CASE TITLE RECIT-READY DIGEST
ENUMERATIONS
Padilla v CA The incumbent mayor Padilla and several policemen were
accused of committing grave coercion against Antonio Vergara
Mayor tries to and his family. It is alleged that Padilla, acting under a municipal
demolish stall in ordinance, sought to remove/demolish Antonio Vergaras stall in
public market the public market for being a nuisance per se. Antonio Vergara
was given 72 hours to vacate, and when he didnt comply,
Padilla and the policemen forcibly demolished the stall and
carried away the goods, wares and merchandise.
The RTC found Padilla and the policemen liable for grave
coercion. Upon appeal to the CA, the CA reversed and acquitted
Padilla and the policemen of the crime, but still ordered them to
solidarily pay Antonio Vergara for the damages to the property
and taking of the goods.
Issue: WON the CA was correct in finding Petitioners liable to
pay despite their acquittal
Held: YES. Petitioners were acquitted not because they did not
commit the acts complained of (destroying of property), but
because the crime charged was grave coercion when it should
have been threat or malicious mischief. Although petitioners are
entitled to acquittal, it does not change the fact that they still
caused damage to Antonio Vergara, and as such must indemnify
him. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist.
Syquia v CA Petitioners Syquia filed for damages against Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery.
Hole in the vault Vicenta Syquia died and his father entered into a Deed of
causing damage to Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care with Manila Memorial
body; no liability as to inter the remains of Vicente.
it was not in the In preparation of transferring the remains of Vicente to to a
contract that the newly purchased lots in Manila Memorial, the concrete vault
vault should be encasing coffin was removed from the underground.
waterproof As the concrete vault was being raised, the Syquias
discovered that the concrete vault had a hole of
DEFINITIONS/
A punishable act or omission can create 2 kinds of civil
liabilities:
Civil liability ex delicto (deemed instituted with the
criminal case)
Quasi delict (separate civil case)
Either one of these may be enforced against the accused, but
offended party may only recover under 1 type.
Art. 29 of the Civil Code states that a civil action for damages is
not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission. This does not mean that such remedy can only be
availed of in a separate civil action, as the civil liability ex
delicto is sufficient to enforce such claim.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to
answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to
be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Negligence - omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time and of the place.
In the absence of stipulation or legal provision providing
the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the
performance of the obligation is that which is expected
of a good father of a family.
 approximately 3 in. in diameter, and the for a certain length of
time (1 hour, or less), water drained out of the hole.
Syquias were very upset with the amount of water that was
collected inside that it flooded the remains of the deceased.
The coffin and the body were also damaged.
Issue: W/N Manila Memorial breached its contract and that
they were guilty of tort
Held : No. There was no negligence on the part of Manila
Memorial. In the contract entered into between the parties,
there was no stipulation that the vault would be waterproof.
Seal - any of various closures or fastenings that cannot be
opened without rupture.
There was also no negligence (refer to definition) on the part
of Manila Memorial. It exercised diligence of that of a good
father
The purpose of the hole was to make sure that the coffin
wont float especially since it was raining heavily on the day
that it was being put to the grave.

Gashem v CA FACTS: Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict
Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Gashem thus:
Iranian Gashem; Shookat Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
wanted to have sex married. She alleges in her complaint that she is 22 year old being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
with Marilou so he Filipina with good moral character and reputation duly respected done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
pretended to want in her community; while petitioner is an Iranian citizen and an contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
to marry her; exchange student taking a medical course in Lyceum. Gashem and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
asshole; claim for courted and proposed to marry her, which she accepted on the
damages allowed; condition that they would get married. They agreed to marry is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the
Article 21. after the end of the school semester. She alleged that petitioner notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish
forced her to live with him in his apartment, and she was a virgin legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while
before she began living with him. During their live-in together, torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept.
Gashem starting maltreating her, threatening to kill her. Gashem
later on repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes
to live with him anymore, stating that he is already married to not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such
someone in Bacolod City. as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the
general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by
Petitioner alleged that he never proposed marriage to or agreed the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
to be married to Marilou. He in fact told her to stop coming to her intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to
place because he discovered that she had deceived him by be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts
stealing his money and passport. or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts
The trial court ruled that applying Art. 21 of the CC, Gashem which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
must pay Marilou damages and attorneys fees. It explained that redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated
private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article
questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances; 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs;
petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, it has become much more supple and adaptable than the
promised to marry private respondent; because of his Anglo-American law on torts.
persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be
deflowered by him; by reason of that deceitful promise, private
respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino
customs and traditions made some preparations for the
wedding; petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and;
such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
morality, good customs, culture and traditions.

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court decision. Hence,

this petition.
It is petitioners thesis that Article 21 of the CC is not applicable
because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or
violated any good custom or public policy. Petitioner asseverates
that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had
professed his love to the private respondent and had also
promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view
of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable.

ISSUE: W/N damages may be recovered for a breach of

promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code

HELD: YES.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is
not an actionable wrong. This notwithstanding, the said Code
contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion
of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal
treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is
an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as
assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the
general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In
between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in
the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress.
Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has
greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has
become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts.

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are

of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry
is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in
a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy.

Here, the Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
 that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and
to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would
keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree
to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent
surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction

LRTA v Navidad Navidad was drunk and entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a token. Escartin, the security guard, approached
Navidad. They had a misunderstanding that led into a fist fight
and Navidad fell on the tracks. At that exact time, a train,
operated by Roman, was coming in and Navidad was killed
instantly.
The widow and children of Navidad filed a complaint for
damages against Escartin, Roman, the LRTA, Metro Transit and
Prudent Security Agency.
The trial court rendered judgment against Prudent and Escartin.
The CA held Roman and the LRTA liable; however, it exempted
Prudent.
When an act constitutes a breach of contract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
The premise for the employers liability is negligence or
fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is
established, the employer can then be made liable on
the basis of presumption juris tantum that the employer
failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection and supervision of its employees. The liability
is primary and can only be negated by showing due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee.

Petitioners insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad was the

reason that the latter fell on the tracks, which was an act of a
stranger which could not have been foreseen nor prevented.

The Court stated that the law requires common carriers to

provide safety to its passengers not only during the course of the
trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and
where they ought to be. In case of death or injury, a carrier is
presumed at fault or negligent.

The Court also explained that the liability of a common carrier

and an independent contractor can be described as solidary. A
liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract.

In this case, the SC agreed with the CA saying that there is

 nothing to link Prudent to the death of Navidad, for the reason
that the negligence of its employee (Escartin) has not been duly
proven. Also, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad
is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman.
Thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or
negligence.
Calalas v CA Sunga was student riding Calalas jeepney. She was seated on
REAR-ENDED the extension seat near the end of the jeep. When a passenger
JEEP was getting off, she gave way to said passenger. There at the
moment, an Isuzu Truck driven by Verena, but owned by Salva,
bumped the rear end of the jeep. This caused injury to Sunga
(fracture, confinement). Sunga filed a complaint for damages
against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by
the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a
common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court judged in favor of Sunga for the damages from
the accident to be paid by the Verena and Salva (not Calalas),
and in favor of Calalas for the damages against his jeep. CA
reversed this, saying that Sungas COA is on the contract of
carriage and not quasi-delict, so it made Calalas liable instead.
SC held that the CA was correct. Calalas was being made liable
from its breach of the contract of carriage, and not from quasi-
delict. Calalas, by virtue of its contract of carriage, is required to
exercise extraordinary diligence to transport passengers safely.
A presumption of negligence arose when the accident
happened, and Calalas must prove that he is not negligent.
Based on the facts (the jeep wasnt parked properly, number of
passengers was beyond the allowed capacity, existence of the
extension seat), Calalas was held to be liable under the contract
of carriage.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his
driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage
caused to petitioners jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in
this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of
carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana
or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of
the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established because it is the basis of the action,
whereas in breach of contract, the action can be
prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the
common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to
his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art.
1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision
between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the
truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only
in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are
 concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are
those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with
regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption
of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers.

I think the point is, there is no quasi-delict because there is a

pre-existing contractual relation.

