Digest 3 of 1

Kong, Marchini Sandro C.
Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Legal Standing
Title: Kilosbayan V. Morato
Reference: GR 118910
Facts:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA)
wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of
4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of
the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8years. PCSO is to employ its
own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO
may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to
declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioners
Contention:1. ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.2. It is still violative of PCSOs
charter.3. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding.4. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art.
9-D of the 1987 Constitution5. Standing can no longer be questioned because it
has become the law of the case Respondents reply:1. ELA is different from the Contract
of Lease2. There is no bidding required3. The power to determine if ELA is
advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO4. PCSO does not have
funds5. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade6. Petitioners do not have a legal
standing because they were not parties to the contract
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing?
Rulings
NO, petitioners have no legal standing.
STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the
petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no
constitutional issues were actually involved.
(b) LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one
litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in
any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases
are not.
(c) RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly
passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any
future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule
does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are
involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical
with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is
free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters
at issue.
d) Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude
determination of the petitioners standing.
(e) STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is
actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are real parties
in interest.
Title: IBP V. Zamora

Facts:
There was a rash of bombings and robberies throughout Metro Manila. To counter it,
then President Joseph E.Estrada commanded the Marines to join the PNP in visibility
patrols around the Metro.-These visibility patrols were referred to as Task Force
Tulungan, and were under the leadership of the PoliceChief of Metro Manila.-In
compliance with presidential mandate, PNP Chief of Staff formulated Letter of
Instructions 02/2000 (LOI). The joint visibility patrols was meant to suppress crime and
other threats to national security and willbe applied to eradicate high-profile crimes
perpetrated by organized crime syndicates. Visibility patrols are to be under the
authority of the PNP, not the military.
Case at bar: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition The
IBP prays for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to nullify the Presidents
order of deploying the Marines to help the PNP. The IBP argue that the deployment is
null and void because its unconstitutional because: There is no Emergency Situation In
derogation of Art 2, Sec. 3 of the Constitution The deployment is an insidious incursion
by the military into a civilian function of government In derogation of Art 16, Sec. 5 of
the Constitution. The deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military
for civilian government functions IBP says that it has standing because it is the official
organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law
and the Constitution The Solicitor General says: Petitioner has no legal standing The
question of the Marines deployment is a political question and not proper for judicial
scrutiny. The organization of Task Force Tulungan does not violate the civilian
supremacy clause of the Constitution.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner have legal standing?
Rulings:
No, the petitioner does not have legal standing.
Its only basis for legal standing is its bounden duty, which is insufficient. Its too
general; its an interest shared by the whole citizenry and the IBP hasnt sufficiently
showed a sufficient and substantial interest in the resolution of the case IBPs
fundamental purpose is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve
the administration of justice. That has nothing to do with the deployment of Marines.
Despite the fact that the petitioner has no legal standing though, the Court has decided
to take cognizance of the issues raised, because of their transcendental significance
and their seriousness, novelty, and weight as precedents, and because the issues will
probably not go away until theyve been resolved.
Title: Joya V. PCGG
Reference: GR 96541
Facts:
On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President
Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie,
Manson and Woods International, Inc. (Christie's of New York, or CHRISTIE'S)
concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two (82) Old Masters
Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President
Marcos, his relatives and cronies.
Petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the PCGG from
proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New
York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th Century Silverware seized from
Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the
Central Bank.
Issues:
1. Whether the petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition?
2. Whether the instant petition involves actual case or controversy?
Rulings:
On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative. This is premised on Section
2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. "Legal Standing" means a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
term "interest" is material interest. It must be personal and not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. Having failed to show
that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become
publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question
their alleged unauthorized disposition.
On the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled also in the negative. There is no actual
case or controversy involved nor is there an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial interpretation.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the petition.
Title: Prof. David V. Arroyo
Reference:
Facts:
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be
implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the
connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA
cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued
for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of
their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the
CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same
day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters
cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In
March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased
to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the
president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become
moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power,
take care power and take over power.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner have legal standing?
Rulings:
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the
bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of
the "liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No.
1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the
Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits
with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus
call for the application of the "transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation of the
standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases.
For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
Topic: Requisites for Taxpayers

