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Survey of Recent Developments

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To cite this article: (1965) Survey of Recent Developments, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 1:2,
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 No 2, September 1965

SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In his speech on 17 August commemorating the twentieth

anniversary of Indonesia's independence President Sukarno re-affirmed
-
the principle of berdikari (berdiri diatas kaki sendiri standing on one's
own feet) which in April had superseded the slogan "A Year of Living
Dangerously" proclaimed on 17 August last year. Despite its title,
"Reach To the Stars - A Year of Self-Reliance", the speech this year
said little about the state of the economy. However, the meaning of
berdikari had already been made sufficiently clear. I! It does not",
the Indonesian people had been told, "mean living behind a Chinese
wall of economic self-sufficiency". It meant cutting imports to a
minimum and, wherever possible, replacing them with home-produced
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substitutes. It meant raising domestic investment to the m a x i m u m

and accepting foreign credits only in forms which left Indonesians in
economic control. It meant, the President added on 17 August, the
acceptance of hardship as the price of revolutionary achievement and
the forgoing of privileges pro bono publico.

What difference the events following the abortive coup of

30 September will make to economic policy in Indonesia it is as yet
too early to say or even guess. .The following pages comment on the
condition of the Indonesian economy as it appeared immediately pre-
ceding the political upheaval.

Foreign Trade and Payments

In the first nine months of 1965 there was a sharp decline

in Indonesia's exports and though the decline in imports was possibly
even greater it is doubtful whether it was sufficient to prevent another
merchandise trade deficit (excludingpetroleum and petroleum products).
Payments for international freight, insurance, interest and other
services were not entirely covered by Indonesia'sshare of the profits
of the oil companies and by income from services, notably tourism.
There were no foreign exchange reserves to meet any remaining
deficit or for debt repayments scheduled at $230 million" for 1965,
and so far the Government has not announced the re-scheduling of debts
or the large cash credits (or both) which are necessary to maintain
international solvency.

* Unless otherwise stated $ refers to $U.S.

1
 All evidence suggests that far from exports (excluding
petroleum and petroleum products) reaching the 1965 target of $600
million, they would fall below the 1964 figure of $475 million and were
unlikely to be more than $400 million. They might be less. The
value of export permits granted in the first half of the year declined
24 per cent compared with the s a m e period last year and the value of
permits actually used fell even more. The figures for July and
August showed the s a m e trend: by the end of August permits actually
used totalled only $224 million. 2

Though there were a few bright spots, such as good

tobacco sales in Bremen and a rise in sugar exports, world market
conditions did not favour Indonesian products. Prices remained low
and competition had increased, for instance, from kapok (Thailand)
and palm oil (Africa), and the world coffee surplus remained.
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Indonesia's position had been further weakened because tariffs within

economic blocs had became even more heavily discriminatory. An
example was the preference given by the European C o m m o n Market
to palm oil from Nigeria and Congo, both associated States. Another
factor discouraging exports was the rise of 5-10 per cent in shipping
freight rates from Indonesia to Europe since August last year3 and
later increases in vessel charter rates. In the first nine months of
1965, exports to Afro-Asian countries had been lower than expected.

Within Indonesia, too, despite the efforts of the Acting-

Minister of Foreign Trade, Brigadier-General A. Jusuf, difficulties
had not diminished. In addition to the continuing problem of goods
accumulating in warehouses for lack of transport, there was a new
threat of dislocation arising from the government'sintention, stated
in April, to establish a monopoly of Indonesia's nine leading traditional
exports by the beginning of 1966. If this policy were carried out about
85 per cent of exports would be in the government's hands compared
.
?
,

with 25 per cent in 1964.". A s the administration lacked the finance,

the technical knowledge and the physical facilities for procuring and
marketing these commodities, this was liable to lead to a repetition
of the difficulties encountered in government purchasing on previous
occasions (when, for instance, coconut farmers were initially paid
in script and had to wait long periods for actual cash). However,
the government went ahead with its plans for a virtual State monopoly
of traditional exports and encouraged private businessmen, w h o m it
intended to oust from this field, to show initiative in producing and
exporting new "weak" products. Though private business did not
respond very readily to this appeal a number of "weak" exports were

* In value terms, and excluding petroleum and petroleum products.

