CHAPTER VI
Sotto v. Sotto
Facts:
The case involves a petition under Section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to reopen the land registration proceedings with regard
to Lot No. 7510 of the Cadaster (i.e. an official register of real
property in a district) of Cebu.
Petitioner, owner of the lot, alleges that he left Respondent in
charge of the lot when he left Cebu in 1907. In April 1921, Petitioner
learned from the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Cebu that the
Respondent had fraudulently obtained registration of the lot in his
own name, and that:
Certificate of Title for that lot had been issued to
Respondent on January 24, 1920
As he was in Cebu, the Petitioner was unable to appear in
court during the land registration proceedings to defend his
property rights
Such appearance was his only remedy to recover the
property in question
Petitioner moves to annul the decision of the Court of First Instance
and requests for a new trial.
Issue:
W/N Section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to
decisions pertaining to land registration proceedings covered by a
Final Decree NO
Ruling:
Section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is NOT applicable to
decisions pertaining to land registration proceedings covered by a
Final Decree.
Looking into the brief history of Section 513 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which was mentioned in Section 14 and Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act as amended by Act No. 1108, it can be
construed that a final decree of confirmation and registration is
not a judgment within the meaning of Section 513 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and such decree cannot be reopened under said
Code except for reasons and in the manner stated in Section 38 of
the said Act.
The Land Registration Act itself distinguishes between a judgment
and the final decree. The decision rendered by the court is styled a
"judgment." The final "decree of confirmation and registration"
cannot be entered until at least thirty days after such judgment has
been rendered.
To hold that the Legislature, by a mere reference in Act No. 1108 to
Section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure intended to include such
final decrees in the term judgment as employed in that section
would be equivalent to holding that it proposed in this casual
manner to abolish the Torrens system. If a final decree of
confirmation and registration should be reopened and cancelled, it
is, of course, obvious that all certificates of title issued under the
decree would fail whether the holders were guilty of bad faith or
not.
In relation to Statutory Construction:
As Act No. 1108 only amended certain sections of the Land
Registration Act and did not amend the Act as a whole or
introduce any new principle, the amended section should
be read in connection with the other sections of the original
Act as if all had been enacted in the same statute, and as far
as possible, effect should be given to them all in furtherance
of the general design of the Act.
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts of section
and is animated by one general purpose and intent.
Consequently each part or section should be construed in
connection with every other part or section and so as to
produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine
the attention to the one section to be construed.
Loyola Grand Villas (South) Homeowners Association v Court of Appeals
G.R 117188 | August 07, 1997 | J. Romero
This is the issue raised in this petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) recognizing LGVHA as
the sole homeowners association in Loyola Grand Villas and
revoking the certificates of registration issued to Loyola Grand Villas
Homeowners (North) Association Incorporated and Loyola Grand
Villas Homeowners (South) Association Incorporated
Optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum: the best interpreter
of the statute is the statute itself
Facts
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. (LGVHAI) was
organized on 8 February 1983 as the homeowners' association for
Loyola Grand Villas.
It was registered with the Home Financing Corporation, the
predecessor of herein respondent HIGC, as the sole
homeowners organization in the said subdivision.
However, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws.
The LGVHAI officers then tried to registered its by-laws in 1988, but
they failed to do so. After, they also discovered that there were two
other homeowners' organizations within the subdivision - the
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (North) Association, Inc.(North
Association) and herein Petitioner Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners
(South) Association, Inc. (South Association).
In July, 1989, when Soliven inquired about the status of LGVHAI,
Atty. Joaquin A. Bautista, the head of the legal department of the
HIGC, informed him that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved
for two reasons.
it did not submit its by-laws within the period required by
the Corporation Code.
there was non-user of corporate charter because HIGC had
not received any report on the associations activities.
These paved the way for the formation of the North and South
Associations.
These developments prompted the officers of the LGVHAI to lodge a
complaint with the HIGC.
They questioned the revocation of LGVHAIs certificate of
registration without due notice and hearing and
concomitantly prayed for the cancellation of the certificates
of registration of the North and South Associations by
reason of the earlier issuance of a certificate of registration
in favor of LGVHAI.
Petitioner South Association appealed the ruling, contending that
LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by
Section 46 of the Corporation Code effectively automatically
dissolved the corporation. The Appeals Board of the HIGC and the
Court of Appeals both rejected the contention of the Petitioner
affirmed the decision of Hearing Officer Javier.
Issue:
Whether or not LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period
prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code had the effect of
automatically dissolving the said corporation?
Ruling:
No.
Automatic corporate dissolution for failure to file the by-laws on
time was never the intention of the legislature.
Moreover, even without resorting to the records of deliberations of
the Batasang Pambansa, the law itself provides the answer to the
issue.
Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best
interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima statuli
interpretatix est ipsum statutum), Section 46 reveals the
legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory,
meaning for the word ''must" in the first sentence thereof.
Note should be taken of the second paragraph of the law
which allows the filing of the by-laws even prior to
incorporation.
This provision in the same section of the Code rules
out mandatory compliance with the requirement of
filing the by-laws "within 1 month after receipt of
official notice of the issuance of its certificate of
incorporation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission."
It necessarily follows that failure to file the by-laws within that
period does not imply the "demise" of the corporation.
By-laws may be necessary for the "government" of the
corporation but these are subordinate to the articles of
incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and
related statutes.
There are in fact cases where by-laws are unnecessary to
corporate existence or to the valid exercise of corporate
powers, thus: "In the absence of charter or statutory
provisions to the contrary, by-laws are not necessary either
to the existence of a corporation or to the valid exercise of
the powers conferred upon it, certainly in all cases where
the charter sufficiently provides for the government of the
body; and even where the governing statute in express
terms confers upon the corporation the power to adopt by-
 laws, the failure to exercise the power will be ascribed to
mere non action which will not render void any acts of the
corporation which would otherwise be valid."
Maddumba v. Ozaeta
FACTS:
Maddumba is the current justice of peace of the municipalities of Solan
and Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the former position of (Respondent) De
Guzman before he joined the Phil. Constabular.
De Guzma had the rank of first lieutenant and continued in service until
the outbreak of the Pacific War.
Later on, after the liberation, De Guzman was demobilized from the Phil.
Army
He wrote to the then Sec. of Justice, the other respondent, Hon. Ozaeta,
expressly asking for his reinstatement to his old post of justice of peace,
invoking the benefits of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 1
(National Defense Act) and RA No. 65 (Phil. Army Bill of Rights)
The application was favorably considered by the Secretary and was
endorsed to the Chief of the Exec. Office. He also recommended that Mr.
Maddumba, the present incumbent be advised to tender his resignation and
that if fails to do so, the office will be declared vacant.
While the matter was still being considered by the Executive, De
Guzman filed his Cert. of Candidacy for the pos. of Vice-mayor of Lingayen,
Pangasinan however, he lost. Thereafter, he wrote to the Sec of Justice,
requesting information as to the status of his application for reinstatement.
Sec. Ozaeta issued A.O 13, wherein a number of former justices of peace
were ordered reinstated, among them is De Guzman. Maddumba was
ordered to vacate his post and surrender the same to De Guzman.
Maddumba filed a petition in the Court, which seeks to enjoin the
respondent Sec. of Justice from enforcing AO 13 and De Guzman from
entering into the discharge of duties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not De Guzman can validly claim the benefits granted
under the Commonwealth Act No.1, specifically Sec. 49 thereof.
RULING:
No. De Guzman has lost his right to the position of justice of the
peace. Sec. 49 of Commonwealth Act No.1 reads as follows:
"Any employee of the Government called for trainee instruction, or
for regular annual active duty training, shall not be compelled to lose his
position or to suffer a lose of pay due to his absence in the fulfillment of his
military obligations."
To intelligently construe the meaning of the clause called for trainee
instruction or for regular annual active duty training the whole Act should
be considered.
The act divides the Phil. Army contemplated by it into the Regular and
the Reserve Force.
Those who served in the Regular force is not allowed to be reinstated to
the office of justice of the peace because by joining the Regular force, they
would have to abandon their judicial office.
The respondent claims that he belongs to the Reserve force.
Sec. 49 is only applied to trainees and to those employees called for
regular annual active duty training
It is important to bear in mind that this is only annual active duty
training, not SERVICE but only TRAINING.
De Guzman joined the Phil. Constabulary and stayed with it indefinitely
and up to the outbreak of the Pacific war. The Court have serious doubts
that he did so only for the regular annual active duty training, there is
reason to believe that he joined the regular force not for mere training.
And also, after the liberation, he was reactivated into the Phil. Army not
on the basis of the regular annual duty training but for regular service in the
armed force of the Phil.
For this reason, the Court believe and hold that section 49 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 does not apply to the case of the respondent
who, left his post as justice of the peace, not to undergo the regular annual
active duty training for several days, or at the longest, weeks, but to join the
regular Constabulary force with which he stayed up to the outbreak of the
last war, and who, later, after liberation, re- enlisted in the Philippine Army,
not for training, but for military service where he remained in active military
service up to the date of his being mustered out. It is unreasonable to
believe that said section 49 could have contemplated and intended holding
a public office, especially a judicial position like that of justice of the peace,
not only open but as still being held (including the salary corresponding to
it) by one who leaving it, joined the Army for military service and stayed
with it for several years, and seeks to return to it only after he was mustered
out.
Republic v. CA
Facts:
Private respondent ACIL Corporation owned several hectares of land in
Linoan, Davao del Norte, which the government took pursuant to
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private respondents certificates of
title were cancelled and new ones were issued and distributed to farmer-
beneficiaries. Lands were valued by Land Bank at 19,312.24 per hectare for
Riceland and 4,267.88 per hectare for brushland. It appears however in
STATEMENT of Agricultural landholdings, a lower Fair Value Acceptable to
Landowner was stated and that based on this statement, the Land Bank
valued private respondents lands uniformly at 16,311.79 per hectare.
Private respondent filed for Petition for Just Compensation in the Regional
Trial Court. It was dismissed by the RTC on the ground that the respondent
should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) pursuant to section 50 of RA 6657 which states that the DAR
is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform.
Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case filed by the respondent?
Ruling:
Yes.
According to section 57 of RA 6657, the Special Agrarian Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under this Act.
New rules of procedure of the DARAB provide that the decision of the
Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment
of just compensation appealable not to the Board but shall be brought
directly to the REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS designated as Special Agrarian
Courts within 15 days from receipt of the notice thereof.
In this case, the private respondents case was properly brought in the RTC.
Lichauco v. Apostol (Johann)
Facts:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importing carabaos
and other draft animals into the Philippines. It now desires to import a
shipment of draft and bovine cattle from Pnom-Phen for the manufacture of
serum. Respondent Director of Agriculture refused to admit said cattle,
except under the condition in Administrative Order 21 of the Bureau of
Agriculture that said cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest
before leaving Pnom-Phen. Petitioner therefore asks for an order requiring
respondents to admit the contemplated importation of cattle into the
Philippines and enjoin them from the enforcement of said administrative
order in the future.
The petitioner asserts that under the first proviso to section 1762 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052 of the Philippine
Legislature, it has "an absolute and unrestricted right to import carabao and
other draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum from
Pnom-Pehn, Indo-China, into the Philippine Islands" and that the
respondents have no authority to impose upon the petitioner the restriction
referred to above, requiring the immunization of the cattle before
shipment.
The respondents, on the other hand, rely upon section 1770 of the
Administrative Code and upon Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of
Agriculture, promulgated on July 29, 1922, by the Director of Agriculture, in
relation with Department Order No. 6, promulgated on July 28, 1922, by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as supplying authority for
the action taken.
Important provisions in Courts decision:
1. First paragraph of section 1762 of Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3052 of the Philippine Legislature:
SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign
countries into the Philippine Islands. It shall be unlawful
for any person or corporation to import, bring or introduce
live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign
country. The Director of Agriculture may, with the approval
of the head of the department first had, authorize the
importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of
thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the
same to the native cattle of these Islands, and such as may
be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to
exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided, however,
That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the
importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and
bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum: Provided,
further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the
 importation, bringing or introduction of which into the
Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be submitted to
regulations issued by the Director of Agriculture, with the
approval of the head of the department, prior to authorizing
its transfer to other provinces.
2. Section 1770 of Administrative Code:
SEC. 1770. Prohibition against bringing of animals from
infected foreign countries. When the Department Head
shall by general order declare that a dangerous
communicable animal disease prevails in any foreign
country, port, or place and that there is danger of spreading
such disease by the importation of domestic animals
therefrom, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to
ship or bring into the Philippine Islands any such animal,
animal effects, parts, or products from such place, unless
the importation thereof shall be authorized under the
regulation of the Bureau of Agriculture.
Section 1770 of the Administrative Code on its face authorizes the action
taken by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in closing our
ports to the importation of cattle and carabao from French Indo-China,
supposing of course, as everybody knows and as the petitioner does not
deny, that the disease of rinderpest exists in that country.
It is claimed that section 1762 of the Administrative Code, so far as it
authorizes restriction upon the importation of draft cattle and bovine cattle
for the manufacture of serum, has been impliedly repealed by the
amendatory Act No. 3052, which is of later enactment that the
Administrative Code. It mainly relies on the first proviso to section 1762, as
amended by said Act No. 3052, which states:
"Provided, however, that the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit
the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for
the manufacture of serum."
Issue:
W/N section 1770 has been repealed by implication, in so far as it relates
to draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum.
Ruling:
It is repealed by implication, for it will be noted that that Act No. 3052 has
no repealing clause, and it contains only one section, i. e., that amending
section 1762 of the Administrative Code.
The contention of the petitioner is untenable, for the reason that section
1762, as amended, is of a general nature, while section 1770 deals with a
particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in section 1762.
Section 1770 is not to be considered as inconsistent with section 1762, as
amended; on rather it must be treated as a special qualification of section
1762.
Section 1770 is special, in the sense of dealing with a special contingency
not dealt with in section 1762, is readily apparent upon comparing the two
provisions. While section 1762 relates generally to the subject of the
bringing of animals into the Island at any time and from any place, section
1770 confers on the Department Head a special power to deal with the
situation which arises when a dangerous communicable disease prevails in
some defined foreign country, and the provision is intended to operate only
so long as that situation continues.
A general statute without negative words does not repeal a previous statute
which is particular, even though the provisions of one be different from the
other.
Wherever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the
same statute, and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would
overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the
general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the
statute to which it may properly apply.
GENERAL RULE: Repeals by implication are not to be favored.
It must not be supposed that the Legislature intended by a latter statute to
repeal a prior one on the same subject, unless the last statute is very broad
in its terms and very clear and explicit in its words as to show that it was
intended to cover the whole subject and to displace the prior statute.
