Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-35113 March 25, 1975

EUGENIO CUARESMA, petitioner,

vs.
MARCELO DAQUIS, PHHC, CESAR NAVARRO, NICANOR GUEVARRA, Sheriff of Quezon City
or his Deputy and JUDGE PACIFICO P. DE CASTRO, respondents. ATTORNEY MACARIO O.
DIRECTO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.: + . wph!1

The predicament in which respondent Macario O. Directo, a member of the Philippine bar, now finds
himself is one of his own making. In a petition for certiorari filed with this Court on behalf of one
Eugenio Cuaresma, he included the following categorical allegations: "4. That your petitioner has no
knowledge of the existence of said case (Civil Case No. 12176, CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch)
aforecited between the respondents Marcelo Daquis, PHHC, and Cesar Navarro, and wherein the
respondent Judge, [gave] due course to the complaint, and the subject matter in litigation; 5. That on
May 26, 1972, the respondent Judge issued an order of demolition, ordering the respondent Sheriff
of Quezon City or his deputy to demolish the house of your petitioner etc., and on the same day May
26, 1972, the Sheriff of Quezon City through his deputy [gave] three (3) days to your petitioner to
remove his house or face demolition, ... ;6 ... 7. That your petitioner was not given a day in court to
present his side of the case, in violation of law, and of the dictum of due process of the constitution,
... "1 Thereafter, after receipt of the comments of respondents, it turned out, as set forth in a
resolution of this Court of August 4, 1972, "that petitioner was fully aware of the existence of said
civil case because on December 14, 1971 Atty. Macario Directo, as counsel of petitioner, addressed
to respondent Marcelo Daquis a letter which indicates that both counsel and petitioner were aware of
the existence of the case. It also appears that, before respondents Marcelo Daquis and Cesar
Navarro filed a motion for a writ of Possession in Civil Case No. Q-12176, petitioner Eugenio
Cuaresma, along with the other occupants of the lot in question, was given thirty (30) days notice to
vacate the premises which period was even extended for another thirty (30) days, but that, despite
that notice, petitioner Eugenio Cuaresma refused to vacate the lot involved in the case. It further
appears that on May 3, 1972, Atty. Macario Directo, as counsel for petitioner, filed a motion for
intervention in the aforementioned Civil Case No. Q-12176; and on May 13, 1972, same counsel
filed a motion to quash or recall the writ of execution, and an opposition to the issuance of a writ of
demolition. On May 22, 1972, respondent Judge Pacifico de Castro issued an order denying the
motion to intervene as well as the motion to quash or recall the writ of execution."2 It was then set
forth in such resolution that there was no truth to the allegation that on May 27, 1972, the date of the
filing of the petition for certiorari in the present case, petitioner had no knowledge of the existence of
Civil Case No. 12176.

Respondent Macario O. Directo was then given ten days to show cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him for deliberately making false allegations in such petition. Thereafter, on
August 16, 1972, came a pleading which he entitled Compliance. This is his explanation: "What your
petitioner honestly meant when he alleged that he [has] no knowledge of the existence of said Civil
Case No. 12176, CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, was from the time the plaintiff Marcelo Daquis
instituted the said case in June 1968 up to and after the time the Court issued the decision in the
year 1970. The plaintiff Marcelo Daquis entered into a conditional contract of sale of the lot involved
in said Civil Case No. 12176 with the PHHC. There were four (4) purchasers, the plaintiff, two
others, and your petitioner. Because of the requirement of the PHHC that only one of them should
enter into the contract, Marcelo Daquis was chosen by the others to enter into the same. Since this
was a sale on installment basis, by agreement of all the purchasers, duly acknowledged by the
PHHC, the monthly dues of the petitioner and the two others, were remitted to Marcelo Daquis, who
in turn remits the same to the PHHC. In June 1968 plaintiff Marcelo Daquis instituted Civil Case No.
12176 in the CFI of Quezon City. From June 1968 up to the time and after the decision was issued
by the court, plaintiff Marcelo Daquis never informed your petitioner of the said case."3 He reiterated
in a later paragraph that all he wanted to convey was that his knowledge of the aforesaid civil case
came only after the decision was issued. He closed his Compliance with the plea that if there were
any mistake committed, "it had been an honest one, and would say in all sincerity that there was no
deliberate attempt and intent on his part of misleading this Honorable Court, honestly and totally
unaware of any false allegation in the petition."4

The above explanation lends itself to the suspicion that it was a mere afterthought. It could very well
be that after his attention was called to the misstatements in his petition, he decided on such a
version as a way out. That is more than a bare possibility. There is the assumption though of good
faith. That is in his favor. Moreover, judging from the awkwardly worded petition and even his
compliance quite indicative of either carelessness or lack of proficiency in the handling of the English
language, it is not unreasonable to assume that his deficiency in the mode of expression contributed
to the inaccuracy of his statements. While a mere disclaimer of intent certainly cannot exculpate him,
still, in the spirit of charity and forbearance, a penalty of reprimand would suffice. At least, it would
serve to impress on respondent that in the future he should be much more careful in the preparation
of his pleadings so that the least doubt as to his intellectual honesty cannot be entertained. Every
member of the bar should realize that candor in the dealings with the Court is of the very essence of
honorable membership in the profession.

WHEREFORE, Attorney Macario O. Directo is reprimanded. Let a copy of this resolution be spread
on his record.

Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. 1w ph1.t

Footnotes t.hqw

1 Petition, pars. 4-7.

2 Resolution of this Court dated August 4, 1972.

3 Compliance, 1-2.

4 Ibid, 2.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC

A.M. Case No. 3195. December 18, 1989

MA. LIBERTAD SJ CANTILLER, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. HUMBERTO V. POTENCIANO, respondent.

Eduardo Cabreros, Jr. for complainant.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM

Public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the
prosecution or defense of his client's cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession. This is so because the entrusted privilege to
practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar or to the public. That circumstance explains the public concern for
the maintenance of an untarnished standard of conduct by every attorney towards
his client. 1

Subject of this administrative complaint is Humberto V. Potenciano, a practicing lawyer and a

member of the Philippine Bar under Roll No. 21862. He is charged with deceit, fraud, and
misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an officer
of the court.

The essential facts are as follows: 2

Complainant herein is the sister of Peregrina Cantiller, defendant in an action for "ejectment"
docketed as Civil Case No. 6046 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 57, San Juan,
Metro Manila.

Another action, likewise involving Peregrina but this time as plaintiff, was then pending before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig, Metro Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 54117 for
"reconveyance with damages." Both actions involve the apartment unit being rented by complainant
and her sister.

When the two cases were concluded, Peregrina came out the losing party. Civil Case No. 54117 for
reconveyance was ordered dismissed by the Regional Trial Court on June 8, 1987 while Civil Case
No. 6046 for ejectment was decided by the Metropolitan Trial Court against her.

On October 8, 1987 pursuant to the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 6046 for ejectment,
complainant and Peregrina were served a notice to vacate the rented premises within four (4) days
from receipt of notice.
Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they consulted a certain Sheriff Pagalunan, on the matter.
Pagalunan, in turn, introduced them to herein respondent. After such introduction, the parties
"impliedly agreed" that respondent would handle their case. Forthwith, a petition entitled "Annulment
of Judgment, Annulment of Sale and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Status
Quo Order, etc." was prepared by respondent to forestall the execution of the order to vacate in Civil
Case No. 6046.

In the afternoon of October 9,1987, the complainant was made to sign by respondent what she
described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly composed 3 petition for
annulment of judgment. Complainant alleges that respondent promised her that the necessary
restraining order would be secured if only because the judge who would hear the matter was his
"katsukaran" (close friend).

Thereupon, the petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig, Metro Manila and
docketed as Civil Case No. 55118. Respondent demanded from the complainant one thousand
pesos (P l,000.00) as attorney's fee which the latter paid that same afternoon.

However, when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153, the presiding judge asked
respondent to withdraw as counsel in the case on the ground of their friendship.

On October 11, 1987, respondent went to the house of complainant and asked her to be ready with
two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) to be given to another judge who will issue the restraining order in
the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 6046). Complainant and her sister were only able to raise the
amount of one thousand pesos which they immediately gave to respondent.

Later respondent informed the complainant and her sister that he could not locate the judge who
would issue the restraining order. The parties, then, instead went to the Max's Restaurant where
respondent ordered some food - including two plastic bags of food allegedly to be given to the judge
who would issue the restraining order. At this juncture, respondent asked for the remaining balance
of the two thousand pesos (P 2,000.00) which he earlier demanded. Complainant gave her last
money-a ten dollar ($ 10.00) bill.

Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, respondent informed complainant and Peregrina
that there was a need to file another case with the Regional Trial Court to enable them to retain
possession of the apartment. For this purpose, respondent told complainant to prepare the amount
of Ten Thousand Pesos (P 10,000.00) allegedly to be deposited with the Treasurer's Office of Pasig
as purchase price of the apartment and another one thousand pesos (P 1,000.00) to cover the
expenses of the suit. Respondent stressed to the complainant the need and urgency of filing the new
complaint.

Complainant and Peregrina raised the said amounts through the kindness of some friends and
relatives. On October 26,1987, the money was handed over to the respondent.

On the same date, a complaint for "Specific Performance, Annulment of Simulated or Spurious Sale
with Damages," later docketed as Civil Case No. 55210, was filed by respondent with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig, Metro Manila.

At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 on October 30, 1987,
respondent, contrary to his promise that he would secure a restraining order, withdrew his
appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as
replacement. Thus, no restraining order or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a consequence,
the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046 was eventually enforced and executed.
Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that there was really no need to make a
deposit of ten thousand pesos (P l0,000.00) relative to Civil Case No. 55210. After further inquiry,
she found out that in fact there was no such deposit made. Thus, on December 23,1987,
complainant sent a demand letter to respondent asking for the return of the total amount of eleven
thousand pesos (P 11,000.00) which the former earlier gave to the latter. However, this letter was
never answered and the money was never returned. Hence, complainant lodged this administrative
complaint against herein respondent.

Meanwhile, on December 29,1987, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, dismissed Civil Case No.
55118 for failure to state a cause of action.4 On January 20,1988, Civil Case No. 5521 0 was likewise
dismissed for being identical with Civil Case No. 55118. 5

Respondent in his answer contends that the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 was done in
good faith and that the allegations of complainant relative to the administrative charge against him
are all lies, product of one's imagination and only intended to harrass him. 6

This Court agrees that the petitions in Civil Cases Nos. 55118 and 55210 appear to be poorly
prepared and written. having represented himself capable of picking up the cudgels for the
apparently lost cause of complainant respondent should have carefully prepared the pleadings if
only to establish the justness of his representation. The little time involved is no excuse.
Complainant reposed full faith in him. His first duty was to file the best pleading within his capability.
Apparently respondent was more interested in getting the most out of the complainant who was in a
hopeless situation. He bragged about his closeness to the judge concerned in one case and talked
about the need to "buy" the restraining order in the other. Worse still he got P 10,000.00 as alleged
deposit in court which he never deposited. Instead he pocketed the same. The pattern to milk the
complainant dry is obvious.

When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its
prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a
client's cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him. The
acts of respondent in this case violate the most elementary principles of professional ethics . 7

The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting his client's interests.
Respondent had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the presiding judge in Civil Case
No. 55118 to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite such prior
knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a replacement nor did he inform complainant of this
fact.

Even assuming that respondent had no previous knowledge that he would be asked to withdraw, the
record is quite clear that four (4) days prior to the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case
No. 55118 respondent already filed a motion therein withdrawing as complainant's counsel
interposing as reason therefor his frequent attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void,
respondent failed to find a replacement. He did not even ask complainant to hire another lawyer in
his stead. 8

His actuation is definitely inconsistent with his duty to protect with utmost dedication the interest of
his client and of the fidelity, trust and confidence which he owes his client. 9 More so in this case,
where by reason of his gross negligence complainant thereby suffered by losing all her cases.

The filing of Civil Case No. 55210 on October 26, 1987, the same day that he had already filed a
motion to withdraw as counsel for complainant in Civil Case No. 55118, reveals his lack of good faith
as an advocate. He also failed to appear for the complainant in said case. It was all a show to get
more money from her. This adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. When confronted with
this evident irregularity, he lamely stated that while he did not physically appear for complainant he
nevertheless prepared and drafted the pleadings.

His services were engaged by complainant hoping that the property subject of the ejectment
proceeding would be returned to her. In fact, it was respondent who persuaded complainant that the
filing of these two cases simultaneously were the means by which this objective can be achieved.
His duty was not only to prepare the pleadings but to represent complainant until the termination of
the cases. This he failed to do.

His representation that there was an immediate need to file Civil Case No. 55210 when he already
knew that he could no longer physically handle the same is an act of deception of his client.10 It
shows lack of fidelity to his oath of office as a member of the Philippine bar.

The allegation of respondent that the ten thousand pesos (P 10,000.00) was given to him as fee for
his services, is simply incredible. Indeed, such amount is grossly disproportionate with the service he
actually rendered. 11 And his failure to return even a portion of the amount upon demand of
complainant all the more bolsters the protestation of complainant that respondent does not deserve
to remain as an officer of the court.

Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a
time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance
with one's oath of office and the canons of professional ethics is an imperative.

Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with
their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter
of public interest.

WHEREFORE, after considering the entirety of the circumstances present in this case, this Court
finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano to be guilty of the charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS
him from the practice of law for an indefinite period until such time he can demonstrate that he has
rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the practice of law.

Finally, respondent is hereby ordered to return to complainant herein the sum of eleven thousand
pesos (P11,000.00) with legal interest from the date of this resolution until it is actually returned.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 3rd ed. (Law Publishing House, 1985), page 153.

2 Pages 1-13, Rollo.

3 Page 2, Rollo.

4 Pages 26-32, Record.

 5 Pages 39-40, Supra.

6 Pages 48-51, Rollo.

7 In re Yeager 56 P 1 691 (1932).

8 Page 11, Report.

9 Canon 17, Code of Professional Responsibility.

10 Sta. Maria vs. Tuason, I I SCRA 562 (1964)

11 Canon 22, Code of Professional Responsibility.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.

The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan in 1992. 4
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber
concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered
it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint
entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal
complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and
control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without
valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8

Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary

investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651
Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines. 13

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent,

being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of
Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding
the case filed by Taggat employees. 14 Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated
the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an
affidavit to support the complaint. 15

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while
working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent
received P10,000 as retainers fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000
for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.

Respondent refutes complainants allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved
by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat
for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to
Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary
investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when
he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit
respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and
filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25

Respondent states that complainants reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that
respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainants statement
during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:
 xxx

Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he would do it, Madam Witness?

A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend and he was working with my Dad and he was
supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat
employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 27Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that
respondents act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28

Respondent denies complainants allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened
and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because
complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29

Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of
retainer fees from complainant but claims that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were
paid for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is
not the same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not
prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:

x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the
respondents asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for
retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of conflict of interest.
Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor
complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32

Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was
filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained
counsel or legal consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651
Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of
Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was
dismissed. 35

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas
("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas resignation, the case was reassigned to
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors
issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with
modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funas Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding
respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and violating
the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the
practice of law. The Report reads:

Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of
whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and
Legal Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors
Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as
having the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).

Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent
undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt
with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and
related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much
familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the
mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.

A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client,
the duty to "maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91
Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)

Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any
interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to
a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case,
matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor
Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been
labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel.
But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of
Taggat.

xxxx

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in
I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the
very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an
employee of the corporation and part of its management.

xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while
being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are
prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto
Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act
of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those
acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in
or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and
calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing
of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former
clients interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a
government prosecutor. 40

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b),
Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent
committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").

Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent
conflicting interests." 44However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent
conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all
concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship
exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty. 46

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct."
Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to
"engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47

Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting
interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One
test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client
any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In
essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to
refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously
represented him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal
complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.
Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned
sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to
prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired
through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to
the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that
basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his
previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to
charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client
does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client. The intent
of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that
he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus,
respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as

x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51

"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. 52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was
not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit
because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as
long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working
as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were
for "Retainers fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the
prohibition in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional
Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees unless the acts
involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondents violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Respondents admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a
government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent
stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely
suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll
of Attorneys on the following grounds:

xxxx

d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his
dealings with the public. 54

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts. 55

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized
private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this
penalty appropriate for respondents violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B.
Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
 CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 153.

2
Id. at 128-129.

3 Id. at 10.

4 Id. at 1, 240.

5 Id. at 240.

6 Id.

7 Id. at 21.

8 Id. at 22.

9 Id. at 75.

10 21 Taggat employees filed their Affidavits alleging that complainant failed to pay them
31 quincenas of their salaries and wages, thus 651 Informations were recommended for
filing.

11Article 288 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides: "Penalties. Except as
otherwise provided in this Code, or unless the acts complained of hinges on a question of
interpretation or implementation of ambiguous provisions of an existing collective bargaining
agreement, any violation of the provisions of this Code declared to be unlawful or penal in
nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor
more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than three
months nor more than three years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court. x x x."

12Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides: "Withholding of wages and
kickbacks prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, to withhold
any amount from the wages of a worker or induce him to give up any part of his wages by
force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever without the workers
consent."

13 Rollo, p. 82.

14 Id. at 2.

15 Id. at 3.

16 Id. at 110-111.

17 Id. at 112-113.

18 Id. at 114.

19 Id. at 243.

20 Id. at 242.

21 Id. at 244.

22 Id.

23 Id. at 243.

24 Id. at 245.

25 Id. at 244.

26 Id. at 246, 483.

27
Id. at 247.

28 Id.

29 Id. at 249.

30 Id. at 247-248.

31 Id. at 350.

32 Id.
33 Id. at 248.

34 Id. at 155-157.

35 Id.

36 Id. at 84-89, 99-103, 232, 237-239, 268, 273, 276-279, 282-284, 294-296, 299-300.

37 Id. at 330-331.

38 Id. at 362.

39The IBP Commissioner imposed a penalty of three months suspension from the practice of
law.

40 Rollo, pp. 549-554.

41 Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

xxxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue
a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the
whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action.

42 Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

43 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6.

44 Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 15.03.

45R. Agpalo, Comments On The Code Of Professional Responsibility And The Code Of
Judicial Conduct 165 (2001 ed.)

46 Berbano v. Barcelona, A.C. No. 6084, 3 September 2003, 410 SCRA 258.

47 RA 6713, Section 7(b)(2).

48 A.C. No. 6708, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 1.

49 Id. at 10-11.

50 Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, A.C. No. 5128, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 167, 178.
 51 Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210, 214.

52 Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., 447 Phil. 750, 759 (2003).

53 Exhs. "B," "B-2," "B-3," rollo, pp. 110-114.

54 Id. at 241-242.

55 Endaya v. Oca, A.C. No. 3967, 3 September 2003, 410 SCRA 244, 255.

Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil
56

Service Laws as mandated by Section 12 of RA 6713.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 1372 June 27, 2002

SPOUSES LIRIO U. RABANAL AND CAYETANO D. RABANAL, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. FAUSTINO F. TUGADE, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant spouses Cayetano and Lirio Rabanal
against Atty. Faustino F. Tugade. It is alleged that respondent, as counsel for complainant Cayetano
Rabanal, did not file the appellant's brief in the Court of Appeals, as a result of which the appeal filed
by Cayetano was dismissed and the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan became final and executory.

It appears that complainant Cayetano Rabanal was one of the accused-appellants in Criminal Case
No. CCC-I-150, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Rabanal y Ibaez, et al.," of the
Criminal Circuit Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.1 He was found guilty of homicide and the case was
appealed to the Court of Appeals. Complainant terminated the services of his previous counsel and
engaged the services of respondent Atty. Faustino F. Tugade as new counsel to prosecute the
appeal.2 However, despite the extension of time granted to him totalling 60 days, Atty. Tugade failed
to file the appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.3 Cayetano filed a motion for
reconsideration, but his motion was denied.4 Complainants alleged that they paid P1,000.00 to
respondent as attorney's fees and, in addition, the amount of P1,400.00 for the preparation of the
appellant's brief.5Complainants sought the suspension from the practice of law or the disbarment of
respondent attorney.6
In his comment dated October 24, 1974, respondent said he did not want to accept complainant's
case due to his busy schedule, but that he was nonetheless prevailed upon by the latter, who is his
"kababayan," to sign the appellant's brief to be filed in the case.7 Cayetano gave the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSN) pertaining to the case to respondent, and the sum of P600.00 as litigation
expenses, after which respondent asked another lawyer to prepare the appellant's brief. However,
on May 11, 1974, Cayetano informed respondent that the Court of Appeals had dismissed his
appeal for failure of counsel to file an appellant's brief. Respondent alleged he then entered his
appearance as counsel for Cayetano and filed a motion for reconsideration with the Court of
Appeals, for which he was paid P800.00.8 The motion was, however, denied and Cayetano served
sentence from 1974 to 1979, when he was released on conditional pardon.9

In a resolution, dated November 4, 1974, the Court referred the administrative case against
respondent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.10 The OSG conducted hearings on February 5, 1976 and November 27, 1976,
during which the spouses Rabanal testified in support of their complaint.11 On January 24, 1979,
Cayetano was released from the New Bilibid Prisons on conditional pardon.12 A few years later, the
Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) assumed jurisdiction over
the administrative case.13 After each of the complainants had testified, the IBP Commissioner set the
hearing for reception of respondent's evidence on June 26, 1992 with warning that the case would
be considered submitted for resolution if respondent failed to present his evidence.14 Three notices
of the hearing sent by registered mail to respondent were, however, returned
unclaimed.15 Accordingly, the IBP Hearing Commissioner, upon motion of complainant Lirio Rabanal,
considered the case submitted for resolution.16 On May 8, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors
recommended to the Court the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for at least one (1)
year.17

On July 15, 1993, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the records of the case to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC). Later, however, the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN) were
lost.18 In any case, on May 20, 2002, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) adopted the findings of
the IBP and recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for one (1) year.19

After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds no basis for reversing the findings and
recommendation of the IBP and the OBC. Their recommendation is affirmed with the modification
that the penalty imposed is reduced from one (1) year to six (6) months.

Respondent claims that he was not the counsel of complainant Cayetano Rabanal prior to the filing
of a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals and he could not be held responsible for
the dismissal of complainant's appeal for failure of counsel to file the appellant's brief. We disagree.

The absence of a written contract does not preclude a finding that there was a professional
relationship which merits attorney's fees for professional services rendered. A written contract is not
an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To
establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and
received in any matter pertinent to his profession.20 Thus, in Villafuerte v. Cortez,21 the Court held
that the admission of respondent lawyer that he received payment from complainant is sufficient
evidence to establish a lawyer-client relationship. In this case, complainant sought and received
legal advice from respondent Tugade, who admitted that he agreed to sign the appellant's brief to be
filed and that he received P600.00 from complainant spouses. It is therefore clear that a lawyer-
client relationship existed between the two.

It is immaterial that respondent Tugade assisted Cayetano in the case as a mere friend or
"kababayan" of the latter. In Junio v. Grupo,22 respondent also denied the existence of a lawyer-
client relationship, stating that complainant was a close personal friend whom he helped in a
personal capacity. Nonetheless, it was held:

To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. . . It is not necessary that
any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for: neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was
had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his
attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the
professional employment must be regarded as established. . . .

In this case, Cayetano consulted respondent Tugade in his professional capacity in order to obtain
advice concerning his appeal. Respondent agreed, as shown by his acceptance of the payment to
him, his receipt of the TSNs of the case, and the fact that he signed the appellant's brief. His claim
that he merely accepted payment but that he asked another lawyer to prepare the brief is an obvious
subterfuge. He has not even named the lawyer assuming that the latter is real. It is hard to see why
respondent should personally accept payment and the transcripts of stenographic notes from
complainant if he did not intend to prepare the appellant's brief. Moreover, the fact that respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration after the dismissal of the appeal only confirms that he was indeed
Cayetano's lawyer.

The records clearly show that respondent Atty. Faustino F. Tugade was remiss in the performance
of his duties as counsel of complainant Cayetano Rabanal. He was given by the Court of Appeals an
extension of time totalling 60 days within which to file the appellant's brief, but he failed to file the
same. He thus violated the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

RULE 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.

RULE 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

What this Court said in another case is fitting:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client
with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity,
care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save
by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit
of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.23
Indeed, a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client. He should be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him, remembering always that his actions or omissions are binding on his
clients. In this case, the failure of respondent to file the appellant's brief resulted in the dismissal of
the appeal. As a consequence, the decision in the trial court finding complainant guilty of homicide
became final and executory and he was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment. As has been held:

An attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his
client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA
107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his
client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of
justice. (People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).24

It should likewise be noted that respondent failed to notify the IBP of his change of address, thus
delaying the resolution of this case. Service of notice and other pleadings, which must be furnished
to the parties, must be made at the last address on record. If the parties are represented by counsel,
such notices shall be sent instead to the counsel's last given address on record in the absence of a
proper and adequate notice of a change of address, unless service upon the party himself is
ordered.25

In Resurreccion v. Sayson,26 the Court attributed the delay in the resolution of an administrative case
to respondent lawyer, after finding that "The 27-year delay in the resolution of this case was, to a
large extent, caused by his failure to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General and to inform
the IBP of his change of address, a failure that also indicated his lack of regard for the very serious
charges brought against him." Similarly, respondent Tugade likewise showed a disregard of the
charge against him, and the IBP properly made its recommendation solely on the basis of
complainants' testimonies and the documentary evidence.

In Galen v. Paguirigan,27 the Court, taking into account that it was a first offense, suspended for a
period of six (6) months a lawyer who failed to file a brief. Atty. Faustino Tugade showed lack of due
care for his client's interest and willful neglect of his duties as an officer of the court, thus warranting
the imposition of the same penalty on him.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Faustino F. Tugade is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months effective upon finality hereof with WARNING that a repetition of
the same negligent act charged in this complaint will be dealt with even more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Chairman, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., abroad, on official business.

Footnotes

1 Entry of Judgment, Vol. I of records, p. 6.

2 Complaint, p. 1; Vol. I of records, p. 1.

3 Id., p. 2; id., p. 2.

4 Id., p. 2; id., p. 2.

5 Id., p. 1; id., p. 1.

6 Id., p. 3; id., p. 3.

7 Id., p. 2; id., p. 10.

8 Id., p. 3; id., p. 11.

9Complaint, p. 2; Vol. I of records, p. 2; Entry of Judgment, Vol. I of records, p. 6; Letter

dated March 3, 1992 of the Superintendent of the Bureau of Corrections, Vol. II of records, p.
3.

10 Vol. I of records, p. 14.

11 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, p. 1; Vol. II of records, p. 12.

12 Vol. II of records, p. 3.

13 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated May 8, 1993, p. 1; Vol. II of records, p. 12.

14 Order of the IBP Hearing Commissioner dated March 27, 1992; Vol. II of records, p. 6.

15 Notices of hearing, Vol. II of records, pp. 2, 5, 8.

16 Vol. II of records, p. 9.

17 Vol. II of records, pp. 13-14.

Report, dated February 20, 2002, of Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, Acting Bar Confidant,
18

Vol. II of records, pp. 42-44.

19 Vol. II of records, pp. 53-54.

20 Dee v. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 651 (1989).

21 288 SCRA 687 (1998).

22 Adm. Case No. 5020, December 18, 2001.

23 Ramos v. Jacoba, Adm. Case No. 5505, September 27, 2001.

24 Id. (emphasis in the original).

Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, 344 SCRA 76 (2000); Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 310
25

SCRA 393 (1999); Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 130 (1988).
 26 300 SCRA 129 (1998).

27 Adm. Case No. 5558, March 7, 2002.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6295. April 14, 2004]

JOSEFINA B. FAJARDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. DANILO DELA

TORRE, respondent.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant was the defendant in Civil Case No. 581 for Forcible Entry,
entitled, Felisa Imperial versus Josefina Fajardo, and the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 582
for Unlawful Detainer, entitled, Josefina B. Fajardo versus Felisa Imperial. The cases
were consolidated and tried jointly by the Municipal Trial Court of Ba-ao, Camarines
Sur, which rendered judgment in favor of Imperial.[1] Complainants counsel, respondent
herein, appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, which affirmed the appealed
decision.
Hence, complainant instructed respondent to file a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals. Respondent demanded the amount of P4,300.00[2] for the preparation and
filing of the petition which complainant complied by remitting the amount to respondent.
It appears that the petition for review was later dismissed by the Court of Appeals
on the grounds of insufficient payment of docket fees and failure to attach the certified
true copy of the assailed decision. Complainant only learned of the resolution
dismissing her petition when her opponent, Imperial, filed a motion for new trial
attaching a copy thereof in the separate action filed by complainant with the RTC of
Iriga City for recovery of possession.
Complainant thus filed a complaint charging respondent of Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Negligence in the Performance of Profession.[3]
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline directed
respondent to answer the complaint. Despite receipt of the Order of the IBP-CBD,
respondent failed to answer the Complaint.
Subsequently, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued a Notice
dated February 13, 2001[4] setting the case for hearing on March 13, 2001. Again,
despite receipt by respondent of the notice, he failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing. Complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.
 On September 22, 2003, the IBP-CBD submitted its Report finding respondent
liable as charged and recommending that he be fined P1,500.00 and suspended from
the practice of law for a period ranging from four (4) to six (6) months. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but reduced the
suspension to one (1) month.
While we agree with the finding that respondent is liable for negligence, we find
inadequate the recommended period of suspension. Hence, we impose on respondent
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
In Ingles v. Dela Serna,[5] it was held:

Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at
the outset, the Court finds the complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly
dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it necessary that further inquiry
should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by merely evaluating
the pleadings submitted, referral is made to the IBP for formal investigation of the
case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex
parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite
reasonable notice.Hereunder are some of the pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court on this matter, viz:

x x x x x x x x x.

SEC. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of the issues or upon failure of respondent to

answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the
investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer
oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present
witnesses on his behalf and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if, upon
reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall
proceed ex parte.

The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the
date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of
Governors, upon prior application.

Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other order issued by the
Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of Court.The
corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator with the before the IBP Board
of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if
necessary in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings set
before the Investigator. Such hearing shall, as far as practicable, be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors
shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of the penalty.

The procedure outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the innocents are spared
from wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted their just
due. Obviously, these requirements are not to be taken lightly. (Emphasis and
italics supplied)

The records show that from the time respondent was directed to file his answer up
to the time the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, nothing was heard from
respondent despite due notice. Hence, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to
present witnesses on his behalf or to be heard by himself and counsel.
The records show that respondent asked for the amount of P4,300.00 for the
preparation of the petition for review to be filed with the Court of Appeals, which amount
was itemized as follows:

Postage - P 350.00
(bulky -21 copies plus annexes)

Xerox copies - 750.00

(@ 500 pages)
(clear copy)
Miscellaneous - 200.00
Legal fees - P 3,000.00
-------------
P4,300.00[6]
However, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition reads:

Before Us is a Petition for Review filed on January 27, 2000. From the records, it
appears that the said petition is not sufficient in form. For one, the payment of the
docketing fees remitted by the petitioner was for only P650.00, which is short by
P280.00. Likewise, the attached copy of the questioned RTC Decision
dated December 15, 1999 is merely a plain photocopy, in violation of Sec. 2(d) of
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, for violation of Sec. 1 and Sec. 2(d) in relation to Sec. 3 of Rule 42
of the 1997 Rules of Court, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis and italics supplied)[7]

 Respondent was not only remiss in the preparation of the petition, but may
have misappropriated a portion of the sum remitted to him by complainant for the
purpose of filing the petition because the docketing fees he remitted was short of
P280.00. What is worse is that respondent failed to inform complainant of the actual
status of the appeal. Such behavior cannot and should not be countenanced because
they run afoul with the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 15. A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his clients.

CANON 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and property collected or
received for or from the client.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.

Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and the property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have lien to same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.

xxxxxxxxx

CANON 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence in him.

xxxxxxxxx

Rule 18.04. A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.

It appears that complainant learned about the dismissal of her petition only through
the copy of the appellate courts resolution appended to an omnibus motion for new trial
and reconsideration[8] in another case, i.e., Civil Case No. 588 for Recovery of
Ownership and Possession. In Garcia v. Manuel,[9] it was held:

The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the
need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the
case and should not be left in the dark as to mode and manner in which his interests
are being defended. It is only thus that the trust and faith in the counsel may remain
unimpaired. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Furthermore, it was held in Rabanal v. Tugade[10] that an attorney is bound to

protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Implicit with
this directive is the command that all lawyers are duty-bound to keep abreast of the law
and legal developments as well as to participate in continuing legal education
programs.[11] All law practitioners should be fully conversant of the requirements for the
filing of certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[12] Ignorantia legis
non excusat.[13] Ignorance encompasses not only substantive but also procedural
laws.[14]
Moreover, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. Verily:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.He must serve
the client with competence and diligence and champion the latters cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to
assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not
only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client;
he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect
of the community to the legal profession.[15]

The records further show that a similar complaint[16] for malpractice and unethical
behavior has been filed against respondent by complainants son with the IBP for the
dismissal of Special Proceedings No. 1471 as a result of respondents gross
negligence. The foregoing only serves to aggravate and to underscore respondents
malfeasance.
The misconduct of respondent is not, however, limited to his professional duties
towards his clients.
Respondents consistent refusal to comply with lawful orders during the proceedings
before the Commission on Bar Discipline without any explanation, despite receipt of
notice, borders on the willful and is not lost on the Court. In Grande v. De Silva,[17] the
Court held:
Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed
at her with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which
merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing her
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients. We can not tolerate any
misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.

All told, respondent has failed to do his duty to his client and has clearly violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the publics perception of the
legal profession.
As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out where a lesser
penalty could accomplish the end desired.[18]However, the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) month imposed by the IBP Board of Governors is not
proportionate to respondents violation of several Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, he deserves a graver penalty,
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Atty. DANILO DELA TORRE
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
This resolution shall take effect immediately. Copies hereof shall be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record; the Office
of the President; the Department of Justice; the Court of Appeals; the Sandiganbayan
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator shall also furnish all
lower courts with copies of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 6-15.

[2] Id., p. 28.
[3] Id., pp. 1-4.
[4] Id., p. 58.
[5] A.C. No. 5763, 3 December 2002, 393 SCRA 252.
[6] Rollo, p. 28.
[7] Id., pp. 53-55.
[8] Id., pp. 46-61.
[9] A.C. No. 5811, 20 January 2003.
[10] A.C. No. 1372, 27 June 2002.
[11] Cuevas v. Bais Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 142689, 17 October 2002, 391 SCRA 192, citing Canon 5,
Code of Professional Responsibility.
[12] Lapid v. Laurea, G.R. No. 139607, 28 October 2002, 391 SCRA 277.
[13] Intengan v. CA, G.R. No. 128996, 15 February 2002, 377 SCRA 63.
[14] Lapid v. Laurea, supra.
[15] Ramos v. Jacoba, A.M. No. 5505, 27 September 2001.
[16] Rollo, pp. 20-23.
[17] A.C. No. 4838, 29 July 2003.
[18] Zaguirre v. Castillo, A.C. No. 4921, 6 March 2003, 398 SCRA 658, citing Saburnido v. Madronio, A.C.
No. 4497, 26 September 2001, 366 SCRA 1; Tboli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. (TADI) v.
Solilapsi, A.C. No. 4766, 27 December 2002, 394 SCRA 269, citing Paras v. Paras, 343 SCRA
414 [2000].

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 70895 May 30, 1986

HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC. and PEDRO HABALUYAS, petitioners,

vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPSON, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 36; SHUGO NODA & CO.,
LTD., and SHUYA NODA, respondents.

Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondents.

RESOLUTION

FERIA, J.:

Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Second Division of the
Court promulgated on August 5, 1985 which granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition and set
aside the order of respondent Judge granting private respondents' motion for new trial.

The issue in this case is whether the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be extended.

Section 39 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, reduced the period for
appeal from final orders or judgments of the Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance)
from thirty (30) to fifteen (15) days and provides a uniform period of fifteen days for appeal from final
orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court counted from notice thereof, except
in habeas corpus cases where the period for appeal remains at forty- eight (48) hours. To expedite
appeals, only a notice of appeal is required and a record on appeal is no longer required except in
appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed. Section 19 of the Interim Rules provides that in these exceptional
cases, the period for appeal is thirty (30) days since a record on appeal is required. Moreover
Section 18 of the Interim Rules provides that no appeal bond shall be required for an appeal, and
Section 4 thereof disallows a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.

All these amendments are designed, as the decision sought to be reconsidered rightly states, to
avoid the procedural delays which plagued the administration of justice under the Rules of Court
which are intended to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive administration of
justice.

However, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.

In the case of Gibbs vs. Court, of First Instance (80 Phil. 160), the Court dismissed the petition for
certiorari and ruled that the failure of defendant's attorney to file the petition to set aside the
judgment within the reglementary period was due to excusable neglect, and, consequently, the
record on appeal was allowed. The Court did not rule that the motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration could not be granted.

In the case of Roque vs. Gunigundo (Administrative Case No. 1684, March 30, 1979, 89 SCRA
178), a division of the Court cited the Gibbs decision to support a statement that a motion to extend
the reglementary period for filing the motion for reconsideration is not authorized or is not in order.

The Intermediate Appellate Court is sharply divided on this issue. Appeals have been dismissed on
the basis of the original decision in this case.

After considering the able arguments of counsels for petitioners and respondents, the Court resolved
that the interest of justice would be better served if the ruling in the original decision were applied
prospectively from the time herein stated. The reason is that it would be unfair to deprive parties of
their right to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a procedure which was not expressly
prohibited or allowed by the law or the Rules. On the other hand, a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to an appeal, a petition for review or a petition for review on
certiorari, and since the purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite the final
disposition of cases, a strict but prospective application of the said ruling is in order. Hence, for the
guidance of Bench and Bar, the Court restates and clarifies the rules on this point, as follows:

1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced
that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with
the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate
Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last
resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.

2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in other cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed, a motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal may
be filed within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days. (Moya vs. Barton, 76 Phil. 831; Heirs of
Nantes vs. Court of Appeals, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 753.) If the court denies the motion for
extension, the appeal must be taken within the original period (Bello vs. Fernando, January 30,
1962, 4 SCRA 135), inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend the period for appeal (Reyes vs.
Sta. Maria, November 20, 1972, 48 SCRA 1). The trial court may grant said motion after the
expiration of the period for appeal provided it was filed within the original period. (Valero vs. Court of
Appeals, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 467; Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, September 28, 1973, 53
SCRA 228).
All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, shall be allowed and determined on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of, and to set aside, the decision of August 5, 1985 is
granted and the petition is dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Paras,
JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS
OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL,
SR., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in
the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the
decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for
having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by
Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this
defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had
been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the
former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial
Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding
petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on
August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9,
1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September
24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of
judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down
in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208),
this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that
no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan
or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a
motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-
53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the
modes and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed
the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30,
1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still
within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669,
October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9,
1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no
longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of
the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to
file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to
the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of
the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view,
there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel
as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme
Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA)
and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its
total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear
chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and ,
therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear
chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of
merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1349. April 18, 1997]

SPOUSES JOSE and TRINIDAD BACAR, complainants, vs. JUDGE

SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., respondent.

DECISION
PADILLA, J.:

In this petition by way of complaint, dated 11 April 1994, petitioner-spouses Jose

and Trinidad Bacar pray for the dismissal from the service of respondent Judge
Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 142, on the grounds of: 1) gross ignorance of the law, and; 2) rendering an
unjust judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-1360 and 89-2878 for homicide and
attempted homicide respectively, both entitled "People of the Philippines v. Gerardo
Fortaleza Marcial".
The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 30 March 1989, an information for homicide (for the death of one Maximo Bacar,
son of herein petitioner-spouses) was filed by 2nd Assistant Fiscal Domingo A. Israel
against Gerardo Fortaleza Marcial before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
142, docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1360.
On 7 June 1989, another information (this time for attempted homicide committed
against one Edgar Mabuyo) was filed by the aforesaid Fiscal Israel against the same
Gerardo Fortaleza Marcial before the same court, docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-
2878.

On 13 May 1992, after trial on the merits, a Joint Judgment in Criminal Cases Nos.
89-1360 and 89-2878 was rendered by respondent judge, finding the accused Gerardo
Marcial guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The dispositive part of
the decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Gerardo
Marcial guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide in Criminal Case
No. 89-1360 and of the offense of Slight Physical Injuries in Criminal Case No. 89-
2878. No modifying circumstances having attended the commission of said crimes,
the accused is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal with respect to Criminal Case No. 89-1360 and to suffer
imprisonment of thirty (30) days of arresto menor as regards Criminal Case No. 89-
2878.

The accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Maximo Bacar in
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the amount of P33,572.00 as
actual damages and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Makati, Metro Manila, May 13, 1992."

On 13 August 1992, the accused, Gerardo Marcial, filed a motion for

reconsideration of the joint judgment, alleging among others, that the court erred in
imposing the penalties without considering at least two (2) mitigating circumstances,
namely: sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party which
immediately preceded the act, and; that the accused had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed.
On 28 October 1992, herein petitioners filed an opposition to said motion. However,
on 13 November 1992, the lower court granted the motion for reconsideration filed by
the accused. After reassessing the facts of the case on the basis of said motion,
respondent judge took into account the mitigating circumstances of want of intent to
commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the act
and accordingly, reduced the penalty in Criminal Case No. 89-1360 to six (6) years
of prision mayor, while retaining the penalty in Criminal Case No. 89-2878, i.e.,
imprisonment of thirty (30) days of arresto menor.
The lower court justified its order thus:
"It appearing upon a re-examination of the evidence on record that the encounter
between the group of the accused Gerardo Marcial and that of the victims Maximo
Bacar and Edgar Mabuyo precipitated a 'free for all fight', that in such a melee,
confusion broke loose and was expected to ensue as a matter of course; that the
participation in the melee of each of the members of the respective groups of the
victims and the accused was unexpected and unpremeditated; that the victim Edgar
Mabuyo admitted that prior to the incident, there was heckling which came from him
directed to the group of the accused Gerardo Marcial and that it was he who started it
out, that accused Gerardo Marcial confined himself to giving a single thrust with an
icepick on the right arm of Edgar Mabuyo and at the back of Maximo Bacar from
which it can be safely inferred that the accused had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong, for otherwise, he would have persisted in attacking the victims to the point of
finishing them off; the Court resolves to accord the accused Gerardo Marcial the
benefit of the mitigating circumstances of want of intent to commit so grave a wrong
and sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the act in accordance with
Article 13, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby reconsiders the
Decision dated May 13, 1992 in the foregoing respect." [1]

On 14 December 1992 and 16 April 1993, respectively, the prosecution filed a

motion for reconsideration and an addendum to said motion. On 25 May 1993, the
accused filed his comment and/or opposition to the prosecution' s motion for
reconsideration. On 9 December 1993, respondent judge issued an order denying the
prosecution' s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. On 4 January 1994, the
prosecution filed another motion for reconsideration and clarification which respondent
judge denied anew on 21 January 1994.
On 11 April 1994, the spouses Jose and Trinidad Bacar, parents of the deceased
victim Maximo Bacar in Criminal Case No. 89-1360, filed the present petition praying for
the dismissal of respondent judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., presiding judge of the
RTC of Makati, Branch 142, for gross ignorance of the law and for rendering an unjust
judgment in said consolidated cases.
On the first issue, petitioners allege that respondent judge committed gross
ignorance of the law when he accorded the accused the mitigating circumstances of
want of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation which immediately
preceded the act in accordance with Art. 13, pars. 3 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code
because these cited provisions are not applicable in either or both criminal cases. They
contend that lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot apply in Criminal Case
No. 89-2878 where the accused was found guilty of slight physical injuries because lack
of intention to kill is not mitigating in crimes against persons, citing the case of People v.
Dalacgac[2] where it was held that in crimes against persons who do not die as a result
of the assault, the absence of the intent to kill reduces the felony to mere physical
injuries, but it does not constitute a mitigating circumstance under Art. 13, par. 3. [3]
Additionally, said mitigating circumstances cannot apply to Criminal Case No. 89-
1360 (for Homicide) for when the accused stabbed the unarmed and defenseless
Maximo Bacar at his back with an icepick, it is crystal clear, so petitioners contend, that
the intention of the accused Gerardo Marcial at that particular moment when he
executed or committed the stabbing was to kill and finish off Maximo Bacar and not to
harm him only.[4] Petitioners cite the case of People v. Boyles, et al.,[5] to wit:

"Article 13, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code addresses itself to the intention of the
offender at the particular moment when he executes or commits the criminal act; not
to his intention during the planning stage. Therefore, when, as in the case under
review, the original plan was only to rob, but which plan, on account of the resistance
offered by the victim, was compounded into the more serious crime of robbery with
homicide, the plea of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong cannot be rightly
granted. The unforgettable fact remains that when they ganged up on their victim,
they employed deadly weapons and inflicted on him, mortal wounds in his neck. At
that precise moment, they did intend to kill their victim, and that was the moment to
which Art. 13, par. 3 refers."[6]

As for the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation, petitioners contend that

this is not applicable to Criminal Case No. 89-1360 (for Homicide) for while Edgardo
Mabuyo, the victim in Criminal Case No. 89-2878, admitted that prior to the incident,
there was heckling which came from him directed at the group of the accused Gerardo
Marcial and that he was the one who started the heckling, and that the heckling
triggered the "free for all fight", there was however, no iota of evidence that the
deceased Maximo Bacar made any provocation. It is further argued by petitioners that
under said Article 13, par. 4, RPC, the provocation to be considered mitigating must
originate from the offended party. Therefore, said mitigating circumstance cannot be
appreciated in the case involving the deceased Maximo Bacar as it is undisputed that
he himself never gave or caused any provocation.
Petitioners contend that instead of according the accused Gerardo Marcial the
aforesaid mitigating circumstances, respondent judge should have considered the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength under Art. 14, par. 15, of the
Revised Penal Code and treachery under Art. 14, par. 16, of the same Code.[7]
On rendering an unjust judgment, petitioners allege that in imposing a straight
penalty of six (6) years imprisonment for homicide, after taking into consideration the
aforesaid mitigating circumstances, respondent judge has rendered an unjust judgment
in Criminal Case No. 89-1360. It is contended that under the graduation and application
of penalties, the penalty that should be imposed can in no case be justified to only six
(6) years "flat".[8]
The present complaint was referred to respondent judge for comment by then
Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad in his First (1st) Indorsement dated 27
May 1994. In reply thereto, respondent judge filed a motion, dated 3 June 1994,
requesting for an extension of twenty (20) days within which to file his comment for the
reason that he needed to borrow the records of said Criminal Cases Nos. 89-1360 and
89-2878 from the Makati Regional Trial Court so that he may be able to file an
intelligible comment. He also explained that per his recollection, when accused Marcial
filed his motion for reconsideration of the joint judgment, respondent judge, to be sure
that he would not commit an error, sought a second opinion from one Judge Nemesio
Felix who allegedly opined that the said accused should have been given the benefit of
homicide in a "tumultuous affray" with no intent to commit the crime, and of self-
defense, and suggested a reducted straight penalty of anywhere from two (2) years to
six (6) years. Respondent's request for extension was granted by then Deputy Court
Administrator Juanito A. Bernad per his letter dated 20 June 1994.
However, as his comment was not forthcoming, tracer letters, dated 8 November
1994 and 10 October 1995, were sent to respondent judge by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA, for brevity), reiterating the directive for him to file his comment on
the complaint against him.
Meanwhile, complainants filed a letter with the OCA dated 20 October 1995
reiterating the charges against respondent judge and particularly assailing his order of
13 November 1992 imposing a straight penalty of six (6) years so as to enable the
accused to avail of the benefits of probation and prayed that judgment be imposed by
this Court on the accused to vindicate the death of their son. They also took exception
to the statement of respondent judge in the assailed order that their motion for
reconsideration dated 10 December 1992 was filed out of time. [9]
Since respondent judge continually failed to file his comment, this Court issued a
Resolution, dated 1 July 1996, requiring respondent judge to 1) show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comment on the
complaint, and; 2) file the required comment on the complaint. In the same Resolution,
the complainants were advised that their prayer to impose the correct penalty in the
criminal charges cannot be granted since the present proceedings involve only the
administrative liability, if any, of respondent judge.
On 6 August 1996, respondent judge finally filed his comment. He explained therein
why he took into consideration the aforesaid mitigating circumstances and contends that
in doing so, he merely exercised his discretion and judgment. As to why he should not
be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for failure to file comment, respondent
judge set forth the following reasons:

"1. In the belief that the complaint for ignorance of the law (for appreciating the two
(2) mitigating circumstances) was unquestionably, obviously and completely baseless
because they were acts of judicial discretion in the appreciation of evidence,
respondent did not give the matter the priority that it deserved.

2. The Bacar spouses assured respondent during a visit to him in the Pasay City RTC
that they were going to withdraw their complaint.

3. Respondent had been under severe stress since the first week of November 1995 to
the present when he discovered that Judge Salvador Abad Santos, executive judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, x x x initiated an administrative complaint against
him x x x"[10]
 On 14 August 1996, respondent judge filed an urgent ex-parte motion for second
(2nd) extension of time to file his explanation, and; on 28 August 1996, respondent
finally filed his explanation on why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt of court for his failure to file a comment.
After evaluating the foregoing facts, the Office of the Court Administrator made the
following findings:
1. Respondent cannot be held liable for rendering an unjust judgment by considering in
favor of the accused the two (2) mitigating circumstances. Under the Rules of Court, a
judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside by the
court rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been
perfected. Moreover, errors in the application of the law and the appreciation of the
evidence are judicial in nature. The remedy therefore of the complainants should likewise
be judicial.
2. However, respondent may be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for imposing
a straight penalty of six (6) years of imprisonment on the accused in his modified judgment
in the case for homicide. The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory
where imprisonment would exceed one (1) year.[11] And in applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law for offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the indeterminate
sentence should have a fixed minimum and maximum.[12] In this case, what was imposed
was a straight penalty which is erroneous.[13]
We agree with aforesaid findings of the Office of the Court Administrator on both
points.
Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties makes him
liable therefor. To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling
or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position unbearable. For no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.[14]
In the case at bar, respondent judge cannot be faulted for modifying his decision
after considering the two (2) mitigating circumstances of want of intent to commit so
grave a wrong and sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the act, set forth
in the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused. Under the law, a judgment of
conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside by the court
rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been perfected.
The fact that respondent judge' s appreciation of the evidence differed from that of
petitioners which could be biased, does not warrant the conclusion that said judge has
rendered an unjust judgment nor that he is ignorant of the law. In the absence of any
indication 1) that the trial court's conclusion is based entirely on speculations; 2) that
there is grave abuse of discretion; 3) that the court, in making its findings went beyond
the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee, or; that the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, or; that the
presiding judge is blatantly biased, the general rule that the trial court' s findings of fact
should be given great weight still stands.
 However, respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law for imposing a
straight penalty of six (6) years imprisonment on the accused in his modified judgment
in the case for homicide. It is basic law that, as stated above, the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where imprisonment exceeds one (1)
year,[15] except only in the following cases:

"a. Offenses punished by death or life imprisonment.

b. Those convicted of treason (Art. 114), conspiracy or proposal to commit

treason (Art. 115).

c. Those convicted of misprision of treason (Art. 116), rebellion (Art. 134),

sedition (Art. 139), or espionage (Art. 117).

d. Those convicted of piracy (Art. 122).

e. Habitual delinquents (Art. 62, par. 5).

Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-

28547, Feb. 22, 1974). Offender is not disqualified to avail of the benefits of
the law even if the crime is committed while he is on parole. (People v.
Clareon, CA 78 O.G. 6701, Nov. 19, 1982).

f. Those who escaped from confinement or those who evaded sentence.

g. Those granted conditional pardon and who violated the terms of the same (Art.
159). (People v. Corral, 74 Phil. 359).

h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one year.

Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one year, the accused
cannot avail himself of the benefits of the law, the application of which is based
upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law and not upon that
which may be imposed in the discretion of the Court. (People v.Hidalgo, [CA]
G.R. No. 00452-CR, Jan. 22, 1962).

i. Those who are already serving final judgment upon the approval of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law." [16]

The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate
sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to
enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from
serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and
moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal
offenses whether punishable by the RPC or by special laws, with definite minimum and
maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty
specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.[17]
In crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the
indeterminate penalty is determined in accordance with the rules and provisions of the
Code exactly as if the Indeterminate Sentence Law had never been enacted. [18]
The rules and provisions which must be applied to determine the maximum term of
the indeterminate penalty are those provided in Articles 46, 48, 50 to 57, 61, 62 (except
paragraph 5), 64, 65, 68, 69, and 71.[19]
However, the aforesaid rules and provisions in those articles, particularly Arts. 50 to
57, 62, 64 and 65, are not applicable in fixing the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty. The Court has unqualified discretion to fix the term of the minimum. [20] The only
limitation is that it is within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense committed, without regard to its three (3) periods.[21]
Take the present case, for example, of homicide in which two (2) mitigating
circumstances attended its commission. The penalty for homicide prescribed by Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Since two (2) mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the
offense, said penalty shall be lowered by one degree pursuant to Article 64 paragraph 5
of the same Code, which in this case is prision mayor. This penalty shall be imposed in
its medium period considering that no other modifying circumstance attended the
commission of the offense, the two (2) mitigating circumstances having been already
taken into account in reducing the penalty by one (1) degree lower (Basan v. People, L-
39483, 29 November 1974, 61 SCRA 275). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree
which is prisioncorreccional and the maximum of which shall be within the range of the
medium period of prision mayor.[22]
Since respondent judge imposed the straight penalty of six (6) years which is
erroneous, he is therefore liable for gross ignorance of the law. This Court has held that
when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it,
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[23] Likewise, that unawareness of and unfamiliarity
with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and duration and graduation of
penalties merit disciplinary action, from reprimand to removal.[24]
Respondent judge cannot shirk responsibility for imposing said erroneous penalty
by saying, as he did in his motion for extension dated 3 June 1994, [25] that he in fact
sought and adopted the opinion of one Judge Nemesio Felix. A judge should have
moral and intellectual courage and independence of mind in the discharge of his duties
for only in that way can he merit his judicial position and the support and confidence of
the people in him.[26]
Respondent judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the law
he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will
have great faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused of
apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal principles.[27]
Finally, this Court takes notice of the fact that respondent judge filed his comment
on this present petition more than two (2) years from the time the Office of the Court
Administrator through then Deputy Court Administrator Juanito Bernad, issued a
directive for him to do so. As a judge, respondent ought to know that all directives
coming from the Office of the Court Administrator and his deputies are issued in the
exercise of administrative supervision of courts and their personnel, hence, they should
be respected. His excuses that the complaint was unquestionably, obviously, and
completely baseless; that complainants were going to withdraw their complaint, and;
that he was under severe stress are not enough for him to ignore said Office's
directives. It took a resolution of the Court itself for respondent judge to finally file his
comment. Even then, respondent judge had to ask for several extensions before
complying with this Court's orders.[28]
WHEREFORE, the Court, resolving to hold respondent Judge Salvador P. de
Guzman, Jr. administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, imposes on him a
FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) WITH A STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Additionally, he is hereby
ADMONISHED for failure to file promptly his comment as directed by the Office of the
Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr.,On leave

[1]
Rollo, p. 45.
[2]
CA, 54 O.G., 1207.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 8-9.
[4]
Rollo, p. 13.
[5]
G.R. No. L-15308, 29 May 1964.
[6]
Rollo, p. 14
[7]
Rollo, p. 18.
[8]
Rollo, p. 21.
[9]
Memorandum to the Hon. Justice Padilla from the OCA, p.2, 6 December 1996.
[10]
Rollo, pp. 142-143.
[11]
People v. Lee, Jr., No. L-66859, 12 September 1984, 132 SCRA 66.
[12]
Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, A.M. No. RTJ-91-758, 26 September 1994, 237 SCRA 1.
[13]
Memorandum from OCA, p. 4, 6 December 1996.
 Bondoc v. de Guzman, A.M. No. 279-J, 30 May 1974; Paulino v. Guevarra, A.M. No. 548-CJ, 30 March
[14]

1977; Lopez v. Corpuz, A.M. No. 425-MJ, 3 August 1977.

[15]
People v. Lee, Jr. Supra
[16]
Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 8th edition (1988), pp. 224-225.
[17]
Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 8th edition, p. 227.
[18]
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Twelfth (12th) Edition (1981), Book I, p. 763.
[19]
Supra. p. 763.
[20]
People vs. Yco, G.R. No. L-6545, 27 July 1954.
[21]
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Twelfth (12th) Edition (1981), Book I, p. 763.
[22]
Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41061, 16 July 1990, 187 SCRA 484.
[23]
Uy v. Dizon-Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ-91-766, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 87.
[24]
In re Paulin, A.M. No. O.C.A.-112, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 605.
[25]
Rollo. p. 80-81
[26]
Nadjirul Takil v. Ensina, A.M. No. 276-MJ, 27 June 1975, 65 SCRA 378.
Daplos v. Arquiza, A.M. No. 1129-MJ, 21 August 1980, 99 SCRA 141; Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog,
[27]

A.M. No. R-351-RTJ, 26 September 1986, 144 SCRA 462 [1986].

[28]
Memorandum to the Hon. Justice Padilla from the OCA, p. 4, 6 December 1996.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005]

OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A.

BUBONG, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This is a verified petition for disbarment[1] filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for
having been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of
Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case
earlier filed by complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially
investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent
with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah,[2] Ambobae Bauduli Datu,
Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and
manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others
for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali
Datus are relatives of respondent.[3]
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating
officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:

It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case
but that he has no case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore,
premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against
respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence. [4]

The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a
report dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated
respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents.
He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of
TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting
Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latters co-accused. As a result
of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondents dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order
No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering
respondents dismissal from government service. Respondent subsequently questioned
said administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition[5] claiming that the Office of the President did not have the authority and
jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that respondents [6] in that petition
violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated
his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition for failure on
the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the questioned order.[7] Respondent thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before
us, seeking the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become
obvious that respondent had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties
of an attorney[8] and that he poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal
profession.[9]
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his
issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both
law[10] and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the
Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the
basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli
Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion,
hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
 Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal
complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad
Abdullah and the latters co-defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in
said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating
prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute.
He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice
was based solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainants allegation,
therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.
Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,[11] this Court referred this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit.
On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order
relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides:

ORDER

When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.

The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of
evidence vis--vis this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president
of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of
this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action. [12]

On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving

Commissioner Fernandezs recommendation for the transfer of venue of this
administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region governor to designate
the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and
recommendation.[13] The IBP Resolution states:

Resolution No. XII-96-153

Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong

RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C.

Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western
Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter
concerned to conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.

Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline,
wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido,
President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this
case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by the IBP
Board of Governors.[14]
 In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter [15] informed
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel [16] had sent
notices to both complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent
consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the
transmittal of the records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the
IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandezs Order
dated 23 February 1996.
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP
Cotabato Chapter to comment on respondents motion. [17]Complying with this directive,
the panel expressed no opposition to respondents motion for the transmittal of the
records of this case to IBP Marawi City.[18] On 25 September 1998, Commissioner
Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of
respondents evidence.[19] This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board
of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said
resolution provides:

RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the

transmittal of the case records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is
directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report
the same to the Board of Governors. [20]

Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October

1998 a motion praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be
stricken from the records.[21] Respondent insists that the investigating panel constituted
by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the investigation of this case
since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner Fernandezs Order of 23 February
1996 clearly vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this case. Moreover,
he claims that he was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP
Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process.
Complainant opposed[22] this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches.
According to complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato
Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted
by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself.
He also claims that respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper when
he was directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City
Chapter, complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is
possible. Finally, complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would
only entail a duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP
Cotabato Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,[23] Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP
Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the
investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position paper were duly
received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP
Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy
of the panels order dated 4 August 1997.[24] Attached to said order was Registry Receipt
No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt was
a handwritten notation reading Atty. Mosib A. Bubong.
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo,
Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report
and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the
approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued
on 30 June 2001, to wit:

RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for

the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to
conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60)
days from receipt of notice.[25]

Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father,
Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12
June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting
the withdrawal of this case.[26]
Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to
direct the chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and
authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of this
case.[27] This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated
19 July 2002.[28] According to Atty. Castillo

After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on
the report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit
of respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to
make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of
Cotabato City.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga

del Norte is hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the
Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days from date
hereof.

