‘Communication Event Roles and “Metapragmatic Extensionism:”
(On the Cognitive Underpinnings of Pedication in Grammar
Michae! Silverstein
‘The University of Chicago
thas certainly been my privilege to be a colleague and, in a number of
enterprises, a collaborator of David McNeil for about three decades. tn te bracing
climate of The Univesity of Chicago ~farenough, apparently, fom the banks of The
Carles River —his innovative work ha bth gestured toward and plausibly theorized the
rmon-autonomy of language considered a vehicle and emergent of conceptual
processing, McNeill as rchly been studying eestual evidence inthe total envelope of
narrational behavior (both verbal and nonverbal). He has been demonstrating the variety
‘of communicative functions of manual semiosis
to, and beyond, the fms
of the capacity of grammatically shaped languge to code propositional content. Indeed,
4 central theme of tis works that grammaticallyshaped propositional content is only
‘one pat of what communicator is cognitively processing in the simplest act of narrative
‘communication. So coding states-of-affars involving a verbal referent and other
denotata is embedded in a nested set of frameworks of mental activity. MeNeill shows
evidence fr this i what emerges in other channels, like the gestural
Indeed, we can se several important properties and relationships inthe picture of
language itself that MeNeil develops. Most importantly, in any communicative event,
language itself codes only part ofthe sender’ ively activated representation-of-
‘things 0 be communicated. And given the digital, “all-or nothing” character of
{grammatical form, st any freeze-frame point in the time-course of naration the part ofthe ongoing communicative signal comprehended within language has one of two
possible relations to the total cognitive representation. It can redundantly code
‘information tat is also gestually coded in phase-simultaneous, analogue, imagistic form:
saying “there” and a finger-point, for example. (The precise way the two channels relate
tics just one among them)
MeNsil tal not, what is coded in language can bea propoiionally
schematic sub-part of a total cognitive image, éncomplet in functionally essential
respects for communicating story. Hence, the supplement to verbal coding necessary to
a narative for example, emerges only in the gestural the exa-grammatcally
communicated realm. Those propetes of language as McNeil secs it show that
meaningful Semantic”) language is nt functionally autonomous from al the rest ofthe
‘otal commonicative envelope indexing the cognitive setivity of narating. As a semiotic
form, though language as coding mechanism sill would seem to operate with principles
that sem tobe hihly dtint fom thos of other chanel
“My own work inthe morphosyntacticcatgoral structures of language and how
they both shape andar shaped by discursive interaction, thts, bythe interpersonal
sociocultural activity of using language. From this work, wish to agus the position that
language as cognitive codng-mechanism i & well formally non-autonomous from the
seciat cognition that is an essential prt of communicative copitve processing. In
particular, my work indicates thst what we might rm the socal cognition of rol
structure in atl communicative events, indexicaly anchored tothe very activity of