeal section 9 of the Opium Law. If said s ection 9 ha s
The constitutional requirement is addressed to the subject, not to the deta i l s
been repealed, it must be by Act No. 3111, whi ch a mends Act No. 2493 (Ad.
of the a ct. The s ubject must be single; the provi s i ons , to a ccompl i s hed the
Code, s ec. 780), by a n a ddition after the words "unprofes s i ona l conduct" of
object i nvolved in that s ubject, may be multifarious. . . . None of the provisions the fol l owi ng:
of a s ta tute will be held uncons ti tuti ona l when they a l l rel a te, di rectl y or
i ndirectly, to the same s ubject, have natural connection, and are not foreign to
the s ubject expressed i n the ti tle. As very frequently expressed by the courts , "The words "unprofes s i ona l conduct, i mmora l , or di s honora bl e
a ny provi sions that are germane to the s ubject expres s ed i n the ti tl e ma y conduct" as used i n this chapter shall be cons trued to i ncl ude the
properl y be i ncl uded i n the a ct. (I Sutherl a nd on Sta t. Cons t., pa r. 118.) fol l owing a cts: (1) Procuring, a iding or abeting a cri mi na l a borti on;
(2) a dvertising, either in his own name or i n the na me of a ny other
pers on, firm, association, or corporation, i n a ny wri tten or pri nted
In order to hold that s ection 9 of Act No. 2381 i s unconstitutional on the ground a l l eged by the
pa per, or document, of medi ca l bus i nes s i n whi ch untruthful or
pl a intiff, the vi olation of the constitutional provision must be s ubstantial a nd manifest. It is not s o i mprobable promises a re ma de, or bei ng empl oyed by, or i n the
i n the ca s e a t ba r.
s ervi ce of any person, firm, a ssociation or corporation s o advertising,
or a dvertising i n any obscene manner derogatory to good morals; (3)
2. To wa rra nt the setting asi de of s ta tutes beca us e thei r s ubjects a re not ha bitual intemperance or a ddition to the use of morphi ne, opi um,
expressed i n the ti tles, the vi olation of the rule must be s ubstantial a nd pl a i n. coca i ne or other drugs having a s i mi l a r effect; (4) convi cti on of a
(Pos a das vs. Menzi, Decision of the United Sta tes Supreme Court, pa ge 388, cri me or mi sdemea nor i nvol vi ng di s honora bl e conduct; a nd (5)
No. 11, Ma y 15, 1929, Uni ted Sta tes Supreme Court Adva nce Opi ni ons .) wi l l ful l y betra yi ng a profes s i ona l s ecret."

At a l l events the va lidity of this Opium Law, Act No. 2381, ha s already been uphel d by thi s court, It ca nnot be seriously contended that aside from the five examples s peci fi ed
not onl y i n the above ci ted ca se, United States vs. Wa yne Shoup, s upra, but a lso in the subsequent there ca n be no other conduct of a phys i ci a n deemed "unprofes s i ona l "
ca s e of Uni ted Sta tes vs. Ja o Li Si ng (37 Phi l ., 211). conduct theretofore deemed grounds for revoca ti on l i cens es . The
ma xi m expressio unius est exclussio alterius s hould be applied only a s a means
Pa s sing to the fifth a nd s ixth assignments of error, wherein counsel for a ppel l a nt contends tha t of di scovering l egislative i ntent a nd s houl d not be permi tted to defea t the
even gra nting that section 9 of Act No. 2381 i s va lid, it was repealed by Act No. 2493 a nd l a ter by pl a in indicated purpose of the Legislature. It does not a ppl y when words a re
s ecti on 780 of the Administrative Code, we note, fi rst, that there i s no express repeal of s ecti on 9 menti oned by wa y of exa mpl e, or to remove doubts . (See Cyc., 1122.) If,
of Act No. 2381. Secondly, i t cannot be held that it has been i mpliedl y repea l ed, for the rea s on therefore, there exists, "unprofessional conduct" not s p eci fi ed i n the l a ws ,
tha t the provisions of s ection 9, Act No. 2381, a re neither contrary to, nor i ncompatible wi th, the wi th more reason does the cri minal use of opium remain a speci fi c ca us e for
provi sions of s ection 780 of the Administrative Code, as a mended. Upon thi s poi nt, we a pprove revoca ti on of l i cens e. (Pa ges 11, 12 a nd 13, bi l l of excepti ons .)
a nd a dopt the fol l owi ng s ta tements ma de by the tri a l judge:
As to the s eventh a nd eighth assignments of error, we fi nd the judgment a nd a ppea l ed from
Couns el contends, in s upport of the above, that Act No. 2493 bei ng complete, correctl y rendered, a nd the moti on of a voi da nce a nd new tri a l properl y deni ed.
a nd "covering the fi el d" by i mpl i ca ti on repea l ed a l l l a ws rel a ti ng to the
pra cti ce of medicine, powers of the Board of Medi ca l Exa mi ners a nd a l l i ed As the Attorney-General correctly observes, the powers vested in the Board of Medical Examiners
ma tters; hence, the said law, expressly providing the causes for revoca ti on of to s us pend or revoke a phys i ci a n's certi fi ca te of regi s tra ti on a nd the a uthori ty gra nted the
medi cal licenses, necessarily excluded all others , even though embodi ed i n Secretary of the Interior of confirming or revers i ng the deci s i on of s a i d boa rd of exa mi ners ,
pri or ena ctments . pa rta ke of a quasi-judicial character, that is, i nvolve the us e of di s creti on. For thi s rea s on, the
exerci se thereof ca nnot be revi ewed by ma ndamus, which is the nature of this ca use on i ts merits.
76
As i n the ca se of courts and judicial officers, i t is a rule of general a ppl i ca ti on
tha t mandamus wi ll not l ie to revi ew or control the a cts of executi ve offi cers Ma yor, 2 Counci lors, and the Secretary were absent. The six councilors, who a re the petitioners i n
a nd boards of s tate and federal governments i n respect of matters as to which
thi s case, were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary presiding
they a re vested wi th discretion. In other words, they ca nnot be compel l ed to
a ct or render a decision i n any particular way, a nd this is s o, even though the offi cer a nd Acting Secretary to ta ke notes of the proceedings. Having thus elected a temporary
exerci se of this discretion requi res the cons tructi on a nd i nterpreta ti on of
s ta tutes. Where public officials exercise their discreti on, i t i s s a i d tha t thei r pres iding officer a nd a secretary of the Council, they proceeded to do business. On the subsequent
concl usions, although disputa bl e, a re i mpregna bl e to mandamus. (38 C. J.,
659-660.) Counci l meetings, the Mayor, Vi ce Mayor, 2 Councilors and Secretary were s till not a round. When

the Mi nutes of the Proceeding was presented to the Ma yor, the latter refused to act upon s aid
Tha t this a ction i s really a mandamus proceeding, a ppears clearly from the terms of the complaint
fi l ed herei n. mi nutes, or particularly to a pprove or disapprove the resolution as a pproved by the Council, the

Ma yor decl aring the s essions a bove referred to as null a nd void and not i n accordance wi th.
Fi nding no merit i n the assignments of error, the judgment a ppealed from is affirmed, wi th cos ts
a ga i ns t the a ppel l a nt. So ordered.

Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. ISSUE: Whether or not the s essions held by the Council were va lid
Villamor, J., reserves his vote.

RULING: Thi s Court (the trial court), a fter perusal of all the records of this case has reached the

concl usion that the sessions held by the petitioner during the absence of the respondent Ma yor
Ja vellana vs Tayo
were perfectly va lid and legal. The a ttendance of the Ma yor is not essential to the va lidity of the
G.R. No. L-18919 December 29, 1962
s ession a s long a s there is quorum constituted i n accordance wi th law. To declare that the
ABELARDO JAVELLANA, TOMAS JONCO, RUDICO HABANA, EXEQUIEL GOLEZ, ALFREDO ANG, and
proceedings of the petitioners were null and void is to encourage recalcitrant public officials who
FILIPINAS SOLEDAD, in their capacities as Councilors of the Municipal Municipality of
woul d frustrate valid session for political end or consideration. Public interest will i mmensely
Buenavista, Province of Iloilo, petitioners appellees,
s uffer, i f a mayor who belongs to one political group refuses to call or a ttend a session, because
vs.
the Council is controlled by a nother political group. (And this was upheld by the SC.)
SUSANO TAYO, as Mayor of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, respondent-
We fi nd s aid award proper under Article 27 of the new Ci vil Code, 3 considering that according to
appellant.
the tri al court, he (Golez) was a ble to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of

a ppellant's refusal to perform his official duty, not withstanding the action tak en by the Provi ncial
FACTS: The petitioners a re duly elected a nd qualified members of the Municipal Council of the
Fi s cal an the Provi ncial Board upholding the va lidity of the session in question.
Muni cipality of Buenavista, Iloilo; a nd that the respondent a t the time the acts herein below

compl ained of took place, was a nd s till is the duly-elected a nd qualified Mayor of the Municipality.
DECISION: Tri a l Court decision affirmed.
The Municipal Council of Buenavista (Council) unanimously a pproved Resolution No. 5, Series of

1960 whi ch set the regular sessions of the Council a nd which resolution was duly a pproved by the [Di gest] Lopez vs . CA (1970)
Lopez publisher and owner of Manila Chronicle and Gatbonton (Editor) v. Court of Appeals and
res pondent. At the ti me a nd place set for the regular session of the Council, the Ma yor, Vice- Cruz (1970)
Ponente: Ferna ndo, J.

77
78
Facts:
Ja nuary 1956 Front-page s tory on the Ma nila Chronicle Fi del Cruz, sanitary i nspector assigned to 2. Li bel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it a lso can not claim any ta lismanic
the Ba buyan Islands, sent distress s ignals to US Airforce planes which forwarded such message to i mmunity form constitutional l imitations
Ma ni la Sta te interest i n press freedom ci ting Justice Malcolm: Full discussion of public a ffairs is necessary
o An Ameri can Army plane dropped emergency s ustenance kits on the beach of the i sland which for the ma intenance of good governance Public officials must not be too thin-skinned with
conta ined, among other things, a two way ra dio set. Using the ra dio s et Cruz reported to the reference to comments on official actsof course cri ticism does not a uthorize defamation.
a uthorities i n Ma nila that the locals were living in terror d ue to a series of killings committed on Nevertheless, as an indivi dual is less than the state, so must expected criticism be born for the
the i sland since Christmas of 1955. common good.
o Phi l ippine defense forces (scout rangers) were i mmediately deployed to the babuya n claro. They So l ong as i t was done i n good faith, the press should have the legal ri ght to have a nd express their
were l ed by Ma jor Wilfredo Encarnacion who discovered that Cruz only fabricated the story a bout opi nions on l egal questions. To deny them that ri ght would be to infringe upon freedom of the
the ki llings to get attention. Cruz merely wa nted tra nsportation home to Ma nila. pres s.
o Ma jor Enca rnacion branded the fiasco as a hoax the same word to be used by the newspapers La s t word on the subject Ci ti ng Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press s hould be given leeway a nd tolerance
who covered the same a s to enable them to courageously a nd effectively perform their important role in our democracy
Ja nuary 13, 1956 - Thi s Week Magazine of the Ma nila Chronicle, edited by Ga tbonton devoted a Freedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of legal va lues
pi ctorial article to i t. It claimed that despite the story of Cruz being a hoax it brought to l ight the TEST of LIABLITY must prove there was a ctual malice i n publishing the story/photo! (Note: but this
mi s ery of the people living i n that place, with almost everybody s ick, only 2 i ndivi duals a ble to wa s not done i n this ca se)
rea d a nd wri te and food and cl othing being scarce
Ja nuary 29, 1956 - Thi s Week Magazine i n the "January News Quiz" made reference to Cruz as a
hea lth i nspector who s uddenly felt "l onely" i n his isolated post, cooked up a story a bout a 4. Citing Concepcion, CJ. Correcti on of error in publishing does not wipe out the responsibility
murderer running l oose on the i sland of Ca layan s o that he could be ferried back to a ri sing from the publication of the original article
ci vi l ization. Ca lled it Hoax of the year Correcti on = Mi tigating ci rcumstance not a justifying ci rcumstance!
In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were published but both photos were of a different person of
the s ame name Fi del G. Cruz former ma yor, business man, contractor from Santa Ma ria, Bulacan Dissent: Dizon, J.
o Ja nuary 27, 1957 publ ished statements correcting their misprint a nd explained that confusion and Ma nila Chronicle should be a bsolved because:
error ha ppened due to the rush to meet the Jan 13th i ssues deadline o No evi dence of a ctual malice
Cruz s ued herein petitioners for l ibel in CFI Ma nila. Cruz won and was a warded P11,000 i n damages o The a rti cle does not ascribe a nything immoral or a ny moral turpitude to Cruz
(5k a ctua l, 5k moral, 1k a ttorneys fees) o The negligence performed by Ma nila Chronicle is this case s hould be considered excusable
CA a ffirmed CFI decision hence this case negligence

Issue: G.R. No. L-10690 June 28, 1957


WON petitioners should be held liable for their error in printing the wrong Fidel Cruzs photo in
relation to the hoax of the year?
APOLONIO PANGILINAN, ET AL., peti tioners,
o WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to prosper?
vs .
FELISA ALVENDIA, res pondent.
Held:
Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is reduced to P1,000.00
Emili P. Cortes and Pacifico L. Santiago for petitioners.
Ratio: Isidro T. Calma for respondent.
1. Mi s ta ke is no excuse to a bsolve publishers because l ibel is harmful on i ts face by the fact that i t
exposes the i njured party to more than tri vial ri dicule, whether i t is fact or opinion is i rrelevant. REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui l i bel is "malicious defamation, expressed either i n writing,
pri nting, or by s igns or pictures, or the l ike, ..., tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead
Thi s is a petition for certiorari to revi ew the decision of the Court of Industrial Rel a ti ons i n Ca s e
or to i mpeach the honesty, vi rtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one No. 215 Pa mpa nga (l a ter tra ns ferred to the Court of Agra ri a n Rel a ti ons whi ch deni ed
who i s a live, and thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ri dicule," reconsideration of the Industrial Court's decision) a uthorizing the ejectment of peti ti oners from
Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel "Publ ication of a person's photograph i n thei r respective l andholdings, a nd their replacement by other tenants of their l a ndl ord's choi ce.
connection wi th an article libelous of a third person, i s a libel on the person whose picture is
published, where the a cts set out i n the a rticle are i mputed to s uch person."
o In thi s case 3rd pers on was Cruz hi s picture being published beside the article i mputes him as the It a ppears that petitioners Apolonio Pa ngilinan, Mariano Bundalian, Mi guel Galang, a nd Va l enti n
purveyor of the hoax of the year Sa ntos are tenants of respondents Felisa Alvendia in barrios San Nicola s a nd Sto. Cri s to, Fl ori da

