NATURE AND PURPOSES:
the subject materials, the Ombudsman
1. Yu vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128466,
May 31, 2001
FACTS:
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon received a
Joint Affidavit and Criminal Complaint from
the members of the Sangguniang Bayan,
charging Municipal Mayor Remegio P. Yu,
Municipal Vice-Mayor Michael S Cosue and
Municipal Treasurer Julieta M. Fernandez
and Rodolfo Macabunga, the proprietor of
Rosales Lumber and Hardware with
violation of R. A. No. 3019, Section 3 (e).
Complainants submitted an amended
criminal complaint dropping Rodolfo
Macabunga from the charge attaching the
affidavit of Macabunga to the effect that he
did not make any delivery of gravel and
sand to the Rosales Public Market.
Petitioners Yu, Cosue and Fernandez
claimed that there was indeed delivery of
the subject materials by Rosales Lumber
and Hardware which submitted the lowest
bid price quotation through its
representative Mr. Virgillo Gil Aguilar. The
delivery was attested to by the affidavits of
sixteen (16) market vendors of Rosales
Public Market, plus the joint-affidavit of
Municipal Engineers Camillo S. Olegario
and Danilo E. Nacion, attesting to the
complete delivery of the materials.
OMB investigator after evaluation of the
evidence for both parties recommended the
dismissal of the case.However, the
Ombudsman disapproved the
recommendation for dismissal.And relying
on the Memorandum of an OMB special
assistant which gave credence to the
affidavit of Rodolfo Macabunga, that he had
not entered into any contract with the
municipality of Rosales for the delivery of
proceeded to charge petitioners with
violation of R. A. No. 3019, Section 3 (e).
Hence,the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan an Information for violation
against petitioners and one Rodolfo
Macabunga, for acting in conspiracy and
making it appear that 100 cu. m. of mixed
gravel and sand for use in the gravelling of
the Rosales Public Market was delivered by
Rosales Lumber and Hardware when in fact
no delivery was ever made.
Upon previous leave of court, petitioner Yu
and Fernandez filed a Motion for
Reconsideration
Previously, accused Cosue filed a separate
Motion for Reconsideration based on the
same grounds that Yu and Fernandez
raised. In a memorandum the Ombudsman
denied the motion for reconsideration. In the
same manner, the Sandiganbayan denied
the motion for reconsideration petitioners
file.
Respondent Ombudsman stressed that the
issues raised are matters of defense that
could be submitted before the
Sandiganbayan at the trial. The affidavits of
the sixteen market vendors and the
municipal engineers Villanueva, Olegario
and Nacion are questionable since the
affidavits were similarly worded. The
Ombudsman alleged that Municipal
Engineers Olegario and Nacion, who both
claimed to be at the site when the gravel
and sand were delivered were unable to
present any delivery receipts to prove the
quantity of the gravel and sand that Rosales
Lumber and Hardware actually delivered.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that there
was probable cause against petitioners and
whether the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in sustaining the
finding of probable cause of the
Ombudsman.
RULING:
No. The prosecution of offenses committed
by public officers is vested in the Office of
the Ombudsman. The Court has
consistently refrained from interfering with
the Ombudsman in the exercise of its
powers, and respects the initiative and
independence inherent in the Ombudsman
who, beholden to no one, acts as the
champion of the people and the preserver of
the integrity of public service.
The rule is based not only upon
constitutional considerations but upon
practical ones as well. If it were otherwise,
the courts would be gravely hampered by
innumerable petitions questioning the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings
before the Ombudsman, in much the same
way that the courts would be swamped if
they would be compelled to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of our
prosecutors each time they decide to file an
information in court or throw out a
complaint.
The main function of the government
prosecutor during preliminary investigation
is merely to determine the existence of
probable cause, and to file the
corresponding information if he finds it to be
so. And, probable cause has been defined
as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in
a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted.
To repeat, it is well settled that in the
absence of a clear abuse of discretion,
courts will not interfere with the discretion of
the Ombudsman, who, depending on his
finding and considered evaluation of the
case, either dismisses a complaint or
proceeds with it.
In the same manner, we can not say that
the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion in finding the existence of
probable cause and continuing with the trial.
2. PCGG v. Desierto, 397 SCRA 171
(2003);
Facts:
The Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), herein petitioner,
charged Disini with bribing the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos as a means
to induce him to assist and favor individuals
and corporate entities. The charge
pertained to the negotiation, award, signing,
amendment and implementation of the main
and related contracts for the Philippine
Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) project of the
National Power Corporation (NPC), as a
result of which the afore-mentioned public
official accumulated and benefited from
unlawful acquisition of income or profits.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion when he
capriciously and arbitrarily dismissed the
charges filed by the PCGG?
Ruling:
In the case before us, however, it is clear
that the ombudsman gravely abused his
discretion in disregarding the evidence on
record, as well as some settled principles
and rulings laid down by this Court. Verily,
there should be a divergence of results
between the present Petition and the
previous one, which distinguished the
charge against the other respondents. They
were classified therein as mere accomplices
or accessories. In the present case,
Herminio T. Disini is being ordinate to that
of the principal. Indeed, an accessory or an
accomplice is like a shadow that follows the
principal, not the other way around.
Indeed, during the preliminary investigation,
the PCGG was not obliged to prove its
cause beyond reasonable doubt. It would be
unfair to expect the Commission to present
the entire evidence needed to secure the
conviction of the accused prior to the filing
of the information. The reason lies in the
nature and the purpose of a preliminary
investigation. At this stage, the prosecutor
does not decide whether the guilt of the
person charged is backed by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt. The former
merely determines whether there is
sufficient basis to believe that a crime has
been committed, and whether the latter is
guilty of it and should be held for trial. The
established rule is that a preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of the parties
respective sets of evidence. It is for the
presentation only of such evidence as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed, and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. During
the preliminary investigation, the main
function of the government prosecutor (the
ombudsman in this case) is merely to
determine the existence of probable cause
and, if it does exist, to file the corresponding
information. Probable cause has been
defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite in a
reasonable mind acting on the facts within
the prosecutors knowledge the belief that
the person charged is probably guilty of the
crime for which he or she is being
prosecuted. Probable cause is a reasonable
ground for presuming that a matter is or
may be well-founded on such state of facts
in the prosecutor mind as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion that it is so. The term does not
mean actual and positive cause; neither
does it import absolute certainty. It is based
merely on opinion and reasonable belief.
Thus, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It
is enough that the act or the omission
complained of is believed to constitute the
offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial to
allow the reception of evidence for the
prosecution in support of the charge. 80 It
ought to be emphasized that in determining
probable cause, the average person weighs
facts and circumstances without resorting to
the calibrations of technical rules of
evidence, of which such persons
knowledge is nil. Rather, the lay person
usually relies on the calculus of common
sense, of which all reasonable persons
have an abundance.
3. Baytan v. COMELEC, 396 SCRA 703
(2003);
Facts:
Petitioners were on their way to register for
the coming elections when they met the
newly elected Brgy. Captain who led them
to register in precinct in Barangay 18 of
Cavite City. When they get home, they
realized their residence was located in
Barangay 28 and so they registered again in
the precinct of Barangay 28. They then
wrote a letter to the Comelec Assistant
Executive Director requesting for advice on
how to cancel their previous registration.
The Election officer of Cavite forwarded
copies of petitioners voters registration
records to the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Atty. Ravanzo for evaluation
who in turn endorsed the matter to the
Regional Director for prosecution.
Eventually, the Law Department endorsed
the case to Ravanzo for Resolution and the
latter recommended for the filing of
information for double registration against
petitioners. The Comelec en banc affirmed
the recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners criminal
cases be dismissed on the ground of lack of
intent and
substantial compliance with the requirement
of cancellation of previous registration.
HELD:
No, the assailed resolutions were issued in
the preliminary investigation stage. A
preliminary investigation is essentially
inquisitorial and is the only means to
discover who may be charged
with a crime, its required function merely to
determine probable cause to justify the
holding of
petitioners for trial. A finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there
is sufficient evidence to procure conviction.
It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. The established rule is
that a
preliminary investigation is not an occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties
4. Aguilar v. Department of Justice, G.R.
No. 197522, September 11, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner is the father of one Francisco M.
Aguilar, alias Tetet (Tetet). He filed a
criminal complaint for murder against the
members of a joint team of police and
military personnel who purportedly arrested
Tetet and later inflicted injuries upon him,
resulting to his death. The persons charged
to be responsible for Tetets killing were
members of the Sablayan Occidental
Mindoro Police Force. The Provincial
Prosecutor held that the evidence on record
shows that the shooting of Tetet by
Dangupon was done either in an act of self-
defense, defense of a stranger, and in the
performance of a lawful duty or exercise of
a right of office. He further observed that
petitioner failed to submit any evidence to
rebut Dangupons claim regarding the
circumstances surrounding Tetets killing. In
the same vein, the Provincial Prosecutor
ruled that Villar, Acaylar, Lara, and Balicol
could not be faulted for Tetets death as
they were left behind in Sitio Talipapa
unaware of what transpired at the Viga
River. As to the alleged maltreatment of
Tetet after his arrest, the Provincial
Prosecutor found that these respondents
were not specifically pointed out as the
same persons who mauled the former. He
added that Hermoso was, in fact, the one
who grabbed/collared Tetet during his
apprehension. The Provincial Prosecutor
similarly absolved Fortuno and Abordo
since they were found to have only been in
passive stance. The DOJ ruled that
petitioner failed to show that respondents
conspired to kill/murder Tetet. In particular,
it was not established that Villar, Lara,
Acaylar, and Balicol were with Tetet at the
time he was gunned down and, as such,
they could not have had any knowledge,
much more any responsibility, for what
transpired at the Viga River. Neither were
Barte, Fortuno, and Abordo found to have
conspired with Dangupon to kill Tetet since
their presence at the time Tetet was shot
does not support a conclusion that they had
a common design or purpose in killing him.
