HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY O F LOGIC, 19 (1998), 41-54

Is there a Zande Logic?

Department of Philosophy, University of SZo Paulo, PO Box 8105, SZo Paulo-SP, 05508-900, Brazil
e-mail: ncacosta@usp.br

OTAVIO
BUENO
Division of History and Philosophy of Science, School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Leeds
LS2 9JT, UK
e-mail: phloab@leeds.ac.uk

AND
STEVEN
FRENCH
Division of History and Philosophy of Science, School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Leeds
LS2 9JT. UK
e-mail: s,r.d,french@leeds.ac.uk

Original submission: October 1995/Revision: October 1996

The issue of what consequences to draw from the existence of non-classical logical systems has been the
subject of an interesting debate across a diversity of fields. In this paper the matter of alternative logics is
considered with reference to a specific belief system and its propositions: the Azande are said to maintain
beliefs about witchcraft which, when expressed propositionally, appear to be inconsistent. When the Azande
have been presented with such inconsistencies, they either fail to see them as such or else accept them as
non-problematical. Is our knowledge of logical truths a relative and culturally determined phenomenon, or
is there some (transcendent) criterion that allows us to adjudicate between alternative logical systems? The
authors propose an approach for resolving disputes about the status of Azande reasoning which assumes
a paraconsistent framework, thus providing a new perspective on this debate.

1. Introduction
We have recently witnessed an interesting debate concerning putative inconsis-
tencies in Zande reasoning1 which touches upon certain fundamental issues in the
representation of belief systems. Motivated by Bloor's analysis of knowledge (Bloor
1976), in particular his considerations concerning the relativity of logical knowledge,
some of the Zande inconsistencies have been carefully considered. In order to
account for them, it has been suggested that there might be an alternative-
Zande-logic, different from the Western one, inside which such inconsistencies could
be adequately accommodated. Jennings (1989, 280), indeed, has pointed out that
Bloor maintains that since the Azande do not revise their beliefs even after having
[an] apparent contradiction pointed out to them, there is not, for them, a
contradiction: and therefore they have a different logic to ours.
Bloor is, in fact, quite adamant in this regard and stresses that 'there must be more
than one logic: a [Zlande logic and a Western logic' (1976, 124).
Our purpose, in this paper, is to consider a particular and distinctive approach to
this matter. Instead of supposing (or, possibly, arguing for) a demarcation between
1 A comment about 'Azande' and 'Zande' might be in order here. Although the name of this people is
Azande, the adjectival form of this name is Zande, and this is the reason for writing 'Zande logic' and
' Zande beliefs '.

014&5340/98 $12.00 0 1998 Taylor & Francis Ltd

42 N. C. A. da Costa, 0. Bueno and S. French

these logics, we suggest, given the crucial role of inconsistenciesin this debate, a radical
change in logic. By introducing a non-classical, paraconsistent, logic as the underlying
logic of Zande reasoning, none of the considered inconsistencies will be threatening.
The main features of this logic, indeed, consist in its admission of some 'contra-
dictions', and in not being trivialized by them (except for some specific contradictions).
Thus, given the features of our sample of Zande reasoning, it seems quite natural to
consider applying this logic in this specific context.
In order to do so, we intend first to present, in section 2, some aspects of the issue
to be dealt with by considering arguments articulated in this debate thus far. Some
remarks on paraconsistent logic are presented in section 3, and our suggestion
concerning the possibility of its application, as well as the appropriateness and the
advantages of doing so, considered. In section 4, arguments against such a proposal,
in terms of the 'principle of charity', are discussed and criticized. Finally, in section 5,
given the tools employed, an important consequence concerning the status of a Zande
logic is spelt out-and this consequence, we will see, reinforces our case.

2. Zande logic, Western logic and a debate

One aspect of the controversy concerning relativism and rationality centres on the
theoretical status of logic. Is our knowledge of logical truths a relative and culturally
conditioned phenomenon, or is there some kind of (transcendent) criterion that allows
us to adjudicate between alternative logical systems? To this old (and, until now,
unsettled) debate some new arguments, favouring the relativist trend, have been
proposed.
Bloor, for example, on the basis of aspects of Evans-Pritchard's work,2 has
asserted the existence of distinct systems of logic (implicitly questioning the possibility,
or at the least the adequacy, of deciding between them). In order to supply evidence for
this thesis, he analyses the Zande case.
The Azande, as Evans-Pritchard (1937) noted, apparently maintain inconsistent
beliefs (in a sense to be made precise later) concerning witchcraft. They assume, on the
one hand, that the presence of a certain witchcraft-substance constitutes both a
necessary and a sufficient condition for a person to be classed a witch. Furthermore,
this substance is inherited by the same-sexed offspring of a witch. So, if a certain
person (a man, for instance) in a Zande clan (which is biologically determined) is a
witch, it follows (by classical logic) that every man in this clan is a witch. More
explicitly, we can state with Jennings (1989, 279) that
(1) All and only witches have witchcraft-substance.
(2) Witchcraft-substance is always inherited by the same-sexed children of a witch.
(3) The Zande clan is a group of persons related biologically to one another
through the male line.
(4) Man A of clan C is a witch.

