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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (NEU COLLEGE OF LAW) ASSIGNED TOPICS AND CASES FOR
NOVEMBER 24, 2017
Santos, et al. vs. Aranzanso, et al., No. L-23828, February 28, 1966_digested
(Special Proceedings Adoption: Consent, Abandonment and Collateral Attack)
Facts: A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old, was filed
by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila. It was alleged that both parents of
the minors have long been unheard from and could not be found in spite of diligent efforts to
locate them; that since the war said minors have been abandoned; and that for years since their
infancy, said children have been continuously been in petitioners care and custody. The consent
to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. After due
publication and hearing, the adoption court granted the petition for the adoption.
Subsequently eight years later Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos filed a petition
for the settlement of the intestate estate of the former, stating among other things that the
surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked that
he be appointed administrator of the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition to the
petition for appointment of administrator, asserting among others that the adoption of Paulina
and Aurora Santos is void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then
living and had not abandoned them.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the deceased and mother of Paulina
opposed also the petition of Simplicio and adopted the pleadings filed by Aranzanso.
The Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to make a collateral attack against
the adoption decree on the ground of failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a
jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab initio.
Issue: WON a decree of adoption could be assailed collaterally in a settlement proceeding.
Held: No. Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was abandoned,
consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.
Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent
which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to
the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and
support which parents owe to their children.
Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal depends upon the
existence of a fact to be established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot
be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order. Hence, the CA erred in reviewing under a
collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of the adopted children
had abandoned them.
MALKINSON VS. AGRAVA
Facts:
On October 13, 1972, petitioners-spouses filed with respondent court their verified petition to
adopt the minor Luis Alberto Martin de Santos, who was born a Filipino citizen in Madrid, Spain
on August 4, 1969, the acknowledged natural child of petitioner Ana Marie de Santos Malkinson
who alone of his parents extended him recognition.
The petitioners claim that the child concerned has been living with them under their care and
custody since their marriage in 1972. Petitioner Frederick Malkinson is an American citizen, while
his spouse is a Filipino citizen and owns a property in the Philippines. They claim that it is to the
best interest of the child that he be adopted by the spouses who are qualified for such legal
adoption.
Respondent Judge Hon. Corazon Agrava dismissed the abovementioned petition in November
1972 because the court opined that the position was insufficient due to the fact that the petitioner
husband is an alien while the child sought to be adopted is a citizen of the country.
Petitioners then moved for reconsideration on the ground that no law prohibits a resident alien,
who is neither a citizen of a country without diplomatic relations with the Philippines nor
otherwise legally disqualified from adopting a Filipino. Respondent court again denied the same
in December 1972.
Issue:
WON an alien who is not legally disqualified may adopt a Filipino
Held:
If alienage alone of the adopter or of the adopted were to be a disqualification, it is inconceivable
that the lawmakers would not have so explicitly provided. Article 335 of the New Civil Code only
provides that non-resident aliens and resident aliens with whose government the Philippines has
broken diplomatic relations are the only two classes of aliens expressly disqualified and
prohibited to adopt, while Article 339 provides that only an alien with whose state our government
has broken diplomatic relations is expressly disqualified and prohibited to be adopted.
Inclusio unius exclusion alterius (The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another)
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care, and education for
the unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in
the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys
of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of
their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Ultimately, under the plain language of the law, alienage by itself does not disqualify a foreigner
such as the petitioner-husband from adopting a Filipino child. Under Art. 338 of the Civil Code,
the petitioner-wife who is also the natural mother, is authorized to adopt her natural child and
raise its status to that of a legitimate child while the petitioner husband is likewise authorized to
adopt his step-child and that such adoption would strengthen the family solidarity of the
petitioner-spouses and the child.
G.R. No. 71370 January 3l, 1987
SLOBODAN BOBANOVIC AND DIANNE ELIZABETH CONNUNGHAM
BOBANOVIC, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SYLVIA P. MONTES (in her capacity as Minister of Social Services and
Development), respondent.
RESOLUTION

ALAMPAY, J.:
In our decision in this case promulgated on July 7, 1986 and which is now the subject of the
motion for reconsideration filed by the Ministry of Social Services and Development, this Court
emphasized that in adoption cases, the interest and welfare of the child is of paramount
consideration and that "every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law (Malkinson vs. Agrava, 54 SCRA 66, and
other cited cases) and the law should not be made, as instrument to impede the achievement of
a salutary policy." (Duncan vs. CFI of Rizal, L-30576,69 SCRA 298).
