Galman, sma

Civpro

NYK International Knitwear Corporation Philippines vs. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 146267. February 17, 2003

Petitioners: NYK INTERNATIONAL KNITWEAR CORPORATION PHILIPPINES and/or CATHY NG

Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and VIRGINIA M. PUBLICO

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:

1. February 8, 1995 - Petitioner NYK hired respondent Virginia Publico as a sewer. Under the
terms and conditions of her employment, Publico was paid on a piece-rate basis, but
required to work from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 midnight. On the average, she earned P185.00
daily.
2. At about 10:00 P.M. of May 7, 1997, Publico requested that she be allowed to leave the
work place early, as she was not feeling well due to a bout of influenza. Permission was
refused but nonetheless, Publico went home. The following day, Publico called up her
employer and notified management that she was still recovering from her ailment.
3. May 9, 1997, Publico reported for work. To her mortification and surprise, however, the
se u it gua d p e e ted he f o e te i g the NYK p e ises, allegedl o a age e ts
order. She begged to be allowed inside, but the guard remained adamant. It was only when
Publico declared that she would just complete the unfinished work she had left on May 7
that the guard let her in.
4. Once inside the factory, Publico requested to see the owner, one Stephen Ng. Her request
was declined. She was instead asked to come back the following day.
5. May 10, 1997 - Publico returned to NYK as instructed. After waiting for three and half (3 1/2)
hours, she was finally able to see Stephen Ng. When she inquired why she was barred from
reporting for work, Mr. Ng told her she was dismissed due to her refusal to render overtime
service. Aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner corporation and its manager, petitioner Cathy Ng,
6. Before the Labor Arbiter, petitioners predictably had a different version of the story.
Allegedly, they took the pains to verify why Publico did not report for work on May 7, 1997
and found out that her husband did not allow her to work at night. As night work is a must
in their line of business, particularly when there are rush orders, petitioners claimed that
gi e Pu li os failure to re der o erti e ork, they ere left ith o other re ourse ut
to fire her.
7. March 19, 1998, the Labor Arbiter held Pu li os dis issal to e illegal.
8. On appeal, the NLRC, in a resolution affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in toto.
9. Petitioners impugned the NLRC decision by way of a special civil action of certiorari filed
before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction to public respondent NLRC for affirming the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter.
10. In its resolution of September 15, 2000, the appellate court dismissed the petition outright.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that there was non-compliance with Section 1 of Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as the petition was merely accompanied by a certified
xerox copy of the assailed NLRC decision, instead of a certified true copy thereof as required
 Galman, sma
Civpro

by the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioners failed to attach the other pleadings and
do u e ts pe ti e t a d ate ial to thei petitio , su h as the pa ties positio pape s,
their evidence and the motion for reconsideration in contravention of the said rule.
Petitioners duly moved for reconsideration, explaining that they had requested for a
e tified t ue op of the NLRCs de isio ut si e the o igi al NLRC de isio as p i ted o
onionskin was not legible, the NLRC itself photocopied the resolution and certified it
afterwards. As p oof of pa e t of petitio e s e uest fo a e tified t ue op of the NLRC
decision, petitioners attached a copy of the official receipts issued by the NLRC, which
described the nature of the entry as CERT. TRUE COPY. Petitioners, likewise, appended in
their motion copies of pertinent pleadings and documents not previously attached in their
petition.
11. December 5, 2000 - the appellate court de ied petitio e s otio fo e o side atio .

ISSUE:

1. Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 60542 on
purely technical grounds, i.e., that the attached copy of the NLRC decision is a mere
photo op of the o igi al de isio a d
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in refusing to ule o the o e t ess of the NLRCs fi di gs that
private respondent was illegally dismissed?

RULING:

1. NO.
Section 1 of Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that the petition shall be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together
with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto. The precursor of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, Administrative Circular No. 3-96, which took effect on
Ju e 1, 1996, i st u ts us hat a e tified t ue op is:
1. . . . The e tified t ue op the eof shall e su h othe op fu ished to a pa t at his
instance or in his behalf, duly authenticated by the authorized officers or representatives of
the issuing entity as hereinbefore specified. x x x
3. The certified true copy must further comply with all the regulations therefor of the issuing
entity and it is the authenticated original of such certified true copy, and not a mere xerox
copy thereof, which shall be utilized as an annex to the petition or other initiatory pleading.
(Emphasis supplied.) x x x

A eo op e e if sta ped as e tified t ue op , is ot a authe ti ated o igi al of

such certified true copy.Applying the preceding guidepost in the present case, the
disputed do u e t although sta ped as e tified t ue op is ot a authe ti ated
original of such certified true copy, but only a xerox copy thereof, in contravention of
paragraph 3 of the above-quoted guidelines. Hence, no error may be ascribed to the Court
of Appeals in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright pursuant to paragraph 5 of
Administrative Circular No. 3-96.

The right to file a special civil action of certiorari is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process.The members of this Court are not unmindful that in exceptional cases and for
compelling reasons, we have disregarded similar procedural defects in order to correct a
patent injustice made. However, petitioners here have not shown any compelling reason for
us to relax the rule. Petitioners are hereby reminded that the right to file a special civil
 Galman, sma
Civpro

action of certiorari is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. A writ of certiorari is a
prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise
of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the
manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.
2. NO.
Findings of facts of the NLRC, particularly in a case where the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are
in agreement, are deemed binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. Petitio e s
arguments fail to persuade us. Petitioners raise factual questions which are improper in a
petition for review on certiorari. Findings of facts of the NLRC, particularly in a case where
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are in agreement, are deemed binding and conclusive upon
this Court.
Factual findings of the NLRC affirming those of the Labor Arbiter, both bodies being deemed
to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdictions, when sufficiently supported
by evidence on record, are accorded respect if not finality, and are considered binding on
the Supreme Court. Petitio e s a e allegatio s of a a do e t a ot sta d the
unswerving conclusion by both quasi-judicial agencies below that private respondent was
unlawfully dismissed. We find no reason to deviate from the consistent findings of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC that there was no basis to find that Virginia abandoned her work.
Indeed, factual findings of the NLRC affirming those of the Labor Arbiter, both bodies being
deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdictions, when sufficiently
supported by evidence on record, are accorded respect if not finality, and are considered
binding on this Court. As long as their decisions are devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness
in the process of their deduction from the evidence proffered by the parties, all that is left is
for the Court to stamp its affirmation and declare its finality. No reversible error may thus be
laid at the door of the Court of Appeals when it refused to rule that the NLRC committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in holding that private
respondent was illegally dismissed.

N.B. A clerk of court is grossly negligent when he certifies as true copy a document
purporting to be a copy of a last will and testament without first examining said document
by comparing it with the original on file to determine whether it is indeed a true and faithful
reproduction of the original in custody of the probate court. (Court of Appeals vs. Escalante,
277 SCRA 331 [1997])
A petition for review filed before the Court of Appeals must contain a certified true copy or
duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. There is no requirement,
however, that the other supporting papers attached to the petition should be certified true
copies as well. (Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz, 336 SCRA 113 [2000])