(5) Every man in clan C is a witch.

2 As Jennings has pointed out, Bloor and Evans-Pritchard present different solutions to the problem.
While for the latter there are 'contradictions' in Zande thought, although the Azande fail to see them,
for the former there are none: the apparent contradictions result from a 'western elaboration of their
[Azande] beliefs', from elaborations that 'are not part of their collective thought practices, the logic,
of the Azande' (Jennings 1989,285; for Evans-Pritchard's work, see his celebrated 1937 work). In this
regard, it seems to us, Jennings and Bloor are professing the same naturalistic view.
 Is there a Zande Logic? 43

However-and it is exactly here that the difficulty is set-Azande accept the premises,
but not the conclusion of this argument. Indeed, as Evans-Pritchard pointed out:
'Azande see the sense of this argument, but they do not accept its conclusion, and it
would involve the whole notion of witchcraft in contradiction were they to do so'
(1937, 24).
In other words, given that, from the viewpoint of classical logic, the set constituted
by propositions (1)-(4) and the negation of (5) is inconsistent, and in as much as
Azande believe them, they hold inconsistent beliefs. The question, then, naturally
arises: how to understand this phenomenon?
Some possible answers have been recently proposed. We may classify them into
two distinct categories. On the one hand, we find proposals based on the idea that, in
order to solve this problem, a dzferent logic should be ascribed to the Azande (this,
in fact, has been the suggestion of Bloor (1976), Jennings (1989), Cooper (1975) and,
to some extent, of Evans-Pritchard (1937)). Obviously, such a logic should allow us to
understand the status of the inconsistencies. On the other hand, in a more conservative
vein, there are alternatives characterized by retaining the same-classical-logic and
explaining the phenomenon by some other means (here we find the proposals of
Salmon (1978) and Triplett (1988)). Let us briefly consider each of them.
Taking logic from a naturalist point of view, Bloor and Jennings characterize it as
'those shared patterns of thought which are socially selected from among the various
patterns of thought to which we are naturally inclined' (Jennings 1989, 275). With
this characterization, and employing some of Wittgenstein's ideas concerning the
relation between the meaning and use of an expression, they claim that within the
Zande system there is no contradiction. Indeed, supposing that meaning is derived
from use (that is, from specific practical situations), contradictions are 'unacceptable
because of the problems in practice to which they give rise' (Jennings 1989, 284;
emphasis added). As Jennings stresses, 'The difficulty in being told that it is raining
and it is not raining is not that it is a contradiction but that we cannot both take and
not take the umbrella' (1989,284). However, following Evans-Pritchard, in practical
affairs there is no difficulty for the Azande. And so, Jennings concludes, 'on Bloor's
account, there is no contradiction' (p. 284).
Moreover, given that Zande 'shared patterns of thought' are different from ours,
their logic, from the naturalist viewpoint, is not the same as the Western logic. In this
sense, there would be a genuinely Zande logic. This idea, in fact, can also be found in
Evans-Pritchard's proposal: 'witchcraft has its own logic, its own rules of thought'
(1937, 79; emphasis added). The problem, then, consists in determining exactly what
kind of logic.
In this regard, Cooper's suggestion (1975) is interesting. He proposes to use
tukasiewicz's three-valued logic to 'dissolve' Zande contradictions. Such a logic,
which has three truth-values (true, false and indeterminate), had already been used by
Reichenbach to 'dissolve' certain anomalies in quantum mechanics. Cooper's basic
strategy consists in considering certain premisses of Zande reasonings as indeterminate
(because, in principle, untestable), showing that within this three-valued logic the
threatening inconsistencies do not follow. For example, he regards premiss (2) of
Jennings' argument as indeterminate. Indeed:

Suppose ... that while [premiss (2)] is not rejected as false, nor is it regarded as true.
Rather it is regarded by the Azande as an in principle untestable proposition which
is consequently assigned the truth-value indeterminate. If we then assume that
44 N. C. A . da Costa, 0. Bueno and S. French

Azande employ the reasoning of L3 [Lukasiewicz logic] we shall not be able to

ascribe to them the belief that all Zande are witches; nor, therefore, shall we be able
to foist a contradiction upon them (Cooper 1975, 245).

Cooper extends this proposal also to the celebrated example of the Nuer twins. (The
Nuer, like the Azande, are reputed to hold inconsistent beliefs.) Their set of beliefs,
presumed inconsistent, may be presented as follows (Cooper 1975, 245) :

(1') Either twins' souls go 'above' or they go elsewhere.

(2') If twins' souls go 'above', twins have souls.
(3') If twins' souls go 'elsewhere', twins have souls.
(4') Some twins-namely, very young ones-do not have souls.

