White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta.

Mesa Tourist and Development

Corporation, Petitioners,
VS.
City of Manila, represented by De Castro, Mayor Alfredo S. Lim, Respondent.

Facts: The City of Manila enacted on December 3, 1992 the assailed City Ordinance no. 7774
entitled, An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and
Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila. Said ordinance had been questioned in the RTC and the
latter declared it as unconstitutional for striking at the personal liberty of the individuals,
contrary to what is enshrined in the Constitution. The lower court observed that the goal the
ordinance sought can be defeated when those who are allegedly involved in illicit relations by
paying for the 12 hours stay. However when the City of Manila raised an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, said decision was reversed. Accordingly, the CA upheld constitutionality because the
ordinance did not violate right to privacy or freedom of movement rather it seeks to use the
inherent police power of the State to reach a lawful objective. Aggrieved, with the decision the
petitioners herein brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

Ruling: The Court finds the Ordinance wanting the essential requisites to uphold its validity.
The Court pointed out that assailed ordinance failed to meet the six requisites of valid exercise of
police power which was already enunciated with various jurisprudence involving the City of
Manila. An ordinance is subjected to the following conditions 1) it must not contravene the
Constitution or any statue, 2) it must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or
discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent
with public policy and 6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance is too broad and sweeping and does not make any distinction at all between the
legitimate and legitimate use of these businesses. Thus, even if one has a legitimate reason to use
these places of lodging, with the Ordinance in effect there is a presumption of illicit patronage.
Said result will greatly affect not only the business of the petitioner but more importantly greatly
hampers the liberty granted by the Constitution to the people.
In view of these reasons the Court declared the Ordinance as unconstitutional. The decision of
the RTC is reinstated.
MMDA, Petitioners,
VS.
Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Respondents.

Facts: Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising (Trackworks) entered into a contract with the Metro
Rail Transit Corporation (MRTC) in 1998. After which respondents had put up commercial
billboards, signage and advertizing media in different parts of MRT 3. However the MMDA
requested respondents to dismantle the commercial billboards pursuant to MMDA Resolution
No. 96-009 which prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of
billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, side walk, Center Island, posts, trees,
parks and open space. Trackworks did not heed the request of petitioners, hence the MMDA
preceded motu propio removing and dismantling the sings and billboards.
Trackworks filed a case in the RTC to restrain the MMDA. RTC ruled in favor of Trackworks.
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration, the MMDA proceeded to question the RTCs ruling
by filing a case with the Court of Appeals. The CA however, affirmed the ruling of the RTC. This
time, MMDA filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA can validly dismantle the billboards and signages.
Ruling: The answer of the Court was curt. The petition had NO Merit. MMDA does not have
the power to do so. Accordingly the Court reasoned that the MMDA cannot invoke its mandate
to justify its action because Trackworks derived its authority from an Agreement between the
DOTC and the MRTC. The nature of the MMDA was to act as a development authority that
cooperated with various national government agencies. All its functions are administrative in
nature. No authority had been delegated to it that extended to then dismantling of posts, singages
and the like.
ACEBEDO Optical Company Inc, Petitioner,
VS.
The Honorable Court of Appeals, Respondents.

Facts: The case at bar is the climax of the events that happened in this manner, ACEBEDO
Optical obtained a business permit from the Mayor of IliganCity subject to the following
conditions: 1) ACEBEDO cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store, 2)
ACEBEDO cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses for patients because these are the
functions of an optical clinic, 3) ACEBEDO cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a
prescription having first issued by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic ,
ACEBEDO can only sell directly to the public, without need of prescription, Ray-Ban and
similar eyeglasses, 4) ACEBEDO cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can
advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames and 5) ACEBEDO is allowed to grind lenses
but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist. Later a complaint was lodged by
the Samahang Optometrist sa Pilipinas-Iligan Chapter (SOPI) alleging that ACEBEDO had not
met all conditions set by the said permit. An investigation was done and three months later the
Mayor issued a notice to cancel the permit of ACEBEDO. ACEBEDO filed a petition with the
RTC but it was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was also dismissed. Undaunted the petitioner went to the Court of Appeals but
the case was dismissed as well. They filed for reconsideration but that too was denied. They
claimed that the conditions set by the Mayor with respect to the permit was considered as
beyond authority for they were several and burdensome.