Title: Demetria V. Alba
Reference: GR 71977
Facts:
Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit
Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree
1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of
Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that The President shall have the
authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner have legal standing as taxpayer?
Rulings:
The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant consideration. The
case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, et al., 110 Phil. 331, is authority in
support of petitioners' locus standi. Thus:
Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one
who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many
decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of
public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the
state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
Although there are some decisions to the contrary, the prevailing view in the United
States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as follows:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite
standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only
persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the
constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.
Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333,
We said that as regards taxpayers' suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to
entertain the same or not.
Title: Gonzales V. Narvasa
Facts:
Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
and of positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.
The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and
recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the
manner of implementing them.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case?
Rulings:
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or
the Constitution Thus payers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise
by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43,
the petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and a taxpayer.
A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a
favorable action. The petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of
sustaining injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and its members. Neither does
he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor
that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised.
In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a

constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have disbursed in alleged
contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payers action is properly brought
only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the
creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as
amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President,
not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the
Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds
pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution.
As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants,

the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to
determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue.
Title: Pimentel V. Ermita
Reference: 472 SCRA 587
Facts:
The Senate and the House of Representatives (Congress) commenced their regular
session on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators
and Representatives, was constituted on 25 August 2004.
Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments[2] to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments.
President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their
respective departments without the consent of the Commission on Appointments, while
Congress is in their regular session.
Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were
previously appointed in an acting capacity.
Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments, assert that while
Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a
vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
without first having obtained its consent.
Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting
capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments even while Congress is in session.
EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the Presidents power of appointment. Sections 16
and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read:
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power to appoint
such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1) The President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person
to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is
vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to
perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a
vacancy.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing?
Rulings:
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In
such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Considering the independence of the Commission on Appointments from Congress, it is
error for petitioners to claim standing in the present case as members of Congress.
President Arroyos issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session
impairs no power of Congress. Among the petitioners, only the following are members
of the Commission on Appointments of the 13th Congress: Senator Enrile as Minority
Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara,
Senator Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator Osmea as members.
Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the Commission on
Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmea
have standing in the present petition. This is in contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada,
Lim, and Madrigal, who, though vigilant in protecting their perceived prerogatives as
members of Congress, possess no standing in the present petition.
Title: Estrada V. Sandiganbayan

Facts
On 4 April 2001, an Information for plunder was filed against former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as
amended by RA 7659, assailed the said law for being unconstitutional. He contends
that (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the reasonable
doubt standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
violations of fundamental right of due process.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
Rulings:
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice. The vagueness doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon
protected speech. The theory is that [w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and
no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with
no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity. The possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
Title: Umali V. Guingona
Facts:
The case is a case filed for the dismissal of the petition for Certiorari Prohibition and
Injunction brought by petitioner against the respondents. It was on October 27, 1993
when Osmundo Umali was appointed as Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos. The late President received a memorandum alleging
against the petitioner in violation of internal revenue laws during the incumbency as
Regional Director. On October 6, 1994, President Ramos issued an Administrative
Order No. 152 dismissing the petitioner from service with forfeiture of retirement and all
benefits provided by law. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but the Office of the
President denied the motion for reconsideration. December 1, 1994, a petition is
brought to the regional Trial Court of Makati pertaining to Certiorari, Prohibition and
Injunction of Administrative Order No. 152.
Issue:
1. Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted government agency and whether the
petitioner can raise the issue of its constitutionality belated in its motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's decision?
Rulings:
Whether the PCAGC is validly constituted government agency and whether the
petitioner can raise the issue of its constitutionality belated in its motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's decision The constitutionality of PCAGC was only
posed by the petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati. It is too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such late stage of the
proceedings below.
In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that the issues posited by the
petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion
arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent facts
and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has
decided to consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the
Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case,
and the position taken by the Solicitor General. that there is no more basis for
Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events that
cannot be overlooked.
Title: Laurel V. Garcia
Facts:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their
representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179
square meters of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan scheduled
on February 21, 1990.
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by
the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on
May 9, 1956, and is part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in
life and property and their suffering during World War II.
As intended, the subject property became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the
latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976. Due to the failure of our
government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained
undeveloped since that time.
proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine

Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease
agreement with a Japanese firm where, at the end of the lease period, all the three
leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine government. On August
11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization of
Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of reparations capital goods and services in the event of
sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were
specifically mentioned in the first Whereas clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been
pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the
Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price at
$225 million.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the
Philippine Government?
2. Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority
and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property
3. In G.R. NO. 92047, apart from questioning the authority of the government to
alienate the Roppongi property assails the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 296, the petitioner also questions the bidding procedures of the Committee
on the Utilization or Disposition of Philippine Government Properties in Japan for
being discriminatory against Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned entities by
denying them the right to be informed about the bidding requirements.
Rulings:
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the
inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic
value to all Filipinos veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and
related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the
President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and
value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be
faithfully followed.
The petition is granted. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective
ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective
needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a
juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and
cannot be the object of appropriation. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino,
Commentaries on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26).
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the
Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene
Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal
declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v.
Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to
make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite.
Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was
attributable not to the governments own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of
financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v.
Lazarao, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act
based on correct legal premises.
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of
the Roppongi propertys original purpose.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an authority to sell, does not have a
provision in this text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from
Japan for the government sector. It merely intends to make the properties available to
foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition.
Rep Act No. 6657, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi
property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and
when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299.
Moreover, President Aquinos approval of the recommendation by the investigating
committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least,
conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property. It does
not have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative
powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a year. Assuming that the
Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale
by the respondents. There is no law authorizing its conveyance, and thus, the Court
sees no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issue raised by petitioner Ojeda.
Title: Hacienda Luisita V Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

Facts:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to
DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted
that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot
validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by
application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296
qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as
HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs
and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their
choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in
the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be,
over their printed names.
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court
decision.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the operative fact doctrine is available in this case?
2. Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional?
3. Whether or not the Court cant order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda
Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously
held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75
hectares covered by HLIs SDP?
4. Whether or not the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just
compensation payable to HLI) is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs
SDP?
5. Whether or not the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands
under RA 6657 has lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed
under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the
qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita
to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
6. Whether or not should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs
be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
Rulings:
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of
respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-
beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the
Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the
qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI,
and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case
since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid
or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the
administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or
recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be
respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts
and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution
approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative
fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs
because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received
under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for
themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that
the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been
rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition
under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling
in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there
was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the
issue of constitutionality.
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita
cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP.
Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP,
which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court
is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless,
this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from
subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by
Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA
6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision
appears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other
portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these
may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB
the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the
area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs
decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each
qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have
been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and
Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare
SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the
assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the
proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land
used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.
4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP.
For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November 21,
1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs
were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be
precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock
distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989.
Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory
acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice
of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is
determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority
noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution
scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing
notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and
is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file
an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just
compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the
exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has
NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to
sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed
after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or
certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have
not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive
period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP
or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover,
should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the
subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at
the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land
distribution under CARP.
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option
to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.
The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never
gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in
HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just]
33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as
HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the
FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common
shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the
number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220
total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85
shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101
shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.
Title: Dante Liban V. Gordon

Facts:
Richard J. Gordon (respondent) filed for a Motion for Clarification and/or for
Reconsideration on the promulgated Decision by the Court on July 15, 2009. The case
brought about by the petitioners was regarding to Gordons forfeiture of his seat in the
Senate when he accepted the Chairmanship in the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC). The court ruled that it was not the case, as PNRC is not a government-owned
and controlled corporation for the purpose of prohibition in Sect. 13, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution. The Court, however, further declared void the PNRC Charter (as in R.A.
95) insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and consequently ruled
that the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. 95 was not an issue in the aforementioned
case; the petitioners did not raise its constitutionality. As the court decided, the
petitioners did not have standing to file the instant petition. Hence, the pronouncement
of the Court on the validity of R.A. No. 95 should be considered obiter.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the provisions of R.A. No. 95 valid and constitutional?
Rulings:
Yes. Richard J. Gordons Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration and movant-
intervenor PNRCs Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision in G.R. No.
175352 dated July 15, 2009 were granted. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 95, as
amended, the charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, was not raised by the
parties as an issue and should not have been passed upon by the Court. The structure
of the PNRC, being neither strictly private nor public in nature, R.A. 95 remains valid
and constitutional in its entirety.
It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has
remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the
1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987
Constitution.
The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or
challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
Title: Serano de Agbayani V. PNB

