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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.117040January27,2000

RUBENSERRANO,petitioner,
vs.
NATIONALLABORRELATIONSCOMMISSIONandISETANNDEPARTMENTSTORE,respondents.

MENDOZA,J.:

ThisisaPetitionseekingreviewoftheresolutions,datedMarch30,1994andAugust26,1994,oftheNational
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner
Ruben Serrano's complaint for illegal dismissal and denied his motion for reconsideration. The facts are as
follows:

Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store as a security checker to apprehend
shoplifters and prevent pilferage of merchandise.1 Initially hired on October 4, 1984 on contractual basis,
petitioner eventually became a regular employee on April 4, 1985. In 1988, he became head of the Security
CheckersSectionofprivaterespondent.2

Sometimein1991,asacostcuttingmeasure,privaterespondentdecidedtophaseoutitsentiresecuritysection
and engage the services of an independent security agency. For this reason, it wrote petitioner the following
memorandum:3

October11,1991

MR.RUBENSERRANO

PRESENT

DearMr.Seranno,

Inviewoftheretrenchmentprogramofthecompany,weherebyreiterateourverbalnoticeto
youofyourterminationasSecuritySectionHeadeffectiveOctober11,1991.

Pleasesecureyourclearancefromthisoffice.

Verytrulyyours,

[Sgd.]TERESITAA.VILLANUEVA
HumanResourcesDivisionManager

The loss of his employment prompted petitioner to file a complaint on December 3, 1991 for illegal
dismissal, illegal layoff, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of salary and
overtimepay.4

Thepartieswererequiredtosubmittheirpositionpapers,onthebasisofwhichtheLaborArbiterdefined
theissuesasfollows:5

Whetherornotthereisavalidgroundforthedismissalofthecomplainant.

Whetherornotcomplainantisentitledtohismonetaryclaimsforunderpaymentofwages,nonpaymentof
salaries,13thmonthpayfor1991andovertimepay.

WhetherornotRespondentisguiltyofunfairlaborpractice.
Thereafter, the case was heard. On April 30, 1993, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding petitioner to
have been illegally dismissed. He ruled that private respondent failed to establish that it had retrenched its
securitysectiontopreventorminimizelossestoitsbusinessthatprivaterespondentfailedtoaccorddueprocess
to petitioner that private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting employees whose
employmentwouldbeterminatedthatprivaterespondenthadnotshownthatpetitionerandotheremployeesin
thesecuritysectionweresoinefficientsoastojustifytheirreplacementbyasecurityagency,orthat"costsaving
devices [such as] secret video cameras (to monitor and prevent shoplifting) and secret code tags on the
merchandise" could not have been employed instead, the day after petitioner's dismissal, private respondent
employedasafetyandsecuritysupervisorwithdutiesandfunctionssimilartothoseofpetitioner. 1 w p h i1 .n t

Accordingly,theLaborArbiterordered:6

WHEREFORE,abovepremisesconsidered,judgmentisherebydecreed:

(a)Findingthedismissalofthecomplainanttobeillegalandconcomitantly,Respondentisorderedtopay
complainantfullbackwageswithoutqualificationordeductionintheamountofP74,740.00fromthetimeof
his dismissal until reinstatement. (computed till promulgation only) based on his monthly salary of
P4,040.00/monthatthetimeofhisterminationbutlimitedto(3)threeyears

(b) Ordering the Respondent to immediately reinstate the complainant to his former position as security
section head or to a reasonably equivalent supervisorial position in charges of security without loss of
seniorityrights,privilegesandbenefits.Thisorderisimmediatelyexecutoryevenpendingappeal

(c) Ordering the Respondent to pay complainant unpaid wages in the amount of P2,020.73 and
proportionate13thmonthpayintheamountofP3,198.30

(d) Ordering the Respondent to pay complainant the amount of P7,995.91, representing 10% attorney's
feesbasedonthetotaljudgmentawardofP79,959.12.

Allotherclaimsofthecomplainantwhethermonetaryorotherwiseisherebydismissedforlackofmerit.

SOORDERED.

PrivaterespondentappealedtotheNLRCwhich,initsresolutionofMarch30,1994reversedthedecisionofthe
Labor Arbiter and ordered petitioner to be given separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of
service, unpaid salary, and proportionate 13th month pay. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his
motionwasdenied.

The NLRC held that the phaseout of private respondent's security section and the hiring of an independent
securityagencyconstitutedanexercisebyprivaterespondentof"[a]legitimatebusinessdecisionwhosewisdom
wedonotintendtoinquireintoandforwhichwecannotsubstituteourjudgment"thatthedistinctionmadebythe
Labor Arbiter between "retrenchment" and the employment of costsaving devices" under Art. 283 of the Labor
Code was insignificant because the company official who wrote the dismissal letter apparently used the term
"retrenchment" in its "plain and ordinary sense: to layoff or remove from one's job, regardless of the reason
therefor" that the rule of "reasonable criteria" in the selection of the employees to be retrenched did not apply
becauseallpositionsinthesecuritysectionhadbeenabolishedandthattheappointmentofasafetyandsecurity
supervisorreferredtobypetitionertoprovebadfaithonprivaterespondent'spartwasofnomomentbecausethe
positionhadlongbeeninexistenceandwasseparatefrompetitioner'spositionasheadoftheSecurityCheckers
Section.

Hencethispetition.Petitionerraisesthefollowingissue:

IS THE HIRING OF AN INDEPENDENT SECURITY AGENCY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO


REPLACE ITS CURRENT SECURITY SECTION A VALID GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE
EMPLOYEESCLASSEDUNDERTHELATTER?7

Petitioner contends that abolition of private respondent's Security Checkers Section and the employment of an
independent security agency do not fall under any of the authorized causes for dismissal under Art. 283 of the
LaborCode.

PetitionerLaidOffforCause

Petitioner'scontentionhasnomerit.Art.283provides:

Closureofestablishmentandreductionofpersonnel.Theemployermayalsoterminatetheemploymentofany
employee due to the installation of laborsaving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the
closing or cessation of operations of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventingtheprovisionsofthisTitle,byservingawrittennoticeonthe,workersandtheDepartmentofLabor
and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the
installation of laborsaving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation
payequivalenttoatleastone(1)monthpayortoatleastone(1)monthpayforeveryyearofservice,whichever
is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of
establishmentorundertakingnotduetoseriousbusinesslossesorfinancialreverses,theseparationpayshallbe
equivalenttoatleastone(1)monthpayoratleastonehalf(1/2)monthpayforeveryyearofservice,whichever
ishigher.Afractionofatleastsix(6)monthsshallbeconsideredasone(1)wholeyear.

In De Ocampo v. National Labor Relations Commission,8 this Court upheld the termination of employment of
three mechanics in a transportation company and their replacement by a company rendering maintenance and
repairservices.Itheld:

In contracting the services of Gemac Machineries, as part of the company's costsaving program, the
services rendered by the mechanics became redundant and superfluous, and therefore properly
terminable.Thecompanymerelyexerciseditsbusinessjudgmentormanagementprerogative.Andinthe
absence of any proof that the management abused its discretion or acted in a malicious or arbitrary
manner,thecourtwillnotinterferewiththeexerciseofsuchprerogative.9

InAsianAlcoholCorporationv.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,10theCourtlikewiseupheldthetermination
of employment of water pump tenders and their replacement by independent contractors. It ruled that an
employer'sgoodfaithinimplementingaredundancyprogramisnotnecessarilyputindoubtbytheavailmentof
the services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees to promote
economyandefficiency.

Indeed, as we pointed out in another case, the "[management of a company] cannot be denied the faculty of
promotingefficiencyandattainingeconomybyastudyofwhatunitsareessentialforitsoperation.Toitbelongs
the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its personnel or contracted to outside
agencies...[Whilethere]shouldbemutualconsultation,eventuallydeferenceistobepaidtowhatmanagement
decides."11Consequently,absentproofthatmanagementactedinamaliciousorarbitrarymanner,theCourtwill
notinterferewiththeexerciseofjudgmentbyanemployer.12

In the case at bar, we have only the bare assertion of petitioner that, in abolishing the security section, private
respondent'srealpurposewastoavoidpaymenttothesecuritycheckersofthewageincreasesprovidedinthe
collectivebargainingagreementapprovedin1990.13Suchanassertionisnotsufficientbasisforconcludingthat
the termination of petitioner's employment was not a bona fide decision of management to obtain reasonable
return from its investment, which is a right guaranteed to employers under the Constitution.14 Indeed, that the
phaseout of the security section constituted a "legitimate business decision" is a factual finding of an
administrativeagencywhichmustbeaccordedrespectandevenfinalitybythisCourtsincenothingcanbefound
intherecordwhichfairlydetractsfromsuchfinding.15

Accordingly, we hold that the termination of petitioner's services was for an authorized cause, i.e., redundancy.
Hence,pursuanttoArt.283oftheLaborCode,petitionershouldbegivenseparationpayattherateofonemonth
payforeveryyearofservice.

SanctionsforViolationsoftheNoticeRequirement

Art. 283 also provides that to terminate the employment of an employee for any of the authorized causes the
employermustserve"awrittennoticeontheworkersandtheDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentatleastone
(1) month before the intended date thereof." In the case at bar, petitioner was given a notice of termination on
October 11, 1991. On the same day, his services were terminated. He was thus denied his right to be given
written notice before the termination of his employment, and the question is the appropriate sanction for the
violationofpetitioner'sright.

To be sure, this is not the first time this question has arisen. In Subuguero v. NLRC,16 workers in a garment
factory were temporarily laid off due to the cancellation of orders and a garment embargo. The Labor Arbiter
found that the workers had been illegally dismissed and ordered the company to pay separation pay and
backwages. The NLRC, on the other hand, found that this was a case of retrenchment due to business losses
and ordered the payment of separation pay without backwages. This Court sustained the NLRC's finding.
However,asthecompanydidnotcomplywiththe30daywrittennoticeinArt.283oftheLaborCode,theCourt
orderedtheemployertopaytheworkersP2,000.00eachasindemnity.

The decision followed the ruling in several cases involving dismissals which, although based on any of the just
causes under Art. 282,17 were effected without notice and hearing to the employee as required by the
implementingrules.18AsthisCourtsaid:"Itisnowsettledthatwherethedismissalofoneemployeeisinfactfora
just and valid cause and is so proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he was not
furnished the twin requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the
employer must be sanctioned for noncompliance with the requirements of, or for failure to observe, due
process."19

The rule reversed a long standing policy theretofore followed that even though the dismissal is based on a just
cause or the termination of employment is for an authorized cause, the dismissal or termination is illegal if
effectedwithoutnoticetotheemployee.Theshiftindoctrinetookplacein1989inWenphilCorp.v.NLRC.20In
announcingthechange,thisCourtsaid:21

TheCourtholdsthatthepolicyoforderingthereinstatementtotheserviceofanemployeewithoutlossof
seniorityandthepaymentofhiswagesduringtheperiodofhisseparationuntilhisactualreinstatementbut
notexceedingthree(3)yearswithoutqualificationordeduction,whenitappearshewasnotaffordeddue
process,althoughhisdismissalwasfoundtobeforjustandauthorizedcauseinanappropriateproceeding
intheMinistryofLaborandEmployment,shouldbereexamined.Itwillbehighlyprejudicialtotheinterests
of the employer to impose on him the services of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the
charges that warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the
undeserving,ifnotundesirable,remainsintheservice.

xxxxxxxxx

However,thepetitionermustneverthelessbeheldtoaccountforfailuretoextendtoprivaterespondenthis
righttoaninvestigationbeforecausinghisdismissal.Theruleisexplicitasabovediscussed.Thedismissal
of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due process. Petitioner committed an
infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal
notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing petitioner from employment.
Consideringthecircumstancesofthiscasepetitionermustindemnifytheprivaterespondenttheamountof
P1,000.00.Themeasureofthisawarddependsonthefactsofeachcaseandthegravityoftheomission
committedbytheemployer.

The fines imposed for violations of the notice requirement have varied from P1,000.0022 to P2,000.0023 to
P5,000.0024toP10,000.00.25

NeedforReexaminingtheWenphilDoctrine

Today, we once again consider the question of appropriate sanctions for violations of the notice experience
during the last decade or so with the Wenphil doctrine. The number of cases involving dismissals without the
requisite notice to the employee, although effected for just or authorized causes, suggest that the imposition of
fineforviolationofthenoticerequirementhasnotbeeneffectiveindeterringviolationsofthenoticerequirement.
JusticePanganibanfindsthemonetarysanctions"tooinsignificant,tooniggardly,andsometimeseventoolate."
Ontheotherhand,JusticePunosaystherehasineffectbeenfosteredapolicyof"dismissnowpaylater"which
moneyedemployersfindmoreconvenienttocomplywiththantherequirementtoservea30daywrittennotice(in
thecaseofterminationofemploymentforanauthorizedcauseunderArts.283284)ortogivenoticeandhearing
(inthecaseofdismissalsforjustcausesunderArt.282).

Forthisreason,theyregardanydismissalorlayoffwithouttherequisitenoticetobenullandvoideventhough
there are just or authorized cause for such dismissal or layoff. Consequently, in their view, the employee
concernedshouldbereinstatedandpaidbackwages.

ValidityofPetitioner'sLayoffNotAffectedbyLackofNotice

Weagreewithouresteemedcolleagues,JusticesPunoandPanganiban,thatweshouldrethinkthesanctionof
fine for an employer's disregard of the notice requirement. We do not agree, however, that disregard of this
requirementbyanemployerrendersthedismissalorterminationofemploymentnullandvoid.Suchastanceis
actually a reversion to the discredited preWenphil rule of ordering an employee to be reinstated and paid
backwageswhenitisshownthathehasnotbeengivennoticeandhearingalthoughhisdismissalorlayoffislater
found to be for a just or authorized cause. Such rule was abandoned in Wenphil because it is really unjust to
requireanemployertokeepinhisserviceonewhoisguilty,forexample,ofanattemptonthelifeoftheemployer
orthelatter'sfamily,orwhentheemployerispreciselyretrenchinginordertopreventlosses.

Theneedisforarulewhich,whilerecognizingtheemployee'srighttonoticebeforeheisdismissedorlaidoff,at
the same time acknowledges the right of the employer to dismiss for any of the just causes enumerated in Art.
282ortoterminateemploymentforanyoftheauthorizedcausesmentionedinArts.283284.IftheWenphilrule
imposing a fine on an employer who is found to have dismissed an employee for cause without prior notice is
deemed ineffective in deterring employer violations of the notice requirement, the remedy is not to declare the
dismissalvoidiftherearejustorvalidgroundsforsuchdismissaloriftheterminationisforanauthorizedcause.
Thatwouldbetoupholdtherightoftheemployeebutdenytherightoftheemployertodismissforcause.Rather,
theremedyistoorderthepaymenttotheemployeeoffullbackwagesfromthetimeofhisdismissaluntilthecourt
findsthatthedismissalwasforajustcause.But,otherwise,hisdismissalmustbeupheldandheshouldnotbe
reinstated.Thisisbecausehisdismissalisineffectual.

Forthesamereason,ifanemployeeislaidoffforanyofthecausesinArts.283284,i.e.,installationofalabor
savingdevice,buttheemployerdidnotgivehimandtheDOLEa30daywrittennoticeofterminationinadvance,
then the termination of his employment should be considered ineffectual and he should be paid backwages.
However, the termination of his employment should not be considered void but he should simply be paid
separationpayasprovidedinArt.283inadditiontobackwages.

JusticePunoarguesthatanemployer'sfailuretocomplywiththenoticerequirementconstitutesadenialofthe
employee's right to due process. Prescinding from this premise, he quotes the statement of Chief Justice
ConcepcionVda.deCuaycongv.Vda.deSengbengco26that"actsofCongress,aswellasoftheExecutive,can
denydueprocessonlyunderthepainofnullity,andjudicialproceedingssufferingfromthesameflawaresubject
to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary notwithstanding." Justice Puno concludes that the
dismissalofanemployeewithoutnoticeandhearing,evenifforajustcause,asprovidedinArt.282,orforan
authorized cause, as provided in Arts. 283284, is a nullity. Hence, even if just or authorized cause exist, the
employee should be reinstated with full back pay. On the other hand, Justice Panganiban quotes from the
statement in People v. Bocar27 that "[w]here the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a
decisionrenderedindisregardofthatrightisvoidforlackofjurisdiction."

ViolationofNoticeRequirementNotaDenialofDueProcess

ThecasescitedbybothJusticesPunoandPanganibanrefer,however,tothedenialofdueprocessbytheState,
which is not the case here. There are three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by the employer of the
notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the employee's
dismissalorlayoff.

The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It does not
applytotheexerciseofprivatepower,suchastheterminationofemploymentundertheLaborCode.Thisisplain
fromthetextofArt.III,1oftheConstitution,viz.:"Nopersonshallbedeprivedoflife,liberty,orpropertywithout
dueprocessoflaw...."Thereasonissimple:OnlytheStatehasauthoritytotakethelife,liberty,orpropertyof
theindividual.ThepurposeoftheDueProcessClauseistoensurethattheexerciseofthispowerisconsistent
withwhatareconsideredcivilizedmethods.

The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the power of
organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of
employmentunderArt.283.Heretheemployeeisnotfacedwithanaspectoftheadversarysystem.Thepurpose
forrequiringa30daywrittennoticebeforeanemployeeislaidoffisnottoaffordhimanopportunitytobeheard
onanychargeagainsthim,forthereisnone.Thepurposeratheristogivehimtimetopreparefortheeventual
loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the
terminationofhisemployment.

EvenincasesofdismissalunderArt.282,thepurposefortherequirementofnoticeandhearingisnottocomply
withDueProcessClauseoftheConstitution.Thetimefornoticeandhearingisatthetrialstage.Thenthatisthe
time we speak of notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due process. Thus, compliance by the
employerwiththenoticerequirementbeforehedismissesanemployeedoesnotforeclosetherightofthelatter
to question the legality of his dismissal. As Art. 277(b) provides, "Any decision taken by the employer shall be
withoutprejudicetotherightoftheworkertocontestthevalidityorlegalityofhisdismissalbyfilingacomplaint
withtheregionalbranchoftheNationalLaborRelationsCommission."

Indeed,tocontendthatthenoticerequirementintheLaborCodeisanaspectofdueprocessistooverlookthe
factthatArt.283haditsorigininArt.302oftheSpanishCodeofCommerceof1882whichgaveeitherpartyto
the employeremployee relationship the right to terminate their relationship by giving notice to the other one
monthinadvance.Inlieuofnotice,anemployeecouldbelaidoffbypayinghimamesadaequivalenttohissalary
for one month.28 This provision was repealed by Art. 2270 of the Civil Code, which took effect on August 30,
1950.ButonJune12,1954,R.A.No.1052,otherwiseknownastheTerminationPayLaw,wasenactedreviving
themesada.OnJune21,1957,thelawwasamendedbyR.A.No.1787providingforthegivingofadvancenotice
orthepaymentofcompensationattherateofonehalfmonthforeveryyearofservice.29

TheTerminationPayLawwasheldnottobeasubstantivelawbutaregulatorymeasure,thepurposeofwhich
was to give the employer the opportunity to find a replacement or substitute, and the employee the equal
opportunitytolookforanotherjoborsourceofemployment.Wheretheterminationofemploymentwasforajust
cause,nonoticewasrequiredtobegiventothe,employee.30ItwasonlyonSeptember4,1981thatnoticewas
requiredtobegivenevenwherethedismissalorterminationofanemployeewasforcause.Thiswasmadeinthe
rulesissuedbythethenMinisterofLaborandEmploymenttoimplementB.P.Blg.130whichamendedtheLabor
Code.Anditwasstillmuchlaterwhenthenoticerequirementwasembodiedinthelawwiththeamendmentof
Art.277(b)byR.A.No.6715onMarch2,1989.Itcannotbethattheformerregimedenieddueprocesstothe
employee.Otherwise,thereshouldnowlikewisebearulethat,incaseanemployeeleaveshisjobwithoutcause
andwithoutpriornoticetohisemployer,hisactshouldbevoidinsteadofsimplymakinghimliablefordamages.

The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 can not be considered a requirement of the Due
ProcessClauseisthattheemployercannotreallybeexpectedtobeentirelyanimpartialjudgeofhisowncause.
This is also the case in termination of employment for a just cause under Art. 282 (i.e., serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of the employer, gross and habitual neglect of duties,
fraudorwillfulbreachoftrustoftheemployer,commissionofcrimeagainsttheemployerorthelatter'simmediate
familyordulyauthorizedrepresentatives,orotheranalogouscases).

Justice Puno disputes this. He says that "statistics in the DOLE will prove that many cases have been won by
employees before the grievance committees manned by impartial judges of the company." The grievance
machineryis,however,differentbecauseitisestablishedbyagreementoftheemployerandtheemployeesand
composed of representatives from both sides. That is why, in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Court of
Appeals,31 which Justice Puno cites, it was held that "Since the right of [an employee] to his labor is in itself a
property and that the labor agreement between him and [his employer] is the law between the parties, his
summaryandarbitrarydismissalamountedtodeprivationofhispropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw."Butherewe
aredealingwithdismissalsandlayoffsbyemployersalone,withouttheinterventionofanygrievancemachinery.
Accordingly in Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation,32 although a professor was dismissed without a
hearing by his university, his dismissal for having made homosexual advances on a student was sustained, it
appearingthatintheNLRC,theemployeewasfullyheardinhisdefense.

LackofNoticeOnlyMakesTerminationIneffectual

Notallnoticerequirementsarerequirementsofdueprocess.Somearesimplypartofaproceduretobefollowed
before a right granted to a party can be exercised. Others are simply an application of the Justinian precept,
embodied in the Civil Code,33 to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith
towardone'sfellowmen.SuchisthenoticerequirementinArts.282283.Theconsequenceofthefailureeitherof
the employer or the employee to live up to this precept is to make him liable in damages, not to render his act
(dismissal or resignation, as the case may be) void. The measure of damages is the amount of wages the
employee should have received were it not for the termination of his employment without prior notice. If
warranted,nominalandmoraldamagesmayalsobeawarded.