Cangco v MRR Petitioner Jose Cangco was riding the train of respondent one Difference between culpa contractual (under contract of
Dude slipped on evening. As the train approached the platform, which was not carriage) and culpa aquilana (under Art. 2180):
watermelons, lost very lit, a fellow rider disembarked from the train onto the
an arm, cant work platform as the train was grinding to a halt. This was a common
anymore practice. Petitioner followed suit, but unbeknownst to him, there
Liability is direct and Employer has the
were crates of watermelons by the ledge of the platform, which
immediate presumptive responsibility
he slipped on. He fell underneath the train and sustained a
for the negligence of its
broken arm that had to be amputated, among other injuries.
servants (rebuttable)
He filed the suit for damages, alleging that due to the loss of his Considered an accident in Substantive and
limb, he is unable to continue working as a clerk. the performance of a duty independent, itself a source
already contracted of obligation between
The issue is whether or not the respondent is liable to the persons without a prior
petitioner for damages. contractual relationship
The Supreme Court found that, yes, respondent is liable to Based on civil law principle Based upon the principle
petitioner. As disembarking the train as it grinds to a halt was a that one who causes that the employer is liable
common practice with many people doing such without injury, damage to another shall for the negligent acts of its
the petitioner, a man possessing vigor and agility of youth, was make good the damage employees
in no risk were if not for the crates of watermelons placed on the caused
platform. Not to mention, he had no knowledge of the existence
of said crates as the platform was dimly lit and no signs were Vinculum exists apart from Wrongful act or omission is
placed thereon. the breach in itself creates the vinculum

Negligence need not be Negligence needs to be

proven; what is needed to proven
be proven is the
contractual relation

Picart v Smith Amado Picart was riding his pony over Catalan Bridge in Tests of negligence:
Camarines Sur which is around 75 meters long, 4.8 meters wide. Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
Pony and car Before he had gotten halfway across, Frank Smith Jr. particular case:
collision approached in a car at a rate of about 10-12mph. Frank Smith
Last clear chance saw this, and in fact blew his horn thrice, but continued going
rule despite realizing that the man on horseback was not observing
the rule of the road. Picart, on the other hand, saw the
automobile and heard the warning signals. However, he chose
to pull the pony closely up against the railing on the right instead
of left, since he thought he did not have sufficient time to get to
the other side. As the automobile approached, continuing on his
left, the pony did not exhibit fright. However, when Smith got
quite near, he tried veering to the right side to escape hitting the
horse. However, this frightened the horse which caused it to turn
its body across the bridge, getting struck on the hook of the left
of the hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.
Picart and the horse fell, ultimately resulting to the horses death.
Picart on the other hand received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for
several days.
The issue in this case is whether or not the defendant, Frank
Smith, in maneuvering his car was guilty of negligence. The
Court held that he is.
As he approached the bridge, he had the right to assume that
the horse and rider would pass over to the proper side. As he
got nearer, it became clear that it would not be done and he
must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the
horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. This
changes things because the automobile was yet some distance
away and it was no longer within the plaintiffs power to move
otherwise. Defendants contention that he was deceived into
doing this because the horse has not yet exhibited fright is
likewise untenable. In the nature of horses, there was an
appreciable risk that if the animal was unacquainted with cars,
he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here
confronted him. Thus, Frank Smith, Jr. was negligent in the eyes
of the law.
A prudent man in the position of defendant would have
recognized the risk. Even if plaintiff himself was not free from However, the antecedent liability in that case arose from the
fault, the Court does not feel constrained to attempt to weight the dangerous conditions of the track that gave rose to the
negligence. In this case, the defendant was actually present and damage. IN this case, plaintiffs damage was only remote.
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation?
- adopts the paterfamilias of Roman Law, where
negligence depends on what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence
- Determined in light of 1) human experience and 2) facts
involved in each particular case
Can a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee
harm as a result of the course pursued?
If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard
against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
suggestion born of this precision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.
Proper criterion:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of another was sufficiently probably to warrant
his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Malcoms Dissent on this case calls this the last clear chance
rule of the law. When a traveler has reached a point where he
cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert
the injury, his negligence is reaching that position becomes the
condition and not the proximate cause of the injury and will not
preclude a recovery.
On antecedent negligence:
Rakes v. Atlantic
While contributory negligence on the part of the person injured
is not a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to
reduce the damages.
 operating the automobile which caused the damage. Thus, it is
enough to say that the negligence of the defendant was the
immediate and determining cause of the accident and that the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff was a remote factor.
Daywalt v Facts:
Corporacion de Teordorica Endencia entered into an agreement with
PP Agustino Daywalt to convey her land to the latter as soon as the
Recoletos title to the land is perfected through land registration
proceedings and a torrens title is issued.
The title was eventually registered, however, the Torrens
Title was not issued until a later date.
Prior to the issuance of the torrens title, Endencia and
Daywalt entered into a subsequent agreement basically
carrying into effect the original agreement except this
time it was in the form of a deed of conveyance.
However, the second contract was carried into effect, yet,
because the Torrens title was not yet issued.
The period of performance of the second contract having
expired, the parties, again, entered into another
agreement for the same obligation.
This time, the Torrens title was issued.
Endencia discovered that the land she owned was
almost 3 times larger than what she thought she was
conveying to Daywalt and, because of such, had qualms
about conveying the land.
Litigation then ensued and Daywalt obtained a favorable
decision giving them the right to demand specific
performance.
However, the conflict arose due to the interference of
Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos(Recoletos),
herein respondent.
Respondents were the owners of a tract of land adjacent
to the land of Endencia.
Father Sanz, the person in charge of the management of
the land of responents had a kind of ascendency over
Endencia since the latter was a religious woman.
Also, Father Sanz was aware of the contracts entered
into by the parties.
The torrens title was, for some reason, delivered to
respondent to keep until the obligation to deliver to
Dismissal of Justice of Peace in Preliminary Proceedings
Does not constitute res judicata on the civil proceedings of the
case at hand, unlike a dismissal on the merits.
To our mind a fair conclusion on this feature of the case is that
father Juan Labarga and his associates believed in good faith
that the contract cold not be enforced and that Teodorica would
be wronged if it should be carried into effect. Any advice or
assistance which they may have given was, therefore,
prompted by no mean or improper motive. It is not, in our
opinion, to be denied that Teodorica would have surrendered
the documents of title and given possession of the land but for
the influence and promptings of members of the defendants
corporation. But we do not credit the idea that they were in any
degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the desire to
secure to themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their cattle
upon the land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of
the plaintiff.
Malice in some form is generally supposed to be an essential
ingredient in cases of interference with contract relations. But
upon the authorities it is enough if the wrong-doer, having
knowledge of the existence of the contract relations, in bad
faith sets about to break it up. Whether his motive is to benefit
himself or gratify his spite by working mischief to the employer
is immaterial. Malice in the sense of ill-will or spite is not
essential.
Translated into terms applicable to the case at bar, the decision
in Gilchrist vs. Cuddy (29 Phil. Rep., 542), indicates that the
defendant corporation, having notice of the sale of the land in
question to Daywalt, might have been enjoined by the latter
from using the property for grazing its cattle thereon. That the
defendant corporation is also liable in this action for the
damage resulting to the plaintiff from the wrongful use and
occupation of the property has also been already determined.
But it will be observed that in order to sustain this liability it is
not necessary to resort to any subtle exegesis relative to the
liability of a stranger to a contract for unlawful interference in
the performance thereof. It is enough that defendant use the
 petitioner was made cumpolsory.
During the same time, respondents entered into an
agreement with Endencia whereby the cattle owned by
respondents would be pastured on the land of Endencia.
Having interfered in the contract between petitioner and
Endencia and causing delay in the performance of the
obligation, petitioner filed this petition.
Issue:
W/N a person who is not a party to a contract for a sale of land
make himself liable for damages to the vendee? And if so, can
the liability go beyond the value of the use and occupation, by
colluding with the vendor and maintaining him in the effort to
resist an action?
Held:
Yes, a person who interferes is liable. And, No, a stranger who
interferes in a contract, though liable for such interference,
cannot be liable beyond the value that could be recovered
against the immediate party.
Airfrance v Plaintiff was a member of a group traveling from Manila to
Carrascoso Lourdes for a pilgrimage. Plaintiff was a folder of a first class
First class airline ticket, however for at Bangkok, the manager of PAL forced
ticket; vacate seat plaintiff to vacate his seat, even if he was already seated,
for a white man. because there was a white man who allegedly had a better right
to the seat.
W/N there was bad faith when the Manager of PAL forced
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation after he was
property with notice that the plaintiff had a prior and better right.
Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person who by
an act or omission, characterized by fault or negligence,
causes damage to another shall be liable for the damage so
done. Ignoring so much of this article as relates to liability for
negligence, we take the rule to be that a person is liable for
damage done to another by any culpable act; and by "culpable
act" we mean any act which is blameworthy when judged by
accepted legal standards. The idea thus expressed is
undoubtedly broad enough to include any rational conception
of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society.
Whatever may be the character of the liability which a stranger
to a contract may incur by advising or assisting one of the
parties to evade performance, there is one proposition upon
which all must agree. This is, that the stranger cannot become
more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of
the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. To
hold the stranger liable for damages in excess of those that
could be recovered against the immediate party to the contract
would lead to results at once grotesque and unjust. In the case
at bar, as Teodorica Endencia was the party directly bound by
the contract, it is obvious that the liability of the defendant
corporation, even admitting that it has made itself coparticipant
in the breach of the contract, can in no even exceed hers. This
leads us to consider at this point the extent of the liability of
Teodorica Endencia to the plaintiff by reason of her failure to
surrender the certificate of title and to place the plaintiff in
possession.
The SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage
between Air France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortious
act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract
merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by
the carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
 already seated. passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one
YES. Although it is true that there is no specific mention of the attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos action
term bad faith in the complaint, such can be inferred from the is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of
facts and circumstances set forth therein. There was evident bad public duty by the Air France a case of quasi-delict.
faith when the Manager ousted Carrascoso out from his seat, Damages are proper.
when his ticket was already confirmed and when he was already
seated at his pre-assigned seat. Moreover, there was no
evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by
the white man. Instead of explaining to the white man that there
was no available seats left, the manager opted to oust
Carrascoso who was then safely settled in his seat.

