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‘Communication Event Roles and “Metapragmatic Extensionism:” (On the Cognitive Underpinnings of Pedication in Grammar Michae! Silverstein ‘The University of Chicago thas certainly been my privilege to be a colleague and, in a number of enterprises, a collaborator of David McNeil for about three decades. tn te bracing climate of The Univesity of Chicago ~farenough, apparently, fom the banks of The Carles River —his innovative work ha bth gestured toward and plausibly theorized the rmon-autonomy of language considered a vehicle and emergent of conceptual processing, McNeill as rchly been studying eestual evidence inthe total envelope of narrational behavior (both verbal and nonverbal). He has been demonstrating the variety ‘of communicative functions of manual semiosis to, and beyond, the fms of the capacity of grammatically shaped languge to code propositional content. Indeed, 4 central theme of tis works that grammaticallyshaped propositional content is only ‘one pat of what communicator is cognitively processing in the simplest act of narrative ‘communication. So coding states-of-affars involving a verbal referent and other denotata is embedded in a nested set of frameworks of mental activity. MeNeill shows evidence fr this i what emerges in other channels, like the gestural Indeed, we can se several important properties and relationships inthe picture of language itself that MeNeil develops. Most importantly, in any communicative event, language itself codes only part ofthe sender’ ively activated representation-of- ‘things 0 be communicated. And given the digital, “all-or nothing” character of {grammatical form, st any freeze-frame point in the time-course of naration the part of the ongoing communicative signal comprehended within language has one of two possible relations to the total cognitive representation. It can redundantly code ‘information tat is also gestually coded in phase-simultaneous, analogue, imagistic form: saying “there” and a finger-point, for example. (The precise way the two channels relate tics just one among them) MeNsil tal not, what is coded in language can bea propoiionally schematic sub-part of a total cognitive image, éncomplet in functionally essential respects for communicating story. Hence, the supplement to verbal coding necessary to a narative for example, emerges only in the gestural the exa-grammatcally communicated realm. Those propetes of language as McNeil secs it show that meaningful Semantic”) language is nt functionally autonomous from al the rest ofthe ‘otal commonicative envelope indexing the cognitive setivity of narating. As a semiotic form, though language as coding mechanism sill would seem to operate with principles that sem tobe hihly dtint fom thos of other chanel “My own work inthe morphosyntacticcatgoral structures of language and how they both shape andar shaped by discursive interaction, thts, bythe interpersonal sociocultural activity of using language. From this work, wish to agus the position that language as cognitive codng-mechanism i & well formally non-autonomous from the seciat cognition that is an essential prt of communicative copitve processing. In particular, my work indicates thst what we might rm the socal cognition of rol structure in atl communicative events, indexicaly anchored tothe very activity of

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