Applying the aforecited judicial guidelines, this Court directed the present Ministry of Social
Services and Development "to forthwith issue without undue delay, the requisite travel clearance
certificate in favor of herein petitioners' adopted child, Adam Christopher Bobanovic." In our
decision, we stated that "all that MSSD had to do was to use a little of its time to verify the
correctness of the case study report, prepared and submitted by the Social Worker who acted
upon instruction of the court below."
Respondent's motion for reconsideration of the decision in this case, dated August 5, 1986,
although filed late, in the interest of justice, was nevertheless admitted under our resolution of
September 5, 1986. In said motion, public respondent stressed the existence of the 1981
Memorandum of Agreement between the State and Territory Adoption Authorities of Australia
and the Ministry of Social Services and Development of the Philippines. Respondent Minister
therein pointed out that under the stated Memorandum of Agreement, it has been agreed among
others, the following.
xxx xxx xxx
1.4. The adoption authorities in both countries will jointly approve of prospective adopting parents
and the selection of particular adoptive parents for a particular child. ... (Rollo, p. 140)
Respondent Minister further averred that certain significant procedures have been accepted and
agreed to be observed, such as:
xxx xxx xxx
4.1. Any person or persons having their ordinary place of residence in an Australian State or
Territory, who wish to adopt a child from the Philippines will apply to the Director of the
appropriate Australian State or Territory investigated, where he is satisfied that the applicants are
fit and proper persons to adopt a child from the Philippines, he will cause the preparation of a
detailed Family Study and will act as intermediary and forward the Family Study to the
Philippines for consideration Only family studies presented by an appropriate Australian State or
Territory Adoption Authority to the Philippine Ministry of Social Services and Development win be
considered.
4.2. In an yapplication for approval as persons fit and proper to adopt a child from the
Philippines, the following will be conditions precedent to the approval of the application by the
Australian State or Territory Adoption Authorities.
(a) Applicants must have attained the ages specified in the appropriate laws of both countries
and be in a position to support and care for their family.
(b) The State or Territory Adoption Authority investigating an application will confirm that
applicants have no criminal record or else make appropriate comment on that record. (Rollo, pp.
141-142)
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The Court is constrained to consider the aforestated matters. We note the assertions of the
respondent Minister which appear uncontroverted in petitioners' reply, that "the preparation of the
Family Study report from the home country on the prospective adopters is a requirement in this
Memorandum of Agreement with Australia. ... "(Rollo, p. 142).
The Court does not say nor do We entertain a belief that the herein petitioners are in any way
disqualified to be adopting parents in their home State or ordinary place of residence. What the
Court simply wishes to express is that it would be more prudent and desirable to require that the
petitioners herein submit themselves to a Family Study Report in their home country so that if a
favorable report is thereafter submitted to the Ministry of Social Services and Development, then
the corresponding travel certification should then forthwith issue, in implementation of the
judgment of adoption already rendered. This step, if taken by petitioners win lead to the removal
Of the basic reason for the reluctance and apprehension of the public respondent Minister who,
understandably, is concerned that the welfare of the adopted child might later be prejudiced a
possibility that may arise in the event that the latter's adoption is not sanctioned or recognized by
Australia where petitioners are citizens and residents of.
It may not be amiss to state that the petitioners, in their Comment to the motion for
reconsideration principally expound on the finality of the decision in the adoption case and that
the working arrangement between the adoption authorities of Australia and the Philippines does
not have the effect of law. But even as petitioners deplore the delay in the issuance of the
certificate of clearance to travel, they, however, fail to tender an explanation or state any reason
whatsoever for their apparent reluctance to submit themselves to a Family Case Study in their
home State.
While the Court takes the view that the decision in the adoption case should not be disturbed and
that all the technicalities that were raised against the adoption should yield to the ultimate end of
promoting the best interest of the adopted child, the same guiding principle should be applied in
the matter of the issuance of the travel clearance certificate. This subsequent aspect of the
adoption which was raised by respondent Minister was brought only lately to the Courts attention.
Thus, it becomes relevant and important to extend consideration to the aforementioned
Memorandum Agreement entered into in 1981 by our country and Australia.
It is well worth considering that the welfare of the adopted child can be truly protected if there is
at least an assurance that the home State of the petitioners has undertaken a family case study
concerning them. As it would be but a simple thing for petitioners to submit to a family case study
report, the Court finds it difficult to perceive the reason for petitioners' apparent adamant attitude
in declining to do so. As petitioners profess their desire to extend to their adopted child the
warmth of a parent's love, the comforts of a caring home and the material provision he needs,
their sincerity in this regard can best be manifested by laying aside any possible inconvenience
on their part or searching for legal technicalities. Whether or not the referred Memorandum
Agreement has the force and effect of law should be of least consideration to the petitioners if
they are truly disposed to do their part to expedite the travel for their adopted child to their
country. The best solution would be for them to accept and submit themselves to a family case
study which should not be at all a difficult thing for them to do.
In the same way that this Court took to task the Ministry of Social Services and Development for
being, paradoxically, 'overly concerned over its claimed exclusive prerogative to conduct the
case study work instead of placing more importance on the possible prejudicial effects of its

refusal on the welfare of the child," a similar rebuke may be fastened on the petitioners for their
seemingly adamant attitude and reluctance to submit themselves to a family case study report,
which if favorable to them would quickly remove the last reasonable obstacle for the issuance of
the subject travel clearance certificate. It will banish the apprehension and any misgiving on the
part of the local authorities concerned that the adopted child might be confronted with
unexpected problems seriously prejudicial to his welfare, should the latter's adoption be not
sanctioned or recognized by the State where petitioners reside and are citizens of.
WHEREFORE, and in the light of the facts and circumstances hereinabove discussed, the
dispositive portion of our judgment in the instant case directing the issuance of the requisite
travel clearance certificate in favor of the child, Adam Christopher Bobanovic, is hereby
SUSPENDED and DEFERRED until after petitioners shall have submitted themselves to a
Family Case Study in their home State of Victoria, Australia where they are said to be residing.
Upon furnishing herein respondent Minister of Social Services and Development with the
corresponding official report on said Family Case Study and if such is favorable to the petitioners
herein, then the requisite travel clearance certificate for the adopted child, Adam Christopher
Bobanovic, should thus be issued by the office of the public respondent Minister as previously
decreed.
Republic vs CA and Bobiles
GR No. 92326, January 24, 1992
FACTS:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat who had been living with her
family since 4 months old. Salvador Condat, father of the child, and the social worker assigned
was served with copies of the order finding that the petition was sufficient in form and
substance. The copy was also posted on the bulletin board of the court. Nobody appeared to
oppose the petition. The judgment declared that surname of the child be changed to Bobiles.
ISSUE: WON the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida filed the
petition.
HELD:
The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare
Code), where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them. After the trial
court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in CA, Family
Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory.
Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The Family
Code will have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or impair vested rights. When
Zenaida filed the petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law
in force at the time and thus vested and must not be prejudiced. A petition must not be
dismissed by reason of failure to comply with law not yet in force and effect at the
time. Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually
joined his wife in adopting Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony in
open court was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be
compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of the
pleadings.
Hence, Petition was denied.
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Republic vs. Toledano
Facts:
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a
former Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala,
a minor who is Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial court granted the petition. Republic, through
the Office of the Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower court erred in granting the
petition for the spouses are not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.
Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt
Held:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family
Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who
are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with
the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the
first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of
America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor
the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse
jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship
when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to
paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt
her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone
without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184.
Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child
to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses
to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
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Note:
The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of
1998). The Supreme Court has held in several cases that when husband and wife are required to
adopt jointly, each one of them must be qualified to adopt in his or her own right. However, the
American husband must comply with the requirements of the law including the residency
requirement of 3 years. Otherwise, the adoption will not be allowed. (Desiderio P.
Jurado, Civil LawReviewer, 2006 ed., p. 232)

Republic v. Hernandez
FACTS:
Herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y
Andrade, filed a petition[2] to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. In the very same
petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to
Aaron Joseph. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
petition for adoption. Petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption
and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petitions should
be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. The trial court ruled in favor of herein
private respondents. Petitioner challenges said order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City by
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of the
minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption b granted.
RULING:
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of
the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption even if not prayed for by petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee
must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus
granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
On the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is hereby
MODIFIED. The court uphold the propriety of the portion of the order of the court below granting
the petition for adoption. The legally adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be
officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade.