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Psychoanalysis and Film Theory Part 2 :
Paula Murphy
INTRODUCTION
In part one of this article, the development of film theory was outlined, and the
and film theory have not always as compatible as they may appear. Part two
will address the various criticisms that have been leveled at film theory for its
relation to notion of the filmic gaze and the interjections of feminist film
theorists.
THE GAZE
In her article, ‘The Orthopsychic Subject: Film Theory and the Reception of
Lacan’, Joan Copjec harshly criticizes what she sees as film theory’s
misinterpretation of Lacan, and her critique centers around two figures who are
generally regarded as being in the ranks of the founders of film theory, Michel
Foucault and Jean Bachelard. Copjec claims that film theory has performed
like any other discourse: it functions as a means through which ‘the modern
screen as a mirror, espoused by eminent critics like Baudry, Comolli and Metz
recognition, and thus as master of the image that he/she sees. This is a drastic
traumatic one that disrupts the subject’s relationship to the world. It produces a
subject that is congenitally split or divided, and one that is in contrast to the
stable subject of film theory, who is master of the image. Copjec claims that
this difference between the Lacanian subject and its re-interpretation in film
theory rests on the issue of the relationship between desire and the law. For
Lacan, desire is both encouraged and prohibited by the law. Desire can only
these two elements, perceiving desire ‘not only as an effect, but also as a
realization of the law’ (Copjec 2000, 443). The subject of traditional film theory
gaze, causing Copjec to state that, ‘[t]he relation between apparatus and gaze
development of the early theories of Metz and others. Zizek agrees with Metz
that before the spectator identifies with characters from the diegesis, he/she
‘the viewer is forced to face the desire at work in his/her seemingly neutral
gaze’ (Zizek 1992, 223). In his later work, The Fright of Real Tears, Zizek
explains this idea more fully. Arguing for the antagonistic relationship between
the eye and the Gaze, he states that, ‘the Gaze is on the side of the object, it
stands for the blind spot in the field of the visible from which the picture itself
looking at an object, the object is already gazing at me’ (Zizek, 2000, 530).
The function of interface occurs when subjective and objective shots in the film
fail to produce a suturing effect. In the usual process of suture, the first shot
second shot which shows the first to be from the point of view of a particular
character. Thus the second shot attempts to represent the absent subject S.
Interface is the point at which this representation fails. Zizek defines interface
as ‘the internal element that sustains the consistency of the ‘external reality’
itself, the artificial screen that confers the effect of reality on what we see’
(Zizek 2001, 54). This internal element, which is necessary for external reality
in film theory outlined in part one. On the surface, suture closes the gap of
nothing can be fully hidden, or fully repressed. This leads Zizek to argue that
reality: rather there is ‘an excess on both sides’ (Zizek 2001, 59). To illustrate
this point, Zizek uses the example of the empty master signifier ‘Nation’. It is a
which also fails on the level of the signifier, since it is incapable of definition.
anchoring point in the symbolic order. This is not the case however, because
the phallus is a signifier of its own impossibility. Zizek points out that Lacan
has likened the phallus to the square root of -1, a number whose value cannot
be calculated, but which nonetheless exists and functions within the system of
mathematics. Although Lacan has often been criticized for his use of
purpose, which is the illustration of his theories. This equation is aligned with
signified is ‘sustained by the void…at the level of the signifier’ (Zizek 2001,
but which fails at the level of the signifier, because it cannot be calculated. It
represents, as Fink suggests, ‘what the subject is that is unthinkable about him’
(Fink 2004, 125): the real, the overflow of signification into the void beyond
language. In the case of the phallus, this void is its castrating dimension, and
is the feminist branch of film theory that has interrogated the phallic aspect of
In feminist film theory, issues surrounding the phallus and sexuality play a
feminism. This is primarily due to the fact that all theorizations of selfhood in
film theory (not just feminist ones) are part of its broader function, which is the
dual interrogation of self as spectator and self on screen. Like mainstream film
consumption: the act of watching a film and the identifications that this act
discourse. Since this activity is by its nature confined to specific films, it is the
analysis of the spectator that consequently forms the central topic for this
section.