Facts:
There is no dispute as to the facts. Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00
from defendant Bank dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real
estate mortgage duly registered covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of the
province of Pangasinan. As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in
the amount of P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year, defendant instituted
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of
Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff
countered with his suit against both defendants on August 10, 1959, her main allegation
being that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years
having elapsed from the date of maturity, July 19, 1944. She sought and was able to
obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was
made permanent in the decision now on appeal. Defendant Bank in its answer prayed
for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own theory the defense of prescription
would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No.
32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act extending the
period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of
the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As
noted, the lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in
favor of plaintiff.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the action has already prescribed?
Rulings:
If we take the orthodox view, the action has prescribed, since the declaration of RA
342as unconstitutional retroacted to 1945 when EO 32 was first issued. Between 1944
when the loan matured and 1959, when PNB collected the loan, 15 years
had elapsed.[The orthodox view was announced by Mr. J. Field, in the case of
Norton vs. ShelbyCounty where the court held that:
"xxx. An unconstitutional act is not a la w; it confers no rights; it imposes
nod u t i e s ; i t a f f o r d s n o p r o t e c t i o n ; i t c r e a t e s n o o f f i c e ; i t i s , i n l e g a l c o
n t e m p l a t i o n , inoperative, as if it had not been passed.
]But if we take the unorthodox view, as the SC did, the action could still
prosper. The period from 1945 when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when it was
declared unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose of prescription
since the Debt Moratorium Law was operative during this time. In effect, only 7
years had elapsed (1944-45, 1953-59).Indeed, it would be unjust to punish the
creditor who could not collect prior to 1953 because the Debt Moratorium Law
was effective, only to be told later that his respect for an apparently valid law
made him lose his right to collect.
A r t . 7 o f t h e C i v i l C o d e wh i c h p r o v i d e s t h a t , "W h e n t h e c o u r t s d e c l a r e
a l a w t o b e inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter
shall govern." seems to be the orthodox view on the matter.
Title: Salazar V. Achacosa

Facts:
Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged
petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent
petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding
the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing that petitioner had
no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas
Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that
there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be
used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner
has (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to
recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing
acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the
same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group,
accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners
residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The
team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for
the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing.
The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of
Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with
unreasonable force.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or
the Secretary of Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or
arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
Rulings:
Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants
of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the
Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not
being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities
must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph
(c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect The power of the
President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the
power to order arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar.
Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts. Furthermore, the search and
seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is
null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to
return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search
and Seizure Order No. 1205.
Title: Endencia V. David

Reference: 93 Phil 696
Facts:
Saturnino David, then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice
Pastor Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos salary pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590
which provides that SEC. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income
tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation
fixed by the Constitution or by law. According to the brief of the Solicitor General on
behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, the decision in the case of Perfecto
vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its
promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No.590. To bring home his point, the
Solicitor General reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower
House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon the salaries of Justice
Endencia and Justice Jugo and other members of the Supreme Court and all
judges of inferior courts amount to a diminution?
2. Whether or not Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 is constitutional?
Rulings:
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from
payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege. It is already attached to his office,
provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on
public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action.
When we come to the members of the Supreme Court, this exception to them is
relatively of short duration. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal,
eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and training required, one
generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late in life, on the
aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that
he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to
receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the
exemption can give more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of
the meager salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its
diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be real, substantial and
onerous.
On the issue of imposition of income tax upon the salaries of the judges, in a rather
exhaustive and well considered decision found and held under the doctrine laid down by
the court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil 552, Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg held
that the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice
Endencia was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the
refund of said taxes. On the issue of whether Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 is
constitutional, the court believes that this is a clear example of interpretation
or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office, found inspection 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring
to the salaries of judicial officers. By legislative fiatas enunciated in section 13, Republic
Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease
of compensation. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof byte
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction
of the Judiciary. The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any
declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give
it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a
statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature
would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. The court reiterates the doctrine
laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of
income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the
Constitution. Further, the court holds that the interpretation and application of the
Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the
judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide
therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and provided in said
statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest
court of the land. Thus the court holds that judgment is affirmed, that Section 13,
Republic Act 590 in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer
shall be considered not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law, constitutes and invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the
judiciary. In this sense, the court is of the opinion that said section is null and void,
it being a transgression of the fundamental principles underlying the separation of
powers. In the light of the issue on imposing income tax on judges salaries, dissenting
opinion of court cited that judges are also citizens and thus their salaries are subjected
to the Income Tax Law prevailing. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed
regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the
Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in
adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. Hence, court affirms judgment as in Perfecto
vs. Meer on the issue of imposing income tax on judges salaries.
Title: Nitafan V. CIR

Facts:
The petitioners seek to enjoin CIR from making deduction of withholding taxes from
their salaries. Petitioners contend that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries,
contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987Constitution mandating
that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased,' In a nutshell,
they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial
officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "during their continuance
in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an
independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
Issue:
1. Whether or not appointed and qualified judges (the petitioners) may be exempt
from payment of income tax?
Rulings:
No. This petition of the judges is then dismissed.
To resolve the legal issue raised in this petition the court looked into the intent of the
framers of the Constitution who drafted the provision in question. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution.
The intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission was to delete the proposed express
grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to
"give substance to equality among the three branches of Government" (in the words of
Commissioner Rigos). Commissioner Joaquin Bernas also said that the salaries of
members of the Judiciary would be subject to the general income tax applied to all
taxpayers. This intent became unclear in the final text of the 1987 Constitution. Having
seen the failure of not including a prohibition on the exemption of any public officer or
employee from payment of income tax, the court has authorized the continuation of the
deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme
Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary.
Title: De la llana V. Alba

Facts:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking ti
enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the
Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by
such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their
incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that
thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and
disregarded.
Issue:
1. Whether or not BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of
the justices and judges in this case?
Ruling:
It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of
the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to
have ceased to hold office. The rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to
an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition
must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office.

There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of
any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge
de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice
Laurel's opinion in People v. Vera. 8 Thus: "The unchallenged rule is that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement." 9 The other petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court
cannot be considered as devoid of "any personal and substantial interest" on the matter
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the
facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its
antecedents. They had laid themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for
the truth, On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was
organized
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for "institutional reforms," characterized in
the Report as "both pressing and urgent." 21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein
pointed out, that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be
the most thorough after four generations
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the
basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the background
as above narrated, its Explanatory Note continues: "Pursuant to the President's
instructions, this proposed legislation has been drafted in accordance with the
guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain objectives of the
reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a
reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper
meeting out of justice
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The
ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38reiterated such a doctrine:
"We find this point urged by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation
of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their
offices
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice
Laurel in Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 2347 46 on the reorganization of the
Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 400747 on the reorganization of all branches of
the government, including the courts of first instance.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise,
however, to questions affecting a judiciary that should be kept independent.
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior
courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges
under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935
Constitution
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or
harmonize constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is
expressly vested with the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to
abolish existing ones.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would
characterize as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of
authority to fix the compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges
thereafter appointed
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does
through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers
Title: Santiago V. Bautista

Facts:
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his
graduation, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor
students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and teachers who composed
the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was
improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (bc the
graduation already proceeded. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part
of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising
judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function
Issue:
1. Whether or not judicial function be exercised in this case?
Rulings:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of

judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In
order for an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a
tribunal for hearing and determination.
2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and
render a decision.
3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the
judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive)
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and
what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.
Judicial power is defined:

as authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the
rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of
adjudication.
The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-
judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a
LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse
claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there from is brought in
turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine.
Title: Garcia V. Board of Investments

Facts:
Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical
Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its
have its plant site for the products naphta cracker and naphta to based in Bataan. In
February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation
applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite
vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted
private respondent BPCs application, stating that the investors have the final choice as
to where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the
project.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the
application of the investors without considering the national interest ?
Rulings:
First, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to which the BPC
agreed. That is why it organized itself into a corporation bearing the name Bataan.
There is available 576 hectares of public land precisely reserved as the petrochemical
zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D. No. 1803. There is no need to buy expensive real
estate for the site unlike in the proposed transfer to Batangas.
Second, the BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan
produces 60% of the national output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock for the
plant in Bataan. It can provide the feedstock requirement of the plant. On the other
hand, the country is short of LPG and there is need to import the same for use of the
plant in Batangas.
Third, naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from the ad valorem tax by the
approval of Republic Act No. 6767 by President Aquino but excluding LPG from
exemption from ad valorem tax. The law was enacted specifically for the petrochemical
industry.
The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this
case, and ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and
the product naphta as feedstock maintained.
The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Courts judicial power to settle actual
controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before
he wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that
nothing is shown to justify the BOIs action in letting the investors decide on an issue
which, if handled by our own government, could have been very beneficial to the State,
as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: .. he would not mind
having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation.
Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-
taken because the 1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain
project, as well as any decision of the BOI regarding the amended application. She
stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong in
its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to the President of the country
and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code.
Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution

does not vest in the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as
in this case.
Title: PACU V. Sec. of Education