79
Bl a nca, Pa mpanga, under tenancy contracts executed on July 17, 1953 (Exhi bits A, B, C, a nd D). On tena nt or not", whom, as they a re "dependent upon hi m for s upport" a nd us ua l l y hel p hi m
Jul y 27, 1954, res pondent Al vendia filed a petition i n the Court of Indus tri a l Rel a ti ons for the opera te the frame enterprise", the l aw considers also part of the tenant's immediate hous ehol d.
ejectment of petitioners on the ground that for the a gricultural yea rs 1953-54 a nd 1954-55, they
di d not personally perform the pri nci pa l work of pl owi ng a nd ha rrowi ng on thei r res pecti ve But res pondent Alvendia claims that as her contracts with petitioners were entered into when Act
l a ndholdings, but entrusted said work to other persons, notwithstanding repea ted dema nds by 4054, the ol d Tenancy Act, wa s s till i n force, the definition of the word "tenant" gi ven i n s a i d Act
res pondent tha t they do the fa rm work thems el ves . Peti ti oners i n thei r a ns wer, deni ed s houl d be a ppl i ed i n thi s ca s e, to wi t:
res pondent's claims, a nd alleged that they were the ones working the land altho ugh at ti mes, they
were helped by their children and sons-in-law; a nd that respondent fi l ed the ejectment a cti on
. . . a fa rmer or farm laborer who undertakes to work a nd cul ti va te l a nd for
a ga inst them because they refused to sign tenancy contracts with her on the 45-55 s hari ng ba s i s
a nother or a person who furnishes the labor with the consent of the landl ord.
a nd i ns i s ted on a 70-30 s ha ri ng ba s i s .

Gra nti ng that Act 4054 a pplies to this case, there i s, however, nothing i n i ts a bove defi ni ti on of
After tri a l, the Industrial Court found that petitioners were being helped either by their sons, sons-
"tena nt" to prohibit the farmer who undertakes to work and cultivate the l a nd of a nother, from
i n-law, or grandsons, on their l andholdings; held that a contract of tenancy i s pers ona l i n na ture
doi ng s uch work with the assistance of his family, who a re under hi s control a nd a uthori ty. The
a nd ca n not be entrusted to a son, son-in-law or gra ndson, espe ci a l l y where there i s a s peci fi c
a bove definition is, in fact, so broad that it eve n includes the labor of third pers ons hi red by the
prohi bition i n the tenancy contracts against allowing third persons to do the princi pa l pha s es of
fa rmer to work on his farm, under the cl a us e "or a pers on who furni s hes the l a bor wi th the
fa rmi ng for the tenants; and authorized petitioners' ejectment a nd replacement by other tenants .
cons ent of the l andlord". It i s the hiring of third persons to do the fa rm work for the tena nt tha t
The ca se wa s l a ter tra ns ferred to the Court of Agra ri a n Rel a ti ons upon i ts crea ti on where
the new tenancy Republic Act No. 1199, el iminated from the ol d concept of "tena nt" under Act
peti tioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Indus tri a l Court's judgement, whi ch wa s
4054, thus restricting the meaning of "tenant" to one "who, himself a nd wi th the a i d a va i l a bl e
deni ed. Hence, thei r pres ent a ppea l .
from wi thin his immediate farm household, cultivates the l a nd bel ongi ng to, or pos s es s ed by,
a nother, with the latter's consent . . ." Whether under the new or the old tenancy law, therefore,
The l ower court found that the "third pers ons " referred to by res pondent Al vendi a to whom the work done by the members of a tenant's family is, i n legal contemplation, included i n the work
peti ti oners a l l egedl y entrus ted the work of pl owi ng a nd ha rrowi ng on thei r res pecti ve tha t the tenant undertakes to perform on the l and given to him i n tenancy. In the absence of clear
l a ndholdings were either their s ons-in-law or grandsons who were not, however, dependent upon a nd ca tegorical i mperatives, we wi l l not cons true s ta tutes i n a s ens e i ncons i s tent wi th the
them for s upport a nd were l i vi ng s epa ra tel y from them. The i s s ue, therefore, i s whether tra di ti ona l uni ty of the Fi l i pi no fa mi l y.
peti tioners vi olated the l aw a nd their tena ncy contra cts i n entrus ti ng thei r fa rm work to s uch
rel a ti ves .
Res pondent Alvendia also contends that her tenancy contract wi th peti ti oners , Exhi bi ts A, B, C,
a nd D, expressly prohibit the latter from asking for a nd a ccepting help in the cul ti va ti on of thei r
Republ i c Act 1199, whi ch took effect on Augus t 30, 1954, defi nes "tena nt" a s : l a ndholdings from their s ons-in-law and grandsons, under the provi s i on i n s a i d contra cts tha t:

. . . a pers on who, himself and with the a id available from within his immediate (a ) The TENANT is the one to plow, harrow and prepare the l and to be planted,
fa rm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or pos s es s ed by a nother, a nd l ikewise, he is the one to plant a nd fence the s eedbed. Wi th res pect to
wi th the latter's consent, for purpose of production, sharing the produce wi th thi s work, the LANDLORD shall not s pend for a nything, but she has the power
the l a ndholder under the share tenancy sys tem, or paying to the l andholder a to tel l or order the TENANT when to plow, harrow, or what to do perta i ni ng,
pri ce certain or a s certa i na bl e i n produce or i n money or both, under the the tena nt's work.
l ea s ehol d tena ncy s ys tem;
The a bove provision contains no prohibition for the tenant to accept assistance from the members
Whi le "i mmediate farm hous ehol d," a ccordi ng to the s a me Act, i ncl udes : of hi s fa mily i n the plowing, harrowing, preparing, planting, or fencing of his landholding. It simpl y
enumerates the exact duties expected of the tenant by his landlord; a nd the tenant i s referred to
. . . the members of the fa mi l y of the tena nt, a nd s uch other p ers on or a s "the one" to perform these duti es , onl y, to di s ti ngui s h hi s obl i ga ti ons from thos e of hi s
pers ons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon hi m l a ndlord. We see nothing in farming tasks that requires indivi dual specialized s kill. B esides , i t i s a
for s upport a nd who us ua l l y hel p hi m opera te the fa rm enterpri s e. fa ct tha t petitioners Galang and Santos were already 74 a nd 64, respecti vel y, when res pondent
s i gned the tenancy contracts wi th them i n 1953. Respondent's having a ccepted petitioners Galang
Under the a bove definition of "tenant" given by Republic Act 1199, peti tioners were wi thi n thei r a nd Santos as her tenants in spite of their advanced a ge not only disproves her claim that they a re
l egal ri ghts i n asking assistance in thei r fa rm work from thei r s ons -i n-l a w or gra nds ons . Such a l ready too old to perform their duties a s tenants, but proves that s he had impliedl y a greed tha t
rel a tives fall within the phrase "the members of the family of the tenant"; a nd the l a w does not thes e petitioners would be helped by their families i n thei r fa rm work, s i nce res pondent mus t
requi re that these members of the tena nt's fa mi l y be dependent on hi m for s upport, s uch ha ve realized that a t their advanced a ge, these petitioners could not by themselves alone perform
qua lification being a pplicable onl y to "s uch other pers on or pers ons , whether rel a ted to the a l l the fa rm work wi thout fa mi l y a s s i s ta nce.