Feminist film theory began as part of the general social and political
feminist movement, but it is useful at the outset to set out the main objections
between spectator and film depicted the gaze as male, evicting the female
was felt that women functioned primarily as objects of desire for the male
gaze. Hence, the basic problem occurs in feminist film theory: whether woman
hegemony. This section will examine the responses of several feminist critics
to these issues.
self and other, and in this way replicates the very structure of patriarchy.
Identification demands sameness, necessitates similarity, disallows difference.
(Friedberg 1990, 36)
Here Friedberg takes the vast, overarching concept of self and other in Lacan
between self and other is an essential part of any identification, and is central
to every relationship: colonizers and colonized, lover and beloved, master and
since identification is built upon a denial of difference from early childhood. For
example, the child in the mirror stage disavows the discrepancy between his
image in the mirror as a unified body, and his experiential chaotic reality. This
Metz, Friedberg contends that the ego-ideal offered by the cinema is ‘not
Secondly, she points out the problems that occur when gendered identification
is considered. The woman is forced either into identifying with ‘the woman who
with the man who is controller of events’ (Friedberg 1990, 42). Friedberg
launches her final attack on Metz by claiming that secondary identification need
not necessarily involve a human form at all, emphasizing her argument that
range of animal, alien and robot characters that it is possible to identify with,
1990, 42).
identification that is not founded on gender divides, but she chooses to utilise it
only to further emphasise the denial of difference that she contends is the
products that are endorsed by film stars, enabling them to purchase and
therefore own or consume the star. In this way, Friedberg argues that
but her analysis is considerably hampered by her own political project, which
the character of Gaby Doriot as an example, she argues like Friedberg that the
many on-screen female characters are indeed ‘everybody’s Lady’. That the
same may be said about many stereotyped male characters does not enter
its turn, an act of remembering’ (Doane 1990, 59). It hardly seems necessary
social past that transcends the subject, she believes that its co-relative –
does not explicitly state exactly how this is to be achieved, remarking rather
vaguely that ‘[t]he task must be not that of remembering women, remembering
with memories and hence histories’ (Doane 1990, 60). Her concluding analysis
of the feminist film The Gold Diggers would suggest that remembering women
supposed to be male in the first place. Any answer to this question cannot fail
main reference point for much of the feminist film theory that was to follow.
Mulvey begins her article by stating that ‘the unconscious of patriarchal society
has structured film form’ (Mulvey 2000, 483). This is a view shared by many
feminist film theorists. Cowie goes as far back as Levi-Strauss to argue that
psychoanalytic theory that in her account allocates woman two main functions:
symbolizing the threat of castration by her absence of a penis, and bringing the
child into the symbolic. Doane cites this as the reason that the male spectator
between his look (at the female genitals) and the boy’s understanding of his
look as sexual difference, which comes about retrospectively with the advent of
the castration complex. For this reason, Doane states that, ‘the male spectator
501). Mulvey argues, as many feminist do, that it is woman’s lack, set down
during this formative period of the infant’s life, which ensures the symbolic
term, which both sexes must relate to, but it means little in itself. In fact, it is
the pre-Oedipal castrations that prove to be the most definitive in both male
and female subjectivity, castrations that are realized only retroactively, après
coup, when the child enters the symbolic. The castrations ‘produce a subject
(Silverman 1988, 16). Mulvey goes on to say that once woman has
successfully ushered her child into the symbolic, ‘her meaning in the process is
at an end, it does not last into the world of law and language except as a
memory of maternal plenitude’ (Mulvey 2000, 483). A statement of this sort not
only steers her down a path of inevitable despair, it is also blatantly untrue. Her
position is based upon the unspoken belief that the symbolic order is
masculine.