In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and
conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:

The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the
President in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein
respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:
 a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,

b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting

law.

And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
In the Comment filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is
good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of
manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by
the way, was filed against respondents relatives. Going over the Decision of the
Office of the President in Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds
substantial evidence were taken into account and fully explained, before the Decision
therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of
respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such
carries a very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent
in the present case.

In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or
disturbing the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato. [29]

In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted

and approved, with modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty.
Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice
of law which should be imposed on respondent whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the
earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP
Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP
which the latter denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this
Court.[30]
The issue thus posed for this Courts resolution is whether respondent may be
disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the
government. We resolve this question in the affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply
because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of
Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers
misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the
bar on such grounds.[31] Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a
government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he
committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his
misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession. [32]
 Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,[33] we ordered the
disbarment of respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service
because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we
declared

[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress
upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose
shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair,
speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject
to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that
truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its
nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix
Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full
candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all
of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral
character.[34]

Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,[35] this Court found
sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she
was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As
we had explained in that case

[A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government,
she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service
is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. (Emphasis
[36]

supplied)

In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of

the President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a
lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and
employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his
relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the
functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties.

Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in the public office
he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-
conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than
the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting
for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as
proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.[37] As we have previously explained in the case
of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:[38]

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of

interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne
out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly
proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding
for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant
is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit
to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administrative of justice. [39]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his

name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision
be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same
be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-
Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., no part.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.

[1]
Filed by Police Supt. Omar P. Ali; Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 4-5.
[2]
Also known as Mona Abdullah Bauduli Datu.
[3]
Respondents Answer-Affidavit, Annex 4 of Respondents Comment dated 16 February 1995; Rollo, Vol.
I, p. 64.
[4]
Annex 14 of Respondents Comment dated 16 February 1995; Rollo, Vol. I, p. 117.
[5]
G.R. No. 112839.
[6]
Named as respondents in the petition were former President Fidel V. Ramos; Hon. Antonio T. Carpio
and Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing (formerly of the Office of the President; now members of this
Court; Hon. Franklin Drilon (then the Secretary of Justice); and Hon Reynaldo V. Maulit (then the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority); and Major Omar P. Ali (complainant in the
present disbarment case).
[7]
Supra, note 2; Rollo, p. 173.
[8]
Rollo, p. 5.
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
Presidential Decree No. 1529, Sections 50, 51, and 58.
[11]
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 156.
[12]
Rollo, Vol. III, p. 40.
[13]
Resolution No. XII-96-153; Rollo, Vol. II, p. 3.
[14]
Rollo, Vol. III, p. 13.
[15]
Sometimes referred to as Cotabato City Chapter or South Cotabato Chapter.
[16]
Composed of Attys. Edgardo A. Camello, Carlos Valdez, Jr. (Chairman), Mando Sinsuat, Jr., Renato
Eugenio, and George C. Jabido.
[17]
Order dated 14 August 1998; Rollo, Vol. III, p. 49.
[18]
Rollo, Vol. III, p. 46.
[19]
Rollo, Vol. III, p. 56.
[20]
Rollo, Vol. III, p. 78.
[21]
Rollo, Vol. III. pp. 57-58.
[22]
Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 60-66.
[23]
Rollo, Vol. III, p. 82.
[24]
Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 86-87.
[25]
Rollo, Vol. III, p. 193.
[26]
Rollo, Vol. V, p. 12.
[27]
Dated 27 July 2001; Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 185-187.
[28]
Rollo, Vol. V, pp. 17-18.
[29]
Rollo, Vol. V, p. 127.
[30]
Resolution No. XV-2003-56.
[31]
Reyes v. Atty. Salvador M. Gaa, A.C. No. 1048, 14 July 1995, 246 SCRA 64; citing Gonzales-
Austria v. Abaya, A.M. No. R-705-RTJ, 23 August 1989, 176 SCRA 634.
[32]
Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig, A.C. No. 4984, 1 April 2003, 400 SCRA 172.
[33]
A.C. No. 3056, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 584.
[34]
Id. at 589-590.
[35]
Supra, note 32.
[36]
Id. at 180.
[37]
Rule 139-B, 139-B, Revised Rules of Court.
[38]
A.C. No. 2884, 28 January 1998, 285 SCRA 93.
[39]
Id. at 100-101.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4984. April 1, 2003]

ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J.

RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR.
REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and JOSE
RABALO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, [1] an
official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross
misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used her public
office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the
CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In
their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants
allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed
acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, [2] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C.
Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches,
Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal
Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded
from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for
facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal
Affairs Service, CHED
 c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded
from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth
anew with full knowledge of the existence of a prior registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was
subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less
for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms.
Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the
application for correction of name.[3]
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by
filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.[4]
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22),
Section 36[5] of Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing
to Borela Tire Supply and Novas Lining Brake & Clutch as evidenced by the dishonored
checks she issued,[6] the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent.[7]
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime
against complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she
encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening
of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against the
respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.[8]
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President
Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and
reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive
of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an appointment for
herself.[9]
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on
the charges.[10] A copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at
Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this
Court with the notation Unclaimed.[11]
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be
served by registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office
informed the Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and
signed for by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on August 27,
1999.[12]
 On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to
the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed
respondent to submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be
considered in default and the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said order
and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to file her Answer, but
again she failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she
had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and the case was
mainly resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline stated as follows:

From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in

violation of her oath as a government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed
made unlawful demands or attempted to extort money from certain people who had
pending applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act
favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her
public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and
reputation of the Commission on Higher Education.

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further
warning that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of
respondent.

On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-
393, the full text of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A:;
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules; and considering that respondent unlawfully used her public
office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation
of the Commission on Higher Education, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for three (3) years.
[13]

At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-

Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her
malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was
Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards, CHED.
 Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official.[14] However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member
of the Bar.[15]
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her
tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon,
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as
consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before
her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to
comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the
CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as
a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to
demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests
awaiting action by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and
any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.
The Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man
for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[16] Respondents demands for sums of money to facilitate the
processing of pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and
runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run
contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional
obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21,
1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all
lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 [17] of said
Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the
public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the
public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests
pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01[18]of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any
unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule
6.02[19] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their
private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be
affected by the functions of his office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one
occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to
refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of
the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at
all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a
lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of
Canon 1[20] and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services,
CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years suspension
from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of
attorneys upon finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross
misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
records of the respondent, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination
to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1]
Admitted to the Bar, May 30, 1986. Per 1998 LAW LIST, p. 232.
[2]
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
[3]
Rollo, p. 3.
[4]
These include: Felina S. Dasig and Victor Alba v. Celedonia R. Coronacion. Rodrigo R. Coronacion, Jr.,
and Jose R. Rabalo, I.S. No. 96-19974 for Perjury, False Testimony: Felma S. Dasig and Victor
Alba v. Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo R. Coronacion, Jr., I.S. No. 96-25879 for Oral
Defamation and Unjust Vexation; Felina S. Dasig and Victor Alba v. Francis Lacandazo, Mark
Imperio and Michael Namoca, l.S. No. 96-27189 for Libel; Felma S. Dasig and Victor Alba v.
Celedonia R. Coronacion, Rodrigo R. Coronacion, Jr., and Jose R. Rabalo, I.S. No. 96-19974 for
Libel; Felina S. Dasig v. Celedonia Coronacion, I.S. No. 97-3026 for Grave Oral Defamation;
Felina S. Dasig v. Celedonia Coronacion, Francis Lacandazo, Mark Imperio, and Michael
Namoca, I.S. No. 96-27189, for violation of Art. 290, Rev. Penal Code; Felina S. Dasig v.
Asuncion Lacandazo and Francis Lacandazo, I.S. No. 96-27189 for Grave Oral Defamation;
Felina S. Dasig and Victor Alba v. Ma. Teresa Galdon Lingal, I.S. No. 96-25870 for Oral
 Defamation, Threat; Felina S. Dasig v. Ruel Martin and Jean Martin, I.S. No. 97-348 for Libel;
Felina S. Dasig v. Celedonia Coronacion, I.S. No. 97-7218 for Perjury, Libel; and Felina S.
Dasig v. Francis Lacandazo. Michael Namoca. and Mark Imperio. I.S. No. 97-8864 for Perjury.
[5]
SEC. 36. Discipline: General Provisions. x x x
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
(22) Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay taxes due to the government.
xxx
[6]
Rollo, pp. 22-24.
[7]
Id. at 26-27.
[8]
Id. at 28-30.
[9]
Id. at 32-35.
[10]
Id. at 36.
[11]
Id. at 47.
[12]
Id. at 57.
[13]
Id. at 61.
[14]
Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, A.M. No. R-705-RTJ, 23 August 1989, 176 SCRA 634, 649.
[15]
Dinsay v. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995, 27 November 1996, 264 SCRA 703, 706; Collantes v. Renomeron,
A.C. No. 3056, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 584, 589.
[16]
Rule 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any mans cause.
[17]
CANON 6. These Canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.
[18]
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
[19]
Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance
his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
[20]
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5438. March 10, 2004]

DAN JOEL V. LIM and RICHARD C. TAN, complainants, vs. ATTY.

EDILBERTO BARCELONA, respondent.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
 On May 9, 2001, Dan Joel V. Lim and Richard C. Tan, [1] both businessmen, filed a
complaint for alleged robbery or extortion and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act against Atty. Edilberto Barcelona, a lawyer formerly employed with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The complaint was simultaneously filed
with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.[2]
Complainant Lim alleged that on the first week of August 2000, respondent phoned
him and introduced himself as a lawyer and chief of the Public Assistance Center,
NLRC. Respondent informed him that his employees filed a labor complaint against him
in his office and it was necessary for him to see and talk with respondent. From then on
respondent would often call him. Respondent visited him in his office and told him to
settle the case or else his business, Top Gun Billiards, would be shut down. Lim
recalled that on August 14, 2000, at around 7:30 p.m., respondent again visited his
establishment and told him to settle the case for P20,000.00.
In support of his allegations, Lim submitted a written complaint of Arnel E. Ditan and
Pilipino Ubante; an endorsement letter dated August 2, 2000 of Atty. Jonathan F.
Baligod of the Presidential Action Center; handwritten calling cards of the respondent;
and an affidavit of desistance executed by Ditan and Ubante.
In their joint affidavit, Ditan and Ubante confirmed the filing of their complaint
against their employer, Lim, and that after some dialogue, the aforenamed employees
executed an affidavit dated August 8, 2000 withdrawing their complaint. According to
Ditan and Ubante, they met the respondent in Top Gun Billiards where the latter often
played billiards. One day, respondent gave them a letter and asked them to sign it.Since
they were busy at that time, they signed it without reading and understanding its
contents. Their employer, Lim, asked what it was about and they told him that they were
just made to sign a document without their understanding it. They added, they did not
have any complaint against their employer. Despite such withdrawal, respondent still
called Lim threatening the latter that he would pursue the case, have his establishment
closed and he would be jailed if he did not come up with P20,000.00 as settlement. In
the evening of August 14, 2000, respondent reiterated his demand for P20,000.00,
again with the threat of closure of the billiard center and putting Lim in jail.
Complainant Lim said that after his meeting with respondent, he agreed to give the
amount but did not fix any date when payment would be made, whereupon, respondent
gave notice that he would drop in at around 7:00 in the evening, on August 16, 2000, to
pick up the money.
Aurora Cruz y Libunao, owner of the carinderia adjacent to Top Gun Billiards, stated
in her sworn statement as well as court testimony that she met respondent when he ate
in her carinderia. She recalled that the respondent told her that he would shut down the
billiard business if the owner would not talk to him. She also recounted that on August
14, 2000, at around 8:30 p.m., she saw on the second floor of the pool house, the
respondent and Lim talking. After a while, the respondent came down and passed by
her carinderia. The respondent then informed her that he and Lim talked about
the P20,000.00 which respondent would give to his alleged boss in Malacaang . During
the hearing, she also recalled seeing Lim hand money to respondent who in turn put the
cash in his attach case and immediately thereafter, she saw three men arrest
respondent.[3]
Notably, almost nine months before the filing of his complaint, or on August 14,
2000, complainant Lim personally submitted a letter to the NBI requesting the NBI to
investigate respondent Atty. Edilberto Barcelona.[4] According to the NBI report, after due
investigation, it decided to conduct an entrapment operation. On August 15, 2000,
Special Investigator Marvin de Jemil, sent nine five hundred peso bills and five one
hundred peso bills for fluorescent powder dusting to the NBI Forensic Chemistry
Division. Further, the NBI reported that thru the NBI Identification and Records Division,
it found no record of such person named Edilberto Barcelona.
The NBI report also stated that on August 16, 2000, Lim informed the NBI
operatives that at around 7:00 p.m. respondent would drop by his pool house to collect
the money. At around 6:30 p.m., the operatives went to the pool house and strategically
positioned themselves and posed as pool players. At about 7:20 p.m., respondent
arrived, sat on a plastic chair and talked to complainant Lim. At around 7:30 p.m., Lim
handed the marked money to the respondent who, in turn, received it. While respondent
was counting the money and about to place it inside his bag, he was immediately
arrested. The respondent initially resisted and tried to create scandal but was later
pacified.
The NBI averred that the respondent was informed of his constitutional rights and
was brought to the NBI office where he was booked and fingerprinted. In his fingerprint
chart, the respondent indicated that he was a government lawyer and assigned at the
office of the Chief, Public Assistance Center, NLRC, Banawe, Quezon City. He showed
his identification card. Later he was brought to the Forensic Chemistry Division for
ultraviolet examination. The certification issued by Forensic Chemist Loren G. Janobas
stated that there were yellow fluorescent specks and smudges on the back and palm of
the left and right hand of the respondent. On August 17, 2000, the NBI turned over
respondent to the City Prosecutor of Manila who eventually indicted him for
robbery/extortion.[5]
Complainant Richard Tan, owner of Tai Hing Glass Supply, a co-signee in the
herein complaint, executed a sworn statement dated August 16, 2000. In it he alleged
that he went to the Criminal Intelligence Division, Intelligence Service of the NBI to
complain about respondent Barcelona. He said that sometime during the last week of
July, respondent called him, introduced himself and informed him that one of his
employees filed an illegal dismissal case against him. He remembered that before
respondents call, he had suspended an employee, Bryan Tellen, for leaving his
workplace without permission. Tellen received several warning letters from him
regarding his misdemeanors. Tan remembered that Tellen once hinted that he knew
someone in the Department of Labor, who turned out to be herein respondent, Atty.
Barcelona. Before Tan sent his accountant, Ditas Guitierrez, to respondents office to
represent him, he told her to bring a copy of Tellens suspension letter and to inform
respondent that Tellen had not been dismissed. When Guitierrez returned, she told him
that respondent wanted him to pay his employee. She added that respondent did not
give her any copy of a formal complaint on the alleged illegal dismissal. After two days,
according to Tan, respondent went to his office, showed him an identification card and
gave him a handwritten calling card. Respondent told him to pay his
employee P20,000.00 to P30,000.00, otherwise respondent would go on with the filing
of the illegal dismissal case. When he said he did not have that kind of money,
respondent lowered the amount to P15,000.00.Complainant Tan added that when he
gave respondent the money, the latter promised to take care of the illegal dismissal
complaint. On July 29, 2000, according to Tan, respondent came to see him
again. Respondent appeared drunk and told Tan to go to the respondents office
because a problem regarding the case arose. Tan stated that before respondent left,
respondent invited his employees to a game of billiards.Tan said he did not consent to
the employees playing because they had work. On July 31, 2000, respondent went to
him a third time and asked for an additional P10,000.00 allegedly for his employee,
Tellen, since the P15,000.00 Tan gave earlier was for respondent only. After a few more
visits by respondent, Tan finally told the respondent to show him the formal complaint
and he would just get himself a lawyer.[6]
The Joint Affidavit of Arrest, signed on August 17, 2000 by Agent Don R.
Hernandez, SI Felix O. Senora and SI Marvin de Jemil, cited complainant Tans
allegations.[7]
Respondent Atty. Barcelona filed his Comment[8] on December 10, 2001, praying for
the dismissal of the complaint against him.Respondent, in his defense, alleges that he
normally played billiards at the Top Gun Billiard Center where he would drop by from his
office before going to his residence; that when certain employees of the billiard center
learned that he was a lawyer and Chief of the Public Assistance Center of the NLRC,
they confided in him their grievance against their employer, Lim, for alleged violation of
labor laws, there respondent gave them assistance; that with the proper complaint and
required documentation accomplished, respondents office scheduled the case for a
dialogue-conference between the complaining workers and their employer; that on
instigation and coercion of complainant Lim, respondent became a victim of theft,
billiard hustling, swindling and syndicated gambling on August 9, 2000; that on or about
August 9, 2000, respondent filed a complaint for theft of cellphone and pack of
cigarettes, billiard hustling, syndicated gambling, and swindling against Lim and his
three workers, eventually docketed as I.S. No. 38251 to 53.[9]
Respondents Comment narrated his version on how the money allegedly was given
to him. According to the respondent, on August 16, 2000, at about 3 p.m., he received a
phone call from complainant Lim informing him that Ian Gonvan,[10] one of the accused in
I.S. No. 38251, admitted taking his cellphone and was willing and ready to return it at
around 7 p.m., at the Top Gun Billiard Center. It was the birthday of his daughter that
was why he took the day off from office. At about 7:30 p.m., he arrived at the billiard hall
and there found Lim with one of his complaining workers, fixing the lamp of one of the
billiard tables. He did not see Gonvan within the premises so he sat and watched the
billiard games going on while he waited. After about 15 minutes Lim sat beside him and
told him that Gonvan could no longer return the cellphone and instead Gonvan
entrusted Lim with the equivalent value in cash. According to respondent, Lim
persistently whispered to him to accept and count the wad of paper money Lim pulled
out. According to respondent, he consistently refused to touch the money and he
insisted, Gusto ko munang makaharap ang sinasabi mong si Gumban, [11] continuously
refusing to accept, much less count, the offered wad of money. Respondent added that
when Lim realized that he could not be prevailed upon to accept it, he placed and
inserted the wad of money in the open side pocket of respondents shoulder bag that
respondent normally carried, again pleading to respondent that he should count the
money. Respondent added that Lims behavior was rude and intimidating so much so
that respondent protested such rudeness. But respondent said while he was trying to
retrieve the wad of money to throw it back to Lim, about five or seven burly men
accosted respondent and handcuffed him over his vehement protestations.[12]
On Tans complaint, respondent declared that he never demanded nor received
money from Tan, and Tans accusations are but a product of the formers fertile
imagination as leverage because he actively assisted a complaining worker of
Tan.[13] Respondent added that a formal labor complaint has been filed against Tan. [14]
Eventually, we referred the complaint against Atty. Barcelona to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Its report with
recommendation is now before us. We shall now proceed to the merits of the complaint.
Respondents version seeks to discredit the NBI report to the effect that respondent
accepted the marked money which Lim handed to him. His version, however, fails to
explain why he was found positive for yellow fluorescent specks and smudges in his
dorsal and palmar aspects of the left and right hands by the Forensic Department of the
NBI.
Respondent claims that he continuously refused to accept, much less count, the
offered wad of money. Because of such refusal, according to respondent, Lim inserted
the wad of money in respondents shoulder bags open pocket while complainant Lim
was still pleading to count the wad of money.
Respondent alleges that the alleged bribery or extortion is a mere concoction of
complainant and as leverage for the cases against Lim and Tan.
Based on the NBI report, this case appears to be an entrapment operation. Notably,
Atty. Don Hernandez and his team of arresting officers confirm the entrapment
operation against respondent on the basis of complainant Lims call for NBI assistance.
While respondent alleges that complainant Lim merely concocted a charge of
extortion against him in retaliation to a complaint for theft which he had filed, it may be
noted that the complaint for theft was not directed against Lim but only against his
workers who were accused by respondent. Hence, there appears to be no strong
reason for Lim to resort to a counter-charge for extortion against respondent.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP concluded that it is highly improbable
that the NBI could be misled by complainant Lim into conducting an entrapment
operation against respondent, if there was no merit to his complaint against
respondent. From a reading of the NBI Report as well as the documents attached to
said report, it is evident that the NBI considered the merits of Lims complaint of extortion
against respondent. Finding it worth pursuing, the NBI conducted an entrapment
operation against respondent. On the basis of the entrapment operation conducted by
the NBI, respondent was caught in the act, so to speak, of attempted
extortion. Respondent was brought to the City Prosecutor of Manila for inquest and the
appropriate complaint for Robbery/Extortion was filed against respondent. [15]
Based on its own evaluation and the NBI Report, the Investigating Commissioner of
the Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for a period of two years.[16]
In the final resolution dated September 27, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP
imposed the penalty of disbarment for the reason that respondent in fact attempted to
extort money as Chief of the Public Assistance Center of the NLRC to threaten/coerce
Lim and that no less than the NBI caught him in the act of receiving and counting the
money extorted from Lim.[17]
The grounds for disbarment or suspension of an attorney are: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyers oath; (6)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party without authority.[18]
The NBI found that respondents hands had yellow fluorescent specks and smudges
with which the money used for the entrapment of the respondent had been powdered.
We find no reason to doubt the NBI report. Also, we see no basis to overturn the
presumption that the NBI had done its duty regularly.
Respondent would make us believe that the specks and smudges of yellow
fluorescent were in his hands because Lim offered him what was allegedly the payment
for the stolen cellphone by a certain Gonvan. Regrettably, there is no corroboration from
Gonvan nor anyone else on this matter. Thus, respondents story appears to us entirely
self-serving.
We had held previously that if a lawyers misconduct in the discharge of his official
duties as government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a
lawyer or to show moral delinquency, he may be disciplined as a member of the Bar on
such ground.[19] More significantly, lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice.Want of moral
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public
office. [20] Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer
shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system. Extortion by a government lawyer, an outright violation
of the law, calls for the corresponding grave sanctions. With the aforesaid rule a high
standard of integrity is demanded of a government lawyer as compared to a private
practitioner because the delinquency of a government lawyer erodes the peoples trust
and confidence in the government.
Needless to say, lawyers owe it to the court and to society not to stir up
litigations. Employees of the billiards hall, Ditan and Ubante, swore that respondent
public officer encouraged complainant Lims workers to file a case against the
latter. Rule 1.03 of the same Code states that a lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive
or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause.
 Noteworthy, as an Attorney IV and Chief of the Public Assistance Center of the
NLRC, respondent failed to observe prudence by hanging out and playing in the billiard
hall. By so doing, he exposed himself unnecessarily to certain elements and situations
which could compromise his official position and his status as a lawyer.
Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is
a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession
subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes suspension and
disbarment.[21] More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous
as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.[22]
Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to
punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers, but also to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of
lawyers and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of the
lawyers oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as
members of the bar.[23] These pronouncements gain practical significance in this case,
considering that respondent is a senior lawyer of the NLRC. It bears stressing also that
government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public
trust. As such, government lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional
obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the public
eye.[24]
As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with
the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession.
In Montano v. IBP,[25] this Court said that only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer may disbarment be imposed
as a penalty. In the instant case, the Court is convinced that the evidence against
respondent is clear and convincing. He is administratively liable for corrupt activity,
deceit, and gross misconduct. As correctly held by the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, he should not only be suspended from the practice of
law but disbarred.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edilberto Barcelona is found administratively guilty
of corrupt activity, deceit, and gross misconduct and is hereby ordered
DISBARRED. Let his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately,
and this resolution spread in his record in this Court and circulated to all courts in
the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C. J., Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and
Tinga, JJ., concur.
 Puno, J., on leave.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.

His middle name in the records is Villagracia. His middle initial in the title is L. Joel is also spelled Jowel
elsewhere in the records.
[1]
In the title only Lim was named complainant, however, the complaint was co-signed by Richard C. Tan,
owner of an establishment also allegedly a victim of Barcelona.Lim and Tan in most of the
records are complainants, except in an Order dated August 20, 2002 of the Commission on Bar
Discipline; in a letter dated October 10, 2002 of the Supreme Court Clerk of Court forwarding the
case to the IBP and in the resolutions of this Court where only Lim was mentioned as
complainant.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 1, 273.
[3]
TSN, 27 January 2003, pp. 163-174.
[4]
Rollo, p. 74.
[5]
Id. at 148-149, 151.
[6]
Id. at 105-107.
[7]
Id. at. 94.
[8]
Id. at 19-23.
[9]
Id. at 137.
[10]
Gumban in some parts of the records.
[11]
I would like first to meet face to face the one you are calling as Gumban.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 138-139.
[13]
Id. at 21.
[14]
Id. at 145.
[15]
Id. at 283-284. The quantum of evidence required in a criminal case, however, differs from that of
administrative proceedings requiring only substantial evidence.
[16]
Id. at 284.
[17]
Id. at 272.
[18]
National Bureau of Investigation v. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-97-1120, 21 February 2000, 326 SCRA 109,
120.
[19]
Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya A.M. No. R-705-RTJ, 23 August 1989, 176 SCRA 634,
649; Dinsay v. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995, 27 November 1996, 264 SCRA 703, 706;
Collantes v. Renomeron, A.C. No. 3056, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 584, 589.
[20]
Macoco v. Diaz, 70 Phil. 97, 98 (1940).
[21]
Re: Administrative Case No. 44 of the RTC, Br. IV, Tagbilaran City, Against Atty. Samuel C. Occea,
A.C. No. 2841, 3 July 2002, 383 SCRA 636, 651-652.
[22]
Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio, 388 Phil. 691, 705 (2000).
[23]
Rivera v. Corral, A.C. No. 3548, 4 July 2002, 384 SCRA 1, 9.
[24]
Igoy v. Atty. Soriano, 419 Phil. 346, 359 (2001).
[25]
A.C. No. 4215, 21 May 2001, 358 SCRA 1, 9; Saburnido v. Madroo, A.C. No. 4497, 26 September
2001, 366 SCRA 1, 7.

THIRD DIVISION

ADM. CASE No. 5649 January 27, 2006

DANDY V. QUIJANO, Complainant,

vs.
GEOBEL A. BARTOLABAC (Labor Arbiter, NLRC-NCR South), and ALBERTO R. QUIMPO
(Commissioner, NLRC-First Division), Respondents.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

On 19 March 2002, complainant Dandy Quijano filed before this Court a verified complaint1 written in
Pilipino against herein respondents Atty. Geobel A. Bartolabac (Bartolabac), Labor Arbiter of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo (Quimpo) of
the same Commission for violating Canon 12 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

According to complainant, respondents violated his constitutional right to due process in failing to
execute the final and executory judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 126561 entitled Quijano v.
Mercury Drug Corporation.4

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Complainant was dismissed from service by the Mercury Drug Corporation (corporation). He filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Eventually, the case was elevated to this Court. On
8 July 1998, the Court promulgated its Decision in favor of herein complainant ordering, among
others, his reinstatement.5 The corporations motion for reconsideration was denied by this Court in
its Resolution dated 5 July 1999.

Complainant relates that he filed with respondent Labor Arbiter Bartolabac a motion for execution on
9 December 1998 but despite the final resolution of his case, Bartolabac issued an order that in
effect changed the tenor of the final judgment.6 While the decision of this Court had mandated
complainants reinstatement, Bartolabac instead awarded backwages and separation pay.
The Court, upon learning this, issued a Resolution7 on 17 November 1999 directing Bartolabac to
fully comply with its Decision dated 8 July 1998 and Resolution dated 5 July 1999 within a non-
extendible period of five (5) days from receipt thereof and to explain in writing why he should not be
punished for indirect contempt for his actuations in handling the case and defiance of the Courts
directives.

Pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, Bartolabac issued an alias writ of execution on 18 February
2000. However, respondent Bartolabac allegedly again unilaterally issued another order dated 5
April 2000, amending his previous order and assigning the complainant to the position of self-service
attendant of the corporation instead of his original position of warehouseman. Subsequently,
respondent Commissioner Quimpo overturned the above order of Bartolabac and directed the
payment of separation pay rather than reinstatement to a substantially similar position as ordered by
this Court.

Complainant adds that he had filed a motion to cite counsel for respondent corporation in
contempt8 and an answer to the order dated 5 April 2000, but these were disregarded by Bartolabac
on the ground that an appeal was already underway at the NLRC by the corporation.

Further, he states that he was not given a copy of the appeal memorandum filed by the corporation
with the NLRC; yet, the NLRC First Division headed by Quimpo disposed of the same. He also
alleges that the corporation did not post a cash bond for the appeal nor did they give him a
temporary reinstatement or payroll reinstatement, which according to complainant, is mandatory.
Despite this, and without giving complainant any opportunity to comment on the appeal
memorandum, Quimpo nonetheless issued a resolution dated 26 September 2000 which ordered
the corporation to pay complainant separation pay plus backwages. Complainant asserts that
Quimpo should have inhibited himself from deciding the case as he, or the NLRC First Division, was
the public respondent in the Supreme Court case.

Complainant admits having received the monetary award in the amount of P449,062.98 from the
corporation in satisfaction of this Courts ruling in G.R. No. 126561 but contends that the award
cannot be considered a cash bond for the appeal memorandum before the NLRC as the same was
computed until 24 November 1999 only and he has a right to the award because his case had long
become final and executory.