Issue: Whether or not the cancellation of the license was within the power of the Mayor acting
pursuant to General Welfare.
Ruling: The Solicitor Generals argument that the power of the Mayor in approving or
cancelling the same is undisputable and inherent. He also interposed that it is pursuant to the
exercise of police power. Valid as his argument is the Court also stated that the licenses as
granted to the petitioners was one that sought to permit the operation of some business and NOT
the practice of some profession. Furthermore the Court also discussed the distinction between
what optometry as a mechanical art and optometry as a profession. The Court distinguished that
what ACEBEDO was engaging in was the former and that if it employs optometrist that will
issue prescription in order to sell wares. It is also noteworthy that the present case that the CA
had erred I holding that the license issued to ACEBEDO was a contract (to which ACBEDO had
agreed to) and such can be taken away by the Mayor. The Court agreed that the conditions were
beyond the scope of his authority. In the end the petitioner won and the Court ordered the Mayor
to reinstate the business permit that it had granted to the Petitioner.
Philippine Press Institute Inc., Petitioner,
VS.
Commission on Elections, Respondent.

Facts: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2772 particularly Section 2 ANS
Section 8. Section 2 purports to require the media enterprises to donate COMELEC free space.
Section 8 prohibits newspapers to allow publication of news, opinions, features or other sections
of the newspaper with particular reference to a candidate/ political party issued by the respondent
Commission on Elections. The Resolution mandates the procurement of free pace of not less than
page in at least one news paper of general circulation, such space is also made available to all
candidates during the periods stated in the law and subject to guidelines prescribed by the
resolution. The said resolution also prohibits the reference to any particular candidate or parties
in the newspaper. Pursuant to the same resolution, Commissioner Maabong sent letters to other
newspapers. According to the Solicitor General, the Resolution does not impose upon the
publishers to provide the COMELEC with free print space. The SolGen also contends that such
Resolution is pursuant to the mandate of the law. However, the Court contended that there is
indeed ambiguity in the Resolution and thus Petitioner cannot be blamed for its interpretation of
the same.

Issue: Whether or not the Resolution amounted to taking of property without just compensation
thus unconstitutional.
Ruling: Before the ruling the Court took into consideration the meaning of taking as defined
in the power of Eminent Domain. In this particular case THE Court looked at two particular
measures: 1) the necessity for taking and 2) the legal authority to effect the taking. On the first
measure, COMELEC proved wanting for they were unable to show that Petitioners were not
willing to sell the print space. It was the contention of the Solicitor General that even if said free
space was mandated it was still within the scope of valid exercise of police power. But that
contention will not hold water because there is no showing that said power was legislatively
given to COMELEC. Thus, Section 2 was declares as Unconstitutional and the petition for
prohibition is made Permanent.
Turning now to Section 8, the court reiterated that Section 8 is valid because it is to be
interpreted within the context of jurisprudence. It was upheld as Constitutional. To summarize
the Court ruled that Resolution 2772 was unconstitutional as far as it applies to Section 2 but
constitutional with respect to Section 8.
Forform Development Corporation,Petitioner,
VS.
Philippine National Railways, Respondent.