Although this may have been true in the past, it is surely now an
The other main issue arising from this article that was to become highly
influential is Mulvey’s assertion that the cinema plays on both the scopophilic
[t]he image of woman as (passive) raw material for the (active) gaze of man
takes the argument a step further into the structure of representation, adding a
further layer demanded by the ideology of the patriarchal order as it is worked
out in its favorite cinematic form – illusionistic narrative film. (Mulvey 2000, 493)
In Mulvey’s article, the cinema represents and exaggerates the very worst
aspects of society from a female point of view. Although the premises that her
grossly outdated, Mulvey further adds to the negativity of her account by failing
to offer any way forward. Following the widespread critical interest that this
article generated, she did however produce a follow up article where she
Having been criticized for only dealing with the male gaze and ignoring
the female spectator, her second article sets out to examine ‘how the text and
center of the narrative arena’ (Mulvey 2000a, 24). Mulvey quotes at length
from Freud and the famous passage in which he proclaims that there is only
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ she attacks Freud for providing an explanation
In light of her criticisms of Freud, it is ironic that Mulvey comes full circle
to agree with him. In an attempt to answer the question of how the female
structured around masculine pleasure allow woman to identify with active male
sexuality: ‘that lost aspect of her sexual identity, the never fully repressed
passive femininity and regressive masculinity, which are offered to her by her
two male counterparts in the film. One allows her to be a tomboy in the ‘male’
world of rivalry and violence; the other, a man of culture and learning shows her
the ‘correct’ path to becoming a lady. Mulvey argues that the position of the
2000a, 35). Although she recognizes that this position is not ideal, Mulvey
be the thread that unravels her entire argument. In spite of her obvious
Lacan than Freud. Penley borrows the term ‘bachelor machine’ to describe the
In her article ‘Feminism, Film Theory and the Bachelor Machines’, Penley takes
in history, claiming that ‘all the other art forms…are simply rehearsals of a
cinema is its most successful achievement’ (Penley 2000, 458). Both Baudry
and Metz describe the cinematic scene (the darkness, the projection from
satisfaction in the case of the former, and ideal subjective unity and visual
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mastery in the case of the latter. Penley criticizes both theorists however, for
cinema’ (Penley 2000, 459). In short, their analyses overlook the position of
the cinema within the symbolic order. This is the point at which Penley returns
to a specific attack on Metz, whom she criticizes for claiming that the cinema is
Metz’s justifications for this claim have already been outlined, based on
the fact that the cinema experience centers around the scopic drive and the
emphasizes that ‘the imaginary is always permeated by the desire of the Other,
and that it is a triangular rather than a dual relation’ (Penley 2000, 460).
symbolic, even if the subject himself is unaware of this fact. This is why Lacan
found in Jean-Paul Sartre such a valuable model for the theorization of vision:
Sartre too believed that the look is subject to the look of the Other, and
feminists like Kristeva, Michele Montelray and Irigaray, who are overly focused
to a third term, the phallus, and their solutions to this problem which
paradoxically return to the body, ignore the prevailing influence of the symbolic
This is a view that is shared by Doane who similarly criticizes French feminists
counter to the maleness of the cinematic apparatus, Penley suggests that the
way forward is not be found in a return to the body, but in the analysis of
fantasy, which ‘provides a way of accounting for sexual difference but which in
fixed and the subject enters into the same contract of temporary belief in its
fantasy and their relation to cinema. Like Penley, she too posits fantasy as the
de-subjectivisation. She borrows this term for Lacan who refers to it in Seminar
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XI. In fantasy, the subject does not occupy a fixed position, but is fluid,
fantasy opens the way for the analysis of cinematic identification that is not
dominated by the ‘male’ apparatus. Cowie argues that in the fiction film as in
fantasy, the subject’s identification is likewise not fixed: ‘[b]oth the daydream
‘thoughtlessly’ composed and the more complex fictional narrative join with the
varying of subject positions so that the subject takes up more than one position’
Theorists like Cowie and Penley are attempting to show the way
forward for feminist film theory. Their intellectual engagement with the
identification that is not a war waged across gender lines shows a positive
the primary role in the theorization of film identification for feminists, it is difficult
Heads in turbans and black birettas, /Heads in wigs and thousand other/
removing the quotation from its context however, Freud omits the intended
purpose of these lines for Heine, for whom they serve to ponder not ‘”What is
Woman”, but instead, “what signifies Man?” (Doane 2000, 495). Thus, Freud’s
pretense, haunted by the mirror effect by means of which the question of the
woman reflects only the man’s own ontological doubts’ (Doane 2000, 496).