From the point of view of classical logic, a set constituted by propositions (l'k(4') is
clearly inconsistent (we may deduce from it a proposition and its negation).
Nevertheless, Cooper argues, using Lukasiewicz's logic, and supposing premiss (1) of
Jennings' formulation of Zante reasoning as indeterminate, this is not the case. Thus,
as with the Azande, no contradiction will result.
However interesting this proposal might be, it is certainly not uncontroversial.
Salmon (1978), for instance, whose ideas pertain to the second category (the one
preserving classical logic), has criticized it on at least two grounds. On the one hand,
she claimed that the Zande case and the quantum mechanics case are not sufficiently
similar to receive the same approach concerning the indeterminate propositions. On
the other hand, Zande premisses, considered as indeterminate by Cooper, are in fact
taken as false by the Azande themselves. As a consequence, she claims, no
contradiction could be settled. Let us briefly consider her arguments.
While some propositions of quantum mechanics are untestable in principle, she
observes, for theoretical reasons (propositions, for example, concerning a particle's
momentum, once we have already determined its position), Zande and Nuer
propositions (presumed by Cooper indeterminate) are not. Indeed, Salmon (1978,448)
stresses,

even if 'Every biological relative of a witch is a witch' is a highly theoretical

statement, this is not a reason for [thinking] it takes the value indeterminate.
Cooper does not show that Azande regard this statement as untestable in principle
in some circumstances though it would be testable in others. Yet it is this
characteristic, not their highly theoretical character, which distinguishes in-
determinate statements in Reichenbach's logic of quantum physics.

So, as Salmon sees it, one of Cooper's main points is problematic.

Moreover, as she is eager to note (p. 452), Azande simply do not accept some
premisses of the Cooper-Jennings argument. Indeed, they consider the heritability of
witchcraft-substance as restricted to very close relatives--denying, this way, premiss
(2) of the argument. Besides, the witchcraft-substance may be 'cool', not manifesting
itself, and then a man, even one possessing it, should not be considered a
witch-amounting, thus, to a rejection of premiss (1). Her conclusion (1978,452) then
is clear:

Since the premise 'Every biological relative of a witch is a witch' turns out on closer
examination to be regarded by Azande as false, Azande are not forced by logic to
 Is there a Zande Logic?

accept the conclusion 'All Azande are witches' is true. There is no contradiction
when the standards of ordinary two-valued logic are employed.
In other words, it would be possible, on Salmon's account, to retain classical logic as
the underlying logic of Zande thought and deny a possible Zande commitment to
inconsistent beliefs. Her main strategy, in order to do so, consists in arguing for the
Zande rejection of certain premises in the argument.
With this suggestion-rejection of premises-we finally reach the last proposal.
Triplett (1988), indeed, considers that Azande explicitly employ this strategy in order
to remain consistent. As he sees it, the fact that Azande resist the conclusion (that
everyone in clan C is a witch) is not evidence for their having an alternative logic.
Rather :
They are simply reasoning according to the method of reductio ad absurdum. Since
the conclusion that all the members of the clan are witches is unacceptable, there
must be something wrong with one or more of the premises. ... They revise their
beliefs so that they are consistent (1988, 364).
Thus, by reconsidering their premisses, Azande, on Triplett's viewpoint, not only do
not accept inconsistencies, but remain within a classical logic framework.
The central point we wish to stress is that what this recent discussion has as a
concensus is the claim that no inconsistency is really found in Zande thought. Triplett,
indeed, analysing some of the Azande reasonings, claims that their underlying logic is
'in fact impeccably Aristotelian' (1988, 361). Replying to his arguments, Jennings
(1989, 275) has stressed that, from a naturalist point of view, although Zande logic
differs from Western logic, 'there is no contradiction in Zande thought '. Even Cooper,
who presented the boldest proposal, suggesting that Azande might be 'incorporating
a certain non-standard logic', is eager to point out (1975,238) that by this means 'the
contradictions and anomalies [of primitive thought] are dissolved'. Finally, Salmon,
criticizing Cooper's approach, has put forward a 'more conservative solution to the
apparent contradictions' (1978, 444; emphasis added).
As opposed to these proposals, we suggest taking Zande inconsistencies at face
value. This supplies, in fact, an altogether different perspective to the whole issue. Thus
far, all the commentators have presented more or less ad hoe manoeuvres in order to
avoid the claim that the Azande uphold inconsistent beliefs (rejection of premisses,
reasoning by reductio ad absurdum, use of a three-valued logic, and so on). These
moves, of course, are perfectly understandable. All the discussion seems to have been
based on the tacit assumption that inconsistencies are to be avoided at any cost. After
all, and here comes a second hidden supposition, inconsistencies lead to trivialization.
And the Zande belief system, weird as it may initially seem, definitely is not trivial. So,
any minimally adequate account of Zande reasoning, it has been assumed, should
'save the appearances', getting rid of the apparent contradictions.
Of course, we are in complete agreement with the claim that the Zande system is
by no means trivial, but we do not see any reason why the previous two assumptions
are to be uncritically maintained. After all, as distinct from the first, inconsistencies do
not need to be avoided at any cost, given that, as against the second, if the logic
underlying Zande reasonings is conveniently changed to a paraconsistent one, no
trivialization will result. This suggestion is that it is possible to model Zande reasoning
without having to meet an a priori consistency requirement, thus putting forward a
different approach to the whole issue. (Of course, there are important issues here to do
 N. C . A. da Costa, 0.Bueno and S. French

with charity, and we shall return to these in section 4.) These are then some of the
reasons to introduce paraconsistent logic in this debate.

3. Paraconsistent logic and Zande reasoning

First we present, in a loose way, some terminology. Let us consider a theory T as
a triple (L, A, G), where L is a language, A is a set of propositions (closed formulas)
of L, called the axioms of T, and G is the underlying logic of T. We suppose that L has
a negation symbol, 1,and that, as usual, the theorems of Tare derived from A by the
rules of G.
In such a context, T is said to be inconsistent if it has two theorems, a and a,
where a is a formula of L; otherwise, Tis said to be consistent. Tis called trivial if any
-
formula of L is a theorem of T; otherwise, T is called non-trivial. T is called
paraconsistent, roughly speaking, if it is inconsistent, but non-trivial. We say that G is
paraconsistent if it can be the underlying logic of paraconsistent theories. Moreover, let
A be an inconsistent set of proposition according to classical logic; we shall also
consider as paraconsistent a logic in which a set like A may be non-trivial.
If Tis a paraconsistent theory, we should stress, it is not the case that any formula
of L and its negation are theorems of T. Typically, in a paraconsistent theory T, there
are theorems whose negations are not theorems of T; nonetheless, there are formulas
which are theorems of T, as well as their negations.
Employing the tools of paraconsistent logic, we can then formalize sets of
reasonings that have contradictory conclusions, in such a way that these conclusions
be simultaneously logically acceptable (i.e. without trivialization). In addition, in some
paraconsistent logical systems, sets of sentences that are trivial within classical logic
may be non-trivial. Nevertheless, in connection with certain topics, most para-
consistent logics reduce to classical logic; for instance, it cannot be the case that here
and now it is raining and not raining3
Our main point in this paper is to suggest that Azande and Nuer may be
using~onsciously or unconsciously-a paraconsistent logic. The Nuer twins
example, considered by Cooper, represents a typical example of paraconsistent
reasoning (whose sets of premisses are trivial within classical logic), and can, without
trivialization, be accommodated within a paraconsistent logic. Similarly, the Cooper-
Jennings argument concerning Zande witchcraft suggests that the implicit Zande logic
is a weak one, in the sense of being a logic strictly weaker than classical logic-weaker,
indeed, in this case, then classical positive logic. As we saw at the start of section 2,
using classical logic, from premisses (1)-(4) the conclusion, ( 5 ) , follows. Azande,
however, seem not to possess a logic with enough strength to obtain this conclusion.
Contrarily, they assert the negation of proposition (5). We are faced, then, with a set
of propositions that are inconsistent from the point of view of classical logic. This set,
however, is plainly acceptable within paraconsistent logic because it is composed of
true propositions. As we have just seen, this logic supplies the tools to deal with such
a set of true propositions.
An obvious question that can be raised at this point concerns that propriety of such
tools for modelling Zande reasoning. Before considering this question, it is important

3 In order to get an idea of the nature of paraconsistent logic, see for instance: da Costa 1974; da Costa,
Beziau and Bueno 1995a; and Priest, Routley and Norman 1989 (for a review of the latter, see Tuziak
1993). Historical considerations on this logic can also be found in Arruda 1980 and 1989; D'Ottaviano
1990, and da Costa, Bbiau and Bueno 1995b.
 Is there a Zande Logic?

to note that in our view there are no a priori context-independent criteria that
guarantee a logic is being used by an individual or a culture. In general, given certain
samples of reasoning (the 'observable data' that we have to take into account), there
are several distinct logics that could be employed to 'model' them (logics that then
would be appropriate to such samples). So, in a way similar to models of data in
science, linguistic phenomena in general underdetermine the logics that could fit them.
Of course, it does not follow from this that such logics are useless for modelling these
phenomena Gust as underdetermination arguments in science do not show that the
theories involved are valueless). But, given this remark, one should be very careful
about an essentialist claim with regard to the logic used in a certain domain. As we will
see in a moment, this feature fits nicely with the use of paraconsistent logics in the
Zande case.
Where does the quest for a logic in the process of modelling particular pieces of
reasoning come from? Roughly speaking, there are two steps here. This modelling
process is especially intricate when the reasonings involved belong to a different
culture. The data at our disposal, particularly in such cases, are never put forward
'raw', but as Suppes (1969) has pointed out in the context of science, they are always
presented through the employment of certain structures. The establishment of the data
(in a sense, a quite theoretical activity in itself) constitutes the first step. In the Zande
case, the data are structured in terms of Evans-Pritchard's description, and carry, of
course, his cultural presuppositions. The second step comes when, given such data,
one can then wonder about a logic to model them (and, due the underdetermination
argument, just a logic!).
Having said that, we should note that, in particular cases, we usually have more
information at our disposal in order to evaluate the propriety of certain logical tools
to model some samples of reasoning-although even then we could hardly establish
that the logic employed is the true one. But we have at least some hints. For instance,
in cases in which the relevant data involve both inconsistency and non-triviality
(roughly speaking, the two main features of paraconsistency), it seems natural to
conjecture that the use of paraconsistent logic may be appropriate. It is thus from this
viewpoint that the Zande case is to be considered. The two basic paraconsistency traits
are in fact found in the data to be accounted for. On the one hand, that the Zande
system is not trivial can be seen by the fact that Azande vigorously reject certain
claims-for instance, proposition (5) of the Cooper-Jennings argument. As Evans-
Pritchard has pointed out, 'they do not accept [this] conclusion' (1937, 24). If their
system were trivial, this could never happen. On the other hand, it is precisely for not
accepting this proposition that their belief system is inconsistent, from the perspective
of classical logic. Thus, it seems that a case can be made for the use of paraconsistent
logic in this context.
This remark also suggests a partial criterion for the choice of a paraconsistent logic
in the modelling of certain reasonings. It suggests the tentative adoption of this kind
of logic, as opposed to others that cannot deal adequately with inconsistencies, when
the context is determined by the conjunction of inconsistency and non-triviality.
But if paraconsistent logic may be appropriate in such cases, what are the
advantages of modelling Zande reasonings using it? First, we can forcefully disclose
the assumptions about consistency-preservation that have been assumed without
criticism throughout this debate. (This is a nice example of how certain assumptions
in a theory can be uncovered and criticized only by the formulation of a rival theory.
It would be simply pointless to spell out such assumptions without actually having the
 N. C. A. da Costa, 0. Bueno and S. French

possibility of developing an alternative account in which they are denied.) By rejecting

these assumptions, we open up new possibilities for modelling and understanding the
relevant phenomena. New issues for interpretation are put forward, and a distinct
picture of the Zande system emerges. (Of course, the details will have to be filled in by
anthropologists !)
Moreover, instead of considering just Zande reasonings, we can also approach the
beliefs involved in these reasonings, taking them at face value as well, within a
paraconsistent framework. In this case, the appropriate paraconsistent logic to deal
with Zande beliefs will be a paraconsistent doxastic logic, a logic that can
accommodate, without trivialization, contradictory beliefs. Using this logic, it is then
possible to model beliefs in 'contradictions', such as those found in the Zande case (for
further details, see da Costa and French 1989).
Having thus considered some positive arguments suggesting the propriety and
advantages of adopting a paraconsistent logic in this context, we now examine, and
criticize, a negative line of argument to the effect that such a proposal might not even
get off the ground.

4. Charity and paraconsistency

There are well-known arguments involving the Principle of Charity which would rule
out the use of non-classical logic as a framework for Zande beliefs/statements.
According to Quine, 'fair translation preserves logical laws .. . ' (Quine 1960, 59), and
most pertinently for this paper, he bluntly rejects the claim that certain people could
accept as true sentences that can be translated 'p and not-p' as 'absurd under our
semantic criteria' (p. 58). The latter phrase gives the game away, perhaps, and Quine's
'semantic criteria' famously involve the observable behaviour of assenting to or
dissenting from certain utterances. Once the analogues to our 'not' and 'and' have
been behaviourally pinned down, the conclusion is that any instance of assent to a
contradiction must be indicative of a faulty translation manual.
However, faced with examples of belief systems such as those of the Azande and
the Nuer (see e.g. Kekes 1976), a number of commentators have suggested that the
form of charity at play in Quine's work is simply too severe. There are then broadly
two sets of proposals for a replacement. One is to urge the abandonment of this form
of charity in favour of some weaker principle which can be applied to translation
across the board (Thagard and Nisbett 1983). The other is to break down translation
into two stages, with charity applying in strict form only to the first, preliminary, stage
and a weaker principle being introduced at the secondary translation (Henderson
1987). Our concern now is which proposal meshes best with the approach adopted
here. Let us begin with the latter suggestion.
The decisive element in this approach is a fine-grained analysis of the process of
constructing a translation manual which isolates earlier and later stages. In the former,
a ' first-approximation' manual is constructed, adequate for translating the sentences
of 'everyday usage'. It is during this stage that the use of the severe form of the
principle of charity is claimed to be necessary, both in practice and in principle. It is
against the background of a first-approximation translation manual that a 'refined'
translation manual is elaborated. This process proceeds by fine-tuning the first-
approximation manual and is guided by a 'principle of explicability', which constrains
the translator to attribute explicable, rather than 'correct' or 'consistent ', beliefs to
the speakers of the source language (Henderson 1987). Inconsistency can then be
accommodated at this level; elsewhere this approach has been employed directly to
 Is there a Zande Logic? 49