Facts: Forform possess several parcels of land in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna. These parcels
of land were originally registered to one Felix Limcaoco, predecessor-in-interest of Forform. The
Government approved the Presidential Commuter Service Project per Resolution no. 751 also
known as Carmona Project. During the construction of the commuter line, several of the
properties of the petitioner had been traversed as right of way. Petitioner filed for recovery of
possession of real property and/or damages. Alleging among others that the PNR used the aid of
military men to take the property without the consent of the petitioner, in the course of the trial
several witnesses were presented by the petitioner who testified to the effect that the occupation
and taking of petitioners property was done with violence and destruction resulting to damages
to the property. On the side of the Respondents they presented as defense that there was no
payment of just compensation because Dr. Felix Limcaoco failed to present the corresponding
OCTs of his property. They also presented the mandate of President Marcos to acquire the right
of way in order to provide a cheap, efficient and safe means of transportation. The Trial court had
rule in favor of the plaintiff. Both parties were not satisfied. The plaintiff was not satisfied on one
hand because the Court did not grant recovery but granted damages; the respondent on the other
hand was because the valuation of the property was too high. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the lower court. Still not satisfied, they elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff can recover the property taken without just
compensation.
Ruling: The Court said no more. When taken together the actions of the petitioner amounted to
an acquiescence of the said property to be used by PNR. After all PNR had occupied such land
for 18 years. Aside from that the moment a party fails to act within reasonable period to reclaim
or to claim just compensation from another, such party shall be stopped from doing so in the
future moreover it would be detrimental to the public to allow the plaintiff recovery. The court
Partially Denied the petition in so far as the petition to recover is involved but Partially
Granted the petition with respect to the attorneys fees and litigation expenses is concerned.
PNR was directed by the Court to institute the proper expropriation proceedings.

Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner,

VS.
Spouses Agustin and Imelda Cancio, Respondents.

Facts: President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1811 which among others reserved
certain parcels of land of the public domain in Lapu Lapu city in favor of petitioner to establish
an Export Processing Zone. Some of these parcels were the property of Agustin and Imelda
Cancio, they were private land. Later, petitioner had leased out respondents property to a third
party (Maitland Smith Inc.) Eventually, on May 2001 petitioner offered to buy respondents
property. But instead of accepting the offer, respondents filed a case of unlawful detainer against
the third party. Petitioner on the other hand filed the expropriation proceedings with the RTC of
Lapu Lapu. The RTC issued two orders, the first order granted the respondents motion that the
petitioner should comply with what is set out by RA 8974. The second order however granted the
petitioners motion for reconsideration. However the trial court issued a third order this time
reinstating the first decision. Aggrieved, with the decision the petitioner elevated the case to the
CA, the latter upheld the ruling. petitioner avers that RA 8974 is not applicable to the present
case.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to the case for purposes of issuing a writ of
possession.
Ruling: It must be noted that expropriation in this case was still in the initial stages. The parties
seem to confuse the payment of zonal valuation with the payment of just compensation itself.
Whereas the latter is the final determination of value the former is a mere requisite to the
issuance of the Writ of Possession. As to the applicability of RA 8974, there is no question that it
applies. Just compensation refers to the final determination of the fair market value of the
property, it is the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.

Land Bank of the Philippines, Petitioner,

VS.
Raymunda Martinez, Respondent.

Facts: Raymunda Martinez 62.5 hectares land,located in Brgy. Agpudlos San Andres, Romblon,
was subject to compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Pursuant to
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Petitioner, Land Bank offered P 1,955,485.60 for just
compensation. Martinez did not accept the offer. Respondent was convinced that the valuation of
her land was too law and was unjust. The Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication
Board (DARAB) through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted an
administrative proceeding for the preliminary determination of just compensation in accordance
with Section 16 (d) of CARL. PARAD raised the value of the land because it found
inconsistencies in the valuation from P 1,955,485.60 the PARAD raised it to P12, 179,492.50.
Land Bank filed a petition before the Special Agrarian Court. Respondent claimed that the
DARAB decision became final 15 days after the receipt of the ruling. Respondent filed before
PARAD petition for the issuance of a writ of execution which was granted. Finding the decision
not favorable to the decision, Land Bank filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the
PARAD decisions. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, Land Banks motion for
reconsideration met the same fate as the petition. Undaunted, Land Bank elevated the matter to
the Supreme Court.

*Issue: Whether or not PARAD gravely abused its discretion when he issued a writ of execution
despite pendency of Land Banks petition for fixing just compensation with the Special Agrarian
Court
Ruling: PARAD committed NO grave abuse of discretion. The ruling of DARAB, pursuant to
its rules, becomes final after a lapse of 15 days as correctly pointed out by the Respondent. The
court took cognizance of the apparently conflicting decision Suntay In this case, the ruling in
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals applied for the guidance of bar and bench.
It would be unjust for the landowner to be deprived of his property and to leave him unsure as to
its value.
Petitioners motions Denied with FINALITY.