Thus, complainant asserts that his constitutional right to due process has been seriously violated by
Bartolabac and Quimpo.

On 22 April 2002, this Court issued a Resolution9 requiring respondents to file their respective
comments on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.

In his comment10 filed on 4 July 2002, Bartolabac states that the present complaint is a rehash of
several complaints against him which complainant filed before different fora, including this Court and
the Office of the Ombudsman.

As to the issue of monetary award and reinstatement due the complainant, Bartolabac argues that
the records of G.R. No. 126561 reveal that the corporation had already released to complainant the
sum of P297,930.75 as cash bond deposit. The amount of P449,062.98 had been deposited to the
cashier of the NLRC. Out of the said remaining amount, Bartolabac directed the release
of P250,660.62 to complainant. The remaining balance of P198,402.36 was to answer for
complainants MEDICARE and SSS contributions, withholding tax, loans, etc., which had yet to be
determined at that time. Bartolabac gave both parties the opportunity to dispute or defend their
respective claims but complainant failed to cooperate either by not attending the scheduled hearing
called for that purpose on 27 March 2000, or by failing to file controverting evidence to dispute the
claimed deductions by the corporation.11

Before Bartolabac could adjudicate the proper monetary award for complainant, the latter filed a
complaint against him before the Office of the Ombudsman for oppression and grave misconduct.
Due to this supervening event, Bartolabacs sense of propriety compelled him to inhibit himself from
further participating in the adjudication of the remaining balance of P198,402.36. But most
importantly, he adds, the case was re-raffled to Labor Arbiter Gaudencio P. Demaisip, Jr. who
awarded the whole amount of P449,062.36 which complainant has already received.

Offering another perspective of the case at bar, Bartolabac avers that after the Supreme Court had
rendered its decision in G.R. No. 126561 on 8 July 1998, the case was re-raffled to Labor Arbiter
Renell Joseph R. Dela Cruz for the satisfaction of judgment. At that point, the exact monetary award
and reinstatement aspects were raised. Both parties submitted conflicting computations on the
monetary award. The corporation also asserted that they had abolished the position of
warehouseman and there was no substantially equivalent vacant position. Labor Arbiter Dela Cruz
then ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers but eleven (11) days thereafter,
said labor arbiter issued an order inhibiting himself from handling the case as he allegedly could not
bear with complainant dictating the rules of the proceedings.12

The labor case was re-raffled to Bartolabac on 20 April 1999. Unaware of the pending motion for
reconsideration of the corporation in G.R. No. 126561 where the feasibility of reinstatement was at
issue, he issued an order on 24 June 1999 ruling out complainants reinstatement, awarding
separation pay instead and the amount of P573,228.00 (less necessary deductions) as backwages.

As a consequence, this Court on 17 November 1999 reproached Bartolabac for completely

disregarding the corporations motion for reconsideration with this Court, directing him to order
complainants reinstatement and payment of backwages, moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees, and requiring him to explain in writing why he should not be punished for indirect
contempt for his handling of the case and defiance of the Courts directives. Bartolabac complied by
filing his manifestation stating that his office was not furnished with a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. His act of adjudicating the issue of reinstatement was impelled by the sense of
urgency on the matter since he received a letter signed by complainant and a Memo from the NLRC
Chairman referring the complainants letter to him for appropriate action.13 Both letters sought the
immediate disposition of his labor case.14

Based on the foregoing, Bartolabac maintains that complainant engaged in forum-shopping for while
complainant knew of the existence of the corporations motion for reconsideration with this Court, he
remained insistent that Bartolabac resolve the reinstatement issue.15

He also stresses that he did not incur delay in the disposition of the labor case. After he received the
17 November 1999 Resolution of this Court on 22 November 1999, he issued an alias writ of
execution on 24 November 1999 directing the sheriff to garnish the amount of P449,062.98 and to
cause the reinstatement of complainant to a substantially equivalent position. When the sheriff
returned the writ unsatisfied for failure of the corporation to comply with the reinstatement aspect as
the open positions were only for pharmacist, pharmacy assistant, cashier and self-service attendant,
he lost no time in resolving that, while the first three positions need college graduates, the self-
service attendant position may be sufficiently performed by complainant even though he is not a
college graduate.16

Lastly, Bartolabac declares that with the filing of the appeal from the order of reinstatement with the
NLRC, he lost jurisdiction over the issue.
For his part, Quimpo alleges that his inclusion in the present administrative case was due to his
participation in disposing of the corporations appeal on the issue of complainants reinstatement as
self-service attendant. He asserts that by law, the Commission has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
hear and decide all decisions, awards or orders rendered by the labor arbiter.17 He adds that said
authority was even tacitly recognized by the Court in its Resolution dated 7 June 2000 in relation to
G.R. No. 126561. The pertinent portions of the resolution read:

"On the issue of reinstatement, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order on April 5, 2000, directing the
private respondent to reinstate petitioner to the position of self-service attendant. The reinstatement
order was impugned by the private respondent as the petitioner was allegedly not qualified for the
position and there was already strained relations between the parties. The reinstatement order is
now pending appeal before the NLRC.

As the NLRC has acquired jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners reinstatement and the amount of
deduction on petitioners monetary award is subject to proof and/or dispute by the respective parties
before the Labor Arbiter, the letter-complaints of the petitioner are thus hereby NOTED.

IN VIEW THEREOF, Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac is hereby directed to determine with
dispatch the amount still owning the petitioner, if any, and to see to it that no further delay would
hamper the proceedings before him. Public respondent NLRC, on the other hand, is requested to
expedite the proceedings before it on the issue of petitioners reinstatement.18

Hence, Quimpo adds, the NLRC did not abuse its discretion when it assumed jurisdiction over the
corporations appeal.

Quimpo likewise explains that in resolving the appeal, he took judicial notice of the various
resolutions issued by this Court and with utmost good faith and fidelity tried to implement the
directive to reinstate the complainant to his former position or to a substantially equivalent position.
However, due to certain supervening events that transpired after the resolution of the labor case and
up to the time of execution, reinstatement had become improbable and so it was the ruling of the
Commission that separation pay instead of reinstatement would be the most logical, sensible and
practical solution.19

As to complainants claim that he was not furnished a copy of the corporations appeal
memorandum, records show that a copy of the appeal memorandum was furnished his counsel and
in any event, complainant admitted his knowledge of the existing appeal when he filed a Reiteration
of Motion to Release Monetary Award dated 20 June 2000, arguing that his monetary award should
be released to him since only the issue of reinstatement is being appealed to the Commission.20

Furthermore, Quimpo states that complainant filed a similar complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman for neglect of duty but the same was dismissed. Complainants motion for
reconsideration was denied with finality on 21 February 2002. Complainants act of re-filing another
administrative complaint is designed primarily to harass and intimidate him.21

He also notes that complainant already received the full satisfaction of his monetary award which
only shows that the Commission has complied in good faith with the directive to execute the
judgment award in favor of complainant.22

Without waiting for this Courts action, complainant filed his Reply to Both Respondent[s]
Comments23 on 23 July 2002. He substantially reiterates the arguments he made in his complaint.
On 19 August 2002, this Court resolved, among others, to refer this case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On 6 May 2003, the IBP submitted
its resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro dismissing the complaint against respondents.24

Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration with the IBP but it was subsequently denied since the
matter had already been endorsed to this Court and the IBP no longer had jurisdiction over the
case.25

We nonetheless resolve to treat the motion for reconsideration as a petition for review on certiorari of
the IBP resolution.26

We now go to the main issue at bar, i.e., whether or not respondents are liable for their acts in
deviating from the final and executory judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 126561.

The Court is unyielding in its adjudication that complainant must be reinstated to his former position
as warehouseman or to a substantially equivalent position. This was stated in its Decision dated 8
July 1998, reiterated in the Resolution dated 5 July 1999, and again stressed in the Resolution dated
17 November 1999. In the latter resolution, it was particularly expressed that:

Indeed, private respondents [Mercury Drug Corporation] contention, as erroneously upheld by the
labor arbiter, that there is no substantially equivalent position for petitioners reinstatement has been
categorically discounted by this Court. We took judicial notice of the fact that private respondent
Mercury Drug Corporation operates nationwide and has numerous branches all over the Philippines.
Petitioner, as warehouseman, occupied a clerical/rank and file position in said company and we find
it highly inconceivable that no other substantially equivalent position exists to effect his
reinstatement.27

Clearly, the Court is unwilling to accept the corporation and respondent labor arbiters reason that
reinstatement is no longer feasible because the position of warehouseman had already been
abolished and there is no substantially equivalent position in the corporation.

Both respondents labor arbiter and commissioner do not have any latitude to depart from the Courts
ruling. The Decision in G.R. No. 126561 is final and executory and may no longer be amended. It is
incumbent upon respondents to order the execution of the judgment and implement the same to the
letter. Respondents have no discretion on this matter, much less any authority to change the order of
the Court. The acts of respondent cannot be regarded as acceptable discretionary performance of
their functions as labor arbiter and commissioner of the NLRC, respectively, for they do not have any
discretion in executing a final decision. The implementation of the final and executory decision is
mandatory.

As held in Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission and Embang:28

Once the case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The
prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory while the other party is obliged to respect
the courts verdict and to comply with it. We reiterate our pronouncement in Salicdan v. Court of
Appeals:29

well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by
the highest court of the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the
controversies.

The Court recognizes Bartolabacs efforts to adjudicate and advance the cause of complainant,
albeit erroneously. In his desire to settle the issue of reinstatement, he determined that complainant,
a high school graduate, be appointed to the position of self-service attendant which requires the
appointee to hold a college degree, since the corporation "failed to rationalize the need for a college
graduate for the position of self-service attendantandcomplainant has exhibited before [the
NLRC] that he has a reasonable degree of comprehension to understand and perform the functions
of a self-service attendant."30 Complainant had pointed out several job openings31 in the corporation
to which he would be qualified, but respondent made no effort to verify it. Instead, he took at face
value the corporations representation that there were limited vacancies. It is inconceivable that a
company as large as the corporation, operating nationwide, could not accommodate complainant
and appoint him to one of its numerous rank and file positions.

Again, we are unceasing in emphasizing that the decision in the labor case has become final and
executory since 1999. There can be no justification for the overturning of the Courts reinstatement
order by the NLRC First Division and full satisfaction of the monetary award of only three (3) years
after the finality of the judgment.
lawphil.net

The Court is not wont to compel the corporation to instantly restore the position of warehouseman if
it has been already abolished. Indeed, the Court granted that complainant could be reinstated to a
substantially equivalent or similar position as a viable alternative for the corporation to carry out.
lavv phil.net

Our Constitution mandates that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property without due
process of law.32 It should be borne in mind that employment is considered a property right and
cannot be taken away from the employee without going through legal proceedings. In the instant
case, respondents wittingly or unwittingly dispossessed complainant of his source of living by not
implementing his reinstatement. In the process, respondents also run afoul of the public policy
enshrined in the Constitution ensuring the protection of the rights of workers and the promotion of
their welfare.33

As a final word, we note that the IBPs report and recommendation falls far short of the Courts
expectations. After a lengthy account of the allegations of the parties, the investigating commissioner
concluded its report with a two-paragraph uncommendably bare exoneration, thus:

A detailed examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties showed that
respondents Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac and Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo only
performed the duties required of them under the Rules and Procedure of Law particularly that
pertaining to the NLRC Rules and Procedures and the Labor Code; as Labor Arbiter and
Commissioner.

In fact, complainants complaints against them before the Ombudsman relative to the same case
were dismissed with finality which office has jurisdiction over respondents relative to the
performance of their duties as Labor Arbiter and Commissioner and not on a lawyer-client
relationship nor on the practice of the professions as lawyer or members of the Bar.34

How the IBP investigating commissioner arrived at that supposition or in what manner were the acts
of herein respondents regularly done cannot be extracted from its scanty determination.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondents liable for violating Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondents Labor Arbiter Geobel A.
Bartolabac and Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of THREE (3) months.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation on the
records of the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 1-5.

2Canon 1A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.

3 Rule 1.01A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct.

4 354 Phil. 112 (1998).

5 The dispositive portion of the decision states:

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. Private respondent MERCURY

DRUG CORPORATION is ordered to: (1) reinstate petitioner DANDY V. QUIJANO to
his former or substantially equivalent position; (2) to pay backwages from the time of
petitioners illegal dismissal until his reinstatement in the payroll on May 1, 1995, and
from the time petitioners salary based on payroll reinstatement was stopped on June
16, 1996 until his actual reinstatement; (3) to pay moral and exemplary damages in
the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos and twenty-five thousand
(P25,000.00) pesos, respectively, and; (4) to pay ten percent (10%) of the total
amount due to petitioner, as attorneys fees. Cost against private respondent.

SO ORDERED."
6On 24 June 1999, respondent labor arbiter issued an Order awarding backwages and
separation pay, in lieu of the Supreme Courts order of reinstatement. Rollo, pp. 47-49.

7 Id. at 6-8.

8Motion to Cite Atty. Corazon Agustin-Counsel for Respondent for Contempt or Indirect
Contempt dated 10 April 2000; id. at 307-308.

9 Id. at 9.

10 Id. at 14-112, including Annexes "1" to "27."

11 Id. at 16.

12Id. at 20, the Order of Labor Arbiter Dela Cruz dated 16 April 1999 is attached as Annex
"6" of respondent Bartolabacs Comment.

13 Id. at 62, Annex "12" of respondent Bartolabacs Comment.

14 Id. at 80-83, Annex "17" and "18" of respondent Bartolabacs Comment.

15 Id. at 26.

16 Id. at 27.

17 Id. at 128.

18 Id. at 129.

19 Id. at 130.

20 Id. at 132.

21 Id. at 132-134.

22 Id. at 134.

23 Id. at 160-208.

24 Id. at 211-224.

25 In accordance with Sec. 12 (c) of Rule 139 of the Rules of Court. Id. at 226.

26 Per Resolution dated 10 November 2003. Id. at 232.

27 Id. at 56. Emphasis in the original.

28 G.R. No. 158971, 25 August 2005.

 G.R. No. 128967, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 586, 599 citing Philippine Veterans Bank v.
29

Estrella, G.R. No. 138993, 27 June 2003, 405 SCRA 168 and Salva v. Court of Appeals, 364
Phil. 284 (1999).

30 Order dated 5 April 2000 by Labor Arbiter Bartolabac. Rollo, p. 95.

31In his Comment dated 20 September 1999 in G.R. No. 126561, he specified some job
vacancies such as: preparer-packager, displayer, tagger, bulker, delivery man, fork lift
operator, tospro monitoring, warehouse clerk, and driver. Id. at 198.

32 Const., Art. III, Sec. 1.

33 Id., Art. II, Sec. 18.

34 Rollo, pp. 223-224.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6585. April 21, 2005]

TOMAS B. YUMOL, JR., FELIX S. VENTIC, ELMER L. MANIEGO and

JAKE M. MAGCALAS, complainants, vs.ATTY. ROBERTO R.
FERRER, SR., respondent.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Tomas B. Yumol, Jr., Felix S.
Ventic, Elmer L. Maniego and Jake Magcalas against Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., for
grave misconduct.
At all time material to the controversy, complainants were employees of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), Atty. Yumol as Officer-in-Charge,[1] Mr. Ventic, as
Supervising Special Investigator, Mr. Maniego as Special Investigator III and Mr.
Magcalas as Special Investigator I. Respondent Atty. Ferrer, Sr., held the position of
Attorney IV, also of the Commission.
On 17 September 2001, Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy sought the assistance of the
CHR for the alleged kidnapping of her child Jianzil Irish M. Dy by her husband, John
Burt Dy, and the coercive act of the latter in the transfer of her account with the Porac
Rural Bank. Acting on this, Atty. Ferrer, a Senior Legal Officer of the CHR, issued the
two (2) Orders quoted below.
The facts as above stated resulted in the heated altercation that took place on 28
September 2001 between respondent and one Mr. John Burt Dy, whereby the latter
accused the CHR of conniving with his wife, Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Dy, and of destroying his
reputation and good name at the Porac Rural Bank. Atty. Yumol, being the OIC Head of
the Office, asked Mr. Dy if he could substantiate his accusations. The latter showed him
two (2) alleged Office Orders dated 18 and 19 September 2001, both signed by
respondent.
The Order dated 18 September 2001,[2] reads:

Acting on the Complaint of Ma. CECILIA M. DY, and pursuant to the provision of
the Family Code that children five (5) years and below should remain under the
custody of the mother, in relation to the provisions of the Constitution vesting powers
unto this Commission and in particular, Section 18, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution, the respondent is hereby ordered to give custody of JIANZIL IRISH
M. DY to the maternal custody of the aforementioned mother.

Wherefore, premises considered, pending investigation of the above-entitled case, the

custody of JIANZIL IRISH M. DY is hereby awarded to the mother MA. CECILIA
M. DY.

SO ORDERED.

City of San Fernando, Pampanga, September 18, 2001.

(SGD)ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR.
Senior Legal Counsel
The Order dated 19 September 2001,[3] reads:

Before this Commission is the Complaint filed by complainant wife for alleged
kidnapping of her child Jianzil Irish M. Dy which happened last August 22, 2001 and
the coercive mean (sic) of respondent JOHN BURT DY in the transfer of the
complainants cash deposit with the Porac Rural Bank.

Finding the allegations to (sic) sufficiently established, custody of the child was
awarded to the Complainant and properly executed with the aid [of] the Sangguniang
Barangay of Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga and the elements of the Porac PNP.

Likewise, we find that there had been coercion in the transfer of complainant (sic)
deposit in bank, which was already effected by the aforementioned Rural Bank.

NOW, THEREFORE, pending the final determination of this above-entitled case

and by virtue of the powers and authority granted this Commission under Sec. 18,
Article 13 of the Constitution, the Rural Bank of Porac is hereby ordered to reinstate
the account of complainant MA. CECILIA M. DY.
SO ORDERED.

City of San Fernando, Pampanga, September 19, 2001.

(SGD)ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR.
Senior Legal Counsel IV
Complainants Yumol and Magcalas, together with their staff, witnessed the incident
and were surprised to see the two (2) orders allegedly issued by respondent. Mr. Dy
also informed Atty. Yumol that the two (2) orders were already enforced by respondent
himself and his co-employees V. Rigor and E. Enolpe, Police Officer Larucom and the
Barangay Captain of their place.
Concerned by the acts of respondent, Atty. Yumol tried to clarify the matter by
writing a letter[4] to the Bank Manager stating, thus:

In reference to the order of Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., Attorney IV of this Regional
Office, the undersigned would like to inform your good office that the Commissions
participation on the matter is limited only to extend legal guidance/assistance
considering that the disagreement of spouses John Burt Dy and Ma. Cecilia M. Dy is a
family matter. Hence, you are being advised to disregard Atty. Ferrers order dated
September 19, 2001.

Moreover, the said case is not officially docketed as part of Human Rights cases
handled by the Commission.

I hope this will clarify any misinterpretation of the Commissions mandate.

On 28 September 2001, Yumol required[5] respondent to explain within seventy-two

(72) hours the unauthorized issuance of the said Orders.
It turned out later that respondent was engaged in private practice by handling
private cases in courts and other quasi-judicial bodies as shown by the following
pleadings:
Pleadings Where Filed
Motion for Reconsideration in Sp. Proc. No. MTC, Sta. Ana, Candaba,
01-01 Pampanga.[6]
Motion for Issuance of Mandatory Injunction MTC, San Fernando,
Pampanga[7]
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For Issuance of RTC-58, Angeles City[8]
Preliminary Injunction
Petition MTC, Sta. Ana, Candaba,
Pampanga[9]
Motion for Reconsideration and Urgent RTC-58, Angeles City[10]
Motion for Postponement
Motion for Reconsideration - do -[11]
Motion for Reconsideration On Denial of the - do -[12]
Release of Vehicle
Addendum to Motion For Re-Investigation - do -[13]
Motion to Set Motion For Release of Vehicle - do -[14]
Several documents were also notarized by respondent, viz:
Documents Where Used
Reply of Norberto San Angel dated October MTC, Branch 1, San Fernando,
16, 2001 Pampanga[15]
Sworn Statement dated October 15, 2001 of Civil Case No. 8509 filed with
May Paule, et al. the MTC San Fernando,
Pampanga[16]
Criminal Complaint of Myrna Bulaon Criminal Case No. 01-1401
MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga[17]
Reply Affidavit of Myrna Bulaon - do-[18]
Affidavit of Renato P. Canlas Special Proceeding No. 01-01 at
MTC, Sta. Ana, Pampanga[19]
Respondent also attended court hearings as shown in the following Minutes of
Hearings, Orders, and Transcripts of Stenographic Notes:
Date Time Case No. Court
March 2, 2001 9:00 A.M. 01-01 (Ejectment MTC/Sta. Ana,
Case) Pampanga[20]
April 23, 2001 1:30 P.M. Crim. Case No. 00- RTC-58 Angeles
1164 City[21]
March 6, 2001 2:15 P.M. Crim. Case No. 00- - do -[22]
1164
August 3, 2001 9:00 A.M. Crim. Case No. 01- MTC, Sta. Ana.
1401 Pampanga[23]
Sept. 7, 2001 - do - - do -[24]
8:30 A.M. Civil Case No. 17360 RTC 42, San Frdo.,
October 15, 2001
Pamp.[25]
Nov. 5, 2001 2:00 P.M. Civil Case No. 8509 MTC Branch 1, San
Fernando,
Pampanga.[26]
Nov. 27, 2001 Civil Case No. 8509 RTC 58, Angeles
City[27]
Dec. 6, 2001 2:00 P.M. Civil Case No. 8509 MTC Br. I, San
Fernando,
Pampanga.[28]
During those times that respondent attended hearings, he declared in his Daily
Time Records (DTRs) that he was present at the Office as shown by the DTRs attached
to the complaint.
 The actuations of the respondent provoked the filing of several criminal cases
against him, to wit:

(1) Falsification of Public Documents,[29]

(2) Usurpation of Functions,[30] and

(3) Violation of Republic Act No. 6713.[31]

Still, despite the cases filed against him, respondent continued attending hearings in
different courts as demonstrated by the following photostatic copies of the Minutes of
the trials of the cases:[32]
Dates Time Court
October 24, 2002 2:00 PM MTC Arayat, Pampanga[33]
November 7, 2002 2:00 PM - do -
January 17, 2003 9:00 AM MTC Sta. Ana,
Pampanga[34]
February 10, 2003 9:00 AM MTC Arayat, Pampanga[35]
March 10, 2003 9:00 AM - do -[36]
March 24, 2003 - do -[37]
March 28, 2003 9:00 AM MTC Sta. Ana,
Pampanga[38]
May 9, 2003 9:00 AM - do -[39]
May 29, 2003 8:30 AM RTC-54, Macabebe,
Pampanga[40]
June 12, 2003 2:00 PM MTC Arayat, Pampanga[41]
June 17, 2003 MTC-4, San Frdo.,
Pampanga[42]
July 17, 2003 8:30 AM RTC-54, Macabebe,
Pampanga[43]
August 26, 2003 9:00 A.M. MTC-4, San Frdo.,
Pampanga[44]

Complainants maintained that all these acts constitute grave misconduct.

We referred the present case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and investigation.
On 04 November 2003, respondent filed a motion[45] for extension of twenty (20)
days within which to file his answer, which was granted by the Commission on Bar
Discipline, IBP, Pasig City.[46]
In his answer,[47] respondent admitted that Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy dropped by
at the CHR to seek assistance regarding the recovery of her minor son and the
restitution of her time deposit. He also acknowledged having issued the two orders but
maintained that the same were in consonance with the powers and functions granted to
all CHR lawyers. He argued that CHR lawyers, pursuant to CHR Resolution No. A-88-
056 dated 8 October 1988 and CHR Resolution No. A89-109-A dated 19 July 1989, can
file, appear, prosecute and represent the Commission for underprivileged victims and
persons whose human rights have been violated or in need of protection in civil, criminal
and administrative matters which are properly cognizable by the Commission. He
likewise claimed that he was allowed by the CHR to file a petition for commission as a
notary public and was commissioned on 01 December 2000. He denied having falsified
his DTRs as the same were certified by complainant Atty. Yumol as Officer-In-Charge of
their office and that his appearances in courts were for legal assistance as allowed in
CHR Resolution No. A-88-056. Lastly, respondent insisted that the instant complaint
was an offshoot of the administrative case filed by Mrs. Ma. Cecilia Mallari-Dy against
Atty. Yumol and the other complainants, which prevented the issuance of a certificate of
clearance to Atty. Yumol relative to his impending retirement.
In their reply,[48] complainants claimed that respondents commission as notary
public was granted only by the CHR on 29 October 2001, and received by the CHR
Region 3 on 07 November 2001, hence, the belated authority granted to him cannot be
made to retroact to the notarized documents which were all done before 07 November
2001. Complainants likewise argued that respondents act of appearing in courts as
counsel is a form of private practice which is expressly prohibited by Republic Act No.
6713.[49] They further explained that the CHR has no authority to issue the questioned
orders as it cannot try and decide cases which courts of justice or quasi-judicial bodies
do. Finally, they pointed out that the complaint filed by Mrs. Dy against them was
already dismissed in an Order dated 15 October 2003.
After investigative hearings, IBP Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-
Maala submitted her report, the dispositive portion of which reads:[50]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, there is merit in the complaint and it is hereby

recommended that respondent ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR. be SUSPENDED
for a period of TWO (2) YEARS from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and
as a member of the bar.

On 30 July 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the penalty imposed: [51]

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that respondent
can be held liable for falsification for making it appear that he was at the CHR office
by logging in at the DTR when actually he was attending a hearing in some courts,
Atty. Roberto R. Ferrer, Sr., is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months.
 The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent has committed
gross misconduct arising from the following alleged acts:
1. Engaging in the private practice of his profession while being a government
employee;
2. Falsifying his Daily Time Records;
3. Issuing unauthorized orders; and
4. Continuously engaging in private practice even after the filing of case against him for
engaging in private practice.
Relative to the first ground, respondent contends that CHR lawyers are authorized
to engage in private practice by invoking CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133.
CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133 authorizes CHR lawyers to engage in private
practice (adopting the Civil Service Commission Resolution) subject to the following
conditions,[52] to wit:

NOW THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby

resolves to adopt the following policy:

Lawyers employed in the Civil Service Commission, upon written request, may be
authorized to practice their profession subject to the following conditions:

1. It shall not entail any conflict of interest insofar as the functions of the Commission
are concerned;

2. It shall not be in representation of a client whose cause of action is against the

government;

3. It shall not involve the use of government funds or property;

4. It shall not impair the lawyers efficiency in the discharge of his/her regular
functions in the office, and absences incurred, if any, shall be covered by duly
approved vacation leaves and pass slips;

5. It shall be subject to the provisions of RA No. 6713 and such other relevant Civil
Service Laws and Rules;

6. The lawyers can appear only in courts of law, offices of state prosecutors
(Department of Justice), Office of the Ombudsman and quasi-judicial agencies
decisions of which are rendered by presidential appointees;

7. Authority is for one year subject to renewal after review of the lawyers office
performance;
8. Provided, that, the commission reserves its right to revoke the said authority.

...

Recognizing that the dearth of lawyers committed to the civil service is due to the . . .
huge disparity in the income of government lawyers as compared to those employed
in the private sector, the Commission on Human Rights is convinced that CHR
lawyers may be authorized to engage in the practice of their profession to augment
their income so as to encourage them in the government service.

NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Human Rights adopts the above-cited

conditions to authorize, upon written request, to practice their profession. However, it
is the Commission (sic) position that said authority should be strictly construed to
maintain efficient and effective delivery of Commission programs and services.
(Underscoring supplied)

Crystal clear from the foregoing is the fact that private practice of law by CHR
lawyers is not a matter of right. Although the Commission allows CHR lawyers to
engage in private practice, a written request and approval thereof, with a duly
approved leave of absence for that matter are indispensable. In the case at bar, the
record is bereft of any such written request or duly approved leave of absence. No
written authority nor approval of the practice and approved leave of absence by the
CHR was ever presented by respondent. Thus, he cannot engage in private practice.
As to respondents act of notarizing documents, records show that he applied [53] for
commission as notary public on 14 November 2000, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42. This was granted by RTC Executive
Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr., on 01 December 2000.[54] However, the CHR
authorized[55] respondent to act as notary public only on 29 October
2001.[56]Considering that acts of notarization are within the ambit of the term practice of
law, for which a prior written request and approval by the CHR to engage into it are
required, the crucial period to be considered is the approval of the CHR on 29 October
2001 and not the approval of the RTC on 04 December 2000.
Practice of law has a settled meaning. It refers to any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.[57] Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainants, the belated
authority granted to respondent cannot be made to retroact to the notarized documents
dated prior thereto.
As to the alleged falsification of DTRs, records show that respondent has been
actually attending hearings in different courts as shown by the minutes of hearings
and/or orders issued by different courts. Since it has been amply established that he
was not properly authorized to do so as no written request by him and approval thereof
of his request and of his leave of absence was made by the CHR, it is an ineluctable
conclusion that he falsified his DTRs when he certified thereon that he was at the office
on the same days and time. Needless to say, he could not be at two different places at
the same time.
We shall now discuss respondents authority to issue the two (2) Orders. The
following are instructive:

. . . The [1987] Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission [on
Human Rights] the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving
civil and political rights. . .

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice,
or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.
Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and
quite distinct meanings.

Investigate, commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or

probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of investigate is to observe or
study closely: inquire into systematically: to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an
official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry. The purpose of investigation, of
course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or
intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of investigate is essentially the same: to follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire
into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking
of evidence; a legal inquiry; to inquire; to make an investigation, investigation being
in turn described as (a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does
not require a hearing . . .

Adjudicate, commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,

decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as to settle
finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues
raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge. And adjudge means
to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to
award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x.

In the legal sense, adjudicate means: To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense; and adjudge means:
To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x
Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment.[58]

The Commission on Human Rights having merely the power to investigate, cannot
and should not try and resolve the subject matters involved in the Order dated 18
September 2001, which awarded the custody of the child to her mother, and Order
dated 19 September 2001, which ordered the Rural Bank of Porac to reinstate the
account of the mother of the child. These matters are undoubtedly and clearly within the
judicial and adjudicatory powers of a regular court.
As to the fourth charge, suffice it to state that despite the cases filed against
respondent in courts, he continued without the proper authority and approved leave of
absence, to engage in the private practice of his profession as shown by certified true
copies of the minutes and orders of the different courts where he attended hearings.
In Spouses Jeneline Donato and Mario Donato v. Atty. Isaiah B. Asuncion,
Sr.,[59] we explained the concept of gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or
flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the administration of
justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the
cause. Such conduct is generally motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.
To our mind, respondents acts of issuing the subject orders, engaging in private
practice without prior written request and authority of the CHR and duly approved leave
of absence, notarizing documents even before being so authorized by the CHR and
falsifying his DTRs, constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, per
the dictates of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or Suspension of Attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds

therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. . . .

The question now arises as to the penalty to be imposed.

Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. On imposing the supreme penalty
of disbarment, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court.[60] While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him
where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.[61] In the case at bar,
the IBP Investigating Commissioner Rebecca V. Maala recommended the suspension
of respondent for two (2) years while the IBP Board of Governors recommended a
lighter penalty of six (6) months suspension. Taking our cue therefrom, we find one (1)
year suspension to be sufficient sanction against respondent - suspension being
primarily intended not as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the
legal profession.[62]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Sr., is hereby found guilty of Gross Misconduct
and is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) year from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and
served on the IBP, as well as to the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all
courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1] Atty. Yumol retired before the filing of the complaint.

[2] Rollo, p. 12.
[3] Rollo, p. 13.
[4] Rollo, p. 16.
[5] Rollo, p. 17.
[6] Annex I hereof; Rollo, pp. 27-28.
[7] Annex I-2 hereto; Rollo, p. 29.
[8] Annexes I-3 to I-4 hereof; Rollo, pp. 30-31.
[9] Annex I-6 hereof; Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[10] Annexes I-7 and I-9 hereof; Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[11] Annex I-9 hereof; Rollo, p. 36.
[12] Annex I-11 hereof; Rollo, p. 37.
[13] Annexes I-12 and I-13 hereof; Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[14] Rollo, p. 41.
[15] Annex H hereof; Rollo, p. 22.
[16] Annex H-2 hereof; Rollo, p. 23.
[17] Annex H-2; Rollo, p. 24.
[18] Annex H-3 hereof; Rollo, p. 25.
[19] Annex H-4 hereof; Rollo, p. 26.
[20] Annex J hereof; Rollo, p. 42.
[21] Annex J-1 hereof; Rollo, p. 43.
[22] Annex J-2 hereof; Rollo, pp. 44-46.
[23] Annex J-3 hereof; Rollo, p. 47.
[24] Annex J-4 hereof; Rollo, p. 48.
[25] Annex J-5 hereof; Rollo, p. 49.
[26] Annex J-6 hereof; Rollo, p. 50.
[27] Annex J-7 hereof; Rollo, p. 51.
[28] Annex J-8 hereof; Rollo, p. 52.
[29]Pending in different Regional Trial Courts of San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 12804 to 12812; Rollo, pp. 59-77.
[30] Pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 46; Rollo, p. 78.
[31] Pending with the Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 1; Rollo, pp. 80-81.
[32] Annexes W to II; Rollo, pp. 82-94.
[33] Annex W; Rollo, p. 82.
[34] Annex X; Rollo, p. 83.
[35] Annex Y; Rollo, p. 84.
[36] Annex Z; Rollo, p. 85.
[37] Annex AA; Rollo, p. 86.
[38] Annex CC; Rollo, p. 88.
[39] Annex DD; Rollo, p. 89.
[40] Annex EE; Rollo, p. 90.
[41] Annex FF; Rollo, p. 91.
[42] Annex GG; Rollo, p. 92.
[43] Annex HH; Rollo, p. 93.
[44] Annex II; Rollo, p. 94.
[45] Rollo, p. 9.
[46] Rollo, p. 102.
[47] Rollo, pp. 103-106.
[48] Rollo, pp. 133-138.
[49] Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
[50] Rollo, pp. 202-208, 26 May 2004.
[51] Rollo, p. 201.
[52] Rollo, pp. 197-198, CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133.
[53] Rollo, p. 129.
[54] Rollo, p. 130
[55] Rollo, p. 139.
[56] This authority was received by CHR, Region 3 on 07 November 2001.
[57] Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 03 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210.
[58] Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681, 02 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483, 494-
496.
[59] A.C. No. 4914, 03 March 2004, 424 SCRA 199, citing SPO2 Jose B. Yap v. Judge Aquilino A.
Inopiquez, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-02-1431, 09 May 2003, 403 SCRA 141.
[60] Tapucar v. Tapucar, A.C. No. 4148, 30 July 1998, 293 SCRA 331; Vda de Rosales v. Ramos, A.C. No.
5645, 02 July 2002, 383 SCRA 498; Tiboli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. v. Solilapsi, A.C. No.
4766, 27 December 2002, 394 SCRA 269.
[61] Montano v. IBP, A.C. No. 4215, 21 May 2001, 358 SCRA 1, citing Resurreccion v. Sayson, A.C. No.
1037, 14 December 1998, 300 SCRA 129; Castillo v. Taguines, A.C. No. 2024, 11 March 1996,
254 SCRA 554; Igual v. Javier, A.C. No. CBD-174, 07 March 1996, 254 SCRA 416; Mendoza v.
Mal, A.C. No. 1129, 27 July 1992, 211 SCRA 839.
[62] Magat v. Santiago, et al., G.R. Nos. L-43301-45665, 01 April 1980, 97 SCRA 1.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1048 July 14, 1995

WELLINGTON REYES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR M. GAA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This administrative complaint for disbarment charges respondent, a former Assistant City Fiscal of
manila, with malpractice and willful violation of his oath as an attorney.

On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of
Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival. According
to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a total of P500.00 on three
other occasions. He said that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's
office at the City Hall.

An entrapment was set up by the NBI.

Complainant furnished the NBI agents several peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper
bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to
complainant for the use in the entrapment.

When complainant went to respondent's office, he was told that the latter would not return until
around 2:30 P.M. So complainant and the NBI agents went back at around 2:30 P.M. As there were
other persons doing business with respondent, complainant had to wait for thirty minutes. When
finally complainant was able to see respondent, the latter greeted him in Tagalog "Ano ba ang sa
iyo?" Complainant answered "Hindi tayo nagkita kaninang umaga." To which respondent replied
"Oo, kanina pa kita hinihintay." Complainant then handed to respondent the marked money which he
placed inside his right pocket. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent and brought him to the
NBI Forensic and Chemistry Division for examination. Respondent's hands were found positive of
the yellow florescent powder applied earlier to the marked money. Respondent was thereafter taken
to the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI where he was photographed,
fingerprinted and record checked. Respondent declined to give a sworn statement to explain his side
of the case, invoking his right against self-incrimination.

On the same date, the NBI recommended the prosecution of respondent for violation of Section 3(b)
of R.A. No. 3019.

On April 13, 1971, the NBI recommended to the Secretary of Justice the filing of administrative
charges and the institution of disbarment proceedings against him.

On April 21, 1971, President Marcos suspended respondent from office pending investigation and
disposition of his administrative case (Case No. 74).

Aside from the criminal complaint and Administrative Case No. 74, two other cases were earlier filed
against respondent: namely, Administrative Case No. 10 for Grave Misconduct filed by one Angel
Alora on October 13, 1969, wherein respondent was found guilty as charged and was recommended
for suspension; and Administrative Case No. 10-A. for partiality filed by Fabiola Fajardo on April 26,
1970, which was pending resolution.

In his answer to the complaint for disbarment, respondent asserted that complainant surreptitiously
planted the marked money in his pocket without his knowledge and consent.

He further said that the criminal case (IS No. 71-6558) filed against him by the NBI at the instance of
complainant was still pending preliminary investigation by the City Fiscal of Manila. In connection
with the incident of March 30, 1971, he said that he had filed a criminal complaint for incriminatory
machination, perjury and attempted corruption of a public official against complainant with the City
Fiscal of Manila.

In reply to the answer, complainant denied that the several cases against respondent were
motivated by revenge, malice or personal ill will. He said that the investigating fiscal had
recommended the dismissal of the charges filed by respondent against him.

In a resolution dated December 23, 1971, this Court resolved to refer the disbarment case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. However, upon the adoption of Rule
139-B of the Revised Rules of Court., the case was transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for
investigation and disposition.

On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be disbarred. Said
recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution dated March 26,
1994.

II

We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

In the case at bench, respondent was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the marked
money from complainant during the entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which resulted in his
arrest and the subsequent filing of administrative and criminal cases against him. In his defense,
respondent merely denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted
by complainant.

It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Delos Reyes
v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him (Bayasen v.
Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 197 [1981]; Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).

Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a character as to affect his
qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of
the bar on such grounds (Gonzales-Austria v. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634 [1989]).

The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138,
Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 [1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay
no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a
ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action (Agpalo, Legal Ethics 66-67
[1983]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and spread on the personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., took no part.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. R-705-RTJ August 23, 1989

LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, LEONILA FUERTES and EDGARDO
SERVANDO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, RTC, Br. 51, Puerto Princess City and ANNA BELLE
CARDENAS, respondents.

A.M. No. R-698-P August 23, 1989

JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, complainant,

vs.
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 52, Puerto Princess
City, respondent.

A.M. No. 2909 August 23, 1989

JUDGE EMMANUEL M. ABAYA, complainant,

vs.
LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 52, Puerto Princess
City, respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:

In a complaint under oath dated July 21, 1986, docketed as Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ, Atty.
Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52,
Puerto Princess City 1 Mrs. Leonila Fuertes and Mr. Edgardo Servando charged Judge Emmanuel
M. Abaya, then Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 51, Puerto Princess City 2 with:

1. Estafa through falsification of public or official documents, by verifying official

hours rendered by one employee in the person of Miss Anabelle Cardenas who
never reported for duty from August 1983 to May 1984 by encashing and receiving
salaries of said Miss Cardenas through forgery of payee's signature in the treasury
warrants, thus deceiving the government and defrauding the Government treasury of
a big amount of money;

2. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting, demanding, receiving bribed (sic)

money in exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different litigants in
Branch 52, where said Judge was temporarily assigned from November 1984 to April
1986 and of which one of the undersigned complainant (sic), LIGAYA GONZALES-
AUSTRIA is the Branch Clerk of Court;

3. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his subordinate Edgardo Servando as

part and condition of his continued employment in Branch 51, where Judge Abaya is
the presiding judge.,

Judge Abaya denied all these charges in his comment dated August 29, 1986, filed in compliance
with the Court Resolution of August 12, 1986. He asserted that these charges were concocted in
retaliation against the administrative complaint docketed as Adm. Matter No. 698-P he earlier filed
on July 18,1986 against one of his accusers, Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria for dishonesty and grave
misconduct in having forged his signature in a probation order in Criminal Case No. 4995 of the
RTC, Branch 52, Puerto Princess, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Cruz," for
attempted murder. Adm. Matter No. 698-P was followed by a petition dated August 5,1986 docketed
as Adm. Case No. 2909 for the disbarment of Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria based on the same
alleged offense.

After Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria had filed her comment on the charges against her, the Court
resolved to consolidate these related cases.

On October 28, 1986, the Court granted the motion of the complainants in Adm. Matter No. R-705-
RTJ to amend their complaint by including Annabelle Cardenas as defendant in the charge of Estafa
thru Falsification of Public Documents. It was averred therein that the initial exclusion was due to
oversight and that it was never intended to exclude her as a co-principal.

By resolution of December 11, 1986, the cases were referred to Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M.
Herrera for investigation, report and recommendation. Based on the evidence presented by the
parties, Justice Herrera finds the respondents guilty of the charges against them and thereby
recommends:

1. The FORFEITURE of retirement benefits of Judge Abaya except earned leave

credits;

2. The REMOVAL of Annabelle Cardenas from office as Court Stenographer;

3. A one-year SUSPENSION from office as Attorney of Atty. Ligaya G. Austria in AC-

2909.4

We now consider these well-thought out recommendations.

I. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER NO. R-705-RTJ:

a. Estafa thru Falsification of Public or Official Documents by Judge Abaya and Annabelle
Cardenas. The gravamen of this charge is that Annabelle Cardenas who was appointed as
Stenographic Reporter of Branch 51, RTC, Palawan in August 1983 upon the recommendation of
Judge Abaya as Presiding Judge therein, was a ghost employee from August 1983 to May 1984 as
she never reported for work during said period, being then employed at Princess Tours Rafols Hotel
as a tourist guide. Notwithstanding, with her knowledge and consent, Judge Abaya verified as true
and correct her daily time records as stenographic reporter purportedly showing that she rendered
service and incurred no absences or tardiness from August 9 to September 30, 1983 and rendered
service for the period from October 1, 1983 to May 31, 1984 and was granted leave of absence from
March 14 to 30, 1984 and from April 23 to 27, 1984. Thus, she was paid her salaries corresponding
to the periods allegedly worked. Some of the Treasury Warrants covering her salaries were,
according to complainants, encashed by Judge Abaya by forging Annabelle Cardenas' signature.

Both Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas vehemently denied the charges, countering that the
latter worked as stenographic reporter from August 1983 to May 31, 1984.

We find the charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas to be supported by substantial
evidence. Especially damaging to the pretensions of the respondents that Annabelle Cardenas
rendered service as stenographic reporter during the period under consideration are the school
records of the Holy Trinity College, showing that Annabelle Cardenas was attending school in the
first semester of school year 1983-1984 from 2:00 P.M. to 8:15 P.M.5 While she claimed to have
been permitted by her teacher to attend her typing and stenography classes after office hours, the
school records reveal that she has other subjects such as Business Organization and Management
(3 units), Ten Commandments (3 units), Sining ng Pakikipagtalastas (3 units) and Accounting for
Single Proprietorship (3 units), her attendance in which can be safely concluded from the passing
grades she received in said subjects. Equally damaging to respondents' assertion are the Daily Time
Records of Princess Tours 6 showing that Annabelle Cardenas acted as tourist guide on 43 working
days when she was supposedly rendering service as stenographic reporter. Her explanation that her
name was placed on the daily time record as team leader, although she did not actually conduct the
tours reflected therein is too shallow to merit belief.

It is indeed quite intriguing that during the ten-month period under consideration, the court calendar
for Branch 51 never once carried Annabelle Cardenas' name to signify her attendance at a court
session. Moreover, she could not produce any single order, transcript or official stenographic notes
that had been taken by her in any case, civil or criminal. All she presented were so-called practice
notes.

Judge Abaya stated in his comment that it was Annabelle Cardenas who was collecting her salary
"without intervention from your respondent.7 It was however proved that Judge Abaya collected
Annabelle Cardenas' salaries on several occasions, as in fact, said Annabelle Cardenas even
executed a special power of attorney in his favor authorizing him not only to collect the treasury
warrants but to endorse and negotiate them as well. 8 Be that as it may, we find the evidence
insufficient on the one hand to overthrow the explanation of respondents that Judge Abaya collected
Annabelle Cardenas' salaries in Manila so that he could bring the same to Candon, Ilocos Sur for
delivery to her mother, who is a good friend of the Judge; and on the other hand to support
complainants' theory that Judge Abaya appropriated the money for himself.

b. Charges of Gross Dishonesty and Corruption by Soliciting, Demanding and Receiving Bribe
Money against Judge Abaya. The act complained of was allegedly committed by Judge Abaya
while temporarily assigned to Branch 52, RTC Palawan vice Judge Jose G. Genilo Jr., who was
temporarily assigned to Batangas City. It must be recalled that complainant Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-
Austria was then Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 52.

It was alleged that Judge Abaya denied the application for bail of the accused in Criminal Case No.
5304 entitled "People vs. Henry Arias and Fernando Oniot for murder, in consideration of the sum of
P 2,000.00 given by Mrs. Leonila Fuertes, complainant and mother of the victim in the aforesaid
case.

Mrs. Leonila Fuertes, a school teacher, testified that she went to Branch 52 at about 5:00 P.M. on
August 13, 1985 in response to a telephone call from court stenographer Nelly Vicente that Judge
Abaya wanted to see her personally. Nelly Vicente referred her to Carmencita P. Baloco, the officer-
in-charge who then called Judge Abaya from the other branch. Judge Abaya directed her to the
adjoining courtroom where he told her, "Ang kaso ninyo ay medyo tagilid, 50-50 dahil walang
eyewitness." (Your case is shaky with only a 50-50 chance of winning because there is no
eyewitness.) She retorted that there was an eyewitness but the Judge insisted that there was none
because the supposed eyewitness had his back turned when her son was stabbed. Nonetheless, the
Judge assured her that he would be able to do something about it ("Ngunit lahat ay magagawan ko
ng paraan dahil ako ang nakakaalam sa mga decision dito"). When Mrs. Fuertes asked the Judge
lwph1.t

what he wanted, he told her that he has a problem. "Kailangan ko ng pera Limang Libo at Ide-deny
ko ang bail na mga acusado" (I need Five Thousand Pesos and I will deny bail to the accused). Mrs.
Fuertes expressed puzzlement on why she had to give money when she was the aggrieved party,
but the Judge cut her off by saying he needed the money badly before he leaves for Manila. Mrs.
Fuertes answered that she would have to consult her brothers-in-law about the matter. The Judge
told her to see him at his house at 7:00 o'clock in the evening.

Mrs. Fuertes consulted her brothers-in-law as well as the then prosecuting fiscal, now Judge Angel
R. Miclat about the matter. Although they were all against the Idea of her acceding to the Judge's
demand, she delivered the amount of Pl,200.00 to Judge Abaya on August 15,1985 in his chambers,
telling him that was all she could afford. Judge Abaya looked dissatisfied but said "Never mind" and
that he would just contact her at the next trial for the final judgment. 9

Roselyn Teologo, stenographic reporter of Branch 52 corroborated that portion of Mrs. Fuertes'
testimony relating to the phone call of Nelly Vicente to Mrs. Fuertes, the latter's arrival on August 13,
1985 at Branch 52 and Mrs. Fuertes having been closeted with Judge Abaya inside the courtroom
for about 20 minutes. She further testified that Carmen Baloco who eavesdropped on the Judge and
Mrs. Fuertes' conversation remarked, "Grabe ito, nanghihingi ng pera." (This is terrible, he is asking
money.) She added that when Judge Abaya emerged from the courtroom, he instructed her not to
tell anybody that Mrs. Fuertes had been there.10

Additional corroborative evidence was given by Judge Angel R. Miclat, then acting City Fiscal for
Puerto Princess City handling Criminal Case No. 5304. He testified that Mrs. Fuertes came to him in
August of 1986 to inform him that Judge Abaya was asking P5,000.00 from her so that the bail
application of the accused would be denied. While he advised her to file a complaint against Judge
Abaya, he was informed later on that Mrs. Fuertes gave Judge Abaya not the amount being asked,
but only about P1,200.00.11

Likewise submitted in evidence by the complainants were the entries in Mrs. Fuertes' diary, thus:

August 13, 1985 called by Judge Abaya to see him after office hours. He asked me
for my case was 50-50.12

August 15, I went to town to see Baby Francisco, gave P2,000 and I brought the
money to Judge. 13

July 2, 1986 Judge Abaya with companion Rufo Gonzales and Celia Fernandez.
Purpose they convinced me to sign my name in the affidavit stating that I will deny
the previous affidavit I made stated that Judge asked from me certain amount and
his request was granted. But I did not sign and asked me to see him in town at the
residence of Menchie his niece personally nakiusap kay Baby upang mai-deny ang
affidavit ko through Atty. Austria ay nakiusap pa rin. He is talking care Nanette na
idinay ko. 13-A

Judge Abaya denied the solicitation as well as the receipt of money from Mrs. Fuertes. He alleged
that the bail application of the accused in Criminal Case No. 5304 was denied, not because of any
outside interference, but because the evidence of guilt was strong. He surmised that Mrs. Fuertes
and Nelly Vicente had been pressured by Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria into testifying against him
out of sheer vindictiveness and that Mrs. Fuertes might have been blaming him for the delay in the
resolution of the criminal case against her son's alleged killers.

We quote with approval Justice Herrera's perceptive reasons for giving full faith and credence to
Mrs. Fuertes' testimony:

We find no improper motive as to why Mrs. Fuertes, a school teacher, would impute
such a serious offense against a judge unless it be the truth. Mrs. Fuertes is not a
 disgruntled litigant. Judge Abaya having denied the petition for bail of the suspected
killer of Mrs, Fuertes' son, she should, under normal circumstances be grateful to the
Judge. Yet she charged him with a serious offense, and travelled all the way from
Palawan to Manila to testify against the Judge. Under the circumstances, We cannot
accept Judge Abaya's contention that Mrs. Fuertes perjured herself just to
accommodate the vengeanceful ire of Atty. Austria against Judge Abaya. That would
be contrary to the ordinary prompting of men.

Upon the other hand, the testimony of Mrs. Fuertes is too rich in details brought out
on cross-examination which cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrications.
They find support in collateral but highly significant circumstances pointed to by Mrs.
Teologo, such as (1) the visible presence of Mrs. Fuertes in the courtroom in
conference with Judge Abaya at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 15, (should
be 13) 1985; and (2) the highly credible testimony of Judge Miclat on the report made
to him by Mrs. Fuertes, as then acting City Fiscal, on the solicitation of Judge Abaya.
It certainly cannot be said that Mrs. Fuertes merely concocted her story at the time
regarding the solicitation of Judge Abaya in connection with the pending case of the
suspected killers of her son. There was absolutely no motive for her to do So.14

c. Charge of illegal Exaction against Judge Abaya. It is alleged that Judge Abaya exacted
portions of the salaries of two (2) employees in Branch 51 of the Palawan RTC as a condition for
their continued employment. Edgardo Servando, one of the complainants herein, and who was
appointed stenographer on September 3, 1984 upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya, declared
that such recommendation was made in consideration of his agreement to give Judge Abaya
Pl,000.00 from his initial salary and thereafter a monthly amount of P400.00, which undertaking he
complied with. However, in December when the Judge before leaving for Manila for the Christmas
vacation asked him for Pl,000.00 from as fringe benefits, medical allowance and year-end bonus, he
was unable to comply as he did not then have cash, the payment of said benefits having been in
checks. A week later, he received a notice of termination effective at the close of business hours on
December 31, 1984 from the Supreme Court upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya.15

Nilo Jamora, a former stenographer of Branch 51 testified that since his employment in said Branch,
Judge Abaya had been exacting from him P350.00 every payday, which exaction ceased only in
March 1986 when Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria filed her charges against Judge Abaya. He further
stated that when he refused to retract his charges against Judge Abaya before the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan despite the Judge's offer of money, the latter demoted him to process server.16

Judge Abaya likewise denied this charge, labelling the same as sheer vindictiveness due to
Servando's termination and Jamora's demotion, fanned by Atty. Austria's proddings. He insists that
the personnel action taken on Servando and Jamora was due to their inefficiency.

While the investigating officer, Justice Herrera observed that both Servando and Jamora "testified in
a natural and straightforward, albeit in an angry manner without attempting to conceal their contempt
for Judge Abaya,17 he concluded that "the evidence in this regard would be unable to withstand
judicial scrutiny for want of ample corroboration. It would simply be the word of one against a
judge. 18

We are in accord with this observation, for indeed, the charge if true is so demeaning to an RTC
judge that it requires more than a bare allegation to sustain it. In this regard, we give respondent
Judge the benefit of the doubt.
In summation, we find Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya guilty of grave and serious misconduct affecting
Ms integrity and moral character which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had his
resignation not been accepted.

The office of a judge exists for one solemn end to promote justice by administering it fairly and
impartially. In regarding justice as a commodity to be sold at a price, Judge Abaya betrayed the very
essence of magistracy. In complicity with Annabelle Cardenas, he likewise abused the trust and
confidence of the people, shortchanging them of services undoubtedly vital to the speedy
administration of justice.

The judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. From him, the people draw their will
and awareness to obey the law. 19 For him then to transgress the highest ideals of justice and public
service for personal gain is indeed a demoralizing example constituting a valid cause for
disenchantment and loss of confidence in the judiciary as well as in the civil service system.

By these acts, Judge Abaya has demonstrated his unfitness and unworthiness of the honor and
requisites attached to his office. As he had previously resigned, we hereby order the forfeiture of his
retirement benefits, except earned leave credits, as recommended by the investigating officer
Justice Herrera.

We further mete out to Annabelle Cardenas in consequence of her grave misconduct as above-
described the penalty of removal from office as Court Stenographer with prejudice to her re-
appointment to the Judiciary.

II. A.M. No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909

The complaints for dishonesty and grave misconduct in A.M. No. R-698-P and for disbarment in
Adm. Case No. 2909 against Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, then Clerk of Court of Branch 52, RTC
Palawan, stem from her act of having allegedly forged the signature of Judge Abaya in a probation
order dated April 22, 1986 in Criminal Case No. 4999 of said court entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Leonardo Cruz" for attempted homicide.

Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria admits to having signed the probation order and of having
promulgated it, but explains that these were done with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya,
who had asked her to prepare orders and decisions in Branch 52 to ease his load of presiding over
two (2) branches. She adverts to Judge Abaya's order of November 4, 1985 which granted accused
Leonardo Cruz' motion for reconsideration of the order denying probation. This order, which carried
certain conditions, set the promulgation of the probation order on January 16, 1986 at 8:00 o'clock in
the morning. In the meantime, Judge Abaya requested Atty. Austria to prepare the probation order
with the day and month in blank for the signature of the Judge.

On January 16,1986, Judge Abaya was absent so the promulgation was reset to April 16, 1986. On
the latter date, the provincial warden failed to bring the accused to court, hence the promulgation of
the probation order was again reset to June 3, 1986, with Judge Abaya allegedly giving instructions
before he left for Manila to promulgate said order even in his absence should the probationer
Leonardo Cruz arrive in court.

On April 21, 1986, Leonardo Cruz came and begged that the probation order be promulgated the
following day, April 22, 1986 as he had to leave for Coron in the same pumpboat that brought him to
Puerto Princess and he had no money to sustain him up to the time the Judge arrives from Manila.
As requested, the promulgation was set on April 22, 1986, only for Atty. Austria to discover that
Judge Abaya had neglected to sign the probation order. In view of the predicament of Leonardo
Cruz and the authority granted to her by Judge Abaya, Atty. Austria signed Judge Abaya's name to
the probation order and promulgated it.

Atty. Austria justifies her action under the theory of agency (Art. 1881 of the Civil Code) 20 in that
having been granted full authority to promulgate the probation order, she necessarily had the
authority to sign the Judge's name if the need arose. She further maintains that as Judge Abaya
never complained about the alleged forgery, he is deemed to have ratified it and is now estopped
from questioning her authority. Lastly, she compares the probation order to a writ of execution which
is usually done by the Clerk of Court.21

Respondent's arguments are quite novel but unpersuasive. As thoroughly explained by Justice
Herrera:

.....her explanation that she is the one preparing decisions and orders in Branch 52
with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya during the time that the latter was
acting as Presiding Judge of said branch and that she was directed to promulgate
the probation order in favor of Leonardo Cruz only to discover that the judge
overlooked to sign the order, even if true, is not a valid justification for her to simulate
the signature of Judge Abaya in the probation order. This is patently illegal. As a
lawyer and branch clerk of court, she ought to know that under no circumstances is
her act of signing the name of the judge permissible. She could have probably
released the order with the statement that it is upon orders of the judge or by
authority of the judge but she could not under any circumstance make it appear as
she did in this case that the Judge signed the order when in fact he did not. The
duties of the clerk of court in the absence of any express direction of the Judge is
well defined under Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 5. Duties of the Clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. In the
absence of the judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving
applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders and notices
that follow as a matter of course under these rules, and may also, when directed so
to do by the judge, receive the accounts of executors, administrators, guardians,
trustees, and receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or to the settlement of the
estates of deceased persons, or to guardianship, trusteeships, or receiverships, and
forthwith transmit such reports, accounts, and evidence to the judge, together with
his findings in relation to the same, if the judge shall direct him to make findings and
include the same in his report.

Signing orders in the name of, and simulating the signature of the judge is not one of
them.

Atty. Austria's theory of agency that she lawfully acted as agent of the Judge is
wholly devoid of merit. The judicial power vested in a judge and its exercise is strictly
personal to the Judge because of, and by reason of his highest qualification, and can
never be the subject of agency. That would not only be contrary to law, but also
subversive of public order and public policy. Nor could her void act in signing the
name of the judge be validly ratified by the latter. Judge Abaya himself is bereft of
any power to authorize the clerk of court to sign his name in his official capacity in a
matter pending adjudication before him. The issuance of the order in question is
strictly judicial and is exclusively vested in the judge which is beyond his authority to
delegate. 22
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. 23 However, if that
misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or
to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground. 24

We find Atty. Austria's misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court to affect her qualification as a member
of tile Bar, for precisely as a lawyer, she ought to have known the illegality of the act complained of.

WHEREFORE, finding the respondents Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, Annabelle Cardenas and Atty.
Ligaya Gonzales-Austria guilty as charged, except that of illegal exaction against Judge Abaya, the
Court hereby orders:

1. In Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ, the FORFEITURE of the retirement benefits of Judge Emmanuel
M. Abaya, except his earned leave credits; and the DISMISSAL from office of Annabelle Cardenas
as Stenographic Reporter with prejudice to her reappointment to the Judiciary; and,

2. In Adm. Matter No. R-698-P and Adm. Case No. 2909, the resignation of Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-
Austria as Branch Clerk of Court IS ACCEPTED as of December 31, 1987 and any and all benefits
accruing during her government service are declared forfeited, except her earned leave credits. Her
SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar for a period of one year from the finality of this decision is
further decreed.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Ombudsman for the filing of appropriate criminal
charges against respondents if warranted.

Copies of this resolution shall be attached to the respondents' respective personal records.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria resigned as Branch Clerk of Court effective as of the

end of December, 1987.

