CASAN MACODE MAQUILING vs Comelec

Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the
United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before
the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 3
April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship.

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local
and national elections. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of
Arnado as USA-American. The COMELEC First Division ruled that the petition for disqualification be granted because he is still
using his US passport after his renunciation of his US citizenship which negates his Affidavit of Renunciation. Arnado filed a Motion
for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before
the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for
Reconsideration.

The COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Arnado on the ground that the use of a US passport. does not
operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of
a US passport does not operate to unrenounce what he has earlier on renounced. Maquiling files a petition before the Supreme
Court to assail the decision of the COMELEC En Banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones qualifications to run for public
office.

RULING: Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC,
he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his
foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated
the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of
the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an
act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to
be qualified to run for a local elective position.

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship,
which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign
citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local
position. The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the
renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue
to attack.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding
the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

A candidate for the House of Representatives who was disqualified for failure to comply with the residence requirement under
the Section 6, Art, VI of the Constitution could not be validly substituted. Distinctions between disqualification under Sec. 68 of
the OEC and Section 78.
Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.

Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan

City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER;
AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES
AND REGULATIONS. The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director
of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under
which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely
to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or
the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all,
therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon
which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to
determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is
the making of the law.

2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the
National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations
complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public
safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus,
31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve
the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is
conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.

3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption
by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be
founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection
that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing
about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of
prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director
of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of
Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and
from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from
7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed
in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of
Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first
indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the
recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of
Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement
addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be
closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila
have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all
animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of
their owners but of the riding public as well.

It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of
the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power. This contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660, 700), "The
rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of
cases, namely: The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Commrs.
Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments
or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead,
248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the necessity of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the
use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions
controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national
roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized
representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library

The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations
now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or
advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the
law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road
should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience
and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was said in Lockes Appeal
(72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature
of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to
things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its
power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things
upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a
subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)

In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan
Transportation v. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe
that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to
the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and
vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the
promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.

The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal
liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state.

Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of
traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law,
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through
education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the
residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the
very means of insuring its preservation.

The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223,
238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future,
because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare,
and be required to yield to the public good." And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is
bringing within the police power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The
development of civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of
the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brought within the
police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered."cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice,
however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of
all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations
of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of
a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.

Group 6 Digest

Calalang vs. Williams

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Petitioner: Maximo Calalang
Respondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.
Ponente: Laurel, J:

Facts:
Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against
the respondents.
It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30 Am to 12:30 pm and
from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7
am to 11pm for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval
of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the
provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public
Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of
the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,
1940.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As
a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issue:
1. Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions
of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or
trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people?

Held:
1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by
the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare
lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of
the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should
not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preserving.

2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society
and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and
of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.

THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER