Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code. 7 The Information provides:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 200751. August 17, 2015.]
MONICO LIGTAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
"Bakit niya babawiin ang aking saka?" tanong ni Tata
Selo. "Dinaya ko na ba siya sa partihan? Tinuso ko na ba siya?
Siya ang may-ari ng lupa at kasama lang niya ako. Hindi ba't
kaya maraming nagagalit sa akin ay dahil sa ayaw kong
magpamigay ng kahit isang pinangko kung anihan?"
Hindi pa rin umaalis sa harap ng istaked si Tata Selo.
Nakahawak pa rin siya sa rehas. Nakatingin siya sa labas
ngunit wala siyang sino mang tinitingnan.
xxx xxx xxx
"Binabawi po niya ang aking saka," sumbong ni Tata
Selo. "Saan pa po ako pupunta kung wala na akong saka?"
xxx xxx xxx
Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas,
sinasabi niyang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila, lahat, ay! ang
lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila.
-"Tata Selo" (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat
LEONEN, J p:
The uncontested declaration, of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board that Monico Ligtas was a tenant negates a finding of theft
beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants having rights to the harvest cannot be
deemed to have taken their own produce.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 2 dated March 16, 2010 and the
Resolution 3 dated February 2, 2012. 4 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision 5 of the Regional Trial Court finding Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of theft. 6 HTcADC
That on or about the 29th day of June 2000 at Sitio
Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Municipality of Sogod, Province of
Southern Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of
gain, entered into the abaca plantation belonging to one
Anecita Pacate, and once inside the plantation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos
of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo,
without the consent of said owner, Anecita Pacate, to her
damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of Twenty
Nine Thousand Pesos (Php29,000.00), Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 8
Ligtas pleaded not guilty. 9
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses during trial: Efren Cabero
(Cabero), Modesto Cipres (Cipres), Anecita Pacate, SPO2 Enrique Villaruel, and
Ernesto Pacate. 10
According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner
of an abaca plantation situated at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod,
Southern Leyte. On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation's administrator, and
several men, including Cipres, went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon
Anecita Pacate's instructions. At about 10:00 a.m., Cabero and his men were
surprised to find Ligtas harvesting abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was
accompanied by three (3) unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened that
there would be loss of life if they persisted in harvesting the abaca. Cabero
reported the incident to Anecita Pacate and the police. 11
On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation and
conducted a survey on the condition of the plantation. They found that 1,000 kilos
of abaca, valued at P28.00 per kilo, were harvested by Ligtas. 12
On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other
before the Sogod Police Station. 13 Ligtas admitted to harvesting the abaca but
claimed that he was the plantation owner. 14
The defense presented three (3) witnesses during trial: Ligtas; Pablo
Palo, his neighbor; and Delia Ligtas, his wife. 15 According to Ligtas, he had
been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate since
1993. 16 Andres Pacate installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land
involved in the criminal case. 17
Ligtas allegedly "made his first harvest in 1997." 18 He then gave
Anecita Pacate her share to the harvest. 19 However, he could not remember the
exact amount anymore. 20 Previously, Ligtas and Pablo Palo were workers in
another land, around 15 hectares, owned by Anecita Pacate and Andres
Pacate. 21
1
 Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent workers to
harvest abaca from the land he cultivated. Ligtas prevented the men from
harvesting the abaca since he was the rightful tenant of the land. 22
Furthermore, Ligtas denied harvesting abaca at the plantation on June
29, 2000. He claimed that he was with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay
fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte, when the alleged
harvesting happened. 23
Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance
of Peaceful Possession on November 21, 2000. 24 On January 22, 2002, the
DARAB rendered the Decision 25 ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the
land. 26
While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally
offered as evidence before the trial court, records are clear that the DARAB
Decision was considered by both the trial court 27 and Court of Appeals 28 and
without any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines. 29
In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held
that "the prosecution was able to prove the elements of theft[.]" 30 Ligtas'
"defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial evidence nor
was his claim of harvest sharing between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly
corroborated by any witness." 31 His "defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification . . . by prosecution witnesses." 32
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Monico Ligtas
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft, this court
hereby renders judgment, sentencing him:
1. To suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years,
nine (9) months and ten (10) days as minimum
to eight (8) years and eight (8) months as
maximum;
2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:
a. The amount of P29,000.00 for the value of
the abaca stole[n];
b. The amount of P5000.00 as moral damages;
c. The amount of P10,000.00 as litigation
expenses/attorney's fees;
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 33 aScITE
I
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. 34 According
to it, "the burden to prove the existence of the tenancy relationship" 35 belonged
to Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the essential elements of a tenancy
agreement. 36
The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB
Decision "declaring him as a bonafide tenant of the . . . land is irrelevant in the
case at bar": 37
Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that "findings of
or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or
his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the
presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and
are not binding upon the courts.["] 38
As to the ownership of the land, the Court of Appeals held that Ligtas
had taken conflicting positions. While he claimed to be a legitimate tenant, Ligtas
also assailed Anecita Pacate's title over the land. Under Rule 131, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court,a tenant cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time
of the commencement of the tenancy relation. 39
The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas' allegations on
ownership. "He claims that the parcel of land owned by [Anecita Pacate] is
different from the subject abaca land. However, such assertion was based
merely on the testimony of the municipal assessor, not an expert competent to
identify parcels of land." 40
More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas committed theft
by harvesting abaca from Anecita Pacate's plantation. 41 Ligtas had constructive
possession of the subject of the theft without the owner's consent. 42 "The
subject of the crime need not be carried away or actually taken out from the land
in order to consummate the crime of theft." 43
Furthermore, Ligtas' argument that the abaca did not constitute as
personal property under the meaning of Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code was erroneous. 44 Following the definition of personal property, the abaca
hemp was "capable of appropriation [and] [could] be sold and carried away from
one place to another." 45 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding
that about 1,000 kilos of abaca were already harvested. 46 Hence, all the
elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently
established by the prosecution.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas' defense of alibi could not excuse
him from criminal liability. 47 His alibi was doubtfully established. "[W]here an
accused's alibi is established only by himself, his relatives and friends, his denial
of culpability should be accorded the strictest scrutiny." 48
Ligtas' attack on the credibility of the witnesses did not prosper. 49 He
failed to show that the case was initiated only through Anecita Pacate's quest for
revenge or to ensure that Ligtas would be evicted from the land. 50
The Court of Appeals dismissed Ligtas' appeal and affirmed the trial
court's Decision finding Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft under
2
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. 51 The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED.
Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated . . . August 16, 2006
of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte, Branch
39, in Criminal Case No. R-225, finding accused-appellant
Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Theft under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED
in all respects.
SO ORDERED. 52
Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 53 which the Court of Appeals
denied on February 2, 2012. 54
II
On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution. 55 This court required People of the Philippines to file
its Comment on the Petition within 10 days from notice. 56
The issues for consideration of this court are:
First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;
Second, whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas
as tenant of the land owned by private complainant Anecita Pacate and located
at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte is conclusive or can
be taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft; and
Third, whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it
upheld the conviction of petitioner Monico Ligtas for theft under Article 308 of
theRevised Penal Code.
The Petition is meritorious.
III
Petitioner argues that the findings of fact of both the trial court and Court
of Appeals must be revisited for being "conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on record and premised on the supposed absence of evidence on the
claim of petitioner [as] tenant." 57
Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule
45 58 of the Rules of Court. 59 Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court are
conclusive and binding on this court when armed by the Court of
Appeals. 60 This court has differentiated between a question of law and question
of fact: HEITAD
A question of law exists when the doubt or
controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to
each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation. 61(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues that
are beyond the scope of the Rule he seeks redress from. 62 However, there are
exceptions to the rule that only questions of law should be the subject of a
petition for review under Rule 45:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting, (6) when in making its findings, the CA
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee, (7)
when the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial
court, (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based, (9) when the acts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent, (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record, or (11)
when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion. 63 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)
This court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the case
is justified "when certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked
by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in
that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the
accused to acquittal." 64
The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant
or not, is generally a question of fact. 65 To be precise, however, the existence of
a tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts presented
corresponding to the statutory elements of tenancy. 66
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision
when it held that all the essential elements of the crime of theft were duly proven
by the prosecution despite petitioner having been pronounced a bona fide tenant
of the land from which he allegedly stole. 67 A review of the records of the case
is, thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.
