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Mecano vs COA

Facts: Petitioner Antonio Mecano, A director of NBI, filed a petition for certiorari to nuliffy the decisions of COA in the 7th
indorsement denying him of reimbursements anchored on the provisions of Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code
in the amount of P.40,831.00.

Earlier the petitioner was hospitalized due to cholecystitis and incurred the abovementioned amount. Under Sec. 699 of
the RAC, he is entitled to allowances in case of injury, sickness or death incurred in the performance of duty. Hence, the
petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses to NBI director Lim, who forwarded the request to the Secretary
of Justice. The request was returned due to the comments of COA chairman, stating that the RAC being relied upon was
already repealed by the administrative code of 1987.

The Petitioner resubmitted the request asserting that the administrative code of 1987 did not operate to repeal in its
entirety the RAC, including Sec. 699. The COA chairman again denied the request asserting the same reasons and
furthered that Sec. 699 was not re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987.

Issue:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated the RAC, including Sec. 699.

Held:

The enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 did not operate to repeal the RAC.

The repealing clause indicated in Sec. 27 of the Administrative Code of 1987 is not an express repealing clause because it
fails to identify or designate the acts that are intended to be repealed. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal
under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific
repealing clause indicates the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in terms of the new and old laws. This latter situation falls under the the category of implied repeal.

Comparing the 2 codes, it is apparent that the new code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter
of the old code. There are several matters treated in the old code which are not found in the new code, such as claims
for sickness benefits under sec. 699.

It is well settled rule of Statutory Construction that repeals by implication are not favored.

Petition granted and COA was ordered to give due course to petitioner's claim for benefits
Solid Homes Vs. Payawal

Facts:

Payawal is a buyer of a certain subdivision lot who is suing Solid Homes for failure to deliver the certificates of title. The
complaint was filed with the RTC. Solid Homes contended that jurisdiction is with National Housing Authority (NHA)
pursuant to PD 957, as amended by PD 1344, granting exclusive jurisdiction to NHA.

Issue:

Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and the competence to award damages

Held:

Supreme Court held that NHA (now HLURB) has jurisdiction

In case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their
enactment. It is obvious that the general law is BP 129 and PD 1344 the special law.

On the competence of the board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by
PD 1344 to hear and decide claims involving refund and any other claims filed by the subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyers against project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

As a result of growing complexity of modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative
bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified acts. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal
with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of
justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the
4th department of government. Statutes conferring powers to the administrative agencies must be liberally construed to
enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose.

Pangasinan Transport Co. vs. Public Service Commission GR NO. 47065, June 26, 1940 FACTS:
This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc
(Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of transporting
passengers in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939,
Pantranco filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses. PSC
granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was made to apply also on their existing business.
Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the Public Service Commission. Since it was denied,
Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.

ISSUES:

Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:

is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation


constitutes undue delegation of powers

HELD:

The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it is a proper
delegation of legislative power, so called Subordinate Legislation". It is a valid delegation because of the
growing complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws. All that has been delegated to the Commission
is the administrative function, involving the use of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly
having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.

The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property rights and is a
mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the good of the public. PSC has the power, upon
notice and hearing, to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued, whenever the facts and
circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for
further proceedings.

In addition, the Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris privati or private use only.

Leveriza vs IAC

FACTS:

This case involves three contracts of lease:

1) Contract A: executed between Civil Aeronautics Administration (lessor) and Rosario Leveriza (lessee)
2) Contract B: executed between Leveriza (lessor) and Mobil Oil (lessee)
3) Contract C: executed between CAA (lessor) and Mobil Oil (lessee)
When Leveriza subleased the property to Mobil Oil (Contract B) without permission from the lessor, CAA
cancelled Contract A and executed Contract C with Mobil Oil. Leveriza contended that Contract C was invalid
not only because it was entered into by CAA without approval by the Department Secretary but also because it
was not executed by the President of the Philippines or officer duly designated. According to Leveriza, the
officer duly designated to cancel the contract is not the Airport General Manager but the Secretary of Public
Works and Communication or the Director of the CAA.

ISSUE:

W/N Contract C was validly entered into

HELD:

SC held that the Airport General Manager had authority to enter into contracts of lease. In executing Contract C,
the Airport General Manager signed for the Director of the CAA, who subsequently ratified the same.

Under sec. 567 of the RAC, a contract of lease may be executed by: (1) President; (2) officer duly designated by
him; and (3) officer expressly vested by law. Under sec. 32 (24) of RA 776, the Director of the CAA is one such
officer vested by law.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V POEA

FACTS:

In March 15, 1985, Vitalico Saco, Chief officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris was killed in an accident in Tokyo Japan. Sacos widow sued
for damages under E.O. 797and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of
POEA. Thepetitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that thecomplaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security
System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant and subsequently awarded the widow 192,000
another amount for death benefits, and burial expenses.

ISSUE

1.WON the POEA has jurisdiction over the case of Saco

2.WON Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of the non-delegation of legislative power

3.WON the POEA denied the petitioner of the due process of law

Held:

1.Yes. POEA has jurisdiction over the case of Saco since he was considered a seaman at the time of his death. Further, pursuant to
Section 4 of E.O. No.797, seamen are considered overseas Filipino workers.

Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined as "employment of a worker
outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid contract. A contract
worker is described as "any person working or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include
seamen" 4 or "any person working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign
employer, principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen." These definitions clearly apply to
Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and alongside the
petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country.

2. No. POEA has authority to issue the said memorandum pursuant to Section 4 of E.O. 797, to
wit:". . . The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).

3. No. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and
apply such regulations. Examples abound: the Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central
Bank on its own circulars, the Securities and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent Office and the
Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department of Natural Resources and so on ad
infinitumon their respective administrative regulations. Such an arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of modern
governments and cannot be considered violative of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the
landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations are observed.

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BOYSCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES V COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS: This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-011 on August 19, 1999 (the COA Resolution), with the subject
Defining the Commissions policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines. In its whereas clauses, the COA
Resolution stated that the BSP was created as a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 460 and Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, the
Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a government-controlled corporation within the meaning
of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution; and that the BSP is appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the
1987 Administrative Code..

ISSUE: The issue was whether or not the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

RULING:

The BSP contends that it is not a government-owned or controlled corporation; neither is it an instrumentality, agency, or
subdivision of the government. The Supreme Court, however, held that not all corporations, which are not government owned or
controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered
institutions which are otherwise known as public corporations. These corporations are treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to a
different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative
relationship to the government or any of its departments or offices. As presently constituted, the BSP is a public corporation created
by law for a public purpose, attached to the Department of Education Culture and Sports pursuant to its Charter and the
Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a private corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and be
economically viable to justify its existence under a special law. The economic viability test would only apply if the corporation is
engaged in some economic activity or business function for the government, which is not the case for BSP. Therefore, being a public
corporation, the funds of the BSP fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.

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Marcos vs. Manglapus, [G.R. # 88211 ]

Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon Aquinos ascension into
presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But President Aquino, considering the
dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his
family. Hence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

Issues: Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines. Assuming that she
has the power to bar, was there a finding made that there is a clear and present danger to the public due to the return?
And have the requirements of due process been complied with in the making of the finding?

HELD: Petition Dismissed.


The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions, it must be treated as a
matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit
to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed
during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security
Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, that there exist factual bases for the President's
decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups,
the communist threat, peace and order issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion
that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the situation in the country.

Another reason of the Court...We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover
from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates
and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the
Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away
by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.

G.R. No. 160093 July 31, 2007

MALARIA EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,INC. (MEWAP), represented by its National President, DR.
RAMON A. SULLA, and MEWAP DOH Central Office Chapter President, DR. GRACELA FIDELA MINA-RAMOS, and PRISCILLA CARILLO, and
HERMINIO JAVIER, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, (substituting the former Executive Secretary Renato de Villa), THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OFHEALTH MANUEL DAYRIT and THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF BUDGETAND MANAGEMENT EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, respondents.

FACTS:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.SP No. 65475 dated
September 12, 2003 which upheld the validity of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 102, the law Redirecting the Functions and
Operations of the Department of Health.
Then President Joseph E. Estrada issued E.O. No. 102 on May 24, 1999 pursuant to Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III
of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and Sections 78 and 80 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8522, also known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1998. E.O. No. 102 provided for structural changes and
redirected the functions and operations of the Department of Health.
On October 19, 1999, the President issued E.O. No. 165 "Directing the Formulation of an Institutional Strengthening
and Streamlining Program for the Executive Branch" which created the Presidential Committee on Executive
Governance (PCEG) composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) as co-chair.
The DBM, on July 8, 2000, issued the Notice of Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action (NOSCA). On July 17,
2000, the PCEG likewise issued Memorandum Circular (M.C.) No. 62, entitled "Implementing Executive Order No. 102,
Series of 1999 Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health."
M.C. No. 62 directed the rationalization and streamlining of the said Department. On July 24, 2000, the Secretary of
Health issued Department Memorandum No. 136, Series of 2000, ordering the Undersecretary, Assistant Secretaries,
Bureau or Service Directors and Program Managers of the Department of Health to direct all employees under their
respective offices to accomplish and submit the Personal Information Sheet due to the approval of the Department of
Health Rationalization and Streamlining Plan.
Petitioner Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) is a union of affected
employees in the Malaria Control Service of the Department of Health. MEWAP filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila seeking to nullify Department Memorandum No. 157, the NOSCA and the Placement List of
Department of Health Personnel and other issuances implementing E.O. No. 102.
While the case was pending, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners sought to nullify E.O. No. 102 for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as it allegedly violates certain provisions of E.O. No. 292 and R.A. No. 8522. Petition was referred
to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same in its assailed Decision. Hence, this appeal

HELD:
Petition was denied.

The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and
statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987
Constitution, viz.:
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
In Canonizado v. Aguirre, it was held that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It alters the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. While the power to
abolish an office is generally lodged with the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive
branch, which may include such abolition, is permissible under our present laws, viz.:
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy.
A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except
where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that
brought it into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular
office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
The Presidents power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20,
Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization
measures, viz.:
SEC. 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers
and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically
enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.10
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the President did not commit bad faith in the questioned
reorganization, viz.:
In this particular case, there is no showing that the reorganization undertaking in the [Department of Health] had
violated this requirement, nor [are] there adequate allegations to that effect. It is only alleged that the petitioners were
directly affected by the reorganization ordered under E.O. [No.] 102. Absent is any showing that bad faith attended the
actual implementation of the said presidential issuance.

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In a nutshell: the president has the power to create the PTC not through PD
1416, as amended by PD 1772.., but finds justification in section 17, art 7, 1987
consti..

However.. PTC is unconstitutional because it violates equal protection clause


having an infirmity consisting of an arbitrary classification against arroyo
administration only and not including other previous administrations

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH


COMMISSION OF 2010, respondent.

[G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010.]

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON


A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., petitioners, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, respondents.