W/N the award of exemplary damage was proper. YES.

The only condition for the award of exemplary damage is that
the defendant should have acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. The manner of
ejectment of Carrascoso fits into this legal precept.

Gilchrist v Cuddy Cuddy is the owner of the film Zigomar. Cuddy entered into a Article 1902 - a person who, by act or omission causes
Zigomar, contract with Gilchrist, wherein the latter will rent the film for damage to another where there is fault or negligence, shall be
Interference of P125 a week. Prior to the agreed date in the contract,Cuddy obliged to repair the damage so done.
contract refunded the payment to Zigomar, saying that it made other
agreements with Espejo for P350 a
week. Gilchrist filed for an injunction against the parties from
showing the film. In the trial, the court found out that Espejo
knew of the contract yet still it convinced Cuddy to rent the film
to him instead. However it was not established that Espejo knew
of the identity of the other party in the contract.
The issue in this case is whether or not Espejo can be held liable
for malicious interference despite the fact that he had no
knowledge of the identity of the other party in the contract that
he caused the breach of.
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. As a rule, the
ground on which the liability of a third person for interfering with
a contract between others rests in the fact that the interference
was malicious. In the case at bar, the only motive for
interference was to make a profit. There was no malice beyond
this desire, but it does not relieve Espejo from legal liability for
interfering and causing the breach of the contract.
The liability of Espejo arises not from contractual obligation but
 from unlawful acts. Article 1902 applies in this case and there is
nothing in the provision which says that the knowledge of the
identity of the other party in the contract is a condition precedent
to the liability of a tortfeasor in the interference of contract.

Board of NACOCO's charter was amended [Republic Act 5] to grant that As the trial court correctly observed, this is a case of damnum
Liquidators v corporation the express power "to buy, sell, barter, export, and in absque injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong is here
Kalaw any other manner deal in, coconut, copra, and dessicated absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one
coconut, as well as their by- products, and to act as agent, or the other is wanting.
DELIVERY OF broker or commission merchant of the producers, dealers or
COPRA NOT merchants" thereof. NACOCO embarked on copra trading
MADE DUE TO activities.
TYPHOON;
Kalaw, General manager and board chairman, of NACOCO,
No actionable entered into series of contracts involving delivery of tons of
wrong in damnum copra, with no prior approval in accordance with usual practice.
absque injuria The contracts were subsequently ratified by board. However,
due to 4 storms (1 in Oct, 2 in Sept, 1 in December), NACOCO
only partially performed contract. The storms had badly
damaged coconut trees all over the country. Kalaw brought the
matter to the Board, which, however, did not act on the
contracts.

The buyers threatened damage suits and some claims were

settled or compromise agreement entered into by new
management. They sought to recover the sum paid from
Kalaw, et al. They charge Kalaw with negligence under
Article 1902 of the old Civil Code; and defendant board
members, including Kalaw, with bad faith and/or breach of trust
for having approved the contracts.

The NACOCO sought to recover the amount of the settlements

from Kalaw.

In the case at bar, the practice of the corporation has been to

allow its general manager to negotiate and execute contracts in
its copra trading activities for and in NACOCO's behalf without
prior board approval. Also, the board ratified the contracts. From
all these, it cannot be said that Kalaw entered the contracts in
bad faith; neither the board of directors. Bad faith contemplates
 a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or ill will.
The source of the damage were the storms. As the trial court
correctly observed, this is a case of damnum absque injuria.
Conjunction of damage and wrong is here absent. There
cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is
wanting.
Farolan v Solmac Farolan is the acting BOC Commissioner while Parayno us the
Marketing acting chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation
division. They were sued in their official capacities for illegal
detention of goods.
Solmac imported the Clojus shipment which is alleged to contain
an OPP film scrap (rejected polypropylene). Upon application for
entry, the BOC asked for an authority from any government
agency in which SOlmac presented a BOI authority for
polypropylene film scrap. But, when it was examined, the Clojus
shipment was not OPP film scrap as declared. Thus, Parayno
and Farolan withheld the release of the importation.
Parayno then asked for BOIs advice on WON the importation
may be released. BOI agreed for its release provided holes will
be drilled on them. Atty. Castro (counsel of Solmac) opposed to
such drilling and wrote to the BOI governor. BOI governor then
wrote a letter to BOC stating that the same may be released
without the drilling of holes.
Solmac then filed an action for mandamus and injunction for the
unconditional release of the importation. Granted. Officers
complied. (Even before RTC rendered its decision, the Clojus
shipment of OPP was already released). Solmac appealed to
make Farolan and Parayno liable for damages despite the
finding of lack of BF on their part. CA held them liable.
Hence, this case.
WON Farolan and Parayno acted in GF in not immediately
releasing the questioned importation. Yes.
GF is always presumed and it is upon him who alleges that the
burden lies. Further, there was a report of the Natl Institute of
Science and Technology (NIST) that the importation was not
OPP film scraps but oriented polypropylene which is prohibited
here in the Phils under a LOI. Also, there was no clean cut
policy on the part of BOI regarding the entry to the Phils of
OPP. Also, even the highest officers of the BOI themselves
were not in agreement as to what the proper course should be.
Thus, these facts contradict the claim that the officers acted in
bad faith.
The prohibition is for the protection of the local market as these
products actually compete with locally manufactured
polypropylene as raw materials which are actually already
sufficient to meet local demands. Thus, Farolan and Parayno
cannot be said to have acted in BF for not immediately
releasing the importation prior to the clarificatory guidelines
from the BOI.
But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in
withholding the release of the subject importation because
indeed it was composed of OPP film scraps, contrary to the
evidence submitted by the National Institute of Science and
Technology that the same was pure oriented OPP,
nonetheless, it is the duty of the Court to see to it that public
officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or
in making decisions for fear of personal liability for damages
due to honest mistake. Whatever damage they may have