With respect to Dangupon, the DOJ held
that no criminal responsibility may be
attached to him since his act was made in
the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of an office under Article 11(5) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Lastly, the
DOJ stated that petitioners suppositions
and conjectures that respondents salvaged
his son are insufficient to overturn the
presumption of innocence in respondents
favor.
ISSUE:
Did the DOJ did gravely abuse its discretion
in upholding the dismissal of petitioners
complaint against respondents?
HELD:
Qualify. first, the lack of probable cause on
the part of Dangupon, who despite having
admitted killing the victim, was exculpated
of the murder charge against him on
account of his interposition of the justifying
circumstances of self-defense/defense of a
stranger and fulfillment of a duty or lawful
exercise of a right of an office under Article
11(5) of the RPC; second, the lack of
probable cause on the part of Fortuno and
Abordo who, despite their presence during
the killing of Tetet, were found to have no
direct participation or have not acted in
conspiracy with Dangupon in Tetets killing;
and third, the lack of probable cause on the
part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol in
view of their absence during the said
incident.
Grave abuse of discretion taints a public
prosecutors resolution if he arbitrarily
disregards the jurisprudential parameters of
probable cause. In particular, case law
states that probable cause, for the purpose
of filing a criminal information, exists when
the facts are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof. It does not mean
actual and positive cause nor does it
import absolute certainty. Rather, it is
merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief and, as such, does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction; it is
enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.
It is well-settled that courts of law are
precluded from disturbing the findings of
public prosecutors and the DOJ on the
existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the purpose of filing criminal
informations, unless such findings are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The rationale behind the general rule rests
on the principle of separation of powers,
dictating that the determination of probable
cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect
is properly an executive function; while the
exception hinges on the limiting principle of
checks and balances, whereby the judiciary,
through a special civil action of certiorari,
has been tasked by the present Constitution
to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
5. Punzalan v. Plata, G.R. No. 160316,
September 2, 2013
Facts:
The Punzalan and the Plata families were
neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong City.
Dencio de la Pena; house boarder of Plata,
was in front of a store near their house
when the group of Rainer Punzalan arrived
and insulted de la Pena, irk by the response
of de la Pena the group of Punzalan ganged
up on him. When De la Pena was about to
flee he met the Cagara, the Platas family
driver, grabbed the gun and pointed it to the
group to scare them. Michael Plata
intervened and wrestle with the gun causing
it to accidentally fire and hit Rainer
Punzalan on the thigh. Pena, Cagara and
Plata was able to proceed to the police
station thereafter after leaving the house
through the backdoor.
Rainer filed a criminal complaint for
Attempted Homicide against Plata and one
for illegal possession of firearm against
Cagara. On the other hand, Michael. And
Ruben Plata field several complaints
against the group of Punzalan and Rosalina
Punzalan. The latter complaint was however
dismissed for lack of sufficient basis both in
fact and law.
Via petition the DOJ modified the resolution
of the Office of the City Prosecutor and
ordered the filing of separate informations
against Rosalinda, Rainer and Randall, etc.
The latter filed for a Motion for
Reconsideration which was then granted
reversing the DOJ Resolution against
complainants and withdraw information
against Rainer, etc..
The Complainants appeal via certiorari to
the CA by way of grave abuse of discretion
of the DOJ withdrawing the informations.
The Ca reversed the decision of the DOJ
stating finding that there is probable cause
on malicious mischief and theft, but not to
oral defamation.
Hence, this petition by Rosalinda, Randal
and Rainier.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
should interfere with the discretion of the
prosecutor in determining probable cause
and who assumes full discretion and control
over the complaint.
Ruling: The well-established rule is that the
conduct of preliminary investigation for the
purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause is a function that belongs to
the public prosecutor. The well-established
rule is that the conduct of preliminary
investigation for the purpose of determining
the existence of probable cause is a
function that belongs to the public
prosecutor.
Consequently, the Court considers it a
sound judicial policy to refrain from
interfering in the conduct of preliminary
investigations and to leave the DOJ a wide
latitude of discretion in the determination of
what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution
of the supposed offenders. The rule is
based not only upon the respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the executive
department but upon practicality as well.
Thus, THE RULE IS THAT THIS COURT
WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE FINDINGS
OF THE DOJ SECRETARY ON THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE
CAUSE UNLESS IT IS SHOWN THAT THE
QUESTIONED ACTS WERE DONE IN A
CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL
EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT EVIDENCING
A CLEAR CASE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION. The party
seeking the writ of certiorari must establish
that the DOJ Secretary exercised his
executive power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner, by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and the abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as would amount to
an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law.
6. Lanier v. People, G.R. No. 189176,
March 19, 2014
PRINCIPLE: While the determination of
probable cause is primarily an executive
function, the Court would not hesitate to
interfere if there is a clear showing that
Secretary of Justice gravely abused his
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in making his determination and
in arriving at the conclusion he reached.
FACTS: On 17th day of December, 2003 at
Province of Aklan, Barry Lanier and Perlita
Lanier, conspiring, confederating, and
mutually helping each other, without
authority of law, have in their possession,
custody and control of suspected dried
Marijuana leaves and shabu which
members of the Task Force Roulette and
the joint elements of Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency confiscated from their
possession and control in the course of a
search by virtue of Search Warrant.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary
Investigation/Reinvestigation on the
ground that they were framed up and
accused the police of planting the illegal
drugs.
The Secretary of Justice acted on the
petition favorably and directed the
withdrawal of the Information. The Secretary
of Justice gave more credence to the
version of petitioners that the illegal drugs
seized were planted. The Court of Appeals
nullified and set aside the DOJ Resolutions
and the RTC Order and reinstated the
Information against petitioners
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of
Justice acted grave abused of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
making his determination that there is no
probable cause.
RULING: YES. When the Secretary of
Justice concluded that there was planting of
evidence based on the lone fact that the
raiding team arrived ahead of the search
team, he, in effect went into the merits of
the defense. When he made a
determination based on his own
appreciation of the pieces of evidence for
and against the accused, he effectively
assumed the function of a trial judge in the
evaluation of the pieces of evidence and,
thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction.
7. Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72,
June 1, 2007, 523 SCRA 318
WHO MAY CONDUCT PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATIONS:
8. Baviera v. Paglinawan, February 8, 2007
FACTS:
Manuel Baviera was the former head of the
HR Service Delivery and Industrial
Relations of Standard Chartered Bank-
Philippines (SCB). He filed with the
Department of Justice, represented herein
by its prosecutors, public respondents, a
complaint charging the officers and
members of the SCB Board of Directors and
other SCB officials with syndicated estafa.
In addition, petitioner filed with the DOJ a
complaint for violation of Section 8.1 of the
Securities Regulation Code against private
respondents.
On February 23, 2004, the DOJ rendered its
Joint Resolution dismissing petitioners
complaint for syndicated estafa. It also
dismissed complaint for violation of
Securities Regulation Code, holding that it
should have been filed with the SEC.
ISSUES:
1. For violation of the Securities Regulation
Code, where should the complaint be filed?
2. Who determines whether a prima facie
case exists or not?
HELD:
First Issue:
A criminal charge for violation of the
Securities Regulation Code is a specialized
dispute. Hence, it must first be referred to
an administrative agency of special
competence, i.e., the SEC. The Securities
Regulation Code is a special law. Its
enforcement is particularly vested in the
SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation
of the Code and its implementing rules and
regulations should be filed with the SEC.
Where the complaint is criminal in nature,
the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the
DOJ for preliminary investigation and
prosecution.
Second Issue:
Concomitant with his authority and power to
control the prosecution of criminal offenses,
the public prosecutor is vested with the
discretionary power to determine whether a
prima facie case exists or not. This is done
through a preliminary investigation designed
to secure the respondent from hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution. A
preliminary investigation is essentially an
inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has
been committed; and (b) whether there is
probable cause that the accused is guilty
thereof. It is the public prosecutor who
determines during the preliminary
investigation whether probable cause exists.
Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss
the criminal complaint against the accused
depends on the sound discretion of the
prosecutor. And as a rule in this jurisdiction,
the courts will not interfere with the conduct
of preliminary investigations or
reinvestigations or in the determination of
what constitutes sufficient probable cause
for the filing of the corresponding
information against an offender.
9. SEC v. Interport Resources Corp., G.R.
No. 135808, October 6, 2008
Facts:
The Board of Directors of IRC approved a
Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda
Holdings Berhad (GHB). Under their
agreement IRC acquired 100% of the entire
capital stock of GEHI which would own and
operate a 102 megawatt gas turbine power
generating barge. In exchange the IRC will
issue to GHB 55% of the expanded stock of
IRC and IRC would acquire 67% of the
entire capital of PRC (Philippine Racing
Club).
It is alleged that a press release announcing
the approval of the agreement was sent tp
PSE through facsimile and the SEC but the
facsimile machine of the SEC could not
receive it. SEC received reports that the
IRC failed to make public disclosures of its
negotiations with GHB. Some of its directors
heavily traded shares utilizing the insider
information.
SEC required the directors to appear to
explain the alleged failure to disclose
material information as required by the
Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts.
Respondents questioned the authority of the
SEC to investigate on said matter since
according to PD 902-A, jurisdiction upon the
matter was conferred upon the PED
(Prosecution and Enforcement Department)
of the SEC however, this issue is already
moot since pending the disposition of the
case, the Securities Regulation Code was
passed thereby effectively repealing PD
902-A and abolishing the PED. They also
contended that their right to due process
was violated when the SEC required them
to appear before the SEC to show cause
why sanctions should not be imposed upon
them since such requirement shifted the
burden of proof to respondents.The case
reached the CA and said court ruled in favor
of the respondents and effectively enjoined
the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or
administrative cases against respondents.
In its resolution, the CA stated that since
there are no rules and regulations
implementing the rules regarding
DISCLOSURE, INSIDERTRADING OR
ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
REVISED SECURITIES ACT,
the SEC has no statutory authority to file
any suit against respondents. The
CA,therefore, prohibited the SEC from
taking cognizance or initiating any action
against the respondents for the alleged
violations of the Revised Securities Act.