Facts:

These are twin cases consolidated assailing the validity of the truth commission created by
pres. Benign Aquino through his E.O. #1 dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010."

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner
Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive
Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI
of the Constitution 6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a
public office and to appropriate funds therefor. 7

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed
by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando
B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

The creation of eo #1 was but a result of prior events..when then Senator Benigno Simeon
Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his
ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. ITESAc

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special
body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive
Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).

--------------------------------------here are the main issues:

1.Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective
petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;

2.Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers
by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public
offices, agencies and commissions;

3.Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ;

4.Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5.Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief

--------------------------------sc decision\

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth


Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with
the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during
the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations
to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an
"independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President
Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc
body is one. 8

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the
ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative
Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from
one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any
other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already
existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office
is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the
question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under
Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term
"restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the
structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As
held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President's power of control.
Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former with that of the latter. 47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the
power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds
basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute
the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the
President to create a public office?

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to
create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No.
1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and
transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last
"Whereas" clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will


necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No.
1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17.The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis
supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal
branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President's power to
conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the President's
powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations
and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in
statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. 51 As explained in the landmark
case of Marcos v. Manglapus:
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed.
As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under
the Constitution. 53 One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the
obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public
office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.
Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of
the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the
funds for the commission." 55 Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing
auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.

On the equal protection clause concept

It, however, does not require the universal application


this is a well known constitutionally protected right..
of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test
of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 81 "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification." 82

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during theprevious administration" 87 only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least
three portions of the questioned executive order.

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member
of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include
past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection
clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and
other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the
restriction of the investigation to the "previous administration" only. The reports of
widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for
distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by
similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely
to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification."

So ptc should be struck down for it suffers from arbitrary classification..

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VIOLA VS. ALUNAN

Facts: 1.Petitioner questions Art. III, 1-2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of
the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers insofar as they are inconsistent with the Local Govt Code because the latter does not
include 1 , 2 and 3 VP positions. It is therefore in violation of the principle that implementing rules and regulations cannot
add or detract from the provisions of the law they are designed to implement. Issue: 1.W/N the questioned rules are
violative of the laws. Ruling: 1.The addl positions were created under the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng Mga
Barangay in its 4 Article. Section 1. Organization of Board of Directors of Local Chapters. - The chapters shall directly
elect their respective officers, namely, a president; executive vice president; first, second, and third vice presidents; a
uditor; and five (5) members to constitute the Board of Directors of their respective chapter... 2.It is also authorized by the
LGC under Sec. 493 which reads: 493. Organization. The liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political
subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vicepresident, and five (5) members of the board of directors.
The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter... 3.That Congress can delegate the power to create positions such as these has been settled
by our decisions upholding the validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to create,
abolish or merge offices in the executive department. Notes: Dissent of Justice Davide on the capacity to create other
necessary positions which he believes is vested only in the Boards of Directors was answered by Art. 210 of the
Implementing Rules of LGC which gives the same power to the incumbent members of Pambansang Katipunan ng mga
Barangay (PKB) which is actually the Barangay National Assembly.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SEC. OF DOTC VS. MABALOT

FACTS:

DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr., issued Memorandum Order No. 96-735 addressed to (LTFRB) Chairman
Dante Lantin. The memorandum directed to effect the transfer of regional functions of that office to the DOTC-
CAR Regional Office, pending the creation of a regular Regional Franchising and Regulatory Office

Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order, against petitioner and LTFRB Chairman Lantin, praying among others that Memorandum Order
No. 96-735 be declared illegal and without effect for being an undue exercise of legislative power.

The lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from implementing Memorandum Order
No. 96-735. and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Then DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo, Jr. filed his
answer to the petition.

Thereafter, Secretary Lagdameo issued the assailed Department Order No. 97-1025, to wit:
DOTC-CAR Regional Office, is hereby established as the Regional Office of the LTFRB
and shall exercise the regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct
supervision and control of LTFRB Central Office.

The lower court rendered a decision that declares the Memo issued by the DOTC Sec as null and void
and without any legal effect as being violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment
on the powers of the legislative department and also of the provision enjoining appointive officials from
holding any other office or employment in the Government.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

VALIDITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES OF THE DOTC SEC.

RULING:

In the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity attending the issuance of the challenged
orders, this Court upholds Memorandum Order No. 96-735 and Department Order No. 97-1025 as legal and
valid administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary. Contrary to the opinion of the lower court, the
President - through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary in the present case -
may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR
as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the concomitant transfer and
performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.

To reiterate the elementary rule in administrative law and the law on public officers that a public office may be
created through any of the following modes, to wit, either (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law
(statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by authority of law.

Congress can delegate the power to create positions. Congress has vested power in the President to reorganize
executive agencies and redistribute functions, and particular transfers under such statutes have been held to be
within the authority of the President.

The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant to the third mode - by
authority of law. The DOTC Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum and Department Orders pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 36 of the President.

In Larin vs. Executive Secretary this Court through the ponencia of Mr. Justice Justo Torres, inked an extensive
disquisition on the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the National Government, which power
includes the creation, alteration or abolition of public offices. Thus in Larin, we held that Section 62 of Republic
Act 7645 (General Appropriations Act [G.A.A.] for FY 1993) evidently shows that the President is authorized
to effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned

In the same vein, Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
provides a strong legal basis for the Chief Executives authority to reorganize the National Government, viz:

Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the


President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President
which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above
or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.

In fine, the designation and subsequent establishment of DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of LTFRB in the
Cordillera Administrative Region and the concomitant exercise and performance of functions by the former as the
LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, fall within the scope of the continuing authority of the President to effectively
reorganize the Department of Transportation and Communications.

Beyond this, it must be emphasized that the reorganization in the instant case was decreed in the interest of the
service and for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera
Administrative Region. In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith.
As a general rule, reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. To our mind, the reorganization pursued in the case at bar bears the earmark of good
faith. As petitioner points out, tapping the DOTC-CAR pending the eventual creation of the LTFRB Regional
Office is economical in terms of manpower and resource requirements, thus, reducing expenses from the limited
resources of the government.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

The DOH launched the HSRA (HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA), a reform agenda. It provided for five
general areas of reform: (1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure funding for priority
public health programs; (3) promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective
performance; (4) strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the coverage of the
National Health Insurance Program (NHIP).
Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government hospitals,
particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring of government hospitals.
Petitioners also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued by the DOH, entitled "Guidelines
and Procedure in the Implementation of the Corporate Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals to Achieve
Fiscal Autonomy, and Managerial Flexibility to Start by January 2001;" and Administrative Order No. 172 of
the DOH, entitled "Policies and Guidelines on the Private Practice of Medical and Paramedical Professionals
in Government Health Facilities," 4 dated 9 January 2001, for imposing an added burden to indigent Filipinos,
who cannot afford to pay for medicine and medical services.
Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reforms had resulted in making free
medicine and free medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they alleged
that the HSRA is void for being in violation of the following constitutional provisions:

ART. III, SEC. 1. ART. II, SEC. 18.


ART. II, SEC. 5. ART. XV, SEC. 1.
ART. II, SEC. 9. ART. XV, SEC. 3.
ART. II, SEC. 10. ART.XIII, SEC. 11.
ART. II, SEC. 11.
ART. II, SEC. 13.
ART. XIII, SEC. 14
ART. II, SEC. 15.
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled "Redirecting the
Functions and Operations of the Department of Health," which provided for the changes in
the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH.
Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code
(Republic Act No. 7160), which provided for the devolution to the local government units of
basic services and facilities, as well as specific health-related functions and responsibilities.
Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which effects the
reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative
function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is void, having been issued in excess of
the President's authority.
ISSUE:

WON HSRA AND EO 102 IS VALID

RULING:

HSRA

As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However,
some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-
executing. The aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are
not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for
legislation.

In Tanada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the
1987 Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative
enactments before they can be implemented.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that Sections
11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court
referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay
down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non self-
executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the
parameters of these guaranteed rights. . . . Without specific and pertinent legislation,
judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least
the aims of the Constitution.
Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the
equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in
connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees
were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the
petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners' bare allegations that it violates the
general principles expressed in the non self-executing provisions they cite herein. There are two
reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional
principles: basic considerations of due process and the limitations of judicial power.

EO102
This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive or
administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the Executive
Department. 29 This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: "[T]he president shall have control
of all executive departments, bureaus and offices." Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive
Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:

SEC. 31.Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office


The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions:
(1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate offices, the Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by
abolishing consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another;
(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments or Agencies; and
(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other Departments or agencies.

In Domingo v. Zamora, this Court explained the rationale behind the President's continuing
authority under the Administrative Code to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of
the President. The law grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in
recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office "to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency."
The DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated under Book IV of the
Administrative Code, mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work of the President.
Indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is under the supervision and control of the President
and, thus, part of the Office of the President. Consequently, Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of
the Administrative Code, granting the President the continued authority to reorganize the Office
of the President, extends to the DOH.

Again, in the year when Executive Order No. 102 was issued, "The General Appropriations Act of
Fiscal Year 1999" (Republic Act No. 8745) conceded to the President the power to make any
changes in any of the key positions and organizational units in the executive department.

-----------------------------------------------

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary GR 96409

FACTS
The Constitutional provision in question is Article XVI, Section 6: "The State shall
establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and
civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their
jurisdiction shall be provided by law."

Background:

In 1990, Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" However, Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and
member of the Philippine Bar sworn to defend the Constitution, filed the petition now at bar on
December 20, 1990, seeking this Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of RA 6975.

Before the 1987 Constitution, the Police force was under the command of the military. This set-
up eroded the civilian character of the police force. Moreover, the integration of the national
police forces with the PC also resulted in inequities since the military component had superior
benefits and privileges. Mindful of these structural errors, the framers of the Constitution
incorporated the abovementioned (Article XVI Sec. 6) provision.

ISSUES:

1.) WON RA 6975 emasculated (restricted) the National Police Commission by limiting its power
"to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP), thus, "control" remained
with the Department Secretary under whom both the National Police Commission and the PNP
were placed.

2.) WON NAPOLCOMs power was eroded by the provision in RA 6975 vesting power to choose
the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police in the Governors and Mayors, respectively.

3.) WON the Commission on Civil Services authority to discipline civil servants was eroded by
vesting upon the Peoples Law Enforcement Boards (PLEB) and city and municipal mayors the
power to discipline PNP members.

4.) WON Sec. 12 of the said law constitutes an encroachment upon the executive and
commander in chief power of the President.

"Section 12.Relationship of the Department with the Department of National


Defense. During a period of twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of
this Act, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) shall continue its present
role of preserving the internal and external security of the State: Provided, that
said period may be extended by the President, if he finds it justifiable, for
another period not exceeding twenty-four (24) months, after which, the
Department shall automatically take over from the AFP the primary role of
preserving internal security, leaving to the AFP its primary role of preserving
external security."