IV
3
 Petitioner claims that private complainant's filing of criminal charges was
motivated by ill will and revenge. 68 The charges were designed to remove
petitioner from the land he has legitimately occupied as tenant. 69 Telling is the
fact that petitioner filed his Complaint before the DARAB on November 21, 2000,
while the Information for Theft was filed on December 8, 2000. 70
Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as
private complainant's tenant. 71 The DARAB Decision is entitled to respect, even
finality, as the Department of Agrarian Reform is the administrative agency
vested with primary jurisdiction and has acquired expertise on matters relating to
tenancy relationship. 72
The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial
evidence. 73 To require petitioner to prove tenancy relationship through evidence
other than the DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the witnesses is absurd
and goes beyond the required quantum of evidence, which is substantial
evidence. 74
Also, according to petitioner, the DARAB Decision has attained finality
since private complainant did not file an appeal. The DARAB's finding as to the
parties' tenancy relationship constitutes as res judicata. 75
On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals
correctly disregarded the DARAB Decision. 76 The trial court could not have
taken judicial notice of the DARAB Decision:
While the DARAB . . . ruled that petitioner is
a bonafide tenant of Pacate, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been heard or are actually pending before the same
judge. 77 (Citation omitted)
Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes conflicting
defenses: that there is a legitimate tenancy relationship between him and private
complainant and that he did not take the abaca hemp. 78 Nevertheless,
respondent maintains that petitioner failed to prove all the essential elements of a
tenancy relationship between him and private complainant. 79 Private
complainant did not consent to the alleged tenancy relationship. 80 Petitioner
also failed to provide evidence as to any sharing of harvest between the
parties. 81
We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy
relationship is conclusive and binding on courts if supported by substantial
evidence.
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal
proceedings. This court has ruled in a number of cases that: ATICcS
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative
law that administrative cases are independent from criminal
actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from
a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution,
or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another
thing is the criminal liability for the same act.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of
evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions
imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the
findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be
binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the
administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence
to be presented in the criminal cases. 82 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming
from the same set of facts involved in a criminal proceeding. This is not a case
where one act results in both criminal and administrative liability. DARAB Case
No. VIII-319-SL-2000 involves a determination of whether there exists a tenancy
relationship between petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal Case No.
R-225 involves determination of whether petitioner committed theft. However, the
tenancy relationship is a factor in determining whether all the elements of theft
were proven by the prosecution.
In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB found:
All the necessary requisites in order to establish
tenancy relationship as required in the above-quoted Supreme
Court ruling, has been established by the evidence submitted
by plaintiff; And these evidences were not controverted by any
evidence submitted by the respondent.
In fine, this board found plaintiff a bonafide tenant of
the land in question and as such is entitled to a security of
tenure, in which case he shall not be dispossessed of his
holdings by the landowner except for any of the causes
provided by law and only after the same has been proved
before, and the dispossession is authorized by the Court and in
the judgment that is final and executory[.] 83 (Citations
omitted)
The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises being considered, judgment
is hereby rendered, finding Monico Ligtas a bonafide tenant of
the land subject in this case and well described in paragraph
three (3) in the complaint, and ordering as follows, to wit:
1. The respondent and all other persons acting for and
in her behalf to maintain plaintiff in the peaceful
possession of the land in dispute;
4
 2. The MARO of Sogod, Southern Leyte, and
concurrently the cluster Manager of Sogod Bay
DAR Cluster to call the parties and assist them
in the execution of a leasehold contract
covering the land in dispute, and for the parties
to respect and obey such call of the said
MARO in compliance with the legal mandate.
3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos
representing the expenses incurred by plaintiff
in vindicating his right and other actual
expenses incurred in this litigation.
Other relief sought are
hereby ordered dismissed for lack
of evidence.
No cost.
SO DECIDED. 84
Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB's findings.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial powers are entitled to respect if supported by substantial
evidence. 85 This court is not tasked to weigh again "the evidence submitted
before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment [as to] the
sufficiency of evidence." 86
V
The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction
to determine whether there is a tenancy relationship between adverse
parties. 87 This court has held that "judicial determinations [of the DARAB] have
the same binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial
body." 88 Disputes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies
relating to:
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements. 89
In Salazar v. De Leon, 90 this court upheld the Department of Agrarian
Reform's primary jurisdiction over agrarian disputes, which includes the
relationship between landowners and tenants. 91 The DARAB Decision is
conclusive and binding on courts when supported by substantial
evidence. 92 This court ruled that administrative res judicata exists in that case:
Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision
dated 17 November 1995 of the DARAB in DARAB Case # II-
380-ISA'94; consequently, the same has attained finality and
constitutes res judicata on the issue of petitioner's status as a
tenant of respondent. TIADCc
Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of
lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of
courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of
administrative res judicata: "The rule which forbids the
reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts
of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting
within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having
general judicial powers. . . . It has been declared that
whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to
decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable
by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such
final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata." To be sure,
early jurisprudence was already mindful that the doctrine of res
judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions
rendered by what are usually understood as courts without
unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof, and that the
more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to
decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been
conferred. 93 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr, 94 this court clarified that res judicata applies
only to decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings
and not to purely administrative proceedings:
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,
and not to the exercise of administrative powers.
Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative
in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take
on a quasi-judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding
involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b) determining
facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an
order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise
of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with
respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what
the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties are;
and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of
the respective rights and obligations of the
parties. 95 (Citations omitted)
We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata: bar by
prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment. In Social Security Commission
v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., et al., 96 this court discussed
and differentiated the two concepts of res judicata:
5
 Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior
judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules
of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule
39, Section 47 (c).
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between
the first case where the judgment was rendered and the
second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance,
the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and
second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first
judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted and determined and not as to matters
merely involved therein. This is the concept of res
judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated
differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated
or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before
a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits
is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot
again be litigated between the parties and their privies,
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter
of the two actions is the same.
Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former
judgment, between the same parties or their privies will be final
and conclusive in the second if that same point or question
was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause
of action is not required but merely identity of issue.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment
sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the
case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be
as between the first and second action, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two
cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior
judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only
identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of
action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of
judgment" applies. 97 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Martillano v. Court of Appeals, 98 the DARAB Decision finding for the
existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties was declared by this
court as conclusive on the parties. 99 As in this case, the DARAB
Decision 100 in Martillano attained finality when the landowner did not appeal the
Decision. 101 This court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata applies:
Under the afore-cited sections of RA 6657, the
Department of Agrarian Reform is empowered, through its
adjudicating arm the regional and provincial adjudication
boards, to resolve agrarian disputes and controversies on all
matters pertaining to the implementation of the agrarian law.
Section 51 thereof provides that the decision of the DARAB
attains finality after the lapse of fifteen (15) days and no appeal
was interposed therefrom by any of the parties.
In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in
DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, there being no appeal
interposed therefrom, attained finality. Accordingly, the matter
regarding the status of Martillano as a tenant farmer and the
validity of the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued in his
favor are settled and no longer open to doubt and controversy.
xxx xxx xxx
We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 was for the
cancellation of petitioner's CLT and Emancipation patents. The
same effect is sought with the institution of DARAB Case No.
512-Bul '94, which is an action to withdraw and/or cancel
administratively the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued to
petitioner. Considering that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 has
attained finality prior to the filing of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul
'94, no strenuous legal interpretation is necessary to
understand that the issues raised in the prior case, i.e.,
DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, which have been resolved with
finality, may not be litigated anew.
The instant case is complicated by the failure of the
complainant to include Martillano as party-defendant in the
case before the adjudication board and the DARAB, although
he was finally impleaded on appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in
the petition will not affect the applicability of the doctrine of bar
by prior judgment. What is decisive is that the issues which
have already been litigated in a final and executory judgment
precludes, by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect
of the doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of
"law of the case," the re-litigation of the same issue in another
action. It is well established that when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them. The
dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what
was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule
6
 or decision, continues to be binding between the same parties
as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated,
continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Hence,
the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no
longer be resurrected anew since said issue had already been
resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle ofres
judicata, at least by conclusiveness of
judgment. 102 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Co v. People, et al., 103 this court held that "the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment also applies in criminal cases." 104 Petitioner in that
case was charged with the violation of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, for
the alleged non-remittance of Social Security System contributions. 105 This
court upheld the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission in a
separate case, which declared the absence of an employer-employee
relationship and had attained finality. 106 This court held that:
The reasons for establishing the principle of
"conclusiveness of judgment" are founded on sound public
policy. . . . It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the
basis on which it stands, upon the obvious principle that where
a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn only
from certain premises, the premises are equally indisputable
with the conclusion. When a fact has been once determined in
the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has
been rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again
litigated between the same parties without virtually impeaching
the correctness of the former decision, which, from motives of
public policy, the law does not permit to be done.
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by
prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (b), and the second
is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (c).