Issue: Whether the CA erred when it rule
that the Petitioner SEC has no statutory
authority to initiate and file any suit(civil,
criminal or administrative) against
respondent corporation.
Ruling:
YES. Section 53 of the Securities
Regulations Code clearly provides that
criminal complaints for violations of rules
and regulations enforced or administered by
the SEC shall be referred to the Department
of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary
investigation, while the SEC nevertheless
retains limited investigatory powers.
Additionally, the SEC may still impose the
appropriate administrative sanctions under
Section 54 of the aforementioned law.
In this case, the SEC already commenced
the investigative proceedings against
respondents as early as 1994. Respondents
were called to appear before the SEC and
explain their failure to disclose pertinent
information on 14 August 1994. Thereafter,
the SEC Chairman, having already made
initial findings that respondents failed to
make timely disclosures of their negotiations
with GHB, ordered a special investigating
panel to hear the case. The investigative
proceedings were interrupted only by the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
Court of Appeals, which became permanent
by virtue of the Decision. During the
pendency of this case, the Securities
Regulations Code repealed the Revised
Securities Act. As in Morato v. Court of
Appeals, the repeal cannot deprive SEC of
its jurisdiction to continue investigating the
case; or the regional trial court, to hear any
case which may later be filed against the
respondents.
10. Arroyo v. DOJ, G.R. No. 199082,
September 18, 2012
Facts:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the
DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-
Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases.
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team
concluded that manipulation of the results in
the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the
provinces of North and South Cotabato, and
Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. It
recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S.
Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be
subjected to preliminary investigation for
electoral sabotage and manipulating the
election results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court
separate Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the
creation of the Joint Panel.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered
the assailed Decision. It ruled that:
1. Fact- Finding Teams Initial Report dated
October 20, 2011, are declared VALID.
However, the Rules of Procedure on the
Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the
Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and
2007 National Elections is declared
INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings
having been conducted in accordance with
Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the
preliminary investigation is hereby declared
VALID.
Issue:
Whether or not the DOJ should conduct
preliminary investigation only when
deputized by the Comelec but not exercise
concurrent jurisdiction
Ruling:
The creation of a Joint Committee is not
repugnant to the concept of "concurrent
jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory
law. The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction
means equal jurisdiction to deal with the
same subject matter. Contrary to the
contention of the petitioners, there is no
prohibition on simultaneous exercise of
power between two coordinate bodies.
What is prohibited is the situation where one
files a complaint against a respondent
initially with one office (such as the
Comelec) for preliminary investigation which
was immediately acted upon by said office
and the re-filing of substantially the same
complaint with another office (such as the
DOJ). The subsequent assumption of
jurisdiction by the second office over the
cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a
settled rule that the body or agency that first
takes cognizance of the complaint shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
others.
NOTE:
The DOJ now conducts preliminary
investigation of election offenses
concurrently with the Comelec and no
longer as mere deputies. If the prosecutors
had been allowed to conduct preliminary
investigation and file the necessary
information by virtue only of a delegated
authority, they now have better grounds to
perform such function by virtue of the
statutory grant of authority. If deputation
was justified because of lack of funds and
legal officers to ensure prompt and fair
investigation and prosecution of election
offenses, the same justification should be
cited to justify the grant to the other
prosecuting arms of the government of such
concurrent jurisdiction.
11. Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigators
of the Department of Justice, G.R. No.
159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 46
FACTS:
An affidavit-complaint was filed with the
DOJ by respondent CIDG-PNP/P Director
Matillano
whom the latter referred to the sworn
statement of AFP Major Ragil. The affidavit-
complaint
was docketed and the DOJ Panel sent a
subpoena to petitioner for preliminary
investigation.
Petitioner appeared together with his
counsel at the DOJ and filed a Motion for
Clarification
questioning DOJs jurisdiction over the
case. DOJ Panel issued an order that the
motion and the
comment/opposition is duly noted and that
in view of additional affidavits/evidence
submitted
by the complainant and to afford
respondents ample opportunity to controvert
the same,
respondents, thru counsel are hereby
directed to file for respective counter-
affidavits and
controverting evidence. Hence, petitioner
filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the
Court against DOJ and its members, CIDG
Matillano and the Ombudsman for grave
abuse of
discretion on the part of DOJ in issuing the
said Order on the ground that DOJ has no
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DOJ has no jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation involving
cases
committed by public official.
HELD:
No. The authority of DOJ Panel is based on
the provisions of the 1987 Administrative
Code
under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV which
states that it is the legal counsel and
prosecution arms
with powers and functions to investigate the
commission of crimes, prosecue offenders
and
administer the probation and correction
system. In Section 1 of PD 1275, it states
that it is
primary responsible for the investigation and
prosecution of all cases involving violations
of
penal laws.
In RA 6770, the Ombudsman has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, take over, at any stage,
from the investigatory agency of the
government, the investigation of such
cases. The authority
of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is not
exclusive
but concurrent with other similarly
authorized agencies referred to include
PCGG and the
provincial and city prosecutors and their
assistants, the state prosecutors and the
judges of the
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit
trial court.
12. Alawiya v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
164170, April 16, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners executed sworn statements
charging accused policemen with
kidnapping for ransom. that at about 10:00
in the morning of 11 September 2001, while
petitioners were cruising on board a vehicle
along United Nations Avenue, a blue Toyota
Sedan bumped their vehicle from behind;
that when they went out of their vehicle to
assess the damage, several armed men
alighted from the Toyota Sedan, poked
guns at, blindfolded, and forced them to ride
in the Toyota Sedan; that they were brought
to an office where P10,000,000 and two
vehicles were demanded from them in
exchange for their freedom; that, after
haggling, the amount was reduced to
P700,000 plus the two vehicles; that the
money and vehicles were delivered in the
late evening of 11 September 2001; that
they were released in the early morning of
12 September 2001 in Quiapo after they
handed the Deed of Sale and registration
papers of the two vehicles. State Prosecutor
Emmanuel Y. Velasco (State Prosecutor
Velasco), who conducted the preliminary
investigation, issued a Resolution dated 14
January 2002, recommending that the
accused be indicted for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. In a Resolution
promulgated on 24 September 2002, then
Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez
reversed the ruling of State Prosecutor
Velasco and ordered the latter to cause the
withdrawal or dismissal of the Information
for kidnapping for ransom. The Secretary of
Justice ruled that there was no prior
approval by the Office of the Ombudsman
before the Information for kidnapping was
filed with the trial court. He also found that
the incident complained of was a bungled
buy-bust operation, not kidnapping for
ransom. The Court of Appeals upheld the
Secretary of Justices ruling that prior
approval by the Office of the Ombudsman
for the Military was needed for the filing of
the Information before the RTC, pursuant to
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001. The
Court of Appeals further sustained the
finding that there were sufficient evidence
that the offense charged against accused
was committed in relation to their office and
that the accused were all acting in the
discharge of their functions as policemen.
ISSUE:
Whether the prior approval by the Office of
the Ombudsman for the Military is required
for the investigation and prosecution of the
instant case against the accused.
HELD:
NO. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), which is representing the Secretary
of Justice, agrees with petitioners that prior
approval by the Ombudsman is not required
for the investigation and prosecution of the
criminal case against the accused
policemen. The OSG correctly cites the
case of Honasan II v. The Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors of the Department
of Justice, where the Court held that the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or
employees is not exclusive but is concurrent
with other similarly authorized agencies of
the government such as the provincial, city
and state prosecutors. In view of the
foregoing, both the Court of Appeals and
the Secretary of Justice clearly erred in
ruling that prior approval by the
Ombudsman is required for the investigation
and prosecution of the criminal case against
the accused policemen.
13. Perez v. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division),
G.R. No. 166062, September 26, 2006, 503
SCRA 252
Facts:
In a resolution dated 24 April 2001, the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
resolved to file charges of violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-
graft and Corrupt Practices) against
petitioners, San Manuel, Pangasinan Mayor
Salvador M. Perez, and Municipal Treasurer
Juanita Apostol by the purchase of one (1)
computer unit costing P120,000.00
acquisition by personal canvass which is in
violation of Secs. 362 and 367 of R.A. 7160,
thereby causing undue injury to the
Municipality of San Manuel, Pangasinan.
On 16 January 2002, prior to the scheduled
arraignment, petitioners filed with the
Sandiganbayan a Motion for leave of Court
to File for a Motion for Reconsideration
alleging the discovery of new evidence
consists in the reassessment by the
auditors of the Commission on Audit (COA)
that though the prices between the subject
computer and that canvassed by the COA
are different, such difference is "not really
that material." Complying with the 6
September 2002 Resolution, petitioners
formalized their Motion for Reconsideration
in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Upon grant of the Motion for
Reconsideration. Accordingly, Assistant
Special Prosecutor Warlito F. Galisanao
prepared a Memorandum recommending
the withdrawal of information, however
opted to recommend an amendment of the
information. Because of the circumstances
of its acquisition clearly indicate that the
public officials involved gave the supplier,
Mobil Link Enterprises/Starlet Sales Center,
a private party, unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence by paying much
more than the prevailing price for a
comparable computer set in the market.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in
the first assailed resolution. Accordingly the
amended information was admitted without
approval from the Ombudsman. Petitioner
file for a Motion for Reconsideration but was
denied. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Office of the
Special Prosecutor has the power to file
informations without delegation from the
Ombudsman.
Ruling: No. The Ombudsmans margin
notes order was to "study whether the
accused, assuming arguendo that there was
no overprice, gave unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to the seller of the
subject computer and submit your
recommendation soonest.
IT IS CLEAR THAT THE
RECOMMENDATION MUST BE
SUBMITTED TO ONE WHO HAS
AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT SUCH
RECOMMENDATION. THE OMBUDSMAN
HAS THE POWER TO FILE
INFORMATIONS, AS WELL AS THE
POWER TO DELEGATE HIS POWERS.