Joseph v Bautista Petitioner Joseph was riding a cargo truck. This cargo truck
tried to overtake a tricycle, and while in the process of doing so a
pickup truck tried to overtake both the cargo truck and the
tricycle. As a result, the cargo truck was forced to veer towards
the shoulder of the road and bumped into a mango tree. This led
to a fracture to Petitioner Josephs leg.
Petitioner Joseph filed a civil case against the owner of the
cargo truck for breach of contract of carriage, and another civil
case against owner and driver of the pickup truck for damages
arising from quasi delict.
With regard to the civil case for quasi delict, the owners of the
pickup truck with the help of their insurance company were
able to settle with Petitioner Joseph. On the basis of such
settlement, the owner of the cargo truck claims that his liability
to Petitioner Joseph had also been extinguished, given that all of
the respondents are solidarily liable and that the full payment of
the indemnity would then be favorable to him.
ISSUE: WON the owner of the cargo truck is absolved from
liability to Petitioner Joseph
HELD: YES. In the case at hand, there was only a single injury
caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at
all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes
concededly committed by public officers are not
actionable absent any clear showing that they were
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to
bad faith. After all, "even under the law of public officers, the
acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of
good faith.
In the same vein, the presumption, disputable though it may
be, that an official duty has been regularly performed applies in
favor of the petitioners. Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter
esse acta. (All things are presumed to be correctly and
solemnly done.) It was private respondent's burden to
overcome this juris tantum presumption.
Cause of Action - a delict or wrongful act or omission
committed by a person against another, in violation of the
primary rights of the latter.
When there is only 1 delict or wrongful act, there is only a
single cause of action, regardless of the number of rights that
may have been violated.
1 cause of action = 1 recovery allowed
 inflicted to Petitioner Joseph, thus he only had 1 cause of action.
He can institute this cause of action against the respondents
differently, as the respondents are differently situated anyway.
This is evident as Petitioner Joseph filed a case for breach of
contract of carriage against 1 respondent, and a case for
damages based on quasi delict against another. However,
despite the institution of different cases, Petitioner Josephs
recovery is limited to 1 only; otherwise, it would be a case of
double recovery and unjust enrichment.
Given this, when Petitioner Joseph was able to fully recover
payment from the owner of the pickup truck, all of the solidary
respondents were freed from liability to Petitioner Joseph.
Petitioner Joseph can no longer enforce a claim against the
owner of the cargo truck for it will be a case for double recovery.
Bermudez, Sr. v A cargo truck, driven by Pontino and owned by Cordova,
Herrera bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a 6-year old, was
riding. Rogelio died.
Parents reserved A Criminal Case was filed against Pontino. Rogelio's
right to file parents filed a reservation to file a separate civil action.
separate civil case The parents did file the separate case but the trial court
dismissed the same on the assumption that Pontino's
negligence constituted a quasi-delict. It insisted that the
criminal case must be decided first.
Issue: W/N the civil action filed by Rogelio's parents is
founded on crime or on quasi-delict and whether a
separate civil case may be filed
Held: Quasi-delict, a separate case may be filed
The parents precisely made a reservation to file an
independent civil action in accordance with the Rules of
Court. In fact, even without such a reservation, the Court
has allowed the injured party in the criminal case to
recover damages based on quasi-delict.
From the cited case of Joaquin v. Aniceto, for an employer
to be subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be
present:
(1) that an employee has committed a crime in the discharge
of his duties;
(2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his
civil liability; (3) that the employer is engaged in some kind
of industry.
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising
from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the
Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the
employer solidarity liable for the negligent act of his
employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of
the diligence of a good father of the family.
Section 2, Rule 111- Independent civil action.-In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case,provided the right is reserved as required in
the preceding section.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of
the accused only when it includes a declaration that the
 facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist

Singson v Bank of Singson was one of the defendants in a civil case, which ISSUE: W//N Singson can recover damages from BPI upon the
P.I. judgment had been rendered sentencing him and his co- basis of a tort or quasi-delict
defendants Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay
Wrong application plaintiff, Philippine Milling Co. a certain sum. HELD: YES. The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for
of writ of damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict, their
garnishment Singson and Lobregat appeal but not Villa-Abrille & Co., as relation with the defendants being contractual in nature. We
against which said judgment, accordingly, became final and have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract
executory. In due course, a writ of garnishment was between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by
subsequently served upon BPI in which the Singsons had a the one against the order and the consequent recovery of
current account insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against the damages therefor. Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
Bank were concerned. Upon receipt of the said Writ of reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France
Garnishment, a clerk of the bank upon reading the name of the vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who, despite
plaintiff herein in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-
defendants, without further reading the body of the said class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the
garnishment froze Singsons accounts. tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages
from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part,
Subsequently, two checks issued by Singson in favor of a for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is
certain company for his business. However, believing that the "contractual both in origin and nature ... the act that breaks the
plaintiff Singson, the drawer of the check, had no more control contract may also be a tort".
over the balance of his deposits in the said bank, the checks
were dishonored and were refused payment by the said bank. In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and
The company then closed Singsons credit account with them considering, particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done
pursuant to this. Singson then wrote a letter to BPI informing to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the
them of this confusion. The President of BPI then apologized to bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee
Singson and notified him that the action of garnishment has had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal
already been removed. BPI lost no time to rectify the mistake damages the amount of which need not be proven in the
that had been inadvertently committed, resulting in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees in the sum of
temporary freezing of the account of the plaintiff with the said P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.
bank for a short time.
The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar
Hence, Singson commenced the present action against the the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the
Bank and its president for damages in consequence of said consequent recovery of damages therefor.
illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account.

CFI dismissed the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs

cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-
delict, because the relation between the parties is contractual in
nature; because this case does not fall under Article 2219 of our
Civil Code, upon which plaintiffs rely; and because plaintiffs have
 not established the amount of damages allegedly sustained by
them.

Rafael Reyes Tumol was driving a trailer truck tractor registered in the name of Reservation of the right to file the separate civil action
Trucking v People Rafael Reyes Trucking when it hit a Nissan Pick-up driven by waives other available civil actions predicated on the
Balcita and Dy. This led to the death of the two and damage to same act or omission of the accused-driver.
the Pick-Up. The provincial prosecutor charged Tumol with
reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage
to property. The offended parties made a reservation to file a
separate civil action arising from the offense charged. They filed
a complaint against petitioner as employer of Tumol based on
quasi delict.

Petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Balcita but private

respondents opted to pursue the criminal action without
withdrawing the civil case quasi ex delicto against petitioner.
Eventually, they withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil
action against the accused and said that they would prosecute
the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action. However, they
did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi delict
against petitioner.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner as owner of the truck can be held

subsidiary liable for damages awarded to offended parties in the
criminal action against the truck driver despite the filing of a SCA
against employer of the truck driver -- NO.

Petitioner cannot be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing

of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. Such
SCA was for recovery of damages (under Art. 2176) arising from
the same act or omission of the accused.

Both the CA and trial court erred in holding the accused civilly
liable and petitioner subsidiarily liable for damages arising from
the crime in the criminal action because the offended parties
filed a SCA against petitioner based on quasi delict resulting in
the waiver of the civil action ex delicto.

The withdrawal of the reservation is ineffective to reverse the

effect of the reservation earlier made because respondents did
not withdraw the civil action against petitioner based on quasi
 delict. The case is remanded to the trial court to render decision
in the civil case awarding damages.
Jarco Marketing v Jarco Marketing owns Syvels Dept Store. Criselda and her 6
CA year old child Zhienieth were at the 2nd floor of the
GIFT-WRAPPED establishment. Criselda was paying when she felt a gust of wind.
CHILD (morbid When she turned around, she saw her daughter under a heap of
but huhuhu) gift-wrapping structures. The daughter died as a result. Criselda
filed for damages by virtue of the accident. Jarco denied any
liability. They claimed that Criselda was negligent in exercising
care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely
roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. The
child too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed
the counter. Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was
made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor
collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction.
SC held that Jarco was at fault. A former employee of Jarco
testified that the gift-wrapping counter was not nailed to the floor;
also, the top heavy because it was filled with decoration, and
hence, unstable. He already informed his superiors regarding
the matter, but they only got angry because a lower employee
was telling them what to do. They only nailed the counter after
the incident. Jarco did not exercise diligence as a prudent man
would have used. The mother was also not negligent because
she only let go her the daughters hand when she got her credit
card slip. The child was near her, and did not loiter around the
premises. Finally, the child cannot be said to commit contributory
negligence due to the presumption that any child below 9 years
old cannot act without discernment. Hence, even if the structures
were nailed, the child is still free from negligence.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault
or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without
any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through
human agency, an event which under the circumstances is
unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one
cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person
concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by
fault of any person and which could not have been prevented
by any means suggested by common prudence.
The test in determining the existence of negligence is
enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he
is guilty of negligence.
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is
conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and
is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains
in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age,
unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since
negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required
discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a
child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively
 presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the
presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence
in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is
a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a
child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed
incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

Sarmiento v Sun- Petitioner was requested by a friend, a certain Virginia Lao, to
Cabrido have her pair of diamond earrings reset into gold rings.
Consequently, petitioner sent a Tita Payag to do such in
Broken diamond Dingdings Jewelry Shop in Tagbilaran City, Bohol, owned and
due to use of pliers operated by respondent spouses. The diamonds in one earring
was appraised to have been 0.33 carats and of almost perfect
cut and clarity.
However, respondent Marilou attempted to dismount the
diamond, but was unsuccessful. She then requested the stores
goldsmith, Zenon Santos, to do so. Using pliers, the diamond
eventually broke.
Applicability of Arts. 1172-1174:
Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties. Corollarily, those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence
or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages. The fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with
the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.