5.) WON the creation of a "Special Oversight Committee" under Section 84 of the Act, especially
the inclusion therein of some legislators as members (namely: the respective Chairmen of the
Committee on Local Government and the Committee on National Defense and Security in the
Senate, and the respective Chairmen of the Committee on Public Order and Security and the
Committee on National Defense in the House of Representatives) is an "unconstitutional
encroachment upon and a diminution of, the President's power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices."

RULING:

The 1st issue

One need only refer to the fundamentally accepted principle in Constitutional Law that the
President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices 16 to lay at rest
petitioner's contention on the matter.

This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk 17 and has been held by us, in
the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 18 to mean "the power of [the President] to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter." It is said to be at
the very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive."

Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the
"Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot be expected to exercise his
control powers all at the same time and in person, 20 he will have to delegate some of them to
his Cabinet members.

The circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized
Department of the Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative realignment that
would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives
and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the
assailed Act, 24 the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national
government.

Such organizational set-up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the
national police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police commission.
The 2nd issue

Sec 51 Xxx Local executives are deputized representatives of NAPOLCOM in their respective
territorial jurisdiction. xxx

We agree, and so hold, with the view of the Solicitor General that "there is no usurpation of the
power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section 51 because under this very same provision, it
is clear that the local executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. x x x As
such deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the exercise of their
functions under that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are
valid and binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM." It is significant to note that the local officials, as
NAPOLCOM representatives, will choose the officers concerned from a list of eligibles (those
who meet the general qualifications for appointment to the PNP) 30 to be recommended by
PNP officials.

The 3rd issue

Pursuant to the Act, the Commission (CSC) exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru the regional
appellate boards, over decisions of both the PLEB and the said mayors. This is so under Section
20(c). Furthermore, it is the Commission which shall issue the implementing guidelines and
procedures to be adopted by the PLEB for the conduct of its hearings, and it may assign
NAPOLCOM hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the PLEBs (Section 43-d4, d5).

The 4th issue

It becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely gives muscle to
and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not fall under the Commander-
in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being
integrated with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a civilian
agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the
President of the power of executive control. cdrep

Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It


simply provides for the transition period or process during which the national police would
gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the internal security of the State.

The 5th issue


There is not the least interference with the President's power of control under Section 84. The
Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body, established and tasked
solely with planning and overseeing the immediate "transfer, merger and/or absorption" into
the Department of the Interior and Local Governments of the "involved agencies." This it will
undertake in accordance with the phases of implementation already laid down in Section 85 of
the Act and once this is carried out, its functions as well as the committee itself would cease
altogether. 32 As an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions it exercises, decidedly do not
constitute an encroachment and in diminution of the power of control which properly belongs
to the President. What is more, no executive department, bureau or office is placed under the
control or authority of the committee.

NOTE: THE NAPOLCOM IS NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION. In contrast, Article XVI,


Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the statutory creation of a national police commission that
will administer and control the national police force to be established thereunder.

------------------------------------------------------------

ALEXIS C. CANONIZADO, EDGAR DULA TORRES, and ROGELIO A.


PUREZA, petitioners, vs. HON. ALEXANDER P. AGUIRRE, as Executive Secretary,
HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, as Secretary of Budget and Management, JOSE
PERCIVAL L. ADIONG, ROMEO L. CAIRME and VIRGINIA U.
CRISTOBAL, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners, members of National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) come before the Supreme
Court to question the Constitutionality of RA 8551 otherwise known as the "Philippine National
Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998 by virtue of which they were separated from
office. Petitioners claim that such law violates their constitutionally guaranteed right to security
of tenure.

NAPOLCOM was originally created under Republic Act No. 6975 (RA 6975), entitled "An Act
Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Reorganized Department Of The Interior
And Local Government, And For Other Purposes." Under RA 6975, the members of the
NAPOLCOM were petitioners Edgar Dula Torres, Alexis C. Canonizado, Rogelio A. Pureza and
respondent Jose Percival L. Adiong. Dula Torres was first appointed to the NAPOLCOM on
January 8, 1991 for a six year term. He was re-appointed on January 23, 1997 for another six
years. Canonizado was appointed on January 25, 1993 to serve the unexpired term of another
Commissioner which ended on December 31, 1995. On August 23, 1995, Canonizado was re-
appointed for another six years. Pureza was appointed on January 2, 1997 for a similar term of
six years. Respondent Adiong's appointment to the NAPOLCOM was issued on July 23, 1996.
None of their terms had expired at the time the amendatory law was passed.
On March 6, 1998, RA 8551 took effect; it declared that the terms of the current Commissioners
were deemed as expired upon its effectivity.

Public respondents insist that the express declaration in Section 8 of RA 8551 that the terms of
petitioners' offices are deemed expired discloses the legislative intent to impliedly abolish the
NAPOLCOM created under RA 6975 pursuant to a bona fide reorganization.

ISSUE:

WON Sec. 8 of Republic Act No. 8551 (RA 8551), otherwise known as the "Philippine
National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998," is Constitutional.

RULING:

RA 8551 Sec. 8 is unconstitutional. It is beyond dispute that petitioners herein are members of
the civil service, which embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. As such, they cannot be removed or suspended from office, except for cause provided
by law. The phrase "except for cause provided by law" refers to ". . . reasons which the law and
sound public policy recognize as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not
merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient."

The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. It is acknowledged
that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officer's right to continue
in the position held and that such power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack
of funds or in the interest of economy. However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must
be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the
constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees.

An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and
permanently, as the word "abolished" denotes. 14 Where one office is abolished and replaced
with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. Thus,
in U .P. Board of Regents v. Rasul 15 we said:

It is true that a valid and bona fide abolition of an office denies to the
incumbent the right to security of tenure. [De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294
(1982)] However, in this case, the renaming and restructuring of the PGH and
its component units cannot give rise to a valid and bona fide abolition of the
position of PGH Director. This is because where the abolished office and the
offices created in its place have similar functions, the abolition lacks good
faith. [Jose L. Guerrero v. Hon. Antonio V. Arizabal, G.R. No. 81928, June 4,
1990, 186 SCRA 108 (1990)] We hereby apply the principle enunciated in Cesar
Z. Dario vs.Hon. Salvador M. Mison [176 SCRA 84 (1989)] that abolition which
merely changes the nomenclature of positions is invalid and does not result in
the removal of the incumbent.

The above notwithstanding, and assuming that the abolition of the position of
the PGH Director and the creation of a UP-PGH Medical Center Director are
valid, the removal of the incumbent is still not justified for the reason that the
duties and functions of the two positions are basically the same . . . . (italics
supplied) cdll

This was also our ruling in Guerrero v. Arizabal, wherein we declared that the substantial
identity in the functions between the two offices was indicia of bad faith in the removal of
petitioner pursuant to a reorganization.

We come now to the case at bench. The question that must first be resolved is whether or not
petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition of their office by Congress.

Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration that office is
vacant. While it is undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish
certain offices, it can not be conceded the power to simply pronounce those
offices vacant and thereby effectively remove the occupants or holders thereof
from the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an
infringement of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, and will
have to be struck down on that account. It can not be justified by the
professed "need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested
with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications,
ranks, and salaries or emoluments.

This is precisely what RA 8851 seeks to do declare the offices of petitioners vacant, by
declaring that "the terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired," thereby
removing petitioners herein from the civil service. Congress may only be conceded this power if
it is done pursuant to a bona fide abolition of the NAPOLCOM.

RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners' positions.

An amendment pointed out by public respondents is the revision of the NAPOLCOM's


composition. RA 8551 expanded the membership of the NAPOLCOM from four to five
Commissioners by adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officio member.

The powers and duties of the NAPOLCOM remain basically unchanged by the
amendments.

Clearly, the NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative,


supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions.
Public respondents argue that the fact that the NAPOLCOM is now vested with administrative
control and operational supervision over the PNP, whereas under RA 6975 it only exercised
administrative control should be construed as evidence of legislative intent to abolish such
office. This contention is bereft of merit. Control means "the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for the that of the latter." On the other hand, to
supervise is to oversee, to have oversight of, to superintend the execution of or the
performance of a thing, or the movements or work of a person, to inspect with authority; it is
the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.Thus,
the power of control necessarily encompasses the power of supervision and adding the phrase
"operational supervision" under the powers of the NAPOLCOM would not bring about a
substantial change in its functions so as to arrive at the conclusion that a completely new office
has been created. cdasia

Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between
them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions.Naturally, it may result in the loss of one's
position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it
must also pass the test of good faith.

A reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure
would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a
separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or
otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is
void ab initio.

Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that there are now
new appointees to the NAPOLCOM.

---------------------------------------------------------

BANDA v. ERMITA

FACTS: The NPO was formed on July 25, 1987, during the term of former President Corazon C. Aquino
(President Aquino), by virtue of Executive Order No. 285 1 which provided, among others, the creation
of the NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the
Philippine Information Agency (PIA). Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 reads:
SECTION 6. Creation of the National Printing Office. There is hereby created a National
Printing Office out of the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing
units of the Philippine Information Agency. The Office shall have exclusive printing jurisdiction
over the following:

a.Printing, binding and distribution of all standard and accountable forms of national, provincial,
city and municipal governments, including government corporations; b.Printing of officials
ballots; c.Printing of public documents such as the Official Gazette, General Appropriations Act,
Philippine Reports, and development information materials of the Philippine Information
Agency.

The Office may also accept other government printing jobs, including government publications,
aside from those enumerated above, but not in an exclusive basis.

The details of the organization, powers, functions, authorities, and related management aspects
of the Office shall be provided in the implementing details which shall be prepared and
promulgated in accordance with Section II of this Executive Order.

The Office shall be attached to the Philippine Information Agency.

On October 25, 2004, President Arroyo issued the herein assailed Executive Order No. 378, amending
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over
the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. The pertinent portions
of Executive Order No. 378, in turn, provide:

SECTION 1. The NPO shall continue to provide printing services to government agencies and
instrumentalities as mandated by law. However, it shall no longer enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over the
printing services requirements of the government over standard and accountable forms. It shall have to
compete with the private sector, except in the printing of election paraphernalia which could be shared
with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, upon the discretion of the Commission on Elections consistent with
the provisions of the Election Code of 1987.

SECTION 2. Government agencies/instrumentalities may source printing services outside NPO provided
that: 2.1The printing services to be provided by the private sector is superior in quality and at a lower
cost than what is offered by the NPO; and 2.2The private printing provider is flexible in terms of meeting
the target completion time of the government agency.

SECTION 3. In the exercise of its functions, the amount to be appropriated for the programs, projects
and activities of the NPO in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) shall be limited to its income without
additional financial support from the government. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source
their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that
the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what
was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO's appropriation in the General
Appropriations Act to its income.

ISSUE: Can the President amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino
when the latter still exercised legislative powers.

RULING: YES.

1. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the
offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President's constitutionally granted
power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power
to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, 12 the
Court pointed out that Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the
President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the
President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code.
2. It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in
various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an
agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
3. Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code significantly provides: Sec. 20.Residual
Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and
functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not
specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.
Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch under Section
31 includes such powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an
inclusive and broad interpretation of the President's power to reorganize executive offices has been
consistently supported by specific provisions in general appropriations laws.
4. In the more recent case of Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, 23
which involved a structural and functional reorganization of the Department of Health under an
executive order, we reiterated the principle that the power of the President to reorganize agencies
under the executive department by executive or administrative order is constitutionally and
statutorily recognized.
5. The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an exercise of a delegated legislative
power granted by the aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative
Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the Office
of the President, "in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." This is a matter already
well-entrenched in jurisprudence. The reorganization of such an office through executive or
administrative order is also recognized in the Administrative Code of 1987.
6. To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the
President and the departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include
the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must
be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the executive department
must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Stated
alternatively, the presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in the executive branch of
government is subject to the condition that such reorganization is carried out in good faith.
7. If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of security
of tenure of affected government employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,
29 we even observed that there was no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except those
who hold constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right to an office or salary.
PICHAY v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O.
12) creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate
or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against
presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President. Pertinent
portions of E.O. 12 provide: Section 4.Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions. (a). . . (b)The Commission,
acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against all presidential appointees in the government and any of its agencies or
instrumentalities . . . xxx xxx xxx Section 8.Submission of Report and Recommendations. After
completing its investigation or hearing, the Commission en banc shall submit its report and
recommendations to the President. The report and recommendations shall state, among others, the
factual findings and legal conclusions, as well as the penalty recommend (sic) to be imposed or such
other action that may be taken." TcCSIa

On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13),
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division
(IAD).

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint affidavit 2 for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members
of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M.
Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five
Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

ISSUES:

A. WON the President has the power to reorganize PAGC.


B. WON EO 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to create a public
office.
C. WON E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of the legislature to appropriate funds.

RULING: NO
A.
1. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for
such purpose: (1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another; (2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to
any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from
other Departments and Agencies; and (3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to
any other Department or Agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from
other departments or agencies.

2. In Domingo v. Zamora, 6 the Court gave the rationale behind the President's continuing authority in
this wise: The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the
President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office
of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he
deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the
command post of the President.

3. Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created
within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing
"delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.

4. However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and
(3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President
Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to
another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize
offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited
to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or
Agencies, and vice versa. The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section
31 (1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects
employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization,
that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O.
292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2)
Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively, 9 and was placed
directly "under the Office of the President." 10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the
functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the President
Proper. 11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the
reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is
allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.

B.

1. The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the
duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the
ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization
required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the
establishment of a third division the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division through which
ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.

C.

1. In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to
recommend the budget necessary for the operation of the Government, 16 which implies that he
has the necessary authority to evaluate and determine the structure that each government agency
in the executive department would need to operate in the most economical and efficient manner.
17 Hence, the express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act
of 2010 of the President's authority to "direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in
any department or agency." The aforecited provision, often and consistently included in the general
appropriations laws, recognizes the extent of the President's power to reorganize the executive
offices and agencies under him, which is, "even to the extent of modifying and realigning
appropriations for that purpose."
2. He (president) is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which is included in the
General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

3. Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount
appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds
for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's own office budget without
committing any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to
appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by
Congress for his office.

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Pan v. Pena Case Digest

1998 Elections newly declared Mayor Marcel Pan of Municipality of Goa, Camarines Sur initiated a
reorganization of the local government, allegedly due to the large budgetary deficit of the municipality
brought about by a bloated bureaucracy. In line with these, the Sangguniang Bayan (Sanggunian) passed
Resolution No. 025-98 authorizing the mayor to partly reorganize the bureaucracy, which was then later
amended by Resolution No. 046-93, giving the mayor full authority to restructure the local government
unit (LGU).

The Sanggunian thereafter created a Placement Committee via Resolution No. 054-98 to oversee
the LGU reorganization in terms of selection and placement of personnel, in consonance with the
procedures laid down in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6656, the Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil
Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganizationof 1988, and its
implementing rules.

Affected by this reorganization were herein respondents local revenue collection officer I
(waterworks supervisor) Yolanda Pea (Pea), utility worker II Marivic Enciso (Marivic), revenue
collection clerk II Melinda Cantor (Cantor), utility worker II Romeo Asor (Asor) and utility worker I
Edgar Enciso (Enciso), who were permanent employees assigned at the various departments of the LGU
but whose positions were abolished.

Respondents applied for the newly created positions in the LGUs new organization and staffing
pattern, Pea as cashier II; Marivic as local legislative staff or bookbinder; Cantor as revenue collection
clerk; Asor as local legislative staff; and Enciso as bookbinder. However, the applications of respondents
were not approved by the Placement Committee. Instead, the latter, recommended, and the mayor
appointed Evelyn Granadino, Salvacion Asor, Myrna Macuja, Ma. Christina Mendoza and Mina Natalia
Vargas to fill up the ranks.

After due notice and hearing, a total of thirty one (31) employees, including respondents, were
separated from the service effective October 30, 1998.

Respondents then filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which, after
consideration of the qualifications of the parties involved, ruled in favor of respondents, taking notice of
why the new positions were filled up by others who are less preferred or qualified in terms of status of
appointment, training, education and length of service, instead of by respondents who were holding
permanent positions.

Mayor Pan sought recourse to SC after his motion for reconsiderations were denied. He insisted
that all those retained in the reorganization were permanent employees holding permanent positions who
are equally, if not better, qualified compared with respondents. And he questioned the conflicting actions
of the CSC when it still ordered the reinstatement of respondents despite its approval of the appointment
of the new appointees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization undertaken by Mayor Pan was done in good faith?

Ruling: (NOT DONE IN GOOD FAITH!)


In fine, the reorganization of the government of the Municipality of Goa was not entirely
undertaken in the interest of efficiency and austerity but appears to have been marred by other
considerations in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees like
respondents.
A reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It alters the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between
them to make the bureaucracy more responsive to the needs of the public clientele as authorized by law. It
could result in the loss of ones position through removal or abolition of an office. For a reorganization
for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, however, it must pass
the test of good faith, otherwise it is void ab initio.

. . . As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make

bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the

position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the

abolition, which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of

tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done, is void ab initio.

There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy

are belied by the existence of ample funds. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656 cites certain circumstances showing bad faith in the removal of
employees as a result of any reorganization, thus:

Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a
valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exist when,
pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered
redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the
exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The
existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as
evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of the reorganization, giving
rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:

a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned;

b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is
created;

c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;

d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and


the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices;

e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. (Emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied)
And Section 3 of the same law provides for the order of removal of employees as follows:

Sec. 3. In the separation of personnel pursuant to reorganization, the following


order of removal shall be followed:

(a) Casual employees with less than five (5) years of government service;

(b) Casual employees with five (5) years or more of government service;

(c) Employees holding temporary appointments; and


(d) Employees holding permanent appointments: Provided, That those in the
same category as enumerated above, who are least qualified in terms of performance and
merit shall be laid first, length of service notwithstanding.

In the case at bar, petitioner claims that there has been a drastic reduction
of plantilla positions in the new staffing pattern in order to address the LGUs gaping budgetary
deficit. Thus, he states that in the municipal treasurers office and waterworks operations unit where
respondents were previously assigned, only 11 new positions were created out of the previous 35 which
had been abolished; and that the new staffing pattern had 98 positions only, as compared with the old
which had 129.

The CSC, however, highlighted the recreation of six (6) casual positions for clerk II and utility
worker I, which positions were previously held by respondents Marivic, Cantor, Asor and
Enciso. Petitioner inexplicably never disputed this finding nor proferred any proof that the new positions
do not perform the same or substantially the same functions as those of the abolished. And nowhere in
the records does it appear that these recreated positions were first offered to respondents.

The appointment of casuals to these recreated positions violates R.A. 6656, as Section 4 thereof
instructs that:

Sec. 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given


preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing
pattern comparable to their former positions or in case there are not enough comparable
positions, to positions next lower in rank.

No new employees shall be taken until all permanent officers and employees
have been appointed, including temporary and casual employees who possess the
necessary qualification requirement, among which is the appropriate civil service
eligibility, for permanent appointment to positions in the approved staffing pattern, in
case there are still positions to be filled, unless such positions are policy-determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical in nature. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In the case of respondent Pea, petitioner claims that the position of waterworks supervisor had
been abolished during the reorganization. Yet, petitioner appointed an officer-in-charge in 1999 for its
waterworks operations even after a supposed new staffing pattern had been effected in 1998. Notably,
this position of waterworks supervisor does not appear in the new staffing pattern of the LGU.Apparently,
the Municipality of Goa never intended to do away with such position wholly and permanently as it
appointed another person to act as officer-in-charge vested with similar functions.

While the CSC never found the new appointees to be unqualified, and never disapproved nor
recalled their appointments as they presumably met all the minimum requirements therefor, there is
nothing contradictory in the CSCs course of action as it is limited only to the non-discretionary authority
of determining whether the personnel appointed meet all the required conditions laid down by law.

Congruently, the CSC can very well order petitioner to reinstate respondents to their former
positions (as these were never actually abolished) or to appoint them to comparable positions in the new
staffing pattern.

Petition Denied!

-----------------------------------------------------

Case Digest: United Claimants Association of NEA (UNICAN) v. National Electrification Administration,
G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012

FACTS: The controversy of this case stemmed from the issuance of Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, otherwise
known as the National Electrification Administration (NEA) Termination Pay Plan, by respondent NEA Board of
Administrators (NEA Board) pursuant to the directive of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo mandating the NEA
Board to submit a reorganization plan in line with the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9136, otherwise known
as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001(EPIRA Law), in order to enhance and accelerate the
electrification of the whole country, including the privatization of the National Power Corporation.

Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were terminated from their employment with the
implementation of the assailed resolutions. They filed an action for Injunction to restrain and/or prevent the
implementation of the abovementioned resolutions contending that the NEA Board has no power to terminate all the
NEA employees, and that Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 were carried out in bad faith.

On the other hand, respondent NEA is a government-owned and/or controlled corporation created in
accordance with Presidential Decree No. (PD) 269 issued on August 6, 1973. Under PD 269, Section 5(a)(5), the
NEA Board is empowered to organize or reorganize NEAs staffing structure. NEA argued that the assailed NEA
Board resolutions were issued in good faith.

ISSUE: (1) Whether the NEA Board had the power to pass Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 terminating all of its
employees
(2) Whether the reorganization was undertaken in bad faith

RULING: (1) Yes. Under Rule 33, Section 3(b)(ii) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the EPIRA Law,
all NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation of a reorganization program
pursuant to a law enacted by Congress orpursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through which the reorganization was
carried out, viz:

Section 5. National Electrification Administration; Board of Administrators;


Administrator.