OFFICE ORDER NO. 40-05 DELEGATES
THE DISPOSITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AND CRIMINAL CASES (FILING
INFORMATIONS) TO THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN, BUT NOT THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR (WHICH IS INCLUDED IN
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN). ALL
THAT IS DELEGATED TO THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR IS THE DISCRETIONAL
AUTHORITY TO REVIEW AND MODIFY
THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN-
AUTHORIZED INFORMATION, BUT
WITHOUT DEPARTING FROM THE BASIC
RESOLUTION. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ARE
GIVEN THE SAME RANK AND SALARY
(RA 6770), BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE THE
SAME FUNCTIONS. Since there is no
express delegation, the Court looked into
whether or not there was an implied
delegation. RA 6770 provides that the
powers of the OSP include: conducting
preliminary investigations and prosecute
criminal cases w/in jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan, enter into plea-bargaining
agreements, and perform other duties
assigned by Ombudsman. Respondents
argue the doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency, saying that since the amended
information has not been disapproved by
the Ombudsman, it has his tacit approval.
The SC said no. This doctrine does not
apply to the Office of the Ombudsman,
which is an apolitical agency.
14. Sia v. People, G.R. No. 159659,
October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA 507
FACTS: Petitioners Ruben and Josephine
Sia were charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City, Branch 27 with three
counts of violation of Section 17 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957,
otherwise known as The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree.
The petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion
to Quash alleging that the City Prosecutors
Office of Naga City has no authority to file
the informations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City Prosecutors
Office of Naga City have authority to file the
informations.
RULING: YES. Section 3 of E.O. No. 71
provides that:
SEC. 3. Without prejudice to the Boards
overall monitoring, enforcement and
visitorial powers, local chief executives shall
designate appropriate local officials who
meet or possess the qualifications,
standards and criteria set by the HLURB as
enforcement officers who shall have full
power to monitor, investigate and enforce
compliance with these provisions of national
laws and standards whose implementation
have been devolved to the local government
in accordance with this Order.
Clearly, the enforcement officers of local
government units shall only have full power
to monitor, investigate and enforce
compliance with the provisions of national
laws and standards whose implementation
have been devolved to the local
government.
REVIEW:
15. People v. Garfin, G.R. No. 153176,
March 29, 2004, 426 SCRA 393
16. Tolentino v. Pacqueo, Jr., G.R. No.
150606, June 7, 2007, 525 SCRA 377
FACTS:
Tolentino filed an Information charging
private respondent Benedict Dy Tecklo of
violation of Republic Act No. 8282 for failing
to remit the premiums due for his employee
to the Social Security System despite
demand. Private respondent filed a Motion
to Quash upon the sole ground that State
Prosecutor Romulo Tolentino, not being the
City Prosecutor nor the Provincial
Prosecutor, has no legal personality nor is
he legally clothed with the authority to
commence prosecution by the filing of the
Information and thus prosecute the case.
State Prosecutor Tolentino filed an
Opposition to Motion to Quash. He
contended that he is authorized to
investigate, file the necessary Information
and prosecute SSS cases since he was
designated as Special Prosecutor for SSS
cases by Regional State Prosecutor
Santiago M. Turingan.
ISSUE:
Is State Prosecutor Tolentino duly
authorized to file the subject Information
without the approval of the City Prosecutor?
HELD:
No. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure states that no complaint or
information may be filed or dismissed by an
investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial
or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor
or the Ombudsman or his deputy. Since the
provision is couched in negative terms
importing that the act shall not be done
otherwise than designated, it is mandatory.
An examination of the functions of the
Regional State Prosecutor under Sec. 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 1275 showed that
they do not include that of approving the
Information filed or dismissed by the
investigating prosecutor. Since the Regional
State Prosecutor is not included among the
law officers authorized to approve the filing
or dismissal of the Information of the
investigating prosecutor, the Information
filed by petitioner State Prosecutor
Tolentino did not comply with the
requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Consequently, the noncompliance was a
ground to quash the Information.
17. Ledesma v. CA, G.R. No. 113216,
September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 656
Facts:
Dr. Juan F. Torres filed a complaint of libel
against petitioner Dr. Rhodora Ledesma in
the Office of the Prosecutor. Finding
sufficient legal and factual basis, the
Quezon City Prosecutors Office filed an
Information for libel against petitioner with
the RTC of Quezon City
A petition for review of the resolution of
Assistant City Prosecutor Vestil was filed by
petitioner before the Department of Justice.
The DOJ gave due course to the petition
and directed the Quezon City prosecutor to
move for deferment of further proceedings
and to elevate the entire records of the
case. A Motion to Defer Arraignment was
filed by the Prosecutor before the court a
quo.The trial court granted the motion and
deferred petitioners arraignment until the
final termination of the petition for review.
Without the consent or approval of the trial
prosecutor, private complainant, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Lift the Order and
to Set the Case for Arraignment/Trial. The
trial court issued an Order setting aside its
earlier Order and scheduling petitioners
arraignment.In a resolution, Justice
Secretary Franklin M. Drilon reversed the
Quezon City investigating prosecutor and
Trial Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
Information attaching the resolution of
Secretary Drilon. The trial judge denied this
motion in his Order.
Issue:
In denying the motion to withdraw by the
judge, did it deprive the secretary of justice
or the president of the power to control or
review the acts of a subordinate official
Ruling:
YES.
Judicial power is defined under the 1987
Constitution as the duty of courts to settle
actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable.
Such power includes the determination of
whether there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. Under
this definition, a court is without power to
directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of Congress
or of the President. It may, however, look
into the question of whether such exercise
has been made in grave abuse of
discretion.
Judicial review of the acts of other
departments is not an assertion of
superiority over them or a derogation of
their functions. In the words of Justice
Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral Commission:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims
of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument
sources and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed
judicial supremacy which properly is the
power of the judicial review under the
Constitution.
It is not the purpose of this Court to
decrease or limit the discretion of the
secretary of justice to review the decisions
of the government prosecutors under him.
In Crespo, the secretary was merely
advised to restrict such review to
exceptionally meritorious cases. Rule 112,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which
recognizes such power, does not, however,
allow the trial court to automatically dismiss
the case or grant the withdrawal of the
information upon the resolution of the
secretary of justice. This is precisely the
import of Crespo, Marcelo, Martinez vs.
Court of Appeals and the recent case of
Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, which all
required the trial court to make its own
evaluation of the merits of the case,
because granting the motion to dismiss or to
withdraw the information is equivalent to
effecting a disposition of the case itself.
18. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
v. Reynaldo, G.R. No. 164538, August 9,
2010, 627 SCRA 88
19. PNB v. Soriano, G.R. No. 164051,
October 3, 2012
FACTS:
PNB filed a complaint-affidavit before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Naga City
charging
Soriano with 52 counts of violation of the
Trust Receipts Law, in relation to Article
315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
In a Resolution, the City Prosecutor of Naga
City
found a prima facie evidence that
respondent is probably guilty of the crime.
The same office
filed Informations against Soriano which
were raffled to the RTC. Meanwhile, PNB
filed a
petition for review of the Naga City
Prosecutors Resolution before the
Secretary of the DOJ.
Soriano was arraigned in, and pled not
guilty in the RTC. On the other litigation
front, the DOJ, in
a Resolution reversed and set aside the
earlier resolution of the Naga City
Prosecutor and
directed the latter to withdraw the
informations for estafa. RTC then issued an
order giving the
prosecution 15 days to comply with the
directive of DOJ. Motion to Withdraw
Informations was
filed by Pros. Imperial duly approved by the
City Prosecutor of Naga City was granted
by RTC. CA
on petition for certiorari dismissed the case,
hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC should rely its order
granting the withdrawal of the informations
on the
Resolution of DOJ.
HELD:
NO. In resolving a motion to dismiss a case
or to withdraw an Information, the trial court
should
not rely solely and merely on the findings of
the public prosecutor or the Secretary of
Justice. It
is the courts bounden duty to assess
independently the merits of the motion, and
this
assessment must be embodied in a written
order disposing of the motion. By relying
solely on
the manifestation of the public prosecutor
and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the
trial
court abdicated its judicial power and
refused to perform a positive duty enjoined
by law. The
said Orders were thus stained with grave
abuse of discretion and violated the
complainants
right to due process.
20. Torres v. Perez, G.R. No. 188225,
November 28, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for
unfair competition against respondents and
Sunshine. Assistant City Prosecutor Saulog
found probable cause to indict respondents
for unfair competition. Respondents filed a
petition for review of the prosecutors
resolution before the Department of Justice
(DOJ), which issued its own Resolution
reversing the finding of existence of
probable cause against them. Contrary to
the prosecutors finding, the DOJ found that
SCC had effectively wound up the latters
partnership affairs when petitioner was
reimbursed for her trip to China. That was
the last of the payments made to her to
cover her share in the partnership affairs,
which started after respondent Imelda
manifested her intention to cease from the
partnership business. Thus, when the
criminal complaint for unfair competition
was filed. There was "no longer any
competition, unfair or otherwise, involving
the partnership. Petitioner argues that
Presiding Judge Untalan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he dismissed
the criminal case against respondents for
unfair competition based on CA findings that
were not yet final. The trial judge was fully
aware that those findings were still subject
to a pending petition before this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether there exists probable cause to
indict respondents for unfair competition
(violation of Section 168 in relation to
Section 170) under R.A. 8293.
HELD:
NO. Judge Untalan acted well within the
exercise of his judicial discretion when he
denied the Motion to Dismiss and/or
Withdraw Information filed by the
prosecution. His finding that there was
probable cause to indict respondents for
unfair competition, and that the findings of
the DOJ would be better appreciated in the
course of a trial, was based on his own
evaluation of the evidence brought before
him. It was an evaluation that was required
of him as a judge. Crespo v. Mogul instructs
in a very clear manner that once a
complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused,
rests on the sound discretion of the said
court, as it is the best and sole judge of
what to do with the case before it. While the
resolution of the prosecutorial arm is
persuasive, it is not binding on the court. It
may therefore grant or deny at its option a
motion to dismiss or to withdraw the
information based on its own assessment of
the records of the preliminary investigation
submitted to it, in the faithful exercise of
judicial discretion and prerogative, and not
out of subservience to the prosecutor.