We hold, therefore, that, with respect to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the employer's failure to comply with the
noticerequirementdoesnotconstituteadenialofdueprocessbutamerefailuretoobserveaprocedureforthe
termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual. It is similar to the
failuretoobservetheprovisionsofArt.1592,inrelationtoArt.1191,oftheCivilCode34inrescindingacontract
for the sale of immovable property. Under these provisions, while the power of a party to rescind a contract is
implied in reciprocal obligations, nonetheless, in cases involving the sale of immovable property, the vendor
cannotexercisethispowereventhoughthevendeedefaultsinthepaymentoftheprice,exceptbybringingan
action in court or giving notice of rescission by means of a notarial demand.35 Consequently, a notice of
rescissiongivenintheletterofanattorneyhasnolegaleffect,andthevendeecanmakepaymentevenafterthe
duedatesincenovalidnoticeofrescissionhasbeengiven.36

Indeed,undertheLaborCode,onlytheabsenceofajustcausefortheterminationofemploymentcanmakethe
dismissalofanemployeeillegal.ThisisclearfromArt.279whichprovides:

SecurityofTenure.Incasesofregularemployment,theemployershallnotterminatetheservicesofan
employeeexceptforajustcauseorwhenauthorizedbythisTitle.Anemployeewhoisunjustlydismissed
fromworkshallbeentitledtoreinstatementwithoutlossofseniorityrightsandotherprivilegesandtohisfull
backwages,inclusiveofallowances,andtohisotherbenefitsortheirmonetaryequivalentcomputedfrom
thetimehiscompensationwaswithheldfromhimuptothetimeofhisactualreinstatement.37

Thus,onlyiftheterminationofemploymentisnotforanyofthecausesprovidedbylawisitillegaland,therefore,
theemployeeshouldbereinstatedandpaidbackwages.Tocontend,asJusticesPunoandPanganibando,that
eveniftheterminationisforajustorauthorizedcausetheemployeeconcernedshouldbereinstatedandpaid
backwages would be to amend Art. 279 by adding another ground for considering a dismissal illegal. What is
more, it would ignore the fact that under Art. 285, if it is the employee who fails to give a written notice to the
employerthatheisleavingtheserviceofthelatter,atleastonemonthinadvance,hisfailuretocomplywiththe
legalrequirementdoesnotresultinmakinghisresignationvoidbutonlyinmakinghimliablefordamages.38This
disparity in legal treatment, which would result from the adoption of the theory of the minority cannot simply be
explainedbyinvokingresidentRamonMagsaysay'smottothat"hewhohaslessinlifeshouldhavemoreinlaw."
ThatwouldbeamisapplicationofthisnoblephraseoriginallyfromProfessorThomasReedPowelloftheHarvard
LawSchool.

JusticePanganibancitesPepsiColaBottlingCo.v.NLRC,39insupportofhisviewthatanillegaldismissalresults
notonlyfromwantoflegalcausebutalsofromthefailuretoobserve"dueprocess."ThePepsiColacaseactually
involvedadismissalforanallegedlossoftrustandconfidencewhich,asfoundbytheCourt,wasnotproven.The
dismissalwas,therefore,illegal,notbecausetherewasadenialofdueprocess,butbecausethedismissalwas
without cause. The statement that the failure of management to comply with the notice requirement "taints the
dismissalwithillegality"wasmerelyadictumthrowninasadditionalgroundsforholdingthedismissaltobeillegal.

Giventhenatureoftheviolation,therefore,theappropriatesanctionforthefailuretogivenoticeisthepaymentof
backwages for the period when the employee is considered not to have been effectively dismissed or his
employmentterminated.ThesanctionisnotthepaymentaloneofnominaldamagesasJusticeVitugcontends.

UnjustResultsofConsideringDismissals/LayoffsWithoutPriorNoticeAsIllegal

Therefusaltolookbeyondthevalidityoftheinitialactiontakenbytheemployertoterminateemploymenteither
foranauthorizedorjustcausecanresultinaninjusticetotheemployer.Fornotgivingnoticeandhearingbefore
dismissing an employee, who is otherwise guilty of, say, theft, or even of an attempt against the life of the
employer,anemployerwillbeforcedtokeepinhisemploysuchguiltyemployee.Thisisunjust.

It is true the Constitution regards labor as "a primary social economic force."40 But so does it declare that it
"recognizestheindispensableroleoftheprivatesector,encouragesprivateenterprise,andprovidesincentivesto
neededinvestment."41 The Constitution bids the State to "afford full protection to labor."42 But it is equally true
that "the law, in protecting the right's of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor selfdestruction of the
employer."43Anditisoppressiontocompeltheemployertocontinueinemploymentonewhoisguiltyortoforce
theemployertoremaininoperationwhenitisnoteconomicallyinhisinteresttodoso.

In sum, we hold that if in proceedings for reinstatement under Art. 283, it is shown that the termination of
employment was due to an authorized cause, then the employee concerned should not be ordered reinstated
eventhoughthereisfailuretocomplywiththe30daynoticerequirement.Instead,hemustbegrantedseparation
payinaccordancewithArt.283,towit:

In case of termination due to the installation of laborsaving devices or redundancy, the worker affected
therebyshallbeentitledtoaseparationpayequivalenttoatleasthisone(1)monthpayortoatleastone
month for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in
cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business
lossesorfinancialreverses,theseparationpayshallbeequivalenttoone(1)monthpayoratleastonehalf
(1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six months shall be
consideredone(1)wholeyear.

Iftheemployee'sseparationiswithoutcause,insteadofbeinggivenseparationpay,heshouldbereinstated.In
eithercase,whetherheisreinstatedoronlygrantedseparationpay,heshouldbepaidfullbackwagesifhehas
beenlaidoffwithoutwrittennoticeatleast30daysinadvance.

On the other hand, with respect to dismissals for cause under Art. 282, if it is shown that the employee was
dismissedforanyofthejustcausesmentionedinsaidArt.282,then,inaccordancewiththatarticle,heshould
notbereinstated.However,hemustbepaidbackwagesfromthetimehisemploymentwasterminateduntilitis
determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is
dismissedrenderstheterminationofhisemploymentwithoutlegaleffect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is
MODIFIED by ordering private respondent Isetann Department Store, Inc. to pay petitioner separation pay
equivalenttoone(1)monthpayforeveryyearofservice,hisunpaidsalary,andhisproportionate13thmonthpay
and,inaddition,fullbackwagesfromthetimehisemploymentwasterminatedonOctober11,1991uptothetime
thedecisionhereinbecomesfinal.Forthispurpose,thiscaseisREMANDEDtotheLaborArbiterforcomputation
oftheseparationpay,backwages,andothermonetaryawardstopetitioner.

SOORDERED.

Davide,Jr.,C.J.,Melo,Kapunan,Quisumbing,Purisima,Pardo,Buena,GonzagaReyesandDeLeon,Jr.,JJ.,
concur.
BellosilloJ.,PleaseseeSeparateOpinion.
Puno,J.,PleaseseeDissentingOpinion.
Vitug,J.,PleaseseeSeparateopinion.
PanganibanJ.,PleaseseeSeparateOpinion.
YnaresSantiago,J.,IjointhedissentingopinionofJ.Puno.

SeparateOpinions

BELLOSILLO,J.,separateopinion

We point out at the outset that this Petition for Review which was filed before the promulgation of St. Martin
FuneralHomev.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,1isnotthepropermeansbywhichNLRCdecisionsare
appealedtothisCourt.BeforeSt.MartinFuneralHome,itwasonlythroughaPetitionforCertiorariunderRule65
thatNLRCdecisionscouldbereviewedandnullifiedbyusonthegroundoflackofjurisdictionorgraveabuseof
discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.AfterSt.MartinFuneralHome,petitionsliketheoneatbar
areinitiallyfiledintheCourtofAppealsforproperadjudication.

Intheinterestofjustice,however,andinordertowritefinistotheinstantcasewhichhasalreadydraggedonfor
solong,weshalltreatthepetitionprohacviceasoneforcertiorariunderRule65althoughitiscaptionedPetition
forReviewonCertiorariafterall,itwasfiledwithinthereglementaryperiodforthefilingofapetitionforcertiorari
underRule65.

Briefly,on4April1985privaterespondentIsetannDepartmentStore,Inc.(ISETANN),employedpetitionerRuben
SerranoasSecurityCheckeruntilhisappointmentasSecuritySectionHead.OnOctober1991ISETANNthrough
its Human Resource Division Manager Teresita A. Villanueva sent Serrano a memorandum terminating his
employment effective immediately "in view of the retrenchment program of the company," and directing him to
secureclearancefromtheiroffice.2

PetitionerSerranofiledwiththeNLRCAdjudicationOfficeacomplaintforillegaldismissalandunderpaymentof
wages against ISETANN. Efforts at amicable settlement proved futile. Ms. Cristina Ramos, Personnel
AdministrationManagerofISETANN,testifiedthatthesecuritycheckersandtheirsectionheadwereretrenched
duetotheinstallationofalaborsavingdevice,i.e.,thehiringofanindependentsecurityagency.

Findingthedismissaltobeillegal,theLaborArbiterorderedtheimmediatereinstatementofSerranotohisformer
ortoanequivalentpositionpluspaymentofbackwages,unpaidwages,13thmonthpayandattorney'sfees.

On appeal the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and ruled that ISETANN acted within its prerogative when it
phasedoutitsSecuritySectionandretainedtheservicesofanindependentsecurityagencyinordertocutcosts
and economize. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration3 Serrano filed the instant petition imputing grave
abuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheNLRC.

Art.282oftheLaborCodeenumeratesthejustcausesfortheterminationofemploymentbytheemployer:(a)
serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or the latter's
representative in connection with the employee's work (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or his duly
authorized representative (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative and, (e) other causes
analogoustotheforegoing.

On the other hand, Arts. 283 and 284 of the same Code enumerate the socalled authorized causes: (a)
installationoflaborsavingdevices(b)redundancy:(b)retrenchmenttopreventlosses(d)closureorcessation
of the establishment or undertaking unless the closure or cessation is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisionsofthelawand,(e)disease.

TheJustcauses enumerated under Art. 282 of the Labor Code are provided by the employee who causes the
infraction. The authorized causes are provided by the employer either because of outside factors such as the
general decline in the economy or merely part of its long range plan for business profitability. Corollarily, in
terminationforajustcause,theemployeeisnotentitledtoseparationpayunlikeinterminationforanauthorized
cause. In addition, the basis in computing the amount of separation pay varies depending on whether the
termination is due to the installation of a labor saving device, or redundancy, in which case, the employee is
entitled to receive separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for
every year of service. In case the termination is due to retrenchment in order to prevent losses or in case of
closure or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or
financialreverses,theseparationpayislower,i.e.,equivalenttoone(1)monthpayoratleastonehalfmonthpay
for every year of service, whichever is higher. As may be gleaned from the foregoing, where the cause of
terminationisforthefinancialadvantageorbenefitoftheemployer,thebasisincomputingforseparationpayis
highercomparedtoterminationdictatedbynecessitywithnoappreciablefinancialadvantagetotheemployer.
Intheinstantcase,weagreewiththeNLRCthatthedismissalofpetitionerSerranowasforanauthorizedcause,
i.e.,redundancy,whichexistswheretheservicesofanemployeeareinexcessofwhatarereasonablydemanded
bytheactualrequirementsoftheenterprise.Apositionisredundantwhereitissuperfluous,andthesuperfluity
may be the outcome of other factors such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of other business, or
droppingofaparticularproductlineorserviceactivitypreviouslymanufacturedorundertakenbytheenterprise.4

Thehiringofanindependentsecurityagencyisabusinessdecisionproperlywithintheexerciseofmanagement
prerogative. As such, this Court is denied the authority to delve into its wisdom although it is equipped with the
power to determine whether the exercise of such prerogative is in accordance with law. Consequently, the
wisdomorsoundnessofthemanagementdecisionisnotsubjecttothediscretionaryreviewoftheLaborArbiter
noroftheNLRCunlessthereisaviolationoflaworarbitrarinessintheexercisethereof,inwhichcase,thisCourt
willstepin.5Specifically,weheldinInternationalHarvesterMacleod,Inc.v.IntermediateAppellateCourt6thatthe
determination of whether to maintain or phase out an entire department or section or to reduce personnel lies
withmanagement.Thedeterminationoftheneedforthephasingoutofadepartmentasalaborandcostsaving
devicebecauseitisnolongereconomicaltoretainitsservicesisamanagementprerogative.