However, it escapes Doane’s notice that Heine’s use of ‘Man’ (he was writing in
the nineteenth century, after all) refers not to the male, but is a linguistic
misreading based on gender prejudice that mirrors Freud’s own. This error in
overzealous and which consequently runs the risk of either repeating the
gender bias that has been suffered by women, or what is perhaps worse,
blinding itself to situations of equality when everything is seen through the lens
of a feminist politics.
has isolated problems, clarified issues and forwarded the theory in a way that
would not otherwise have been possible. From film theory’s idealistic
accounted for the mechanisms of power and ideology was necessary. For a
time, Althusserian Marxism played this role until objections began to be raised
ideology via the symbolic order, but who is also a producer of meaning, après
Metz’s grande syntagmatique, also bore the influence of Lacan from a different
British film theory, came a shift to a mode of theory that could incorporate the
taken up by Heath and also by Metz, whose founding essay ‘The Imaginary
Signifier’ showed the possibilities that Lacanian psychoanalysis could offer film
theory. In spite of the criticisms of theorists like Copjec and Zizek; that film
interjections into the theory have raised fresh issues, steering film theory in a
contains a underlying bedrock of unity, perhaps coming closer than any theory
psyche.
Bibliography
Copjec, Joan, 2000. ‘The Orthopsychic Subject: Film Theory and the Reception
of Lacan’ in Film and Theory: An Anthology, ed. by Robert Stam and Toby
Miller. Oxford: Blackwell. [pp. 437-455]
Cowie, Elizabeth, 2000, ‘Woman as Sign’ in Feminism and Film, ed. by E. Ann
Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. [pp. 48-49]
Doane, Mary Ann, 2000, ‘Heads in Hieroglyphic Bonnets’ in Film and Theory:
an Anthology, ed. by Robert Stam and Toby Miller. Oxford: Blackwell. [pp.
495-509]
Doane, Mary Ann, 1993, ‘Subjectivity and Desire: An(other) Way of Looking’ in
Contemporary Film Theory, ed. by Anthony Easthope. New York: Longman.
[pp. 162-177]
Fink, Bruce, 2004. Lacan to the Letter: Reading Ecrits Closely. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Lacan, Jacques, 1977. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental
Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Translated by Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth
Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis.
Mulvey, Laura, 2000. 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' in Film and
Theory: An Anthology. Edited by Robert Stam and Toby Miller. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Penley, Constance, 2000. ‘Feminism, Film Theory, and the Bachelor Machines’
in Film and Theory: An Anthology. ed. by Robert Stam and Toby Miller. Oxford:
Blackwell. [pp. 456-473]
Zizek, Slavoj, 1992. Everything you Always Wanted to Know About Lacan (But
Were Afraid to Ask Hitchcock). London: Verso.
Zizek, Slavoj, 2000. ‘Looking Awry’ in Film and Theory: An Anthology, ed. by
Robert Stam and Toby Miller. Oxford: Blackwell. [pp. 524-538]
Zizek, Slavoj, 2001. The Fright of Real Tears: Krystof Kieślowski between
Theory and Post Theory. London: BFI Publishing.
an international and interdisciplinary journal of postmodern cultural sound, text and image
[1]
See part one of this article for a discussion of Metz’s ‘The Imaginary Signifier’.
[2]
See Seminar XI, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, pg. 17.
[1]
Part I of this essay is in Kritikos, Volume 2, February 2005: http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/%7Enr03