Reference: 97 Phil 806
Facts:
The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act
No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A.)
They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty
and property without due process of law; B.) They deprive parents of their natural right
and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C.) Their provisions conferring on
the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. Petitioners complain
that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from
the Secretary of Education. Petitioners reason out, this section leaves everything to the
uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department.
The Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the
statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive authority of the legislature
to formulate standard . . . Also, the textbooks to be used in the private
schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted to the
Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of
said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor
of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the
general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there is actual controversy?
Rulings:
No justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We are not informed that
the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or
intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial
privileges or rights for so refusing.
Conclusion.An unprejudiced consideration of the fact presented under the caption
Private Adventure Schools leads but to one conclusion, viz.: the great majority of them
from primary grade to university are money-making devices for the profit of those who
organize and administer them. The people whose children and youth attend them are
not getting what they pay for. It is obvious that the system constitutes a great evil. That
it should be permitted to exist with almost no supervision is indefensible. The
suggestion has been made with the reference to the private institutions of university
grade that some board of control be organized under legislative control to supervise
their administration. The Commission believes that the recommendations it offers at the
end of this chapter are more likely to bring about the needed reforms.
Herein lies another important issue submitted in the cause. The question is really
whether the law may be enacted in the exercise of the States constitutional power (Art.
XIV, sec. 5) to supervise and regulate private schools. If that power amounts to control
of private schools, as some think it is, maybe the law is valid. In this connection we do
not share the belief that section 5 has added new power to what the State inherently
possesses by virtue of the police power. An express power is necessarily more
extensive than a mere implied power. For instance, if there is conflict between an
express individual right and the express power to control private education it cannot off-
hand be said that the latter must yield to the formerconflict of two express powers. But
if the power to control education is merely implied from the police power, it is feasible to
uphold the express individual right, as was probably the situation in the two decisions
brought to our attention, of Mississippi and Minnesota, states where constitutional
control of private schools is not expressly produced.
Title: Tan V. Macapagal

Facts:
Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino people. The
petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the Deliberating Constitutional Convention
was" without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act
6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present
Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than the form now
outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to
propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan
laid down therein."
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners has locus standi?
2. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case?
Rulings
1. NO. Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement ."Pascual v.
The Secretary of Public Works: validity of a statute may be contested only by one who
will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement .Taxpayers only have
standing on laws providing for the disbursement of public funds.
Expenditure of public funds , by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."
2. NO. At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution
that would radically alter the 1935constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review.
The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually does something already. Then
the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body. Separation of power
departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive and
the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties, judiciary may
not interfere so that it may fulfil its duties well. The court may not interfere until the
proper time comes ripeness
More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is
no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it
intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the
courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the command of the Constitution as interpreted
by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or a new
precedent being announced, it is controlling. That is implicit in the rule of law.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration cannot therefor be sustained.
Title: Dumlao V. Comelec

Facts:
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution.
Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already
received retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the
same local elective office from which he has retired.
Issue:
1. Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the
equal protection and due process rights.
Rulings:
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural
infirmities, hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a
misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of
petitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and
Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases
and controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause
guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from
implementing said provision
No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on
reasonable and real differentiations. In thepresent case, employees 65 years of age
have been classified differently from younger employees. The former are subject to
compulsory retirement while the latter are not.
Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective localofficials because there
can be retirees who are even younger and a 65 year old retiree could be as good as a
65 year old official who is not a retiree. But there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old
elective officialwho is trying to run for office because there is the need for new blood to
assume relevance. When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired
and unavailable for the same government work.
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby

declared valid.
Title: North Cotabato V. Republic

Facts:
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This
document prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace
Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties and
the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.
Issue:
1. When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue
of its constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer
justiciable by the Court?
Rulings:
Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect.
The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing
more than a piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source
of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other
oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer present an
actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an
assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable
controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character,
whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts.
The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the
great public interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and
not of public opinion. The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and
existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on
supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must be careful that it is
not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional law.
Title: Oposa V. Factoran