The instant case was then filed for damages against the
respondents for the broken gem.

The issue is w/n the respondents are liable.

Yes, they are. The Court noted that the common practice in
extracting or removing precious gems was through the use of a
miniature wire saw; the respondents employee, Santos, used
pliers. Respondent Marilou inspected the diamond before
attempting to remove it and saw that it was in very good
condition. The fact that it broke at the hands of the respondents
employees is enough to show that his negligence was the cause
of the damage. Res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself).

Taylor v Manila
Electric

Bataclan v Medina Facts: A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume

Respondent was the owner of a bus company. 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by
Petitioners husband was riding one of respondents buses plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
 from Cavite to Pasay and was seated beside the driver.
While in transit, at around 2am, the front tire burst and the
bus began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal and turned turtle.
Some of the passengers managed to leave, except
Petitioners husband and 3 other passengers.
Petitioners husband screamed for help because he couldnt
get out.
Eventually, 10 men came with lighted torches to see in the
dark.
However, because of the torches, the bus went ablaze
eventually killing Petitioners husband and the other
passengers.
Hence, petitioner, with her 5 minor children, filed the case
with the Trial Court.
The Trial Courts awarded damages in favor of petitioner. Yet,
despite such, both parties appealed.
Issue:
W/N the bus company should be relieved from liability
because they were not the proximate cause of death?
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'
And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Held:
They are liable. The SC said they were the proximate cause
of death.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns,
and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical
injuries, if through some event, unexpected and
extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by
lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets
it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might
still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the
fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present
case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do
not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back,
the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch
was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with
 them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was
more natural than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men
with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence
of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the
burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor.
According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were
on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the
driver should and must have known that in the position in
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and
around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when
spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed
even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the
conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the
bus.

Fernando v CA The septic tank in Agdao Public Market wasnt emptied for 19
Septic Tank; years. The market master, upon knowing such fact, had a
Proximate Cause bidding where Bascon won.
However, before the scheduled date of the emptying of the
septic tank, five bodies were found dead inside the septic tank,
one of which was a bidder for such project. The septic tank was
also found to be almost empty. Upon examination, it was found
that the lungs of the victims burst due to the intake of toxic gas,
which was sulfide gas produced from the waste inside the septic
tank.
W/N Davao City was guilty of negligence in the case at bar for
the following:
1. Failing to empty the septic tank on a yearly basis
2. For failing to supervise the area where the septic tank is
located
W/N such negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of
the deaths of the victims.
NO, to all.
1. While it may be true that the public respondent has
been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank
annually, such negligence was not a continuing one.
Upon learning from the report of the market master
about the need to empty such tank, the Agdao Public
Market immediately had a bidding for such service.
2. The toxic gas from the waste matter could not have
leaked out because the septic tank was air-tight; there
was no report of any casualty of gas poisoning despite
the presence of people living near it or PASSING on top
 of it.
3. An accident such as a toxic gas leakage from the septic
tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its
covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred
because the victims on their own and without authority
from the public respondent opened the septic tank. The
fatal accident in this case would not have happened but
for the victims negligence.
4. The surreptitious way in which the victims did their job
without clearance from the market master or any of the
security guards goes against their good faith. The
proximate and immediate cause of the death of the
victims was due to their own negligence. Consequently,
the petitioners cannot demand damages from public
respondent.

Urbano v IAC Filomeno Urbano found his palay silo flooded with water coming If an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
Bolo, Tetanus Toxin, from an irrigation canal nearby that had overflowed. He later operation the circumstances, which result in injury because of a
Proximate Cause found out that Marcelo Javier was responsible for opening the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is
irrigation canal causing the flood. A quarrel ensued between the the proximate cause. The tetanus infection, which was caused
two where Urbano hacked Javier with a bolo, wounding the later by Javiers failure to take the necessary precaution, is the
in the hand and the leg. Javier was treated. Days later, Javier proximate cause of his death, and not the hacking of Urbano.
was admitted to the hospital having lockjaw and convulsions.
The doctors found out that Javiers condition was caused by
tetanus toxin. Javier died in the hospital.
An information was filed against Urbano for Homicide and was
convicted of the crime. The petitioners argue that the proximate
cause of Javiers death was the latters own negligence, that he
got infected when after two weeks he returned to his farm and
tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands, exposing the
wound to infection.
The issue in this case is whether or not there is an efficient
intervening cause which would exculpate Urbano from any
liability for Javiers death.
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The rule is that the
death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused.
The medical findings lead the SC to the conclusion that the
infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his
 death. The infection was distinct and foreign to the crime.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made basis of an action if
such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or
give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible,
if there intervened between the prior cause and injury a distinct,
successive and unrelated cause of injury, even though such
injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion.

Bernal v House On Holy Friday in 1925, a procession was held in Tacloban, The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any,
and Tacloban Leyte. Fortunata Enverso and her daughter Purificacion Bernal does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense
Electric came from another municipality to attend the celebration. could only result in reduction of the damages.
Afterwards, the two, along with Fausto and Elias (Fortunata's
friends), passed along a public street called Gran Capitan.
Bernal was allowed to walk a short distance in front of her
mother. When they passed by the offices of the Tacloban Electric
& Ice Plant, a car appeared from the opposite direction and
scared Bernal, causing her run and fall into the street gutter
where hot water was flowing from the plant. Bernal was taken to
the hospital, but she died that same night from 3rd degree burns
over her whole body.

Tacloban Electric tried to argue that the cause of death was

actually not the hot water and that the hot water was allowed to
flow down the side of the street by the authorities. These, the trial
court did not give credence to, but the argument that the plaintiffs
contributed to the accident by their own fault and negligence was
taken into consideration, and the action was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether Tacloban Electric is liable to Fortunata even

through the alleged negligence of the latter

RULING/RATIO: YES.

The mother and child had a perfect right to be where they were
and to walk in the manner they were, even while Purificacion
Bernal was a short distance away from her mother. No one could
have foreseen the coincidence of an automobile appearing and
of Bernal falling into the ditch. But the hot water really was a
hazard for which the plant did not take enough caution to
dispose of. The contributory negligence of the child and her
mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in
 its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the
damages.
Gabeto v Araneta Basilio and Proceso took a carromata near Plaza Gay, in Iloilo,
to go to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma. When the driver of the
carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction of the
cockpit, Araneta stepped out into the street and stopped the
horse and taking the reins. He argued that he had called the
carromata before the other two did. The driver had apparently
never seen nor heard him calling.
When the driver tried to move again, the bit came out of the
horse's mouth (because of the looseness of the bridle or the
rottenness of the material from which it was made), and the
driver had to get off the carromata, pull the horse to the curb,
and look for the bit. While he was doing so, the horse is free
from control and became disturbed and pulled the whole thing
forward, pushing the driver to the sidewalk. The carromata struck
a police telephone box, which fell, and scared the horse so that it
galloped up the street.
Basilio was able to get off the carromata while it was still on the
sidewalk, but Proceso was not, and while the horse was
galloping, he jumped or fell from the rig (in front of Mission
Hospital), was injured, and later on died. Proceso is the
husband of Gabeto.
Other facts: Judge Southworth initially awarded Gabeto P3,000
worth of damages to which she appealed.
WON Araneta is liable. No.
Even conceding that Aranetas act in stopping the horse was
improper, nevertheless such act was too remote from the
accident which presently ensued to be considered the legal or
proximate cause thereof.
The mere fact that Araneta interfered with the carromata would
not make him liable for the death of Proceso, because it is
admitted by Julio Pagnaya that he afterwards got out of the
carromata and went to the horse's head to fix the bridle. The
evidence is furthermore convincing to the effect that, after Julio
alighted, the horse was conducted to the curb and that an
appreciable interval of time elapsed same witnesses say
several minutes before the horse started on his career up
the street.
The stopping of the rig by Araneta in the middle of the street
was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be
considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by
getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the
driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of
the animal, and Araneta cannot be charged with liability for the
accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.
The driver, Julio, testified that while the horse was on the curb,
Araneta, still annoyed, had accidentally brought down his hand
on the horse's nose, and because of this, the horse ran away.
However, this was not supported by any other witness.
The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather
of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily
broken. Julio had a natural interest in refuting this fact, as well
as in exculpating himself in other respects; and we are of the
opinion that the several witnesses who testified for the
defendant gave a more credible account of the affair than the
 witnesses for the plaintiff. According to the witnesses for the
defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the
bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and they say that Julio,
after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to
fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely
off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to
go away as previously stated.