80
The decision a ppealed from i s, therefore, reversed, a nd the ejectment action filed by res pondent
a ga inst petitioners di s mi s s ed, wi th cos ts a ga i ns t res pondent Fel i s a Al vendi a . So ordered. No. Gra mmatically, the qualifying cl ause refers only to the last a ntecedent; that is, "any ci ti zen of

the Phi lippines or a ny a ssociation or corporation organized under the laws of the Phi l i ppi ne s ." It
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix,
JJ., concur. s hould be noted that there i s a comma before the words "or to a ny ci tizen, etc.," which separa tes

s a id phrase from the preceding ones. But even di s rega rdi ng the gra mma ti ca l cons tructi on, to

ma ke the acceptance of the backpay certi fi ca tes obl i ga tory upon a ny ci ti zen, a s s oci a ti on, or
Florentino v. PNB
corpora tion, which a re not government entities or owned or controlled by the government, would

G.R. No. L-8782. April 28, 1956 render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional for i t would amount to an impairment of

the obligation of contracts by compelling private credi tors to a ccept a s ort of promi s s ory note

FACTS: pa ya ble within ten years wi th interest at a ra te very much lower than the current or even the legal

one. It was also found out i n the Congressional Record tha t the a menda tory bi l l to Sec. 2 wa s

The petitioners a nd a ppellants filed a petition for mandamus a gainst Philippine Nati ona l Ba nk to ma de which permits the use of backpay certi ficates a s payment for obligations and i ndebtednes s

compel i t to a ccept the ba ckpa y certi fi ca te of peti ti oner Ma rcel i no B. Fl orenti no to pa y a n i n fa vor of the government. Another reason is that i t is matter of genera l knowl edge tha t ma ny

i ndebtedness in the s um of P6,800 s ecured by rea l es ta te mortga ge pl us i nteres t. The de bt offi cials a nd employees of the Phili ppi ne Government, who ha d s erved duri ng the Ja pa nes e

i ncurred on Ja nuary 2, 1953, whi ch is due on January 2, 1954. Peti ti oner i s a hol der of Ba ckpa y Occupa tion, have already received their backpay certificates and us ed them for the pa yment of

Acknowl edgment No. 1721 da ted October 6, 1954, i n the a mount of P22,896.33 by vi rtue of the obligations to the Government a nd i ts enti ti es for debts i ncurred before the a pprova l of

Republic Act No. 897 a pproved on June 20, 1953. Peti ti oners offered to pa y thei r l oa n wi th the Republ i c Act No. 304.

res pondent bank with their backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953,

refus ed to a ccept the l a tter's ba ckpa y certi fi ca te. Under s ecti on 2 of Republ i c Act No. 879, Fl orentino i ncurred his debt to the PNB on January 2, 1953. Hence, the obligation was s ubs i s ti ng

res pondent-appellee contends that the qualifying clause refers to all the a ntecedents , wherea s when the Amendatory Act No. 897 wa s a pproved. Consequently, the present case fa l l s s qua rel y

the a ppel l a nt's contenti on i s tha t i t refers onl y to the l a s t a ntecedent. under the provi s i ons of s ecti on 2 of the Amenda tory Act No. 897.

Peopl e v. Ta ma ni

ISSUE: G.R. Nos : L-22160 & L-22161

Whether or not the clause who may be willing to a ccept the same for s ettl ement refers to a l l Fa cts : On Februa ry 14, 1963, the l ower court found Ta ma ni gui l ty of cons umma ted a nd
a ttempted murder. On
a ntecedents menti oned i n the l a s t s entence of s ecti on 2 of Republ i c Act No. 879.
February 25, 1963, Ta ma nis counsel received a copy of the decision and consequently fi l ed for a
moti on
for reconsideration on Ma rch 1, 1963. It wa s deni ed. On Jul y 13, 1963, the l ower court s ent a
HELD: denial order to the counsel through his wife via registered mail. On September 10, 1963, the s a i d
couns el a ppea l ed
81
the l ower courts deci s i on. HELD:
Then, the a ppellees argued that the a ppeal should be dismissed contending that the appeal should No. La bra dor has every ri ght to ca ncel the contra cts of s a l e, purs ua nt to Cl a us e 7 of the s a i d
ha ve been made up to July 24, 1963 whi ch is the 15 da y period of appeal from the da te of noti ce contra ct for the reason of the l apse of five years of default payment from Ma pa. P.D. 957 does not
a nd not from the date of promulgation. Thus, the appellees claimed that the appeal wa s fi l ed 47 a pply because i t was enacted long a fter the execution of the contracts i nvolved, a nd, other tha n
da ys l a te. thos e provided in Cl ause 20, no further wri tten commi tment wa s ma de by the devel oper. The
2 words which are offered a nd i ndicated i n the s ubdivision or condominium pla ns refer not onl y
Is sue: Whether the 15-day period s hould commence from the date of promulga ti on or from the to other forms of devel opment but a l s o to fa ci l i ti es , i mprovements , a nd
da te of notice of the decision. Held: Appeal was dismissed. The 15-day period s hould commence i nfrastructures. The word a nd is not meant to s epara te words , but i s a conjuncti on us ed to
from the da te of promul ga ti on. Ra ti o: Rul e 122 of the Rul e s of Court provi des : SEC. 6. denote a joi nder or a uni on.
When a ppea l to be ta ken
.
Chua v. CSC (Civil Service Commission) Case Digest
a n a ppeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or
order a ppealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal s hal l be i nterrupted from the ti me a Chua v. Civil Service Commission
moti on for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion s hall have been s erved G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)
upon the defenda nt or hi s a ttorney.
3 FACTS:
The a ssumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from Februa ry 25, 1963, when a RA 6683 provi ded benefi ts for ea rl y reti rement a nd vol unta ry s epa ra ti on a s wel l a s for
copy of the decision was allegedly s erved on a ppellant's counsel by registered ma i l , i s not wel l - i nvol untary s eparation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who a re qua l i fi ed: Sec. 2.
ta ken. The word "promulgation" i n section 6 s hould be construed as referring to "judgment" while Covera ge. Thi s Act s ha l l cover a l l a ppoi nti ve offi ci a l s a nd empl oyees of the Na ti ona l
the word "notice" s hould be construed as referring to "order". That construction is sancti oned by Government. The benefits a uthorized under this Act s hall apply to a ll regular, temporary, casual
the rul e of a nd emergency employees, regardless of a ge, who ha ve rendered a t l ea s t a tota l of two (2)
reddendo s i ngul a s i ngul i s cons ecutive years of government servi ce as of the date of s epa ra ti on Peti ti oner Lydi a Chua ,
: "referri ng each to each; referring each phrase or expression to i ts a ppropri a te object", or "l et bel ieving that she i s qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, fil ed a n a ppl i ca ti on on
ea ch be put i n i ts proper place, that is, the words should be ta ken distributively". Therefore, when Ja nuary 30, 1989 wi th Res pondent Admi ni s tra ti on, whi ch, however, deni ed the s a me.
the order denying a ppellant's motion for reconsideration was served by regi s tered ma i l on Jul y Recours e by the peti ti oner to Res pondent Commi s s i on yi el ded the s a me res ul t.
13th on a ppellant's counsel, he had only 1 da y wi thin which to file his notice of a ppeal and not 11
da ys . Appella nt Ta ma ni 's noti ce of a ppea l , fi l ed on September 10, 1963, wa s 58 da ys l a te. ISSUE:
W/N Peti tioners s tatus a s a co-terminus employee i s excluded from the benefi ts of RA 6683
(Ea rl y Reti rement La w).
Mapa v. Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation Case Digest
HELD:
Jose Antonio Mapa v. Hon. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation The petition is gra nted. The Early Retirement La w would vi olate the equal protection cl ause of
G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989) the constitution i f the Supreme Court were to sustain Res pondents s ubmi s s i on tha t the
benefits of said law are to be denied a cl ass of government employees who are similarly situated
FACTS: a s those covered by the said law. The court a ppl i ed the doctri ne of neces s a ry i mpl i ca ti on i n
Ma pa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which a re payable i n ten years. Ma pa deci di ng thi s ca s e.
defa ulted to pay the i ns ta l l ment dues a nd conti nued to do s o des pi te cons ta nt remi nders
by La bra dor. The latter i nformed Ma pa that the contracts to s ell the l ots were ca ncelled, but Mapa G.R. No. L-5127 May 27, 1953
i nvoked Cl a us e 20 of the four contra cts . Sa i d cl a us e obl i ga tes La bra dor to compl ete the
development of the lots, except those requiring the servi ces of a publ i c uti l i ty compa ny or the
PEDRO BATUNGBAKAL, pl a i nti ff-a ppel l ee,
government, wi thi n 3 yea rs from the da te of the contra ct. Peti ti oner contends tha t P.D.
vs .
957 requires La brador to provide the facilities, improvements, and i nfra s tructures for the l ots ,
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and MANUEL AGREGADO, as Auditor General of the
a nd other forms of development i f offered a nd indica ted i n the a pproved s ubdi vi s i on pl a ns .
Philippines,defenda nts -a ppel l a nts .
ISSUE:
W/N Cl a use 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957 through the doctrine of l a s t Government Corporate Counsel Pompeyo Diaz, Assistant Attorney Leovigildo Monasterial and Juan
a ntecedent, ma ki ng the ca ncel l a ti on o f the contra cts of s a l e i ncorrect. T. Alano for appellant.
Jose M. Casal for appellee.

