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Obergefell v.

Hodges

Facts: Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between one man and one
woman. The petitioners, 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased, filed
suits in Federal District Courts in their home States, claiming that respondent state officials violate the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully performed in
another State given full recognition. Each District Court ruled in petitioners favor, but the Sixth Circuit
consolidated the cases and reversed.

Issue: Do federal laws which do not sanction same-sex marriages violate the right Fourteenth Amendment
by denying same-sex couples the right to marry?

Ruling: Yes. The Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two people of the
same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was
lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state. The Court noted other changes in the institution of marriage:
the decline of arranged marriages, invalidation of bans on interracial marriage and use of contraception,
and abandonment of the law of coverture. The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. Marriage is a centerpiece of social
order and fundamental under the Constitution; it draws meaning from related rights of childrearing,
procreation, and education. The marriage laws at issue harm and humiliate the children of same-sex
couples; burden the liberty of same-sex couples; and abridge central precepts of equality.

Acebedo vs. Arquero

Facts: Petitioner filed an administrative case against Respondent for immorality. The latter cohabited with
petitioners wife and their union had allegedly produced a child. Respondent admitted to the affair but
denied paternity. He justified his actions by reason of a Kasunduan or written agreement entered into by
complainant and his wife, consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to seek any partner and to
live with him or her.

Issue: Does an agreement between spouses, where they agreed to be separated and consent to seeking
another partner, have an effect on the validity of their marriage?

Ruling: No. Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had
absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Article 1
of the Family Code provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is an institution of public order or
policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the
parties.

Republic vs. Silverio


Facts: Silverio underwent a sex reassignment surgery. From then on, she lived as a female and was engaged
to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel to Mely,
and his sex from male to female.

Issue: May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

Ruling: No. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest. To the mind of the court, petitioner failed to
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason and that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name, to justify such change.
Likewise, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error, is immutable. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries
in his birth certificate.

Republic vs. Cagandahan

Facts: Cagandahan was born female and was registered as such in her birth certificate. While growing up,
she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
(CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male
person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from
female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

Issue: May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate on
the ground of her medical condition known as CAH or being intersex?

Ruling: Yes. Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is
fixed.
With respect to the change of name, the SC found that such a change will conform with the change of the
entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

People v Teves, August 25, 2011 656 SCRA 307

FACTS: Cenon Teves and Thelma got married in 1992. After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. In
2002, Thelma was informed that her husband contracted a second marriage. Sometime in 2006, Thelmas
uncle filed a complaint for bigamy against Cenon Teves. During the pendency of the criminal case for
bigamy, Cenons and Thelmas marriage declared null and void by the RTC of Caloocan on the ground that
Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code. Said decision became final by virtue of a Certification of Finality.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime of Bigamy (Article 346, RPC) despite the judicial
declaration that his previous marriage with Thema is null and void.

RULING: YES. The court held that it does not matter whether the case for declaration of nullity was filed
before the case for bigamy was instituted, for as long as the offender contracted a subsequent marriage
while his previous marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a Declaration of Nullity of the
First marriage at the time he contracted the second marriage.
If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution
by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a
favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in
petitioners case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the
filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage.

Domingo v. CA 226 SCRA 572 Sept. 17, 1993

FACTS: Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976. Unknown to Soledad, Roberto was married to
Emerlina dela Paz. Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in
1983. In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge and consent. In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto and separation of property.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.

RULING: Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of
other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is
required by law to show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity.

Republic v. Dayot, 550 SCRA 435, March 28, 2008

FACTS: Jose Dayot and Felisa Tecson were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of
a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit attesting that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years. On July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment/Nullity of Marriage with
the RTC. He contended that no marriage ceremony was celebrated; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit ; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. According to Jose, in 1986, he
came to live in a boarding house where Felisa was his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested
him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her
brother from Saudi Arabia. There, he was told that he needed to sign the papers so that the package could
be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, he relented when Felisa told him that his
refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. In February
1987, Jose allegedly discovered a copy of his marriage contract lying on top of the sala table in Felisa's
house. Jose confronted Felisa but the latter feigned ignorance. For her part, Felisa claimed that that while
her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August
31, 1990. Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void due to the absence of a marriage license

RULING: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only
in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court. The solemnization of a marriage without
prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the
allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested
to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that
an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and
may be raised any time.

Ninal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000


Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were
born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and
8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986
stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the
said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the
persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Issue: WON the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after
his death?
Held: Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary,
yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient
that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore,
being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the
facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts."
**note: The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law
in effect at the time of their celebration
Manzano v. Sanchez, 358 SCRA 1, March 8, 2001
Facts: Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to
him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were
born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew
or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two
had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as
manifested in their joint affidavit.
Issue: WON parties can marry on the ground that they have been living with each other for more than 7
years despite the existed of a previous marriage?
Held: No. Article 34 of the Family Code provides that no license shall be necessary for the marriage of a
man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate
affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract,
it was indicated that both were separated. Respondent Judge ought to know that a subsisting previous
marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.