After having established that the termination of petitioner Ruben Serrano was for an authorized cause, we now
addresstheissueofwhetherproperprocedureswereobservedinhisdismissal.

SincetheStateaffordsprotectiontolaborundertheConstitution,7workersenjoysecurityoftenureandmayonly
beremovedorterminateduponvalidreasonandthroughstrictobservanceofproperprocedure.8Article279of
theLaborCodespecificallyprovides

Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.

Security of tenure however does not guarantee perpetual employment. If there exists a just or an authorized
cause,theemployermayterminatetheservicesofanemployeebutsubjectalwaystoproceduralrequirements.
The employer cannot be legally compelled to have in its employ a person whose continued employment is
patently inimical to its interest. The law, while affording protection to the employee, does not authorize the
oppressionordestructionofhisemployer.9

Subject then to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and to be protected against dismissal
except for a just or authorized cause, and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Art. 283 of the
LaborCode,theemployershallfurnishtheworkerwhoseemploymentissoughttobeterminatedawrittennotice
containingastatementofthecauseofterminationandshallaffordthelatterampleopportunitytobeheardandto
defendhimselfwiththeassistanceofhisrepresentative,ifhesodesires,inaccordancewithcompanyrulesand
regulationspromulgatedpursuanttoguidelinessetbytheDOLE.10

As specifically provided in Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the employer may terminate the employment of any
employee due to redundancy by serving a written notice on the worker and the DOLE at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof. In the instant case, ISETANN clearly violated the provisions of Art. 283 on
notice.11ItdidnotsendawrittennoticetoDOLEwhichisessentialbecausetherighttoterminateanemployeeis
notanabsoluteprerogative.ThelackofwrittennoticedeniedDOLEtheopportunitytodeterminethevalidityof
thetermination.

The written notice ISETANN sent to Serrano was dated 11 October 1991 or on the same day the intended
termination was to take effect. This obviously did not comply with the 30day mandatory requirement. Although
the cause for discharge may be just or authorized, it is still necessary and obligatory to afford the employee
concernedhisbasicandmoreimportantrighttonotice.Serranowasnotgiventhechancetomaketheneeded
adjustmentsbroughtaboutbyhistermination.Significantly,thenoticeisintendedtoenabletheemployeenotonly
topreparehimselfforthelegalbattletoprotecthistenureofemployment,whichcanbelong,arduous,expensive
andcomplicatedbyhisownstandards,butalsotofindothermeansofemploymentandeasetheimpactofthe
lossofhisjoband,necessarily,hasincome.

We are of the view that failure to send notice of termination to Serrano is not tantamount to violation of his
constitutionalrighttodueprocessbutmerelyconstitutesnoncompliancewiththeprovisiononnoticeunderArt.
283oftheLaborCode.

The legitimacy of a government is established and its functions delineated in the Constitution. From the
Constitutionflowsallthepowersofgovernmentinthesamemannerthatitsetsthelimitsfortheirproperexercise.
Inparticular,theBillofRightsfunctionsprimarilyasadeterrenttoanydisplayofarbitrarinessonthepartofthe
government or any of its instrumentalities. It serves as the general safeguard, as is apparent in its first section
which states, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
personbedeniedtheequalprotectionofthelaws."12Specifically,dueprocessisarequirementforthevalidityof
anygovernmentalactionamountingtodeprivationofliberty.13Itisarestraintonstateactionnotonlyintermsof
what it amounts to but how it is accomplished. Its range thus covers both the ends sough to be achieved by
officialdomaswellasthemeansfortheirrealization.14

Substantive due process is a weapon that may be utilized to challenge acts of the legislative body, whether
nationalorlocal,andpresumablyexecutiveordersofthePresidentandadministrativeordersandregulationsofa
rulemaking character. Procedural due process, on the other hand, is available for the purpose of assailing
arbitrarinessorunreasonablenessintheadministrationofthelawbyexecutivedepartmentorthejudicialbranch.
Procedural due process likewise may aid those appearing before Congressional committees if the proceedings
arearbitraryorotherwiseunfair.13

Proceduraldueprocessdemandsthatgovernmentalacts,morespecificallysointhecaseofthejudiciary,notbe
affected with arbitrariness.16 The same disinterestedness required of men on the bench must characterize the
actuationsofpublicofficials,notexcludingthePresident,tosatisfytherequirementsofproceduraldueprocess.17

In his dissent Mr. Justice Puno states that "the new majority opinion limiting violations of due process to
government action alone is a throwback to a regime of law long discarded by more progressive countries." He
opines that "today, private due process is a settled norm in administrative law," citing Schwartz, an authority in
administrativelaw.

We beg to disagree. A careful reading of Schwartz would reveal that requirements of procedural due process
extended from governmental to private action only in instances where there is "sufficient governmental
involvement"or"theprivateactionwassosaturatedwithgovernmentalincidents."

ThecardinalprimaryrequirementsofdueprocessinadministrativeproceedingswerehighlightedinAngTibayv.
Court of Industrial Relations:18 (a) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and
submitevidenceinsupportthereof(b)thetribunalmustconsidertheevidencepresented(c)thedecisionmust
have something to support itself (d) the evidence must be substantial (e) the decision must be based on the
evidencepresentedatthehearing,oratleastcontainedintherecordanddisclosedtothepartiesaffected(f)the
tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy,andnotsimplyaccepttheviewsofasubordinate(g)theboardorbodyshould,inallcontroversial
questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding may know the various issues
involved,andthereasonforthedecisionrendered.

AlsoinLumiquedv.Exevea19itwasheld

Inadministrativeproceedings,theessenceofdueprocessissimplytheopportunitytoexplainone'sside.
One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even more creditably as it is
morepracticablethanoralarguments,throughpleadings.Anactualhearingisnotalwaysanindispensable
aspectofdueprocess.Aslongasapartywasgiventheopportunitytodefendhisinterestsinduecourse,
he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very
essenceofdueprocess.

Fromtheforegoing,itisclearthattheobservanceofdueprocessisdemandedingovernmentalacts.Particularly
inadministrativeproceedings,dueprocessstartswiththetribunalorhearingofficerandnotwiththeemployer.In
the instant case, what is mandated of the employer to observe is the 30day notice requirement. Hence, non
observance of the notice requirement is not denial of due process but merely a failure to comply with a legal
obligationforwhichwestronglyrecommend,weimposeadisturbancecompensationasdiscussedhereunder.

In the instant case, we categorically declare that Serrano was not denied his right to due process. Instead, his
employerdidnotcomplywiththe30daynoticerequirement.However,whileSerranowasnotgiventherequired
30daynotice,hewasneverthelessgivenand,infact,tookadvantageofeveryopportunitytobeheard,first,by
theLaborArbiter,second,bytheNLRC,andthird,bynolessthanthisCourt.BeforetheLaborArbiterandthe
NLRC,petitionerhadtheopportunitytopresenthissidenotonlyorallybutlikewisethroughproperpleadingsand
positionpapers.

Itisnotcorrectthereforetosaythatpetitionerwasdeprivedofhisrighttodueprocess.

We have consistently upheld in the past as valid although irregular the dismissal of an employee for a just or
authorizedcausebutwithoutnoticeandhaveimposedasanctionontheerringemployersintheformofdamages
for their failure to comply with the notice requirement. We discussed the rationale behind this ruling in Wenphil
Corporationv.NLRC20thus
The Court holds that the policy of ordering reinstatement to the service of an employee without loss of
seniorityandthepaymentofhiswagesduringtheperiodofhisseparationuntilhisactualreinstatementbut
not exceeding three years without qualification or deduction, when it appears he was not afforded due
process,althoughhisdismissalwasfoundtobeforjustandauthorizedcauseinanappropriateproceeding
intheMinistryofLaborandEmploymentshouldbereexamined.Itwillbehighlyprejudicialtotheinterests
of the employer to impose on him the services of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the
charges that warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the
undeserving,ifnotundesirable,remainsintheservice....However,thepetitionermustneverthelessbe
held to account for failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his
dismissal. The rule is explicit as above discussed. The dismissal of an employee must be for just or
authorized cause and after due process. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement.
Thus,itmustbeimposedasanctionforitsfailuretogiveaformalnoticeandconductaninvestigationas
requiredbylawbeforedismissingpetitionerfromemployment.Consideringthecircumstancesofthiscase
petitionermustindemnifyprivaterespondenttheamountofP1,000.00.Themeasureofthisawarddepends
onthefactsofeachcaseandthegravityoftheomissioncommittedbytheemployer(emphasissupplied).

In Sebuguero v. National Labor Relations Commission21 Mr. Justice Davide Jr., now Chief Justice, made this
clearpronouncement

It is now settled that where the dismissal of an employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so
proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e. he was not furnished the twin
requirements of notice and the opportunity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer
mustbesanctionedfornoncompliancewiththerequirementsoforforfailuretoobservedueprocess.The
sanction,inthenatureofindemnificationorpenalty,dependsonthefactsofeachcaseandthegravityof
theomissioncommittedbytheemployer.

ThisrulingwaslaterablyamplifiedbyMr.JusticePunoinNathv.NationalLaborRelationsCommission22where
hewrote

Therulesrequiretheemployertofurnishtheworkersoughttobedismissedwithtwowrittennoticesbefore
terminationofemploymentcanbelegallyeffected:(1)noticewhichapprisestheemployeeoftheparticular
acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the
employeeoftheemployer'sdecisiontodismisshim.Intheinstantcase,privaterespondentshavefailedto
furnish petitioner with the first of the required two (2) notices and to state plainly the reasons for the
dismissalintheterminationletter.Failuretocomplywiththerequirementstaintsthedismissalwithillegality.

Bethatasitmay,privaterespondentcandismisspetitionerforjustcause....Weaffirmthefindingofthe
public respondent that there was just cause to dismiss petitioner, a probationary employee (emphasis
supplied).

Also,inCamuav.NationalLaborRelationsCommission23thisCourtthroughMr.JusticeMendozadecreed

In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that no written notice of the charges had
beengiventopetitionerbytherespondentcompany....Accordingly,inaccordancewiththewellsettled
rule, private respondents should pay petitioner P1,000.00 as indemnity for violation of his right to due
process....Althoughanemployeevalidydismissedforcausehemayneverthelessbegivenseparation
pay as a measure of social justice provided the cause is not serious misconduct reflecting on his moral
character(emphasissupplied).

Nonobservance of this procedural requirement before would cause the employer to be penalized by way of
paying damages to the employee the amounts of which fluctuated through the years. Thus, for just cause the
indemnityrangedfromP1,000.00toP10,000.00.24 For authorized cause, as distinguished from just cause, the
awardrangedfromP2,000.00toP5,000.00.25

ThisCourthasalsosanctionedtherulingthatadismissalforajustorauthorizedcausebutwithoutobservanceof
the mandatory 30day notice requirement was valid although considered irregular. The Court ratiocinated that
employers should not be compelled to keep in their employ undesirable and undeserving laborers. For the
irregularity,i.e.,thefailuretoobservethe30daynoticeoftermination,theemployerwasmadetopayameasly
sumrangingfromP1,000.00toP10,000.00.