(a) For the purpose of administering the provisions of this Decree, there is hereby
established a public corporation to be known as the National Electrification Administration. x x x

xxxx

The Board shall, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, have the following
specific powers and duties.

xxxx

5. To establish policies and guidelines for employment on the basis of merit, technical
competence and moral character, and, upon the recommendation of the Administrator to organize
or reorganize NEAs staffing structure, to fix the salaries of personnel and to define their powers
and duties. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Betoy v. The Board of Directors, National Power Corporation,[4] the Court upheld the dismissal of all the
employees of the NPC pursuant to the EPIRA Law. In ruling that the power of reorganization includes the power of
removal, the Court explained:

[R]eorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or


abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of
ones position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the
purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass
the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio. (Emphasis supplied.)

Evidently, the termination of all the employees of NEA was within the NEA Boards powers and may not
successfully be impugned absent proof of bad faith.

(2) No. Petitioners Failed to Prove that the NEA Board Acted in Bad Faith.
Congress itself laid down the indicators of bad faith in the reorganization of government offices in Sec. 2 of
RA 6656, an Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of
Government Reorganization, to wit:

Section 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a
valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a
bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to
merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other
lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following
circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of
reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved
party:

(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new
staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;

(b) Where an office is abolished and other performing substantially the


same functions is created;

(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status
of appointment, performance and merit;

(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency


concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same function as the
original offices;

(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3
hereof. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the abolished offices were replaced by
substantially the same units performing the same functions; and (2) incumbents are replaced by less qualified
personnel.

The Court already had the occasion to pass upon the validity of the similar reorganization in the NPC. In the
aforecited case ofBetoy,[7] the Court upheld the policy of the Executive to terminate all the employees of the office
before rehiring those necessary for its operation. We ruled in Betoy that such policy is not tainted with bad faith:

It is undisputed that NPC was in financial distress and the solution found by Congress
was to pursue a policy towards its privatization. The privatization of NPC necessarily demanded
the restructuring of its operations. To carry out the purpose, there was a need to terminate
employees and re-hire some depending on the manpower requirements of the privatized
companies. The privatization and restructuring of the NPC was, therefore, done in good
faith as its primary purpose was for economy and to make the bureaucracy more efficient.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Evidently, the fact that the NEA Board resorted to terminating all the incumbent employees of NPC and, later
on, rehiring some of them, cannot, on that ground alone, vitiate the bona fides of the reorganization.
Petition Dismissed! Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 are upheld.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bagaoisan vs Nat'l Tobacco Administration. G.R. No. 152845 : August 5, 2003.

FACTS:
1. The petitioner was terminated from their position in the national tobacco administration as a result of
the executive order issued by president Estrada which mandates for the stream lining of the national
tobacco administration, a government agency under the department of agriculture.
2. The petitioners filed a letter of appeal to the civil service commission to recall the ossp.
3. Petitioner all file a petition for certiorari with prohibition an mandamus with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and a temporary restraining
order with the regional trial court of Batak to prevent the respondent from enforcing the notice of
termination and from ousting the petitioners in their respective offices.
4. The regional trial court issued an order ordering the national tobacco administration to appoint the
petitioner to the other position similar to the one that they hold before.
5. The national tobacco administration appealed to the court of appeals who reversed the decision of the
RTC.
6. Petitioner appealed to the supreme court.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the reorganization of the national tobacco administration is valid true issuance of
executive order by the president.

RULING:

It is important to emphasize that the questioned Executive Orders No. 29 and No. 36 have
not abolished the National Tobacco Administration but merely mandated its reorganization
through the streamlining or reduction of its personnel. Article VII, Section 17, of the
Constitution, expressly grants the President control of all executive departments, bureaus,
agencies and offices which may justify an executive action to inactivate the functions of a
particular office or to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law. Section
78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 8522 (General Appropriations Act of FY 1998) has
decreed that the President may direct changes in the organization and key positions in any
department, bureau or agency pursuant to Article VI, Section 25 of the Constitution, which grants
to the Executive Department the authority to recommend the budget necessary for its operation.
Evidently, this grant of power includes the authority to evaluate each and every government
agency, including the determination of the most economical and efficient staffing pattern, under
the Executive Department.

The president has the power and authority to do so, so the reorganization is valid.

We adhere to the x x x ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of the President to
effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling
further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads of departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a
comprehensive review of this respective mandates, missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects,
activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of
public services and which may be scaled down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will
result in the streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their respective agencies.
Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual streamlining and productivity improvement in
agency organization and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the
purpose by the Office of the President. The law has spoken clearly. We are left only with the duty to
sustain.

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in
the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power
that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), the President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he
may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In
Canonizado vs. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312], we ruled that reorganization involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes
place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including
the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize.

It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out reorganization in any
branch or agency of the executive department, what is then left for us to resolve is whether or not the
reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in `good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or
to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides for the circumstances
which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a
result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the
new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of
offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same
functions as the original offices, and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.

Petition DENIED.

G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995 AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner, vs.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, JR.,respondents. FACTS:

The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career Executive Service Board is challenged
in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclea Research Institute. She applied for a Career
Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility.
On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career
Executive Service Board.
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission passed
Resolution No. 93-4359.
The above resolution became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer,
Rank IV.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which
recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul,
among others, resolution No. 93-4359.
The petition is anchored on the following arguments: (1) ESPONDENT COMMISSION USURPED THE
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY
LAW also, (2) RESPONDENT CSC USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT
ILLEGALLY AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY
The Solicitor General agreed with the contentions of petitioner. Respondent Commission, however,
chose to defend its ground.

ISSUE: WON respondent commission has the power to abolish the Career Executive Service Board.

RULING: We find merit in the petition.

The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974 4 which adopted the Integrated Plan.
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the
legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices
is primarily a legislative function.
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB.
On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside
funds for the operation of CESB.
Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:

Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a
Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary independent
constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as the need arises.

But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with
Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission's power to reorganize is
limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16
From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively
attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB
shall be autonomous.
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent
Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent
Commission.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related
government agency to another is to attain "policy and program coordination."
Petition GRANTED.

0--------------------------------------------------- NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMNSTRATION vs. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION AND VIOLETA GARCIA

Facts:

In 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under
permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also
appointed under permanent status up to September 1984. By virtue of Executive Order No. 649 which authorized the restructuring of the Land
Registration Commission to National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein.
Petitioner was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II under temporary status, for not being a member of the Philippine Bar.
October 23, 1984, petitioner Garcia was administratively charged. While said case was pending decision, her temporary appointment as such
was renewed in 1985. October 30, 1986, Secretary of Justice notified petitioner of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II
on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money". Then MSPB dropped the appeal of petitioner Garcia as well as her motion for
reconsideration was denied on similar ground.

June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission directed that private respondent Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Register of Deeds II
or its equivalent in the NALTDRA.

Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of the above Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. It contends that
Sections 8 and 10 of Executive Order No. 649 abolished all existing positions in the LRC and transferred their functions to the appropriate new
offices created by said Executive Order, which newly created offices required the issuance of new appointments to qualified office holders.
Verily, Executive Order No. 649 applies to private respondent Garcia, and not being a member of the Bar, she cannot be reinstated to her
former position as Deputy Register of Deeds II.

Issue:
1.) Whether or not E.O. 649 abolished all the existing positions in LRC.
2.) Whether or not there was a valid reorganization.
3.) Whether or not the qualification requirement of membership in the Bar applicable to Garcia.

Ruling:

1.) Yes .The question of whether or not a law abolishes an office is one of legislative intent about which there can be no controversy
whatsoever if there is an explicit declaration in the law itself. A closer examination of Executive Order No. 649 which authorized the
reorganization of the Land Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration
(NALTDRA) Thus, without need of any interpretation, the law mandates that from the moment an implementing order is issued, all
positions in the Land Registration Commission are deemed non-existent. This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of a
position does not involve or mean removal for the reason that removal implies that the post subsists and that one is merely
separated therefrom. 5 After abolition, there is in law no occupant. Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this sense that
from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
2.) YES. There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the Government. Under
Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, the applicable law at that time:

Sec. 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by this
Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective offices upon the appointment and qualifications of their
successors.The power to reorganize is, however; not absolute. We have held that reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been
regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better
systematize the operation of the Land Registration Commission. A reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose
of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.

3.) YES. The position which private respondent Garcia would like to occupy anew was abolished pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a
valid reorganization measure. There is no vested property right to be re employed in a reorganized office. Not being a member of
the Bar, the minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization law for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds
II, she cannot be reinstated to her former position without violating the express mandate of the law.

LARIN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and his co-accused of the crimes of violation of some provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code and R.A 3019.His conviction
was reported to the President of Philippines through a memorandum. Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo Quisumbing acting under the
authority of the President issued Memorandum Order No. 164 which provides for the creation of an executive Committee to investigate the
administrative charge against petitioner. The petitioner questioned the administrative complaint filed against him. Meanwhile, the President
issued E.O. No. 132 which mandates for the streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Under said order, some positions and functions are
abolished, renamed, decentralized or transferred to other offices, while other offices are also created. The Excise Tax Service, of which the
petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was abolished. Consequently, under A.O. No. 101, petitioner was
found guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits
and retirement benefits including disqualification for reappointment in the government service. Petitioner questioned his unlawful removal
from office. Petitioner challenged the authority of the President to dismiss him from office. He argued that in so far as presidential appointees
who are Career Executive Service Officers, the President exercises only the power of control not the power to remove. He likewise assailed that
he was removed as a result of the reorganization made by the Executive Department in the BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132. He claimed that there
is yet no law enacted by Congress which authorizes there organization by the Executive Department of executive agencies, particularly the
BIR. On the other hand, the respondents contended that since petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of
the President. Respondents claimed that he was not dismissed by virtue of EO 132 but because he was found guilty of grave misconduct in the
administrative cases filed against him.

Issue:
a) Whether or not the president has the power to discipline the petitioner?
b) Were the proceedings taken pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 164 in accord with due process?
c) What is the effect of petitioners acquittal in the criminal case to his administrative charge? d) Does the President have the power to
reorganize the BIR or to issue the questioned E.O. NO. 132?
e) Is the reorganization of BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132 tainted with bad faith?