McKee v IAC Petitioner was inside a car with her 3 children, 1 househelp and Emergency Rule - one who suddenly finds himself in place of
driven by her father. 2 children suddenly appeared from the right danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
side of the road, which caused the father/driver to swerve to the means tha may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
opposite lane to avoid them. While on the opposite lane, the not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently
driver saw that there was a truck approaching, thus he flashed and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method,
his headlights while moving back towards his lane, expecting that unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought
the truck would slow down. The truck did not slow down and about by his own negligence.
collided with the car, causing the death of the driver, 1 child and
the househelp, all seated at the front of the car. Proximate Cause - that cause which in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
2 cases for damages based on quasi delict were filed against the produces the injury, and without which the result would not
owner of the truck and the driver. A criminal complaint for have occurred.
reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide was also filed
against the driver. The driver and owner of the truck contend that Last Clear Chance - the contributory negligence of the party
it was the driver of the car that was negligent. The fact that he injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that
was on the wrong lane is the proximate cause of the collision. defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of
ISSUE: WON the car being in the wrong lane is the proximate the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last
cause of the collision clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences thereof.
HELD: NO. The driver of the car cannot be deemed negligent, as
his act of swerving to the opposite lane was to avoid running
over 2 children. Given the circumstances, any person in the
place of the driver would also try to avoid running over the
children by swerving the car away.
Furthermore, the act of entering the opposite lane cannot be
deemed the proximate cause of the collision, as the driver of the
truck had enough time and distance to slow down or avoid hitting
the car. Had the driver of the truck been paying attention to the
road, the collision could have been avoided. Also, the speed of
the truck exceeded the maximum limit allowed on a bridge.
Clearly, it was the truck drivers negligence which was the
proximate cause of the accident. Owner of the truck is liable as
 the employer of the driver.

Ong v Metropolitan
Water District
Kid drowning; no
liability from the
resort
Dominador Ong, together with his two brothers went to Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Metropolitan Water District swimming pools. The negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for
While in the pool, Dominador told his brother that he'll just the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by
go to the locker rooms to drink a Coke. His brothers then exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
transferred to another pool when they saw Dominador injurious consequences to claimant, notwithstanding his
leave. negligence
Few minutes later, some other boys informed the The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party
lifeguards that someone was underwater for a long time. charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury
Lifeguard Abao immediately jumped into the big cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after
swimming pool and retrieved the lifeless body of the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in
Dominador. He immediately applied CPR and a whole which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be
team brought Dominador to the nearest hospital. Their said to have contributed to the injury
efforts to revive him failed.
Issue: W/N the death of Dominador can be attributed to
the negligence of Metropolitan Water District and or its
employees so as to entitle the family to recover damages
Held: NO. The principle to be observed is that the person
claiming damages has the burden of proving that the
damage is caused by the fault or negligence of the
person from whom the damage is claimed.
Initially, the brothers' testimony stated the lifeguard didn't
immediately respond to their call for help but later on in
trial it was proven that the lifeguard did immediately dived
into the pool. Furthermore, it was shown that Metropolitan
actually taken all the necessary precautions to avoid
danger with all its equipment. It has "done what is
humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life
to Dominador."
It is not known how Dominador came into the big pool
there without any companion and that the lifeguard
responded immediately.

PAL v CA A complaint was filed by Jesus Samson, averring that he flew as
co-pilot on a regular flight from Manila to Legaspi with plane
PAL co-pilot suffered belonging to defendant PAL. In their attempt to land the plane,
injuries; plane crash Captain Bustamante, due to his very slow reaction and poor
landed beyond judgment overshot the airfield, and as a result notwithstanding
runway; causal the diligent efforts of the plaintiff co-pilot to avert an accident, the
The law is clear in requiring a common carrier to exercise the
highest degree of care in the discharge of its duty and business
of carriage and transportation under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1756
of the New Civil Code. These Articles provide:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business
connection; periodic airplane crashlanded beyond the runway; that the jolt caused the
dizzy spells, head of the plaintiff to hit and break through the thick front
headache and windshield of the airplane causing him severe brain concussion,
general debility wounds and abrasions on the forehead with intense pain and
suffering. The complaint further alleged that instead of giving
plaintiff expert and proper medical treatment called for by the
nature and severity of his injuries, defendant simply referred him
to a company physician, a general medical practitioner, who
limited the treatment to the exterior injuries without examining the
severe brain concussion of plaintiff. He was further called to duty
by PAL just several days after the incident. Suffering periodic
dizzy spells, headache and general debility, plaintiff every now
and then complained to defendant. PAL later on discharged him
from his employment.
PAL denied the averment in the complaint alleging among others
that the accident was due due solely and exclusively to inevitable
unforeseen circumstances whereby plaintiff sustained only
superficial wounds and minor injuries which were promptly
treated by defendants medical personnel.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, ordering
PAL to pay petitioner damages, attorneys fees, and the
expenses of litigation. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
judgment, modifying the award of damages. Upon denial of their
MR, PAL filed this petition on the ground that the decision is not
in accord with law or with applicable jurisprudence.
PAL claims said facts are not fully borne out by the evidence on
record and insists that the injuries suffered by private respondent
during the accident were superficial in nature; that the periodic
spells, headache, and general debility complaint of every now
and then by private respondent subsequent to the incident were
due to emotional disturbances and that no negligence can be
attributed to Capt. Delfin Bustamante much less to PAL for the
occurrence, hence PAL cannot be held liable for damages.
Petitioner claims absence of any causal connection between
private respondents superficial injuries and his alleged
subsequent periodic spells, headache and general debility,
pointing out that these subsequent ailments were found by
competent physician to be due to emotional disturbances.
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is
further expressed in Articles 1734, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7,
while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passenger safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755.
The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on the part of
common carriers is for the safety of passengers as well as for
the members of the crew or the complement operating the
carrier, the airplane in the case at bar. And this must be so for
any omission, lapse or neglect thereof will certainly result to the
damage, prejudice, nay injuries and even death to all aboard
the plane, passengers and crew members alike.
Moreover, because of the repeated recurrence of Samsons
neurasthenic symptoms cranad(dizzy spells, headache,
nervousness), this prompted PALs Flight Surgeon to
recommend that Samson be grounded permanently as he was
psychologically unfit to resume his duties as pilot.

ISSUE: W/N there is a causal connection between the injuries

suffered by Jesus Samson during the accident and the
subsequent periodic dizzy spells, headache and general
debility

HELD: The dizzy spells, headache and general debility of

Samson was an after-effect of the crash-landing.

Substantial evidence support this conclusion.

1. Defendant would imply that plaintiff suffered only
superficial wounds which were treated and not brain
injury. The Court rejected PALs claim however
considering that they found it it is extremely hard to be
certain of the cause of his dizzy spells, and suggested a
possibility that it was due to postraumatic syndrome,
evidently due to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff in
hitting the forehead against the windshield of the plane
during the accident. The admitted difficulty of defendants
doctors in determining the cause of the dizzy spells and
headache cannot be a sound basis for finding against the
plaintiff and in favor of defendant.
2. Whatever it might be, the fact is that such dizzy spells,
headache and general debility was an after-effect of the
crash-landing. Be it brain injury or psychosomatic,
neurasthenic or psychogenic, there is no gainsaying the
fact that it was caused by the crash-landing. As an effect
of the cause, not fabricated or concocted, plaintiff has to
be indemnified. The fact is that such effect caused his
discharge.
3. A surgeon found that blood was coming from plaintiffs
ears and nose. He testified that plaintiff was suffering
from cerebral concussion as a result of traumatic injury to
the brain caused by his head hitting on the windshield of
the plane during the crash-landing.
4. A neurologist and psychiatrist found abnormality reflected
 by the electroencephalogram examination in the frontal
area on both sides of plaintiffs head.

The SC also found imputation of gross negligence by PAL for

having allowed Capt. Bustamante to fly on that day despite being
sick. He admittedly had tumor of the nasopharynx cranad(nose).
In fact, one month prior to the crash-landing, there had been
instances of Capt. Bustamantes slow reaction and
miscalculations.

Assuming that the pilot was not sick or that the tumor did not
affect the pilot in managing the plane, the evidence shows that
the overshooting of the runway and crash-landing at the
mangrove was caused by the pilot for which acts the defendant
must answer for damages caused thereby. And for this
negligence of defendants employee, it is liable. At least, the law
presumes the employer negligent imposing upon it the burden of
proving that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the supervision of its employees.