Both concepts are founded on the principle of estoppel, and
are based on the salutary public policy against unnecessary
multiplicity of suits. Like the splitting of causes of action, res
judicata is in pursuance of such policy. Matters settled by a
Court's final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked
again. Relitigation of issues already settled merely burdens the
Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion,
and wastes valuable time and energy that could be devoted to
worthier cases. 107 (Citations omitted)
In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 108 this court ruled that tenancy relationship must be duly proven:
[A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be
evidence to prove this allegation. The principal factor in
determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what
the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship. 109 (Citation omitted)
The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the
essential elements of a tenancy relationship were proven by petitioner. 110 It
found that there was substantial evidence to support petitioner's claim as tenant
of the land. 111 In rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and
affidavits of both petitioner and private complainant. 112 It was convinced by
petitioner's evidence, which consisted of sworn statements of petitioner's
witnesses that petitioner was installed as tenant by Andres Pacate sometime in
1993. 113 Petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the produce
after harvest. 114 However, Andres Pacate had died before the first
harvest. 115 Petitioner then gave the landowner's share to private complainant,
and had done so every harvest until he was disturbed in his cultivation of the land
on June 29, 2000. 116
We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private
complainant failed to heed the Notices sent to her and refused to attend the
scheduled hearings. 117 The DARAB even quoted in its Decision the reason
offered by private complainant's counsel in his Motion to Withdraw as counsel:
That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case,
the respondent has already shown her intention not to
participate the proceedings of the case for reasons known only
to her; AaCTcI
That despite the advi[c]e of the undersigned,
respondent stood pat with her decision not to participate in the
proceedings of the case;
That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can
do nothing except to withdraw as he is now withdrawing as
counsel for the respondent of the above-entitled case[.] 118
It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of
decisions of other courts or even records of other cases that have been tried or
are pending in the same court or before the same judge. 119 In declaring that the
DARAB's findings on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private
complainant are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of
Appeals 120 relied on Cornes, et al. v. Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc., et al. 121
In Cornes, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural
land in Tarlac that was principally devoted to sugar and rice and who claim the
rights of their predecessors-in-interest, filed separate Complaints before the
Provincial Adjudication Board of Region III in Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed that
when the registered owner of the land, Josefina Roxas Omaa, sold the land to
respondents, respondents were aware of the tenancy relationship between
petitioners and Josefina Roxas Omaa. 122
Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in
exchange for the renunciation of their tenancy rights under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.However, they failed to comply with their obligations under
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the terms of the compensation package. 123 Petitioners then filed a series of
Complaints before the DARAB. The cases were consolidated and resolved by
the Provincial Adjudicator. 124
The Provincial Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that "there was no
tenancy relationship [that] existed between the parties." 125 He found that
petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were mere hired laborers, not
tenants. Tenancy cannot be presumed from respondents' offer of a
compensation package. 126
On appeal, the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial
Adjudicator. It found that there was an implied tenancy between the parties.
Petitioners were deemed tenants of the land for more than 30 years. They were
entitled to security of tenure. 127
The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and reinstated the
Provincial Adjudicator's Decision. It held that there was no substantial evidence
to prove that all the requisites of tenancy relationship existed. However, despite
the lack of tenancy relationship, the compensation package agreement must be
upheld. 128
This court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision. 129 It held that
petitioners failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence of a tenancy
relationship:
At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the
landowner and the tenants. While it appears that there was
personal cultivation by petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest of the subject landholding, what was established was
that petitioners' claim of tenancy was founded on the self-
serving testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes that his
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
landholding for more than 30 years and had engaged in a "50-
50" sharing scheme with JOSEFINA and JOSEFINA's
grandmother, the previous owner thereof. Self-serving
statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must be
adduced. Such claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence
to support them. The burden rests on the shoulders of
petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy,
which burden they failed to discharge with substantial
evidence. Such a juridical tie must be aptly shown. Simply put,
he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of
proof, and from the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof
never parts. The same rule applies to administrative cases. In
fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving
his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the
facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under
no obligation to prove his exception or defense. . . .
Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court
that there existed a sharing of harvests in the context of a
tenancy relationship between petitioners and/or their
predecessors-in-interest and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is
illuminating to the effect that to prove such sharing of harvests,
a receipt or any other evidence must be presented. None was
shown. No receipts were presented as testaments to the
claimed sharing of harvests. The only evidence submitted to
establish the purported sharing of harvests was the testimony
of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes. The sharing arrangement cannot
be deemed to have existed on the basis alone of petitioner
Rodolfo Cornes's claim. It is self-serving and is without
evidentiary value. Self-serving statements are deemed
inadequate; competent proof must be adduced. If at all, the
fact alone of sharing is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship.