It is concluded that section 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in full
force; and the determination of this question is necessarily fatal to the
petitioner's case. There can be no dispute; and when the Department Head
declared that the disease prevails in those regions and that there is danger
of spreading it by the importation of cattle and carabao into this country, he
was acting upon a matter within his province, the Court is not disposed to
review the conclusion.
People v. Gatchalian (Jojo)
Facts:
Alfonso Gatchalian was an owner and manager of New Life Drug Store in the
City of Zamboanga. He was charged before the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga with a violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 602 in four
separate informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 2206, 2207, 2208 and 2209) for
not paying the minimum wage to one his employees, Expedite Fernandez.
He only received P60 to P90 for August 1951 up to December 1953, leaving
a difference of an unpaid salary in the total amount of P1,016.64 as
provided by law.
In their defense, Gatchalians counsel stated that the violation charged does
not constitute a criminal offense, but carries only a civil liability and even if
it does, the section of the applicable law does not carry any penalty for its
violation. The City Attorney contended that the law carries both civil and
criminal liability, the latter being covered in Section 15 which provides for
the penalty for all willful violations of any of the provisions of the Minimum
Wage Law.
On December 1956, the Court issued an order dismissing the informations
with costs de oficio and cancelling the bail bond filed by the "accused. The
court also directed the Regional Representative of the Department of Labor
to immediately institute a civil action against the erring employer for the
collection of the alleged underpayment of wages due the employees. A
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the Government took the
present appeal.
Issue: W/N Gatchalian is criminally liable for paying below the minimum
wage to Fernandez?
Ruling:
Yes. It is clear that Section 3 explicitly requires every owner of an
establishment outside of Manila or its environs to pay each of its employees
P3.00/day and one year thereafter of the effectivity date, P4.00/ day.
Section 15 imposes a penalty for a willful violation of any of its provisions
and for any underpayment of wages due an employee, while Section 16
states that any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of section
15 shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a line of not more than
P10,000, or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.
The origin of our Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602) may be of help in
arriving at an enlightened and proper interpretation of the provisions under
consideration. It was patterned after the U. S. Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, as amended, and so a comparative study of the pertinent provisions
of both would be enlightening.
An examination of the two Acts show that while in substance, they are
similar, they however contain some differences in their phraseology and in
the appointment of their provisions. While Section 15 (a), paragraph 2, of
the Fair Labor Standards Act makes it unlawful for an employer not to pay
the minimum wage prescribed therein, our Minimum Wage Law does not
contain a similar provision. The failure to pay the prescribed minimum wage
is not declared unlawful in our law.
It should also be noted that while Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act
which provides for the penalties to be imposed for any willful violation of
the provisions of the Act specifically states that those penalties refer to acts
declared unlawful under Section 15 of the same Act, our law does not
contain such specification. Section 15 (a) merely provides that "Any person
who willfully violates any of the provisions of this Act shall upon conviction"
be subject to the penalty therein prescribed. This reveals that while the Fair
Labor Standards Act intends to subject to criminal action ONLY ACTS THAT
ARE DECLARED UNLAWFUL, our law by legislative fiat intends to punish NOT
ONLY THOSE EXPRESSLY DECLARED UNLAWFUL BUT EVEN THOSE NOT SO
DECLARED BUT ARE CLEARLY ENJOINED TO BE OBSERVED TO CARRY OUT
THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF THE LAW. One such provision is
undoubtedly that which refers to the payment of the minimum wage
embodied in Section 3.
Indeed, the main objective of the law is to provide for a rock-bottom wage
to be observed and followed by all employers of an agricultural and
industrial establishment. This objective would be defeated were we to
adopt a restrictive interpretation of the above penal clause, for an employer
who knows that he cannot be amenable to a criminal action would be prone
to subvert the law because if he is detected it would be easy for him to pay
the underpayment and the corresponding interest as would be the case
were he to assume merely a civil liability.
Although it is true that Section 3 under which appellee was charged does
not state that it shall be unlawful for an employer to pay his employees
wages below the minimum wage, but merely requires that the employer
shall pay wages not below the minimum wage. Absence of such declaration
does not make the non-observance of the provisions less unlawful than
otherwise, for such provision embodies precisely the raison d'etre of the law
itself. Indeed, Section 3 is the very provision on which all the other
provisions of the law are built.
The informations under which Gatchalian was charged only mention Section
3 of the law as the one violated and this section does not contain a penal
clause, but this does not make the informations defective. There is no law
which requires that in order that an accused may be convicted the specific
provision which penalizes that act charged be mentioned in the information.
Section 15 (a) is clear and unambiguous and covers the provisions embodied
in Section 3 of the law.
UP Board of Regents and Cristino Jamias v. Auditor General and the GSIS
(Joshua)
Facts:
Petitioner Cristino Jamias was a Professor of English Language and
Literature and concurrently Head of the University Publications Department.
His service had been unquestionably continuous for more than fifteen years
before he reached the age of 65 years on July 20, 1961. Dean (now Regent)
Tomas S. Fonacier of the U.P. College of Arts and Sciences requests that
Jamias' service be extended for one academic year for he had been
commissioned to write the history of U.P. but had just finished half of it.
The Auditor General held that the Board of Regents was without power to
extend the services of U.P. professors beyond the compulsory limit of 65
years. GSIS wrote Prof. Jamias that his services rendered after the
compulsory retirement age were illegal; and that he (Jamias) was not
entitled to compensation. Then followed the directive of U.P. Auditor
Alfredo Liboro that Prof. Jamias' salary be withheld.
Issue:
Whether or not the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines
(U.P.) may extend the tenure of a professor beyond the retirement age by
law fixed at 65 years.
Ruling:
No. As government employees, U.P. professors are compulsorily covered by
the Retirement Law, Commonwealth Act 186, as amended, which creates a
uniform retirement system for all members of the GSIS. The applicable
retirement law at the time Prof. Jamias reached retirement age of 65 years
on July 20, 1961 was Section 4 (a), Commonwealth Act 186
SEC. 4. Scope of application of System. (a) Membership in the System
shall be compulsory upon all regularly and permanently appointed
employees, xxx upon all teachers except only those who are substitutes xxx
It makes eminent sense to say that the deletion of the University of the
Philippines from the exception cannot be of de minimis effect (insignificant).
It may be said that in accordance with Republic Act 660, retirement was
automatically compulsory at age 65 if the employee had completed 15 years
of service; except that upon specific approval by the President of the
Philippines, an employee might be allowed to continue to serve after the
age of 65 years if he possessed special qualifications and his services were
needed. This power given to the President by Republic Act 660 was granted
also by Republic Act 728 to the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
However, when Sec. 12(e) of Commonwealth Act 186 (as amended by RA
3096, the law here applicable) took effect on June 17, 1961, this grant of
power to extend the service of an employee beyond the age of 65 was
eliminated. Such elimination operates to repeal the eliminated provision.
Retired employee may be retained in the government beyond 65 years of
age finds support from Section 12(d) of Commonwealth Act 186 (as
amended by RA 3096)
(d) An employee separated from the service who is receiving an annuity
shall not be eligible again to appointment to any appointive position or
employment under any 'employer' unless the appointing authority
determines that he is possessed of special qualifications and his medical
examination has been approved by the System, in which event he shall not
be entitled to payments of his annuity during the period of his new
employment. Upon the termination of his new appointment, the payments
of the annuity which were discontinued shall be resumed.
To harmonize Section 12(d) with Section 12(e) as it stood amended by
Republic Act 3096 is to hold that a retired employee who is receiving
annuity from the GSIS may be reappointed to the government service only if
he has not yet reached the age of 65 years. The prohibition in Section 12(e)
against the extension of the service of a retirable government employee
where the conditions for automatic and compulsory retirement exist is so
patent and so clear that it will not admit of any other construction that
would violate legislative intent.
But.
The unique and peculiar circumstances under which Prof. Jamias' services
were sought, engaged and harnessed anew, sufficiently justified a special
contract of services up to April 15, 1962. This the Board of Regents had
authority to do, even as it had no power to extend his original term. The
questioned resolution must be viewed in this sense. He is thus entitled to
payment of his salary up to the last named date.
Upon the view we take of this case
-vote to grant the writ of prohibition prayed by the petitioners
-permanently enjoined from withholding the salary of petitioner Cristino
Jamias corresponding to the extended period of service from July 20, 1961
to April 15, 1962
-GSIS is hereby permanently enjoined from deducting any amount from
petitioner Jamias' five-year retirement annuity
(in short, bawal magextend ng tenure ang Board of Regents, but may
compensation parin na mabibigay kay Prof. Jamias kasi nakapagtrabaho na
siya lagpas sa retirement date niya)
Cuyegkeng v Cruz (Justin)
Facts:
Petitioners Cuyegkeng et al are physicians who were listed and
nominated by the Executive Council of the Philippine Medical Association,
pursuant to Section 13 of the Medical Act of 1959, to sit as members of the
Board of Medical Examiners. Such list was delivered to President of the
Philippines for appointment. Respondent Cruz was appointed by the
President to the said board but was not part of the list submitted to the
President. Section 13 of the law states that:
The Board of Medical Examiners, its composition and duties. The Board
of Medical Examiners shall be composed of six members to be appointed by
the President of the Philippines from a confidential list of not more than
twelve names approved and submitted by the executive council of the
Philippine Medical Association
Among the 12 physicians submitted to the President for
appointment, the President decided to appoint 6 members of the Board, 5
coming from the list of 12 physicians who were submitted to the President,
and Dr. Pedro Cruz taking the 6th slot, even if he isnt in the list submitted to
the President. Petitioners contend that the President may not appoint
anyone who is not named in the list submitted by the Council, and as such,
the appointment is null and void.
When respondent was appointed on Nov. 18, 59, respondent was
already a member of such board, with his term expiring on June 20, 60.
During respondents tenure as a member of the Board, the Medical Act of
1959 was passed. Section 15 of such law states that:
Tenure of office and compensation of members. - The members of
the Board of Medical Examiners shall hold office for one year: Provided,
That any member may be reappointed for not more than one year
Issue : W/N Cruzs appointment is valid
Ruling : Yes
Held : The members of said group opine that it is not absolutely necessary
that the person reappointed under this provision be included in the list
mentioned in section 13 of Republic Act No. 2382, for, in case of conflict
between two (2) provisions of the same statute, the last in order of position
is frequently held to prevail (82 C. J. S. 718), unless it clearly appears that
the intent of Congress is otherwise, and no such intent is patent in the case
at bar. Furthermore, the purpose of section 13, in requiring the favorable
indorsement of the Philippine Medical Association, evidently, to reasonably
assure that the members of the Board of Medical Examiners are among the
best in their profession, and one who has already held, or who still holds a
position in said Board, is presumed to belong to such class, in the absence of
proof to the contrary. There is not even the slightest suggestion that
respondent does not live up to the standard required for membership in
said Board.
In conclusion, although none of the groups already adverted to have
sufficient votes to constitute the requisite majority, the members of this
Court are unanimous in the opinion that respondent herein has a good and
valid title to his office.
ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and CTA
(Keisha)
FACTS
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling
of centrifugal sugar. The sugar is produced and placed in containers
called jute bags.
 In 1957, It made two importations of jute bags, free from customs
duties and special import tax upon the Petitioners filing of re-
exportation and special import tax bond, conditioned upon the
exportation of the jute bags within one year from the date of
importation.
However, out of the 44,800 jute bags imported first, only 8,647
were exported. On the second shipment, only 25,000 were exported
out of the 75,200 jute bags. The total number of imported jute bags
in one year was only 33,647. The other 86,353 bags were only
shipped after the one-year period expired but within 3 years from
importation
Petitioner requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's
extension of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6
which was to expire the following day, citing reasons for its failure
to export the remaining jute bags within the period of one year.
The request was denied by the Commissioner.
Because of the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation
of the balance of 86,353 jute bags within one year from their
importation, the Petitioner was required to pay the amount of P
28,629.42 representing the customs duties and special import tax
due thereon, which the petitioner paid under protest but later on
demanded to refund the amount it had paid.
ISSUE
WON the Commissioner of Customs has discretion to extend the
period of one year provided for in section 23 of the Philippine Tariff
Act of 1909.
WON the interpretation or construction of an ambiguous or
uncertain statute by the Executive Department or other
Administrative Agencies be given consideration. In the case at bar,
the Bureau of Customs.
RULING
FIRST ISSUE
Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act Of 1909 and the
superseding sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code are
silent as to whether the said period may be extended even
when they are fixing at one year the period within which the
containers therein mentioned must be exported.
By reason of this silence, the Bureau of Customs Issued
Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion
and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and,
more specifically, to make officially known its policy to
consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-
extendible.
SECOND RULE
Considering that the statutory provisions in question
(Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and Sec.
105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code) have not been the
subject of previous judicial interpretation, then the
application of the doctrine of "judicial respect for
administrative construction, the Bureau of Customs, issued
Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion
and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and,
more specifically, to make officially known its policy to
consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-
extendible., " would, initially, be in order.
Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted
the statute is the rule applicable that courts will give consideration
to construction by administrative or executive departments of the
state.
The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an
ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by the executive department
or other agency charged with its administration or enforcement is
entitled to consideration and the highest respect from the courts,
and must be accorded appropriate weight in determining the
meaning of the law, especially when the construction or
interpretation is long continued and uniform or is contemporaneous
with the first workings of the statute, or when the enactment of the
statute was suggested by such agency.
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and
Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be
given controlling weight.
In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or
practical construction, the courts often refer to several factors
which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as factors leading
 the courts to give the principle controlling weight in particular
instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These factors are
the respect due the governmental agencies charged with
administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and
informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the
drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on
which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical
working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute
presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for
discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the
statute.
Uytengsu v. Republic
FACTS
Petitioner was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental in October 6, 1927. He took and finished his primary and
secondary education in the same municipality. It was in 1947 when
he moved to the US in pursuance of further studies and finished
with a degree of Bachelor of Science in 1950.
In his vacation, petitioner returned to the Philippines and filed an
application for naturalization in the same year (July 1950).
Petitioner then went back to the US to study a post-graduate course
in chemical engineering.
Application for naturalization was granted by the lower court.
The Solicitor General, believing otherwise, appealed the decision of
the lower court contending that petitioner left the Philippines
immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until
several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof, citing
Sec. 7 of Commonwealth Act no. 473 providing that any person
desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship, among other
requirements, shall reside continuously in the Philippines from the
date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to
Philippine citizenship
ISSUE
WoN residency as mentioned in the provision should mean actual
physical presence
RULING
YES. Supreme court ruled that if the residence thus required is the
actual or constructive permanent home, otherwise known as legal
residence or domicile, then the applicant must be domiciled in the
Philippines on both dates. Consequently, when section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 imposes upon the applicant the duty
to state in his sworn application "that he will reside continuously
in the Philippines" in the intervening period, it CANNOT refer
merely to the need of an uninterrupted domicile or legal
residence, irrespective of actual residence, for said legal residence
or domicile is obligatory under the law, even in the absence of the
requirement contained in said clause.