82
MONTEMAYOR, J.: na mes of fictitious buyers or through dummies, contrary to the pol i cy of thi s
Compa ny.
Thi s is an appeal by the National Development Company (NDC) and Ma nuel Agregado a s Audi tor
General of the Philippines from a decision of the Court of First Ins ta nce of Ma ni l a orderi ng the On Ma y 28, 1947, Ba tumbakal filed a petition for reconsideration with the Office of the President;
a ppellants to reinstate the plaintiff-appellee Pedro Batungbakal i n his former position a s property the ma tter was referred to Hon. Sixto de la Costa as Chairma n of the Inves ti ga ti ng Commi ttee.
exa mi ner i n the Comptrol l er's offi ce i n the NDC, wi th a s a l a ry of P2,040 per a nnum, the
compensation he was receiving when he wa s s us pended on December 31, 1946, a nd further On December 4, 1948, the Inves ti ga ti ng Commi ttee of the NDC under the Cha i rma ns hi p of
orderi ng that he be paid his back s a l a ry a t the ra te of P2,040 per a nnum from the da te of hi s Honorable e la Costa s ubmittee to the President of the Philippines through the Secretary of Justice
s us pension up to the date of his reinstatement, deducting therefrom wha tever a mount he s ti l l i ts report of the i nves ti ga ti on whi ch ends thus :
owed the NDC. The a ppeal having been ta ken direct to this court, only ques ti ons of l a w ma y be
ra i sed and the finding of facts made by the tri a l court a re bi ndi ng on the pa rti es a nd on thi s
In vi ew of the foregoing, the commi ttee recons i ders i ts previ ous fi ndi ngs ,
tri buna l . The fa cts a s found by the l ower court ma y be bri efl y s ta ted a s fol l ows .
decl aring that Batungbakal and de la Cruz have not committed negl i gence i n
the di scharge of their duties, a nd therefore recommends their reins ta tement
On February 14, 1939, pl a intiff Pedro Batungbakal was appointed by the Auditor General a s ca s h to the s ervi ce of the Na ti ona l Devel opment Compa ny.
a nd property examiner i n the office of the Comptroller of the NDC. Shortly before the Pa cifi c wa s
the position of cash and property examiner was divi ded i nto two, na mel y, ca s h exa mi ner a nd
On Augus t 17, 1949, the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce forwa rded the s a i d report together wi th other
property examiner, Batungbakal retaining the position of property examiner. Around October of
perti nent pa pers to the Offi ce of the Pres i dent wi th the fol l owi ng recommenda ti on:
1944 he went on l ea ve.

In vi ew of the foregoing, the unders i gned recommends tha t: (1) Mr. Pedro
When the NDC was reopened i n Ma rch, 1945, Ba tungba ka l a nd s ome other empl oyees i n the
Ba tungbakal be reinstated with the wa rni ng tha t, a s repres enta ti ve of the
Comptrol ler's office were recalled to duty. The Comptol l er wa s under the s upervi s i on of the
Comptrol ler, which included the a uditing department, he wa s bound by the
Audi tor General but hi s s a l a ry a nd thos e of hi s pers onnel were pa i d by the NDC. Si nce the
rul es, regulations a nd i nstructions issued by the Management of the Nati ona l
reorga nization of the NDC it became the practice that only the Comptroller was a ppointed by the
Devel opment Company a nd his failure hereafter to compl y wi th thes e rul es ,
Audi tor General with the a pproval of the Board of Directors of the Company while the pers onnel
regul ations and instructions will be more s everely dea l t wi th; . . . "t" (Exhi bi t
i n hi s offi ce were a ppoi nted by the compa ny i ts el f.
A).

On Augus t 24, 1945, Ba tungbakal was appointed by the Chairman of the Boa rd of Di rectors a nd
On September 5, 1949, the Office of the President of the Philippi nes referred the ma tter to the
Acti ng General Ma nager of the NDC a s property examiner i n s aid company with a salary of P100 a
General Manager of the NDC through the Cha i rma n of the Control Commi ttee, Government
month; he was promoted i n salary to P2,040 a yea r effective April 1, 1946, i n the same position of
Enterpri s e Counci l (GEC) for a ppropri a te a cti on.
property examiner by a ppointment dated Ma rch 30, 1946, s i gned by the Acti ng General Ma na ger
of the NDC.
On October 14, 1949, the Executi ve Vi ce -Cha i rma n of the Control Commi ttee of the GEC
forwa rded the pa pers to the Genera l Ma na ger of the NDC wi th the fol l owi ng s ta tements :
On December 31, 1946, Ba tungbakal was s us pended from offi ce a s property exa mi ner by the
Inves ti ga ti ng Commi ttee crea ted by Admi ni s tra ti ve Order No. 39 of the Pres i dent of the
Phi l ippines, a nd on April 17, 1947, he received from the officer i n charge of the NDC noti ce of hi s The Control Committee, GEC, hereby concurs in the vi ew of the Se creta ry of
di s mi s s a l . Sa i d noti ce rea ds a s fo l l ows : Jus ti ce stated i n the precedi ng s econd endors ement exonera ti ng Mes s rs .
Pedro Ba tungbakal a nd Sisenando de la Cruz of the charge of gross negligence
i n the performa nce of thei r duti es s i nce the evi dence ga thered by the
Purs uant to the instruction of the Chi ef of the Executi ve Offi ce, I ha ve the
Investigating Committee headed by Judge de l a Costa s hows that they di d not
honor to i nform you tha t a ccordi ng to the report of the Inves ti ga ti on
know of the existence of the instructions contained in the memorandum order
Commi ttee whi ch wa s crea ted under Admi ni s tra ti ve Order No. 39 of Hi s
of the Ma nagement dated June 13, 1946 a nd the goods sol d by the Na ti ona l
Excel l ency, the President of the Philippines to i nvestigate the business a ffa i rs
Devel opment Company were delivered to an authorize represe nta ti ve of the
a nd operations of the Na tional Development Company, you have been found
pa rty to whom the goods were s ol d. (See Exhi bi t 2-A of the res pondent
to ha ve committed gross negligence i n the performance of your duti es to the
Audi tor Genera l .)
detri ment of thi s Compa ny. The s a i d Commi ttee l i kewi s e found tha t
i rregularities committed by you constitute acts a nd ommi s s i on whi ch ma de
pos sible the ommission of i rregularities in the disposal of ya rns ei ther i n the On October 27, 1949, the Technical Assistant (Lega l Credi t a nd Col l ecti on) of the NDC wrote a
l etter to the Audi tor Genera l through the Audi tor of the ND C, wherei n a fter gi vi ng a bri ef

83
s ta tement of the ca s e of Ba tungba ka l i ncl udi ng the fi ndi ngs a nd recommenda ti on of the from December 31, 1946 up to Apri l 17, 1947 a mounti ng to P689 wa s a ppl i ed to the s um of
Inves ti ga ti on Commi ttee a nd the recommenda ti on of the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce for the P1,392.42 (s houl d be P1,394.42), l ea vi ng a n unpa i d ba l a nce of P705.42.
rei nstatement of Batungbakal, he requested the opinion of the Auditor General a s to whether or
not Ba tungbakal was entitled to his backpay from the date of his s us pens i on to the da te of hi s On Augus t 15, 1950, the Acti ng Secretary of Economic Coordination replyi ng to a letter of counsel
rei s nta tement. for Ba tungbakal s aid that he approved the a cti on ta ken by the Boa rd of Di rectors of the NDC
rei terating its previous resolution that it had no objection to the re -employment of Batungbakal to
The Auditor of the NDC i n his first indorsement to the Auditor General among other thi ngs s a i d: a ny s uitable position in the NDC but s tating however that it was not possible to re -empl oy hi m a t
tha t ti me because his former i tem was already occupied by someone else, a nd that there were no
Obvi ously, the reinstatement of Mr. Ba tungbakal i n the Office of the Auditor of va ca nt i tem to whi ch he coul d be a ppoi nted.
the Na tional Development Company is no longer feasible, because there i s no
va ca ncy for the positi on of "property exa mi ner" formerl y hel d by hi m. . . . On October 2, 1950, Ba tungbakal wrote to the Chai rma n of the Boa rd of Di rectors of the NDC,
requesting his resinstatement in the s ervice of the company a nd the pa yment to hi m of a l l hi s
xxx xxx xxx s a lary up to the date of his resinstatement. Acting upon this request the Board of Directors of the
NDC i n i ts meeting held October 8, 1950 a uthorized his reinstatement as previ ous l y a pproved by
s a id Board on April 12, 1950 provi ded that "he renounce his ri ght to cl aim for the pa yment of hi s
However, in vi ew of the recommendation of the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce i n thi s
ba ck s alary, a nd authorized the Acti ng General Ma nager to l ook for a suitable positi on for hi m i n
ca s e, thi s Offi ce bel i eves tha t no objecti on ma y i nterpos ed to the the Na ti ona l Shi pya rd & Gra vi ng Dock Depa rtment."
rei nstatement of Mr. Ba tungbakal in the National Development provided tha t
the s ame is not made to any position under the juri s di cti on of the Genera l
Audi ti ng Offi ce. On November 4, 1950, Ba tungbakal through counsel informed the Genera l Ma na ger of the NDC
tha t he decl i ned to a ccept a ny pos i ti on other tha n the one formerl y occupi ed by hi m a nd
reques ted tha t hi s ba ck s a l a ry be pa i d to hi m a s s oon a s pos s i bl e.
xxx xxx xxx

In i ts meeting of November 8, 1950, the Boa rd of Directors of the NDC a pproved Ba tungba ka l 's
Accordi ngly, i t is believed that Mr. Ba tungbakal i s not enti tl ed to a ny s a l a ry
reques t for the pa yment of hi s s a l a ry a mounti ng to P 7,820 a s of October 31, 1950, a nd
from the ti me of his suspension or dismissal to the date of his resinsta tement a ppropriated the necessa ry s um therefore, s ubject to the fi na l a pprova l of the GEC a nd the
or a ppointment to a position different from tha t hel d by hi m when he wa s
Audi tor General provided Batungbakal relinquished his right to reinstatement i n the s ervice of the
s us pended a nd l a ter di s mi s s ed from offi ce.
NDC.

On February 15, 1960, the Audi tor General returned the papers of Batungba ka l of the NDC wi th
On November 17, 1950, the Acti ng Genera l Ma na ger of the NDC wrote to the Secreta ry of
the fol l owi ng s ta tement:
Economic Coordination tra nsmitting excerpts from the minutes of the meeting of the NDC held on
November 8, 1950, for hi s final approval a t the same ti me informing Batugbakal's couns el of hi s
In vi ew of the foregoing ci rcumstances s urroundi ngs the ca s e of Mr. Pedro a cti on.
Ba tungbakal and the fact that his reinstatement to the position formerl y hel d
by hi m i n that office is no l onger feasible, this Office recommends tha t a new In a memorandum to the Auditor General dated December 29, 1950, the Chi ef La w Offi cer, a fter
pos ition be created in the Na tional Development Company to which he may be
di s cussing the fact of the case of Batungbakal s tated his opinion tha t the a cti on of the Boa rd of
rei ns ta ted, provi ded i t wi l l not be i n the Audi ti ng Depa rtment.
Di rectors of the NDC a uthorizing the payment of back salaries to Batungbakal was legally justifi ed
for the rea son that Batungbakal had not been suspended and dismissed for ca use, and that a s a n
Wi th reference to his cl aim for salary, this Office will offer no objection to the empl oyee of the NDc which is an agency of the Government he could not be removed except for
pa yment thereof from the a te of his suspension on December 31, 1946, to the ca us e. The Senior Attorney of the same office i n another memorandum to the Auditor General on
da te of hi s di s mi s s a l on Apri l 17, 1957 (Exhi bi t 1-AG). the s ame matter said that he had a n i nterview with counsel of Batungbakal regarding the l a tter's
cl a im for back salary, a nd ma de reference to efforts of the Auditor's office towards a compromis e
On Apri l 15, 1950, the Secreta ry of the Boa rd of Di rectors of the NDC wrote to Ba tungba ka l a nd s tated his bel i ef tha t the ful l ba ck s a l a ry of Ba tungba ka l coul d l ega l l y be pa i d by the
i nformi ng hi m tha t the Boa rd of Di rectors of the NDC i n i ts meeti ng of Apri l 12, 1950, ha s Government because i t covered a period of only three years, a nd that there wa s a precedent to
a uthorized the payment of his salary during the period of his s uspension from December 31, 1946 s upport i t, namely, that of Severo Yap, former Superintendent of the of a bout of Prisons who wa s
to the da te of his dismissal on April 17, 1947, a s recommended by the Auditor Genera l , a nd tha t pa i d his back salary for a period of about five ye ars during his s uspension, a nd he expres s ed hi s
the Boa rd likewise authorized his reappointment to a ny s uitable position in the NDC. His ba ckpa y bel i ef tha t the offi ce ma y not i ns i s t on further compromi s e.