handle Zande witchcraft beliefs (da Costa and French 1995). Within this framework,
first-approximation manuals are regarded as consistent, arising as they do from the
employment of charity, and any inconsistency-such as appears within the Zande
system-is accommodated through the introduction of a notion of 'representational '
belief (ibid.).
However, the question now arises: why should inconsistency be eliminated, a
priori, from even first-translation manuals? We recall Quine's comments that
attribution of inconsistency would be absurd under our semantic criteria. By this is
meant our classical criteria, formulated and expressed in terms of classical logic. But
why should such criteria be imposed even at this initial stage?
Henderson offers an answer which echoes Quine, Davidson and Hollis: the
purpose of invoking charity at least, at the beginning of the translation process is to
'make meaningful disagreement possible, and this depends entirely on a foundation-
some foundation-in agreement' (Davidson 1974, 196-7). Thus, it is only by
identifying some core of agreement that we can go on to investigate disagreement.
Quine, in particular, argued for the application of charity as the only plausible way of
using behavioural evidence-the only evidence available to us-in the initial
construction of our translation manual. And Hollis, likewise, emphasizes the need to
establish a bridgehead of 'everyday' beliefs, modelled within the framework of
classical logic (see Hollis 1982).
In particular, Henderson insists that it is only against the background of a
provisional, or ' first-approximation', translation manual, established charitably, that
'obvious' inconsistency (that is, inconsistency that is not the result of unrealized
consequences of a set of beliefs) can be problematic. He gives two reasons in support
of this claim :
(1) the identification of putative, flagrant error or conspicuous inconsistency can be
made sufficiently precise and well-grounded to warrant investigation only using
such a manual, and (2) well-grounded information needed for the investigation of
such attributions of error (for explicability) is accessible only through such a
manual (Henderson 1987,230).
(It is worth noting that if the 'attributions of error' are understood as embracing
attributions of inconsistency, then this second 'reason' seems to be no more than a re-
statement of the initial claim above.)
Consider the treatment of truth-functions, for example, which Henderson
considers to be 'more simply charitable' than the treatment of observation sentences
(p. 244). The central procedure is to match patterns of assent and dissent with the
truth-conditions for truth-functions. Thus, for example, an element of the source-
language will be translated as the sign for negation if it is found that the users of the
language almost universally dissent to a compound sentence comprised of that
element and another sentence, just in case they assent to the latter. (Of course, this
assumes that dissent can be understood in terms of negation, which may not be the
case within a non-classical framework.) This treatment is 'more simply charitable'
because truth-functions are 'behaviourally quite simple' and 'dispositions to the
prevailing patterns of assent and dissent are effectively instilled' (p. 244). These
patterns can then be fitted with the (emphasis) truth-conditions for truth functions so
as to construe the language users as either almost always correct or widely mistaken.
If the latter, they would be either mistaken as to the meaning of their own truth-
functional constructions or be suffering from a 'systematic logical incompetence'
 50 N. C. A. da Costa. 0. Bueno and S. French

(p. 245). However, in this case, according to Henderson (and Quine), the translation
would be so horribly perverse as to be reducible to nonsense. Thus there is no reason
not to be charitable.
Moreover, there is a reason not to translate uncharitably and this, put bluntly, is
that being uncharitable is more trouble than it is worth (ibid.). The central idea here
is that if we are charitable in translation the 'deviations' we encounter become
explicable in terms of the sociological and psychological theories we have developed to
explain our own behaviour. Dropping charity renders these deviations inexplicable in
these terms.
There are two central elements of this account to which we wish to draw attention.
The first is reliance on the truth-conditions for truth-functions; the second is reliance
on 'present and foreseeable' (p. 246) sociological and psychological theories of
behaviour. In both cases, questions are begged against a paraconsistent account, even
at this level of the first-approximation manual. In the first, this is obvious if by the
truth-conditions Henderson means the truth-conditions of classical logic. These will
be different, of course, for paraconsistent logic, and the issue of 'fitting' the patterns
of assent and dissent to such conditions becomes much more complex, even in the case
of negation. One aspect of this issue concerns the relativization of 'correct' and
'mistaken' in this context, and to construe the latter as either a misunderstanding of
the meaning of the speakers' 'own' truth-functional constructions or as 'systematic
logic incompetence' is to make a gross assumption that only classical logic will serve
at the first-approximation level. Here the perversity lies not with the translation, but
with the latter assumption.
As for the reason not to translate uncharitably, this again amounts to little more
than a refusal to contemplate alternative approaches erected on non-classical
foundations. The claim that charity is easier suggests that these 'theories we have
developed for use on ourselves' are themselves expressed in classical terms. However,
this is itself debatable in terms of the paraconsistent approaches to both 'everyday'
and scientific beliefs within our Western culture that have been developed (see, for
instance, da Costa and French 1989, 1990 and, especially, 1993). It may be hard work
to construct a non-classical (in all senses) sociological or psychological theory of
Zande behaviour, but that is no reason not to try-it is certainly no reason to support
the imposition of charity!
Nevertheless, perhaps some such reason can be given, drawing on a comment made
by one of the relativists themselves. In rejecting the a priori adherence to the principle
of non-contradiction, Jennings writes that 'the difficulty in being told that it is raining
and not-raining is not that it is a contradiction but that we cannot both take and not
take an umbrella' (Jennings 1989, 284). The central idea here is that, at this level,
contradictory assertions are impediments to action. If certain such assertions were
pervasive-again, at this level--certain actions would be 'blocked'. From the
observation that the appropriate actions are not 'blocked', we may have good reason
to suppose that a translation of the corresponding assertions as contradictory is
inappropriate. This may give us a reason for being charitable at the practical level.
Hence the reason we should employ the principle of charity is a 'practical' reason, in
the sense of one which points towards action, as opposed to theoretical reasons which
point towards 'truth', however construed (see e.g. Audi 1989).
The issue of the application of a general understanding of practical reason-or,
better, practical reasoning-in this context deserves further exploration, but for the
purpose of this paper we shall be content with indicating how it might illuminate
 Is there a Zande Logic? 51