2 Judge Abaya's resignation was accepted on February 17, 1987.

3 p. 1, Rollo in Adm. Case No. R-705-RTJ.

4 p. 28, Report and Recommendation.

5 Exhs. H-1 & H-2.

6 Exh. L-1.

7 p. 33, Rollo in Adm. Matter No. R-705-RTJ.

8 Exh. 8.
 9 T.s.n. February 3,1988, pp. 12-18.

10 Exh. B tsn, February 3, 1988, pp. 33-38.

11 tsn, February 1, 1988, pp. 12-13.

12 Exh. A-1 Austria.

13 Exh. A-2.

13-A Exh. A-3.

14 pp. 23-24, Report and Recommendation.

15 Exhibit D.

16 T.s.n. February 29,1988, pp. 19-27.

17 pp. 22-23, Report and Recommendation.

18 lbid.

19 (Dela Paz v. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540; Canon 22, Canons of Judicial Ethics; Castillo
v. Barsana, Adm. Case No. 77-Md April 18,1975).

20 Art. 1881 states: "The agent must act within the scope of his authority. He may do
such acts as may be conducive to the accomplishment of the purpose of the
agency."

21 pp. 7-19, Rollo in A.C. No. 2909.

22 pp. 25-27, Report and Recommendation.

23 In re Turrel 2 Phil. 266; In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66.

24 In re Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, August 29, 1975.

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

(PCGG), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO
C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS,
NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE,
 MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG
(represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS,
JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE,
MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME
KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG,
ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED
BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE
CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS
CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.,
GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES,
IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL
HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE
CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN
TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC.,
SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO
HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA, respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns
on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government
service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent
counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital
Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account
with the Central Bank.[1]It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had
approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests
totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as
uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to
GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans,
GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume
business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held from March 26 to 28,
1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. [5] Subsequently, former
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First
Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs
liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
 In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of
the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against
respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos,
Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo,
Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T.
Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation
(Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic
Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan
Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel
Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort
Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc.,
Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to
herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan.[6] In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by
the PCGG.[7] After the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred the cases to
the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case
Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their
counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his
private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged
that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General[10] and counsel to Central
Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by
respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the
Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and
appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in
the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No.
0005.[11] It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his present
employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did
not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term
as Solicitor General.[12] It further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the
year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing
his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within
one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. [13] The PCGG
did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from
the Sandiganbayans Second Division to the Fifth Division.[15] In its resolution dated
July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion
to disqualify respondent Mendoza.[16] It adopted the resolution of its Second
Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in
substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought
reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December
5, 2001.[17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July
11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[18] The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions
contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a
former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in
which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central
Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendozas appearance on behalf of
the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res
judicata does not apply.[19]
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view,
however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and
forthwith resolve the substantive issue.

Substantive Issue
 The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with
any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were
pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did
not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one
source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the
standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the
central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client.
The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including specific
pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore
settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence,
loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the
litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's
practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary
America did not differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states
used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney
behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such
regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early
America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and
differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some
standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive
standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as
pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the
duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.[20]
The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethics in the
United States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two
ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York Field
Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise
statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of
the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and
George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline
of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail
and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-
nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer
behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the do no falsehood oath and the
deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or
indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency
recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property.
Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege
and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely
exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial
and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide
a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more
comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new
era in American legal ethics.[21]
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began
to guide lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes
were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the
two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic
discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty
and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association
codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the
bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding
rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar
associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial
period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth
century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial
predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama
State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of
drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members.[22]
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association
code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states
codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908
Canons of Ethics.[23]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were
insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was
entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32
of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[24]
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of
the canons. Among their concerns was the revolving door or the process by which
lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then
leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts,
and influence garnered in government service.[25] These concerns were classified
as adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts. Adverse-interest
conflicts exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a
client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with
while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are
adverse.[26] On the other hand, congruent-interest representation conflicts are
unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers. [27] For
several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new
canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended
one canon and added thirteen new canons. [28] To deal with problems peculiar to former
government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for adverse-
interest conflicts and congruent-interest representation conflicts.[29] The rationale for
disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyers largely discretionary
actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the
government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later
become private practice clients.[30] Canon 36provides, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits
of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ
should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any
matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and
added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to
47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the
ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis
Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of
the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial
revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between the inspirational
and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in
the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in
matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the
Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that
defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere.[34] In the case of
Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)[35] became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting
committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code.[36]
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results
and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules
of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the restatement format, where
the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The
new format was intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement because
the only enforceable standards were the black letter Rules. The Model Rules eliminated
the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, by
placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the
black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements
particularly with regard to conflicts of interests.[37] In particular, the ABA did away with
Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the
subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite nature.[38]
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it
submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local
customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June
21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility.[39] Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals particularly with former
government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure
of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the
expansive phrase investigated and passed upon with the word intervened. It is,
therefore, properly applicable to both adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-
interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03.
Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted
as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents
Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists
a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning
of matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of
the intervention made by the former government lawyer on the matter. The American
Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any discrete, isolatable
act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and
specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of intervention
by respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the
following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting the matter where he intervened
as a Solicitor General, viz:[40]
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth
Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively
intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to
proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared
by certain key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor
Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and
General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota
P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director
of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they
averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General
(Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of
GENBANK. The pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he
advised that the following procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board

reporting that studies and evaluation had been made since the last
examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the
bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be
permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and
the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the
liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and
approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the
foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved
by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance
reciting the proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance
of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary
Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent
documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the
petition for assistance in the banks liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said
minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy

of the subject memorandum of the Director, Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with
copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and

Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March 25,
1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust
Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and

Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977,
submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended
by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of Genbank,
together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the

Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of
the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor
General involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with
the CFI of Manila. In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation is given in black and
white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

 SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by
the head of the appropriate supervising or examining department or his
examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the
condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty
of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the
Monetary Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements
of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the
Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of
recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take
charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and
gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors,
exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not
limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.

...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said
period that the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest
requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and
approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General,
file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which
have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of
such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to
adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets
of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the
Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the
Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as
liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously
appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall,
with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-
bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to money or
sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for
the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of
the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
 functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court
to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of

the Monetary Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section
34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court
only if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made
in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court
enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section
and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing
proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in
bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court
in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank,
in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall
be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of
a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in
an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff
conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may
suffer by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of
Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and
dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a

bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions
to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of
business. Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of
an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced
by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or
financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the

appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with
the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the
contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827,
Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to

liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in
stressing that the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do
not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of
respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No.
342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza which is the matter involved
in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the matter involved in Civil Case No.
0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza
had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also
given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The matter
where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the
necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The
subject matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to
but is different from the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096
involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied
Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the
liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank.
Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far
removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK
was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking
malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of
GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying
that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in
Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the intervention contemplated
by Rule 6.03. Intervene means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to

occur, fall, or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between
by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two
things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .)[41]

On the other hand, intervention is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that

may affect the interests of others.[42]

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under
the first interpretation, intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the
intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. [43] Under the second
interpretation, intervene only includes an act of a person who has the power to
influence the subject proceedings.[44] We hold that this second meaning is more
appropriate to give to the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not
exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous
such as x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally,
Canon 36 provided that a former government lawyer should not, after his retirement,
accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or
passed upon while in such office or employ. As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the
phrase which he has investigated or passed upon resulted in unjust disqualification of
former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-
101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the
government service, had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further
constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a
private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally
and substantially as a public officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No.
107812 is significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special
proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent
Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed,
the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for
its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks
the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the
court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice
but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such
a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the
usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a

commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the
government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by
the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the
United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure
that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will achieve its end without
necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not
interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent.
At present, it is already difficult for government to match compensation offered by the
private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse that situation.
The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to
recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and
contacts that can later be exchanged for higher income in private practice.[45]Rightly,
Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service would be too
great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the
practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the
firm with which they become associated to be disqualified.[46] Indeed, to make
government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter. [47]
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation
tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal
representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing
counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
noted the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings,
deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the
opponent, and observed that the tactic was so prevalent in large civil cases in recent
years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary. [48] Even the United
States Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals description of
disqualification motions as a dangerous game.[49] In the case at bar, the new attempt to
disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent
Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years
and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent
Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was
filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to
the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least,
the circumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled
put petitioners motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the
prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted
that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of
choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. [51] The
client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work
done by the latter.[52] The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective
counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated
reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government
service. According to Prof. Morgan: An individual who has the security of knowing he or
she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work
vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and
resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of private
employment does not enjoy such freedom.[53] He adds: Any system that affects the right
to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit
inhibits official independence.[54] The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor
General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed
that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of
independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend
acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to
defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the
independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former
government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current
state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may extend to all
members of his law firm.[55] Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming
the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and
loss of public confidence in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging
public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best [56] which can lead to untoward
results.[57] No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to
former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of
information between the government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to
protect.[58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the
1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct[59] and some courts have
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of
interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government,
the witnesses in the case, and the public.[60]
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it
correctly disfavors lawyers who switch sides. It is claimed that switching sides carries
the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential official
information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar.
As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on
the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter
of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents
Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official information
might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent sides to
be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for
respondents Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of
Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of
Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests
coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no
objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of
respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are
involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to
avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a
conflict of loyalties while still in government service.[61] The example given by the
proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he
or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less
vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in 1960:
The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well
occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive
administration of government policies.[63] Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern
as probably excessive.[64] He opines x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would
feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client the
government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the best
government lawyers the ones who were hardest to beat not the least qualified or least
vigorous advocates.[65] But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the case
at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank
on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of
Allied Bank. Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and
respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as
the excessive influence of former officials or their clout.[66] Prof. Morgan again
warns against extending this concern too far. He explains the rationale for his
warning, viz: Much of what appears to be an employees influence may actually be the
power or authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure
from government x x x.[67] More, he contends that the concern can be demeaning to
those sitting in government. To quote him further: x x x The idea that, present officials
make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about
the present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or
talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores
the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even
the appearance of favoritism.[68]

III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the
congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should
be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply
retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by
the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not
yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify
respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any
standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness
of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their
concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our
Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-
0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Panganiban and Tinga, JJ., Please see separate opinion.
Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., Please see dissenting opinion.
Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair.
Chico-Nazario, J., No part.

[1] Rollo, p. 240; Filcapital Development Corporation was a related interest of the Yujuico Family Group
and the directors and officers of GENBANK.
[2] Rollo, pp. 240, 242.
[3] Rollo, p. 7.
[4] Rollo, pp. 7, 108, 248.
[5] Rollo, pp. 110-114, 248.
[6] Rollo, pp. 217-218.
[7] Rollo, p. 143.
[8] Rollo, pp. 216-220.
[9] Rollo, pp. 44, 221- 225.
[10] Atty. Mendoza served as Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986.
[11] Rollo, p. 63.
[12] Rollo, p. 61.
[13] Rollo, pp. 57-63.
[14] Rollo, p. 178.
[15] Rollo, pp. 42, 44; The Motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for petitioners in Civil
Case Nos. 0096-0099 was filed with the Sandiganbayans Second Division. However, the motion
was ultimately resolved by the Sandiganbayans Fifth Division in its proceedings held on July 11,
2001.
[16] Rollo, p. 42.
[17] Rollo, p. 43.
[18] Rollo, pp. 2-40.
[19] Rollo, pp. 12-14.
[20] Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Revolution, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1385 (2004).
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 24-25 (2002); In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1927).
[25] Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 456 (1986).
[26] Id. at 457.
[27] Ibid.; The use of the word conflict is a misnomer; congruent-interest representation conflicts arguably
do not involve conflicts at all, as it prohibits lawyers from representing a private practice client
even if the interests of the former government client and the new client are entirely parallel.
[28] Supra, note 20.
[29] ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 36 (1908); ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(1963), DR 9-101(b); ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, MR 1.11(a) and (b) (1983).
[30] Supra, note 25 at 458.
[31] Supra, note 20.
[32] Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 25 (2002).
[33] Canon 9 was adopted to replace Canon 36 because Canon 36 "proved to be too broadly
encompassing." ABA Opinion No. 342 (1975); Canon 9 states: A lawyer should avoid even the
appearance of professional impropriety.
[34] Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Statement (1983); "The Disciplinary Rules ...
are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below
which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action."
[35] DR 9-101(b): A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial
responsibility while he was a public employee.
[36] Supra, note 20.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.09 comment (1984): The other rubric formerly used for
dealing with disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a two-fold problem. First, the
appearance of impropriety can be taken to include any new client-lawyer relationship that might
make a former client feel anxious. If that meaning were adopted, disqualification would become
little more than a question of subjective judgment by the former client. Second, since impropriety
is undefined, the term appearance of impropriety is question-begging. It therefore has to be
recognized that the problem of disqualification cannot be properly resolved . . . by the very
general concept of appearance of impropriety.
[39] Supra, note 32.
[40] See Dissent of J. Callejo, Sr., pp.19-20.
[41] Websters Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p. 1183 (1993).
[42] Id.
[43] Id.; This may be inferred from the second definition of intervene which is to occur, fall, or come in
between points of time or events.
[44] Id.; This may be inferred from the third definition of intervene which is to come in or between by way of
hindrance or modification, and the second definition of intervention which is interference that may
affect the interests of others.
[45] Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 461 (1986).
[46] Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 657
(1957).
[47] Remarks of Federal Trade Commission Chairman Calvin Collier before Council on Younger Lawyers,
1976 Annual Convention of the Federal Bar Association (September 16, 1976).
[48] Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Board of Education of New
York City v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Williamsburg Wax Museum v. Historic
Figures, Inc., 501 F.Supp. 326, 331 (D.D.C. 1980).
[49] Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985).
[50] Rollo, p. 143; The petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction were filed sometime in August
1986. The motion for disqualification in Civil Case No. 0096-0099 was filed on February 5, 1991.
[51] United States v. Brothers, 856 F. Supp. 370, 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).
[52] First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978); EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco,
Inc., 746 F.2d 1459, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Realco Serv. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 880 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
[53] Morgan, Appropriate Limits on Participation by a former Agency Official in Matters Before an Agency,
Duke L.J., Vol. 1980, February, No. 1, p. 54.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 292-293; Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569 (1949).
[56] Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 320 (1986).
[57] Id. at p. 321.
[58] Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 657
(1957).
[59] Supra, note 38.
[60] United States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44
(2d Cir. 1983).
[61] Supra, note 53 at 44.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid., see footnote 207 of article.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Id. at 45.
[66] Id. at 42.
[67] Id. at 42-43.
[68] Id. at 43.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

BIDIN, J.:

In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National Bank charged
respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of
complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thus:

A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or

employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.

by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which
respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.

Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging the
sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for
P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in
favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division
Compound. When a civil action arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant
bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the
employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.

Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by
complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and
dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil
Service Commission.

Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainants Asset Management
Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia
Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the couple. When a civil action ensued
between complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were
represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the
Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs. Ong
Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He alleged that he
did not participate in the litigation of the case before the trial court. With respect to the case of the
Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he never appeared as counsel for them. He contended
that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the
case is actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a
general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein. They are only
using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who although not partners,
maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own
cases independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among
them.

In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.

During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was previously
fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456 entitled "Milagros
Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where respondent appeared as
counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and
Associates."

The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully substantiated.
Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a
partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the attestation of complainant's counsel, Atty.
Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of the Almeda spouses' case, respondent attended the
same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically
dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of
the application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly admitted being the
partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that respondent was working in the same office
as Atty. Ferrer.

Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself a violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the clients secrets and confidential
records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members at all times.

From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to devise ways and
means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to
see the legal weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his
professional service. In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in
consideration of the money he expected to earn.

The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3 years.

The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994, submitted
to this Court its Report and recommendation in this case, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation contained in the said Report with
the IBP Board of Governors. On December 12, 1994, respondent also filed another "Motion to Set
Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the
Court took into consideration the aforesaid pleadings.

In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize the
paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting interests. In the similar case
of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal
Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case
against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft
case, this Court, citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:

The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him,
that even if respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence
acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to
information regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated in
the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that triggered the mauling
incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical injuries. This Court's
remarks inHilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:

"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a

complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-
known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an
attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in
advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainant's cause."

Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former
client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their
previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the
other side in the forcible entry case. In the case of Hilado vs. David, supra, this
Tribunal further said:

Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and
client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but
as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public policy, of good taste. As has been
said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties,
but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double dealing. Only thus can litigants. be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to respondent in
the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as
counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he
formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit:

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting

consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning
of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in behalf on one client, it
is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO from
the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in Metro
Manila.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and

Chief, Public Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY.
RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.

[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON

BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, respondents.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the
July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an
interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of
property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee
of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half
after a decision thereon has been rendered.
 Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of
his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to
change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest
of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the
Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-
old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all
the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of
legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order
as long as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules
2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the
warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP
Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, [8] which
was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest
whether or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.[10] Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not
submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11]Respondent, on the other
hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. [12] It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. [15] The following
elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in

which one may attain the highest eminence without making much
money;

2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice

involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. [16]

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings
hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded
for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight
months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14,
2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17]Ten months later, he caused the
same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such
acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-
styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed,
in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months
from the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have
otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage
bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity
of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no
injury to the lawyer and to the bar.[20]Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or
names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even
the use of calling cards is now acceptable.[21]Publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v.
Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to
the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a
lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a
daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity
or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication
of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is

found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is
likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.

[1]
Rollo, p. 13.
[2]
Id., pp. 14-15.
[3]
Id., p. 9.
[4]
Id., pp. 21-57.
[5]
Id., p. 60.
[6]
Id., p. 62.
[7]
Id., p. 72.
[8]
Id., p. 75.
[9]
Id., p. 73.
[10]
Id., p. 109.
[11]
Id., p. 110.
[12]
Cantiller v. Potenciano, A.C. No. 3195, 18 December 1989, 180 SCRA 246, 253.
[13]
Canlas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77691, 8 August 1988, 164 SCRA 160, 174.
[14]
Agpalo R., LEGAL ETHICS, p. 12 [1997].
[15]
Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, 10 June 2002.
[16]
Agpalo, supra, at pp. 13-14, citing In re Sycip, 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 1, 10; Pineda E.L. LEGAL AND
JUDICIAL ETHICS, p. 58 [1999].
[17]
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 41.
[18]
Id., p. 110.
[19]
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 3.
[20]
Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, supra, at p. 61.
[21]
Id., p. 65.
[22]
Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378, 407.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. L-1117 March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if
desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the
poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had
any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon
27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular
letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were
repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the
opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999]

GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC., complainant, vs.

ATTY. PRIMO R. NALDOZA, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., filed before this Court a
Petition for disbarment against Attorney Primo R. Naldoza. The precursor of this Petition was
the action of respondent, as counsel for complainant, appealing a Decision of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). In relation to the appeal, complainant asserts that
respondent should be disbarred for the following acts:
1. Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final and executory
2. Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five US dollars (US$2,555) from
complainant, allegedly for cash bond in the appealed case
3. Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act.[1]
In his Answer,[2] respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to file an appeal. On the
contrary, he asserts that it was the complainant who insisted on appealing the case in order to
delay the execution of the POEA Decision.[3] He also controverts complainants allegation that he
asked for a cash bond and that he issued the fake receipt.[4]
In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The pertinent portions of the complaint were summarized by the IBP in this wise:

Under its petition, complainant alleges that the respondent was given the task to
defend the interest of the complainant corporation in POEA Case No. 8888-06-468,
entitled Olano, et al. versus Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., et al.; that when
the said case was resolved in favor of the complainant therein on October 5, 1992, the
respondent Atty. Naldoza knowing fully well that the said decision had already
become final and unappealable[,] through malpractice in [an] apparent desire to
collect or to bleed his client of several thousand pesos of attorneys fees, convinced the
complainant to appeal the case before the Supreme Court. Thus, on December 14,
1992, the respondent filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review which was
docketed as G.R. No. 107984 and that two (2) days thereafter misrepresented to the
complainant corporation that the complainant ha[d] to pay, which it did, [a] Cash
Bond in UNITED STATES DOLLAR amounting to TWO THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S. $2,555.00) to the Supreme Court in order that the said
appealed case could be heard or acted upon by the Supreme Court. The said amount
was given to the respondent.

x x x [S]ubsequently the complainant corporation came to know that the fees to be

paid to the Supreme Court consist[ed] only of normal filing and docket fees for such
kind of appeal but in order to cover up respondents misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza
presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme court receipt
representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00.

Subsequent verification from the Supreme Court made by the complainant corporation
revealed that the said receipt issued by the treasurers office of the Supreme Court x x
x [was] spurious, meaning a fake receipt. The said verification revealed that what was
only paid by the respondent to the Supreme court was the amount of P622.00 as
shown by the enumerated legal fees of the Supreme Court Docket-Receiving Section
showing the handwritten name of the respondent for purpose of showing that the said
computation was requested by and addressed to the respondent.[5] (citations omitted)

Meanwhile, a criminal case[6] for estafa based on the same facts was filed against herein
respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 141. Although
acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared civilly liable in the amount of US$ 2,555.
 Thereafter, respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss on July
22, 1996, on the ground that he had already been acquitted in the criminal case for
estafa. Complainant opposed the Motion.[7]
On February 16, 1998, this Court received the IBP Board of Governors Resolution, which
approved the investigating commissioners report[8] and recommendation that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. In his Report, Investigating Commissioner
Plaridel Jose justified his recommendation in this manner:

x x x [R]espondent fails to rebut the position of the complainant that the signature [on
the receipt for the amount of $2,555.00] was his. Hence, respondent anchors his
position on a mere denial that it is not his signature. Likewise, the respondent denies
the check voucher dated December 15, 1992, and the encircled signature of the
respondent, which x x x according to him is falsified and irregular. No evidence,
however, was presented by the respondent that his signature therein was falsified and
irregular. [As to the altered Supreme Court Official Receipt, the respondent denied]
that he ha[d] anything to do with it because it was the complainant who signed the
Petition for Review and tried to explain that his name appear[ed] to be the payee
because he [was] the counsel of record of the petitioner. But while it is true that the
affiant in the said Petition for Review [was] Mr. Rogelio G. Gatchalian, president of
the complainant company, the respondent does not deny that he signed the said
petition as counsel of the petitioner corporation and that he was actually the one who
prepared the same and the notary public before whom the affiant subscribed and
[swore] as the one who caused the preparation of the said petition.

The legal form (Exh. G) of the legal fees for the Petition for Review re G.R. 107984
was denied by the respondent because according to him he was never given a chance
to cross-examine the person who issued the [certification] x x x. However, respondent
does not deny that he is the person referred to by the handwritten name P.R. Naldoza
who paid the legal fees of P622.00.

In addition to the said respondents Formal Offer of Evidence, he submitted to this

Commission as his most important piece of evidence the Decision of acquittal in
Criminal Case No. 93-8748 entitled People of the Philippines versus Primo R.
Naldoza, the copy of which Decision is appended to his Manifestation with Motion to
Dismiss dated July 22, 1996 praying for the dismissal of the present administrative
case in view of his being exonerated in the said criminal case based on the same facts
and evidence.[9] (citations omitted)

Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondents contention that his acquittal in the companion
criminal case should result in the dismissal of this administrative complaint. The commissioner
emphasized that the criminal case for estafa[10] was completely different from the proceedings
before him; acquittal in the former did not exonerate respondent in the latter.[11] He further noted
that the RTC Decision itself hinted at the administrative liability of respondent, since it found
him civilly liable to herein complainant for $2,555.[12]
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be sanctioned. However,
the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
At the outset, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondents Motion to Dismiss should be
denied. In that Motion, he maintains that he should be cleared of administrative liability, because
he has been acquitted of estafa which involved the same facts. He argues that the issue involved
there was the very same issue litigated in this case,[13] and that his exoneration was a result a full
blown trial on the merits of this case.[14]
In a similar case, we have said:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of xxx criminal
law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases.[15]

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.[16] They are distinct from
and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary;[17] in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly
preponderant evidence is all that is required.[18] Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a
prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.[19]
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result
in a finding of liability in the administrative case.[20]Conversely, respondents acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil
liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative
action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the
administrative liability of the lawyer.[21] The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well to remember the
Courts ruling in In re Almacen,[22] which we quote:

x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court
motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x (emphasis
ours)

We shall now discuss seriatim the specific charges against respondent.

First. Complainant alleges that respondent appealed the POEA Decision, despite knowing
that it had already become final and executory. The IBP investigating commissioner had no
explicit finding on this point. Rogelio G. Gatchalian testified that during the pendency of the
appeal, his company had received from the POEA a Writ of Execution which led him to the
conlcusion that they [had] lost the case before the Supreme Court.[23] This, however, does not
substantiate the charge.
Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal. Neither has there
been any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the POEA Decision had
become final and executory. Worse, there has been no evidence that respondent knew that the
case was unappealable.Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the Petition for Review was
dismissed for petitioners failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the
assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand on.
Second. Be that as it may, we agree with the IBP that respondent obtained from complainant
the amount of $2,555, on the false representation that it was needed for the appeal before this
Court. According to Gatchalian,[24] respondent explained that the amount would cover all the
expenses to be incurred in the Petition for Review with the Supreme Court and which amount
also will answer for the payment as sort of deposit so that if our case is lost, the money will be
given or paid to the complainant in that case so that our deposit with the bank would not be
garnished.[25] Corroborating Gatchalians testimony, Edna Deles declared that respondent received
the amount on the representation that it would be paid to the Supreme Court in connection with
the Olano case.[26]
The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. Quite the contrary, when
he paid P10,000 and issued a check to complainant as his moral obligation, he indirectly
admitted the charge. Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of
appropriating the money of another.This is an admission of misconduct.[27] In his Answer
submitted to this Court, he declared:

(8). That I have no knowledge, information or belief as to truthfulness of the

allegation of the Petitioner, on his allegation no. 8 and no. 9, the truth being that in all
the cases and assignments made by the Petitioner to me, I was made to report to him
personally and to his Board of Directors the progress of the cases both orally and in
writing. I even [went] to the extent of paying him P10,000.00 as my moral obligation
only to find after accounting that he still owes me P180,000.00 as attorneys fee [to]
which I am entitled under rule 130 of the rules of court sec. 24, and under sec. 37 of
the above-cited rules, I have the right to apply the funds received from Gatchalian in
satisfaction of my claim for Professional Services, otherwise known as Attorneys Lien,
as shown in my Service Billings and Statement of Accounts.[28] (emphasis ours)

Contrary to respondents claim, the amount of $2,555 was not a part of his attorneys lien. He
demanded the money from his client on the pretext that it was needed for the Petition before the
Supreme Court, but he actually converted it to his personal gain. This act clearly constitutes
malpractice.[29] The claim that respondent merely applied his lien over the funds of his client is
just an afterthought, the accounting being made after the fact. It is settled that the conversion by
a lawyer of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession.[30]
Third. In an effort to conceal his misappropriation of the money entrusted to him,
respondent gave complainant a photocopy of a receipt purportedly showing that the Supreme
Court had received the sum of $2,555 from him. Again, the testimonies of Gatchalian[31] and
Deles[32] were equally clear on this point. After respondent had presented the false receipt,
Gatchalian learned that no such payment was made. Ms Araceli Bayuga of the Supreme Court
Cash Collection and Disbursement Division issued a certification that respondent had paid the
amount of P622 only, not $2,555. In fact, the records of the said case[33] contain no indication at
all the Court has required the payment of the latter sum, or that it has been paid at all.
Juxtaposed to the complainants evidence, the bare denials of respondent cannot overturn the
IBPs findings that he has indeed presented a false receipt to conceal his misappropriation of his
clients money. We agree with the IBP that it is unbelievable that the complainant in the person of
Rogelio Gatchalian, being a layman as he is without any knowledge in the procedure of filing a
case before the Supreme court, could spuriously weave such documents which are denied by the
respondent.[34]
In view of the foregoing, respondent has clearly failed the standards of his noble
profession. As we have stated in Resurrecion v. Sayson:[35]

[L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their
clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.

Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he demanded money from his client for a
bogus reason, misappropriated the same, and then issued a fake receipt to hide his
deed. In Dumadag v. Lumaya,[36] the Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not
remitting to his client the amount he had received pursuant to an execution, viz.:

[E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former client, the
records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of
P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of the canons of
professional responsibility.

In Obia v. Catimbang,[37] we meted out the same penalty to a lawyer who had
misappropriated the money entrusted to him:
The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office as attorney. These acts are noted with disapproval by the
Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and to engage in no conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law. Such misconduct discredits the legal profession."

Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted
to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall
to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve
to continue being a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[1]
Petition, pp. 1-3; records, vol. 1, pp. 1-3.
[2]
Received on June 7, 1993.
[3]
Answer, pp. 3-4; records, vol. 1, pp. 29-30.
[4]
Ibid. pp. 5-6 & 31-32.
[5]
Report, pp. 1-2; records, vol. 1.
[6]
Criminal Case No. 93-8748, before Judge Manuel D. Victorio.
[7]
The Opposition to Motion to Dismiss was received by the IBP on September 26, 1996.
[8]
An Ex Parte Motion to Resolve was filed by complainant on September 19, 1997. The commissioners Report was
dated October 13, 1997.
[9]
Report, pp. 5-6.
[10]
Citing Batacan, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1973 ed.
[11]
Ibid., citing In re Terrel, 2 Phil 266 [1903]; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil 399 [1928]; Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil 350
[1933].
[12]
We quote the following from the RTC decision:
Under the evidence, it is shown by the testimonies of Rogelio Gatchalian and Edna Deles that indeed the accused
[respondent herein] told them that the Supreme Court required him to deposit a cash bond in the appealed case. In
view of such representation of the accused, private complainant [delivered] to him this said sum of money. Although
the accused disavowed having received the money and disowned his signatures on the receipt and voucher, x x x his
lone and uncorroborated testimony could not override the candid and positive declarations of the prosecution
witnesses.
xxx xxx xxx
There is however preponderance of evidence to hold the accused civilly liable to the private complainant in the
amount of US$ 2,555.00 which he received from the private complainant and for which he should be ordered to
refund. (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
[13]
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss; records, vol. 2, p. 310.
[14]
Ibid.
[15]
Pangan v. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981]; citing In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil 399 [1928].
[16]
Sui generis. See In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 [1970].
[17]
See Moreno v. Bragat, 293 SCRA 581 [1998].
[18]
See Re: Agrapino A. Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1 [1977]; Maderazo, v. Del Rosario, 73 SCRA 540 [1976]; Lim v.
Antonio, 41 SCRA 44 [1971]; In re Tionko, 43 Phil 191 [1922].
[19]
See Re: Brillantes, supra; Calo v. Degamo, 20 SCRA 447 [1967].
[20]
See Villanos v. Subido, 45 SCRA 299 [1972].
[21]
See Esquivas v. CA, 272 SCRA 803 [1997].
[22]
31 SCRA 562, 600 [1970]; cited in Esquivas v. CA, supra, pp. 812-813.
[23]
TSN, July 26, 1994, pp. 31-32.
[24]
TSN, July 26, 1994, pp. 12, 17.
[25]
TSN, July 26, 1994, pp. 12-13.
[26]
TSN, January 13, 1995, pp. 9-10, 12-13.
[27]
Obia v. Catimbang, supra.
[28]
Respondents Answer, p. 7; records, vol. 1, p. 33.
[29]
See Cabigao v. Rodrigo, 57 Phil 20 [1932].
[30]
See Obia v. Catimbang, 196 SCRA 23 [1991]; Quilban v. Robinol, 171 SCRA 768 [1989]; Manaloto v. Reyes, 15
SCRA 131, 134 [1965]; Daroy v. Legaspi, 65 SCRA 304 [1975].
[31]
TSN, July 26, 1994, pp. 39-44.
[32]
TSN, January 13, 1995, pp. 22-24.
[33]
GR No. 107984, Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. NLRC, Teresita Olano, Secretary of Labor, POEA
Administrator, et al..
[34]
IBP Report, p. 10.
[35]
Adm. Case No. 1037, December 14, 1998.
[36]
197 SCRA 303, 307 [1991].
[37]
196 SCRA 23, 27-28 [1991].

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 516 June 27, 1967

TRANQUILINO O. CALO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ESTEBAN DEGAMO, respondent.

Teodoro O. Calo, Jr. for complainant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Pedro A,. Ramirez for investigators.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Disbarment proceedings against the respondent Esteban Degamo1 upon a verified letter-complaint
of the petitioner, Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr., filed with this Court on 2 March 1962, and charging the
former with "having committed false statement under oath or perjury" in connection with his
appointment as Chief of Police of Carmen, Agusan.

On 12 March 1962, this Court required the respondent to file "an answer (not a motion to dismiss.)
After interposing an unsuccessful motion for a bill of particulars, he filed his answer on 29 May 1962
and this Court accordingly referred the case to the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and
recommendation. In turn, the Solicitor General referred the case to the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan.
The fiscal conducted an investigation. The petitioner adduced evidence, but not the respondent,
because on the date set for hearing, on 25 July 1964, following several postponements, the
respondent failed to attend, despite due notice, for which reason the investigating fiscal considered
the respondent as having waived his right to present evidence. Thereafter, the fiscal forwarded the
record of the investigation to the Solicitor General. On the basis thereof, the Solicitor General filed
his report and a complaint with this Court, recommending the disbarment of the respondent, for
gross misconduct.

No evidence having been submitted by the respondent, the following facts are either unrebutted or
admitted:

On 17 January 1959, respondent Esteban Degamo, as an applicant to the position of Chief of Police
of Carmen, Agusan, subscribed and swore to a filled-out "Information Sheet" before Mayor Jose
Malimit of the same municipality. The sheet called for answers about name, personal circumstances,
educational attainment, civil service eligibility and so forth. One item required to be filled out reads:

Criminal or police record, if any, including those which did not reach the Court. (State the
details of case and the final outcome.)"

to which respondent answered, "None."

Having accomplished the form, the respondent was appointed by the mayor to the position applied
for. However, on the day the respondent swore to the information sheet, there was pending against
him, and two (2) other co-accused, a criminal case in the Court of First Instance of Bohol (No. 2646)
for illegal possession of explosive powder.2

Prior to the commencement of this administrative case, the respondent was also charged in an
information, dated 23 September 1960, for perjury, in the Court of First Instance of Agusan,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2194, on the same facts upon which he is now proceeded against as
a member of the Philippine bar.

In his defense, the respondent claims that his answer "None" to the aforequoted questionnaire was
made in good faith, it being his honest interpretation of the particular question (heretofore quoted)
that it referred to a final judgment or conviction and that Criminal Case No. 2646 was not a criminal
or police record. 1wph1.t

The defense is plainly untenable. The questionnaire was simple, couched in ordinary terms and
devoid of legalism hence, it needed no interpretation. It only called for simple information. That it
asked for records "which did not reach the Court" entirely disproves respondent's technical twist to
the question as referring to final judgments or convictions.

Petitioner's letter-complaint was filed on 2 March 1962 while the act of the respondent complained of
was committed on 17 January 1959. Without explaining how and upon what authority, respondent
invokes the defense of prescription. This defense does not lie; the rule is that

The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does
the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime,
prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment
proceeding, . . . (5 Am. Jur. 434).

Nor is the pendency of Criminal Case No. 2194 (for perjury) a prejudicial question, since the ground
for disbarment in the present proceeding is not for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude but
for gross misconduct. A violation of a criminal law is not a bar to disbarment (6 Moran 242, 1963 Ed.,
citing the case of In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577), and an acquittal is no obstacle to
cancellation of the lawyer's license. (In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399).

Respondent Degamo stresses that there is no cause of action against him because the information
sheet is not required by law but only by the Civil Service Commission. This argument is beside the
point. The issue is whether or not he acted honestly when he denied under oath the existence
against him of any criminal or police record, including those that did not reach the court. In this, he
did not tell the truth. He deliberately concealed it in order to secure an appointment in his own favor.
He, therefore, failed to maintain that high degree of morality expected and required of a member of
the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, 27 April 1963; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No.
145, 28 Dec. 1956; Bolivar vs. Simbol, Adm. Case No. 377, 29 April 1966 **), and he has violated his
oath as a lawyer to "do no falsehood". It needs no reiteration that the ethical standards applicable to
a member of the bar, who thereby automatically becomes a court officer, must necessarily be one
higher than that of the market place.

The facts being clear and undisputed, respondent's insistence upon patent technical excuses
disentitle him to leniency from his Court.

For the foregoing reasons, respondent Esteban Degamo is hereby disbarred, and his name ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

The "Resolution of the Court on the " Motion for Reconsideration" was promulgated on
*

August 30, 1967 and is printed in this volume.

1 Admitted to the Bar on 7 February 1965.

2 The information bears data of 3 July 1958 (Exh. "B-1").

 16 Supreme Court Reports Annotated 623.
**

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 1474 January 28, 2000

CRISTINO G. CALUB, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ABRAHAM A. SULLER, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

What is before the Court is a complaint for disbarment against respondent premised on grossly
immoral conduct for having raped his neighbor's wife.

In the morning of January 20, 1975, while complainant was away, respondent Atty. Abraham A.
Suller went to the complainant's abode in Aringay, La Union ostensibly to borrow a blade.

As the respondent was a friend of the family and a neighbor, the complainant's wife let him in.
Thereafter, respondent began touching her in different parts of her body. When she protested,
respondent threatened her and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. At that moment,
complainant returned home to get money to pay for real estate taxes. When he entered the house,
he saw his wife and respondent having sexual intercourse on the bed.1 She was kicking respondent
with one foot while the latter pressed on her arms and other leg, preventing her from defending
herself.

On January 23, 1975, complainant filed with the Municipal Court, Aringay, La Union a criminal
complaint2 for rape against respondent. The case was later remanded to the Court of First Instance,
Agoo, La Union.

On June 3, 1975, Cristino G. Calub filed with the Supreme Court the instant complaint for
disbarment against respondent Atty. Abraham A. Suller.3

On June 16, 1975, the Court required respondent to file an answer within ten (10) days from notice.4

On July 14, 1975, respondent filed his answer. He denied the accusation as a fabrication.5

On July 21, 1975, the Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and
recommendation.6
From 1975 until 1978, the Office of the Solicitor General conducted hearings where both parties
appeared with their respective counsel. In a petition filed on November 6, 1978, respondent prayed
for the suspension of proceedings pending final termination of Criminal Case No. A-420 pending with
the Court of First Instance, La Union, Branch 3, Agoo.7

On December 11, 1978, the Court referred the petition to the Solicitor General, the case having been
referred to him previously.8

In 1991, the investigation of the case was transferred to the Committee on Bar Discipline, Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. On August 28, 1991 the latter sent notice of hearings to both parties.9

On January 23, 1992, the Committee issued an order terminating the proceedings and considering
the case submitted for resolution as notice to complainant remained unserved while respondent
failed to appear despite due notice.10

On March 3, 1993, the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution
recommending that the disciplinary penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year be meted on respondent.11

The record discloses that the Court of First Instance acquitted respondent Suller for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Such acquittal, however, is not
determinative of this administrative case.

The testimonies of witnesses in the criminal complaint, particularly that of the complainant suffice to
show that respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in having carnal knowledge of his
neighbor's wife without her consent in her very home.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor
or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.12

In this case, we find that suspension for one year recommended by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is not sufficient punishment for the immoral act of respondent. The rape of his neighbor's
wife constituted serious moral depravity even if his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in
the criminal prosecution for rape. He is not worthy to remain a member of the bar. The privilege to
practice law is bestowed upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and,
equally important, morally.13 "Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to
the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in order to maintain one's good
standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity."14

WHEREFORE, respondent Abraham A. Suller is DISBARRED from the practise of law. Let his name
be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED. 1w phi 1.nt

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1
TSN, March 19, 1975, pp. 1-23 in Criminal Case No. A-420.

2
Criminal Case No. 1888 (Municipal Court), then it was docketed as Criminal Case No. A-
420 after it was remanded to the Court of First Instance, Rollo, Vol. I, p. 3.

3
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 1-2.

4
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 9.

5
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 10-11.

6
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 13.

7
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1-2.

8
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 5.

9
Rollo, Vol. III, p. 1.

10
Rollo, Vol. III, p. 2.

11
Rollo, Vol. III, p. 5-11.

Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408, 414 (1997); Mijares vs. Villaluz, 274 SCRA 1
12

(1997).

13
Resurreccion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129, 137 (1998).

14
Docena vs. Limon, 295 SCRA 262, 265-266 (1998).

FIRST DIVISION

RAMON C. GONZALEZ, A.C. No. 5321

Complainant,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, CJ, Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Atty. ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, Promulgated:
Respondent. September 27, 2006
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

Disbarment cases are sui generis. Being neither criminal nor civil in
nature, these are not intended to inflict penal or civil sanctions. The main
question to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to
be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.

The Case and the Facts

This case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed by Ramon C.

Gonzalez with the Office of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme
Court. The Complaint was subsequently referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[2] Complainant charged Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz with
grave misconduct, abuse of authority, and acts unbecoming a
lawyer. The antecedents were summarized by the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) as follows:
 x x x [C]omplainant alleges that on 11 August 2000, while he
was driving along the South Superhighway upon entering
the Sucat Toll Gate heading towards Makati, respondent, who was
driving a Nissan Infiniti suddenly cut across his path while overtaking
him and almost hit his car had he not been able to evade it. According
to complainant, he chased respondents car and when he was side by
side with respondents car, he angrily confronted respondent and then
drove on. Complainant claims that respondent then chased him and
shot him twice but fortunately missed him by a few inches[,] but
broken glass coming from the shattered window allegedly hit him and
slightly wounded his right arm and stomach. Complainant adds that
respondent allegedly tried to escape but he was able to chase him and
block his way at the Nichols Toll Gate where the PNCC guards
responded to his call for assistance. According to complainant,
respondent attempted to escape and avoid the PNCC guards by
proclaiming boisterously that he is a lawyer and a customs official but
complainant was able to block his way again and their vehicles
collided in the process.Complainant claims that he requested the
PNCC guards to confiscate respondents firearm and accompany them
to the nearest police station. At the time of the arrest, respondent
allegedly opened the back door of his car and pretended to have
accidentally dropped so much money which distracted the policemen
from further searching the car.

At the police station, respondent allegedly identified himself

and his lady companion, a certain FerlitaSemeniano, and [said] that he
was the Deputy Customs Collector assigned
at Batangas City. Complainant claims that respondent yielded one (1)
Super .38 cal. Springfield Automatic Pistol, SN NMII 3138, one (1)
magazine with seven (7) live ammos and three (3) spent (empty)
shells. Complainant adds that respondent presented only an unsigned
Memorandum Receipt (MR) of the firearm without any Mission Order
or Permit to Carry. Complainant claims that respondent allegedly kept
calling persons to help him and a fabricated Mission Order was
brought and presented by another person more than eight hours after
the shooting incident and apprehension.

Complainant alleges that the Nissan Infiniti used by respondent

is allegedly a luxury vehicle which was not covered by any document
whatsoever and it was not verified whether stolen or smuggled.
 Complainant finally alleges that the PNP Crime Laboratory
examined his car and they recovered one slug in between the wall of
the left rear door while the other bullet went through the right front
seat and exited at the left rear door of complainants car and that cases
of Frustrated Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearms were
already filed at the Paraaque City Prosecutors Office.

xxxxxxxxx

In his Comment dated 04 January 2001, respondent claims that

the present administrative case is unfounded and unwarranted and was
allegedly filed in bad faith, with malice and ill motive and allegedly
has no other purpose but to harass, vex, humiliate and dishonor
him. In support thereof, respondent points to the fact that complainant
filed substantially identical complaint affidavits with the same
identical alleged cause of action as that of the present administrative
case at [various] judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative tribunals
and accused him of forum-shopping.

Respondent denied the narration of facts stated in complainants

Complaint-Affidavit as self-serving, a misrepresentation of facts and
obviously tainted. Respondent claims that he was not the aggressor
during the incident and that he did not provoke
complainant. Respondent claims that he justly acted in self-defense
and defense of a stranger under the true actuality of facts and
circumstances the[n] prevailing.

Respondent also claims that the acts complained of in the

present case were not connected with the practice of the legal
profession and the fact that he was a lawyer is merely coincidental,
immaterial and irrelevant.

xxxxxxxxx

In connection with the cases filed by the parties against each

other, respondent submitted the xxx Resolutions/Decisions issued in
said cases to show that the charges filed against him by the
complainant were dismissed while the criminal cases he filed against
the latter [were] filed in court.
 xxxxxxxxx

Finally, it is the submission of the respondent that since the

alleged acts complained of are not within the sphere of his
professional duties as a lawyer, but rather are acts done in his non-
professional or private capacity, the same, cannot allegedly be the
subject of an administrative complaint for disbarment.[3]

Report and Recommendation

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In his Report,[4] IBP Investigating Commissioner Rafael Antonio M.

Santos said that the dismissal of the criminal and other administrative
charges filed by complainant indicated that respondents version of the
incident was given credence by the investigating officials and agencies
of the various other tribunals in which these charges were
filed.Consequently, since no sufficient evidence warranted the
imposition of further disciplinary sanctions on respondent, the
investigating commissioner recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case.

In Resolution No. XVI-2005-29 dated March 12, 2005, the board of

governors of the IBP adopted the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Santos.
On July 8, 2005, the Resolution, together with the records of the case,
was transmitted to this Court for final action, pursuant to Section 12(b)
of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. On August 4, 2005, complainant
asked this Court to set aside Resolution No. XVI-2005-29 of the IBP
board of governors. Upon orders of this Court,[5] respondent filed
on August 22, 2005, his Comment on complainants plea.

The Courts Ruling

The Court disagrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

At the outset, we stress that the dismissal of the criminal cases against
respondent did not erase the occurrence of the shooting incident, which
he himself does not deny. Moreover, this incident has been established
by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, he must face the consequences
of his actions.

The first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides as follows:
 CANON 1. - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.[6]

Furthermore, respondent bound himself to obey the laws in his attorneys

oath,[7] which underscores the role of lawyers as officers of our legal
system. A lawyers brash transgression of any, especially a penal, law is
repulsive and reprehensible and cannot be countenanced by this Court.[8]

Admitting that he fired shots in the direction of complainant while they

were speeding along South Luzon Expressway,[9] respondent justifies his
actions by claiming self-defense and defense of a stranger. During the
traffic altercation, complainant allegedly exchanged angry words with
respondent and, from an open car window, even threw a handful of coins
at the latter.[10] Respondent further avers that, from his higher vantage
point, he saw complainant draw a pistol.[11] The former contends that
when he fired the shots, he had no intention of hitting complainant but
merely wanted to scare him away.

Reviewing the factual circumstances, we are convinced that the defenses

proffered are mere afterthoughts. Based on the physical and
documentary evidence, complainants version of the incident is more
credible.
First, the allegation of respondent that complainant hit him with coins is
highly improbable. At that time, both vehicles were speeding along the
highway. Since the PNP Crime Laboratory Report[12] showed that the
bullets fired by respondent had come from the right side, his vehicle
must have been to the right of complainants. If we were to accept this
version, the coins hurled by complainant had to pass through his cars
right window and then through the left window of respondents
admittedly taller sports utility vehicle (SUV). Given their relative
positions, it is highly incredible that the coins could have hit
respondent and his companion.

Second, assuming that respondent and his companion were indeed hit by
coins, this alleged fact was not a sufficient unlawful aggression that
would justify shooting at complainant.

As a lawyer, respondent should know that the following three requisites

must concur to justify self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-
defense.[13] On the other hand, in defense of a stranger, the first two
requisites must also be present together with the element that the person
defending was not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil
motive.[14]
Of these requisites, unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for
upholding both self-defense and defense of a stranger; the
fundamental raison detre of these defenses is the necessity to prevent or
repel an aggression.[15] The alleged throwing of coins by complainant
cannot be considered a sufficient unlawful aggression. Unlawful
aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent threat to
life and limb.[16] There was no aggression to prevent or repel. Absent
this imminent threat, respondent had no legal reason to shoot in the
direction of complainant.

Third, for lack of supporting evidence, neither can merit be accorded to

respondents claim of imminent threat after allegedly seeing complainant
draw a pistol. The Joint Affidavit[17] of PNCC
Officers Florencio Celada y Seso, Jr. and
Mario Puso y Visaya mentioned no firearm found in the possession of
complainant. Except for the bare and belated allegations of respondent,
there was no showing that complainants alleged possession of the pistol
had been reported to the PNCC officers or later to the police
headquarters. Thus, without proof of the existence of the firearm,
respondent has not convincingly shown any legal justification for his act
of firing at complainant.[18]
Fourth, right after the shooting incident, respondent fled the scene. He
stopped only when PNCC officers blocked his vehicle in response to
complainants call for assistance. If respondent was only protecting
himself and his companion, then his righteous indignation should have
propelled him to report immediately his version of the incident to the
PNCC officers.

Disbarment Proceedings
Sui Generis

Respondent maintains that the dismissal of the cases filed by

complainant against him in the various tribunals and agencies proves
that the present case for disbarment is unfounded.

We do not agree.

Well-established is the rule that administrative cases against lawyers

belong to a class of their own. These cases are distinct from and proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.[19] In Re Almacen,[20] the Court
discoursed on this point thus:

x x x [D]isciplinary proceedings [against lawyers] are sui generis.

Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, x x x [they do] not involve
x x x a trial of an action or a suit, but [are] rather investigation[s] by
the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
 Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
[They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
[their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who
by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. x x x.[21]

Respondents administrative liability stands on grounds different

from those in the other cases previously filed against him; thus, the
dismissal of these latter cases does not necessarily result in
administrative exculpation. Settled is the rule that, being based on a
different quantum of proof, the dismissal of a criminal case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence does not necessarily foreclose the
finding of guilt in an administrative proceeding.[22]

Misconduct Committed
in a Private Capacity

Untenable is respondents argument that the acts complained of cannot be

the subject of a complaint for disbarment, because they were done in his
private capacity.
Whether in their professional or in their private capacity, lawyers may
be disbarred or suspended for misconduct.This penalty is a consequence
of acts showing their unworthiness as officers of the courts; as well as
their lack of moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor.[23] When the misconduct committed outside of their
professional dealings is so gross as to show them to be morally unfit for
the office and the privileges conferred upon them by their license and
the law, they may be suspended or disbarred.[24]

In Cordon v. Balicanta,[25] this Court explained the rationale for this

holding as follows:

x x x. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and

attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master
its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. Thus, the requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Lawyers are
expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission
to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain
one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good
moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such
character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This
must be so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client's
property, reputation, his life, his all.[26]
The vengeful and violent behavior exhibited by respondent in what
should have been a simple traffic altercation reveals his conceit and
delusions of self-importance. By firing his gun openly in a congested
highway and exposing complainant and the general public to danger, he
showed his utter lack of a sense of responsibility, as well as of respect
for law and order.

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents gross

misconduct. In line with Lao v. Medel,[27]Co v.

Bernardino,[28] and Saburnido v. Madroo,[29] suspension from the practice of

law for one year is appropriate in this case.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz is found GUILTY of gross

misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDEDfor one year from the practice
of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson, First Division
 W E C O N C U R:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

[1]
Dated August 21, 2000; rollo, pp. 1-2.
[2]
Resolution dated February 12, 2001; rollo, p. 45.
[3]
November 5, 2004 Report of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, pp. 4-13.
[4]
Id.
[5]
September 21, 2005 Resolution of the Third Division.
[6]
Emphasis ours.
[7]
I, (name), of (address), do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood nor consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will
not delay any mans cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntarily,
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis
supplied)
[8]
Gonzaga v. Realubin, 312 Phil. 381, March 14, 1995; Bautista v. Gonzales, 182 SCRA
151, February 12, 1990.
[9]
Respondents Sworn Statement dated September 3, 2000, p. 2; rollo, p. 65.
[10]
Id. at 1; rollo, p. 64.
[11]
Id. at 2; rollo, p. 65.
[12]
Rollo, p. 59.
[13]
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 11(1).
[14]
Id., Art. 11(3).
[15]
Rimano v. People, 416 SCRA 569, November 27, 2003; People v. Gonza, 415 SCRA
507, November 11, 2003; People v. Caratao, 451 Phil. 588, June 10, 2003.
[16]
People v. Escarlos, 410 SCRA 463, September 10, 2003; People v. Caratao, supra.
[17]
Rollo, p. 76.
[18]
See People v. Diego, 424 Phil. 743, January 17, 2002.
[19]
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza, 374 Phil. 1, September 29, 1999.
[20]
31 SCRA 562, February 18, 1970; see also Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc.
v. Naldoza, supra.
[21]
Id. at 600-601, per Castro, J.
[22]
Pablejan v. Calleja, A.M. No. P-06-2102, January 24, 2006; Office of the Court
Administrator v. Caete, 441 SCRA 512, 520, November 10, 2004.
[23]
Calub v. Suller, 380 Phil. 532, January 28, 2000; Saburnido v. Madroo, 418 Phil.
241, September 26, 2001; Lao v. Medel, 453 Phil. 115, July 1, 2003.
[24]
Soriano v. Dizon, AC No. 6792, January 25, 2006; Quingwa v. Puno, 125 Phil.
831, February 28, 1967.
[25]
439 Phil. 95, October 4, 2002.
[26]
Id. at. 115-116.
[27]
Supra.
[28]
349 Phil.16, January 28, 1998.
[29]
Supra.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. L-2018 December 10, 1982

UY CHUNG SENG and CHING UY SENG, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE C. MAGAT, respondent.

Romulo Rivera for complainants.

Jose C. Magat in his own behalf.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On March 27, 1979, Uy Chung Guan Seng and Ching Uy Seng filed a verified Complaint for
Disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose C. Magat alleging that the following circumstances
warranted his exclusion from the Roll of Attornies:

On 22 August 1977 (should be 11 August 1977), Complainant CHING UY SENG a

ROBERT CHING received a letter from Respondent Atty. JOSE C. MAGAT,
threatening to report him to the government authorities if he would not get in touch
with him (MAGAT) and his clients with respect to a bunch of documents and papers
pertaining to Complainants' business. Such documents turned out to be a part of the
articles which were stolen from the office/residence of Complainants on 2 June 1977.
In the morning of 13 August 1977, UY CHUNG GUAN SENG a HENRY CHING; his
lawyer, Atty. ELISEO LEGASPI; and NBI Agent RODOLFO DAHIROC went to the
Office of Atty. MAGAT at Room 512 Madrigal Bldg., Escolta, Manila, in response to
the above-mentioned letter. Atty. MAGAT initially demanded the sum of P500,000.00
in exchange for the robbed documents. CHING, LEGASPI and Agent DAHIROC
insisted on seeing the documents first and to talk with Atty. MAGAT's clients before
they negotiate the terms of the return of the documents. The meeting was reset on
15 August 1977 at 3:00 p.m., during which Atty. MAGAT informed them that their
demand was reduced to P300,000.00 on a "take it or leave it" basis. Atty. MAGAT's
"clients" who brought in the robbed documents turned out to be the suspects in the
robbery of the office/residence of Complainants on 2 June 1977, Atty. MAGAT
insisted that HENRY CHING produce P30,000.00 to show his good faith in pushing
through with the negotiation. It was at this juncture that the NBI Agents confronted
the group and brought them to the NBI office together with the robbed documents for
investigation. 1

Required to comment, respondent alleged that there was absolutely no truth to the charge imputed to
him; that the incident became the subject of a criminal charge for Light Threats filed by the NBI Agents
with the Office of the Fiscal of Manila (IS No. 77-26882) which, after preliminary investigation, was
dropped for "utter insufficiency of evidence"; and that after the lapse of more than one year from the date
of said criminal complaint, complainants through Atty. Eliseo Legaspi, reopened the case before this
Tribunal merely to harass him and assail his character and conduct. Respondent prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for utter lack of merit.

On June 5, 1979, upon consideration of the Complaint and the Comment, this Court resolved to
suspend respondent from the practice of law effective immediately upon notice, and until further
orders. The Court further resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation.

On September 24, 1979, the Solicitor General 2 submitted his Report and Recommendation, quoted in
full hereunder:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

COME NOW the undersigned counsel and after investigation of the complaint in the
above-entitled case pursuant to the Resolution dated June 5, 1979, notice of which
was received by the Office of the Solicitor General on June 11, 1979, respectfully
submit this Report and Recommendation.

1. This case stemmed from a letter dated August 11, 1977 sent by respondent Atty.
Jose C. Magat to Mr. Robert Ching, one of the complainants herein, which, reads as
follows:
J.C. Magat Law Office

R-512 Madrigal Building

Escolta, Manila

Tel. No. 48-23-01

PERSONAL DELIVERY

Mr. Robert Ching

528 San Fernando, or 107 Renta St.

Binondo, Manila

Dear Mr. Ching:

Mr. Felicisimo Cruz and his companions came to this office with bunch of documents
and papers and statements of accounts pertaining to the business transactions of the
A-1 Photo Litho and Photo Engraving. Their intention was for me to first get in touch
with you about the disposition of the same or go direct to the Government office to
examine the said documents with original invoices and triplicates thereof showing
discrepancies in amounts.

I do not know whether you will be interested. If you are interested, you may get in
touch with me in my office possibly in the afternoon of any day except Sunday and
Saturday, although I am here on Saturdays up to 1:00 p.m.

If I do not hear from you upon receipt of this letter either today or tomorrow, I will
consider your silence as indifference and that I can proceed to do what I believe is
proper.

V
e
 r
y

t
r
u
l
y

y
o
u
r
s
,

(
S
G
D
.
)

J
O
S
E

C
.

M
a
g
a
t

JCM/

P.S. Enclosed is a sample of transactions of your company indicating the actual

amount paid on the original invoice and the amount shown on the triplicate thereof
and likewise the amount not reported in our statement of account.

(In.) JCM

(Exh. "C", p. 27, Records).

The letter was personally delivered by respondents secretary to complainant Uy

Chung Guan Seng, brother of complainant Robert Ching (pp. 243, 246, t.s.n., July
23, 1979). Enclosed with the letter was a columnar sheet containing a list of invoices
indicating the amount actually paid, as shown in the original invoice, and the amount
reflected in the triplicate thereof (Exh. C-1, p. 28, Record; p. 246, t.s.n., Id.).
2. On August 11, 1977, the letter was referred to Atty. Eliseo P. Legaspi. In the
afternoon of that same day, Atty. Legaspi and Uy Chung Guan Seng went to the
office of respondent Magat at Rm. 512 Madrigal Bldg., Escolta, Manila, but Atty.
Magat was not there, However, they met Atty. Magat on the Escolta sidewalk in front
of the Lyric Theater. Atty. Legaspi and Atty. Magat conferred about the letter and the
latter told the former that he will communicate with his client. Atty. Magat also told
Atty. Legaspi to come back on August 13 (pp. 94-98, t.s.n., July 9, 1979).

3. In view of the development, Atty. Legaspi wrote on August 12, 1977 a letter to the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI for short) seeking assistance "by
way of assigning one of your agents in my planned conference with Atty. Magat
tomorrow" (Exh. D, p. 29, Records; pp. 28-29, Id.). Conformably with the request, the
NBI assigned Agent Rodolfo Dahiroc to assist Atty. Legaspi (p. 32, t.s.n., Id.).

4. On August 13, 1977, Atty. Legaspi, Agent Dahiroc, and complainant Uy Ching
Guan Seng, also known as Henry Ching, went to the office of Atty. Magat at Rm. 512
Madrigal Building to Negotiate about the contents of the letter Exhibit "C", but the
group of Felicisimo Cruz mentioned in the letter did not arrive. Atty. Magat asked
Atty. Legaspi who Agent Dahiroc was, he being then dressed in T-shirt. Atty. Legaspi
introduced Agent Dahiroc as his assistant (p. 102, t.s.n., July 9, 1979). Atty. Magat
told Atty. Legaspi to return on August 15 (p. 35, t.s.n., July 6, 1979).