With regard to the indemnity or penalty, which we prefer seriously to be referred to as "disturbance
compensation,"theCourthasawardedvaryingamountsdependingonthecircumstancesofeachcaseandthe
gravity of the commission. We now propose that the amount of the award be uniform and rational and not
arbitrary. The reason for the proposal or modification is that in their noncompliance with the 30day notice
requirement the erring employers, regardless of the peculiar circumstances of each case, commit the infraction
onlybythesingleactofnotgivinganynoticetotheirworkers.Itcannotbegainfullysaidthattheinfractioninone
caseisheavierthanintheotherasthenonobservanceconstitutesonesingleact.Thus,ifthedismissalisillegal,
i.e. there is no just or authorized cause, a disturbance compensation in the amount of P10,000.00 may be
consideredreasonable.Ifthedismissalisforajustcausebutwithoutnotice,adisturbancecompensationinthe
amount P5,000.00 may be given. In termination for an authorized cause and the notice requirement was not
compliedwith,wedistinguishfurther:Ifitistosavetheemployerfromimminentbankruptcyorbusinesslosses,
thedisturbancecompensationtobegivenisP5,000.00.Iftheauthorizedcausewasintendedfortheemployerto
earnmoreprofits,theamountofdisturbancecompensationisP10,000.00.Thisdisturbancecompensation,again
westronglyrecommend,shouldbegiventothedismissedemployeeatthefirstinstance,themomentitisshown
thathisemployerhascommittedtheinfractionofnotcomplyingwiththe30daywrittennoticerequirement
totidehimoverduringhiseconomicdislocation.

Therightofthelaborerstobeinformedoftheirimpendingterminationcannotbetakenlightly,andtheawardof
any amount below P5,000.00 may be too anemic to satisfy the fundamental protection especially accorded to
laborandtheworkingman.Infact,itishardlyenoughtosustainafamilyofthreemoresoiftheemployeehas
fiveormorechildren,whichseemstobetheaveragesizeofaFilipinofamily.

Henceforth, if the dismissal is for a just cause but without observance of the 30day notice requirement, the
dismissal is deemed improper and irregular. If later the dismissal is ascertained to be without just cause, the
dismissedemployeeisentitledtoreinstatement,ifthisbefeasible,otherwisetoseparationpayandbackwages
plus disturbance compensation of P10,000.00 and moral damages, if warranted. On the other hand, if the
dismissal is ascertained to be with just cause, the dismissed employee is entitled nevertheless to a disturbance
compensation of P5,000.00 if the legal requirement of the 30day notice to both employee and DOLE has not
beencompliedwith.

Ininstanceswherethereisobviouslyagroundfordismissal,aswhentheemployeehasbecomeviolentandhis
presencewouldcausemoreharmtohiscoworkersandthesecurityandserenityoftheworkplace,theemployee
maybesuspendedinthemeantimeuntilheisheardwithproperobservanceofthe30daynoticerequirement.
Likewise,ifthedismissalisforanauthorizedcausebutwithouttherequirednotice,thedismissalisimproperand
irregular and the employee should be paid separation pay, back wages and disturbance compensation of
P5,000.00 or P10,000.00.00 depending on the cause. As already intimated, if the authorized cause is for the
purpose of saving the employer from imminent bankruptcy or business losses, the disturbance compensation
should be P5,000.00 otherwise, if the authorized cause is for the employer, in the exercise of management
prerogative,tosaveandearnmoreprofits,thedisturbancecompensationshouldbeP10,000.00.

Intheinstantcase,Serranowasgivenhiswalkingpapersonlyontheverysamedayhisterminationwastotake
effect.DOLEwasnotservedanywrittennotice.Inotherwords,therewasnonobservanceofthe30daynotice
requirement to both Serrano and the DOLE. Serrano was thus terminated for an authorized cause but was not
accordedhisrightto30daynotice.Thus,hisdismissalbeingimproperandirregular,heisentitledtoseparation
payandbackwagestheamountsofwhichtobedeterminedbytheLaborArbiter,plusP10,000.00asdisturbance
compensation which, from its very nature, must be paid immediately to cushion the impact of his economic
dislocation.

One last note. This Separate Opinion is definitely not advocating a new concept in imposing the socalled
"disturbance compensation." Since Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC 26 this Court has already recognized the
necessityofimposingasanctionintheformofindemnityorevendamages,whenproper,notspecificallyprovided
byanylaw,uponemployerswhofailedtocomplywiththetwinnoticerequirement.Attheveryleast,whatisbeing
proposed to be adopted here is merely a change in the terminology used, i.e., from "sanction," "indemnity,"
"damages" or "penalty," to "disturbance compensation" as it is believed to be the more appropriate term to
accuratelydescribethelamentablesituationofourdisplacedemployees.

Indeed,fromthetimetheemployeeisdismissedfromtheservicewithoutnoticeinthiscasesince11October
1991totheterminationofhiscase,assumingitresultsinhisreinstatement,orhisbeingpaidhisbackwages
andseparationpay,asthecasemaybe,howlongmusthebemadetosufferemotionallyandbearhisfinancial
burden?Willreinstatinghimand/orpayinghisbackwagesadequatelymakeupfortheentireperiodthathewas
indistressforwantofanymeansoflivelihood?PetitionerSerranohasbeendeprivedofhisonlysourceofincome
his employment for the past eight (8) years or so. Will his reinstatement and/or the payment of his back
wages and separation pay enable him to pay off his debts incurred in abject usury to which he must have
succumbedduringhislongperiodoffinancialdistress?Willitbeadequate?Willitbejust?Willitbefair?Thus,
dowereallyandtrulyrenderjusticetotheworkingmanbysimplyawardinghimfullbackwagesandseparation
paywithoutregardforthelongperiodduringwhichhewaswallowinginfinancialdifficulty?

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission should be
MODIFIED. The termination of petitioner RUBEN SERRANO being based on an authorized cause should be
SUSTAINEDASVALIDalthoughDECLAREDIRREGULARforhavingbeeneffectedwithoutthemandatory30day
notice.

ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE INC. should PAY petitioner SERRANO back wages and separation pay the
amounts of which to be determined by the Labor Arbiter, plus P10,000.00 as disturbance compensation which
mustbepaidimmediately.Consequently,exceptasregardsthedisturbancecompensation,thecaseshouldbe
REMANDEDtotheLaborArbiterfortheimmediatecomputationandpaymentofthebackwagesandseparation
payduepetitioner.

EXCEPTashereinstated,Iconcurwiththemajority.

PUNO,J.,dissentingopinion

Theruleofaudialterampartemheartheotherside,istheessenceofproceduraldueprocess.Thata"partyis
not to suffer in person or in purse without an opportunity of being heard" is the oldest established principle in
administrativelaw.1Today,themajorityisreliesthattheallimportantrightofanemployeetobenotifiedbefore
he is dismissed for a just or authorized cause is not a requirement of due process. This is a blow on the
breadbasket of our lowly employees, a considerable erosion of their constitutional right to security of tenure,
hencethishumbledissentingopinion.

Areviewofourlawondismissalisinorder.

I.DISMISSALDUETOJUSTCAUSE

ThelawallowingdismissalofanemployeeduetoajustcauseisprovidedinArticle282oftheLaborCode:

Art.282.Terminationbyemployer.Anemployermayterminateanemploymentforanyofthefollowing
causes:

(a)Seriousmisconductorwillfuldisobediencebytheemployeeofthelawfulordersofhisemployer
orrepresentativeinconnectionwithhiswork

(b)Grossandhabitualneglectbytheemployeeofhisduties

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorizedrepresentative

(d)Commissionofthecrimeoroffensebytheemployeeagainstthepersonofhisemployerorany
immediatememberofhisfamilyorhisdulyauthorizedrepresentativeand

(e)Othercausesanalogoustotheforegoing.

Thelongestablishedjurisprudence2isthattojustifydismissalofanemployeeforajustcause,hemustbegiven
twokindsofnoticebyhisemployer,viz:(1)noticetoapprisetheemployeeoftheparticularactsoromissionsfor
whichthedismissalissought,and(2)subsequentnoticetoinformhimoftheemployer'sdecisiontodismisshim.
Similarly,deeplyingrainedisourrulingthatthesepreandpostnoticerequirementsarenotmeretechnicalitiesbut
arerequirementsofdueprocess.3

ThencamethecaseofWenphilCorporationvs.NLRCandMallarein1989.4ItisthemajorityviewthatWenphil
reversed the long standing policy of this Court on dismissal. This is too broad a reading of Wenphil. A careful
statementofthefactsofWenphilandtherulingofthisCourtisthusproper.

First, the facts. The private respondent Roberto Mallare is the assistant head of the backroom department of
petitioner Wenphil Corporation. At about 2:30 pm on May 20, 1985, Mallare had an altercation with his co
employee, Job Barrameda, about tending the Salad Bar. He slapped Barrameda's cap, stepped on his foot,
pickedupanicescooperandbrandisheditagainstthelatter.Herefusedtobepacifiedbyanotheremployeewho
reported the incident to Delilah Hermosura, assistant manager. Hermosura summoned Mallare but the latter
refused to see the former. It took a security guard to bring Mallare to Hermosura. Instead of making an
explanation,MallareshoutedprofanewordsagainstHermosura.Hedeclaredthattheiraltercationshouldonlybe
settledbyhimandBarrameda.

Thefollowingmorning,Mallarewassuspended.Intheafternoon,hewasdismissedfromtheservice.Hereceived
anofficialnoticeofhisdismissalfour(4)dayslater.

Mallare filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.
NohearingwasconductedinviewoftherepeatedabsenceofthecounselofMallare.Thepartiessubmittedtheir
respectivepositionpapers.OnDecember3,1986,theArbiterdeniedthecomplaintashefoundMallareguiltyof
grave misconduct and insubordination, which are just causes for dismissal. The Arbiter also ruled that Mallare
wasnotdenieddueprocess.Onappeal,theNLRCreversed.ItheldthatMallarewasdenieddueprocessbefore
hewasdismissed.ItorderedMallare'sreinstatementandthepaymentofhisone(1)yearbackwages.

OncertioraritothisCourt,wereversedtheNLRCandreinstatedthedecisionoftheArbiterwiththemodification
that petitioner should pay to Mallare an indemnity of P1,000.00 for dismissing Mallare without any notice and
hearing.Weheld:

Petitionerinsiststhatprivaterespondentwasaffordeddueprocessbutherefusedtoavailofhisrighttothe
same that when the matter was brought to the labor arbiter he was able to submit his position paper
although the hearing cannot proceed due to the nonappearance of his counsel and that the private
respondentisguiltyofseriousmisconductinthreateningorcoercingacoemployeewhichisagroundfor
dismissalunderArticle283oftheLaborCode.

The failure of petitioner to give private respondent the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed
constitutesaninfringementofhisconstitutionalrighttodueprocessoflawandequalprotectionofthelaws.
Thestandardsofdueprocessinjudicialaswellasadministrativeproceedingshavelongbeenestablished.
In its bare minimum due process of law simply means giving notice and opportunity to be heard before
judgmentisrendered.

Theclaimofpetitionerthataformalinvestigationwasnotnecessarybecausetheincident,whichgaverise
to the termination of private respondent, was witnessed by his coemployees and supervisors, is without
merit.Thebasicrequirementofdueprocessisthatwhichhearsbeforeitcondemns,whichproceedsupon
inquiryandrendersjudgmentonlyaftertrial.

However,itisamatteroffactthatwhentheprivaterespondentfiledacomplaintagainstpetitioner,hewas
afforded the right to an investigation by the labor arbiter. He presented his position paper as did the
petitioner.Ifnohearingwashad,itwasthefaultofprivaterespondentashiscounselfailedtoappearatthe
scheduled hearings. The labor arbiter concluded that the dismissal of private respondent was for just
cause.Hewasfoundguiltyofgravemisconductandinsubordination.Thisisbornebytheswornstatements
ofwitnesses.TheCourtisboundbythisfindingofthelaborarbiter.