*There were three questions raised but for emphasis of the topic the focus is just compensation
and eminent domain.

Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio

VS.
Jovito M. Luis et. al.

Facts: Herein respondents are owners of a parcel of land protected by TCTs 53591 and 53589.
The parcel of land was taken by the City of Pasig and used as a municipal road. The Sanggunian
of Pasig City passed Resolution no. 15 authorizing compensation for the said parcel of land. But
the Appraisal Committee of the City placed the value of the respondents land at P 150 per square
meter. Respondents wrote a letter to the Appraisal Committee to consider the value of their land
at P2000 per square meter. One of the respondents wrote a letter to Mayor Eusebio informing
him of a higher value now set at P5000 per square meter. The Mayor replied that the city cannot
pay more than what was stated by the Appraisal Committee. Respondents filed a case for
reconveyance and/ damages. They prayed that property be returned to them with the proper
payment of rentals plus 12% legal interest. RTC ruled in favor of respondents ordering herein
petitioner to return the property to the respondents as well as declaring the acts of the latter as
illegal and unjust. Petitioner appealed to the CA but did not get a favorable decision. Petitioner
raised the issue of prescription. In this case prescription does not apply

Issue: Whether respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by the city
government and in the event that the answer is in the negative how just compensation can be
determined.
Ruling: This case fall on all fours with the ruling in Forform. In the Forform case it will be
remembered that the Court ruled because there was no question interposed by the landowner on
the lack of expropriation proceedings then said landowners have tacitly waived their right and
thus considered stopped rom questioning power to expropriate.
The case at bar is similar to the aforementioned Forform case in that the landowners did not
question as well the taking of their property. In view of this the petition is partially granted. CA
decision is modified. Valuation of just compensation and award of back rentals by the RTC is Set
Aside. City of Pasig through its duty authorized officials is DIRECTED to institute the
appropriate expropriation proceedings.

National Power Corporation

VS.
Heirs of Macasangkit Sangkay

Facts: Petitioner undertook the Agus River Hydro Electric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to
generate electricity for Mindanao. It included constructing several underground tunnels to be
used in delivering said water flow. Respondents sought payment of just compensation premised
on the ground that the tunnels that delivered such water flow traversed their land. They claimed
that the presence of the tunnels deprived them of the possible agricultural, commercial, industrial
and residential value of the land and that they were burdened by the water passing through the
tunnel because it led to the constant shaking of the ground and were very noisy. When the
respondents filed a case in the RTC the judge ruled in their favor awarding them actual damages
and just compensation in the amount of P135,532,500 plus monthly rentals with 12% interest,
exemplary damages and 15% of the total amount was awarded as attorneys fees. NPC had
elevated the case to the CA but it upheld the lower courts decision on the liability of NPC and
denied their petition for lack of merit. Relentless, NPC raised the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the Heirs were entitled to just compensation.

**Ruling: The Court agrees with respondents. It ruled that the five-year prescriptive period laid
down in RA 6395 Section 3 (1) does not apply to just compensation. An action to recover
compensation from the state does not prescribe in five years. Without undergoing any formal
expropriation proceedings, the court explained that indeed the act of the NPC amounted to taking
private property without just compensation. The concept of taking does not limit itself to mere
acquisition of title, physical possession or occupancy. Taking can also mean destruction,
restriction or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and
enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. Compensation is
due to those who fall within these concepts of taking. Though respondents proffered and
explanation such explanation was weighed but proven to be wanting. As a matter of fact,
according to the court, what is just compensation to these three parcels of land is a matter of
evidence.
With regard to the matter of valuation the reckoning point according to the court the value at the
time of the filing of the complaint. Upholding the contention of NPC would be to deny to the
respondents the fundamental principle of due process.
The court upheld the ruling of the CA and imposed some modifications to wit: 1) interest at the
rate of 12% per annum is imposed on the principal amount of P 113,532,500 as just
compensation reckoned from the filing of the complaint on November 21,1997 until full liability
is paid. The moral damages and exemplary damages were deleted.