Aranes v. Occiano, 350 SCRA 402, April 11, 2002


Facts: Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late
groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away.
However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia
was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore
of the Philippine Navy.
Respondent judge was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage
of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were
complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could
not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in
Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which
request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents
submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage
license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to
the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding,
it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization,
he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it
would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the
license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it
up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be
delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Issue: Whether or not a judge can solemnize a marriage outside his territorial jurisdiction?
Ruling: No. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction
as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited
to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia
in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability.
Issue: Whether or not a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is valid?
Ruling: No. In People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of
validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority
when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance
of the law.

Alcantara v. Alcantara, 531 SCRA 446, Aug. 28, 2007


Facts: A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita
A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage
for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro,
a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. They got married on the same day, 8 December
1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose
de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without
the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,
appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never
went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place.
Issue: WON the issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, where the parties are neither
residence thereof, are mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage?
Ruling: Yes. there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance
of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity
in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Issue: WON appearing before a fixer who arranged everything and facilitated the ceremony before a
solemnizing officer, invalidates the marriage?
Ruling: No. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will
be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-
bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent
official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to
ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
Tenchavez v. Escano, 15 SCRA 355, Nov. 29, 1965
Facts:
Vicenta Escano (27 yrs. old) married Pastor Tenchavez (32 yrs. old) without the knowledge of the
formers parents before a Catholic chaplain in the house of one Juan Alburo in Cebu City.
The marriage was duly registered with the local civil register.
A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous
relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are
studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested
by Vicentas parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad, he disagreed for a
new marriage.
Years after, without informing her husband, Vicenta applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City,
and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the
United States.
Then she filed a verified complaint for divorce against Pastor in the Second Judicial District Court of
the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character." A decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said
tribunal.
After the decree, the parents of Vicenta filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor.
Vicenta then sought papal dispensation of her marriage.
Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California,
and, by him, has begotten children. She then acquired American then citizenship.
Pastor filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta
from joining her husband.

Issue: Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano valid and binding upon the courts of the
Philippines.

Ruling: No. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband Pastor, was still a Filipino
citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the New Civil Code, which provides: Laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Under the NCC, absolute divorce is not possible and only provides for legal separation. For Philippine
Courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the
declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd paragraph of Art. 17, NCC: Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, policy and
good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the
detriment of those members of our society outside the Philippines. Therefore, a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid
in this jurisdiction.
In this jurisdiction, Vicenta Escanos divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid;
for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez is still existent and undissolved.

Republic v. Orbecido, 472 SCRA 114, Oct. 15, 2005


Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
She, Stanley, and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Par. 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration
but it was denied.

Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Ruling: Yes and No. In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court states the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is still barred from
remarrying.

Bayot v. CA, 570 SCRA 472, Nov. 7, 2008


Facts:
Rebecca Macapugay Bayot was an American citizen and born in Agoa, Guam, USA.
She married Vicente Bayot at Greenhills, Mandaluyong on April 20, 1979. On November 27,1982,
Rebecca gave birth to a daughter named Alix at San Francisco, California.
However, as the marriage turned sour, Rebecca initiated a divorce on 1996 in Dominican Republic.
The latter ordered the dissolution of marriage and remarriage after competing the legal
requirements.
However, there must be a joint custody and guardianship to Alix, and the conjugal property,
particularly the real properties located only in Manila that they acquired during their marriage be
settled.
However, Rebecca stated under oath on May 28, 1996 that she is an American citizen and she is
carrying a child not of Vicente.
Rebecca again filed another petition in Manila on March 2001 for absolute nullity of marriage on
the ground of dissolution of partnership gain, monthly support for their daughter and that Vicente
is psychological incapacitated.
Vicente averred and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause and action and filed a case of adultery
and perjury against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the contrary, charged Vicente with bigamy and
concubinage.
On the other note, Rebecca became a recognized Filipino citizen on 2000.

Issue: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Rebecca in 1996 in Dominican Republic while she was still
an American citizen valid and binding in the Philippines.

Ruling: Yes. First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself
in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after
her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally
said divorce as an American citizen. Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national
laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce.

Further in Garcia v. Recio, the Court ruled that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the
divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may,
the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

Corpus v. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266, Aug. 11, 2010


Facts:
Corpuz was a former Filipino who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
He married Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.
Corpuz went to Canada for work and when he returned to the Philippines he found out that his wife
was having an affair with another man.
He filed a petition for divorce in Canada and the same was granted.
After two years from the effectivity of the divorce decree, Corpuz found a new Filipina to love.
Corpuz went to the Pasig Civil Registry Office and registered the divorce decree on his and Sto.
Tomas' marriage certificate.
Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce before the RTC.
RTC denied his petition, it ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under Art.
26(2) of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree

Ruling: The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26(2) of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
The legislative intent behind Art 26(2) is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree.
Art. 17 of the New Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of Art. 26(2) of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to the rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
An action based on Art. 26(2) is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the aliens spouse to remarry, the courts can declare the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree) whose status
and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.

* Please take note: In this case, the SC considered the recording of the divorce decree on Corpuz and Sto. Tomas'
marriage certificate as legally improper. No judicial order yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree,
thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree of Corpuz and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate, on the strength alone
of the foreign decree presented by Corpuz (Please see Art. 407 of the New Civil Code and the Law on Registry
of Civil Status -Act No. 3753)

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