Bythesametoken,theconclusionofthepublicrespondentNLRConappealthatprivaterespondentwas
not afforded due process before he was dismissed is binding on this Court. Indeed, it is well taken and
supportedbytherecords.However,itcannotjustifyarulingthatprivaterespondentshouldbereinstated
withbackwagesasthepublicrespondentNLRCsodecreed.Althoughbelatedly,privaterespondentwas
affordeddueprocessbeforethelaborarbiterwhereinthejustcauseofhisdismissalhadbeenestablished.
Withsuchfinding,itwouldbearbitraryandunfairtoorderhisreinstatementwithbackwages.

Three member of the Court filed concurring and dissenting opinions. Madam Justice Herrera opined that: (a)
Mallare was dismissed for cause, hence, he is not entitled to reinstatement and backwages (b) he was not
denieddueprocessand(c)hehasnorighttoanyindemnitybuttoseparationpaytocushiontheimpactofhis
loss of employment Mr. Justice Padilla took the view that: (1) Mallare was not entitled to reinstatement and
backwages as he was guilty of grave misconduct and insubordination (2) he was denied administrative due
processand(3)formakingsuchdenial,Wenphilshouldpay"separationpay(insteadofindemnity)inthesumof
P1,000.00."MadamJusticeCortesheldthat:(1)Mallarewasnotillegallydismissed(2)hewasnotdenieddue
process (3) he was not entitled to indemnity and (4) if P1,000.00 was to be imposed on Wenphil as an
administrativesanction,itshouldformpartofthepublicfundofthegovernment.

IshalldiscusslaterthatWenphildidnotchangeourrulingthatviolationofthepredismissalnoticerequirementis
aninfringementofdueprocess.

II.DISMISSALDUETOAUTHORIZEDCAUSE

TheapplicablelawondismissalduetoauthorizedcauseisArticle283oftheLaborCodewhichprovides:

Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the
employmentofanyemployeeduetotheinstallationoflaborservingdevices,redundancy,retrenchmentto
prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the
closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the
workersandthe[Department]ofLaborandEmploymentatleastone(1)monthbeforetheintendeddate
thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of laborsaving devices or redundancy, the worker
affectedtherebyshallbeentitledtoaseparationpayequivalenttoatleasthisone(1)monthpayortoat
leastone(1)monthpayforeveryyearofservice,whicheverishigher.Incaseofretrenchmenttoprevent
losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
seriousbusinesslossesorfinancialreverses,theseparationpayshallbeequivalenttoone(1)monthpay
oratleastonehalf(1/2)monthpayforeveryyearofservice,whicheverishigher.Afractionofatleastsix
(6)monthsshallbeconsideredone(1)wholeyear.
InSebuguerov.NLRC,5weheldthruouresteemedChiefJusticeDavidethat"therequirementofnoticetoboth
the employees concerned and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is mandatory and must be
writtenandgivenatleastonemonthbeforetheintendeddateofretrenchment."Weexplainedthatthe"noticeto
theDOLEisessentialbecausetherighttoretrenchisnotanabsoluteprerogativeofanemployerbutissubjectto
the requirement of law that retrenchment be proved to prevent losses. The DOLE is the agency that will
determine whether the planned retrenchment is justified and adequately supported by fact."6 Nonetheless, we
ruled:

The lack of written notice to the petitioners and to the DOLE does not, however, make the petitioners'
retrenchmentillegalsuchthattheyareentitledtothepaymentofbackwagesandseparationpayinlieuof
reinstatementastheycontend.Theirretrenchment,fornothavingbeeneffectedwiththerequirednotices,
is merely defective. In those cases where we found the retrenchment to be illegal and ordered the
employees'reinstatementandthepaymentofbackwages,thevalidityofthecruseforretrenchment,thatis
theexistenceofimminentoractualseriousorsubstantiallosses,wasnotproven.Buthere,suchacauseis
presentasfoundbyboththeLaborArbiterandtheNLRC.ThereisonlyaviolationbyGTIoftheprocedure
prescribedinArticle283oftheLaborCodeineffectingtheretrenchmentofthepetitioners. 1 w p h i1 .n t

Itisnowsettledthatwherethedismissalofanemployeeisinfactforajustandvalidcauseandissoproventobe
butheisnotaccordedhisrighttodueprocess,i.e.,hewasnotfurnishedthetwinrequirementsofnoticeandthe
opportunitytobeheard,thedismissalshallbeupheldbuttheemployermustbesanctionedfornoncompliance
withtherequirementsoforforfailuretoobservedueprocess.Thesanction,inthenatureofindemnificationor
penalty,dependsonthefactsofeachcaseandthegravityoftheomissioncommittedbytheemployerandhas
rangedfromP1,000.00asinthecasesofWenphilvs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,SeahorseMaritime
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, Shoemart, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
Rubberworld(Phils.)Inc.vs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,PacificMills,Inc.vs.Alonzo,and Aurelio vs.
National Labor Relations Commission to P10,000.00 in Reta vs. National Labor Relations Commission and
AlhambraIndustries,Inc.vs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission.Morerecently,inWorldwidePapermills,Inc.
vs.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,thesumofP5,000.00wasawardedtotheemployeeasindemnification
fortheemployer'sfailuretocomplywiththerequirementsofproceduraldueprocess.

Accordingly,weaffirmthedeletionbytheNLRCoftheawardofbackwages,Butbecausetherequirednoticesof
the petitioners' retrenchment were not served upon the petitioners and the DOLE, GTI must be sanctioned for
suchfailureandtherebyrequiredtoindemnifyeachofthepetitionersthesumofP20,000.00whichwefindtobe
justandreasonableunderthecircumstancesofthiscase.

III.REEXAMINATIONOFTHEWENPHILDOCTRINE:

FROMBADTOWORSE

TheminorityoftheCourthasaskedforareexaminationofWenphilbecauseasthemajoritycorrectlyobserved,
"thenumberofcasesinvolvingdismissalswithouttherequisitenoticetotheemployeealthougheffectedforjustor
authorized causes suggests that the imposition of fine for violation of the notice requirement has not been
effectiveindeterringviolationsofthenoticerequirement."

WemustimmediatelysetWenphilinitsproperperspectiveasitisaveryexceptionalcase.Itsdoctrinemustbe
limited to its distinct facts. Its facts therefore ought to be carefully examined again. In Wenphil, it was clearly
established that the employee had a violent temper, caused trouble during office hours and even defied his
superiorsastheytriedtopacifyhim.Theemployeewasworkingforafastfoodchainthatservedthepublicand
whereviolencehasnoplace.ThesefactswereestablishedonlyintheproceedingsbeforetheLaborArbiterafter
the employee filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. There were no formal investigation proceedings before the
employerastheemploymentwasdismissedwithoutanynoticebytheemployer.Giventhesefacts,weruledthat
thepredismissalnoticerequirementwaspartofdueprocessnonetheless,weheldthattheemployeewasgiven
due process as he was heard by the Labor Arbiter we found that the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
provedthattheemployerwasguiltyofgravemisconductandinsubordinationweconcludedwiththerulethatit
would be highly prejudicial to the interest of the employer to reinstate the employee, but the employer must
indemnify the employee the amount of P1,000.00 for dismissing him without notice. We further held that "the
measure of this award depends on the facts or each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the
employer."7

Attheoutset,IwishtoemphasizethatWenphilitselfheld,andrepeatedlyheldthat"thefailureofpetitionertogive
private respondent the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed, constitutes an infringement of his
constitutionalrighttodueprocessoflawandequalprotectionofthelaws.Thestandardsofdueprocessoflawin
judicialaswellasadministrativeproceedingshavelongbeenestablished.Initsbareminimumdueprocessoflaw
simplymeansgivingnoticeandopportunitytobeheardbeforejudgmentisrendered."8TheCourtthensatisfied
itself with this bare minimum when it held that the post dismissal hearing before the Labor Arbiter was enough
compliance with demands of due process and refused to reinstate an eminently undesirable employee.
Heretofore, the Court was far from satisfied with this bare minimum as it strictly imposed on an employer
compliancewiththerequirementofpredismissalnotice,violationofwhichresultedinordersofreinstatementof
the dismissed employee. This is the only wrinkle wrought by Wenphil in our jurisprudence on dismissal.
Nonetheless, it should be stressed that the Court still punished Wenphil's violation of the predismissal notice
requirementasitwasorderedtopayanindemnityofP1,000.00totheemployee.Theindemnitywasbasedon
theiteratedandreiteratedrulethat"thedismissalofanemployeemustbeforjustorauthorizedcauseandafter
dueprocess."9

Our ten (10) years experience with Wenphil is not a happy one. Unscrupulous employers have abused the
Wenphil ruling. They have dismissed without notice employees including those who are not as eminently
undesirableastheWenphilemployee.Theydismissedemployeeswithoutnoticeasageneralrulewhenitshould
betheexception.Thepurposeofthepredismissalnoticerequirementwasentirelydefeatedbyemployerswho
werejusttoowillingtopayanindemnityforitsviolation.Theresult,asthemajorityconcedes,isthattheindemnity
weimposedhasnotbeeneffectivetopreventunjustdismissalsemployees.Tobesure,thisisevenasupreme
understatement. The ugly truth is that Wenphil is the mother of many unjust and unauthorized dismissals of
employeeswhoaretooweaktochallengetheirpowerfulemployees.

As the Wenphil indemnity doctrine has proved to be highly inimical to the interest of our employees, I humbly
submit a return to the preWenphil rule where a reasonless violation of the predismissal notice requirement
makes the dismissal of an employee illegal and results in his reinstatement. In fine, we should strike down as
illegalthedismissalofanemployeeevenifitisforajustifiedendifitisdonethruunjustifiedmeansforwecannot
bedisciplesoftheMachiavelliandoctrineoftheendjustifiesthemeans.Withduerespect,themajoritydecision
comes too near this mischievous doctrine by giving emphasis on the end and not the means of dismissal of
employees.WhatgratesisthatthemajoritytodayespousesadoctrinemoreperniciousthanWenphilfornowit
announces that a violation of the predismissal notice requirement does not even concern due process. The
reasons relied upon by the majority for this new ruling against the job security of employees cannot inspire
assent.

FIRST.I would like to emphasize that one undesirable effect of Wenphil is to compel employees to seek relief
againstillegaldismissalswiththeDOLEwhereasbefore,aremedycanbesoughtbeforetheemployer.Inshifting
this burden, an employee's uneven fight against his employer has become more uneven. Now, an illegally
dismissed employee often goes to the DOLE without an exact knowledge of the cause of his dismissal. As a
matter of strategy, some employers today dismiss employees without notice. They know that it is more
advantageous for them to litigate with an employee who has no knowledge of the cause of dismissal. The
probabilityisthatsaidemployeewillfailtoprovetheillegalityofhisdismissal.Allthathecanproveisthathewas
dismissedwithoutnoticeandthepenaltyfortheomissionisamerefine,apittance.

ThecaseatbardemonstrateshowdisastrousWenphilhasbeentoourhelplessemployees.Inholdingthatthe
petitionerfailedtoprovehiscauseofaction,themajorityheld"...wehaveonlythebareassertionofpetitioner
that, in abolishing the security section, private respondent's real purpose was to avoid payment to the security
checkers of the wage increases provided in the collective bargaining agreement approved in 1990." The bare
assertionofthepetitionerisunderstandable.Thenoticegiventohimspokeofageneralgroundretrenchment.
Nodetailsweregivenabouttheemployer'ssuddenretrenchmentprogram.Indeed,theemployeewasdismissed
onthedayhereceivedthenoticeinviolationofthe30dayrequirement.Hewasgivennotime,noopportunityto
ascertainandverifytherealcauseofhisdismissal.Thus,hefiledwiththeDOLEacomplaintforillegaldismissal
withahazyknowledgeofitsrealcause.Heretofore,itistheemployerwhomweblameandpenalizeifhedoes
notnotifyhisemployeeofthecauseofhisdismissal.Today,themajorityputstheblameontheemployeefornot
knowing why he was dismissed when he was not given any notice of dismissal. In truth, the suspicion of the
petitionerinthecaseatbarthathewasdismissedtoavoidpaymentoftheirwageincreasesisnotwithoutbasis.
The DOLE itself found that petitioner has unpaid wages which were ordered to be paid by the employer. The
majorityitselfaffirmedthisfinding.