certain facets of this debate over Zande beliefs. Thus commentators who reject the
suggestion that non-classical logic might usefully be applied here emphasize the ways
in which the Azande get around the inconsistency at the practical level: they may
accept that a man is a witch, but avoid the imputation to the whole clan by claiming
that he was a bastard; or they may claim that the witchcraft-substance is cool so that
witchcraft fails to function (Evans-Pritchard 1937,245). Triplett (1988), in particular,
deploys these moves against Bloor and Jennings, claiming that they show the Azande
to be reasoning entirely classically, as we have noted. In response, Jennings has argued
that such moves are individual responses and not a matter of institutionalized belief,
which is the level at which logic, understood from the naturalized perspective, is
situated (Jennings 1989). However, as Triplett goes on to note, such a distinction is
hard to maintain, particularly in the case of the 'witchcraft-substance is cool'
response, as this appears to be as general and non-specific as anything else in the Zande
system and is explicitly referred to by Evans-Pritchard as a 'doctrine' (Triplett 1994).
We can use the distinction between 'practical' and 'theoretical' reasoning to
mediate between these positions. Let us recall Evans-Pritchard's point that 'In
practice [the Azande] regard only close paternal kinsmen of a known witch as witches.
It is only in theory that they extend the imputation to all a witch's clansmen (1937,24).
As Triplett notes, this might provide the basis for Bloor and Jennings's distinction
between individual and institutional responses (see Triplett 1994, 755). However, we
read it as marking the distinction between 'practical' and 'theoretical' reasoning in
the following sense: at the practical level inconsistency is avoided, not because of some
a priori adoption of the principle of non-contradiction, as Triplett supposes, but
because of the consequences for practical action-action which, prior to the imposition
of British rule in the region could have life or death consequences !4 Practical reasoning
can be just as general and non-specific as its 'theoretical' counterpart, of course, and
the relevant distinction, to which the application of charity cleaves, is demarcated
along action-oriented lines.
Furthermore, as we have already emphasized, each side of the debate differs in
maintaining that there might be contradictions within the Zande system, and this can
be most readily accommodated by describing the system in paraconsistent terms. This
sheds further light on Evans-Pritchard's remark that 'Azande do not perceive the
contradiction as we perceive it because they have no theoretical interest in the subject'
(Evans-Pritchard 1937,25). Jennings reads this as saying that the Azande perceive no
contradiction and therefore must be operating in terms of a non-classical logic.
Triplett argues that this is a misreading which ignores the point noted by Evans-
Pritchard that the Azande do not see the contradictions as we would see them (Triplett
1994, 757-8). In terms of this wider context, Triplett claims, the Azande see the
contradictions looming and take steps to avoid them, thus operating entirely
classically. From our perspective, we can read this comment in the following way:
contra Jennings, the contradictions might not be eliminated; but, contra Triplett, they
feature within the Zande system at the 'theoretical'-or, as da Costa and French
(1995) have suggested, as the 'representational'-level where they may not be avoided
by classical manoeuvres. At this level, from which 'lay '-Azande are typically excluded,
it is the princes who, forced to adjudicate between rival witchcraft claims, recognize
that the system is not perfect. (For an explication of this point in terms of partial truth

4 Death by witchcraft could be avenged by the physical killing of the witch, by compensation or by lethal
magic; under British rule only the method of magic was permitted (see Evans-Pritchard 1937, 27).
 52 N. C. A. da Costa, 0. Bueno and S. French