It is well settled that, whenever possible, a legal provision must not
be so construed as to be a useless surplusage, and, accordingly,
meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having
no effect whatsoever thereon.
This consequences may be avoided only by construing the clause in
question as demanding actual residence in the Philippines from the
filing of the petition for naturalization to its determination by the
court.
Thus, petition was dismissed and the decision of the lower court
granting naturalization was thereby reversed.
Mejia v. Balalong
FACTS
Petitioners are candidates for councilors of the City of Dagupan and
were elected. Respondents are also candidates but were defeated
in the November 1947 Elections.
The President, on December 30, 1947 appointed these losing
candidates as Councilors of the City of Dagupan anyway. Thus this
quo warranto proceeding by the petitioners was brought to the
Court.
ISSUE
WON the President had authority to appoint the respondents as
officials of the City of Dagupan
RULING
Under Sections 7 and 11 if Act No. 170 (the Act that created the City
of Dagupan), the President has the power to appoint the Mayor and
municipal/city councilors
 However, Section 7 of the Revised Election Code prescribes that on
the second Tuesday of November 1947 and on the same date every
four years thereafter a regular election shall be held to elect the
officials who will occupy all the elective provincial, city and
municipal offices throughout the Philippines.
This means that if the City of Dagupan was created before the
November 1947 Elections, the President has no power to appoint its
officials as they have to be elected pursuant to the Revised Election
Code.
The city government of Dagupan was organized by Executive Order
No. 96 (January 1, 1948). If the City itself was created on this date
then the President has power.
The Court rules however that the City of Daguan was created by
Act No. 170 which took effect upon its approval and is operative
from the exact instance of its becoming a law. Executive Order No.
96 which added the municipality of Calasiao to the City of
Dagupan is recognition that the City itself was already existing
thus the President had no power to appoint respondents as
councilors. The petition is granted.
Manila Lodge no. 761 Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks v Court
of Appeals (1976)
FACTS:
Philippine Commission enacted Act 1360 which authorized the City of
Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay to form part of the Luneta
extension. Said act provides that reclaimed area "shall be the property of
the City of Manila" and that the City of Manila is authorized to set aside part
of the reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension at the north end for a
hotel site, and to lease thesame, with the approval of the Governor General,
to a responsible person or corporation for a term not to exceed 99 years.
Act No. 1657, amending Act 1360 was passed to authorize Manila to lease
or sell the portion set aside as a hotel. The City of Manila then applied for a
registration of the reclaimed area known under as the Luneta extension,
situated in the district Ermita (Spanish `tong part na to arte).
The registration was subject to encumbrances in Article 39 of the Land
Registration Act as may be subsisting and (HOLA ESPANYOL NA NAMAN)
subject to the disposition and conditions of Act 1360 and contracts of sale
entered by the City of Manila with Army and Navy Club and Manila Lodge.
City of Manila then conveyed 5,543.07 square meters of the reclaimed area
to the Manila Lodge on the basis of which a transfer certificate of title was
issued to the latter over the parcel of land. At the back of the document, it
provided: city of Manila has the legal option to repurchase the said property
solely for public purposes, at any time after fifty years from the 13th of July
1911, at the price previously paid to the buying entity or the future market
price of the property, whichever value is higher.
Manila Lodge petitioned for the cancellation of the repurchase.
Manila Lodge sold the property, with its improvements, to the Tarlac
Development Corporation.(Wise yung mga lolo niyo.) TDC gave
downpayment and mortgaged the property.
Court of First Instance (trial court) classified the land to be "public park or
plaza" and, therefore, part of the public domain. The court consequently
declared that the sale of the subject land by the City of Manila to Manila
Lodge was null and void, and that TDC was a purchaser thereof in good faith
and for value from ML and can enforce its rights against the latter. CA
affirmed this decision.
ISSUE: Whether the reclaimed is patrimonial property of the city of Manila
or part of public dominion (park or plaza); and therefore subject to
repurchase under Act 1360
RULING: Public dominion, intended for public use.
1. CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE. A sale of public dominion needs authority
of the legislature. Patrimonial land does not. The statute shall be
construed as a whole: whatever changes the legislature made, it
should be given effect with its other parts. In saying that the land is
patrimonial, would be against the actual law that provides that the
City of Manila is authorized to lease or sell the land.
2. IF IT IS AN EXTENSION OF LUNETA, IT RETAINS THE CLASSIFICATION.
reclaimed area is an "extension to the Luneta in the City of Manila."
If the reclaimed area is an extension of the Luneta, then it is of the
same nature or character as the old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has
been said that a power to extend or continue an act or business
 cannot authorize a transaction that is totally distinct. It is not
disputed that the old Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is so
considered by Section 859 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of
Manila. Hence the "extension to the Luneta" must be also a public
park or plaza and for public use.
PLDT v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Facts:
The franchise contained in Act No. 1368 was originally granted to John Sabin
and Louis Glass in 1905. This was acquired by PLDT from its immediate
predecessor, the Philippine Telephone and Telegraph Company. In 1928, a
special franchise was further granted to PLDT under Act No. 3436.
Under Act No. 1368, sections 4 and 5, the company was subject to the
franchise tax of 2% of all gross receipts. Under Act. No. 3436, the franchise
tax was reduced to 1%. PLDT paid its franchise tax, but omitted thirteen
item as basis of the tax, which may be grouped as follows:
(a) Amounts due from customers but uncollected and either written off or
carried on PLDTs books
(b) Amounts received from employees of the plaintiff-appellant for supplies
and materials sold to them
(c) Uncollected amounts due from employees of PLDT for supplies and
materials sold them
(d) Interest on plaintiffs-appellant's bank deposits
Thereafter, the Collector of Internal Revenue demanded the payment of
said sum of P3,977.22 and PLDT paid it under protest and asked for the
ruling of the officer. The ruling being adverse, the plaintiff-appellant brought
action in the Court of the First Instance of Manila. The court absolved the
CIR from the plaintiff's complaint without pronouncement as to costs. It
ruled that the "gross receipts" in plaintiffs-appellant's franchises includes
amounts due from customers even if uncollected and not actually received
by plaintiff-appellant and either written off or carried along on plaintiff-
appellant's hooks. To construe the phrase gross receipts as meaning only
actual receipts so as to exclude therefrom amounts which the plaintiff-
appellant should have collected but failed to collect, would place a premium
on the failure of the plaintiff-appellant to collect amounts receivable
through no fault of the government. It would be tantamount to depriving
the government of the revenue to which it is entitled, simply because the
plaintiff-appellant has failed to collect said amounts.
Thus, PLDT filed the instant case, contending that the trial court erred in
holding that the term gross receipts includes all the items listed above (a-
d).
Issue: WON the items listed (a-b) should be subject to franchise tax
Ruling: NO for items b and c, YES for items a and d
(a): the amounts due from customers but uncollected
PLDT contends that it should not pay franchise tax thereon on the
ground that they were not gross receipts. "Receipts" means
amounts actually received, for otherwise they would not be
receipts.
If the word of the franchise were to be construed in their literal
sense, independently of the organic act or the Constitution, the
theory of the plaintiff-appellant may be plausible
However, it should be noted that the Philippine Legislature granted
the franchises through Acts Nos. 1368 and 3436 under the authority
vested in it by Section 74 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the first
organic act, and by Section 28 of the Jones Law, which provides
that:
That all franchises, privileges or concessions granted under this Act
shall provide for the payment of a reasonable percentage of gross
earnings into the Treasury of Philippine Islands, or of the province or
municipality within which such franchises are granted and exercised.
The organic acts use the word "earnings." A person may have
earned his salary but may not have collected it, or may be unable to
collect it from an insolvent employer. A person cannot demand
payment of his unpaid salary unless he has earned it. This would
show that to collect is a different act from to earn.
Consequently, the uncollected "gross receipts" which should be
construed as meaning the same thing as "gross earnings" should be
subject to the franchise tax.
Therefore, the amounts above mentioned due from customers
which are uncollected or written off or carried in the books are
subject to the franchise tax. The acts of the Legislature granting the
franchises should be construed so as not to contravene or violate
the organic acts above mentioned, for otherwise said legislative acts
would be null and void or unconstitutional.
(b): some supplies of little value sold to employees for their convenience
and that of the company, in connection with their work
It does not appear that the company made profits out of small
transactions as mere facilities for its employees, extending over
several years.
Such being the case, it would seem far-fetched to imagine that they
come within the franchise tax.
It should be considered that the appellant has paid the regular sales
tax on these small sales. Consequently, the franchise tax collected in
said group in the amount of P97 should be refunded.
(c): uncollected amounts due from employees of PLDT for supplies and
materials sold to them
The same ruling in letter b would apply.
The amount of P23.23 should be refunded.
(d): interests on plaintiff-appellant's bank deposits
PLDT argues that the Collector of Internal Revenue, previous to the
transactions herein involved, had never collected the franchise tax
on items of the same nature as those herein in question and this is
evidence that such transactions are not subject to tax on the
principle that a prolonged practice on the part of an executive or
administrative officer in charge of executing a certain statue is an
authoritative construction of great weight.
This contention may be granted, but the principle is not absolute
and may be overcome by strong reasons to the contrary.
If through a misapprehension of law an officer has erroneously
executed it for a long time, the error may be corrected when the
true construction is ascertained. Such we deem to be the situation
in the present case.
Incidentally, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply here. There is
no doubt that said group represents profit of the company made in
the course of its regular transactions in connection with its
franchises, thus it is subject to franchise tax.
Alba v. Evangelista (Malcolm)
Facts:
On January 1, 1954, the President of the Philippines appointed Vivencio
Alajar as Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas (Annex D). He took his oath and
assumed office on January 6, 1954; on March 31 of that year, his
appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointment (Annex D-
1) and he continued holding office until November, 1955, when he received
a communication from Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema
informing him that the President had designated Juliano Alba in his stead as
Acting Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas and requesting him to turn over his
said office to Mr. Alba effective immediately.
Not satisfied with the action of the President, Vivencio C. Alajar instituted
quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Capiz against
Juliano A. Alba
The lower court held that the petitioner (Vivencio C. Alajar) was "entitled to
remain in office as Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas with all the emoluments,
rights and privileges appurtenant thereto until he resigns, dies or is removed
for cause. Without costs."
The decision, however, was not executed because the herein petitioner,
Juliano A. Alba, brought the matter up to this Superiority
The Solicitor General requested permission to intervene in the certiorari
case (G.R. No. L-10360), alleging that the order of immediate execution
issued by the trial judge deprived him of the opportunity to be heard and
defend the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 603 in the lower court and
he desire to heard by this Court before We proceed to determine the
constitutionality of section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 by the affirmative vote
of 8 Justice thereof
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 603 creating the City of Roxas provides that
the Vice-Mayor shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments and shall hold office at the
pleasure of the President.
Issue:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines can legally replace
respondent Vivencio C. Alajar, with or without cause, by petitioner Juliano
A. Alba
Ruling:
YES! A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred
by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power.
Admittedly, the act of Congress in creating a public office, defining its
powers, functions and fixing the "term" or the period during which the
officer may claim to hold the office as of right and the "tenure" or the term
during which the incumbent actually holds the office, is a valid and
constitutional exercise of legislative power
In the exercise of the power, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 603 on
April 11, 1951, creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for
the position of Vice-Mayor and its tenure or period during which the
incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President
The pervading error of the respondents lies in the fact that they insist on the
act of the President in designating petitioner Alba in the place of respondent
Alajar as one of removal. The replacement of respondent Alajar is not
removal, but an expiration of its tenure
Clearly, what is involved here is not the question of removal, or whether
legal cause should precede or not that removal. What is involved here is the
creation of an office and the tenure of such office, which has been made
expressly dependent upon the pleasure of the President.
It is an established rule that when the law authorizes a superior officer to
remove a subordinate at pleasure his discretion in the exercise of the power
of removal is absolute.
San Miguel v. Avelino (Mark C)
Facts:
Mandaue city enacted Mandaue City Ordinance No. 97, otherwise known as
the Mandaue City Tax Code. The City Treasurer demanded from San Miguel
Co. payment of specific tax on the total volume of beer it produced in
Mandaue. San Miguel contested the correction of specific tax saying that
the ordinance is void as it imposed a specific tax beyond its territorial
jurisdiction. The City Fiscal sustained its validity but the Acting Secretary of
Justice gave the opinion that it is of doubtful validity. Mandaue City filed a
suit for collection, thus contesting the opinion of the Acting Secretary of
Justice. San Miguel filed a motion to dismiss but Judge Avelino of the CFI of
Cebu denied saying that the court finds no justifiable reason in dismissing
the complaint at this stage of the proceedings. San Miguels argument is
that a suit of collection is not the appeal provided in Sec. 47 of the Judiciary
Act: The decision of the Sec of Justice shall be final and executory unless,
within 30 days upon receipt thereof, the aggrieved party contents the same
in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON the filing of suit for collection after such opinion was rendered may be
considered an appeal
Ruling:
No, to so construe sec 47 would bar what otherwise would be a proper case
cognizable by a court just because the procedure contended for, which is
that of an appeal under the circumstances of a term vague and
ambiguous, was not followed. It would run counter to the well-settled
doctrine that between two possible modes of constructions, the one which
would not be in conflict with what is ordained by the Consti is to be
preferred.
The Acting Sec of Justice limited himself to a finding that the ordinance is
of doubtful validity, which is far from a declaration of its being repugnant
to the Consti. Presumption of validity continues. To doubt is to sustain.
That is merely to accord recognition to the well-settled doctrine that only in
a very clear case is the judiciary judged in nullifying a statute or ordinance.
Flores v. San Pedro (Mark F.)
G.R L-8580 September 30, 1957
Case deals with the prescription of action for the recovery of
overtime compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
Statutes are in pari materia when both laws purpose, person, and
specific subject matter are the same.
Facts:
Petitioners are former employees in respondents electric and ice plants.
They filed a suit to recover compensation for overtime work allegedly
rendered by them during their tenure. Respondent moved for the dismissal
of the suit on the ground of prescription. Respondent invoked the 3 year
prescriptive period provided in the minimum wage law since the eight-
hour labor law does not provide for the prescription of recovery of
overtime work compensation. RTC ruled in favor of respondent, hence, the
petition with the SC.