Petitioner is a common carrier engaged in the business of

carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public, as defined in Art. 1732, CC. The law is clear in requiring a
common carrier to exercise the highest degree of care in the
discharge of its duty and business of carriage and transportation.

National In a memorandum of agreement, NDC appointed MCP as its NDC: National Development Copmany
Development v CA agent to manage and operate Dona Nati for and in its behalf. MCP: Maritime Company of the Philippines
1,200 bales of American Cotton was loaded on board the vessel
in San Francisco and 200 cartons of sodium lauryl sulfate and 10
cases of aluminum foil were loaded at Tokyo. En route to Manila,
the vessel figured in a collision at Ise Bay, Japan with a
Japanese vessel. Therefore, there was damage and loss of
cargo.

Petitioner was an insurer and, therefore, it paid the consignees

or their successors-in-interest the amount of damaged or lost
cargo. It filed a complaint to recover the amount from NDC and
MCP as owner and ship agent respectively, of the Dona Nati
vessel.
 ISSUE: which laws govern loss or destruction of goods due to
collision of vessels outside Philippine waters

NDC argues that it is the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act that

should apply and not the Civil Code or the Code of Commerce.
Under the said Act, the carrier is not responsible for loss or
damage resulting from the act of the pilot or servants of the
carrier in the navigation or management of the ship.

The Court here ruled that the law of the country to which the
goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common
carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. Thus, the
rule is that for cargoes transported from Japan to the Philippines,
the liability of the carrier is governed primarily by the Civil Code,
and in matters not regulated by it, by the Code of Commerce and
special laws. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act being a special
law, it is merely suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code.

In this case, it is established that the goods were transported

from San Francisco and Tokyo to the Philippines. Therefore,
Philippine laws will apply and it is immaterial that the collision
occurred in foreign waters.

Under the Civil Code, common carriers from the nature of their
business are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in their
undertakings. Further, the Code of Commerce provides that
where collision is imputable to the personnel of a vessel, the
owner shall indemnify the losses and damages incurred. Primary
liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of
the universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster is merely
the representative of the owner who has the actual or
constructive control over the conduct of the voyage.

It is well settled that both the owner and agent of the offending
vessel are liable for damage done where both are impleaded,
and because the obligation had its origin in a tortious act and did
not arise from contract.

International Petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.) Inc., Respondeat superior = let the master answer
Flavors v Argos hereafter IFFI, is a corporation organized and existing under
LIBELOUS Philippine laws. Respondents Argos and Pineda are the general Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of
MANAGING manager and commercial director, respectively, of the defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
DIRECTOR AND Fragrances Division of IFFI. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
PREMATURE managing director. Costa and respondents dont get along too party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal
INDEPENDENT well. When the positions of GM and commercial director were prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence.
CIVIL CASE decided to be redundant, Argos and Pineda tendered their Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his
resignation. But Costa declared them persona non grata and primary civil liability. It does not apply to an action against the
advised his employees not deal with them further. Respondents employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such
filed a case of libel against Costa, and an independent civil case liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the
for damages against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of the
Costas employer. MTD on the ground that respondents failed to wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed
reserve right to file a separate civil action was denied. Could the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought
private respondents sue petitioner for damages based on against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the
subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under conviction of its employee is premature.
Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the
criminal libel cases against petitioners employee? SC says
NO. Respondents tried to make IFFI subsidiarily liable for
Costas libelous statements, using Art. 33 as basis since this can
hold the employer liable in an independent civil case from the
libel case of the employee. However, by invoking the principle of
respondeat superior, respondents tried to rely on Art. 33 to hold
IFFI primarily liable for its employees defamatory statements. But
we also find that respondents did not raise the claim of primary
liability as a cause of action in its complaint before the trial court.
On the contrary, they sought to enforce the alleged subsidiary
liability of petitioner as the employer of Costa, the accused
in pending criminal cases for libel, prematurely. Subsidiary
liability can only arise after conviction.

Castilex Industrial Romeo So Vasquez was driving his motorcycle at around 2:00
v Vasquez am. When circling the Fuente Osmea, he was hit by the Toyota
Hilux (GBU-714) owned by petitioner corporation, but driven by
Guy hits motorcycle Benjamin Abad, its Production Manager. The latter rushed
rider at 2:00 a.m. in Vasquez to the hospital. Abad bound himself to answer all of
a sketch place after Vasquezs expenses. However, Vasquez would later succumb to
doing overtime work his injuries. The respondents are the parents of Vasquez.
Respondeat superior was applied, not bonus pater familias. In
the US, the presumption is conclusive on the employer; in the
Philippines, it is merely gives rise to presumption juris tantum,
and it is indispensable that the employee was engaged within
the scope of his assigned tasks.

A criminal case was filed against Abad, but it was dismissed due
to failure to prosecute. The civil case was instituted for the
petitioner to answer vicariously for the Vasquezs death; Cebu
Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid medical expenses.
The issue is whether or not the corporation is liable for the
damages caused by Abad who was driving a car owned by it.

No, it is not. The Court first clarified the misapprehension of

petitioners with regard to the fourth and fifth paragraphs of Art.
2180, to which the CA found Abad liable under the fifth, and the
Court agreed. Under the said paragraph, whether or not
engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for
torts committed by its employee within the scope of his assigned
tasks. Thus, it had to be determined whether Abad was working
with said scope.

The Court found that he was not. Firstly, Abad himself testified
that at that time, he was leaving the restaurant he ate in after he
did some overtime work for the petitioner. Contrary to the CA, the
Court held that the mere fact that Abad was driving a car owned
by the petitioner at the time the tort was committed is not enough
to charge petitioner unless he was within the scope of his
employment. By surveying American jurisprudence, the Court
saw that:
1. An employee going to and from work to get meals is not
within the scope of his employment
2. Traveling to and from work is also not within the scope of
employment, unless the employee has not fixed time at
work and his duties require him to move from place to
place
3. An employee using the company vehicle outside office
hours generally makes the employer not liable for
negligent operation

Thus, the Court ruled that such principles are applicable in our
jurisdiction on the basis of respondeat superior, but such is a
rebuttable presumption. Further, it is essential that the employee
was acting in his employers business or within the scope of his
assigned tasks.

Finally, it was shown that Abad was leaving Goldies Restaurant,

which is seven km away from his workplace, with a woman at
2:00 a.m. It was noted that the area he was in was littered with
prostitutes, pimps and drug addicts. Given the circumstances, in
 no way can it be construed that Abad was working within the
scope of his functions entrusted to him.
Manuel v CA Private respondents were passengers of International Harvester
Scout Car (Scout car) owned by Ramos for their trip to
Bus and Scout Car Camarines Norte in the morning of 27 Dec 1977. Respondent
Collission Abcede was the driver of the car.
Zig Zag Road of
Camarines Norte It was 4:10PM and there was a drizzle when the Scout car was
hit by a bus owned by Superlines Transportation, Co. Inc, with
Emiliano Manuel as driver, as it was negotiating its way up the
zigzag road in Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte. Were it not for a
protective railing, the Scout car would have fallen into a deep
ravine. However, all its ten occupants, including 4 children, were
injured, 7 of which sustained serious physical injuries.
Emiliano Manuel, the bus driver, was prosecuted for multiple
physical injuries, but he could not be found, so this quasidelict
case was instituted against Manuel and Superlines. RTC and CA
both granted the petition.
In this appeal - and issue in this case - is that petitioners contend
that it was Fernando Abcede, Jr., the driver of the scout car, who
also did not have a license, was at fault. According to them, a
bus passenger was heard saying 'Iyan na nga sinasabi ko ang
lakas ng loob nung driver ng kotse.' Likewise, they contend that
the accuracy of the pictures and sketches submitted are
inadmissible in evidence because it was prepared the day after
the incident. The "tell-tale" skid marks and other details have
already been obliterated by the heavy downpour which lasted for
at least an hour after the accident.
Mallari v CA Mallari Sr., petitioner, was the owner of a passenger jeep
driven by his son.
The jeep collided with a deliver van of Bulletin Publishing
Corp along the National Highway in Bataan.
He was on the proper lane of the road until a Fiera
stopped in front of him.
Eh, tangina, di maka hintay, nagcounterflow si gago para
makaovertake kahit nakita niyang padating yung Delivery
Van ng Publishing Corp.. Yan tuloy.. Bangga si gago.
The left front side of the delivery van collided with the rear
The Court denied the petition, holding that although the skid
mark argument is possible, it remains a possibility that not all
skid marks were washed away. Granting that the skid marks
were inaccurate, the respondents were able to offer other
conclusive evidence such as a trail of broken glass which
scattered along the car's side, whereby the bus lane was
entirely clear of debris.
Furthermore, the fact that the Scout Car was found at rest
against the guard railing shows that it must have been hit and
thrown backwards.
Petitioners' contention that the Scout car must have been
moved backwards to rest on the guard railing is not only a
speculation but is also contrary to human experience. There
was no reason to move it backwards if the purpose was to
clear the road, all that was done was to leave it where it was at
the time FO the collision. Even petitioners accept the fact that
when the police arrived at the scene of the accident, they found
no one there.
Petitioners also showed witnesses saying that the younger
Abcede was the one behind the driver's wheel. CA, in its fact
finding, noted that none of the witness saw him actually driving.
He could have simply been thrown off his seat toward the
steering wheel.
As to the contention that the awarded damages are excessive,
the Court found that the trial court's findings show otherwise.
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for
the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary
situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not
to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle
is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity
for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not
have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having
time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite
direction comes into view.
 left side of the jeep. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the
The collision cause the death of Israel Reyes. This contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
prompted his widow to file a case for damages against has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating
everybody involved in the collision. a traffic regulation.
The Trial Court fucking ruled that Mallari was not liable
and only Bulletin should be liable..
On appeal, however, the righteous CA reversed the
decision making Mallari, the person who should obviously
be liable, liable and relieved Bulletin from liability.
Mallari, the counter-flowing ugok, appealed to the SC.
According to him, no evidence was given to prove that he
overtook at a curve and that the TCs facts should be
given more consideration.