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On February 7, 1951, the Audi tor General by his 2nd indorsement returned to the Administrator of (c) To order the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of five thousand pesos
Economic Coordination the resolution a dopted by the Board of Directors of the NDC on November (P5,000) representing dama ges a nd a ttorney's fees a nd a l s o to order the
8, 1950, a uthori zi ng the pa yment to Ba tungba ka l of the s um of P7,820 a s ba ck s a l a ry from defenda nts to pa y the cos ts of thi s s ui t; a nd
December 31, 1946 to October 31, 1950 wi th the fol l owi ng comment a nd recommenda ti on:
(d) To gra nt the pl a i nti ff a l l other jus t a nd equi ta bl e rel i ef.
Thi s office finds no s peci fi c provi s i on of l a w under whi ch pa yment to Mr.
Ba tungba ka l of the a fores a i d a mount of P7,820 ma y be a uthori zed. The The defendants each filed a n answer. Hearing was had on the prel i mi na ry i s s ue ra i s ed by the
provi sions of s ection 260 of the Revised Administrative Code which a uthorizes Audi tor General i n his a nswer to the effect that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's
pa yment to a suspended employee of hi s ful l s a l a ry corres pondi ng to the ca us e of action a gainst the Auditor General whose decisions a re appealable only to the Pres i dent
whol e period of his suspension upon his exonera ti on or rei ns ta tement ma y of the Phi lippines or to Supreme Court defending on whether the a ggrieved party i s a government
not be a pplied in the i nstant case beca us e, a s wi l l be noted from the fa cts offi cer or a private person, ci ting Arti cle XI, section 3, of the Constitution, Commonwealth Act 327,
s ta ted in the within letter of Mr. Ba tungbakal, dated October 2, 1950, he wa s a nd Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Auditor General further claimed that hi s ri ght a nd duty to
not merel y s us pended from offi ce but a l s o di s mi s s ed from the s ervi ce. a ppoint personnel a nd to a pprove a ccounts was discretionary on his part and could not be limited
or compel l ed by ma nda mus .
In the ca se, however, of employees who were dismiss ed from the s ervi ce by
the Commissioner of Ci vil Servi ce but s ubsequently exonerated upon appeal to Rul ing, that the court had jurisdiction, it ordered the ca se to be tried on its meri ts . After tri a l th e
the Ci vi l Servi ce Board of Appeals, it was ruled by the President as a ma tter of l ower court presided by Judge Fidel Ibaez rendered the decision now appealed from as related at
pol icy that payment of their salary for the period they were out of the s ervi ce the begi nni ng of thi s opi ni on.
s ha ll be discretionary on the part of the Depa rtment Hea d concerned. Thi s
rul i ng, i t i s bel i eved, ma y be fol l owed i n the i ns ta nt ca s e.
To determine the ri ght of pl a i nti ff Ba tungba ka l to rei ns ta tement a nd to ba ck s a l a ri es , i t i s
neces s a ry to a s certa i n hi s s ta tus a s a n empl oyee. Al tho hi s s a l a ry wa s pa i d by the NDC,
In vi ew of the precarious financial condi ti on of the Na ti ona l Devel opment neverthel es s , he wa s a ppoi nted by the Audi tor Genera l who under s ecti on 548 of the
Compa ny, the unders i gned, purs ua nt to the a fores a i d rul i ng, hereby Admi nistrative Code, is ex officio a uditor of corporations like the NDC wherein the Government of
a uthorizes the payment to Mr. Ba tungbakal of his salary corresponding only to the Phi l i ppi nes owns the ma jori ty s tock. As s uch ex officio a udi tor, the Audi tor Genera l i s
the peri od from the da te of hi s s us pens i on on December 31, 1946 to a uthorized to appoint his representative in the said corporation as well as to a ppoi nt a nd fi x the
December 31, 1947. s a lary a nd the number of personnel to a ssist said representative i n sai d work. Ba tung ba ka l wa s
s uch employee i n the office of the comptroller or a udi tor of the NDC, under the control of the
On Apri l 12, 1950, the Administrator of Economic Coordination in his 3rd i ndors ement, returned Audi tor General. Al though a fter the reorganization of the NDC i t became the practice for the NDC
s a id resolution to the General Ma nager of the NDC i nformi ng hi m tha t i n vi ew of the rea s ons i ts elf to appoint personnel in the office of the comptroller or company a uditor, neverthel es s , the
s ta ted in the preceding indorsement, his office had no objection to the payment of the s a l a ry of pra cti ce ca nnot override or supplant the legal provisions of the law, much lees affect the status of
Ba tungba ka l from December 31, 1946 to December 31, 1947. s uch pers onnel .