Issue: Whether RTC was correct in using the 3-year prescriptive period
found in minimum wage law in the absence of a provision on prescription
in the Eight-hour labor law
Ruling:
No. The RTC was incorrect in applying Minimum wage laws prescriptive
period. The court ruled that the prescriptive period provided for in the
Minimum wage Law specifically refers to the enforcement of any cause of
action under that Act and its application cannot be extended to causes of
action arising under the Eight-Hour Labor Law on the theory propounded by
the lower court that the two laws are in pari materia, because in point of
fact they are not.
The two laws are distinct from one another. One pertains to minimum daily
wages with no provision for compensation of overtime work while the other
deals with the length of a working day which provides for compensation for
rendered service beyond the required hours of work. Since the two statutes
are not in pari materia, the prescriptive period found in Minimum Wage
Law cannot be applied to the Eight-Hour Labor law.
Republic v. Asuncion (PAOLO)
Facts:
On July 1991, respondent Alexander Dionisio y Manio, a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned to the Central Police District
Command Station 2 in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched by his
Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street in Novaliches to respond to a
complaint that a person was creating trouble there. Dionisio proceeded to
that place, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang.
On 7 August 1991, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the
Office of the City Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City an Information2 charging Dionisio with the crime of homicide
Respondent Judge dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 "for re-filing
with the Sandiganbayan" on the ground that the Sandiganbayan, and not
the Regional Trial Court, has jurisdiction over the case. This is because in
Deloso vs Domingo, the court said that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over offenses committed by public officials when the penalty prescribed by
law for the offense is higher than prision correccional.
The Sandiganbayan can still be classified as a regular court functioning
within the framework of the judicial department of the government. It is a
"trial court and bound by the rules governing trial courts. It is one of the
'inferior courts' in Article X of the Constitution whose jurisdiction may be
questioned before the Supreme Court and whose judgments are subject to
its review, revision, affirmance or setting aside. The independence of the
judiciary enshrined in the Constitution calls for the unitary judicial system
with the Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchical set-up"
Petitioner insists that the dismissal of the criminal case below, "for refiling
with the Sandiganbayan" was erroneous becaeuse Section 46 of R.A. No.
6975 vests the exclusive jurisdiction in criminal cases involving PNP
members only in the "regular courts" which excludes the Sandiganbayan
since it is, constitutionally and statutorily, a "special court" and not a regular
court.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman maintains the view that it is the
Sandiganbayan and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over
the subject criminal case in view of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 and the Joint
Circular of 14 October 1991. It asserts that the term "regular courts" in
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 includes the Sandiganbayan and that R.A. No.
6975 has not repealed Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is classified as a regular
court
Ruling: Yes
- Petitioner's insistence that it is not a regular court because, by the
Constitution and by the statutes, the Sandiganbayan is a special court
and, therefore, not a regular court is untenable. In the first place, a
comparison between the words regular and special is inappropriate
since the opposite of the latter is not the former and vice versa. Special
means "designed for a particular purpose; confined to a particular
purpose, object, person, or class," and is, therefore, the antonym of
general. On the other hand, regular means "steady or uniform in course,
practice, or occurrence," as opposed to casual or occasional. In other
 words, special and general are categories in the distributive order. 42
With reference then to the courts, they principally relate to jurisdiction.
Thus, there are courts of general jurisdiction and courts of special
jurisdiction. It is, of course, incorrect to say that only courts of general
jurisdiction are regular courts. Courts of special jurisdiction, which are
permanent in character, are also regular courts. The Sandiganbayan is a
court with special jurisdiction because its creation as a permanent anti-
graft court is constitutionally mandated and its jurisdiction is limited to
certain classes of offenses.
- There is, as well, no merit in the theory of petitioner that Section 46 of
R.A. No. 6975 impliedly repealed Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
P.D. No. 1861, as regards the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
members of the PNP. First, the argument is based on the faulty assumption
that the Sandiganbayan, being a special court, is not a regular court within
the contemplation of Section 46. Second, both provisions are not
irreconcilable and the presumption against an implied repeal has not been
overcome. Implied repeal may be indulged in only if the two laws are
inconsistent, or the former law must be repugnant as to be irreconcilable
with the latter law. Necessarily then, an attempt must be made to
harmonize the two laws.
In Valera vs.Tuason, this Court stated:
One of the well-established rules of statutory construction
enjoins that endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions
of a law or of two laws so that each shall be effective. In order that
one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws must
actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be
irreconciliable [sic] with the latter act. (U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil.,
208). Merely because a later enactment may relate to the same
subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient
to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law may be
cumulative or a continuation of the old one. (Statutory Construction,
Crawford, p. 634).
Lacson v.Roque (Pepe)
Facts:
Arsenio Lacson, the Mayor of Manila, following the acquittal of Celestino C.
Juan, made several allegedly libelous statements against certain courts of
justice, stating among other things that if he (petitioner Lacson) had the
power to fire Justice Montesa, he would do so for being incompetent, an
arrogant, an ignoramous. After making the said statements, charges of
contempt of court were brought forth against petitioner Lacson. In light of
the charges brought against Lacson, the President, acting through Executive
Secretary Mariano Roque issued a letter to petitioner regarding the latters
suspension from office during the pendency of the cases against him to be
effective upon receipt of the said letter. Upon being informed of the
mayors suspension, the vice mayor immediately took office in his stead.
Petitioner assails the legality of his suspension
Issue: Whether or not the mayor may be suspended by the president from
his post.
Ruling:
No. Section 9 of RA 409 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila provides that the mayor shall hold office for four years, unless
sooner removed. The charter does not provide for reasons for removal of
the mayor from his post. This is in direct contrast to the rest of the
aforecited charter which provides for the removal and suspension of board
members and other city officials.
Furthermore, section 14 of said charter specifies the causes for removal of
board members and other city officials.
Although the President is vested with the power to remove as provided for
in the Revised Administrative Code, he must still do so in accordance with
the laws governing such positions. This is because there is neither a
statutory nor Constitutional provision granting the president the authority
to remove or suspend public officials from their respective posts except in
case of disloyalty to the Philippines.
CITY OF NAGA vs AGNA.(PRETZEL)
SUPREME COURT G.R. No. L-36049 May 31, 1976
IMPORTANT:A statute will not be construed as repealing prior acts on the
same subject in the absence of words to that effect unless there is an
irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or unless the new law is evidently
intended to supersede all prior acts on the matter in hand and to comprise
itself the sole and complete system of legislation on that subject. Every new
statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in
relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize
and stand together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable
interpretation
pari materia - Statutes that relate to the same person or thing, or to the
same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object. When
statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that
they should be construed together.
Petitioners: Mayor Vicente Sibulo of Naga City and Naga City Treasurer
Joaquin Cleope
Respondents: Catalino Agna, Felipe Agna, and Salud Velasco.
FACTS:
On June 15, 1970, City of Naga enacted Ordinance No. 360 entitled
An ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 4, as amended, imposing a sales tax
on the quarterly sales or receipts on all businesses in the City of Naga
changing and amending the graduated tax on quarterly gross sales of
merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to
percentage tax on gross sales provided in Section 2 thereof. In response,
private respondents paid taxes on their gross sales for the quarter from July
1, 1970 to September 30, 1970.
Private Respondents filed with the City Treasurer of the City of Naga
a claim for refund together with interests from the date of the payments,
alleging that Ordinance No. 360 did not take effect in the year of its
approval in 1970 but in 1971, therefore the taxes they paid were illegal and
should be refunded to them. They invoked Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides: A municipal license tax already in
existence shall be subject to change only by ordinance enacted prior to the
15th day of December of any year after the next succeeding year, but an
entirely new tax may be created by any ordinance enacted during the
quarter year effective at the beginning of any subsequent quarter.
They submit that since Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the City
of Naga, is one which changes the existing graduated sales tax on gross sales
or receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari merchants provided for in
Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to a percentage tax on their gross sales
prescribed in the questioned ordinance, the same should take effect in the
next succeeding year after the year of its approval which is 1971.
The City Treasurer denied the respondents claim for refund, so
respondents filed complaint with the Court of First Instance of Naga.
The petitioners claim that Ordinance No. 360 became effective on
July 6, 1970, as it was published in accordance with the Charter of the City
of Naga (R.A. 305), which states that an ordinance takes effect after the
tenth day following its passage unless otherwise stated. They contend that
Ordinance No. 360 was enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Naga
on June 15, 1970 and was transmitted to the City Mayor for his approval or
veto on June 25, 1970 but it was not acted upon by the City Mayor until
August 4, 1970. Pursuant to Section 14 of R.A. 305, which states "if within
10 days after receipt of the ordinance the Mayor does not return it with his
veto or approval the ordinance is deemed approved.", said ordinance
should have taken effect after the 10th day following its passage. Since the
ordinance in question was not returned by the City Mayor with his veto or
approval within 10 days after he received it on June 25, 1970, the same was
deemed approved after the lapse of ten days on July 6, 1970.
They further contend that even under Section 2, of R.A. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Acts) which expressly provides: "A tax ordinance shall go into
effect on the fifteenth day after its passage unless the ordinance shall
provide otherwise', Ordinance No. 360 could have taken effect on June 30,
1970, which is the fifteenth day after its passage by the Municipal Board of
the City of Naga on June 15, 1970, or as earlier explained, it could have
taken effect on July 6, 1970, the date the ordinance was deemed approved
because the ordinance itself provides that it shall take effect upon its
approval.
Respondent Judge rendered judgement holding that Ordinance No.
360, was enforceable in the year 1971 following the date of its approval and
required the petitioners to reimburse the private respondents with the
corresponding interests from the filing of the complaint up to the
reimbursement of the amounts plus attorney's fees and the costs of the
proceedings.
Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari on the Court of
First Instances decision.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 360 Took effect on the year 1971?
RULING:
Yes. As invoked by the private respondents, Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code contemplates of two types of municipal ordinances,
namely: (1) a municipal ordinance which changes a municipal license tax
already in existence and (2) an ordinance which creates an entirely new tax.
1. Under the first type, a municipal license tax already in existence
shall be subject to change or repeal only by an ordinance enacted
prior to the 15th day of December of any year after the next
succeeding year to enable the taxpayers to adjust themselves to the
new charge or burden brought about by the new ordinance.
2. The second type of a municipal ordinance where an entirely new tax
may be created by any ordinance enacted during the quarter year to
be effective at the beginning of any subsequent quarter.
 There is no distinction between an ordinance which changes a
municipal license tax already in existence and an ordinance creating an
entirely new tax in Section 2 of R.A. 2264 which merely refers to a "tax
ordinance" without any qualification whatsoever.
Of the two provisions invoked by petitioners, Section 2 of R.A. 2264
is more relevant because it refers to effectivity of a tax ordinance and being
a provision of much later law it is deemed to have superseded Section 14 of
R.A. 305 in so far as effectivity of a tax ordinance is concerned.
R.A. 2264 Section 9 provides repeal and modification of all acts,
executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations or parts thereof,
inconsistent with any of the provisions of it, but fails to show any provision
expressly repealing Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. It is a
well established principle in statutory construction that a statute will not be
construed as repealing prior acts on the same subject in the absence of
words to that effect unless there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between
them, or unless the new law is evidently intended to supersede all prior acts
on the matter in hand and to comprise itself the sole and complete system
of legislation on that subject. Every new statute should be construed in
connection with those already existing in relation to the same subject
matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they can
be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation.
Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 2 of
R.A. 2264 refer to the same subject matter-enactment and effectivity of a
tax ordinance. In this respect they can be considered in pari materia.
Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person
or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose
or object. When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory
construction dictates that they should be construed together. This is
because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are
supplementary or complementary to the earlier enactments and in the
passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the existing
legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with
reference thereto. Having thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the
same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is
deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the
legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express
repeal of the old and they all should be construed together. In construing
them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should be
compared with the new provisions and if possible by reasonable
construction, both should be so construed that effect may be given to every
provision of each. However, when the new provision and the old relating to
the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the
latter expression of the legislative will.
There is no conflict between Section 2309 of the Revised
Administrative Code and Section 2 of the R.A. 2264. The first clause of
Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code shall be applied when the
problem refers to the effectivity of an ordinance changing or repealing a
municipal license tax already in existence, while Section 2 of R.A. 2264 shall
govern where the problem refers to effectivity of an ordinance creating an
entirely new tax.
The ordinance in question is one which changes the graduated sales
tax on gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandise and sari-sari
merchants prescribed in Section 3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the City of Naga to
percentage tax on their gross sale-an ordinance which definitely falls within
the clause of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. Accordingly
it should be effective and enforceable in the next succeeding year after the
year of its approval or in 1971 and private respondents should be refunded
of the taxes they have paid to the petitioners on their gross sales for the
quarter from July 1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 plus the corresponding
interests from the filing of the complaint until reimbursement of the
amount.
De Jesus v. People
FACTS
Local elections was held on Jan. 18, 1980. Ananias Hibo, the defeated
candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the position of the office of Mayor of
the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed a complaint with COMELEC
charging herein petitioner, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with
violation of the 1978 Election Code. The assistants of the Fiscal, Manuel
Genova and Delfin Tarig, as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted
the investigation of the said complaint. The petitioner files a prima facie
case against De Jesus of violation of section 89 and sub-sections [x] and
[mm] of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978.
xxx xxx xxx
[x] Any election registrar or any person acting in his behalf who issues or
causes the issuance of a voter's certificate of registration or cancels or
causes the cancellation thereof the violation of the provisions of this Code.
xxx xxx xxx
[mm] Any person who, without authority, acts as, or assumes r performs
any -function of a member of the election committee, or the board of
canvassers, or deputy of representative of the Commission.
The prima facie case contains the following:
De Jesus filed a motion to quash the information with a contention that
neither the tanodbayan nor the sandiganbayan has the authority to
investigate, prosecute and try the offense. The Tanodbayans exclusive
authority to investigate and prosecute offenses and the sandiganbayans
jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against the petitioner was
maintained by the prosecution.
ISSUE
Which of the COMELEC and the Court of First Instance (now RTC) or the
tanodbayan and the sandiganbayan has the power to investigate, prosecute
and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his or
her office, and the Sandiganbayan?
HELD
On the principles of statutory construction whereas between the specific
and general statue, the former must prevail since it evinces the legislative
intent more clearly than a general does. And whenever reconciliation
between the statutes is possible, like in this case, the former should be
deemed as an exception to the latter
Under the constitution, the sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over
offenses done by public officers in respect to their office as stated in Art XIII
Sect. 5 while the tanodbayan shall receive and investigate complaints to
public office.
Also it was provided in:
Presidential Decree Nos. 1606 and 1607, creating the said entities.
Thus, under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan shall have
jurisdiction over:
[a] Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379;
[b] Crimes committed by public officers and employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes; and,
[c] Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
in relation to their office.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Sandiganbayan Second Division dated
August 13, 1982 is hereby set aside and Criminal Case No. 5054. entitled
"People of the Philippines versus Rogelio de Jesus" is ordered dismissed. The
COMELEC is hereby directed to forthwith conduct an investigation, and if
the evidence so warrants, to prosecute the complaint against petitioner
before the proper court of first instance. No costs.
Montelibano v. Ferrer
FACTS:
1. Jose Benares filed with the Municipal Court of Bacolod a criminal
complaint against Petitioners Montelibano, et al., charging them with the
crime of malicious mischief, for allegedly causing damage to the sugarcane
plantation belonging to Benares.
2. The pertinent facts are; petitioner Montelibano is the president of Capitol
Subdivision, Inc. As such, Montelibano leased to Benares property for 5 crop
years. Years after the end of the lease contract, the Subdivision instituted
against Benares an unlawful detainer case, ordering his ejectment. Benares
appealed to the CFI of Negros Occidental. The CFI then issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injuction for Benares to turn over the lot to the
Subdivision. However, Benares continued to plant on the lotso the
Subdivision filed a petition to cite Benares in contempt. The petition was
denied, but Benares was required to immediately and promptly obey the
order of the CFI. Thereafter, the provincial sheriff delivered the land to the
Subdivision; consequently Montelibano, et al. cleared the lot of the
sugarcane planted by Benares, hence this petition.
3. Montelibano, et al. filed a motion to quash on the ground that the only
officer authorized under Sec. 22 of Commonwealth Act No. 326, or the
Charter of the City of Bacolod, to initiate criminal cases in the courts thereof
is the City Attorney.
4. Respondents argue that the provision is merely declaratory of the powers
of the City Attorney of Bacolod.

ISSUE:
WoN Sec. 22 is merely declaratory of the powers of the City Attorney of
Bacolod.
HELD:
NO
1. In the case of Espiritu v Dela Rosa, the Court refused to issue a writ of
mandamus to compel the CFI of Manila to accept a complaint filed directly
with the said court, without the intervention of the City Fiscal of Manila,
because the only officer authorized by law to conduct preliminary
investigation is the City Fiscal (Sec. 2474, Admin. Code)
2. In the City of Manila, criminal complaints may be filed only with the City
Fiscal, who is thereby given, by implication, the exclusive authority to
institute criminal cases in the different courts of said city, under the
provisions of its Charter, originally found in Section 39 of Act No. 183:
"x x x The prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila shall have charge of the
prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations x x x He shall
investigate all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of
ordinances, and prepare the necessary informations or make the necessary
complaints against the persons accused, and discharge all other duties in
respect to criminal prosecutions enjoined upon provincial fiscals x x x
3. This provision was mutatis mutandis reproduced, firstly, in section 2437
of the Old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), then in section 2465 of the
Revised Administrative Code, and lastly in section 38 of Republic Act No.
409. We do not see, and respondents herein have not pointed out, any
reason why the above quoted provision of the Charter of the City of
Bacolod, should be interpreted differently from said sections of the Charter
of the City of Manila, which are substantially identical thereto.
4. Since it may be presumed that the legislature knew a construction, long
acquiesced in, which had been given by the courts to a statute re-enacted
by the legislature, there is a presumption of an intention to adopt the
construction as well as the language of the prior enactment. It is accordingly
a settled rule of statutory construction that when a statute or a clause or
provision thereof has been construed by a court of last resort, and the same
is substantially reenacted, the legislature may be regarded as adopting such
construction.
CHAPTER VII
People v. Garcia
FACTS:
Eugenio Garcia Madrigal was found guilty of the crime of robbery.
When the crime was committed, the defendant was merely 17 years
old. The lower court, ignoring the fact that defendant was a minor,
sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years, 2
months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years of prision
mayor.
He was also sentenced to pay the offended party, jointly and
severally with the other accused, the sum of P85 as indemnity for
damages. Republic Act No. 47 (Oct 3, 1946), which amended article
80 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing from 18 to 16 the age
below which accused have to "be committed to the custody or care
of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution," instead
of being convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the
controversy.
The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication
has also amended paragraph 2 of article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that when the offender is over fifteen and
under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period."
Issue:
Whether Eugenio, being 17 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime,was entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of article 68, paragraph 2, of theRevised Penal Code.
Ruling:
There are well recognized rules of statutory construction which are
against the lower courts contention. One of these rules is that all
parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect
may be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting
intentions in the name statute are never to be supposed or so
 regarded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous
language.
This rule applies in the construction of a statute and its amendment,
both being read together as a whole. "An amended act is ordinarily
to be construed as if the original statute has been repealed, and a
new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted
in its stead; or, as frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards
any action after the adoption of the amendment, as if the statute
had been originally enacted in its amended form. The amendment
becomes a, part of the original statute as if it had always been
contained therein, unless such amendment involves the abrogation
of contractual relations between the state and others. Where an
amendment leaves certain portions of the original act unchanged,
such portions are continued in force, with the same meaning and
effect they had before the amendment. So where an amendatory
act provides that an existing statute shall be amended to read as
recited in the amendatory act, such portions of the existing law as
are retained, either literally or substantially, are regarded as a
continuation of the existing law, and not as a new enactment.
The court finds, no irreconcilable conflict between Article 68,
paragraph 2, as it now stands and Article 80 as amended, There is
no incompatibility between granting accused of the ages of 15 to 18
a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum
age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. In
other words, there is no inconsistency between sending defendants
of certain ages to prison and giving them a penalty lower than the
imposable one on adults under the same or similar circumstances.
Let it be remembered that the privilege of Article 68, supra, is not
by its nature inherent in age but purely statutory and conventional,
and that this privilege is granted adult offenders under given
conditions.
Vda. De Gomez v. Government Insurance Board (Victoria)
G.R. No. L-602 March 31, 1947
Facts:
Andres A. Gomez had worked for the provincial government of
Pampanga for a continuous period of 25 years. He had worked as a
provincial delegated appraiser from August 8, 1914 until Feb 28,
1938, when he died. His appointment to this position was
temporary since he had not taken the civil service. His salary was
P90 a month.
On August 8, 2937, Commonwealth Law No. 186 was passed. This
law was on the creation of the National Government Life Insurance
System called Government Service Insurance System, which the
province of Pampanga approved. So, Andres A. Gomez, having
completed a form for membership insurance, was not insurable on
his death on Feb 28, 1938, because his status was merely
temporary.
The widow of Gomez brought the case before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Pampanga to request that the amount of Andres
policy be given to her. The court, relied on the fact that Andres
Gomezs employment was merely temporary and therefore, ruled
that he didnt have the right to be insured automatically with the
GSIS. The CFI dismissed the case.
The case was brought before the SC .
Issue: Whether or not Gomez, at the time of his death, had the
qualifications to be considered as a regular and permanent employee for
the purpose of collecting the amount of his insurance policy by the
beneficiary. YES.
Ratio:
It had been found that on October 16, 1937, Andres Gomez took the
2nd degree examination of the civil service and that he had favorable
results, but such result was not announced after his death.
Although it was argued that Gomez's passing of the exam can not be
given retroactive effect, since Article 663 (d) of the Revised
Administrative Code, provides that "a period of trial service shall be
required before appointment or employment made permanent; "
and it is clear that Gomez, who had died after the examination and
before his result was announced, could hardly be subjected to such
a period of 6 months.
The court said that this way of interpreting the law has the defect of
being too literal, and "the letter kills (sometimes), while the spirit
vivifies." Note that Gomez had served as the province for 25
consecutive years until the day of his death. When they have long
been able to overcome the test of their competence, in the daily
 exercise of their duties, it must be presumed that their superiors
were satisfied with their suitability.
The court said that it is obvious that the effects of the approval
should go back to the date of the examination. The proof of the
competence, of the suitability of the examiner, was made before his
death; therefore, it must be effective since the date of the test. It
even seems superfluous that this is discussed.
Therefore, the trial period of 6 months need not be abided by. For
the purposes, at least, of the validity of your insurance policy,
Gomez must have passed the exam which makes him automatically
qualified for a regular and permanent position from the date of the
examination. Therefore, he was insurable and, of course, insured on
the day of his death, under the terms of Law No. 186. This
conclusion is so overwhelming that the Government Service
Insurance System practically accepted the premium paid, the
corresponding receipt.
In the merits of the above, the judgment of the court is revoked and
the defendant is ordered to pay the sum of P1,052, the amount of
the insurance policy of the late Andres A. Gomez, plus legal interests
since the interposition of the lawsuit, and the costs of the trial.
Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals
GR NO. 125297, JUNE 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner purchased pieces of jewelry from Solid Gold International
Traders, Inc.
Petitioner, however failed to pay the purchase price which urged solid
Gold to file Civil Cases against her for specific performance
Yu Oh and solid Gold (represented by Joaquin Novales III, Gen. Manager)
then entered into a compromise agreement
O Provided that the petitioner shall issue a total of 99 host dated
checks of P50k each
Therefore, petitioner issues 10 checks at 50k each drawn against Equitable
Banking Co.
O This was deposited by Novaes in Far East Bank and Trust Company
O However these were dishonored by the Bank
Novales then filed for 10 separate Information (Criminal Cases)
O BP 22 Bouncing Checks Law
O The accused plead not guilty
O The RTC convicted the accused
O Petitioners counter that the RTC had no jurisdiction
Petitioners defenses:
O No notice of dishonor was made and given to them as drawer
O Failure to consider that the reason of closed account for the
dishonor of 10 checks
O Failed to consider that there was only one act which caused the
offense
O Disregarded the definition of a check
Petitioner contends that BP 22 provides only insufficiency of funds but the
CA included in the scope those with no accounts or closed account
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in construing the scope of BP 22
RULING:
No. Since the intent of the law was to discourage the issuance of
worthless checks
The term closed account is within the meaning of the phrase does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank which check is
subsequently dishonored shall be punished by imprisonment.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
The petitioner was acquitted since there was no notice of dishonor made
to the drawer by the drawee bank (NIL)
U.S. v. Go Chico ZYRA
FACTS:
On August 1908, appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the
windows and one of the show cases of his store, in the form of a small
button, of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio
Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection
in the Philippine Islands to designate and identify those in armed
insurrection against the United States. The defendant is charged with the
violation Section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission which
provides for any person who shall expose to public view any flag, banner,
emblem or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands
to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not criminal intent on the part of the accused is necessary
in this case (Just in case sir asks)
2. Whether or not the prohibition of the law is directed only against
the use of the identical banners, devices, or emblems actually used during
the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United
States (This is the issue more related to the topic.)
RULING:
1. No, it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with
criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the
intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. In the
case at bar, the action was prohibited by the Government because it tends
to incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection against
governmental authority just as effectively if made in the best of good faith
as if made with the most corrupt intent. In this case, the evil to society and
to the Government does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who
displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon the
public mind. The legislature did not intend that a criminal intent should be a
necessary element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense
embraces no word implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly
or willfully. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but
he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things,
the crime itself. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device
in his window. Nothing more is required to commit the crime.
2. No, the Court does not believe that the law is applicable only to the
identical banners, etc., actually used in the late insurrection, and not to
duplicates of those banners, can be sustained. In this case, to say that the
display of a certain banner is a crime and that the display of its exact
duplicate is not is to say nonsense.
The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands
to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States"
mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any
flag which is of that type. This description refers not to a particular flag, but
to a type of flag. There is no concrete word known by which that flag could
be aptly or properly described. The great and only characteristic which it
had upon which the Commission could seize as a means of description and
identification was the fact that it was used in the insurrection.
The Court does not believe that in construing the statute in question
there is necessity requiring that clauses should be taken from the position
given them and placed in other portions of the statute in order to give the
whole Act a reasonable meaning. Leaving all of the clauses located as they
now are in the statute, a reasonable interpretation, based upon the plain
and ordinary meaning of the words used, requires that the Act should be
held applicable to the case at bar. Though penal statutes are to be
construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the
obvious purpose of the legislature.
Legal maxim:
Where a penal statute is capable of 2 interpretations, one which will operate
to exempt an accused from liability for violation thereof and another which
will give effect to the manifest intent of the statute and promote its object,
the latter interpretation should be adopted.
US v. Ah Chong
Facts:
In the case of US v. Ah Chong, Ah Chong was employed as a cook at
Officers quarters No. 27 at Fort McKinley and at the same place
Pascual Gualberto was employed as a houseboy or muchacho. No
one slept in the house except the two servants, occupying a small
room toward the rear of the building. The door of the room was not
furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a
measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this
somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against
it a chair.
Ah Chong was suddenly awakened by someone who was forcing to
open the door. He sat up in bed and called out twice, Who is
there? He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the
door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing
his way into the room. Fearing that the intruder was a robber or a
thief, Ah Chong leaped to his feet and called out, If you enter the
room, I will kill you.
At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of
the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness
and confusion Ah Chong thought that the blow had been inflicted by
the person who had forced the door open. Seizing a common
kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, Ah Chong struck out
 wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his
roommate, Pascual.
Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps. Seeing
that Pascual was wounded, Ah Chong called to his employers who
slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascuals wounds.
The deceased and the accused had an understanding to knock at the
door and acquaint his companion with his identity.
Ah Chong alleged that it was because of repeated robberies that he
kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection. He
admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it
under the impression that Pascual was a ladron (burglar) because
he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite warnings.
The Trial Court ruled that Ah Chong was guilty of simple homicide,
with extenuating circumstances. Ah Chong admitted that he killed
his roommate but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any
intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-
defense.
Issue:
W/N Ah Chong should be acquitted because of mistake of fact
YES
Ruling:
Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have
been justified in killing the intruder under Article 8 of the Penal
Code (Article 11(1) of the RPC), which requires, to justify the act,
that there be:
Illegal aggression
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it
Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself
There can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete
exemption from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his
fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had
been in fact a dangerous thief or ladron, as the defendant
believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt
the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and
the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendants
thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill
the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned
that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of
escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available
weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in striking
promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts
and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief
or a ladron. That neither the defendant nor his property nor any
of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time
when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such unlawful
aggression on the part of a thief or ladron as defendant believed
he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real
necessity for the use of the knife to defend his person or his
property or the property under his charge.
Ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is
sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a
necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in larcerny,
animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) cancels the
presumption of intent, and works an acquittal; except in those
cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the
penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where,
under the provisions of Article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any
wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from
that which he intended to commit.
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime,
any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have
proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the
actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or
negligence on his part; That is to say, the question as to whether he
honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the
mistake is to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared
to him at the time when the mistake was made, and the effect
which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected
to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or otherwise,
upon which he acted.
Ah Chong struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm
belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping
 room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril,
both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to
his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have
presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he
was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-
defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he
would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account
of his act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of
negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his
mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believes threatened his
person and his property and the property under his charge.
