Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Hodges
Facts: Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between one man and one
woman. The petitioners, 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased, filed
suits in Federal District Courts in their home States, claiming that respondent state officials violate the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully performed in
another State given full recognition. Each District Court ruled in petitioners favor, but the Sixth Circuit
consolidated the cases and reversed.
Issue: Do federal laws which do not sanction same-sex marriages violate the right Fourteenth Amendment
by denying same-sex couples the right to marry?
Ruling: Yes. The Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two people of the
same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was
lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state. The Court noted other changes in the institution of marriage:
the decline of arranged marriages, invalidation of bans on interracial marriage and use of contraception,
and abandonment of the law of coverture. The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. Marriage is a centerpiece of social
order and fundamental under the Constitution; it draws meaning from related rights of childrearing,
procreation, and education. The marriage laws at issue harm and humiliate the children of same-sex
couples; burden the liberty of same-sex couples; and abridge central precepts of equality.
Facts: Petitioner filed an administrative case against Respondent for immorality. The latter cohabited with
petitioners wife and their union had allegedly produced a child. Respondent admitted to the affair but
denied paternity. He justified his actions by reason of a Kasunduan or written agreement entered into by
complainant and his wife, consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to seek any partner and to
live with him or her.
Issue: Does an agreement between spouses, where they agreed to be separated and consent to seeking
another partner, have an effect on the validity of their marriage?
Ruling: No. Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had
absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Article 1
of the Family Code provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is an institution of public order or
policy, governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the
parties.
Issue: May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
Ruling: No. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest. To the mind of the court, petitioner failed to
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason and that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name, to justify such change.
Likewise, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error, is immutable. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries
in his birth certificate.
Facts: Cagandahan was born female and was registered as such in her birth certificate. While growing up,
she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
(CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male
person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from
female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
Issue: May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate on
the ground of her medical condition known as CAH or being intersex?
Ruling: Yes. Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is
fixed.
With respect to the change of name, the SC found that such a change will conform with the change of the
entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
FACTS: Cenon Teves and Thelma got married in 1992. After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. In
2002, Thelma was informed that her husband contracted a second marriage. Sometime in 2006, Thelmas
uncle filed a complaint for bigamy against Cenon Teves. During the pendency of the criminal case for
bigamy, Cenons and Thelmas marriage declared null and void by the RTC of Caloocan on the ground that
Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code. Said decision became final by virtue of a Certification of Finality.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may be held guilty for the crime of Bigamy (Article 346, RPC) despite the judicial
declaration that his previous marriage with Thema is null and void.
RULING: YES. The court held that it does not matter whether the case for declaration of nullity was filed
before the case for bigamy was instituted, for as long as the offender contracted a subsequent marriage
while his previous marriage is subsisting thereby not being able to secure a Declaration of Nullity of the
First marriage at the time he contracted the second marriage.
If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution
by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a
favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in
petitioners case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the
filing of the Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
FACTS: Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976. Unknown to Soledad, Roberto was married to
Emerlina dela Paz. Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in
1983. In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge and consent. In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto and separation of property.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.
RULING: Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of
other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is
required by law to show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity.
FACTS: Jose Dayot and Felisa Tecson were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of
a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit attesting that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years. On July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment/Nullity of Marriage with
the RTC. He contended that no marriage ceremony was celebrated; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit ; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. According to Jose, in 1986, he
came to live in a boarding house where Felisa was his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested
him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her
brother from Saudi Arabia. There, he was told that he needed to sign the papers so that the package could
be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, he relented when Felisa told him that his
refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. In February
1987, Jose allegedly discovered a copy of his marriage contract lying on top of the sala table in Felisa's
house. Jose confronted Felisa but the latter feigned ignorance. For her part, Felisa claimed that that while
her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August
31, 1990. Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void due to the absence of a marriage license
RULING: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only
in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court. The solemnization of a marriage without
prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the
allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have
qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested
to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that
an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and
may be raised any time.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano valid and binding upon the courts of the
Philippines.
Ruling: No. At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband Pastor, was still a Filipino
citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the New Civil Code, which provides: Laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Under the NCC, absolute divorce is not possible and only provides for legal separation. For Philippine
Courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees between Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the
declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd paragraph of Art. 17, NCC: Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, policy and
good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the
detriment of those members of our society outside the Philippines. Therefore, a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid
in this jurisdiction.
In this jurisdiction, Vicenta Escanos divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid;
for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez is still existent and undissolved.
Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Ruling: Yes and No. In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court states the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes naturalization he is still barred from
remarrying.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Rebecca in 1996 in Dominican Republic while she was still
an American citizen valid and binding in the Philippines.
Ruling: Yes. First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself
in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after
her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally
said divorce as an American citizen. Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national
laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce.
Further in Garcia v. Recio, the Court ruled that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the
divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may,
the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
Issue: Whether or not Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
Ruling: The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26(2) of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
The legislative intent behind Art 26(2) is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree.
Art. 17 of the New Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of Art. 26(2) of the Family Code provides the
direct exception to the rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
An action based on Art. 26(2) is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the aliens spouse to remarry, the courts can declare the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree) whose status
and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
* Please take note: In this case, the SC considered the recording of the divorce decree on Corpuz and Sto. Tomas'
marriage certificate as legally improper. No judicial order yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree,
thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree of Corpuz and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate, on the strength alone
of the foreign decree presented by Corpuz (Please see Art. 407 of the New Civil Code and the Law on Registry
of Civil Status -Act No. 3753)