21. Po v. Department of Justice, G.R. No.
195198, February 11, 2013
Facts:
Jasper T. Tan (Tan), is a stockholder of
Coastal Highpoint Ventures, Inc. (CHVI), a
real estate development company. Chiu is
its President. Tan claimed that Loreli Lim Po
is Chius personal accountant. Po asserted
otherwise and instead alleged that she is
merely a consultant for CHVI.
Tan lamented that pertinent information
relative to CHVIs operations were withheld
from him. His repeated requests for copies
of financial statements and allowance to
inspect corporate books proved futile.
Consequently, he filed before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Cebu a complaint
against Chiu and Po for violation of Section
74(2), in relation to Section 144 of the
Corporation Code of the Philippines.
Prosecutor Fernandez-Cavada issued a
Resolution finding probable cause to indict
Chiu and Po. A petition for review was filed
before the Department of Justice (DOJ). On
March 2, 2010, then Undersecretary
Ricardo R. Blancaflor issued a resolution
reversing Prosecutor Fernandez-Cavadas
findings.
On April 30, 2010, then Acting DOJ
Secretary Agra reversed the Resolution
dated March 2, 2010 and instead affirmed
Prosecutor Fernandez-Cavadas earlier
disquisition. Chiu and Pos motions for
reconsideration were denied by Secretary
Agra through a Resolution.
Petitions were filed to the CA but Pos
petition was dismissed on technicality,
while, Chius petition were denied for lack of
merit as Grave abuse of discretion wasnt
shown.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CA can re-
evaluate the findings of Secretary Agra in
finding probable cause to indict Chiu.
Ruling: No. Again, even if we were to take
exception of Chius case by giving due
course to his petition either under Rule 45
or Rule 65, still, the result is its dismissal. In
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank)
v. Tobias III,26 we stated that:
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS, THE
COURTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO DIRECTLY
DECIDE MATTERS OVER WHICH FULL
DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY HAS BEEN
DELEGATED TO THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, OR TO
SUBSTITUTE THEIR OWN JUDGMENTS
FOR THAT OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH, REPRESENTED IN THIS CASE
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. THE
SETTLED POLICY IS THAT THE COURTS
WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THE
EXECUTIVE DETERMINATION OF
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE PURPOSE
OF FILING AN INFORMATION, IN THE
ABSENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. THAT ABUSE OF
DISCRETION MUST BE SO PATENT AND
GROSS AS TO AMOUNT TO AN EVASION
OF A POSITIVE DUTY OR A VIRTUAL
REFUSAL TO PERFORM A DUTY
ENJOINED BY LAW OR TO ACT AT ALL
IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, SUCH AS
WHERE THE POWER IS EXERCISED IN
AN ARBITRARY AND DESPOTIC
MANNER BY REASON OF PASSION OR
HOSTILITY. x x x.
In this regard, we stress that a preliminary
investigation for the purpose of determining
the existence of probable cause is not part
of a trial. At a preliminary investigation, the
investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of
Justice only determines whether the act or
omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. Probable cause refers to
facts and circumstances that engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof. There is no definitive
standard by which probable cause is
determined except to consider the attendant
conditions; the existence of probable cause
depends upon the finding of the public
prosecutor conducting the examination, who
is called upon not to disregard the facts
presented, and to ensure that his finding
should not run counter to the clear dictates
of reason.
22. Villanueva v. Caparas, G.R. No.
190969, January 30, 2013
FACTS: An altercation occurred between
Renato Caparas, husband of respondent
Edna R. Caparas, and Villanueva in the
morning of August 24, 2005, which
altercation led to the death of Renato.
Finding probable cause, the prosecutor filed
a criminal information for homicide against
Villanueva. Villanueva filed a petition for
review before the Department of Justice.
The Secretary set aside the prosecutors
resolution and directed the prosecutor to
move for the withdrawal of the information.
The Secretary found the evidence against
Villanueva insufficient to support a prima
facie case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Secretary committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing his
resolution which was cited as basis for
Villanuevas motion to withdraw the
information.
RULING: YES: The determination of
probable cause is essentially an executive
function, lodged in the first place on the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
investigation on the offended partys
complaint. The prosecutors ruling is
reviewable by the Secretary who, as the
final determinative authority on the matter,
has the power to reverse, modify or affirm
the prosecutors determination. As a rule,
the Secretarys findings are not subject to
interference by the courts, save only when
he acts with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
or when he grossly misapprehends facts; or
acts in a manner so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
by law; or when he acts outside the
contemplation of law.
The Secretary, in this case, calibrated the
evidentiary weight of the NBI opinion vis-a-
vis the autopsy report, as well as Ednas
complaint-affidavit vis--vis the affidavit of
Jovita, and in so doing, already went into
the strict merits of Villanuevas defenses.
23. Alawiya v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
164170, April 16, 2009
24. Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Santos, G.R. No. 1995542, March 19, 2014
FACTS:
Sometime in 2007, an investment scam
involving Performance Investment Products
Corporation was exposed. Santos was
charged in the complaints in her capacity as
investment consultant of PIPC Corporation.
Soon thereafter, the SEC, through its
Compliance and Endorsement Division, filed
a complaint-affidavit for violation of Sections
8, 26 and 28 of the Securities Regulation
Code before the Department of Justice. The
DOJ issued a Resolution signed by a panel
of three prosecutors, with recommendation
for approval of the Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor, and ultimately approved by
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo,
indicting herein respondent Santos and
others for violation of Section 28 of the
Securities Regulation Code. Respondent
Santos filed a petition for review before the
Office of the Secretary of the DOJ.
Thereafter, the Office of the Secretary of the
DOJ, through its then Undersecretary
Ricardo R. Blancaflor, issued a Resolution
which excluded respondent Santos from
prosecution for violation of Section 28 of the
Securities Regulation Code.
ISSUE:
Is Santos properly excluded by the DOJ
Secretary from the Information for violation
of Section 28 of the Securities Regulation
Code?
HELD:
No. Generally, at the preliminary
investigation proper, the investigating
prosecutor, and ultimately, the Secretary of
the DOJ, is afforded wide latitude of
discretion in the exercise of its power to
determine probable cause to warrant
criminal prosecution. However, the authority
of the prosecutor and the DOJ is not
absolute; it cannot be exercised arbitrarily or
capriciously. Where the findings of the
investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of
the DOJ as to the existence of probable
cause are equivalent to a gross
misapprehension of facts, certiorari will lie to
correct these errors.
While it is the court's policy not to interfere
in the conduct of preliminary investigations,
it has, on more than one occasion, adhered
to some exceptions to the general rule. The
conclusions made by the Secretary of the
DOJ and the appellate court are a myopic
view of the investment solicitations made by
Santos on behalf of PIPC Corporation
and/or PIPC-BVI while she was not licensed
as a broker or dealer, or registered as a
salesman, or an associated person of a
broker or dealer. The Court therefore
sustains the DOJ panel findings which were
not overruled by the Secretary of the DOJ
and the appellate court.
25. Lanier v. People, G.R. No. 189176,
March 19, 2014
Facts:
The police operatives conducted a test-buy
at petitioners residence in Barangay
Balabag, Boracay Island where they were
able to purchase P5,000.00 worth of shabu
and P1,000.00 worth of marijuana from
petitioners. On the basis of the test-buy
operation, they were able to secure a
search warrant from the RTC of Aklan. A
Receipt for Property Seized was prepared
but petitioners refused to sign the same.
Petitioners were placed under arrest. The
assistant prosecutor of Kalibo filed an
Information charging the petitioners. The
petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the
Information before the RTC of Kalibo but the
RTC denied the motion and remanded the
case to the provincial prosecutor for
preliminary investigation.
The prosecutor upheld the Information and
directed the return of the records to the RTC
for disposition. Petitioners filed a petition for
review before the DOJ. The Secretart of
Justice favored the petitioner on the belief
that the evidences seized were planted. In a
Resolution directed the prosecutor to
withdraw the Information before the RTC.
RTC then granted the Motion to Withdraw
Information by the prosecutor. OSG filed to
the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to
annul the Resolution of the DOJ. The CA
found probable cause to sustain the
petitioners indictment and reinstated the
Information against the petitioners. CA
nullified and set aside the DOJ Resolution
and the Order of the RTC.
Issue: Whether the petition for review before
the CA assailing the DOJ resolution is
fatally defective
Ruling: NO.
When confronted with a motion to withdraw
an Information on the ground of lack of
probable cause based on a resolution of the
Secretary of Justice, the bounden duty of
the trial court is to make an independent
assessment of the merits of such motion.
Having acquired jurisdiction over the case,
the trial court is not bound by such
resolution but is required to evaluate it
before proceeding farther with the trial.
While the Secretarys ruling is persuasive, it
is not binding on courts.20 When the trial
courts Order rests entirely on the
assessment of the DOJ without doing its
own independent evaluation, the trial court
effectively abdicates its judicial power and
refuses to perform a positive duty enjoined
by law.
The RTC erroneously held that it has not yet
effectively acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused as no commitment
order has yet been issued against them. In
Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a
criminal complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case or
dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the
accused rests within the exclusive
jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of
the trial court. The rule applies to a motion
to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the
case even before or after arraignment of the
accused. When the trial court grants a
motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss
the case, or to quash the Information, or to
withdraw the Information in compliance with
the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or
to deny the said motion, it does so not out of
subservience to or defiance of the directive
of the Secretary of Justice but in sound
exercise of its judicial prerogative.