Ruling:
a.) Yes. Under the law,[3] Career Executive Service officers, namely Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau director, Assistant
Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as
may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, are all appointed by the President. Concededly, petitioner was appointed
as Assistant Commissioner in January, 1987 by then President Aquino. Thus, petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to
career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President.
This is in line with the well settled principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred to the
President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that Memorandum Order No. 164, which created a
committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner, was issued pursuant to the power of removal of the
President. This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no reservation. It must be pointed out that
petitioner is a career service officer. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the existence of
security of tenure.. As a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure. No less than the 1987 Constitution
guarantees the right of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service. It is emphatic that career service officers and
employees who enjoy security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. In other words, the fact
that the petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his
pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection,
thus, may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural due process.

b.) Yes, although the proceedings taken complied with the requirements of procedural due process, this Court, however, considers that
petitioner was not dismissed for a valid cause. It must be stressed at this juncture that the conviction of petitioner by the
Sandiganbayan was set aside by this court .We specifically ruled in no uncertain terms that : a) petitioner cannot be held negligent in
relying on the certification of a co-equal unit in the BIR, b) it is not incumbent upon Larin to go beyond the certification made by the
Revenue Accounting Division that Tanduay Distillery, Inc. had paid the ad valorem taxes, c) there is nothing irregular or anything
false in Larin's marginal note on the memorandum addressed to Pareno, the Chief of Alcohol Tax Division who was also one of the
accused, but eventually acquitted, in the said criminal cases, and d) there is no proof of actual agreement between the accused,
including petitioner, to commit the illegal acts charged. We are emphatic in our resolution in said cases that there is nothing "illegal
with the acts committed by the petitioner(s)." We also declare that "there is no showing that petitioner(s) had acted irregularly, or
performed acts outside of his (their) official functions." Significantly, these acts which We categorically declare to be not unlawful
and improper in G.R. Nos. 108037-38 and G.R. Nos. 107119-20 are the very same acts for which petitioner is held to be
administratively responsible.

c.) We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission,
the dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charge does not foreclose the institution of administrative action nor carry with it the relief
from administrative liability.[6] However, the circumstantial setting of the instant case sets it miles apart from the foregoing rule and
placed it well within the exception. Corollarily, where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in
the criminal action which was later on set aside by this court upon a categorical and clear findings that the acts for which he was
administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the
dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in such a case, there is no basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the
administrative suit

d.) Yes. Under its Preamble, E.O. No. 132 lays down the legal basis of its issuance of E.O. 132, namely: a) Section 48 and 62 of R.A. No.
7645, b) Section 63 of E.O. No. 127, and c) Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292.This provision speaks of such other powers vested in
the President under the law. What law then which gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 [9] which
amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of
these two decrees are unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked."

e.) Yes. E.O. No. 132 clearly leads us to an inescapable conclusion that there are circumstances considered as evidences of bad faith in
the reorganization of the BIR.

Section 1.1.2 of said executive order provides that:

"1.1.2 The Intelligence and Investigation Office and the Inspection Service are abolished. An Intelligence and Investigation
Service is hereby created to absorb the same functions of the abolished office and service. xxx" (italics ours)

This provision is a clear illustration of the circumstance mentioned in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 6656 that an office is abolished and
another one performing substantially the same function is created. Another circumstance is the creation of services and divisions in
the BIR resulting to asignificant increase in the number of positions in the said bureau as contemplated in paragraph (a) of section 2
of R.A. No. 6656. Under Section 1.3 of E.O. No. 132, the Information Systems Group has two newly created Systems Services. Aside
from this, six new divisions are also created.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CASE DIGESTS

G.R. No. 49065 June 1, 1994

EVELIO B. JAVIER, RIZAL G. PAGTANAC, JOVITO C. PLAMERAS, JR., SILVESTRE E. UNTARAN,


JR. and ALFONSO V. COMBONG, JR., Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MAXIMIANO
SENTINA, JUANITO BULAC, FRED PALLON, AMADO YANGSON, ANGEL MARTINEZ, DIONISIO
NOMBREHERMOSO, MANUEL RIVERO, JR., FEDERICO RUIZ, JR., MELQUIADES GALIDO,
AGUSTIN ALMOROS, GENEROSO BARSUBIA, FELOMINO CABREJAS, FORTUNATO CADIAO,
FERNANDO CONDES, MARCELINO DE LA CRUZ, PELAGIO JUADA, FRANCISCO JUBILAN,
RODOLFO SIASOL, EPE MACABANTI, ERNESTO GRASPARIL, EUSTAQUIO MENA, DIONISIO
JAVIER, PETRONILO BERGANTINOS, FRANCISCO ABANTO, FELIMON ABLE, CORAZON
HABLADO, JOSE ADUG, SILVESTRE ELLO, ESTEBAN MANINGO, ELEUTERIO PLAMERAS,
FELIPE DE LOS REYES, GONZALO VELASCO, TEODULFO NARANJO, ALFREDO BACAWAG, JOSE
CEPE, ENRIQUE JOSILVA, PEDRO QUANICO, PELAGIO ESPARAR, CRISANTO GELLA,
RODULFO GUMANAO and CRISANTO MEJUGE, respondents, ENRIQUE A.
ZALDIVAR,intervenor.

VITUG, J.: chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

SUBJECT MATTER: VALIDITY OR CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROVINCIAL BOARD RESOLUTION 206,


ABOLISHING OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL ENGINEER ry

Facts:

Provincial Engineer Maximiano Sentina and forty (40) officials and employees of the Office of
the Provincial Engineer filed a petition for mandamus and damages against the entire
Provincial Board of Antique. The petition was anchored on the hypothesis that the abolition
of the Office of the Provincial Engineer was a circumvention of the constitutional mandate
on security of tenure and intended only to weed out provincial officials and employees who
opposed the Provincial Boards candidacy in the November 1971 elections. chan roblesv irtualawl ibra ry cha n robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Respondents, denying petitioners ascriptions, insisted that the abolition of the Office of the
Provincial Engineer was motivated instead by a provision of Presidential Decree No. 17, which
lowered the internal revenue allotment to the road and bridge fund of the province from 50%
to 17.5% thereby leaving an inadequate allotment for materials, salaries and operating
expenses of the Office of the Provincial Engineer. Respondents averred that the power of the
provincial board to create an office carried with it the power to abolish it; that administrative
remedies had not been exhausted by petitioners; and that mandamus was an improper
remedy inasmuch as the power to appropriate funds for the Office was not ministerial but
within the sound judgment of respondents. chanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

RTC DECISIONRENDERED DECISION IN FAVOR OF petitioner, PROVINCIAL BOARD

THE court a quo reasoned that the "drastic decrease in the amount available for appropriation"
was the principal consideration that impelled the Provincial Board to abolish the Office. The
court a quo also took note of the resolutions of several municipal councils in Antique calling the
attention of the Provincial Board to the neglect in the maintenance of provincial roads.

the Court finds and so holds that Resolution No. 206, Series of 1973, was validly enacted by
the herein respondents, composing the Provincial Board of Antique, and consequently dismisses the
herein petition.
motion for recon was filed by herein petitioners but denied, then they appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which reversed the decision of TC, in favour of petitioners

ca decision: rendered in favour of respondents, provincial engineer, et.al

"the passage of Resolution No. 206 was prompted in the main by reasons other than those stated
therein," and that the evidence on record "adequately justifie(d) the charge that personal and
political animosities on the part of petitioner Sentina, on (the) one hand, and respondents, on the
other, (had) caused the respondent Provincial Board to enact said resolution." The appellate court
declared

(a) Resolution No. 206, Series of 1973 of the Provincial Board of Antique, to be null and
void;

(b) granting the writ of mandamus, and ordering the respondents, or their successors as members of
the Provincial Board of Antique, to reinstate the petitioners to the positions they held in the Office of
the Provincial Engineer ; to appropriate the necessary amounts for the maintenance of said office and
the payment of the back salaries of the petitioners

(c) ordering the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay each of the petitioners for moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees, respectively;

(d) ordering the lower court to conduct further proceedings to determine the amount allowable as
back salaries to each of the petitioners

----------------------------------hence the present petition filed by provincial board:

MAIN ISSUES:

: whether or not the provincial board had the authority under the then existing laws to enact the
questioned resolution, and, in the affirmative, whether or not that authority was legitimately exercised

SC DECISION: PETITION IS GRANTED, BOARD RESO IS VALID, BOARD HAS AUTHORITY TO


ISSUE SUCH RESO, IT WAS DONE IN GOOD FAITH

RESPONDENT, PROVINCIAL ENGINEER ET AL, contends that reso in dispute is unconstitutional for
being violative of General order no. 3 and Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution -

Sec. 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall
continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of the
Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by this Constitution vested in the Prime Minister
shall vacate their respective offices upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. -

purpose behind General Order No. 3 to continue, i.e., to consolidate in the hands of the President,
the power to appoint, dismiss and control all officials of the government, both national and local, in
line with the nature and spirit of martial law. 7Respondents quote a portion of the Journal of the
Constitutional Convention during its 287th plenary session of 25 November 1972, where their
counsel, Arturo Pacificador, a constitutional convention delegate, stated on the floor during the
discussions on Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution, that ". . . the local government unit
who may believe that an office they (have) created is no longer necessary may petition the
President to issue a decree abolishing the same, but it will be beyond their power to abolish
by themselves said office in view of the clear mandate of the provision of the Constitution."

Undoubtedly, Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution did convey an authority to carry out a
valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the Government, 9recalling to mind General Order No.
3, but this general provision could not have meant or envisioned an absolute proscription on
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, if and when minded, from themselves creating or abolishing positions, an
authority that they theretofore had under the then existing laws. One such law was Section 18 of
Republic Act No. 5185 (Local Autonomy Act), then still in force, which empowered provincial
governments to create, among other positions, the office of a provincial engineer.

While the law did not expressly vest on provincial governments the power to abolish that office,
absent, however, any contrary provision, that authority should be deemed embraced by implication
from the power to create it. Section 23 of the Act, in fact, expressed that an "implied power of a
province . . . (should) be liberally construed in its favor" and "(a)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to
the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of local government and it (should) be
presumed to exist."

We must rule then that the power of the province of Antique to abolish the office in question did exist
at the time.

The real debatable issue focuses on the real reasons behind the questioned action of the provincial
board. An abolition of office is not per se objectionable but this rule carries a caveat that the act is
done in good faith.chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

There are contrary findings gathered by CA and RTCOn the one hand, valid reasons have been
shown that tend to substantiate the need at the time for the abolition of the office in question by the
Provincial Board. Upon the other hand, it cannot be discounted that personal and political motives did
contribute in no small measure in that final decision of the board. Hence, considering the convexity of
circumstances attendant to the decision process. An order of reinstatement is necessary but rest
assured that..We are not prepared, however, to conclude a clear case of bad faith on the part of
respondents.

Because reinstatement is impossibleIt is our considered view that in lieu of an order for
reinstatement of private respondents, an award for backwages, equivalent to five (5) years without
qualification or deduction, should be paid to said respondents, pursuant to our ruling in Rubio, et al.,
vs. Peoples Homesite & Housing Corporation, et al.

This is however no longer an easy matter. In the first place, it is doubtful if reinstatement as a remedy
would be feasible in view of the fact that more than twenty-three (23) years have already elapsed
since the petitioners-employees positions were abolished. Many of them will have found employment
elsewhere. Some may have passed away. Many others will have reached retirement age or will no
longer be employable on account of age or inadequacy of qualifications, by this time. In the second
place, as the PHHC and the other respondents allege, it would be unfair to "permit a dismissed laborer
to earn back wages for all time, or for a very long period of time," without allowing the employer to
prove the salaries the laborer had earned during the period of his separation, or what efforts he had
exerted to find gainful employment; . . .