On the ba sis of the facts above recited, Batungbakal apparently dissatisfied i f not di s gus ted wi th In a n opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justi ce i n hi s s econd i ndors ement of Jul y 27, 1949,
the trea tment accorded him, filed this case in the Court of First Instance of Manila a gainst the NDC requested by the Auditor General, the said Secretary s a i d tha t the a udi tor Genera l control l ed
a nd Ma nuel Agrega do a s Audi tor Genera l wi th the fol l owi ng pra yer: corpora tions referring to the Cebu Portland Cement Co. (which has the same s tatus as the NDC a s
wel l as their s ubordina tes a re not corpora te empl oyees but a gents of the Government a nd
Wherefore pl a i nti ff pra ys thi s Honora bl e court: therefore they a re embraced in the ci vil servi ce. According to the Secreta ry of Jus ti ce thi s vi ew
wa s s ha red by the Commi s s i oner of Ci vi l Servi ce hi ms el f.
(a) In the fi rst cause of action, to order the officer-in-charge of the defenda nt
NDC to rei ns ta te the pl a i nti ff i nto the s ervi ce wi thout a ny condi ti on or Arti cl e XII, section 4, of the Constitution provides that "no officer or employee i n the ci vi l s ervi ce
qua l i fi ca ti on wha ts oever; s ha l l be removed or s us pended except for ca us e a s provi ded by l a w." Secti on 694 of the
Admi nistrative Code has a similar provision. Interpreting these two laws, basis a nd s ta tutory, we
ha ve held in the ca se of Lacson vs. Romero,1 G.R. No. L-3081, 47 Off. Ga z., 1778 a nd De los Santos
(b) In the s econd cause of a ction, to order the Auditor General to approve the
vs. Mallari2 G.R. No. L-3881, Augus t 31, 1952, tha t a ci vil service official may not be removed from
cl a im of the plaintiff for his back salary from the time he wa s s us pended on offi ce except for ca use. We have here a ca se of a civil s ervi ce empl oyee, s us pended a nd l a ter
December 31, 1946 up to the ti me that he would be rei ns ta ted, a nd a l s o to
di s missed without case as s hown by the fact that after a reinvestigation he wa s exonera ted a nd
order the officer-in-charge of the NDC to pa y the back salaries of pl a i nti ff for
found guiltless of the charges of gross negligence filed against him, and was even recommended
the a bove-s ta ted peri od a t the ra te of P2,040 per annum;
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for rei nstatement by the Government Commi ttee tha t i nves ti ga ted hi m. In other words , hi s courts . This same question was raised a nd decided in the ca s e of Yncha us ti & Co. vs. Wri ght, 47
s us pension a nd removal were illegal and in violation not only of the Admi ni s tra ti ve Code but of Phi l ., 866, where it was held that the failure to a ppeal from the Auditor's decision does not a ffect
the Cons titution i tself. To remedy the evil and wrong committed, the least that could be done is to cl a imant's ri ght of redress i n the Courts , a nd tha t a l though the Orga ni c Act provi des tha t the
res tore to him the office and post of which he had been illegally deprived, a nd to i ncl ude i n tha t "deci sion of the Audi tor s ha l l be fi na l a nd concl us i ve upon the executi ve bra nches of the
remedy or redress payment of the salary which he s houl d ha ve recei ved duri ng thi s peri od of Government," s aid Organic ACt does not provide that s aid decision shall be fi na l a nd concl us i ve
i l l ega l s us pens i on a nd di s mi s s a l i s fa r from unrea s ona bl e a nd unjus t. upon ei ther the Legi s l a ture or the Judi ci a ry.

But the Auditor Genera l contends tha t un der the l a w whi ch gi ves hi m ri ght to a ppoi nt the As for the contention that for the Auditor General to reinstate the plaintiff would be ta nta mount
pers onnel in the office of the Comptroller of the NDC, he has full discreti on to a ppoi nt or not to to compelling him to dismiss without ca use the pres ent i ncumbent who wa s a ppoi nted a fter
a ppoint any person in that office; that as Auditor General vested by the Constitution a nd s ecti on pl a intiff's dismissal, suffice it to s ay that in so doing, neither i njustice nor vi olation of law would be
584 of the Administrative Code with jurisdiction over the accounts of the Government i ncl udi ng commi tted. Inasmuch a s Batungbakal was illegally suspended and dismissed, l egally speaking, hi s
cl a ims against i t, he also has full discretion to grant or wi thhold back salaries corresponding to the pos ition never became va cant, hence there was no va cancy to which the present incumbent could
peri od of suspension or dismissal of a n employee a ppoi nted by hi m. I t i s a l s o cl a i med tha t to be permanently a ppointed. In other words, the present i ncumbent's occupa ncy of or tenure i n
rei nstate Batungbakal to his former pos i ti on woul d mea n the remova l wi thout ca us e of the s a id pos t i s tempora ry a nd preca ri os a nd does not come wi thi n the contempl a ti on of the
pres ent i ncumbent. We ca nnot agree with Auditor General. His theory a nd contention i f a ccepted cons titutional prohibition. But, a s s umi ng for the moment tha t the i ncumbent's tenure were
a nd followed would lead to a n unfortunate and i ntol era bl e s i tua ti on, i ncongruous wi th ba s i c perma nent a nd that said tenure fell under the protection of the Constitution, s till, his being ma de
pri nci pl es of jus ti ce a nd the cons ti tuti ona l protecti on of ci vi l s ervi ce empl oyees a ga i ns t to l ea ve the post to give way to the plaintiff's s uperior ri ght, may yet be considered as removal for
Government abuse a nd unjustified s uspens i on or remova l . Wi thout reference to the pres ent ca us e, not unlike a case of quo wa rranto where a respondent incumbent is ousted by court order
Audi tor General, l et us i magine in the future a n a rbi tra ry a nd wrong-mi nded Audi tor Genera l to gi ve wa y to the s ucces s ful pa rty or peti ti oner.
di s missing a n employee from his office or i n a n office under his control, without ca us e, a nd l a ter
a ppointing a nother person to the same position. Such dismissed employee ma y es ta bl i s h to the The deci s i on a ppea l ed from i s a ffi rmed, wi th cos ts .
s a tisfaction of the Government and the courts that he was innocent and was di s mi s s ed wi thout
rea s on or ca use, and yet under the theory a fore -mentioned, such dismissed empl oyee i s utterl y
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
hel pless a nd without redress because his reinstatement and the payment of hi s ba ck s a l a ry a re
Jugo, J., concurs i n the res ul t.
whol ly within the Auditor General's discretion which may not be controlled by ma nda mus to s a y
nothi ng of the fa ct tha t ha vi ng a l rea dy fi l ed the pos i ti on, there i s no va ca ncy to whi ch the
di s missed employee may be re -appointed. The unrea s ona bl es a nd fa l l a cy of the theory a nd
contention a bove-mentioned is patently revealed and brought home by the ca s e jus t i ma gi ned.

When a citizen a fter due hearing establishes his ri ght i n court, s aid right i s paramount and must be
gi ven force a nd effect. The wa y mus t be cl ea red for i ts enforcement, a nd techni ca l i ti es i n
procedure, judi ci a l a s wel l a s a dmi ni s tra ti ve, mus t gi ve a wa y.

Ha vi ng proven that he (the plaintiff) had been suspended a nd dismissed without ca us e, contra ry
to the express provision of the Constitution, his reinstatement becomes a plain ministerial duty of
the Audi tor Genera l , a duty whos e performa nce ma y be control l ed a nd enjoi ned
by mandamus.3 There is no room for discreti on. The Audi tor Genera l i s not bei ng di rected to
perform a n act which he may or ma y not execute a ccording to his discreti on. He i s bei ng a s ked
a nd enjoined to redress a grieva nce, to ri ght a wrong done. And the payment of the back sala ry i s
merely i ncidental to and follows reinstatement, this, a side from the paral l el a nd a na l ogy whi ch
ma y be found i n s ection 260, pa ragraph 1, Revised Adminis tra ti ve Code whi ch provi des for the
pa yment of ba ck s a l a ry upon rei ns ta tement.

It i s further a rgued that Batungbakal not having appealed from the decision of the Auditor General
denyi ng his cl aim to reisntatement a nd payment of back s alary, a s provi ded by Arti cl e XI, s ecti on
3, of the Constitution, the Jones Law, section 255, Revised Administrative Code, Commonwea l th
Act No. 327, s ection 2 thereof, and Rule 45, of the Rules of Cou rt, said decision has become fi na l
a nd conclusive upon the executive branches of the Government, a nd he ma y not res ort to the
86