We also sustain the conclusion reached by the
Provincial Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals that the
testimony of Araceli Pascua, an employee of the DAR in
Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding was tenanted
cannot overcome substantial evidence to the contrary. To
prove the alleged tenancy no reliance may be made upon the
said public officer's testimony. What cannot be ignored is the
precedent ruling of this Court that the findings of or
certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or
his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the
presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and
are not binding upon the courts. This ruling holds with greater
effect in the instant case in light of the fact that petitioners, as
herein shown, were not able to prove the presence of all the
indispensable elements of tenancy. 130 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted) EcTCAD
Thus, in Cornes, this court did not categorically hold that the DARAB's
findings were merely provisional and, thus, not binding on courts. What was
deemed as a preliminary determination of tenancy was the testimony of the
Department of Agrarian Reform employee stating that the land involved was
tenanted. Further, the tribunals had conflicting findings on whether petitioners
were bona fide tenants.
In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant
appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is presumed that the Decision has long
lapsed into finality. 131 It is also established that private complainant participated
in the initial stages of the DARAB proceedings. 132 Therefore, the issue of the
existence of a tenancy relationship is final as between the parties. We cannot
collaterally review the DARAB's findings at this stage. The existence of the final
Decision that tenancy exists creates serious doubts as to the guilt of the
accused.
VI
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 According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code were not established since he was a bona fide tenant of
the land. 133The DARAB's recognition of petitioner as a legitimate tenant
necessarily "implie[d] that he ha[d] the authority to harvest the abaca hemp from
[private complainant's land]." 134 This shows that petitioner had no criminal
intent.
As to the existence of another element of theft that the taking was
done without the consent of the owner petitioner argues that this, too, was
negated by his status as private complainant's tenant:
The purported lack of consent on the part of the private
complainant as alleged by the prosecution, is misplaced. In
fact, it was even improper for . . . Anecita Pacate to stop or
prevent petitioner from harvesting the produce of the
landholding because as tenant, petitioner is entitled to security
of tenure. This right entitled him to continue working on his
landholding until the leasehold relation is terminated or until his
eviction is authorized by the DARAB in a judgment that is final
and executory. 135 (Citation omitted)
Petitioner argues that the constitutional presumption of innocence must
be upheld:
Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to
support a conviction." In acquitting an appellant, we are not
saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we
are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's
evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For
that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in
favour of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful
obeisance to the fundamental law." 136 (Citations omitted)
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of the trial court
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of theft.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ARTICLE 308. Who are Liable for Theft. Theft is committed
by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall
take personal property of another without the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost
property, shall fail to deliver the same to the
local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously
damaged the property of another, shall
remove or make use of the fruits or object of
the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed
estate or a field where trespass is forbidden
or which belongs to another and without the
consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon
the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or
other forest or farm products.
The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2)
the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the
owner's consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5) the taking was done without
violence against or intimidation of the person or force upon things. 137
Tenants have been defined as:
persons who in themselves and with the aid available from
within their immediate farm households cultivate the land
belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent,
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or
money or both under the leasehold tenancy
system. 138 (Citation omitted)
Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or
she cultivates. The landowner's share in the produce depends on the agreement
between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the tenant is with the
landowner's consent.
The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy
between petitioner and private complainant negates the existence of the element
that the taking was done without the owner's consent. The DARAB Decision
implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The
prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft. HSAcaE
In Pit-og v. People, 139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of
sugarcane and banana crops on the basis of reasonable doubt. 140 The
prosecution failed to prove lack of criminal intent on petitioner's part. 141 It failed
to clearly identify "the person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his
knowledge and consent, was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to
him." 142 There were doubts as to whether the plants taken by petitioner were
indeed planted on private complainant's lot when petitioner had planted her own
plants adjacent to it. 143 Thus, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that
the property belonged to private complainant. This court found that petitioner
"took the sugarcane and bananas believing them to be her own. That being the
case, she could not have had a criminal intent." 144
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 In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was
entitled to the produce as a legitimate tenant cultivating the land owned by
private complainant. Personal property may have been taken, but it is with the
consent of the owner.
No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be
presumed innocent of the crime until proven guilty. 145 "[I]t is better to acquit ten
guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person." 146 Thus, courts must
consider "[e]very circumstance against guilt and in favor of
innocence[.]" 147 Equally settled is that "[w]here the evidence admits of two
interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with
innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be
acquitted." 148
In view of petitioner's acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we find it
unnecessary to discuss further the other errors raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated March 16, 2010 and the Resolution dated February 2, 2012
are REVERSED and SETASIDE. Petitioner Monico Ligtas is ACQUITTED of the
crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is
ordered immediately RELEASED, unless he is confined for any other lawful
cause. Any amount paid by way of a bailbond is ordered RETURNED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
||| (Ligtas v. People, G.R. No. 200751, [August 17, 2015])

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