and a comparison with, say, inconsistent models in science, see da Costa and French
1995. Note, again, that this recognition arises from the difficultiesinvolved in using the
system as a basis for action.) Our claim, therefore, is that the Zande system of
witchcraft beliefs can be interpreted as involving inconsistency, which can be most
appropriately captured in paraconsistent terms-indeed, the phrase 'they do not
perceive the contradiction as we (classically) perceive it' succinctly suggests our
paraconsistent viewpoint-but the moves to avoid the consequences of this system
must be understood at the level of practice.
Returning to the issue of translation and charity, then, we should apply this
principle in order to generate a first-approximation translation manual not because of
some question-begging adherence to classical logic, but because contradictory
assertions impede action. As we have indicated, this amounts to apractical reason for
being charitable: given that action is occurring, we can infer that at least some
assertions, at this level-which is the most basic behaviourally and where the
rationalists' bridgehead can be built-are not contradictory and can be translated in
charitable terms. Of course, this applies only at this most basic level and as soon as we
move to utterances of a more theoretical nature (and we recognize that there may be
no exact distinction between levels in all cases, although like the theory-observation
distinction in science, we may perhaps claim that some utterances, at least, can clearly
be situated on one or other side of the line), we must abandon charity for something
like Henderson's principle of explicability. And when it comes to explicability, of
course, paraconsistent logic can be drawn upon-indeed, it seems quite appropriate in
this case.
Let us now return to consider the first of the two proposals concerning charity
described above. This is the strategy adopted by Thagard and Nisbett (1983), who
distinguish no fewer than five levels of stringency when it comes to charity. They begin
by observing that in claiming that contradictory assertions are absurd under our
semantic criteria, Quine appears to adopt the most severe form, which amounts to the
insistence that we should never translate utterances as contradictory (ibid., p. 253).
However, Thagard and Nisbett then draw on these anthropological studies of the
Azande and Nuer to argue that such a severe line is inappropriate:
To assume that the Nuer, Berbers and other peoples are disinclined to assent to
contradictions in all cases is to assume that they share our attitudes towards formal
logic, but why expect this any more than we would expect them to share our
attitudes toward empirical science? (1983, 254).
Rather, they suggest (p. 265), we should adopt a weaker principle which allows us to
understand contradictory utterances in terms of their social functions.
Now, although we are sympathetic to this approach and in particular to the
suggestion that one must not beg any questions by assuming classical logic, the
adoption of a weaker principle for all stages of the translation process fails to grasp the
practical constraints on the initial stages of this process. In particular, dropping the
'severe' form of charity in favour of something weaker across the board would not be
appropriate, as we have indicated. In order to establish the first-approximation
translation, 'severe' charity should be assumed, for the sorts of 'practical' reason
noted above. The weaker principle of explicability then takes over to produce a more
fine-grained manual in terms of which the contradictory utterances can be understood.
Thus we reject the first proposal in favour of the second, but not for the Quinean
reasons Henderson draws upon: charity, for us, is entirely a practical matter!
 Is there a Zande Logic? 53

Of course, our approach would seem to mesh nicely with the claims of those who
reject the complete overthrow of classical logic and adopt instead a more sophisticated
'pluralist' line. And of course there is much more to say here, concerning, for example,
the role of logic in 'practical' reasoning, but for the purposes of this paper we hope we
have said enough.

5. A Zande logic?
Having thus suggested the possibility of applying paraconsistent logic to
understand some aspects of Zande reasoning, we intend to conclude this paper by
emphasizing one consequence of this tentative application.
It is possible to show that if a finite sample of Zande reasoning is adequately
formalized by a paraconsistent logic, then there are infinitely many paraconsistent
logics, different from each other that will allow us to reach the same result. Moreover,
given that numerous paraconsistent logics are genuine extensions of classical logic, if,
using the latter, we are able to formalize Zande reasonings, the same follows for the
former. So the quest for determining a properly so-called Zande logic (as the unique
underlying logic of Zande reasonings) seems to us to present difficulties which are not
easy to overcome. Indeed, by what means could the real Zande logic be logically
settled?
This, of course, is the old underdetermination argument that we have just
discussed, now seen from a distinct perspective. In a sense, we have two levels of
underdetermination here. On the one hand, an 'internal' underdetermination (with
regard to paraconsistent logics), due to the fact that such logics are constructed in a
hierarchy of infinitely many systems (see da Costa 1974). On the other hand, given the
way in which these systems have been constructed (see again da Costa 1974), an
'external' underdetermination occurs, as the result of these systems being extensions
of the classical logic. In both cases, we could never argue for the uniqueness of a Zande
logic. So, from this point of view, and strictly speaking, the answer to the question
posed by the title of this paper is simply: 'Yes, there are many!'
Is this a shortcoming for the present proposal? In our view, no. There are at least
two reasons for this. First, given the underdetermination argument previously
discussed, we were not expected to establish the true logic that models a certain sample
of reasoning, and in a sense this fact is nicely reflected and reinforced by the two levels
of underdetermination just found with the introduction of paraconsistent logic in the
Zande case. This very feature, however, as we have pointed out, supplies a rich and
varied logical machinery to represent both Zande reasonings and beliefs.
Nonetheless, and this is the second reason, despite this underdetermination, it is
possible to claim that, to a certain extent, some of these logics could be chosen for
pragmatic considerations. If not true, they are at least appropriate with regard to the
domain being modelled. And, in a certain sense, each particular level of the hierarchy
of paraconsistent logics just mentioned can be associated with a certain level of the
hierarchy of the structures employed in order to represent the relevant data. Each
paraconsistent logic, in its own level, would then 'save the appearances' of Zande
reasoning, in the sense of being faithful to the inconsistencies found, without leading
to triviality. When further information is added, we would move to a higher level of
the hierarchy, and a distinct paraconsistent logic may then be adopted, depending
both on the kind of information that we have and on pragmatic considerations (such
as, for instance, its simplicity). So, despite the fact that there would be many Zande
logics, still they would be under considerable control.
 Is there a Zande Logic?

Our conclusion, then, consists in leaving the whole debate with a suggestion-and
an 'open answer' at the end.

Acknowledgement
The authors wish to thank Peter Simons and an anonymous referee for their
helpful suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.

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