Legal Maxims:
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea the act itself does not
make man guilty unless his intention were so
Actus me incito factus non est meus actus an act done by me
against my will is not my act
Ignorantia facti excusat Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is,
in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse.
People of the Philippines v Alfonso Gatchalian
G.R L-12011-14 | September 30, 1958 | Bautista Angelo, J.
Facts
Alfonso Gatchalian, owner or manager of the New Life Drug Store,
was charged before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga with a
violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 602 in four separate
informations.
RA No. 602 An Act to Establish a Minimum Wage Law, and
for other purposes
Section 3: Minimum wage. (a) Every employer shall pay
to each of his employees who is employed by an enterprise
other than in agriculture wages at the rate of not less than
(1) Four pesos a day on the effective date of this Act and
thereafter for employees of an establishment located in
Manila or its environs;
(2) Three pesos a day on the effective date of this Act and
for one year after the effective date, and thereafter P4 a
day, for employees of establishment located outside of
Manila or its environs: Provided, That this Act shall not apply
to any retail or service enterprise that regularly employs not
more than five employees.
Gatchalian willfully and feloniously paid Expedito
Fernandez, a salesman in his establishment, a monthly
salary of P60 to P90, less that what was provided for by law.
When arraigned, Gatchalian pleaded not guilty to the charge.
His counsel then, in his behalf, filed a written motion to dismiss
based on two grounds:
violation does not constitute criminal offenses but carries
only a civil liability, and even if it does constitute criminal
liability, the section of the law alleged to have been violated
does not carry any penalty penalizing it
the provisions of the law are ambiguous
The Court, after hearing the arguments of both parties, as well as
some members of the local bar, issued an order dismissing the
informations with costs de oficio and cancelling the bail bond filed
by the accused.
The court in the same order directed the Regional Representative of
the Department of Labor to immediately institute a civil action
against the erring employer for the collection of the alleged
underpayment of wages due the employees.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the Government
took the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of R.A 602 are ambiguous and do not
provide penalties for violating the said law?
Ruling:
It is clear from the provisions that while Section 3 explicitly requires
every owner of an establishment located outside of Manila or its
environs to pay each of its employees P3.00 a day on the effective
date of the Act, and one year thereafter P4.00 a day, Section 15
imposes both a criminal penalty for a willful violation of any of the
above provisions and a civil liability for any underpayment of wages
due an employee.
 The intention of the law is clear: to slap not only a criminal liability
upon an erring employer for any willful violation of the acts sought
to be enjoined but to attach concurrently a civil liability for any
underpayment he may commit as a result thereof.
The law speaks of a willful violation of "any of the provisions of this
Act", which is all-embracing, and the same must include what is
enjoined in Section 3 thereof which embodies the very fundamental
purpose for which the law has been adopted.
The final claim of appellee is that inasmuch as the provisions of the
law under which he was prosecuted are ambiguous and there is
doubt as to their interpretation, that doubt should be resolved in his
favor because a penal statute should be strictly construed against
the State.
This contention must also fail if we are to be consistent with
our interpretation of the provisions of Section 15 (a) of the
law.
We have stated that that section is clear and unambiguous
and covers the provisions embodied in Section 3 of the
law, and if such is the case then there is no room for the
application of the principle invoked by appellee.
With this, they decided that the trial court erred in dismissing the
case.
REALTY INVESTMENT v VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
This case is an appeal from an order of the CIF of Rizal dismissing the
case as to Maria Pastrana and her husband Prudencio Castrence.
Plaintiff Realty Investment is the owner of the Valhalla Gardens Subd.
Situated in Rizal City.
Pastrana bought from plaintiff a house and lot, let known as 262-VV, for
a price of PHP 7,200. She paid PHP 700 as down payment.
The deed provided that the purchaser should pay to the vendor in its
office in Manila the balance of PHP 6500, together with interest thereon at
10% per annum.
Pastrana had paid eight installments leaving a balance on her contract of
the sum of 6,238.14.
War between the US and Japan broke out. As a result, payments were
interrupted, the plaintiffs office having been closed.
Thereafter, Pastrana paid the remaining installments to the Japanese
Imperial Army in the Phil. (J.I.A.P) The Register of Deed of then Greater
Manila, (defendant) Mariano Villanueva, issued to Pastrana Transfer Cert. of
Title No. 75513.
Plaintiff prays the Court to declare as due and payable on account of the
purchase price the sum of PHP 6,238.14 and to declare null and void the
purported sale between J.I.A.P and to order the Register of Deeds to
reinstate plaintiffs tile to said lot.
OR AS AN ALTERNATIVE, order payment to the Realty Investment by
Pastrana the remaining balance of the contract.
The case was dismissed by virtue of the MORATORIUM proclaimed in E0
25 as amended by EO 32.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge is correct in dismissing the case on the ground of
the moratorium law
RULING:
No, the dismissal of the case was improper. The court observed that the
indemnity sought was a subsidiary liability and would not come into being
unless and until decision was rendered against the defendants for such
payment. Here, the money judgement prayed for is not even an accessory
or subsidiary to the main action. It is an alternative remedy and as such is
contingent upon defendants unwillingness or inability to permit the
cancellation of the title issued to them and to surrender the land.
As a final word, let it be noted that the moratorium orders were conceived
exclusively for the benefit of debtors in the strict sense of the term; i.e. for
the suspension of payments in money during the time of financial distress
occasioned by the late war. They were not intended to suspend other rights
of action.
Manoko v. NHA
Facts:
Petitioners challenges the constitutionality of PD 1669 and PD 1670 for
expropriation of the property of Tambunting Estate and Estero de Sunog-
Apog on the grounds that it deprived them of due process of law and right
to just compensation.
President issued LOI instituting a nationwide slum improvement and
resettlement program (SIR) as a national housing policy. The NHA began to
implement the decrees by sending letter to the petitioners who are owners
of the said property, stating that the former deposited 5 million with the
PNB regarding the Tambunting Estate. Petitioners alleged that the amount
of 5 million for her property does not constitute a just compensation and
she did not believe that she was obliged to withdraw the amount of 5
million or surrender her titles over the properties. They also alleged that
they were deprived of due process and equal protection of law because
their properties were automatically expropriated by the decrees and they
were immediately deprived of the ownership and possession of the
properties without hearing or proper procedure
Issue:
Whether the PD 1669 and 1670 are unconstitutional?
Ruling:
Yes.
The challenged decrees are uniquely unfair in the procedures adopted and
the powers given to NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is summarily
proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree without the
slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding.
The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory everytime a specific
decree or law orders the expropriation of somebodys property and
provides its own peculiar manner of taking the same. There is no showing
whatsoever as to why the properties involved were singled out for
expropriation through decrees or what necessity implied the particular
choices or selections.
Statutes on expropriation must be construed strictly in favor of the rights of
the people and against the State.
Baretto v. Tuason
Facts:
In the ancient town to Binondo, Don Antonio Tuason founded a mayorazgo
of strict agnation upon the third and the remainder of the fifth of all his
properties by an instrument executed to that end, duly approved by the
King of Spain in a cedula issued for that purpose. It was therein provided,
among other things, that the revenue of the properties so entailed, and all
such others as might be annexed thereto, should be distributed in the
proportion of four-fifths for the first born, and his successors, and one-fifth
for the other eight children and other descendants of the founder,
mentioned in the instrument. It is presented for consideration the
mayorazgo founded by the deceased Don Antonio Tuason. On the same
year, the founder died in the City of Manila.
Plaintiffs allege that:
The defendants, and their predecessors, all of whom descend from
the lines of the first born, have so considered it and have been paying,
up to the year 1921, sums of money on account of the fifth of the
revenue of the mayorazgo;
The defendants purchased in 1905 and 1915 the rights of some of
the beneficiaries for the said trust;
In the payments of the fifth of the revenue mentioned, fraud was
committed;
The plaintiffs, who are part of the descendants of four of the eight
children who were the beneficiaries of the fifth of the revenue, were
without a copy of the instrument of foundation, the protocol of the
notary before whom it was acknowledged having disappeared, and that
for this reason they were unaware of their rights and were unable to
discover the fraud until the year 1922 in which the original of the said
Royal Cedula was discovered in the archives of Seville, Spain;
The defendants fraudulently obtained a Torrens title in their favor
upon the entailed real estate; that there are now no surviving
descendants of four of the eight children of the founder who are
beneficiaries of the fifth of the revenue.
One of the issues at bar is who are the persons entitled to the remedy. The
recipients of the fifth of the revenues of the mayorazgo are indicated in the
sixth clause of the instrument of foundation, it states:
"It shall be his duty to set apart one-fifth of the net revenue derived from the
entail each year, and that one-fifth part shall be divided into eight parts,
giving one to each of my eight children, and in their absence, to my
grandchildren, but upon the understanding that if one or more of my
children should die without succession, the part belonging to them shall be
distributed among my children and other descendants of mine according to
their needs and as prudence may dictate to him, so that, when the time
arrives that none of my children are alive, it shall then be always understood
that said fifth part shall be applied to all those of my descendants who are
poor, the apportionment to be made by him prudently according to their
needs and therefore the possessor of the entail is hereby charged to
discharge this duty with conscientious scruple.
Issue:
W/N the descendants of Don Antonio Tuason, subsequent to his
grandchildren, are entitled to receive a fifth of revenues of his properties.
Ruling:
If the descendants of the younger children, subsequent to the grandchildren
of the founder, are granted under certain circumstances the right to possess
the mayorazgo itself, with all its properties, it does not make sense how it
can be said that these descendants, subsequent to grandchildren, were
prohibited from receiving a fifth of the revenues of said properties.
The intention of the founder was not to restrict the grant of the usufruct
(the right to enjoy the use and advantages of another's property short of the
destruction or waste of its substance) of the fifth of the revenue by limiting
it to a certain number of generations of the younger children, but that he
intended to extend it to all of the descendants of the latter.
The Court applied the rule of law of the Partidas (Rule 28, Title 34, 7th
Partido), which says:
"Privilegia recipiunt largum interpretationem voluntati consonan
concedentis." (Privileges are to be interpreted with liberality in accordance
with the will of him who grants them.)
Manila Lodge v. CA
Facts:
On June 26, 1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1360 which
authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The
reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension.
Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 1657, amending
Act No. 1360, so as to authorize the City of Manila either to lease or sell the
portion set aside as a hotel site. The total area reclaimed was a little over 25
hectares. The City of Manila applied for the registration of said area and on
January 20, 1911, O.C.T. No. 1909 the same was issued under its name.
On July 13, 1911 the City of Manila, affirming a prior sale, cancelled 5,543.07
square meters of the reclaimed area to Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent
and Protective Order of Elks of the U.S.A. (BPOE) on the basis of which TCT
No. 2195
For the remainder of the Luneta Extension, after segregating the portion
sold to the Manila Lodge No. 761 (BPOE), a new Certificate of Title No. 2196
was issued to the City of Manila. BPOE subsequently sold the said 5,543.07
square meters to Elks Club, Inc., to which was issued TCT No. 67488. The
registered owner, "The Elks Club, Inc.," was later changed by court order to
"Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc."
In January 1963 the BPOE petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch IV, for the cancellation of the right of the City of Manila to
repurchase the property. This petition was granted.
On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold the land together with all the
improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC) for the
sum of P4,700,000.
The City of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
for the reannotation of its right to repurchase and the court issued an order
to regain said right of City of Manila to repurchase the property after 50
years.
TDC filed on April 28, 1971 against the City of Manila and the Manila Lodge
No. 761, BPOE, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 83009 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, containing three causes.
The third cause of action, reserving to the plaintiff TDC the right to recover
from the defendant BPOE some amounts, in the remote event that the final
judgment in this case should be that the parcel of land now in question is a
public park.
The Court then declares that the parcel of land formerly covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 2195 and 67488 in the name of BPOE and now by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73444 in the name of Tarlac Development
Corporation is a public park or plaza.
BPOE contends that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the very
enabling acts and/or statutes according to which the subject property was,
and still is, patrimonial property of the City of Manila and could therefore be
sold and/or disposed of like any other private property.
Issue:
W/N the property subject of the action, pursuant to the provisions of Act
No. 1360, as amended by Act No. 1657, was patrimonial property of the City
of Manila and not a park or plaza.
Ruling:
No. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect
to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from, or is unraveled
by the four corners of the statute. In order to discover said intent, the whole
statute and not only a particular provision thereof should be considered. It
is therefore necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as
amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent.
The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila
is a grant of "public" nature, the same having been made to a local political
subdivision. The reclaimed area, an extension to Luneta, is declared to be a
property of the City of Manila. It is of public dominion, intended for public
use. This being said, it is of the same nature or character as the old Luneta.
It has also been said that a power to extend (or continue an act or business)
cannot authorize a transaction that is totally distinct in itself. It is not
disputed that the old Luneta is a public park or plaza and it is considered as
one by Section 859 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. Hence,
the "extension to the Luneta" must also be recognized the same.
Hebron v. Reyes
Facts:
Bernardo Hebron, a member of the Liberal Party, and respondent Eulalio D.
Reyes, of the Nacionalista Party, were elected mayor and vice-mayor,
respectively, of Carmona, Cavite. for a term of four (4) years, beginning
from January 1, 1952. Petitioner discharged the duties and functions of
mayor continuously until May 22 or 24, 1954, when he received the
following communication from the Office of the President: the President
has decided for the good of the public service, to assume directly the
investigation to the administrative charges against you for alleged
oppression, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct in office
you are hereby suspended from office.. to last until the final termination
of the administrative proceedings.
Respondent Eulalio D. Reyes acted as mayor of Carmona. Although the term
of office of petitioner herein expired on December 31, 1955, his claim to the
Office of Mayor of Carmona, Cavite, has not thereby become entirely moot,
as regards such rights as may have accrued to him prior thereto.
Issue:
Whether a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of
the Philippines.
Ruling:
No. In Lacson v. Roque, it was held that the President has no "inherent
power to remove or suspend" them (referring to local elective officers).
Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the
particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to
constitutional limitation. There is neither statutory nor constitutional
provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove municipal
officials. By article VII, section 10, paragraph (1) of the Constitution (1935)
the President "shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law", but supervision does not
contemplate control. The proviso "as may be provided by law", is a clear
indication of constitutional intention that the provisions was not to be self-
executing but requires legislative implementation.
While sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code read:
SEC. 2188. Supervisory authority of provincial governor over municipal
officers. - The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints
made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office. he may in such
case suspend the officer pending action.
SEC. 2189. Trial of municipal officer by provincial board. - .. The preventive
suspension of a municipal officer shall not be for more than thirty days. At
the expiration of the thirty days, the suspended officer shall be reinstated in
office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against
him..