2
 marketed, including human hair, handicrafts, pandan hats, crocodile
skins and parrots. Their value was estimated at about $1 million a
month. 4

In view of the decline in export earnings in the first nine

months of 1965 it is highly improbable that the reduction of imports
was sufficient to eliminate the merchandise deficit of the corresponding
period in 1964 (see Table 1).

Table 1: -
Balance of Trade, Jan. Sept. 1962-64a

Exports Imports Balance

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$ millionb
Jan.-Sept. 1962 333 467 -134
Jan. -Sept. 1963 322 318 + 4
Jan. -Sept. 1964 333 48 9 -156

Notes: a. 'Excludingpetroleum and petroleum products.

b. Converted at the rate of Rp. 45 = $U.S. 1.

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik, quoted in BN 13 August

1965: preliminary figures.

Much of the considerable decline in imports is accounted

for by the fact that rice purchases were inflated last year in antici-
pation of the government'sban on rice imports. Precautionary
buying in JanuarylSeptember 1964 had caused the value of rice imports
to rise to $153 million compared with $55 million and $42 million in
the corresponding periods in 1962 and 1963. T h e resulting build-up
of stocks m a y well have enabled rice imports in the first nine months
of 1965 to
:*
be reduced by at least $100 million, that is to a negligible
amount.

The severe rise in the domestic retail price from July

* Rice imports in 1961, 1962 and 1963 had been steady at about
$100 million a year. Thus the anticipatory buying in 1964 could have
led to a stock valued at s o m e $50 million being carried over to 1965.

3
 onwards, even prior to the season of domestic shortage, raised anew the
issue whether to resume rice imports or wait for the rising market
price to correct the situation by forcing consumers to use substitute
carbohydrate foods and by encouraging farmers to increase dry-season
production. Lack of foreign exchange virtually ruled out the former
alternative, while the latter was obviously politically difficult.

Other imports seemed unlikely to contribute much to the

restoration of external balance. Imports of raw materials and
accessories for production, e.g., textile yarn and spare parts, have
been so severely cut in recent years* that continued imports, augmented
where possible with home-produced supplies, were needed if the
decline in domestic production was to be arrested. There remained
luxury goods and here the government faced an impasse. It was the
high price which importers of luxuries were willing to pay for foreign
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exchange through the SPP system which provided the financial incentive
for exporters. Hence, although the government continued to advocate
the reduction of luxury imports, it could
*a,
not vigorously carry out this
policy while the SPP system lasted..pq.

In addition to a (reduced) merchandise deficit and to the

service deficit there were foreign exchange claims on Indonesia of
$230 million for repayment on a debt which totalled about $2, 000
million at the beginning of 1965. To meet these claims there were no
foreign exchange reserves. The only relief so far known amounted
to $29 million in the form of credits for consumer goods, raw materials
and spare parts from West Germany, East Germany, China and
Pakistan (see Table 2). A s against this, other creditors (U.S.S.R.,
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia), through bilateral trade agreements,
had in 1965 required Indonesia to supply export surpluses totalling
$16 million, apparently as a contribution to debt service.

In July the Indonesian Parliament passed a Foreign

Exchange Budget for 1965 which showed

In JanuarylSeptember 1962, 1963 and 1964 the values of imports

of raw materials and accessories for production were $178 million,
$141 million and $128 million (Biro Pusat Statistik, quoted in BN 13
August 1965. Converted at the rate of Rp. 45 = $U.S. 1).

** O n 14 September 1965 President Sukarno ordered a new adminis-

trative body, the Self-RelianceC o m m a n d (Kotari), under the leader-
ship of Brigadier-GeneralA. Jusuf, to review the SPP system and
bring an end to the importing of consumer goods (BN22 September 1965).

4
 Estimated Receipts $550 million*
Estimated Expenditure $765 million*

It is not known what these figures represent. Most likely

they were based on the assumption of a merchandise balance at $400
million and a balance of payments on current account at $550 million,
leaving a deficit on capital account (debt repayment) of $215 million.
N o indication was given as to how the $215 million deficit was to be
covered. Though new credits were available, (see Table 2) they
were mainly in the form of capital equipment and services, presumably
additional to the imports included in estimated expenditure, and could
therefore make no contribution towards financing the deficit. It was
stated unofficially in July that Indonesia would probably receive a
cash credit "from a certain friendly country"; but by 30 September
no large cash credit or further re-scheduling of foreign debts had
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been announced by the Indonesian government. The foreign exchange

budget was to be reviewed in October.

Foreign Credits

Though foreign credits totalling $295 million or more appear

to have been secured in 1965, either through protocols to existing
agreements or through new agreements, s o m e were (on30 September)
still at the stage of provisional contracts. Experience has shown that
a number of these tend to be cancelled. A Netherlands credit for
100 million guilders,for instance, which has been under discussion
since last year, appears to have been made contingent on a settlement
of Dutch claims for compensation for Netherlands property nationalised
since 1957; recently 70 per cent of the credit was reported to have
been implemented. The protocols and agreements known to have been
signed this year are listed in Table 2.

The Budget

The 1965 Budget passed by the Indonesian Parliament

( D P R - G R )on 13 July was officially claimed to be more realistic than
its predecessor. The previous budget estimated a balance of receipts
and expenditure at about Rp. 400 billion which contrasted with an
outturn of Rp. 300 billion receipts and disclosed expenditure of Rp.600
billion. The budget passed in July 1965 provided for a revenue of
Rp. 671 billion, plus amounts which have not been published, against
an expenditure of Rp. 965 billion made up of Rp. 725 billion for routine
expenses and Rp. 240 billion for development.7 It was officially stated,
* Convertedat the rate of Rp. 45 = $U.S. 1.

5
 Table 2: Foreign Credits Jan. -Sept. 1965

Creditor Agreement Purpose Value

$ million

Japan Provisional, 7 July Sugar Mills 30

1965
Provisional, 12 July Ships
1965
-
60 90

China 29 Jan. 1965 Goods & Equipment 50

24 March 1965 (Goods & Equipment 20
(Cash -
10 80
East Germany Additional loan, Projects 35
-
10 45
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M a y 1965 R a w Materials
West Germany Hermes credit, Transport,
Jan. 1965 Communications 25
Additional credit, (Steel project 9
March 1965 (Raw materials -4 38
Netherlands Part of 100 million Public Works -
20 20
guilders, Sept.
1965
Italy Final contract,
14 July 1965
Hotel Banteng -
12 12

Pakistan Protocol, March R a w materials -

5 5
1965
France Jan. 1965 Government
Departments &
Institutions -5 5
U. S. S.R. Instalment of past
credit a ? ? -?
295

Note: a. The amount is not known. U.S.S.R. is providing a

total of $350 million in instalments over a period of
years.

Source: BN 29 Jan. 1965, 2 July 1965, 28 M a y 1965;

Newsletter, Indonesian Embassy Canberra, 12 July
1965; Bangkok Post, 14 March 1965; FEN 1 5 March
1965, 25 March 1965; Warta Berita, Radio Republik
Indonesia, 8 July 1965; Indonesian Herald, 23 September
1965.
6
 however, that this figure did not give a full account of government
expenditure: extraordinary expenses were not disclosed but were
contained in a Special Budget, also passed on 13 July, I t over which the
President exercises full control".

The 1965 Budget, it was officially announced, would show a

smaller deficit than its predecessor and thus slow down the rate of
inflation. A s total receipts and expenditure were not disclosed, how-
ever, it is impossible to know whether this claim was justified (see
Table 3).

Increased revenue was expected to c o m e from a number of

new taxes and levies (see Table 4). S o m e of these proved successful.
It was stated that an "Amnesty Tax" imposed on tax evaders late last
year quickly yielded more than the estimated amount of Rp. 50 billion
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and that a new Compulsory Levy on imports, intended to raise Rp. 102
billion, had in the first two months of its operation brought Rp. 17
billion into the Treasury. This levy, however, illustrates the anomaly
in Indonesian public finance that a considerable part of government
revenue has been derived from taxes, duties, levies and contributions
on imports while at the same time the government has stressed the
necessity of reducing imports to the barest minimum in order to con-
serve foreign exchange. Another new tax, a Special Compulsory levy
to be paid by the owners of motor vehicles (Dwikora SWI), was less
successful. It was expected in March that this levy would raise

Table 3: Central Government Finances, 1962-1965

Gross Receipts Gross Expenditure Deficit

Rp. billion

1962 74 122 48
1963 a 162 330 168
1964a 300 600 300
1965b (671 + ?) (965 + ?) ?