** There were other issues in this case but they do not fall within the topic at hand (i.e. the
quantum meruit of the lawyers).

Anunciacion Vda. De Quana et.al.

VS.
Republic of the Philippines

Facts: The case at bar is a consolidation of the two petitions for review on certiorari involving
the same issue. In1949 the National Airport, Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) pursued to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. The negotiators met with the
landowners and as they would later claim, the negotiators told them that in the event that said
airport would close or would transfer operations then they (landowners) would have the right to
repurchase. Others accepted while others did not saying that the purchase price offered was too
low thus the Republic was forced to institute a civil action. The RTC declared that the
expropriation was valid exercise of eminent domain. One of the petitioners (GR No. 168812)
was decided by the RTC and the CA in favor of the petitioners, the CA in doing so was under the
impression that the decision in the case was conditional- the land was to be used for the
expansion of the airport and in the event that the land ceases to utilized as such, the owners had
the right to repurchase. MCIAA admitted that there was closure of the airport sometime in June
1992. In the petition of Quana (GR No. 168770) the same issue was involved. Hence following
the first petition, judgment was ruled in favor of the petitioners as well. The CA affirmed the
decision as well.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were entitled to recover their property.

Ruling: Republic is wanting in merit. MCIAA had admitted that the airport was closed on June
1992. Three facts have been established to uphold the meritorious contention of Quano to wit: 1)
that the land was actually taken by the Government in order to expand Lahug Airport, 2) that said
airport had been closed and abandoned, a significant portion thereof had been purchased by a
private company and 3) that it was indeed negotiated between the NAC and landowners that in
the event the airport in question was closed or was abandoned. The court had operated on the
presumption that the Lahug airport will continue operation however facts, as they are presented
had overcome that presumption.
Furthermore, pubic use, as contemplated in eminent domain includes ant usefulness, utility or
advantage or what is beneficial to the general public. In the interest of justice, the same legal
situation should not result to a landowners losing of his property, under the guise of public use,
only so that a private citizen can benefit. Equity and justice demand that because of the facts
presented, the only solution is revonceyance. Hence MCIAA was ordered to reconvey the
property to the petitioners and they shall not be compelled to return whatever interest has
accrued in their favor as just compensation.

Arsenion P. Lumiqued
VS.
Hon. Apolinario G. Exevea

Facts: Arsenion P. Lumiqued (Petitoner) was the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional
Director for the Cordillera Autonomous Region until President Ramos dismissed him pursuant to
Admin. Order no. 52. Dismissal was the result of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional
Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the
DAR. Three complaints were filed. One for the malversation through falsification of official
documents, it was alleged that he committed at least 93 counts of falsification. In the second
complaint of private respondent, petitioner was accused in violation of the Commission on
Appointments (COA) rules and regulations by failing to liquidate cash advances. The third
charged petitioner with oppression and harassment. A committee was created to investigate.
Lumiqued had filed his counter-affidavits for the three accusations by the respondents as per
instruction of the said committee. Committee hearings were conducted but Lumiqued was not
assisted by counsel. He and his counsel failed to appear for the second hearing and so the case
was deemed submitted for resolution. Later he filed a motion for additional hearing which was
denied. The Committee had found him liable for all charges. He filed reconsideration with the
Office of the president which was denied. Undaunted, Lumiqued filed another motion for
reconsider claiming that his constitutional right to due process was violated because he did not
have a counsel present with him during the hearing. Before it can be resolved he died.

Issue: Whether or not the due process clause encompasses the right to have counsel in an
administrative inquiry.
Ruling: While it is true that the records of the hearing has showed that petitioner felt confident
he can answer the questions of the committee without counsel, it must be pointed out that the
presence of counsel in an administrative inquiry is permissive meaning they may or may not be
there depending on the person. Petitioner was not deprived of his day in court for it was his
own explicit acts- he did not inform the Committee that he was confined to the hospital and his
response in the first hearing that he was confident that he could answer the questions of the
committee.
Lawyers while desirable are not the Siamese twins of due process. The Constitution does not
regard the people as too helpless or hapless to not be able to defend themselves if they were on
the side or right even without a lawyer in a non-criminal proceeding.
Petition Dismissed.

Secretary of Justice
VS.
Hon. Ralph C. Lantion

Facts: The present case stems from an extradition proceeding where the petition of the private
respondent for copies of the extradition proceedings and to be given reasonable time to
comment. One of the major *contentions raised by the herein petitioners was the absence of
notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result to denial of fairness.

Issue: Whether or not due not due process embraces the notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings.

Ruling: The court appreciates the facts as presented, the claim of private respondent that due
process had been denied should be given the weight of helium. The claim of private respondent
has no merit because the alleged injustice he will suffer is weak. An extradition proceeding is not
a criminal action or a civil action. It is a proceeding sui generis. The evaluation process is not
akin to a criminal actions preliminary investigation. Urgent motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioner is granted.

*Nine contentions were raised but the jugular issue of this case was whether or not due not due
process embraces the notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. Other contentions dealt with the interpretation of the RP-US extradition treaty.

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

VS.
Commission on Elections

Facts: The COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or
organizations from the list of several national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions. Among the parties subjected to the cutting board was the Philippine Guardians
Brotherhood Inc. It was delisted not only for failure to receive a 2% vote in 2004 but for failing
to participate in the 20007 elections. PGBI moved for reconsideration but it was denied. PGBI
contends that the intention of the party-list act was to provide not one but two separate grounds
attaching in it motion to the SC the records of the Senate deliberation on the Party-list law. It also
pointed out that the implementation of the resolution was contrary to Jurisprudence of the court.

*Issue: Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated.

**Ruling: The court found that there was no violation of due process. Jurisprudence would
show that due process refers to the opportunity to be heard. When applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is simply the change to explain ones side. What is abhorred by justice
is the absence of notice and hearing. But in the case at hand, there was no such absence.
Therefore, due process had not been violated.

*There were two issues on this case one is mentioned above the other were whether or not
COMELEC had legal basis to delist the party.
** The petition was partly granted in so far as COMELECs delisting of PGBI was concerned.

TELEBAP
VS COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners in this case was assailing the Constitutionality of the BP 881 Section
92 particularly because it demanded from these petitioners to provide COMELEC time
and space where all candidates can air out their programs during campaign period. One
major premise alleged by the petitioners was that the demand made by COMELEC
violated their right to equal protection because it singled them out. They also point out
that they stand to lose millions and millions of pesos in unrealized revenue if they
complied with the said law.
COMELEC on the other hand contends that it is within the ambit of their mandate in
ensuring a free, fair and honest elections to compel broadcasting networks to allot a
specific time in their program for COMELEC during campaign period.

Issue: Whether or not BP 881 Sec. 92 violates the equal protection clause in the
Constitution.

Ruling: The court held in the negative. The argument posited by the petitioners that they
have been subject to being the sole target of the law holds no ground. It must be pointed
out that unlike print media the broadcast media operates because of a franchise granted
by the State and in such manner the State has every right to impose upon those to whom
it granted such a privilege certain social responsibilities. The intention of the law bears
one of the highest social value-that is to ensure that the participants in the election who
may not have the same political machinery of others candidates can be given the same
chance to air out their plans for government and so ensuring a level playing field.

People v. Jalosjos
Facts: Romeo Jalosjos is a member of the House of Representatives who was convicted
beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness. He argues that
because he was elected by the sovereign people of Zamboanga del Norte. This makes his
situation sui generis and to not allow him to attend the sessions of Congress would
virtually be tantamount to his removal and to stifle the voice of Zamboanga del Norte.

Issue: Whether or not he should be allowed to discharge his functions in Congress.

Ruling: No. To allow Jalosjos to attend the sessions, which the court takes notice
happens almost every day, is short of declaring him a free man. Indeed it would be
repugnant to the principle of equal protection to treat him so. The court cannot, should
not and must not grant inequality in the guise of official duty. The true essence of equal
protection or our laws is to treat all persons similarly situated in the same manner. Being
a congressman does not grant upon a person exemption from penalty that the state
imposes for in doing so, floodgates of inequality will be opened.

Biraogo
VS
 Philippine Truth Commission

Facts: The case is a result of a member of Congress questioning the constitutionality of

EO 1 issued by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III as contrary to the equal protection
clause of the constitution. EO 1 created the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) which
conferred upon the Commission. Among others, the PTC had an investigative authority
and was tasked to conduct a fact-finding investigation on reported graft and corruption
cases involving third level public officials and higher, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories from the private sector during the previous administration and submit its
findings to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.

Issue: Whether or not EO 1 violates the equal protection clause.

Ruling: The purpose of the Truth Commission does fall within the investigative power
of the President, however to uphold the same would be to transgress the fundamental law
of the land. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things situated in
similarly should be treated in the same manner both as to the rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the Equal protection clause is to secure the
person within the States jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination
whether through the express terms of a law or through duly constituted bodies of the
State. When the Executive Order assailed in this case was evaluated according to the test
of reasonableness, it crumbles. The four requisites are: 1) the classification rests on
substantial distinction, 2) it is germane to the purpose of the law, 3) it is not limited to
existing conditions only and 4) it applies equally to all members of the same class.
Peripheral differences do not satisfy the requirements. A perusal of the Order reveals that
it is focused on the Arroyo Administration only, which is a member of a class of past
administrations. To allow this order to stand would be to arm any administration with the
idea that they can use their office to create Commissions and use the same as vehicles
for vindictive retribution. While the court appreciated prioritization, arbitrary
classification violating the Constitution trumps such prioritization.

COMELEC V. CRUZ
Facts: Before the Barangay and Sanguniang Kabataan Elections on October 29, 2007 some
officials had filed for a declaratory relief assailing the constitutionality of a provision in RA
9164, An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections,
amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
The claim was that it violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it applied not
prospectively but retrospectively more so when the law singled out the baranggay officials.
COMELEC argues on the other hand that the law is not unconstitutional. It is not penal in nature
hence the claim of those who filed the declaratory relief had no merit and neither was it a
violation of equal protection. According to COMELEC what the law did was merely to restate
the three-limit rule already stated in the Local Government Code.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed law was unconstitutional.

Ruling: As correctly pointed out by the COMELEC the claim of violating the equal protection
clause has no basis to be challenged in this case. The law can distinguish between these barangay
officials and other officials with respect to term limits because the constitution allows
COMELEC to do so. Here there exist a substantial distinction, there is no reason to apply the
equal protection clause because the law itself did not produce any detrimental effect to the
officials.

Jose Miguel Arroyo

vs. Department of Justice

Facts: COMELEC issued a Resolution No. 9266 which approved the creation of a committee
jointly with the Department of Justice. The allegations of massive fraud in the 2004 and 2007
elections led to this Resolution. DOJ issued Department Order No. 640 and named three
prosecutors for the Joint committee. Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating a Joint Committee and
Fact Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections Electoral Fraud and Manipulation
Cases. It was to conduct necessary preliminary investigation and based on evidence. The team
was given the mandate to find real, documentary, and testimonial evidence which will be used in
the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Committee. It was agreed that the main
focus would be the electoral fraud and manipulation cases committed during the May 14, 2007
elections. The team concluded that there was a manipulation of results in the Provinces of North
and South Cotabato and Maguindanao. The Fact-finding team focused on Abalos among others
and GMA for electoral fraud and for the manipulation of the election results.
It was assailed for being arbitrary and violative of the equal protection clause.

Issue: Whether or not there was violation of the equal protection clause. While indeed, GMA and
Mike Arroyo were among those in the preliminary investigation, they were not the only focus
and neither did the law specifically focus on their allies. Private individuals were also subjected
to the investigation by the Joint Committee. It must be remembered that on various case the court
has already explain that the equal protection guarantee prevents undue favor or privilege. It is
aimed at discrimination and oppression based on inequality either because of the facts or the law.
However it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like
circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.

Nota Bene: When compared with a previous case (Philippine Truth Commission) remember that
in the previous the distinction was not substantial, what was investigated in the former was the
Arroyo Administration only. In this case however it did not focus only on Arroyo and her allies,
neither did it focus only on public officials. Hence, all were treated equally in line with the
mandate of the Resolution.