26. Aguilar v. Department of Justice, G.R.
No. 197522, September 11, 2013
27. Punzalan v. Plata, G.R. No. 160316,
September 2, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for attempted
homicide against Plata. Plata and several
others filed
several complaints against petitioners. The
Office of the City Prosecutor, in its Joint
Resolution,
dismissed the complaints filed against the
petitioners for lack of sufficient basis both in
fact and
in law. Plata, et al filed their separate
petitions before the DOJ and the DOJ
modified the Joint
Resolution of the Office of the City
Prosecutor and ordered the filing of
separate informations
against petitioners. The prosecutor filed a
motion for reconsideration and upon review
, the DOJ
reconsidered its findings and ruled that
there was no probable cause and directed
the Office of
the City Prosecutor to withdraw the
informations. The complainants elevated the
matter to the
CA by way of certiorari ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the
DOJ Secretary in which the CA annulled
and set aside the resolution of the DOJ.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA should interfere with the
discretion of the prosecutor in determining
the
existence of probable cause.
HELD:
No. The well-established rule is that the
conduct of preliminary investigation for the
purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause
is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor.
The prosecution of crimes lies with the
executive department of the government
whose
principal power and responsibility is to see
that the laws of the land are faithfully
executed. A
necessary component of this power to
execute the laws is the right to prosecute
their violators.
Succinctly, the public prosecutor is given a
broad discretion to determine whether
probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime and
should be
held for trial.
28. People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
126005, January 21, 1999
FACTS:
Rosalinda Dy, according to the petition, was
shot at pointblank range by private
respondent Jonathan Cerbo in the presence
and at the office of his father, private
respondent Billy Cerbo. Petitioner Dy avers:
1) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
holding that the Regional Trial Court Judge
had the authority to reverse [the public
prosecutors] finding of probable cause to
prosecute accused xxx and thus dismiss the
case filed by the latter on the basis of a
motion to quash warrant of arrest.
2) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
fully and unqualifiedly applying the case of
Allado, et. al. vs. PACC, et. al. G.R. No.
113630, [to] the case at bench despite [the]
clear difference in their respective factual
backdrop[s] and the contrary earlier
jurisprudence on the matter.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that no probable cause exists to
merit the filing of charges against private
respondents Billy Cerbo.
HELD:
YES. The determination of probable cause
during a preliminary investigation is a
function that belongs to the public
prosecutor. It is an executive function, the
correctness of the exercise of which is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and
may not be compelled to pass upon. the
public prosecutor has broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exist
and to charge those whom be or she
believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law. Otherwise stated, such
official has the quasi-judicial authority to
determine whether or not a criminal case
must be filed in court.Thus, in Crespo v.
Mogul, the Court ruled:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal
actions either commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of the fiscal. The
institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or
may not file the complaint or information,
follow or not follow that presented by the
offended party, according to whether the
evidence , in his opinion, is sufficient or not
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The reason for placing
the criminal prosecution under the direction
and control of the fiscal is to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecutions by
private persons.Prosecuting officers under
the power vested in them by law, not only
have the authority but also the duty of
prosecuting persons who, according to the
evidence received from the complainant,
are shown to be guilty of a crime committed
within the jurisdiction of their office. They
have equally the duty not to prosecute when
the evidence adduced is not sufficient to
establish a prima facie case. , since their
objectives are different, the judge cannot
rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in
finding probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously
and understandably, the contents of the
prosecutors report will support his own
conclusion that there is reason to charge
the accused of an offense and hold him for
trial. However, the judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have
supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutors bare report upon which to
legally sustain his own findings on the
existence or non-existence of probable
cause to issue an arrest order. This
responsibility of determining personally and
independently the existence of non-
existence of probable cause is lodge in him
by no less than the most basic law of the
land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could
ease the burden of the judge and speed up
the litigation process by forwarding to the
latter not only the information and his bare
resolution, but also so much of the records
and the evidence on hand as to enable His
Honor to make his personal and separate
judicial finding on whether to issue a
warrant of arrest.It is not required that the
complete or entire records of the case
during the preliminary investigation be
submitted to and examined by the judge.
We do not intend to unduly burden trial
courts by obliging them to examine the
complete records of every case all the time
simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest
of the accused. What is required, rather, is
that the judge must have sufficient
supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits,
sworn statements of witnesses or transcript
of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to
make his independent judgment, or at the
very least, upon which to verify the findings
of the prosecutor as to the existence of
probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely
solely and entirely on the prosecutors
recommendation, as the Respondent Court
did in this case. Although the prosecutor
enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in
the performance of his duties and functions
which in turn gives his report the
presumption of accuracy, the Constitution,
we repeat, commands the judge to
personally determine probable cause in the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court
has consistently held that a judge fails in his
bounden duty if he relies merely on the
certification or the report of the investigating
officer.
29. Tan v. Ballena, G.R. No. 168111, July 4,
2008, 557 SCRA 229
Facts: Petitioners Antonio Tan, Danilo
Domingo and Robert Lim were officers of
Footjoy Industrial Corporation. respondent
Amelito Ballena and one hundred thirty-nine
(139) other employees of Footjoy, filed a
Joint Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan against
the company and petitioners Tan and
Domingo in their capacities as
owner/president and administrative officer,
respectively.
The Complaint-Affidavit alleged that the
company did not regularly report the
respondent employees for membership at
the Social Security System (SSS) and that it
likewise failed to remit their SSS
contributions and payment for their SSS
loans, which were already deducted from
their wages.
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit. petitioners
Tan and Domingo blamed the economic
distress that beset their company for their
failure to timely pay and update the monthly
SSS contributions of the employees. The
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a
joint resolution, which found probable cause
to charge Footjoy, Antonio Tan, and Danilo
Domingo with violations of Sections 9, 10
and 24, paragraph (b) in relation to Section
28, paragraphs (e), (f) and (h) of the Social
Security Law.
Petitioners filed for a motion for
reconsideration. The Provincial Prosecutor
then issued a Final Resolution and a
Supplementary Resolution; two resolutions
in total on the course of the motion for
reconsideration. petitioners filed a Petition
for Review with the DOJ, alleging, inter alia,
that the Assistant Prosecutor committed
grave and manifest error when he found
probable cause to charge them with the
alleged offenses. The DOJ however ruled to
withdraw the informations.
At the Court of Appeals, Respondents
claimed that the DOJ committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in finding that no
probable cause existed to charge petitioners
Tan, Domingo and Lim with violations of the
SSS Law; that the allegation of petitioners'
failure to report respondents to the SSS for
coverage is not supported by evidence; and
that charges [for the violation] of a special
law such as the Social Security Act can be
overcome by a show of good faith and lack
of intent to commit the same. After resolving
to some of the technicalities. The CA ruled
in favor of Respondents reinstating the
informations and setting aside the DOJ
resolution having acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Hence this petition by petitioners. (duh)
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed serious error when it reversed
the DOJ resolution, which found that there
was no probable cause to indict petitioners
for any violation of the SSS Law.
Ruling: No. The findings of the prosecutor
with respect to the existence or non-
existence of probable cause is subject to
the power of review by the DOJ. Indeed, the
Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify
the resolution of the prosecutor, after which
he shall direct the prosecutor concerned
either to file the corresponding information
without conducting another preliminary
investigation, or to dismiss or move for
dismissal of the complaint or information
with notice to the parties.
This power of review, however, does not
preclude this Court and the Court of
Appeals from intervening and exercising our
own powers of review with respect to the
DOJ's findings. In the exceptional case in
which grave abuse of discretion is
committed, as when a clear sufficiency or
insufficiency of evidence to support a finding
of probable cause is ignored, the Court of
Appeals may take cognizance of the case
via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
This is precisely the situation in the case at
bar. In deciding the respondents' Petition for
Certiorari, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the DOJ committed palpable mistake in
reversing the Final Resolution of the
Provincial Prosecutor and, in so doing,
acted with grave abuse of discretion.
In the assailed decision, the Court of
Appeals declared that the DOJ's dismissal
of the charges against petitioners, on the
ground that the evidence on record did not
support the same, was incorrect.
Furthermore, the appellate court held that
the defenses of petitioners of good faith and
lack of criminal intent should not have been
considered, inasmuch as the offenses
charged were for violations of a special law
and are therefore characterized as mala
prohibita, in which the intent to commit is
immaterial.
30. Heirs of the late Nestor Tria v. Atty.
Obias, G.R. No. 175887, November 24,
2010,
636 SCRA 91
FACTS: Engr. Nestor Tria was shot by a
gunman while waiting to board his flight to
Manila. During the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, respondent filed her Counter-
Affidavit denying that she was in anyway
involved with the killing of Engr. Tria. The
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Camarines Sur issued a resolution directing
the filing of an information for murder
against Aclan and Ona but dismissing the
case for insufficiency of evidence as against
herein respondent, Atty. Epifania Obias.
Petitioners appealed to the Department of
Justice. The DOJ agreed with the
contention of petitioners that there is
interlocking circumstantial evidence
sufficient to show that respondent conspired
with Aclan and Ona in the killing of Engr.
Tria. Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal to
the Office of the President (OP). The OP
thus concluded there was no interlocking
circumstantial evidence of respondents acts
before, during and after the killing of Engr.
Tria that would establish conspiracy among
Aclan, Ona and respondent to commit the
crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the
President erred in taking cognizance of the
appeal of respondent.
RULING: NO. Memorandum Circular No. 58
provides:
No appeal from or petition for review of
decisions/orders/resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice on preliminary
investigations of criminal cases shall be
entertained by the Office of the President,
except those involving offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death wherein new
and material issues are raised which were
not previously presented before the
Department of Justice and were not ruled
upon in the subject
decision/order/resolution.
The offense for which respondent was
charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death, which is clearly within the
jurisdiction of the OP in accordance with
Memorandum Circular No. 58. It is not
mandatory for the President to order the
DOJ to reopen or review respondents case
even if it raised new and material issues
allegedly not yet passed upon by the DOJ.
Hence, the OP acted well within its authority
in reexamining the merits of respondents
appeal in resolving the motion for
reconsideration.
31. Tan, Jr. v. Matsuura, G.R. No. 179003,
January 9, 2013
32. People v. Yecyec, G.R. No. 183551,
November 12, 2014
FACTS:
Calixto B. Sison was the supervisor of
Pioneer, a domestic corporation engaged in
the buying and selling of rubber. Pioneer,
through Sison, filed an affidavit- complaint
against the herein respondents for Robbery
with Intimidation of Persons. After
conducting the requisite preliminary
investigation, the MCTC found probable
cause to hold respondents liable for
Robbery with Intimidation of Persons. While
affirming the finding of probable cause by
the investigating judge for the unlawful
taking, the Provincial Prosecutor, however,
found that the respondents should only be
liable for the lower offense of Theft
Thereafter, an Information was filed before
the Regional Trial Court, charging the
respondents with the crime of Theft. Upon
its review, however, the RTC arrived at the
conclusion that the evidence on record
failed to establish probable cause absent
two of the essential elements of the crime of
Theft and dismissed the case. the CA
issued the assailed decision affirming the
dismissal of the charges against the
respondents.
ISSUE: Did the RTC and the CA err in
dismissing the information against the
respondents for the crime of Theft for want
of probable cause?
RULING:
Yes. To determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those believed to have
committed the crime as defined by law, is a
function that belongs to the public
prosecutor. Whether or not that function has
been correctly discharged by the public
prosecutor, that is, whether or not he has
made a correct ascertainment of the
existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and
may not be compelled to pass upon. In this
case, there is no question that the
Information filed against the respondents
was sufficient to hold them liable for the
crime of Theft.
A review of the resolutions of the MCTC, the
Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC, and the CA
shows that there is substantial basis to
support finding of probable cause against
the respondents, albeit with the RTC and
the CA having varying opinions as to the
application and interpretation of such basis.
Hence, as the Information was valid on its
face and there was no manifest error or
arbitrariness on the part of the MCTC and
the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC and the
CA erred when they overturned the finding
of probable cause against the respondents.
REINVESTIGATION/PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
33. Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987);
Facts:
Assistant Fiscal with the approval of the
Provincial Fiscal filed an information for
estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the
Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.When
the case was set for arraigment the accused
filed a motion to defer arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice of
the resolution of the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an
order the presiding judge, Leodegario L.
Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied but
the arraignment was deferred to afford time
for petitioner to elevate the matter to the
appellate court.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction
was filed by the accused in the Court of
Appeals. The CA restrained Judge Mogul
from proceeding with the arraignment of the
accused until further orders of the Court.
The SolGen recommended that the petition
be given due course. CA granting the writ
and perpetually restraining the judge from
enforcing his threat to compel the
arraignment of the accused in the case until
the Department of Justice shall have finally
resolved the petition for review.
Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for
review reversed the resolution of the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused.A
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal
with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy
of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr.
Issue: Whether the fiscal may re-investigate
a case and subsequently move for the
dismissal should the re-investigation show
either that the defendant is innocent or that
his guilt may not be established beyond
reasonable doubt
Ruling:
YES. The action of the fiscal or prosecutor
is not without any limitation or control. The
same is subject to the approval of the
provincial or city fiscal or the chief state
prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe
elevated for review to the Secretary of
Justice who has the power to affirm, modify
or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal.
Consequently the Secretary of Justice may
direct that a motion to dismiss be filed in
Court or otherwise, that an information be
filed in Court.
The preliminary investigation conducted by
the fiscal for the purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is
terminated upon the filing of the information
in the proper court. In turn, as above stated,
the filing of said information sets in motion
the criminal action against the accused in
Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to
conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at
such stage, the permission of the Court
must be secured. After such reinvestigation
the finding and recommendations of the
fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court or not, once the case
had already been brought to Court whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel should be
proper in the rase thereafter should be
addressed for the consideration of the
Court, The only qualification is that the
action of the Court must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused or the right
of the People to due process of law.
34. Roberts v. CA, 254 SCRA 307 (1996);
Facts:
This case involves the prosecution of
petitioners Roberts, et al., corporate officers
and members of the Board of Directors of
[the former] Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc.
in connection with the company promotion
called Number Fever. The private
complainants were handlers of the
supposedly winning 349 Pepsi crowns.
The cases filed against petitioners were (1)
estafa under Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code; (2) violation of R.A. No. 7394,
(The Consumer Act of the Philippines); (3)
violation of E.O. No. 913 (Strengthening the
Rule-Making and Adjudicatory Powers of
the Minister of Trade and Industry in order
to further Protect Consumers); and (d)
violation of Act No. 2333 (An Act Relative to
Untrue, Deceptive and Misleading
Advertisements, as amended). Probable
cause was however found by the
investigating prosecutor only for the crime of
estafa, but not for the other alleged
offenses.
Issue:
Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying, on the basis of
Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend
proceedings and hold in abeyance the
issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer
arraignment until after the petition for review
filed with the DOJ shall have been
resolved?
Ruling:
YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis
of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to
suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance
the issuance of warrants of arrest and to
defer arraignment until after the petition for
review filed with the DOJ shall have been
resolved.
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which
bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an
appeal, by way of a petition for review, by
an accused in a criminal case from an
unfavorable ruling of the investigating
prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to,
as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been
filed in Court.
NOTE:
In criminal prosecutions, the determination
of probable cause may either be an
executive or a judicial prerogative. We
reiterate that preliminary investigation
should be distinguished as to whether it is
an investigation for the determination of a
sufficient ground for the filing of the
information or it is an investigation for the
determination of a probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first
kind of preliminary investigation is executive
in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job.
The second kind of preliminary investigation
which is more properly called preliminary
examination is judicial in nature and is
lodged with the judge.
35. Dungog v. CA, 159 SCRA 145 (1988);
FACTS:
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued
a resolution, finding a prima facie case for
filing of an
information for estafa against Pantaleon and
was approved by Provincial Fiscal of Bohol.
After it
was filed and docketed with the RTC of
Bohol, private respondent filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation with the public respondent
Provincial Fiscal. Acting on the
reinvestigation, the
Provincial Prosecutor and its assistant
reversed the resolution and filed for Motion
to Withdraw
the Information and Postponement of
Arraignment. RTC denied the Motion and
that Provincial
Fiscal and private respondent filed a
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction
before the CA which the latter ruled on
respondent Fiscals favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fiscal retains its
discretion on the disposition of the case
when the
information is already filed in court.
HELD:
No. The rule is now well settled that once a
complaint or information is filed in court any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in
the sound discretion of the court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of
the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in court he cannot impose
his
opinion on the trial court. For while it is true
that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial
discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court, once the case had
already
been brought to court, whatever disposition
the fiscal may deem proper thereafter
should be
addressed to the court for its consideration
and approval.
36. Velasquez v. Undersecretary of Justice,
182 SCRA_ 388 (1990);
FACTS:
Felix A. Velasquez, as Executive Vice-
President/Managing Director of Techtrade,
filed a complaint for estafa against Avila in
the Manila City Fiscal's Office, where it was
docketed as I.S. No. 86-28751. Assistant
Fiscal Romulo Lopez dismissed the
complaint. However, upon review by the
Chief, Investigation Division of the City
Fiscal's Office, the latter set aside Fiscal
Lopez' resolution and ordered the filing of
an information for estafa against Avila in the
Regional Trial Court.
Avila twice sought a reconsideration of that
resolution, but both motions were denied by
the City Fiscal. Avila filed a second motion
for reconsideration which the
Undersecretary of Justice, Honorable
Artemio Tuquero granted on January 4,
1989 (Annex A, Petition). He directed the
City Fiscal:... to conduct a reinvestigation of
this case to afford respondent to properly
present evidence that he was duly
authorized to pay the subject creditors and
for complainant to rebut the same with
controverting evidence, and thereafter to
resolve the case anew on the basis of all
the evidence adduced.
ISSUE:
Will the petition for certiorari involving the
directive of reinvestigation prosper?
HELD:
YES. A motion for reinvestigation should,
after the court had acquired jurisdiction over
the case, be addressed to the trial judge
and to him alone. Neither the Secretary of
Justice, the State Prosecutor, nor the Fiscal
may interfere with the judge's disposition of
the case, much less impose upon the court
their opinion regarding the guilt or
innocence of the accused, for the court is
the sole judge of that. The Undersecretary
of Justice gravely abused his discretion in
ordering the re-investigation of the criminal
case against Avila after it had been filed in
court. The avowed purpose of the
reinvestigation "to give an opportunity to the
private respondent to present an authentic
copy of the board resolution of the offended
party (Techtrade Management International
Corporation) which [allegedly] had
authorized him to deal and otherwise
dispose of the funds of the corporation" (p.
72, Rollo), can also be achieved at the trial
in the lower court where that piece of
evidence may be presented by the accused
as part of his defense.
37. People v. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361
(1976);
Facts;
Herein appellants were charged with the
crime of murder in an information filed by
the City Fiscal of Ormoc. At the hearing of
November 26, 1974, appellants' counsel
moved for a reinvestigation of said ease,
along with two other related cases which the
court granted.
On December 3, 1974, the trial court
postponed the hearing of the case to
December 17 and 18, 1974. in view of the
City Fiscal's motion "for a deferment of the
hearing or trial set for December 5 and 6,
1974 until such time the
REINVESTIGATION shall have been
terminated for which the result of said
reinvestigation will be submitted to this
Honorable Court for its resolution in the
premises."
On December 6, 1974, however, the trial
court, motu proprio cancelled the aforesaid
hearings on December 17, and 18, 1974,
and, instead, reset the arraignment and trial
of the case to December 10 and 11, 1974.
At the hearing of December 10, 1974,
appellants counsel manifested to the court
that pursuant to its approval of his motion
for reinvestigation, the City Fiscal had set
the reinvestigation for December 12, 1974
and had already issued the corresponding
subpoena to secure the attendance of the
witnesses. Nevertheless, the court a quo,
issued an order setting the hearing of the
case to the next day, December 11, 1974,
appellants' counsel reiterated his
manifestation and added he said
reinvestigation should first be finished and
the corresponding resolution rendered
thereon and submitted to the court before
any trial of the case should take place.
The trial then again rescheduled the hearing
on December 13. Immediately thereafter,
Special Counsel Rosario R. Polines, in
representation of the City Fiscal, manifested
that the private prosecutor, Atty. Procadilla,
be authorized to conduct the case for the
prosecution.
When the case was called for hearing on
December 13, 1974, counsel for the
appellant asked the court to wait for the City
Fiscal to appear, since the reinvestigation of
the case had already been terminated and
the Fiscal, if given a chance, might be able
to report on said reinvestigation. When the
case was called for hearing on December
13, 1974, counsel for the appellant asked
the court to wait for the City Fiscal to
appear, since the reinvestigation of the case
had already been terminated and the Fiscal,
if given a chance, might be able to report on
said reinvestigation. The Trial Court
proceeded with the arraignment, Trial,
Cross-examination and Presentation of
evidence and promulgated its judgement
despite the adamant manifestation of the
Appellants Counsel.
Issue: Whether or not Appellants were
denied of due process of law.
Ruling: Yes they were denied of due
process of law. When the trial court,
therefore, ignored the appellants'
manifestations objecting to the arraignment
and the trial of the case, until after the City
Fiscal shall have rendered a resolution on
his reinvestigation, but instead considered
such manifestations on their part as a plea
of riot guilty and proceeded to try the case,
received the evidence for the prosecution,
and then rendered judgment against them
on the basis thereof, it committed a serious
irregularity which nullifies the proceedings
below because such a procedure is
repugnant to the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Besides, as correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, "what is more deplorable
and which renders patently irregular all the
proceedings taken in this case, was the total
absence of the City Fiscal and/or any of his
assistants or special counsel on December
13, 1974, when the appellants were
arraigned and when the private prosecutor
presented evidence and rested the case
supposedly for the People.
While there is nothing in the rule of practice
and procedure in criminal cases which
denies the right of the fiscal, in the exercise
of a sound discretion, to turn over the active
conduct of the trial to a private prosecutor,
nevertheless, his duty to direct and control
the prosecution of criminal cases requires
that he must be present during the
proceedings. Thus, in the case of People
vs. Munar this Court upheld the right of the
private prosecutor therein to conduct the
examination of the witnesses because the
government prosecutors were present at the
hearing; hence, the prosecution of the case
remained under their direct supervision and
control.
In the present case, although the private
prosecutor had previously been authorized
by the special counsel Rosario R. Polines to
present the evidence for the prosecution,
nevertheless, in view of the absence of the
City Fiscal at the hearing on December 13,
1974, it cannot be said that the prosecution
of the case was under the control of the City
Fiscal. It follows that the evidence
presented by the private prosecutor at said
hearing could not be considered as
evidence for the plaintiff, the People of the
Philippines. There was, therefore, no
evidence at all to speak of which could have
been the basis of the decision of the trial
court.
38. Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 )
SCRA 773 (1996);
FACTS: Petitioner who is the incumbent
governor of Palawan. He was replaced by
private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez.
Rodriguez filed before the Office of the
Tanodbayan with violation Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Respondent
court, without ruling on petitioners motion to
include co-principals, issued its questioned
resolution granting the motion to suspend
pendente lite and ordering the suspension
of petitioner as Provincial Governor.
Petitioner initially filed an "Urgent Motion for
Quashal of Information and/or
Reinvestigation in the Light of Supervening
Facts." Respondent court issued denied the
motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not another preliminary
investigation should have been conducted
since the acts charged in the complaints
filed before the Tanodbayan are different
from the charges contained in the
informations.
RULING: NO. It is clearly apparent that the
complaints and the informations are based
on substantially the same factual settings,
except that the respective designations are
different. Axiomatic is the rule that what
controls is not the designation of the offense
but its description in the complaint or
information. The real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital
of facts in the complaint or information. It is
not the technical name given by the fiscal
appearing in the title of the information that
determines the character of the crime but
the facts alleged in the body of the
information.
39. People v. Nitcha, 240 SCIZA 283
(1995);
40. Go v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138
FACTS: Petitioner, while traveling in the
wrong direction on a one-way street, almost
had a collision with another vehicle.
Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot
the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off.
An eyewitness of the incident was able to
take down petitioners plate number and
reported the same to the police, who
subsequently ordered a manhunt for
petitioner. 6 days after the shooting,
petitioner presented himself in the police
station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the
police detained him. Subsequently a
criminal charge was brought against him.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed
the case to the lower court, setting and
commencing trial without preliminary
investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the
petitioner has waived his right to preliminary
investigation as bail has been posted and
that such situation, that petitioner has been
arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls
under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7,
Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides for the rules and
procedure pertaining to situations of lawful
warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition
for certiorari assails such procedure and
actions undertaken and files for a
preliminary investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner effectively
waived his right to preliminary investigation.
RULING: NO. The general rule on arrest
provides that the same is legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant. However,
there are instances specifically enumerated
under the law when a warrantless arrest
may be considered lawful. Despite that, the
warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito
Go does not fall within the terms of said
rule. The police were not present at the time
of the commission of the offense, neither do
they have personal knowledge on the crime
to be committed or has been committed. In
view of the above, the allegation of the
prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code before a preliminary
investigation may be conducted is baseless.
In this connection, petitioner has all the right
to ask for a preliminary investigation to
determine whether is probable cause that a
crime has been committed and that
petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well
as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety
and aggravation brought by a criminal
proceeding.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when
he walked in the police station, he neither
expressed surrender nor any statement that
he was or was not guilty of any crime. When
a complaint was filed to the prosecutor,
preliminary investigation should have been
scheduled to determine probable cause.
41. San Agustin v. People, G.R. No.
158211, August 31, 2004
FACTS:
Information was filed before the Regional
Trial Court, charging the petitioner with
kidnapping/serious illegal detention. The
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information. The RTC issued an Order
directing the City Prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation. The petitioner opposed the
reinvestigation contending that the
prosecutor should conduct a regular
preliminary investigation since the inquest
investigation was void. The Assistant City
Prosecutor came out with a Resolution
finding probable cause of arbitrary detention
against the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the
petitioner was unlawfully arrested; hence,
he was entitled to preliminary investigation
and release from detention subject to his
appearance during the preliminary
investigation. It declared that the petitioner
had already been granted a reinvestigation
after which the Information filed with the
RTC was withdrawn. Consequently, it
further declared that the petition had been
mooted by the withdrawal of the Information
from the RTC and the filing of another
Information in the MeTC for arbitrary
detention. It ruled that even if the
reinvestigation conducted by the City
Prosecutor is defective, the Information filed
with the MeTC is valid because under the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, there
is no need for a preliminary investigation for
crimes cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial
Court.
ISSUE: Is the petitioner entitled to a
preliminary investigation?
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner is entitled to a
preliminary investigation before an
Information may be filed against him for said
crime. The inquest investigation conducted
by the State Prosecutor is void because
under Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, an inquest
investigation is proper only when the
suspect is lawfully arrested without a
warrant. The petitioner was unlawfully
arrested without a warrant of arrest against
him for kidnapping/serious illegal detention.
The trial court should suspend proceedings
and order a preliminary investigation
considering that the inquest investigation
conducted by the State Prosecutor is null
and void. In sum, then, the RTC committed
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the
City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation
which is merely a review by the Prosecutor
of his records and evidence instead of a
preliminary investigation as provided for in
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
As regards the contention that here is no
need for a preliminary investigation for
crimes cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, the court ruled that whether or not
there is a need for a preliminary
investigation under Section 1 in relation to
Section 9 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure depends upon the
imposable penalty for the crime charged in
the complaint filed with the City or Provincial
Prosecutor Office and not upon the
imposable penalty for the crime found to
have been committed by the respondent
after a preliminary investigation. The crime
charged in the complaint of the NBI filed in
the Department of Justice was
kidnapping/serious illegal detention, the
imposable penalty for which is reclusion
perpetua to death.
WHEN WARRANT OF ARREST MAY
ISSUE:
42. Sales vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
143802, November 16, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner, mayor, fatally shot his political
rival and he surrendered and put himself in
custody of
the police. A complaint of murder was filed
in the MCTC and the judge then issued a
warrant of
arrest for petitioner but the latter filed a
petition for habeas corpus before the CA
that the judge
must be oust from the case by reason of
affinity. The petition was granted and the
accused was
released subject to the outcome of the
proper preliminary investigation. The
records then
forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor by
the judge was forwarded again to the
Ombudsman
for the latter to conduct preliminary
investigation. The Graft Investigator then
issued a
resolution recommending for the filing of
information for murder before the
Sandiganbayan and
was approved by the Ombudsman. It
appears that petitioner belatedly received
the copy of the
Resolution of the Graft Investigator and
because he was thus prevented from
seeking
reconsideration, he filed a Motion to Defer
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest pending
determination
of probable cause, but was denied by
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan deprived
the petitioner of his constitutional right to
due
process for the issuance of the arrest
warrant despite objection.
HELD:
YES. Petitioner was not only denied the
opportunity to file a motion for
reconsideration of the
Ombudsmans final resolution but also
deprived of his right to a full preliminary
investigation
preparatory to the filing of the information
against him. Sandiganbayan patently erred
to have
relied purely on the Ombudsmans
certification of probable cause. In the order
of criminal cases,
the task of determining probable cause for
purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is a
responsibility which is exclusively reserved
by the Constitution to judges.
43. Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
169727-28, August 18, 2006
44. People v. Judge Yadao, G.R. No.
162144-54, November 13, 2012

45. Cajipe v. People, G.R. No. 203605, April

23, 2014

46. Santos v. Orda, Jr., 620 SCRA 374

47. Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 197293,

April 21, 2014