SEC. 2191. Action by Secretary of the Interior. - . Secretary of the Interior
shall review the case without unnecessary delay and shall make such order
for the reinstatement, dismissal, suspension, or further suspension of the
official, as the facts shall warrant and shall render his final decision upon the
matter within thirty days after the date on which the case was received.
With this, the Executive may take appropriate measures to compel the
provincial governor and the provincial board to take said action, the
provincial governor and the provincial board may not be deprived by the
Executive of the power to exercise the authority conferred upon them in
sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Executive is
merely appellate in character; that, said assumption of powers, in the case
at bar, even exceeded those of the Provincial Governor and Provincial
Board, in whom original jurisdiction is vested by said sections 2188 to 2190,
for, pursuant thereto, "the preventive suspension of a municipal officer shall
not be for more than 30 days" at the expiration of which he shall be
reinstated.
In the matter of the petition of CELESTINO CO Y QUING REYES to be
admitted a citizen of the Philippines. CELESTINO CO Y QUING REYES,
Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-
Appellant. (Justin)
This is an appeal from a decision, of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, granting the petition for naturalization, as citizen of the Philippines,
of appellee Celestino Co y Quing Reyes. Appelant maintains that :
i.) The lower court erred in not finding that the petitioner appellee has
failed to comply with all the requisites prescribed by the law to acquire
Philippine citizenship.
The Court of First Instance of Manila erred in hearing this case and granting
the naturalization petition. Section 9 of CA 473 or the Naturalization Act
states that :
xxx It shall be the duty of the clerk of the court to publish the same at
petitioners expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the
Official Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the
province where the petitioner resides xxxx
It was submitted that the Petition was only published in the Official
Gazette once, instead of the required 3 instances. Such section of the Law
was already construed in Ong Son Cui v. RP, stating that :
The notice of hearing of this case should therefore have been
published three times not only in the Voz de Manila but in the Official
Gazette as well. And there being only one publication of said notice of
hearing in this case in the Official Gazette, the same is clearly incomplete
and therefore insufficient to confer jurisdiction to the court a quo to try
the case and grant the petition. It is argued, however, that there has been a
substantial compliance with law because the notice of hearing in question
was published three times in the Voz de Manila and once in the Official
Gazette; but since the law expressly provides that the notice of hearing be
published three times, this should be strictly observed
However, it was argued that it is impossible for the petitioner to
comply with weekly submissions to the OG because the OG is now being
published monthly. The Court said that it has no merits, for the true intent
of the law is that said notice should be published 3 times, although not
weekly. Hence, a single publication is not sufficient compliance with the
Law.
We find no valid reason to depart from such view. Indeed, said section 9
requires that the petition for naturalization be published "once a week, for
three (3) consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette." This provision
demands compliance with the following requirements, namely: (1) the
publication must be weekly; (2) it must be made three (3) times; (3) and
these must be "consecutive."
As the Supreme Court of the U.S. has aptly put it in U.S. v. Gingsberg (243
U.S. 472, 61 L. ed. 853, 856), and quoted, approvingly, by this Court in
Bautista v. Republic of the Philippines (supra):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"An alien who seeks political rights as a member of this nation can rightfully
obtain them only upon terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts
are without authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is
rigidly to enforce the legislative will in respect of the matters so vital to the
public welfare."
= Naturalization Laws should be construed strictly=
The publication required by law in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation is a means of screening aliens applying for
Filipino citizenship by giving the public a chance to come forward and
protest the grant of such citizenship if they possess any information
derogatory to the applicant
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY V. FERDINAND J.
MARCOS
(Keisha)
FACTS
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority was created by virtue
of RA 6958 to manage the Mactan International Airport and the
Lahug Airport. Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA
enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes. In
Section 14 of its Charter provides that the Authority shall be
exempt from realty taxes imposed by the National Government or
any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities.
In 1994, the Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu demanded
payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to
petitioner. Petitioner objected to such demand, citing Sec. 14. It
asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government which
performs governmental functions, citing Sec. 133 of the Local
Government Code which puts limitations on the taxing powers of
local government units. Sec. 133, LGC provides that the exercise of
the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
shall not extend to the levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on
the National government, its agencies and instrumentalities and
local government units.
The Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside the realty tax
account, insisting that the MCIAA is a GOCC whose tax exemption
privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of
the LGC.
Sec.193 provides that tax exemptions or incentives granted to or
presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical,
including GOCCs except local water districts, cooperatives duly
registered under RA 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity
of this Code.
Section 234 meanwhile provides that exemption from payment of
real property tax previously granted to or presently enjoyed by all
persons, whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs are hereby
withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC.
Because Cebu city was about to issue a warrant of levy against the
properties of MCIAA, the latter was compelled to pay its tax account
under protest. MCIAA likewise filed a petition for declaratory relief
with the RTC of Cebu, contending that the taxing powers of local
government units do not extend to the levy of taxes or fees of any
kind on an instrumentality of the national government. MCIAA
insisted that while it is indeed a GOCC, it nonetheless stands on the
same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national
government by the very nature of its powers and functions.
The City however maintained that MCIAA is not an instrumentality
of the government but merely a GOCC performing proprietary
functions, and hence, the exemptions granted to it were deemed
withdrawn by virtue of Secs. 193 and 234 of the LGC.
The trial court dismissed the petition. MR denied. Hence this
petition.
Petitioner asserts that although it is a GOCC, it is mandated to
perform functions in the same category as an instrumentality of the
government.
An instrumentality of the Government is one created to
perform governmental functions primarily to promote
certain aspects of the economic life of the people.
Petitioner further contends that being an instrumentality of the
National Government, respondent City of Cebu has no power nor
authority to impose realty taxes upon it in accordance with Sec. 133
of the LGC.
In Basco v. PAGCOR, the SC said the local governments have
no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Gov't like
PAGCOR, which has a dual role (its role to regulate gambling
casinos is governmental, placing it in the category of an
agency or instrumentality of the Government which should
be exempt from local taxes.)
Petitioner thus concludes that there is a distinction in the LGC
between a GOCC performing gov't functions as against one
performing merely proprietary ones, and it is clear from Secs. 133
and 234, LGC that the legislature meant to exclude instrumentalities
of the national government from the taxing powers of LGUs.
ISSUE
WON petitioner is exempted from payment of taxes
RULING
No. Taxation is the rule and tax exemption is the exception. Thus,
the exemption may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing
authority. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption
was granted to private parties based on material consideration of a
mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered
by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
The general rule, as laid down in Section 133 of the LGC is that the
taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of, inter alia,
taxes, fees and charges of any kind on the National Government,
its agencies, and instrumentalities, and LGUs. However, pursuant
to Section 232, provinces, cities and municipalities in the Metro
Manila Area MAY impose real property taxes except on inter alia,
real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its
political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has
been granted for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person
(Sec. 234a).
As to tax exemptions/incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by
natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs,
GENERAL RULE: Tax exemptions or incentives are
withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC
EXCEPTION: Those granted to local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, non-stock and
non-profit hospitals and educ institutions, and unless
otherwise provided in the LGC. This latter proviso could
refer to Section 234 enumerating the properties exempt
from real property tax. The last paragraph of Section 234
further qualifies the retention of the exemption insofar as
real property taxes are concerned by limiting the retention
only to those enumerated therein; all others not included in
the enumeration therefore lost the privilege upon the
effectivity of the LGC. Even as to real property owned by the
Rep. Of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234,
the exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial use of such
property has been granted to a taxable person for
consideration or otherwise.
Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew,
upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from payment of real
property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, except as provided
in the said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a
government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its
exemption from such tax granted it by its charter has been
withdrawn.
CIR v. CA
FACTS
Private respondent ANSCOR, a foreign corporation in the course of
expansion, had been increasing its capitalization, mainly composing
of common shares of stock.
In 1967, it asked for the assistance of the US Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) on advice as to whether their exchange of common
with preferred shares constitutes a tax avoidance scheme, which
the IRS answered in the negative, further stating that said practice is
merely a recapitalization scheme.
And so private respondent began exchanging shares of stock from
common to preferred shares
For some years from its inception, respondent has been issuing
dividends in the form of stocks to its shareholders
In 1973, respondent received a deficiency withholding tax-at-source
assessment, pursuant to Sec. 53 and 54 of the 1939 Revenue Code
for its failure to withhold tax on proceeds representing taxable
income of recipients from redeemed/cancelled stock dividends
Respondent filed a protest with the CTA and won, arguing among
others, that it has been subject to the Tax Amnesty pursuant to PD
67.
Petitioner herein appealed the decision before the CA, but the CA
upheld the decision of the CTA. Hence this appeal before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE
WoN ANSCOR is correct in invoking its position as belonging to
those granted the tax amnesty
RULING
No. The Supreme Court ruled that PD 67 condones the collection of
all internal revenue taxes including the increments or penalties or
account of non-payment as well as all civil, criminal or
 administrative liabilities arising from or incident to (voluntary)
disclosures under the NIRC of previously untaxed income and/or
wealth realized here or abroad by any taxpayer, natural or juridical.
ANSCOR is a withholding agent, not a taxpayer with respect to the
deficiency tax involved
More importantly, a tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is
never favored nor presumed in law and if granted by a statute, the
terms of the amnesty like that of a tax exemption must be
construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the
taxing authority. The rule on strictissimi juris equally applies. So
that, any doubt in the application of an amnesty law/decree should
be resolved in favor of the taxing authority.
Thus, ANSCOR is liable to pay deficiency withholding tax-at-source
up to the amount arising from redeemed stock dividends amounting
to taxable dividends.
So PLDT filed cases for refund and refused to pay their taxes to
Laguna
This case was dismissed on account of it had the same arguments
as the previous cases that PLDT lost but what is key is strictissimi
juris
ISSUE
WON strictissimi juris applies
RULING
Yes, it does.
PLDT forwards that strictissimi juris (tax exemption should be
construed liberally in favor of the government) does not apply
because they allege that what they were granted was tax exclusion
and not tax exemption.
Court says that theyre the same. They produce the same effects
and are of the same nature. Petition dismissed

Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor MACY

PLDT v. Laguna LCID
FACTS
PLDT repeats its arguments for exemption of the local franchise tax
it owes to Laguna. (They have already lost the same case with the
same arguments against Davao and Bacolod)
RA 7082 Section 12 embodies the in lieu of all taxes lause where
PLDT shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to 3% of all its gross
receipts in lieu of all taxes.
The Local Government Code Section 137, notwithstanding such tax
exemption, the LGU may impose a tax on businesses enjoying a
franchise at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of its gross annual
receipts for the preceding calendar year.
Section 139 of the LGC also withdrew the tax exemption granted to
PLDT under RA 7082
The Province of Laguna then proceeded to collect tax from PLDT
with the authority granted to it by the LGC
RA 7925 aka Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the
Philippines Section 23 most-favored treatment clause provided
for an equality of treatment in the telco industry.
June 2, 1998, Dept of Finance issued a ruling that as of March 16,
1995 (effectivity of RA 7925), PLDT became exempt from local
franchise tax (LGC tax)
FACTS:
Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor
federation while the other petitioners are its affiliate unions with members
from among the employees of the following offices, schools, or government
owned or controlled corporations, including PNB, MWSS, GSIS, SSS,
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Admin, Philippine Normal College, PUP. The
petition eventually included Philippine Government Employees Association
(PGEA).
In PD 851, it is provided that employers are required to pay a 13th month
pay to their employees xxx wherein employers does not embrace the
Republic of the Philippines as an employer.
SECTION 1. All employers are hereby required to pay all their employees
receiving a basic salary of not more than P1,000 a month, regardless of the
nature of their employment, a 13th-month pay not later than December 24
of every year.
Section 3 of the IRR enumerated the employers not covered under PD 851.
It contained distressed employers, government, and any of its political
subdivisions, employers already paying 13th month pay, etc.
Petitioners contend that the IRR of PD 851 included other types of
employers not exempted by the decree; that the Minister of Labor and
Employment does not have authority to exempt other types of employers
from the requirement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 3 of the IRR of PD 851 is valid for providing
exemptions to PD 851, particularly on exempting the government as an
employer under PD 851
HELD: It is valid.
(1) GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES ARE COVERED IN OTHER STATUTES.
Employees in the government service were to benefit from labor standard
laws, their coverage is explicitly stated in the statute or presidential
enactment.
(2) THE PD PROVIDES THE SET OF EMPLOYERS COVERED. Had the intention
been to include government employees under the coverage of PD 851, it
should have expressly so provided and there should have been
accompanying yearly appropriation measures to implement the same. That
no such express provision was provided and no accompanying appropriation
measure was passed clearly show the intent to exclude government
employees from the coverage of P.D. No. 851.
(3) OLD RULE OF STATCON. Restrictive statutes and acts which impose
burdens on the public treasury or which diminish rights and interests, no
matter how broad their terms do not embrace the Sovereign, unless the
Sovereign is specifically mentioned. (Pag involved yung state, sasabihin `to
ng batas. Pag hindi stated sa batas na involved ang state, edi hindi involved.
Wag magulo. So liberal to.)
Republic v. Villasor
Facts:
o On July 3, 1961, the Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered a
decision in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of P. J. Kiener
Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
Corporation, and against the Republic of the Philippines, confirming
the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of
Special Proceedings.
o Thereafter, Judge Villasor issued an Order declaring the aforestated
decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of
Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute the said
decision.
o Pursuant to the said Order, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution
was issued. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of
Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of
garnishment with several Banks, specially on the "monies due the
Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to
cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution.
o The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the
Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the
Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees,
pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
as per Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP Controller.
o Thus, the instant petition was filed contending that the respondent
Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance
of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and
notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void
Issue: WON Judge Villamor acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing an alias writ of execution against
the Republic of the Philippines
Ruling: YES
o What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the
dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of
constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty
that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless
it gives its consent.
o It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic
formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.
o This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now
made explicit in the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided:
 "The State may not be sued without its consent. (Article XV, Sec.
16).
o The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued
by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant's action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior
to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy.
o Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary
that had accrued in favor of an employee.
o In Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, it was ruled that:
"A rule which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in
the hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the
process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of
its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by
express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers
to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited
directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as
long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still
another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it."
The order thus impugned and the alias writ of execution must be nullified.
Uy Coque v. Sioca (Malcolm)
Facts: (basta something about the validity nung will na hindi daw sinunod
yung requirements as stated in the law)
The validity of the will is attacked on the ground that the testatrix was
mentally incapacitated at the time of its execution and on the further
ground that it was not executed on the form prescribed by section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645,
The transcript of the testimony taken in the probate proceedings not
appearing in the record, we cannot review the findings of the court below as
to the sanity of the testatrix. This leaves for our consideration only the
question as to whether the omission of certain formalities in the execution
of the will are fatal to its validity.