Facts:
The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the
respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement
(TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in
the country is causing vast abuses on rainforest.
They furthered the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn
to a balanced and healthful ecology. the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such
as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table
as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may
be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive
erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the
volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance
and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction
of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and
(k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led
to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global
warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Issue:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.
Rulings:
Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be heard.
The SC decided in the affirmative.
Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall protect
and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can,
for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded
considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its
entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest,
mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at
the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come.
This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Bottom line:
These minors have fought for our rights up to the highest level of legal remedy. These
minors thought of our interest and right. These minors battled for our sons and
daughters and those yet to come. These minors were concern for us to live in a
balanced and healthful ecology. Sadly, we, who are learned and with discernment, are
oblivious. Until when do we learn our lesson? Remember, we have an
"INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY" to our future generations.
Title: Kilosbayan V. Guingona

Facts:
Petitioners submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of
Lease with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and
conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the PGMC, in
violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits
the PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other
similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." Even granting arguendo that a
lease of facilities is not within the contemplation of "collaboration" or "association," an
analysis, however, of the Contract of Lease clearly shows that there is a "collaboration,
association, or joint venture between respondents PCSO and PGMC in the holding of
the On-Line Lottery System," and that there are terms and conditions of the Contract
"showing that respondent PGMC is the actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO."
19
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the
implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by the PCSO and the Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also
know as "lotto."
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of
serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated
Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the
executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews;" and that the petitioners
have no standing to maintain the instant suit.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition?
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid?
Rulings:
As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in
view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on
locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even
association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute
actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of
various government agencies or instrumentalities.
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in
question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor
should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the
intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself.
Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is hereby
declared contrary to law and invalid.
Title: Ymbong vs Ochoa

Reference: GR: 204819
Facts:
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of
population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society,
diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely
circulate in various media. From television debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by
socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy -the
clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite
calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers
from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound
and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention. A perusal
of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn,
the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products, and to
religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels
medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health
programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive
health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test"
and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free
exercise of religion and the right to free speech.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the issue is ripe for adjudication?
Rulings:
Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper
hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express
their own views on this matter.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child
was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court
cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that
induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH
Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients
only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the
same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also
uses the term primarily, must be struck down.
Title: People V. Mateo

Reference: GR 147678 87
Facts:
Appellant Efren Mateo was charged with ten counts of rape by his step-daughter Imelda
Mateo. During the trial, Imeldas testimonies regarding the rape incident were
inconsistent. She said in one occasion that incident of rape happened inside her
bedroom, but other times, she told the court that it happened in their sala. She also told
the court that the appellant would cover her mouth but when asked again, she said that
he did not. Despite the irreconcilable testimony of the victim, the trial court found the
accused guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial and recommends
an acquittal of the appellant.
Issue:
1. Whether or not this case is directly appeallable to the Supreme Court?
Rulings:
While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of
cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death,
nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost
circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is
imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a
review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.
Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or
innocence must be accorded an accused, and no case in the evaluation of the facts can
ever be overdone.
A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would
minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment
imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from
entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for
its final disposition.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested
in the Supreme Court
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making
prerogative of the Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress.
The rule here announced additionally allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme
Court on automatic review is such a procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly
Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section of Rule 125, and
any other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 19
September 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court in cases similarly involving
the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.

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Kong, Marchini Sandro C.

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Title: IBP V. Zamora

Topic: Requisites for Taxpayers

In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a

As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants,

Title: Estrada V. Sandiganbayan

proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine

Title: Hacienda Luisita V Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

Title: Dante Liban V. Gordon

Title: Serano de Agbayani V. PNB

Title: Salazar V. Achacosa

Title: Endencia V. David

Title: Nitafan V. CIR

Title: De la llana V. Alba

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office.

Title: Santiago V. Bautista

A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of

Judicial power is defined:

Title: Garcia V. Board of Investments

Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution

Title: PACU V. Sec. of Education

Title: Tan V. Macapagal

Title: Dumlao V. Comelec

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby

Title: North Cotabato V. Republic

Title: Oposa V. Factoran

Title: Kilosbayan V. Guingona

Title: Ymbong vs Ochoa

Title: People V. Mateo

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