In Antiporda vs. Ticao (160 SCRA 4C), the Court, citing previous cases, held that since the
reinstatement of an employee unjustly terminated was no longer feasible, the latter should instead be
awarded "backwages equivalent to five (5) years without qualification or deduction." chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, JUDGMENT is hereby
rendered ORDERING petitioners, or their incumbent successors in the Provincial Government of
Antique, to cause to be paid to private respondents back salaries, computed as of the date of their
removal, equivalent to five (5) years without qualification or deduction. No costs. GRANTED
--------------------------------------------------------------

2nd.. G.R. No. L-57883 March 12, 1982

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo,


ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C.
ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO
AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on
Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, Respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

facts
The subject matter of this case deals mainly with the constitutionality of BP 129 or "An act reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."

Said legislative act of Congress, petitioners assert, constitute a violation of time-honored principle of judiciary
independence as set forth in the constitution which provides: "The Members of the Supreme Court and judges
of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal." 3

The bulk of the controversy is grounded on the fact that said statute MANDATES that Justices and judges of
inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act,
would be considered separated from the judiciary.

Because of the termination of their incumbency, herein petitioners instituted this present action for being a
breach of their constitutional right to security of tenure

Hence, petitioners prays the court to render judgment declaring BP 129 unconsitutional and for further
seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Moreover, petitioners bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in the enactment of said act,
characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the
compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the
date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed.

Speaking for the respondent and favouring the validity of BP 129, solicitor general estelito Mendoza, points
out in his Answer that there is no valid or legal justification for attacking the constitutionality of said act, it
being a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary,

..the exchange of views being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion
and so hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.

SC decision..(pls dont complain..this is shortened version na jed.. ) I cited the most


important principles for the subject. If you want to find out particular provisions used, pls
refer to full text..

1.petitioners have locus standi: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement." of petitioners, are vindicating
at most what they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. 'The protection
of private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered
state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown
that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated.

2. petitioners assert that..the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 demonstrate lack of
good faith.

Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its antecedents.

,.. On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. . The
Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary .(the purpose of the
committee).."The Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the following
Report. It expresses at the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and
means for what today is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial
system. There are problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measuresIt is
imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially
those of modest means much more so, the poorest and the humblest can vindicate their rights
in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts
operate must be manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those whose interests
are affected by the exercise of their functions.. New social interests are pressing for recognition in
the courts. Groups long inarticulate, primarily those economically underprivileged, have found legal
spokesmen and are asserting grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judicially has not
proved inattentive "To be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly
stressed and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization. Of equal importance is the
aspect on the substantiation of the true meaning of social justiceThe efforts towards reducing the
gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory legislation.
vital concern is the problem of clogged dockets,

(note: SC says in the above texts that Congress, in enacting BP 129 did not exercise bad faith for in
fact it had more than legal justification in doing so, taking into consideration a review of the history of
the law before it took into effect.)

3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in the
Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a
major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after four
generations. 22 Sc in this paragraph only took judicial notice on various major reorganization..
but this par., in my opinion is of less importance in our subject(admin)

very important..4. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office
within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity.

No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the
abolition of their offices. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbents. ..., if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have
ceased to hold office. abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is
the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith." The test remains
whether the abolition is in good faith. Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among
other judicial districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising
Manila and the provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. Section 2, Article VIII of
the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the case of the Supreme Court. It is
admitted that section 9 of the same article of the Constitution provides for the security of tenure of all
the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of the same article of the Constitution
must be coordinated and harmonized.

5.) It was pointed out by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same
court is valid and constitutional. such conclusion flowing "from the fundamental proposition that the
legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them
territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions." . For the
Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts was the appropriate response to
the grave and urgent problems that pressed for solution.

6).. The implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the
Executive, may give rise, however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept
independent. 64 The president, under Article VII, shall be the head of state and chief executive of the
Republic of the Philippines." 66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: "The
Executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." 67 As originally framed, the 1973
Constitution created the position of President as the "symbolic head of state." 68 In addition, there
was a provision for a Prime Minister as the head of government exercising the executive power with
the assistance of the Cabinet 69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was established. In the
light of the 1981 amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of
Labor 70 could state: "The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended
Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character.2 What is equally apparent is that the
strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments.. It is understandable then why
in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with the provision transferring to the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need "to preserve unimpaired
the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents and purposes, there
is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches." 74 (note: the court emphasizes in
this aspect the power of the president as wielding the exclusive executive power solely lodge in his
office and, his ties and relations with Congress in proclaiming BP 129 into effecting the
reorganization, hence, SC stressed that it was given administrative supervision over lower court
judges and employees, therewith, because of the possibility that there may be again another fusion
of Executive and Legislative branches as what happened in marcos regime)

7.). To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides
with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of
the Constitution.

Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In
case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position.

8.) Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or
harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly
vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing
ones.

It is of the essence of constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within
the boundaries of its conceded competence. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence
than in independence and separation of powers, The constitutional structure is a complicated
system, and overlappings of governmental functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent
necessities of governmental coordination." 86 In the same way that the academe has noted the
existence in constitutional litigation of right versus right, there are instances, and this is one of them,
where, without this attempt at harmonizing the provisions in question, there could be a case of power
against power. That we should avoid.

9.) There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would
characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of
authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed

The existence of a standard is thus clear. the test being the completeness of the statue in all its
terms and provisions when enacted. there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise,
the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied.

10.) It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted.

"A public office is a public trust." 104 The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a
significance transcending that of a purely personal right. independence in thought and action
necessarily is rooted in one's mind and heart. there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence
than the God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be
guaranteed a fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them
to be subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after
another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty Ideal. Just
as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by
any other department or the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence
to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act."

WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown,
this petition is dismissed. No costs.

-----------------------------------------

3RD.G.R. No. 106296 July 5, 1996

ISABELO T. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner,


vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:p

FACTS:

Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC),
having been appointed to that position by the President of the Philippines on July 17, 1974.
In his, two administrative cases were filed against petitioner for illegal use of government
vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials belonging to the college, oppression and
harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The administrative cases, which
were filed with the Office of the President, were subsequently referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation.
Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019, 3(e) and R.A. No. 992, 20-21 and R.A. No. 733,
14 were likewise filed against him with the Office of Tanodbayan.

LATER, three (3) informations for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, as amended) were filed against him. The informations alleged
that he appropriated for himself a bahay kubo, which was intended for the College, and
construction materials worth P250,000.00, more or less. Petitioner was also accused of
using a driver of the College as his personal and family driver.

THEREAFTER, petitioner was preventively suspended from office pursuant to R.A. No.
3019, 13, as amended. In his place Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-
charge, and then as Acting President

On 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, CONVERTING
THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY,

Mateo continued as the head of the new University. On April 3, 1979, he was appointed
Acting President and on March 28, 1980, as President for a term of six (6) years.

the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila rendered judgment acquitting petitioner of the charges
against him PETITIONER is ordered reinstated to the position of President of the
Philippine College of Commerce, now known as the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,
from which he has been suspended. By virtue of said reinstatement, he is entitled to receive
the salaries and other benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. The bail bonds filed by
the accused for his provisional liberty in these cases are hereby cancelled and released.

The cases filed before the Tanodbayan (now the Ombudsman) were likewise dismissed ..On
the other hand, the administrative cases were dismissed for failure of the complainants to
prosecute them.

, petitioner filed with the RTC motion for execution ordering his reinstatement to the position
of president of the PUP and the payment of his salaries and other benefits during the period
of suspension. Motion was granted but in the meantime president cory Aquino appointed dr.
gellor as acting pup PUP president,,succeeding Dr. Nemesio Prudente.. who likewise
succeeded Dr. Mateo.. because of this, the sheriff was not able to comply with such writ of
execution.. DR. gellor refuse to vacate the position as he wanted to consult the Pres. Aquino
for this conflict.

Upon motion by the People of the phils. the CA issued a temporary restraining order,
enjoining petitioner to cease and desist from acting as president of the PUP pursuant to the
reinstatement orders of the trial court,

After which, the 7th div CA rendered a decision. setting aside the orders and writ of
reinstatement issued by the trial court. The payment of salaries and benefits to petitioner
accruing after the conversion of the PCC to the PUP was disallowed. Recovery of salaries
and benefits was limited to those accruing from the time of petitioner's suspension until the
conversion of the PCC to the PUP. The case was remanded to the trial court for a
determination of the amounts due and payable to petitioner.

SC DECISION:

SC DECISION: modified..reinstatement no longer feasible, but only entitled separation pay or


retirement benefits

Hence this petition. Petitioner argues that P.D. No. 1341, which converted the PCC into the PUP, did
not abolish the PCC. He contends that if the law had intended the PCC to lose its existence, it would
have specified that the PCC was being "abolished" rather than "converted" and that if the PUP was
intended to be a new institution, the law would have said it was being "created." Petitioner claims
that the PUP is merely a continuation of the existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could be
reinstated to his former position as president.

In part the contention is well taken, but, as will presently be explained, reinstatement is no longer
possible because of the promulgation of P.D. No. 1437 by the President of the Philippines on June
10, 1978.

P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce
into what is now the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in the same way that earlier in
1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the Philippine School of Commerce into the
Philippine College of Commerce. What took place was a change in academic status of the
educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its
curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization.

As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an
organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so.

P.D. No. 1341, provides:

1. The present Philippine College of Commerce is hereby converted into a


university to be known as the "Polytechnic University of the Philippines," hereinafter
referred to in this Decree as the University.

As already noted, R.A. No. 778 earlier provided:

1. The present Philippine School of Commerce, located in the City of Manila,


Philippines, is hereby granted full college status and converted into the Philippine
College of Commerce, which will offer not only its present one-year and two-year
vocational commercial curricula, the latter leading to the titles of Associate in
Business Education and/or Associate in Commerce, but also four-year courses
leading to the degrees of Bachelor of Science in Business in Education and Bachelor
of Science in Commerce, and five-year courses leading to the degrees of Master of
Arts in Business Education and Master of Arts in Commerce, respectively.

The appellate court ruled, however, that the PUP and the PCC are not "one and the same institution"
but "two different entities" and that since petitioner Crisostomo's term was coterminous with the legal
existence of the PCC, petitioner's term expired upon the abolition of the PCC.
New course offerings can be added to the curriculum of a school without affecting its legal existence.
Nor will changes in its existing structure and organization bring about its abolition and the creation of
a new one. Only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.

The Court of Appeals also cites the provision of P.D. No. 1341 as allegedly implying the abolition of
the PCC and the creation of a new one - the PUP - in its stead

The law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned by the PCC were being
"transferred" to the PUP but only that they "stand transferred" to it. "Stand transferred" simply
means, for example, that lands transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the
PUP as the new name of the institution.

But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of president of the PUP could not be
ordered by the trial court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been promulgated fixing
the term of office of presidents of state universities and colleges at six (6) years, renewable for
another term of six (6) years, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to terminate the terms
of incumbents who were not reappointed.