What hurts is that while the majority was strict with the petitioneremployee, it was not so with the employer
ISETANN.Immediately,itvalidatedthefindingoftheNLRCthatpetitionerwasdismissedduetotheredundancy
of his position. This is inconsistent with the finding of the Labor Arbiter that the employer failed to prove
retrenchment, the ground it used to dismiss the petitioner. A perusal of the records will show that Ms. Cristina
Ramos, Personnel Administration Manager of the employer ISETANN testified on the cause of dismissal of the
petitioner.Shedeclaredthatpetitionerwasretrenchedduetotheinstallationofalaborsavingdevice.Allegedly,
thelaborsavingdevicewasthehiringofanindependentsecurityagency,thus:10

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Atty.Perdigon:

Yousaidthatyourcompanydecidedtophaseoutthepositionofsecuritycheckers...
Ms.Ramos:

YesSir.

Q:Andinsteadhiredtheservicesofasecurityagency?

A:Yes,sir.

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Q:Didyounotretrenchthepositionofsecuritycheckers?

A:Weinstalledalaborsavingdevice.

Q:Soyoudidnotretrench?

A:No.sir.

Q:HowaboutthepositionofSectionHeadofSecurityDepartment?

A:Itwasabolishedin1991.

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Q:Areyouawareoftheretrenchmentprogramofthecompanyasstatedinthisletter?

A:Actuallyit'snotaretrenchmentprogram.It'saninstallationofalaborsavingdevice.

Q:SoyouaretellingthisCourtnowthattherewasnoretrenchmentprogram?

A:Itwasactuallyaninstallationofalaborsavingdevice(emphasissupplied).

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Q:...What(is)thislaborsavingdevicethatyouarereferringto?

A:Thelaborsavingdeviceisthattheservicesofasecurityagencywerecontractedtohandletheservices
ofthesecuritycheckersofourcompany.

Q:Areyousureofwhatlaborsavingmeans,Madamwitness?

A:Yes,sir.

Q: You said you installed a labor saving device, and you installed a security agency as a labor saving
device?

A:Wehiredtheservicesofasecurityagency.

Q:Soaccordingtoyou...asecurityagencyisalaborsavingdevice?

Atty.Salonga:

Alreadyanswered,yourHonor.

Obviously,Ms.Ramoscouldnotevendistinguishbetweenretrenchmentandredundancy.TheLaborArbiterthus
ruledthatpetitioner'sdismissalwasillegal.TheNLRC,however,reversed.ThemajorityaffirmedtheNLRCruling
that ISETANN's phase out of its security employees is a legitimate business decision, one that is necessary to
obtainreasonablereturnfromitsinvestment.Tousethephraseofthemajority,thisisa"bareassertion."Nothing
inthemajoritydecisionshowshowthereturnofISETANN'sinvestmenthasbeenthreatenedtojustifyitssocalled
businessdecisionaslegitimate.

SECOND.Themajorityholdsthat"theneedisforarulewhich,whilerecognizingtheemployee'srighttonotice
beforeheisdismissedorlaidoff,atthesametimeacknowledgestherightoftheemployertodismissforanyof
thejustcausesenumeratedinArt.282ortoterminateemploymentforanyoftheauthorizedcausesmentionedin
Arts.283284.IftheWenphilruleimposingafineonanemployerwhoisfoundtohavedismissedanemployee
forcausewithoutpriornoticeisdeemedineffectiveindeterringemployerviolationsofthenoticerequirement,the
remedyisnottodeclarethedismissalvoidiftherearejustorvalidgroundsforsuchdismissalorifthetermination
isforanauthorizedcause.Thatwouldbetoupholdtherightoftheemployeebutdenytherightoftheemployer
to dismiss for cause. Rather, the remedy is to consider the dismissal or termination to be simply ineffectual for
failureoftheemployertocomplywiththeprocedurefordismissalortermination.

Withduerespect,Ifinditmostdifficulttofollowthelogicofthemajority.BeforeWenphil,weprotectedemployees
with the ruling that dismissals without prior notice are illegal and the illegally dismissed employee must be
reinstatedwithbackwages.Wenphildilutedthatrulewhenitheldthatdueprocessissatisfiediftheemployeeis
giventheopportunitytobeheardbytheLaborArbiter.Itfurtherheldthatanemployeecannotbereinstatedifitis
establishedinthehearingthathisdismissalisforajustcause.Thefailureoftheemployertogiveapredismissal
notice is only to be penalized by payment of an indemnity. The dilution of the rule has been abused by
unscrupulousemployerswhothenfollowedthe"dismissnow,paylater"strategy.Thisevilpracticeofemployers
waswhatIexpectedthemajoritytoaddressinreexaminingtheWenphildoctrine.Attheveryleast,Ithoughtthat
the majority would restore the balance of rights between an employee and an employer by giving back the
employee's mandatory right to notice before dismissal. It is disquieting, however, that the majority rearranged
thisbalanceofrightbytiltingitmoreinfavoroftheemployer'srighttodismiss.Thus,insteadofweakeningabit
the right to dismiss of employers, the majority further strengthens it by insisting that a dismissal without prior
noticeismerely"ineffectual"andnotillegal.

Thestubbornrefusalofthemajoritytoappreciatetheimportanceofpredismissalnoticeisdifficulttounderstand.
Itisthelinchpinofanemployee'srightagainstanillegaldismissal.Thenoticetellshimthecauseofhisdismissal.
It gives him a better chance to contest his dismissal in an appropriate proceeding as laid down in the parties'
collectivebargainingagreementortherulesofemploymentestablishedbytheemployer,asthecasemaybe.In
addition,itgivestoboththeemployeeandemployermorecoolingtimetosettletheirdifferencesamicably.Infine,
the prior notice requirement and the hearing before the employer give an employee a distinct, different and
effectivefirstlevelofremedytoprotecthisjob.Intheeventtheemployeeisdismissed,hecanstillfileacomplaint
withtheDOLEwithbetterknowledgeofthecauseofhisdismissal,withlongertimetopreparehiscase,andwith
greater opportunity to take care of the financial needs of his family pendente lite. The majority has taken away
fromemployeesthiseffectiveremedy.Thisisnottosaythatthepredismissalnoticerequirementequalizesthe
fight between an employee and an employer for the fight will remain unequal. This notice requirement merely
givesanemployeeafightingchancebutthatfightingchanceisnowgone.

It is equally puzzling why the majority believes that restoring the employee's right to predismissal notice will
negatetherightofanemployertodismissforcause.ThepreWenphilrulesimplyrequiresthatbeforetherightof
theemployertodismisscanbeexercised,hemustgivepriornoticetotheemployeeofitscause.Thereisnothing
strangenordifficultaboutthisrequirement.Itisnoburdentoanemployer.Heisbereftofreasonnottogivethe
simplenotice.Ifhefailstogivenotice,hecanonlycursehimself.Heforfeitshisrighttodismissbyfailingtofollow
the procedure for the exercise of his right. Employees in the public sector cannot be dismissed without prior
notice.Equalprotectionoflawdemandssimilartreatmentofemployeesintheprivatesector.

THIRD.ThecaseatbarspecificallyinvolvesArticle283oftheLaborCodewhichlaysdownfour(4)authorized
causesforterminationofemployment.11Theseauthorizedcausesare:(1)installationoflaborsavingdevices(2)
redundancy(3)retrenchmenttopreventlossesand(4)closingorcessationofoperationoftheestablishmentor
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the law. It also provides that prior to the
dismissalofanemployeeforanauthorizedcause,theemployermustsendtwowrittennoticesatleastonemonth
beforetheintendeddismissalonenoticetotheemployeeandanothernoticetotheDepartmentofLaborand
Employment(DOLE).Wehaveruledthattherighttodismissonauthorizedcausesisnotanabsoluteprerogative
ofanemployer.12WeexplainedthatthenoticetotheDOLEisnecessarytoenableittoascertainthetruthofthe
causeoftermination.13TheDOLEisequippedwithmenandmachinestodeterminewhethertheplannedclosure
or cessation of business or retrenchment or redundancy or installation of labor saving device is justified by
economic facts.14 For this reason too, we have held that notice to the employee is required to enable him to
contestthefactualbasesofthemanagementdecisionorgoodfaithoftheretrenchmentorredundancybeforethe
DOLE.15Inaddition,thisnoticerequirementgivesanemployeealittletimetoadjusttohisjoblessness.16

ThemajorityinsiststhatifanemployeeislaidoffforanauthorizedcauseunderArticle283inviolationoftheprior
noticerequirement,hisdismissalshouldnotbeconsideredvoidbutonlyineffectual.Heshallnotbereinstatedbut
paid separation pay and some backwages. I respectfully submit that an employee under Article 283 has a
strongerclaimtotherighttoapredismissalnoticeandhearing.Tobeginwith,heisaninnocentpartyforhehas
notviolatedanytermorconditionofhisemployment.Moreover,anemployeeinanArticle283situationmaylose
hisjobsimplybecauseofhisemployer'sdesireformoreprofit.Thus,theinstallationofalaborsavingdeviceisan
authorized cause to terminate employment even if its noninstallation need not necessarily result in an overall
loss to an employer possessed by his possessions. In an Article 283 situation, it is easy to see that there is a
greater need to scrutinize the allegations of the employer that he is dismissing an employee for an authorized
cause. The acts involved here are unilateral acts of the employer. Their nature requires that they should be
proved by the employer himself. The need for a labor saving device, the reason for redundancy, the cause for
retrenchment,thenecessityforclosingorcessationofbusinessareallwithintheknowledgeoftheemployerand
the employer alone. They involve a constellation of economic facts and factors usually beyond the ken of
knowledgeofanordinaryemployee.Thus,theburdenshouldbeontheemployertoestablishandjustifythese
authorizedcauses.Duetotheircomplexity,thelawcorrectlydirectsthatnoticeshouldbegiventotheDOLEforit
istheDOLEmorethanthelowlyemployeethathastheexpertisetovalidatetheallegedcauseinanappropriate
hearing. In fine, the DOLE provides the equalizer to the powers of the employer in an Article 283 situation.
WithouttheequalizinginfluenceofDOLE,theemployeecanbeabusedbyhisemployer.

Further,Iventuretheviewthattheemployee'srighttosecurityoftenureguaranteedinourConstitutioncallsfora
predismissal notice and hearing rather than a post facto dismissal hearing. The need for an employee to be
heardbeforehecanbedismissedcannotbeoveremphasized.Asaforestated,inthecaseatbar,petitionerwasa
regularemployeeofISETANN.Hehadtherighttocontinuewithhisemployment.Theburdentoestablishthatthis
righthasceasediswithISETANN,aspetitioner'semployer.Infine,ISETANNmustbetheonetofirstshowthat
theallegedauthorizedcausefordismissingpetitionerisreal.Andonthisfactualissue,petitionermustbeheard.
BeforethevalidityoftheallegedauthorizedcauseisestablishedbyISETANN,thepetitionercannotbeseparated
from employment. This is the simple meaning of security of tenure. With due respect, the majority opinion will
reducethisrightofouremployeestoamereillusion.Itwillallowtheemployertodismissanemployeeforacause
thatisyettobeestablished.Ittellstheemployeethatifhewantstobeheard,hecanfileacasewiththelabor
arbiter,thentheNLRC,andthenthisCourt.Thus,itunreasonablyshiftstheburdentotheemployeetoprovethat
hisdismissalisforanunauthorizedcause.