It will be noted that the attestation clause does not state the number of
pages contained in the will nor does it state that the witnesses signed in the
presence of each other. Neither do these facts appear in any other part of
the will.
Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills
are very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, "A will must
be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is
entirely void.
Issue: W/N the will is void for not following the requirements as stated in
the law.
Ruling: YES!
In statutory construction the evident intent of the legislator controls and will
probably not be disputed.
But it must not be forgotten that in construing statutory provisions in regard
to the formal requisites of a will, we are seeking to ascertain the intent, of
the legislator and not that the testator; the latter's intention is frequently
defeated through non-observance of the statue.
The amendments or changes introduced by Act No. 2645 are (a) that the
will must now be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator;
(b) that the testator and witnesses must sign each page on the left margin;
(c) that the pages be numbered correctly; (d) that the attestation clause
shall state the number sheets or page used in the will and (e) that it must
appear from the attestation clause itself that the testator and witnesses
signed in the form and manner required by law and that is this can no longer
be proven by evidence aliunde.
The changes mentioned under (d) and (e) are the only ones which need be
considered in the present case. The purpose of requiring the number of
sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the document might
easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change
the testamentary dispositions of the will

PLDT v. Davao
Facts:
Pldt filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus seeking to enjoin Davao City
from fulfilling its contract with ITT Philippines for the installation of Davao
Citys telephone system and to compel the Public Service Commission to
require that Davao obtain a cert of public convenience and necessity. Pldt
applied for preliminary injunction but the same was denied. Davao City
Council passed Resolutions Nos. 664 and 2015 which authorized the
establishment of a city-wide telephone system owned and operated by
Davao. Pursuant thereto, Davao entered a contract with ITT Phils. Pldt
contends that it would result in unlawful expenditure of public funds and is
prejudicial to pldts rights as prior owner and operation of a city-wide
telephone system in Davao (pldts rights are not exclusive).
Issue:
1. WON Davao has power establish and operate a telephone system
2. WON Davao needs to secure a cert of public convenience and necessity
from the Public Service Commission
Ruling:
1. Yes, pldts telephone system in Davao covers only the poblacion and do
not appear to include the 10 districts near the poblacion. While pldt hopes
to provide 40,000 additional lines throughout the country by 1969, the
countrys need as of 1964 was already at 58,000. Davao was responding to a
pressing necessity that can fully serve and benefit the people in its territory.
Such resolutions constitute a lawful exercise of Davaos power to legislate
under its charter for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. An
adequate telephone service is no longer a mere convenience but is
indispensable to the social life, business communications, transactions, etc.
2. No, Davao City is a govt entity and the Public Service Act exempts from
said requirement:
Section 13. (a) The Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision, and
control over all public services and their franchises, equipment, and their
properties, and in the exercise of its authority, it shall have the necessary
powers and the aid of the public force: Provided, That public service owned
or operated by government entities or government-owned or controlled
corporations shall be regulated by the Commission in the same way as
privately-owned public services, but certificates of public convenience or
certificates of public convenience and necessity shall not be required of
such entities or corporations. ...
Section 14. The following are exempted from the provisions of the
preceding section:
(e) Public service owned or operated by any instrumentality of the National
Government or by any government-owned or controlled corporations,
except with respect to the fixing of rates.
Quimsing v. Lachica
Revised Admin Code prohibits cockfighting not held on legal holiday
or in event of festivities.
RA 938 provides to city council power to issue ordinance to regulate
cockpits. (It only provides for the location and who can enter
cockpits. It does not lay down when cockfighting shall be held other
than the allowed instances found in the admin code)
Facts:
Petitioner is the owner and manager of a licensed cockpit in Iloilo. Said
cockpit was raided by members of the city police force under the command
of the Respondent on the ground that it was being illegally operated on a
Thursday which was not a legal holiday. Petitioner Quimsing contends that
by virtue of an ordinance by the city council, he was allowed to operate the
cockpit on that day; Quimsing was eventually arrested on the same day.
Quimsing now claims for damages alleging that the raid was made illegally
and in bad faith since cockfighting on Thursdays, by virtue of the city
ordinance, was authorized. Respondent contends that the raid was not
attended with malice since under the RPC and Revised Admin Code,
Cockfighting is prohibited on Thursdays.
Petitioner Quimsing contends that the provisions prohibiting cockfighting in
the Admin Code is found under the title on municipal law, therefore, it does
not apply to chartered cities such as Iloilo city. Furthermore, it is important
to note that section 21 of the charter of iloilo city provides that the
municipal board can regulate places of amusements. Consequently, RA 938
provides that the municipal or city council shall have the power to regulate
cockpits.
Issue: Whether Republic Act No. 938, as amended, gives local governments
a blanket authority to permit cockfighting at any time
Ruling: No, grants of power to local government shall be construed strictly,
and doubts on the interpretation shall be resolved in favor of the National
Government. The power given to local governments under RA 938 does not
necessarily connote the power to regulate cockfighting (what was written in
the law was regulation of cockpits). In addition, provisions in RA 938 only
mentions the regulation of the distance of cockpits to other establishments
and those who may enter such cockpits. It does not expressly or impliedly
pertains to power to regulate when cockfighting shall be held and how
frequent it should occur. Therefore, Admin Code is still the controlling law.
Lorenzo v. Posadas
Facts:
On October 4, 1932, the plaintiff Pablo Lorenzo, in his capacity as trustee of
the estate of Thomas Hanley, deceased, brought this action in the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga against the defendant, Juan Posadas, Jr., then
the Collector of Internal Revenue, for the refund of the amount of
P2,052.74, paid by the plaintiff as inheritance tax on the estate of the
deceased, and for the collection of interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent
per annum. The defendant Juan Posadas set up a counterclaim for
P1,191.27 alleged to be interest due on the tax in question and which was
not included in the original assessment.
On May 1922, a fellow named Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga,
Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and personal
properties.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga considered it proper for the best
interests of their estate to appoint a trustee to administer the real
properties which, under the will, were to pass to Matthew Hanley ten years
after the two executors named in the will, was, on March 8, 1924,
appointed trustee. Moore took his oath of office and gave bond on March
10, 1924. He acted as trustee until February 29, 1932, when he resigned and
the plaintiff herein was appointed in his stead.
During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of
Internal Revenue assessed against the estate an inheritance tax, together
with the penalties for deliquency in payment. The plaintiff paid the said
amount under protest, notifying the defendant that that unless the amount
was promptly refunded, suit would be brought for its recovery. Defendant
overruled plaintiffs protest and refused to refund the said amount. Plaintiff
then went to court. The CFI dismissed Lorenzos complaint and Posadas
counterclaim. (First Paragraph) Both parties appealed to this court.
Issues :
a.Should the provisions of Act No. 3606 favorable to the tax-payer be given
retroactive effect? NO
b.Has there been deliquency in the payment of the inheritance tax? If so,
should the additional interest claimed by the defendant in his appeal be
paid by the estate? YES
Ruling
a. It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is governed by the statute in
force at the time of the death of the decedent (26 R. C. L., p. 206; 4 Cooley
on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 3461). The taxpayer can not foresee and ought not
to be required to guess the outcome of pending measures. Of course, a tax
statute may be made retroactive in its operation. Liability for taxes under
retroactive legislation has been "one of the incidents of social life. But
legislative intent that a tax statute should operate retroactively should be
perfectly clear. "A statute should be considered as prospective in its
operation, whether it enacts, amends, or repeals an inheritance tax, unless
the language of the statute clearly demands or expresses that it shall have a
retroactive effect." (61 C. J., P. 1602.). Act No. 3606 however does not
contain any provisions indicating legislative intent to give it retroactive
effect therefore no such effect is given by the court.
The defendant Collector of Internal Revenue maintains, however, that
certain provisions of Act No. 3606 are more favorable to the taxpayer than
those of Act No. 3031, that said provisions are penal in nature and,
therefore, should operate retroactively. Properly speaking, a statute is penal
when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state
which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the power to pardon. In
common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to include within the
term "penal statutes" all status which command or prohibit certain acts, and
establish penalties for their violation, and even those which, without
expressly prohibiting certain acts, impose a penalty upon their commission
(59 C. J., p. 1110). Revenue laws, generally, which impose taxes collected by
the means ordinarily resorted to for the collection of taxes are not classed as
penal laws, although there are authorities to the contrary.
b. The plaintiff correctly states that the liability to pay a tax may arise at a
certain time and the tax may be paid within another given time. As stated by
this court, "the mere failure to pay one's tax does not render one delinqent
until and unless the entire period has elapsed within which the taxpayer is
authorized by law to make such payment without being subjected to the
payment of penalties for failure to pay his taxes within the prescribed
period.
Ibasco v. Ilao
Facts:
Petitioner Claro Ibasco was elected as mayor of Mercedes, Camarines Norte.
His election was being protested by Jose Pascual who alleged that several
anomalous activities had taken place during the elections in several
precincts wherein minors had been allowed to vote, and some people were
made to vote twice. Pascual was then made to file an amended protest
wherein he would name the precincts where said anomalous activities had
occurred during the elections. Ibasco then file a motion to dismiss the case
due to the fact that Pascual had failed to file the amended protest. The
court subsequently denied Ibascos motion. Ibasco questioned the validity
of the ballots cast in favor of Pascual. However, the trial court ruled that
Ibasco could not impugn the validity of the ballots as he had failed to file his
defense. Ibasco then filed a motion for reconsideration stating that he had
not been declared in default and therefore had a right to do the same, but
the motion was denied.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in preventing petitioner from providing
evidence to nullify the the ballots involved in the protest.
Ruling: Yes. The trial court ruled on the basis that the failure of petitioner to
file an answer in his defense is tantamount to an admission of the
allegations brought against him. However, the trial court erred in
promulgating the said ruling because although Rule 132 which provides for
the extension of the application of the Rules of Court to election cases
which are not covered by Election Law. Said rule provides that the Rules
of Court may be applied whether by analogy or in a suppletory character,
and that the gap should be filled in whenever practicable and convenient
thus preventing an unrestrained application of said rules. It is therefore a
general rule that one may not prove facts which he has not alleged. As
such, under a general denial, the defendant may present any evidence
which disproves, or tends to disprove any of the allegations in the
complaint.
It has been postulated as a fundamental principle underlying the trial of
election cases that technicalities or procedural barriers should not be
allowed to stand if the same would tend to defeat rather than promote the
interest of justice. Rather, it is enjoined that the Election Law should be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people may not be
defeated.
DOMALANTA vs Court of Appeals.
SUPREME COURT G.R. No. L-55932. March 16, 1987
Petitioners: Ignacio Domalanta (loaner), Atty. Teodoro Domalanta (Son of
Ignacio), Dominador Domalanta (Son of Ignacio,brother of Teodoro).
Respondents: Magdalena Bautista (landowner)
FACTS:
Respondent Magdalena owned a lot in Santolan Road, Quezon CIty
registered under her name. Respondent having obtained various loans
amounting to P 500.00 from Tomas, her lessee, she signs a note
acknowledging her obligation and promising to sell of her lot to him
should she fail to pay her debt. Because the respondent planned to sell her
lot to another, Tomas caused to be annotated on the original of her title on
file in the register of deeds his adverse claim over of the property.
Respondent obtained a loan from petitioner Ignacio, and offered to
mortgage her lot as security. Through petitioner Atty. Teodoro, respondent
filed a petition to cancel Tomas adverse claim, which was denied by the
court.
Respondent was unable to redeem her property when the mortgage
obligation matured, so she decided to sell it to Atty. Teodoro for P6,000.00,
where she executed a deed of absolute sale. The sale was registered,
cancelling the registration of said property under respondents name and
issuing such to Atty. Teodoro.
Atty. Teodoro as counsel and co-plaintiff of respondent filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City to recover possession
of the lot from Tomas and to cancel his adverse claim. During the pendency
of the case, Atty. Teodoro conveyed the property to his brother Dominador
for P8,000.00. The decision rendered ordered Tomas to vacate the property
and remove his constructions therefrom, as soon as he was paid the P 28, 1980. In this case the motion for reconsideration was received by the
500.00 debt owed to him by the Respondent. He was also ordered to pay Court of Appeals 26 days late on September 23, 1980. The filing of a
monthly rental and monthly water bills upon receiving payment of his loan. pleading by registered mail with the Court under Section 1, Rule 13, of the
Dominador filed an ejectment suit against respondent for non- Rules of Court, like service by registered mail under Section 5 of the same
payment of rentals for her occupancy in the property. rule, requires that the pleading be "plainly addressed to the court where the
Respondent retaliated by filing a suit against the petitioners, praying case is pending."
that the sale she made be reformed and declared an equitable mortgage, On certain occasions, this Court has allowed liberality in the construction
and that the titles issued to them be annulled. The Court of First Instance of of the Rules. The present case, however, does not warrant such liberality
Quezon City granted her petition. because the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is satisfactorily
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which modified
supported by the records. According to the observations of the Court of
the decision, and released a resolution stating the finality of the decision
because of no filed motion for reconsideration. Appeals there was no evidence that Respondent ceased to have the
It appears that Atty. Teodoro prepared a motion for reconsideration complete possession of the sold property, there was no attempt by the
and misaddressed it to The Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, thus it did petitioners to transfer the property to their names for taxation purposes,
not reach the Court of Appeals until after its resolution. The motion for there is evidence showing that respondent paid monthly interest indicating
reconsideration was denied for being tardy. the transaction was a loan with interest, and that the debt of respondent
Petitioners filed the present petition stating that the Court of piled up and earned interest. Thus, the Court of Appeals considered the sale
Appeals in not giving due course to their motion for reconsideration.
as an equitable mortgage.
violated Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, which states: that the
filing of pleadings, appearances, motions and notices, orders and other
papers with the Court as required by these rules shall be made by filing
them personally with the Clerk of the Court or by sending them by
registered mail. In the first case the Clerk shall endorse in the pleadings the
date of the mailing of the motions, pleadings or any other papers or
payments or deposits, as shown by the Post Office stamps on the envelope
or the registry receipt, payment or deposit in Court. The envelope shall be
attached to the record of the case.

ISSUE: WON The Court of Appeals erred in not giving due course to
petitioners motion for reconsideration?

RULING: Petition Dismissed

No.
In petitioners motion to set aside the resolution before the Court of
Appeals they attached a certification of the postmaster stating that the
decision which was sent by registered mail to Atty. Teodoro was received by
him on August 13, 1980, however the postmaster notified the Court of
Appeals that the said decision was received by Atty. Teodoro on August 12,
1980. Such discrepancy is inconsequential as the reglementary period for
filing appellants motion for reconsideration would have expired on August