Notes: a. Actual; preliminary.

b. Estimate; Budget Bill, July 1965.

Source: International Financial Statistics, M a y 1965;

BN 23 July 1965.

7
 Table 4: Central Government Receipts, 1964, 1965

1964 1965
(provisional) (budget estimate)

Rp. billion
Gross Receipts 300 671 + ?
including
Direct Taxes
Income Tax 28 15
Corporation Tax 41a 100
Other 1 74b
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Indirect Taxes
Import Duties 34 56
Sales 24 100
ExciseC 39 87
Foreign Exchange Taxes 70 ?
Luxury goods contribution - 4
Compulsory Levy on imports - 102
Non-tax Receipts
Share of Profit of State Enterprises 1.5 10
Bonds 0. 04 20
Levies
Excess Profits 32+ ?d
Dwikora SWI 10
Business Licences 30

-
Notes: a. Of which Rp. 25 billion was paid by State
enterprises.
b. Made up of Tax Amnesty revenue (Rp.50 billion),
Stamp Tax and contribution of credit (Rp.12.5
billion), miscellaneous taxes (Rp.11 billion).
c. Excluding some minor excise duties. Derived
mainly from tobacco.
d. O n kerosene and gasoline only. Excess profit
on other goods not disclosed.

Source: BN 19 March 1965, 23 July 1965.

8
 Rp. 40 billions, but by July the amount had been reduced to Rp. 10
billion and it was proving difficult to collect even this sum.

Planned expenditure, which in money terms was about 50

per cent higher than last year, was very much lower in real terms.
Routine outlays had been cut by the reduction of the rice subsidy and
the discontinuation of the fertilizer subsidy. Development expenditure,
already cut back last year, had been further reduced. It was to be
financed by bank credits which would be limited to a number of key
projects nearing completion. These included the Djatiluhur dam, six
spinning mills, two weaving and finishing mills and completion of
cement, paper, tin, iron and steel projects and extensions to the
Palembang fertilizer works. "Projects to which the President pays
Special Attention", however, topped the list of priorities. *
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The Budget was to be reviewed in October. On 14

September President Sukarno instructed the new Self-Reliance
C o m m a n d (Kotari), as one of its "urgent tasks to be immediately per-
formed", to increase State revenue, to make a fundamental review of
the taxation system and to "re-organise superfluous subsidies".l o

Inflation

According to official indices the cost of living increased by

170 per cent in 1962, 119 per cent in 1963 and 134 per cent in 1964; it
rose a further 50 per cent from January to August 1965 (see Table 5).
Most of the rise occurred in the last two months, July and August, and
was especially apparent in the price of the staple food, rice. In
.,I_

September the trend gathered momentum. r'i

Retail prices of imported consumer goods, mainly classed

as luxuries, followed the same trend (Table 6). The period from
January to September was characterised by alternating spells of heavy
buying and hesitancy in the markets for durable consumer goods such
as cars, motor scooters, television sets and tape recorders. By

* See note on "The President's Projects", below, p.68.

** On the open market in Djakarta on 19 September the retail price
of c o m m o n rice (beras kwalitet biasa) was Rp. 640 a liter (Rp. 800
a kg.). Warta Berita. Antara, 22 September 1965.

9
 Table 5: Cost of Living, Jan.-Aug. 1965
62 ltemsa Food, fuel, clothinnb RiceC
Index, Mar. 1957-Feb.1958=100 Index, Sept. 1959 = 100 Rp. per liter

Djakarta. Palembang hbkassar Djakarta Djakarta

Jan. 6968 6394 4997 5177 305

Feb. 8012 7060 5843 5404 310

March 7444 7363 6196 m 3 250

April 7593 7160 6669 5406 255

May 7938 7671 6910 5842 250

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June 8492 8084 I).a. 6010 270

July 10141 9598 n.a. 7122 350

A%. n. a. n. a. n.a. 7811 410

-
Notes: a. Since December 1963 the 62 Items Cost of Living Index has replaced the
19 Items Index based in Djakarta 1953 = 100.
b. Rice, flour, fish, sugar, salt, coconut oil, kerosene, textiles.
C. Beras tumbuk bulu, No. 1, open market price.

-
Source: Biro Pusat Statistik, quoted in BN 5 April 1965, 28 M a y 1965, 12 July 1965,
28 July 1965, 1 1 August 1965, 27August 1965, 27 September 1965.

September the rates paid for Production Incentive Certificates (SPP)*,

which m a y be taken to have represented importers'assessment of the
future course of retail prices, had also risen markedly (see Table 6).
The official SPP rate had risen to $1 = Rp. 8500 (34x 250), while two
months earlier the open market rate had already reached $1 = Rp. 14500
(58 x 250).

Banking

Presidential Edict No.8/ 1965. issued after the SPP incident of

* Under the system of Production Incentive Certificates an exporter

received a percentage of his export earnings (officially 20, and in some
areas of Sumatra 30 per cent) in the form of a certificate (SPP)which
he was entitled to sell on the open market. The SPP rates were quoted
as multiples of the transaction rate, $1 = Rp. 250.

10
 Table 6: SPP Prices and Prices of Imports, Jan. -Sept. 1965

SPP Ratesa Tinned Foodsb Clothing Materials

Official Open Market Index, 15 Aug. 1955 = 100

Jan. 19 31 13183 14375

Feb 16 n.a. 13346 13638
March 16 n. a. 12593 10492
April 16 n.a. n.a. 10572
May 17 27 14641 13136
June 25 n.a. 2 1564 14825
July 28 58 24854 19609
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Aug. 28 n. a. 3O72lc 2O52gc

Sept. 36 n.a. n.a. n. a.

Notes: a. General SPP .

b. Corned beef, sardines.,powdered milk.
c. 10 August.

Source: Biro Pusat Statistik, quoted in BN 2 April 1965;

4, 14, 18 M a y 1965; 8, 28, 29 June 1965; 7 July
1965; 3, 4, 6 August 1965; 6, 8, 17, 22 September
1965.
4
11 M a y 1965 , ordered the reorganisation of the Indonesian banking
system to form a single unit. The incident m a y have precipitated the
reorganisation, but even before the edict a step in the direction of a
banking monopoly had been taken. At the end of last year, the various
State banks were directed to specialise in given fields, e.g . , one was
* O n 11 M a y sums totalling Rp. 51 billion were lodged at the SPP
Exchange in the Bank of Indonesia for the purchase of Production
Incentive Certificates (SPP). The magnitude of the deposits (equivalent
to one-third of total government revenue for the first quarter of 1965)
caused the Bank to freeze the funds and temporarily suspend SPP
sessions. Subsequent investigations revealed that most of the funds
were speculative and had come from other State banks. The action
of the banks was illegal on two counts: firstly, only bona fide importers
were permitted to purchase SPP, and, secondly, credit dealings
between banks were prohibited.

11
 to concentrate on agriculture, one on industry and one on communi-
cations.

W h e n the edict was signed there were five State banks. Only
one of these, the State Bank of Indonesia, had been founded by the
Indonesian government; the others, including the Bank of Indonesia,
which now functions mainly as the Central Bank, had been confiscated
from the Dutch. In addition to the State banks there were eighty-four
private banks, all except three of them small concerns. All banks
were Indonesian-owned; the last owned by foreigners closed when
legislation in M a y 1964 made it illegal for them to receive deposits
from the public.

O n 17 August 1965 the State banks were formally merged with

the Bank of Indonesia to be known henceforth as the State Bank of
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Indonesia,l 1 - the choice for the new institution of the name of the one
Indonesian foundation among the banks was no doubt intentional. All
responsibilities, functions, assets and rights of the merged banks
were transferred to the Unitary Banking System and their personnel
was made responsible to the Minister of Central Banking Affairs.

The future of the private banks remained uncertain. The

Minister of Central Banking Affairs, Jusuf Muda Dalam, was asked
by the First Vice-premier, D r Subandrio, to incorporate them into
the Unitary Banking System but no date was fixed. U p to the present
they have played a subordinate role, only about 15 per cent of the
banking business being in their hands (Table 7). However, their
influence has probably been greater than this figure suggests,
especially in the economically important islands outside Java, since
their head-offices are more widely distributed than those of the
State banks (see Table 8).

The reorganisation of the banking system was designed to

tighten government control over bank credit, the volume and general
direction of which had been laid down for both private and State banks
in the July budget (Table 9).