5. On August 15, 1977, Atty. Legaspi accompanied by Agent Dahiroc and Henry
Ching, again went to the office of Atty. Magat. Upon reaching the place, Atty. Magat
told the trio that the group of Felicisimo Cruz will arrive at 5:00 o'clock that afternoon.
While waiting for the group of Felicisimo Cruz to arrive, conversation ensued, during
which Atty. Magat demanded P500,000.00 for the return of the documents
mentioned in the letter. This amount was reduced to P300,000.00, with the request,
however, that an advance payment of P30,000.00 be made to show good faith; upon
paying the balance, all the documents will be returned (pp. 35-37, Id.; pp. 260261,
t.s.n., July 23, 1979). Shortly thereafter Felicisimo Cruz and his group arrived,
bringing along with them two sacks of invoices and papers and the black portfolio of
Uy Chung Guan Seng. Atty. Magat showed Uy Chung Guan Seng the folder or
plastic bag containing papers and the portfolio to verify whether those were really
their papers (pp. 37-38, t.s.n., July 6, 1979). It turned out that the person introduced
as Felicisimo Cruz is Rodolfo Salita the driver of complainant Robert Ching, who qqq
with P 40,000.00 owned by Robert Ching on December 3, 1976 (p. 39, Id.), and who
had sent a letter to Uy Chung Guan Seng on July 1, 1977 (Exhs. L and L-1) admitting
participation in the robbery committed at the latter's office on June 2, 1977 in which
papers and documents pertaining to their business, among other things, were taken.
Rodolfo Salita's companions were Jesus Salita and his brother-in-law Robert Rajotte
(pp. 3940, Id.).

6. When the group of Rodolfo Salita, alias Felicisimo Cruz, arrived with the
documents subject of the negotiation, and after verification of sample documents,
Atty. Legaspi community gate secretly with Agent Dahiroc to get reinforcements and
then in a loud voice ordered Dahiroc and Uy Chung Guan Seng to get the
P30,000.00 being demanded by Atty. Magat as earnest-money (p. 40, Id.; p. 135,
t.s.n., July 9, 1979). Whereupon Uy Chung Guan Seng and Agent Dahiroc left Atty.
Magat's office and went downstairs. Uy Chung Guan Seng proceeded to the Insular
Bank of America in Dasmarinas pretending to get the money there, while agent
Dahiroc went to get reinforcements (p. 40, t.s.n., July 6, 1979; pp. 262-264, t.s.n..
July 23, 1979). After a few minutes, Agent Dahiroc and the reinforcements arrived
and they placed Rodolfo Salita, Jesus Salita, Robert Rajotte and a certain Rogelio
Villagracia under arrest; they also seized the articles and documents brought by
Rodolfo Salita and his group (p. 41-42, t.s.n., July 6, 1979; p. 357, t.s.n., July 25,
1979; pp. 383-384, t.s.n., July 27, 1979). Agent Dahiroc, after introducing himself as
an NBI agent, apprised Atty. Magat that the documents seized were the subject of a
robbery case and that from the tenor of the letter, Exhibit 'C'. there was a case of
extortion against respondent (pp. 358-359, t.s.n., July 25, 1979). Agent Dahiroc then
invited Atty. Magat to go to the NBI for investigation (p. 359-361, Id.). Atty, Magat
pleaded that as a brother in the profession, he wanted to talk with him on a personal
level, so he invited Agent Dahiroc to go with him to the Kentucky Cocktail Lounge
which was near his office. Agent Dahiroc acceded because the other persons
arrested were already in the custody of the other NBI Agents. At the Kentucky
Cocktail Lounge Atty. Magat told agent Dahiroc that if the latter wanted to, they can
make some money. Agent Dahiroc answered that there was no money in the
documents because they had been brought to the attention of the government and
that there was a complaint for robbery. Agent Dahiroc further told Atty. Magat that
there was no way for them to have a happy agreement', so the former brought the
latter back to the office (pp. 362-363, t.s.n., July 25, 1979; pp. 386387, t.s.n., July 27,
1979). At the office, Atty. Magat insisted on his right not to go to the NBI, so Agent
Dahiroc called up the NBI Regional Director and informed him of the unwillingness of
Atty. Magat to go with the group to the NBI. As a compromise Atty. Magat was
allowed to remain after he had prepared and signed a written undertaking that he
would report to the NBI office the following day for questioning regarding the matter
(Exh. Q p. 37, Records; pp. 364-366, t.s.n., July 25, 1979). Contrary to his written
promise, Atty. Magat did not report to the NBI Office (p. 367, Id.).

Agent Dahiroc prepared an inventory of all the articles and documents seized during
the raid at the office of Atty. Magat (Exh. S); NBI photographers took pictures of the
office of respondent where the raid took place, as well as of the persons arrested and
the articles seized (Exhs. F, G, H, I, J, and K pp. 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 73, Records), On
August 19, 1977, Agent Rodolfo Dahiroc and Leopoldo Cotaco submitted their
written report on the incident in question (Exh. R, pp. 7-14, Records; pp. 367-371,
Id.).

7. In the course of their conversation during one of his meetings with agent Dahiroc
and Atty. Legaspi, respondent Magat told the duo that as counsel for Felicisimo and
his group in the transaction, his share would be one-third (1/3) of the amount which
they would receive from the complainants (pp. 402-404, t.s.n., July 27, 1979).

8. Respondent Atty. Magat admits that he wrote and sent the letter, Exhibit "C", to
complainant Robert Ching but he claims that he prepared the same at the request of
Felicisimo Cruz after being shown sales Invoices of A-I Photo Litho, a firm managed
by Robert Ching, and after noticing discrepancies in the amounts appearing in the
originals and in the duplicates of said invoices (pp. 7-8, t.s.n., July 30, 1979). He also
admits that on August 13, 1977, he showed Atty. Legaspi the sample of the sales
invoice of the A-1 Photo Litho containing the anomalous discrepancies
aforementioned (p. 13, Id.). He, however, denies that he demanded the amounts
mentioned by the witnesses for the complainants because what he did was merely to
convey the demands of his clients (pp. 18-23, Id.).

9. The actuations of respondent Atty. Magat constitute malpractice and gross

misconduct. Writing and sending the letter Exhibit C and demanding from the
complainants the amount of P500,000.00, later on reduced to P300,000.00, with
P30,000.00 as downpayment to show good faith, in consideration for the return of
anomalous invoices and documents, is highly reprehensible. Such acts constitute not
only threat but extortion. Respondent's protestations of good faith in sending the
letter to the complainants are not convincing if indeed he had no ulterior motive, he
should have referred the documents brought by Salita and his companions directly to
the BIR instead of addressing a letter with a veiled threat to the complainants and
having the letter delivered personally to them.

Even assuming as true the allegation of respondent that he did not actually demand
the amounts mentioned above for himself but that he merely conveyed the demands
made by the group of Felicisimo Cruz, such act is still violative of an attorney's oath.
For then, respondent assisted his clients in a scheme which he knows to be
dishonest. He knew that the documents presented by Felicisimo Cruz to him are
proof that the government has been unlawfully deprived of much needed taxes. As
testified to by him, respondent, after verifying the invoices, was convinced that the A-
I Litho and Photo Engraving was cheating the government (pp. 83-84, Id.). He knew
too that the decree of Cruz and his group to extort money from the complainants in
exchange for the anomalous documents was illegal. Despite such knowledge and
awareness, he connived with his clients in violating the law. And for what? It is in
consideration of the one-third share he would receive from the proceeds of the
transaction. The assistance he extended to his clients' dishonest scheme and his
connivance with them in violating the law render the respondent guilty of
unprofessional conduct which warrants his disbarment or suspension.

The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for

the purpose of violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes
such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer of the court, as
amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for
which he may be removed or suspended (Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 21).The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney
knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts
which justify disbarment. (In Re Terrel 2 Phil. 266, 267-268;
Emphasis supplied).

10. The grounds for disbarment or suspension enumerated in the statute should not
be taken as a limitation of the general power of the courts to disbar or suspend a
lawyer. For the power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. A lawyer may
be removed not only for malpractice or dishonesty in his profession but also for his
gross misconduct which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which the law confers upon him (In Re Puno, 19 SCRA 439).

It has been repeatedly ruled that the purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts
and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to ensure the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function
shag be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and dents may
repose confidence (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). In the case at bar,
respondent has not exercised honesty and trustworthiness and has failed to have up
to the high standards of the law profession.

It is the duty of a member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety and his
actuations should be beyond suspicion. It is true that an attorney enjoys the legal
presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved, but this presumption has been
 rebutted by the clear and convincing evidence presented by the complainants and
their witnesses.

The actuations of respondent constitute attempted extortion although what was filed
against him in the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila was only for light threats. Of
course, respondent was able to show that the charge for light threats lodged against
him was dismiss, as shown by the memorandum of Assistant Fiscal Billy M. Apalit
and the memorandum of 2nd Assistant City Fiscal Artemio M. Cusi recommending
the dismissal of the charge of light threats filed against him (Exh. 2, 2-A, 2-B & 3, pp.
81-84, Rec.). But the dismissal of the criminal complaint against respondent does not
preclude his disbarment. Even granting that the acts committed by him may not be
sufficient to make him criminally liable, the same nevertheless constitute gross
misconduct and/or malpractice, which are grounds for disbarment. Moreover, the
purpose of disbarment, as stated above, is not to punish the offender but to protect
the courts and the public from his pernicious activities.

It is not amiss to mention at to juncture that respondent is facing two other

administrative cases before this Honorable Court, filed by his own cousins, one
involving an affidavit notarized by him and the other an answer to a complaint
prepared and filed by him in a certain case (t.s.n., pp. 77- 78, July 30, 1979).

RECOMMENDATION

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, it is respectfully

recommended that the respondent Atty. Jose C. Magat be disbarred.

In line with this recommendation, the undersigned counsel are filing together with this
Report and Recommendation the corresponding complaint. Manila, September 19,
1979. 3

The Complaint filed by the Solicitor General also prays that respondent be disbarred, that his name
be stricken off the roll of attorneys; and that his certificate of admission to the bar be recalled.

In his Answer to the Complaint, respondent reiterated the contentions in his Comment and added
that his "sole defense" is anchored on the letter he wrote to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on
August 12, 1977, attached to his Answer as Annex " 2-A ", which reads:

J. C. MAGAT LAW OFFICE

R-512 Madrigal Building

Escolta, Manila

Tel. No. 48-23-01

CONFIDENTIAL
 The Honorable Commissioner

Bureau of Internal Revenue

Quezon City

Sir:

On August 10, 1977, a certain Mr. Felicisimo Cruz came to my office and brought to
my attention several books of accounts and invoices reflecting anomalies committed
by the owner thereof, the A-1 Litho Photo and Litho Engraving company with offices
at 528 San Fernando, Binondo, Manila.

I have no control of the documents, however, because they are always with the said
Mr. Cruz and he told me that he stole an those documents from the company
because he was allegedly dismissed illegally.

I have written the head of the company to have a meeting with the said Mr. Cruz in
my office if he wants to see those documents again. In the meantime, knowing that
the meeting will not immediately take place, I have written to your office with a view
to examining the documents if they are again brought into my office by Mr. Cruz.

I am not sure you will he interested but if your office would be, you may send one of
your men in my office until the meeting goes through.

Very
truly
yours,

(SGD.)
JOSE
C.
MAGA
T4

Likewise attached to respondent's Answer to the Complaint as Annex "2" is the reply of the BIR to
Atty. Magat's request that said office furnish him with a copy of his original letter. The reply reads:

October 25, 1979

Atty. Jose C. Magat

R-512 Madrigal Building

Escolta, Manila

Sir:

Upon your request, as per your letter to this Office dated October 19, 1979, which
was received by the office of the Commissioner on October 22, 1979, enclosed is a
xerox copy of your original letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, dated
August 12, 1977. The original letter is on file with the docket of the tax investigation
report on A-1 Litho Photo and Litho Engraving Co. submitted by Special Agents of
the Tax Fraud Division.

The said letter was received by the Records Division, BIR, Quezon City on
September 6, 1977, and this was transmitted to the Tax Fraud Division, BIR, on
September 7, 1977. The Post mark of the Manila Central Post Office on the envelope
which contained said letter, bears the date August 16, 1977 p.m.

Very
truly
yours,

EFREN
I.
PLANA

Acting Commissioner
of Internal

Reven
ue

By:

REYN
ANDO
A.
SUAR
EZ

Chief
Tax
Fraud
Divisio
n

TAN
1549-
655-7 5
On October 21, 1982, the case was set for hearing during which respondent appeared on his own
behalf. Thereafter the Court resolved to consider the case submitted for resolution.

Upon the oral and documentary evidence, we find the charges substantiated and the Report and
Recommendation of the Solicitor General thorough and well founded.

Although respondent's confidential letter to the BIR is dated August 12, 1977, or ostensibly a day
after respondent's letter to Robert Ching, and prior to the raid on respondent's office on August 15,
1977, the BIR letter of October 25, 1979, supra, specifically stated "the Post mark of the Manila
Central Post Office of the envelope which contained said letter, bears the date August 16, 1977 p.m.
". Evidently, respondent's letter was mailed the day after the raid on August 15, 1977 as an
afterthought designed to stave off impending liability. His defense at the hearing that the Post Office
was delayed in stamping the letter is puerile The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions (Rule 131, Sec. 5 [m]) has not been overcome. Besides, if respondent were really
motivated by the desire to expose tax anomalies, he could have written the BIR directly. There was
no need to have written his letter (Exhibit "C") to Robert Ching.

The dismissal of the criminal complaint for Light Threats against respondent by the City Fiscal's
Office (Exhibits "2", "2-A", "2-B" and "3", pp. 81-84, Record) will not preclude the fact that respondent
has not exhibited honesty nor show trustworthiness in the discharge of his duties as a member of the
Bar. The dismissal of the criminal complaint does not exonerate him of profession al misconduct.

The proper disciplinary action against respondent is disbarment for malpractice and gross
misconduct. He has shown himself unfit for the office and unworthy of' the privileges which the law
confers upon him. 6

The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or

the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment. (In Re Terrel 2
Phil, 266, 267-268).

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose C. Magat is hereby disbarred; his name is ordered stricken off
the Rollo of attorneys; and his Certificate of Admission to the Bar is hereby recalled.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Acting C.J.), Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., & Concepcion, J., are on leave.

Aquino and Plana JJ., took no part.

De Castro, J., I reserve my vote.

Footnotes

1 pp. 4-5, Rollo.

 2 He was assisted by Asst. Solicitor General Lorenzo G. Timbol and Solicitor Jesus
O. Albay

3 pp. 90 1 00, Rollo.

4 p. 113, Ibid.

5 p. 112, Ibid.

6 In Re Puno, 19 SCRA 439 (1967); In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 568 (1923).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 195 January 31, 1958

In re: Attorney JESUS T. QUIAMBAO, respondent.

Jose G. Gatchalian and Santiago F. Alidio for respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

On 17 May 1954 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R. No. 11104-R, Pedro R.
Peralta, plaintiff appellee vs. Jesus T. Quiambao, defendant-appellant, affirming that of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (case No. 1783) and transmitted the record of the case to this Court for
whatever action it may deem proper, to take against Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao for having
committed acts unbecoming a member of the Ba.

It appears that sometime in January 1949 Manuel Quiambao, an agent of the Yek Tong Lin Fire &
Marine Insurance Company offered for sale to Pedro R. Peralta a parcel of land located in barrio
Moriones, Tarlac, Tarlac containing an area of 44 hectares for P15,000. Peralta accepted the offer,
and on 7 February 1949 he opened a checking account with the Tarlac branch of the Philippines
National Bank by depositing therewith the sum of P11,000. With a cheek of P11,000 drawn upon the
bank in Manila, Peralta and Manuel Quiambao proceeded to Manila and contacted Attorney Jesus T.
Quiambao, brother of Manuel, at his house to seek his help in the purchase of the parcel of land. On
9 February Peralta and the two brothers cashed the check at the bank in Escolta and repaired to the
law office of Honesto K. Bausa, attorney for the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Company, at
the Regina building, where upon reaching the door Peralta handed to Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao
the sum of P11,000. Attorney Quiambao went inside the office of Attorney Bausa, where he stayed
for about an hour, leaving Peralta at the door waiting for him. As he emerged from the law office,
Attorney Quiambao told Peralta to wait for a while because "they will place your name in the title,"
and later on executed a document (Exhibit A), acknowledging receipt from Peralta of the sum of
P12,000 to kept by the former as attorney-in-fact of the latter pending issuance of the title to the
parcel of land. The receipt acknowledges the sum of P12,000, because Peralta had given Attorney
Quiambao the sum of P1,000 as earnest money. Days passed and as Peralta d not receive the title
to the period of land, he went to the office of the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Company to
inquire to the parcel of land had already been issued in his name and there he learned from the
bookkeeper of the company that the title had not yet been issued in his name. He then demanded
the return of the sum of P12,000 from Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao b the later failed to return it to
him.

Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao does not deny having received the sum of P12,000 from Peralta, but
claims that the same had been returned to him be installments through his brother Manuel
Quiambao, who was Peralta's friend, and in whose house Peralta and his family lived; that he gave
Attorney Bausa the sum of P500 as earnest money when they went to see hi that the balance of
P12,000 was left in his custody; that Peralta was authorized to take possession of the property and
make improvements on it pending actual transfer to him; that the balance of P11,500 in his (Attorney
Quiambao's) custody was withdrawn from him by brother Manuel by authority of Peralta; that the first
withdrawal in the sum of P3,000 was made sometime in the first week of March 1949, the second in
the sum of P4,000 in April 1949, the third in the sum of P3,000 or P2,000 on or about the 24th of
May, 1949, and the last for the balance of the sum, paid by his wife, sometime in June 1949; that he
and his wife did not ask any receipt for all the withdrawals; that all these sums were spent to build an
earth dam in the parcel of land, to hire a bulldozer, to buy seedlings, and to construct houses for 28
tenants, except the sum of P4,000, withdrawn by Manuel Quiambao by way of loan from Peralta,
which the former promised to pay to the latter as soon as he would secure a loan from the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation; that on 10 March 1950, a document (Exhibit 1) was signed by
Jesus T. Quiambao, Pedro R. Peralta and Manuel Quiambao reciting, among others, that the sum of
P12,000 in the custody of Attorney Quiambao was periodically withdrawn from him by Manuel
Quiambao at the behest and/or with the knowledge and consent of Pedro R. Peralta; and that on
that same day Pedro R. Peralta executed another document (Exhibit 2) releasing Attorney Jesus T.
Quiambao from liability for the sum of P12,00 entrusted to him. It recites

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that I should collect the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS, (P12,000.00)
from Mr. Manuel Quiambao, from the proceeds of the sale of his property, as satisfaction of
the money receipted by Mr. Jesus T. Quiambao and withdrawn from him with my knowledge
and consent.

This is made in order to secure the realization of said sum from Mr. Manuel Quiambao
exclusively.

Manila, March 10, 1950

(Sgd.) PEDRO PERALTA

The Court of Appeals is of the opinion that Attorney Jesus T. Quiambao engineered the whole
scheme to induce, through his brother Manuel, Pedro R. Peralta to purchase the parcel of land in
question, knowing fully well that it was not for sale because the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine
Insurance Company was just a mortgagee and not in a position to sell it. In that way succeeded in
taking from Peralta the sum of P12,000 which he appropriated for his own use and benefit; that he
fraudulently and maliciously induced Peralta to sign the document marked Exhibit 1, thereby
relieving him from the obligation of paying the said sum to Peralta and at the same time caused the
latter to execute another document marked Exhibit 2 where Peralta undertook to collect from Manuel
Quiambao the whole sum of P12,00.

The respondent attorney was required by this Court to answer the charges against him. In his
answer he set up the same defenses he had set up in case No. 17837 of Court of First Instance of
Rizal and CA-G.R. No. 11104-R of the Court of Appeals which were overruled by the two Court.
By his acts the respondent has shown that he is unworthy to continue as a member of the Bar. He is,
therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.

Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No, 6854 April 25, 2007

[Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380]

JUAN DULALIA, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is charged by
Juan Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation Rules 1.01,1 6.02,2 and 7.033 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as follows:

Complainants wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building permit for the construction
of a warehouse. Despite compliance with all the requirements for the purpose, she failed to secure a
permit, she attributing the same to the opposition of respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004
letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan,
reading as follows, quoted verbatim:

xxxx

This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F. Soriano, Spouses David
Perez and Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and Mrs. Jessie de Leon and family, his
relatives and neighbors.

It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the building of the abovenamed
person has started and that the undersigned and his family, and those other families mentioned
above are respective owners of the residential houses adjoining that of the high-rise building under
construction of the said Mrs. Soriano-Dulalia. There is no need to mention the unbearable nuisances
that it creates and its adverse effects to the undersigned and his above referred to clients particularly
the imminent danger and damage to their properties, health and safety.

It was represented that the intended construction of the building would only be a regular and with
standard height building and not a high rise one but an inspection of the same would show
otherwise. Note that its accessory foundation already occupies portion of the vacant airspace of the
undersigneds residential house in particular, which readily poses danger to their residential house
and life.

To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property, loss of life and for the
protection of the safety of all the people concerned, they are immediately requesting for your
appropriate action on the matter please at your earliest opportune time.

Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of Meycauayan who is the Chief Legal
Counsel of its Legal Department, and by virtue of Sub par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, he is inquiring if there was already full compliance on the part of
the owner of the Building under construction with the requirements provided for in Sections 301, 302
and 308 of the National Building Code and on the part of your good office, your compliance with the
provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same foregoing cited Building Code.

Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the non-compliance with said
Sections 301, 302, 303 and 304 of the National Building Code by all the parties concerned. (Which
are not confined only to penalties provided in Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)

x x x x4 (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly supplied)

By complainants claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit because of a
personal grudge against his wife Susan who objected to respondents marrying her first cousin
Imelda Soriano, respondents marriage with Carolina Agaton being still subsisting.5

To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint Affidavit6 he filed against respondent
before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e)7 of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c)8 of Republic Act No.
6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).9

By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005,10 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the complaint in
light of the following findings:

The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent allegedly opposes the application of his
wife for a building permit for the construction of their commercial building. One of the reason[s]
stated by the complainant was that his wife was not in favor of Imeldas relationship with respondent
who is a married man. And the other reason is that respondent was not authorized to represent his
neighbors in opposing the construction of his building.

From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have satisfactorily answered all the
charges and accusations of complainant. We find no clear, convincing and strong evidence to
warrant the disbarment or suspension of respondent. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that
he is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof
rests upon the complainant to overcome the presumption and establish his charges by a clear
preponderance of evidence. In the absence of the required evidence, the presumption of innocence
on the part of the lawyer continues and the complaint against him should be dismissed (In re De
Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239; Balduman vs. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).

x x x x.11 (Underscoring supplied)

By Resolution of June 25, 2005,12 the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.

Hence, the present Petition for Review13 filed by complainant.

Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he contracted a second marriage
with Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 while his marriage with Carolina Agaton, which was
solemnized on December 17, 1967, is still subsisting.

Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the Municipal Legal Officer of
Meycauayan to oppose his wifes application for building permit, in violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan,
complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 7.03.

To his Comment,14 respondent attached the July 29, 200515 Joint Resolution of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing complainants complaint for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA
3019 and Section 4 (a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of which joint resolution reads:

x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of herein respondent Atty. Pablo
Cruz addressed to the Building official appears to be not an opposition for the issuance of
complainants building permit, but rather to redress a wrong and an inquiry as to whether compliance
with the requirements for the construction of an edifice has been met. In fact, the Office of the
Building Official after conducting an investigation found out that there was [a] violation of the Building
Code for constructing without a building permit committed by herein complainants wife Susan
Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage Order was issued. Records disclose fu[r]ther [that] it was only after
the said violation had been committed that Susan Dulalia applied for a building permit. As correctly
pointed out by respondent, the same is being processed pending approval by the Building Official
and not of the Municipal Zoning Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent the allegation that
respondent was engaged in the private practice of his law profession despite being employed in the
government as Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the undersigned has taken into
consideration the explanation and clarification made by the respondent to be justifiable and
meritorious. Aside from the bare allegations of herein complainant, there is no sufficient evidence to
substantiate the complaints against the respondent.16 (Underscoring supplied)

After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of the charges of violating
Rules 6.02 and 7.03 in order.

Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as Municipal Legal Officer to
advance his own personal interest against complainant and his wife.

As for respondents September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show that he opposed the
application for building permit. He just inquired whether complainants wife fully complied with the
requirements provided for by the National Building Code, on top of expressing his concerns about
"the danger and damages to their properties, health and safety" occasioned by the construction of
the building.

Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed on September 28,
2004,17 whereas the questioned letter of respondent was priorly written and received on September
13, 2004 by the Municipal Engineer/ Building Official, who on the same day, ordered an inspection
and issued a Cease and Desist Order/Notice stating that "[f]ailure to comply with th[e] notice shall
cause this office to instate proper legal action against you."18

Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 200519 from the Office of the Municipal Engineer
showed, complainants wife eventually withdrew the application as she had not yet secured
clearances from the Municipal Zoning Administrator and from the barangay where the building was
to be constructed.

Respecting complainants charge that respondent engaged in an unauthorized private practice of

law while he was the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, a position coterminous to that of the
appointing authority, suffice it to state that respondent proffered proof that his private practice is not
prohibited.20

It is, however, with respect to respondents admitted contracting of a second marriage while his first
marriage is still subsisting that this Court finds respondent liable, for violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County, Nevada,
USA,21 when the Family Code of the Philippines had already taken effect.22 He invokes good faith,
however, he claiming to have had the impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article
83 of the Civil Code.23 For while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have
retroactive application, there is a qualification thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes "conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms
of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community."24 Gross immoral
conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.25

In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la Cruz,26 this Court declared that the therein
respondents act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting
constituted immoral conduct, for which he was suspended for two years after the mitigating following
circumstances were considered:

a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost
seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;

b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom
he described to be very intelligent person;

c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;

d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;

e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and
child went to Australia;

f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.27

In respondents case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the benefit of the
doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable provision when he contracted
the second marriage abroad. From 1985 when allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an allegation
which was not refuted, until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no showing that he
was romantically involved with any woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has remained an
absentee even during the pendency of this case.

As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with Imelda Soriano. The
community in which they have been living in fact elected him and served as President of the IBP-
Bulacan Chapter from 1997-1999 and has been handling free legal aid cases.

Respondents misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at the time he
contracted his second marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude of his residential community
towards his second marriage notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.

As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a second marriage while the first
marriage was still in place as being contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.28

In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:

CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the
practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.

Respondents claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3,
1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the
Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as "ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith."

Apropos is this Courts pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:29

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance
and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of
the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and
diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to
committing mistakes.30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. He is
WARNED that a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1 Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

2Rule 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

3 Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.

4 Rollo, pp. 60-61.

5 Annex "E" of the Complaint, rollo, p. 36.

6 Rollo, pp. 7-10.

7SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
8SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. (A) Every public official and
employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and
execution of official duties:

(a) Commitment to public interest. Public officials and employees shall always
uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All government
resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used
efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in
public funds and revenues.

xxxx

(c) Justness and sincerity. Public officials and employees shall remain true to the
people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not
discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall
at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to
their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to
appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as
members of their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.

9In the Complaint Affidavit it was erroneously referred to as RA 7160 (The Local
Government Code of 1991).

10 Rollo, pp. 367- 374.

11 Id. at 373-374.

12 Id. at 366.

13 Id. at 419-433.

14 Id. at 456-490.

15 Annex "11," rollo, pp.608-610.

16 Rollo, pp. 609-610.

17 As shown by Annex "A" of the Complaint, rollo, p.12.

18 Rollo, p. 74.

19 Id. at 199.

20Id. at 79. Attached as Annex "5" of respondents Answer is the Memorandum dated July 2,
1998 of Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor Eduardo A. Alarilla, which states:

xxxx
 In accordance with MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 of
the Office of the President, Malacaang, you are hereby given permission to engage
in the private practice of your legal profession provided that it shall not be in conflict
with your powers, duties and responsibilities defined and provided for by the Local
Government Code of 1991, thus, always giving priority to the interest of the
municipality.

xxxx

21 Annex "10", rollo, p. 261.

22 The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

23
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the
time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

24St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Dela
Cruz, A.C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 614, 624; Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio, 388 Phil.
691, 707 (2000); Narag v. Narag, 353 Phil. 643, 655 (1998).

25St. Louis University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Dela Cruz,
supra at 624; Ui v. Bonifacio, supra.

26 Supra.

27 Id. at 625.

28 Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313, 314 (1957).

29 A.C. No. 6252, October 5, 2004, 440 SCRA 91.

30 Id. at 100-101.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 229 April 30, 1957

IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS
vs.
NARCISO N. JARAMILLO, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Juan T. Alano for complainants.
Narciso N, Jaramillo in his own behalf.

PARAS, C.J.:

The respondent was prosecuted for and convicted of estafa in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan and, on appeal, was finally sentenced by the Court of appeals to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from two months and one day of arresto mayor to one year and one day of prision
correccional in its decision promulgated on April 17, 1954. On August 5, 1955, while the respondent
was serving sentence for said conviction, the Solicitor General filed in this Court the present
complaint for respondent's disbarment.

In his answer respondent contends that his conviction was a judicial error; that it was unfortunate on
his part that the trial court did not believe his explanation of the loss of the amount involved in the
criminal case; that his imprisonment and the sufferings and mental anguish he has suffered since
the commencement of the criminal of the criminal case constitute more than sufficient punishment;
that for this Court to further disbar him is excessively inhuman, humiliating and cruel.

There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The review of respondent's
conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed.
No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on
him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved
himself unfit to protect the administration of justice.

Wherefore, the respondent is hereby disbarred and ordered to surrender to this Court, within fifteen
days from notice hereof, the lawyer's certificate heretofore issued to him. So ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.