Issue:
W/N Mallari, and not Bulletine should be liable?

Held:
Tangina. Malamang. Liable si Mallari.
The Court of Appeals correctly found, based on the
sketch and spot report of the police authorities which
were not disputed by petitioners, that the collision
occurred immediately after petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook
a vehicle in front of it while traversing a curve on the
highway. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of
Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as amended,
otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic
Code which provides:
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. - (a) The
driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the
center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another
vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left
side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a
sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or
passing to be made in safety. (b) The driver of a vehicle
shall not overtake or pass another vehicle proceeding in
the same direction when approaching the crest of a
grade, nor upon a curve in the highway, where the drivers
view along the highway is obstructed within a distance of
five hundred feet ahead except on a highway having two
or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction
 where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass
another vehicle: Provided That on a highway, within a
business or residential district, having two or more lanes
for movement of traffic in one direction, the driver of a
vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right.
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper
lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is
clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety.
When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a
curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right
side of the road and the driver does not have the right to
drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to
turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite
direction comes into view.
In the instant case, by his own admission, petitioner
Mallari Jr. already saw that the BULLETIN delivery van
was coming from the opposite direction and failing to
consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00
o'clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane
and overtook two (2) vehicles in front of it at a curve in
the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision
resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the
jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of the
passenger jeepney, petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr., who
recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane
where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under
Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he
was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the
appellate court, petitioners failed to present satisfactory
evidence to overcome this legal presumption.

Marinduque Iron v Deceased Mamador boarded a truck belonging to petitioner, W/N the deceaseds own violation of the prohibition against
Workmens such truck got into an accident when it tried to overtake another laborers riding the haulage trucks constitutes negligence which
Compensation truck on the company road, causing it to turn over and hit a precludes recovery. NO.
Laborer riding coconut tree.
haulage truck; hit a Workmens Compensation law provides: Liability of third parties: This violation was considered as a possible evidence of
coco tree; it shall be optional with such injured employee either to claim negligence but was declared that, under the circumstances, the
Prohibition on riding compensation from his employer or sue such other person for laborer could not be declared to have acted with negligence.
haulage trucks damages.
Even granting there was negligence, it could not be notorious
The heirs sued the driver (Macunat) which was convicted and or gross negligence. Getting or accepting a free ride on the
ordered to indemnify the heirs. company's haulage truck couldnt be gross negligence,
because as the referee found, no danger or risk was apparent.

Cipriano v CA Elias Cipriano was the owner of E.S Enterprises, engaged in

Rustproofing, Kia rustproofing of vehicles. Maclin Electronics brought a 1990
Pride, Fire Insurance model Kia Pride to petitioners shop for rustproofing. The car was
ready for release on April 30 but on May 1, a fire broke out at an
adjacent restaurant. The car was kept inside the building to
protect it from theft, therefore it was not salvaged and was
burned to the ground together with the shop.
Maclin filed a suit for reimbursement of the value of the car.
Petitioner invoked fortuitous event as a ground to exempt it from
liability.
The issue in the case at bar is whether or not Cipriano can be
made liable for the loss of the car
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. As a general
rule, a violation of statutory duty is negligence per se. Cipriano is
not being held liable for the breach of his contractual obligation
with MAclin, but rather he is made libale for failure to comply with
a duty imposed upon him by law. Under PD 1572, Cipriano,
being engaged in the service and repair of motor vehicles, is
required to register with DTI and as a condition for such
registration, the covered enterprise must secure insurance
coverage. There is a statutory duty imposed which Cipriano
failed to comply with. This amounts to negligence rendering him
liable for damages. While the fire in this case might be
considered a fortuitous event, the circumstances cannot exempt
Cipriano from liability for loss.

F.F. Cruz & Co. v A fire broke out in petitioner's shop which spread to the private Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
CA respondent's house. Both the shop and the house were razed to petitioners failure to construct a firewall between its shop and
Failure to build a the ground. the residence of private respondents, in accordance with city
firewall as required ordinances, supports a findings of negligence.
by city ordinances. Private respondents filed a case for damages against petitioner
alleging that the proximate cause of their house being burned Failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety
down was due to the negligence of the petitioner in failing to regulations is an act of negligence.
construct a firewall despite several requests, which was required
under city ordinances.
 Issue: WON petitioners are liable for damages for the burning
down of respondent's house. - Yes

Held: Petitioner's failure to construct a firewall in accordance

with the city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of
negligence.

The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety

regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence.
(Teague v Fernandez)

Sanitary Steam A collision between petitioners panel truck and respondents Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law,
Laundry v CA Cimarron resulted in the death of the driver of the Cimarron like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless
along with 2 others, and injuries to the other passengers. it is a contributing cause of the injury.

Passengers of the Cimarron claimed that the vehicle was hit on A party who asserts that another person, by violation of the
its front portion by petitioner's panel truck, which was travelling in Land Transportation and Traffic Code, contributed to the
the opposite direction. collision of vehicles, has the burden of showing a causal
connection between the injury received and the alleged
The driver of petitioners truck claims that a jeepney in front of violation.
him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to
avoid hitting the jeepney and that this caused his vehicle to
swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane.
As a result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the
north-bound lane.

Private respondents then filed for damages against petitioner.

RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents.

Petitioner contends that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of

contributory negligence and, therefore, its liability should be
mitigated, if not totally extinguished. Petitioner claims that the
driver of the Cimarron was guilty of violation of traffic rules and
regulations at the time of the mishap, thus in accordance with
Art. 2185 respondent is presumed to be negligent.

Petitioner cites RA 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code)

and claims the respondents negligence consisted of the
following:
1. The Cimarron was overloaded: passenger capacity of the
vehicle was only 17 but there were 20-25 passengers.
2. The front seat was occupied by 4 adults, including the driver.
3. It had only one headlight on, as the other headlight was not
functioning.

Petitioner further contends that the sudden swerving of a vehicle

caused by its driver stepping on the brakes is not negligence per
se (Bayasen v CA). They also contend that the driver of the
Cimarron had the last opportunity to avoid the accident, but
because of their negligence, he was not able to avoid a collision
with the panel truck.

Issue: WON petitioners can be held liable for damages? - Yes.

Held: It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the
Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles.
Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal
connection between the injury received and the violation of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the
violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the
injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence,
consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other
negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a
contributing cause of the injury.

The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the

petitioners driver. The swerving of the panel truck to the opposite
lane could mean not only that petitioner's driver was running the
vehicle at a very high speed, but also that he was tailgating the
passenger jeepney ahead of it.

The panel truck was over speeding because the maximum

allowable speed for trucks and buses on open country roads is
only 50 km/hr. Petitioner was running at 60km/hr, in violation of
the law.

Since petitioner was not able to fully prove by preponderance of

evidence that he exercised due diligence in the selection of its
employees, he is liable for the negligence of his employee.