According to the Minister of Central Banking Affairs the

banks readily adapted themselves to the Banting Stir (New Course)
advocated by President Sukarno in April 1965, i. e., credit was being
granted only for the expansion of production on estates and farms and
in key industries. But it seemed doubtful whether restraint upon
bank credit could by itself achieve much. No provision was made
for the financing of imports, a significant omission, no doubt connected
with the official announcement in April that the government intended to

12
 Table 7: Volume of Eank Credits 1962-1965

Bank Credits 1962 1963 1964 1965

(Provis.) (target)

Rp. billion
Total
___ 51. 2 91.6 221 400a
State Banks 42. 7 75. 0 185.6 34213
Private Banks 8.5 16.6 35. 4 58
Percentage of Private
to Total 17 18 16 14.5
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__
Notes: a. Likely to be exceeded. T h e demand for credits
w a s estimated in July at Rp. 478. 2 billion.
b. M a d e up of Rp. 64 billion from Bank of Indonesia
and Rp. 278 billion from the other State banks.

Source: Explanatory Note to 1965 Budget.

Table 8: Geographical Distribution of Banks, July 1965

Java Other Islands

State Banks (excl. Bank

of Indonesia)
Head-offices 4 0
Branches 182 154

Private Banks
Head-offices 60 24
Branches 74 52

Source: Explanatory Note to 1965 Budget.

13
 establish a monopoly of imports by the beginning of 1966; meanwhile,
however, it penalised bona fide importers as well as speculators.
Exporters, though they were officially required to reach an export
target of $600 million, were allocated insufficient bank credit to
purchase even the leading export commodity, rubber. Under the
circumstances illegal practices developed, e.g. , rubber growers
were being paid for their products in Payment Orders instead of
money. These Payment Orders, similar in shape and design to a
conventional cheque, were repeatedly endorsed and exchanged and
might even, according to Indonesian press announcements, be cashed
by the trading company which had issued them. Like eighteenth
century bills of exchange they had c o m e to serve as money substitutes.

Table 9: Allocation of Bank Credit, 1965

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Production Export Miscell. Total

Rp. billion
Total 2 00 I 48 52 400
State Banks 171 137 34 342
Private Banks 29 11 18 58

Source: Explanatory Note to 1965 Budget.

Administration

Late in 1964 President Sukarno had set up the Supreme C o m m a n d

- with himself as Commander-in-Chief.
of Economic Operations (Kotoe),
Its function was to give overall direction to the economy, concentrating
especially on an effort to make Indonesia self-sufficient in food and
clothing.

Recently the President re-defined Kotoe's function as concern

with the economic aspects of the confrontation of Malaysia and assigned
the remainder of its role to a new body, the Self-Reliance C o m m a n d
(Kotari), set up on 5 September 1965 under the leadership of the
Minister of Internal Trade and Acting-Minister of Foreign Economic
Relations, Brigadier-General Achmad Jusuf.

Kotari was described by Brigadier-GeneralAchmad Jusuf as an

interim body with executive functions only; it would, he said, be
superseded by the National Economic Executive Board (Depenas)when

14
 that body was formed. Meanwhile, however, it had been vested with
wide economic power and made subordinate to the President alone.
All State institutions, the Armed Forces in particular, were instructed
by the President to guarantee its security. All other government
institutions with economic functions were reduced to advisory bodies
and some, the President stated, might be declared redundant and
abolished.

Kotari. potentially a compact administrative unit with well-

defined powers to make and carry out decisions, was composed of
five Ministers each with a specific function; Brigadier-General
Achmad Jusuf (Trade and Chief-of-Staff); the Minister of Central
Bank Affairs, Jusuf Muda Dalam (Finance); the Minister of Information
Major-General Achmadi (Information); the Minister of Light Industry,
Brigadier-GeneralM. Jusuf (Production), and a Minister of State,
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Brigadier- General Ac hmad Sukendro (Communications).

J. G.

Footnotes

1. Biro Pusat Statistik. quoted in BN 10 September 1965.

2. Foreign Exchange Traffic Bureau, quoted in BN 22 September
1965
3. Indonesian Herald, 1 June 1964.
4. BN 15 September 1965.
5. Biro Pusat Statistik, quoted in BN 13 August 1965.
6. FEN 8 April 1965, BN 25 June 1965 and 30 June 1965.
I. BN 23 July 1965.
8. Ibid.
9. BN 9 July 1965, 6 August 1965.
10. BN 24 September 1965.
11. EN 20 August 1965.

I5