In this case, Dr. Pablo T. Mateo Jr., who had been acting president of the university since April 3,
1979, was appointed president of PUP for a term of six (6) years on March 28, 1980, with the result
that petitioner's term was cut short. In accordance with 7 of the law, therefore, petitioner became
entitled only to retirement benefits or the payment of separation pay. Petitioner must have
recognized this fact, that is why in 1992 he asked then President Aquino to consider him for
appointment to the same position after it had become vacant in consequence of the retirement of Dr.
Prudente.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by SETTING ASIDE the
questioned orders of the Regional Trial Court directing the reinstatement of the petitioner
Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the position of president of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines and the payment to him of salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during his
suspension in so far as such payment would include salaries accruing after March 28, 1980 when
petitioner Crisostomo's term was terminated. Further proceedings in accordance with this decision
may be taken by the trial court to determine the amount due and payable to petitioner by the
university up to March 28, 1980.

SO ORDERED.

---------------------------------------

4th G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995

AIDA D. EUGENIO, petitioner,


vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. & HON. SALVADOR
ENRIQUEZ, JR.,respondents.

The power of the Civil Service Commission to abolish the Career Executive Service Board is
challenged
Facts:

. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a
Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a
CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank
by the Career Executive Service Board. 1
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service
Commission 2 passed Resolution No. 93-4359, which had the effect of absorbing Career
executive service board under the newly created office, to wit:.., the Career Executive Service
Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil
Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and
equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career
Executive Service.
The above resolution became an impediment. to the appointment of petitioner as Civil
Service Officer, Rank IV.
the Civil Service Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 93-4359 which abolished the
Career Executive Service Board.
Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359,
including whether the Civil Service Commission has authority to abolish the Career
Executive Service Board. Because these issues remain unresolved, the Office of the
President has refrained from considering appointments of career service eligibles to career
executive ranks.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief, aggrieved and considering the many
issues which remain unsolved, as the Career Executive Service Board which
recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench
to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-4359. The petition is anchored on the following
arguments:

A.

IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT COMMISSION


USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT
ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW, THROUGH THE
ISSUANCE OF CSC: RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;

B.

ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT CSC USURPED


THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ILLEGALLY
AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEY, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE
OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359.

Sc decision: cesb is a body created by law it can only be abolished through a statutory act from
congress.. in the present case, there is no such law pass.. disputed resolution is null and void

The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974 4 which adopted the Integrated Plan.
Article IV, Chapter I, Part of the III of the said Plan provides:Article IV Career Executive
Service . A Career Executive Service hereinafter referred to in this Chapter as the
Board, is created to serve as the governing body of the Career Executive Service.
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by
the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public
offices is primarily a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public Officers
and
Employees, 5 viz:

Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public
offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in this
respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it supreme, and the legislature
may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the
exigencies of government it is necessary to create and define duties, the legislative
department has the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be
created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of
existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that
body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of
the incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish the office.

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has
set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17,
Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to
abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be headed
by a Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are
necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in
the organization as the need arises.

But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with
Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission, viz:

Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The Commission shall have the following
offices:

(1) The Office of the Executive Director


(2) The Merit System Protection Board
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs
(4) The Office of Planning and Management
(5) The Central Administrative Office
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records
(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation .
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations \
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs
(14) The Office of Retirement Administration
(15) The Regional and Field Offices.

As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission's power to reorganize
is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16, supra. From its inception, the
CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent
Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous.
It is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad
and positive outlook." 6 The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its
attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the
control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching
one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain "policy and program
coordination." This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code,
to wit:

(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department
or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is
permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a
system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and
projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through
its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal
policies of the attached corporation or agency.

, the petition is GRANTED and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent Commission is hereby
annulled and set aside. No costs.

-----------------------------------------------------

5th G.R. No. 150974 June 29, 2007

KAPISANAN NG MGA KAWANI NG ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSIONER FE B. BARIN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS CARLOS R. ALINDADA, LETICIA
V. IBAY, OLIVER B. BUTALID, and MARY ANNE B. COLAYCO, of the ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Facts
RA 9136, popularly known as EPIRA (for Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), was
enacted on 8 June 2001 and took effect on 26 June 2001. Section 38 of RA 9136 provides
for the abolition of the ERB and the creation of the ERC.

At the time of the filing of this petition, the ERC was composed of Commissioner Fe B.
Barin and Deputy Commissioners Carlos R. Alindada, Leticia V. Ibay, Oliver B. Butalid,
and Mary Anne B. Colayco (collectively, Commissioners).

Pursuant to Section 38 of RA 9136, the Commissioners issued the proposed Table of


Organization, Staffing Pattern, and Salary Structure which the President of the Philippines
approved.

Meanwhile, KERB submitted to the Commissioners its Resolution No. 2001-02 which
requested the Commissioners for an opportunity to be informed on the proposed plantilla
positions with their equivalent qualification standards.
, the Commissioners issued the guidelines for the selection and hiring of ERC employees. A
portion of the guidelines reflects the Commissioners view on the selection and hiring of the
ERC employees vis-a-vis Civil Service rules,

Since R.A. 9136 has abolished the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), it is the view of the
Commission that the provisions of Republic Act No. 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of
[Tenure of] Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization) will not directly apply to ERCs current efforts to establish a new
organization. Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, however, will have suppletory
application to the extent possible in regard to the selection and placement of employees
in the ERC.

KERB stated their objection through, a letter to the Commissioners regarding the latters
stand that Civil Service laws, rules and regulations have suppletory application in the
selection and placement of the ERC employees.

KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB or change the ERBs character as an
economic regulator of the electric power industry. Said ACT merely changed the ERBs name to the
ERC and expanded the ERBs functions and objectives.

KERB made a number of requests: (1) the issuance of a formal letter related to the date of
filing of job applications, including the use of Civil Service application form no. 212; (2) the
creation of a placement/recruitment committee and setting guidelines relative to its functions,
without prejudice to existing Civil Service rules and regulations; and (3) copies of the plantilla
positions and their corresponding qualification standards duly approved by either the
President of the Philippines or the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

Commissioner Barin replied to KERB. She stated that Civil Service application form no.
212 and the ERC-prescribed application format are substantially the same. Furthermore, the
creation of a placement/recruitment committee is no longer necessary because there
is already a prescribed set of guidelines for the recruitment of personnel. The ERC
hired an independent consultant to administer the necessary tests for the technical and
managerial levels.

Finally, the ERC already posted the plantilla positions, which prescribe higher standards, as
approved by the Department of Budget and Management.

Commissioner Barin stated that positions in the ERC do not need the prior approval of the
CSC, as the ERC is only required to submit the qualification standards to the CSC.

,the ERC published a classified advertisement in the Philippine Star. Two days later, the
CSC received a list of vacancies and qualification standards from the ERC. The ERC formed
a Selection Committee to process all applications.

KERB, fearful of the uncertainty of the employment status of its members, filed the
present petition
The Issues

KERB raises the following issues before this Court:

1. Whether Section 38 of RA 9136 abolishing the ERB is constitutional; and

2. Whether the Commissioners of the ERC were correct in disregarding and considering merely
suppletory in character the protective mantle of RA 6656 as to the ERB employees or petitioner in
this case.4

The Ruling of the Court

Constitutionality of the ERBs Abolition and the ERCs Creation

All laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. KERB failed to show any breach of the
Constitution.

A public office is created by the Constitution or by law or by an officer or tribunal to which the
power to create the office has been delegated by the legislature.6 The power to create an office
carries with it the power to abolish. President Corazon C. Aquino, then exercising her legislative
powers, created the ERB by issuing Executive Order No. 172 on 8 May 1987.

The question of whether a law abolishes an office is a question of legislative intent. There
should not be any controversy if there is an explicit declaration of abolition in the law itself.7 Section
38 of RA 9136 explicitly abolished the ERB. However, abolition of an office and its related positions
is different from removal of an incumbent from his office. Abolition and removal are mutually
exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint, there is no occupant in an abolished office. Where
there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the constitutional guarantee
of security of tenure does not arise in the abolition of an office. On the other hand, removal implies
that the office and its related positions subsist and that the occupants are merely separated from
their positions.8

A valid order of abolition must not only come from a legitimate body, it must also be made in
good faith. An abolition is made in good faith when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or
when it does not circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees.9 Abolition
of an office may be brought about by reasons of economy, or to remove redundancy of functions, or
a clear and explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment.10 Where one office is
abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal
nullity.11 When there is a void abolition, the incumbent is deemed to have never ceased holding
office.

KERB asserts that there was no valid abolition of the ERB but there was merely a
reorganization done in bad faith. Evidences of bad faith are enumerated in Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 6656 (RA 6656),12 Section 2 of RA 6656 reads:

No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and
after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona
fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need
to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or
other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the
following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made
as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an
aggrieved party:

(b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions is created;

KERB claims that the present case falls under the situation described in Section 2(b) of RA
6656. We thus need to compare the provisions enumerating the powers and functions of the ERB
and the ERC to see whether they have substantially the same functions. Under Executive Order No.
172, the ERB has the following powers and functions:

After comparing the functions of the ERB and the ERC, we find that the ERC indeed
assumed the functions of the ERB. However, the overlap in the functions of the ERB and of the ERC
does not mean that there is no valid abolition of the ERB. The ERC has new and expanded
functions which are intended to meet the specific needs of a deregulated power industry.
Indeed, National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration v. Civil Service
Commission stated that:

[I]f the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional functions, duties or
powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office different from the one abolished, even
though it embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be considered as an abolition of
one office and the creation of a new or different one. The same is true if one office is abolished and
its duties, for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or office.13

KERB argues that "RA 9136 did not abolish the ERB nor did it alter its essential character as
an economic regulator of the electric power industry. x x x RA 9136 rather changed merely ERBs
name and title to that of the ERC even as it expanded its functions and objectives to keep pace with
the times." To uphold KERBs argument regarding the invalidity of the ERBs abolition is to ignore
the developments in the history of energy regulation.

After almost four decades, significant developments in the energy sector changed the
landscape of economic regulation in the country.

Throughout the years, the scope of the regulation has gradually narrowed from that of public
services in 1902 to the electricity industry and water resources in 1972 to the electric power industry
and oil industry in 1977 to the electric industry alone in 1998. The ERC retains the ERBs traditional
rate and service regulation functions. However, the ERC now also has to promote competitive
operations in the electricity market. RA 9136 expanded the ERCs concerns to encompass both the
consumers and the utility investors.

Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry, including the
privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive
structure, and the delineation of the roles of various government agencies and the private entities.
The law ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct sectors, namely: generation,
transmission, distribution and supply. Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and
its transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter.
In tandem with the restructuring of the industry is the establishment of "a strong and purely
independent regulatory body." Thus, the law created the ERC in place of the Energy Regulatory
Board (ERB).

To achieve its aforestated goal, the law has reconfigured the organization of the regulatory
body. x x x15

There is no question in our minds that, because of the expansion of the ERCs functions and
concerns, there was a valid abolition of the ERB. Thus, there is no merit to KERBs allegation that
there is an impairment of the security of tenure of the ERBs employees.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. No costs.DENIED