Theperniciouseffectsofthemajoritystanceareselfevidentinthecaseatbar.Forone,petitionerfoundhimself
immediatelyjoblessandwithoutmeanstosupporthisfamily.Foranother,petitionerwasdeniedtherighttorely
on the power of DOLE to inquire whether his dismissal was for a genuine authorized cause. This is a valuable
rightforalltoooften,alowlyemployeecanonlyrelyonDOLE'svastpowerstocheckemployerabusesonillegal
dismissals.WithoutDOLE,pooremployeesarepreystotheclawsofpowerfulemployers.Lastbutnottheleast,it
wasthepetitionerwhowasforcedtofileacomplaintforillegaldismissal.Toajoblessemployee,filingacomplaint
is an unbearable burden due to its economic cost. He has to hire a lawyer and defray the other expenses of
litigationwhilealreadyinastateofpenury.Atthispoint,thehaplessemployeeisinanowinpositiontofightfor
hisright.Tousealocaladage,"aanhinpaangdamokungpataynaangkabayo."

Inthecaseatbar,thejobofthepetitionercouldhavebeensavedifDOLEwasgivennoticeofhisdismissal.The
records show that petitioner worked in ISETANN as security checker for six (6) years. He served ISETANN
faithfullyandwell.Nonetheless,inadesireformoreprofits,andnotbecauseoflosses,ISETANNcontractedout
the security work of the company. There was no effort whatsoever on the part of ISETANN to accommodate
petitionerinanequivalentposition.YettherewasthepositionofSafetyandSecuritySupervisorwherepetitioner
fittedlikeaperfectT.Despitepetitioner'slongandloyalservice,hewastreatedlikeanoutsider,madetoapplyfor
the job, and given a stringent examination which he failed. Petitioner was booted out and given no chance to
contest his dismissal. Neither was the DOLE given the chance to check whether the dismissal of petitioner was
reallyforanauthorizedcause.AllthesebecauseISETANNdidnotfollowthenoticeandhearingrequirementof
dueprocess.

FOURTH.Themajorityhasinflictedamostseriouscutonthejobsecurityofemployees.Themajoritydidnothing
torestorethepreWenphilrightofemployeesbutevenexpandedtherighttodismissofemployerbyholdingthat
thepredismissalnoticerequirementisnotevenafunctionofdueprocess.Thisseismicshiftinourjurisprudence
oughtnottopass.

The key to the new majority ruling is that the "due process clause of the Constitution is a limitation on
governmentalpowers.Itdoesnotapplytotheexerciseofprivatepowersuchastheterminationofemployment
undertheLaborCode."Themainreasonallegedisthat"onlytheStatehasauthoritytotakethelife,liberty,or
propertyoftheindividual.ThepurposeoftheDueProcessClauseistoensurethattheexerciseofthispoweris
consistentwithsettledusageofcivilizedsociety."

TherecanbenoroomfordisagreementonthepropositionthatthedueprocessclausefoundintheBillofRights
oftheConstitutionisalimitationongovernmentalpowers.Norcantherebeanydebatethatactsofgovernment
violative of due process are null and void. Thus, former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion emphasized in
Cuaycongv.Senbengco 17that"...actsofCongressaswellasthoseoftheExecutive,candenydueprocess
onlyunderpainofnullity,andjudicialproceedingssufferingfromthesameflawaresubjecttothesamesanction,
any statutory provision to the contrary notwithstanding." With due respect to the majority, however, I part ways
with the majority in its new ruling that the due process requirement does not apply to the exercise of private
power.Thisoverlyrestrictivemajorityopinionwillsapthedueprocessrightofemployeesofitsremainingutility.
Indeed,thenewmajorityopinionlimitingviolationsofdueprocesstogovernmentactionaloneisathrowbacktoa
regime of law long discarded by more progressive countries. Today, private due process is a settled norm in
administrativelaw.PerSchwartz,aknownauthorityinthefield,viz:18

PrivateDueProcess

As already stressed, procedural due process has proved of an increasingly encroaching nature. Since
Goldbergv.Kelly,therighttobeheardhasbeenextendedtoaneverwideningarea,coveringvirtuallyall
aspectsofagencyaction,includingthosepreviouslyexcludedundertheprivilegeconcept.Theexpansion
ofdueprocesshasnotbeenlimitedtothetraditionalareasofadministrativelaw.Wesawhowprocedural
rightshaveexpandedintothenewerfieldofsocialwelfare,aswellasthatofeducation.Butdueprocess
expansionhasnotbeenlimitedtothesefields.Thecourtshaveextendedproceduralprotectionstocases
involving prisoners and parolees, as well as the use of established adjudicatory procedures. Important
Supreme Court decisions go further and invalidate prejudgment wage garnishments and seizures of
propertyunderreplevinstatuteswherenoprovisionismadefornoticeandhearing.ButtheCourthasnot
gone so far as to lay down an inflexible rule that due process requires an adversary hearing when an
individualmaybedeprivedofanypossessoryinterest,howeverbriefthedispossessionandhoweverslight
the monetary interest in the property. Due process is not violated where state law requires, as a
preconditiontoinvokingthestate'saidtosequesterpropertyofadefaultingdebtor,thatthecreditorfurnish
adequatesecurityandmakeaspecificshowingofprobablecausebeforeajudge.

In addition, there has been an extension of procedural due process requirements from governmental to
privateaction.InSection5.16wesawthatGoldbergv.Kellyhasbeenextendedtotheevictionofatenant
from a public housing project. The courts have not limited the right to be heard to tenants who have
governmental agencies as landlords. Due process requirements also govern acts by "private" landlords
wherethereissufficientgovernmentalinvolvementintherentedpremises.Suchaninvolvementexistsin
thecaseofhousingaidedbyFederalHousingAdministrationfinancingandtaxadvantages.Atenantmay
notbesummarilyevictedfromabuildingoperatedbya"private"corporationwherethecorporationenjoyed
substantial tax exemption and had obtained an FHAinsured mortgage, with governmental subsidies to
reduceinterestpayments.The"private"corporationwassosaturatedwithgovernmentalincidentsastobe
limitedinitspracticesbyconstitutionalprocess.Hence,itcouldnotterminatetenancieswithoutnoticeand
anopportunitytobeheard.

But we need nor rely on foreign jurisprudence to repudiate the new majority ruling that due process restricts
government alone and not private employers like ISETANN. This Court has always protected employees
whenever they are dismissed for an unjust cause by private employers. We have consistently held that before
dismissinganemployeeforajustcause,hemustbegivennoticeandhearingbyhisprivateemployer.InKingsize
ManufacturingCorporationvs.NLRC,19thisCourt,thruMr.JusticeMendoza,categoricallyruled:

. . . (P)etitioners failure to give notice with warning to the private respondents before their services were
terminatedputsingravedoubtpetitioners'claimthatdismissalwasforajustcause.Section2RuleXIVof
theRulesimplementingtheLaborCodeprovides:

An employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular
acts or omission constituting the ground for dismissal. In case of abandonment of work, the notice
shallbeservedontheworker'slastknownaddress.

Thenoticerequired,...,actuallyconsistsoftwopartstobeseparatelyservedontheemployee,towit:(1)
noticetoapprisetheemployeeoftheparticularactsoromissionsforwhichthedismissalissoughtand(2)
subsequentnoticetoinformhimoftheemployer'sdecisiontodismisshim.

Thisrequirementisnotameretechnicalitybutarequirementofdueprocesstowhicheveryemployeeis
entitled to insure that the employer's prerogative to dismiss or lay off is not abused or exercised in an
arbitrarymanner.Thisruleisclearandunequivocal....20

Inotherwords,wehavelongadoptedinourdecisionsthedoctrineofprivatedueprocess.Thisisasitoughtto
be.The1987Constitutionguaranteestherightsofworkers,especiallytherighttosecurityoftenureinaseparate
articlesection3ofArticleXIIIentitledSocialJusticeandHumanRights.Thus,a2020visionoftheConstitution
will show that the more specific rights of labor are not in the Bill of Rights which is historically directed against
government acts alone. Needless to state, the constitutional rights of labor should be safeguarded against
assaultsfrombothgovernmentandprivateparties.Themajorityshouldnotreverseoursettledrulingsoutlawing
violationsofdueprocessbyemployersinjustcausescases.

Topropupitsnewrulingagainstouremployees,themajorityrelatestheevolutionofourlawondismissalstarting
fromArticle302oftheSpanishCodeofCommerce,totheNewCivilCodeof1950,toR.A.No.1052(Termination
PayLaw),thentoR.A.No.1787.Tocompletethepicture,letmeaddthatonMay1,1974,theLaborCode(PD
442) was signed into law by former President Marcos. It took effect on May 1, 1974 or six months after its
promulgation.TherightoftheemployertoterminatetheemploymentwasembodiedinArticles283,21284,22and
285.23BatasPambansaBlg.130whichwasenactedonAugust21,1981amendedArticles283and284,which
todayarecitedasArts.282and283oftheLaborCode.24

OnMarch2,1989,RepublicActNo.6715wasapprovedwhichamended,amongothers,Article277oftheLabor
Code.Presently,Article277(b)reads:
Art.277.Miscellaneousprovisions.(a)....

(b)Subjecttotheconstitutionalrightofworkerstosecurityoftenureandtheirrighttobeprotected
against dismissal except for a just or authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of
notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is
sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and
shallaffordthelatterampleopportunitytobeheardandtodefendhimselfwiththeassistanceofhis
representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated
pursuanttotheguidelinessetbytheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment.Anydecisiontakenby
theemployershallbewithoutprejudicetotherightoftheworkertocontestthevalidityorlegalityof
his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission.Theburdenofprovingthattheterminationwasforavalidorauthorizedcauseshallrest
ontheemployer.....

Previoustotheamendment,Article277(b)read:

Art.277.Miscellaneousprovisions.(a)....

(b)Withorwithoutacollectiveagreement,noemployermayshutdownhisestablishmentordismiss
orterminatetheemploymentofemployeeswithatleastoneyearofserviceduringthelasttwoyears,
whether such service is continuous or broken, without prior written authority issued in accordance
withtherulesandregulationsastheSecretarymaypromulgate.

RuleXIV,BookVofthe1997OmnibusRulesImplementingtheLaborCodeprovides:

TerminationofEmployment

Sec.1.Securityoftenureanddueprocess.Noworkershallbedismissedexceptforajustorauthorized
causeprovidedbylawandafterdueprocess.

Sec. 2. Notice of dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written
noticestatingtheparticularactsoromissionsconstitutingthegroundsforhisdismissal....

xxxxxxxxx

Sec.5.Answerandhearing.Theworkermayanswertheallegationsstatedagainsthiminthenoticeof
dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker
ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so
desires.

These laws, rules and regulations should be related to our decisions interpreting them. Let me therefore
emphasize our rulings holding that the predismissal notice requirement is part of due process. In Batangas
Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.vs. Court of Appeals,25 which was decided under the provisions of RA No. 1052 as
amendedbyRANo.1787,thisCourtruledthat"thefailureoftheemployertogivethe[employee]thebenefitofa
hearingbeforehewasdismissedconstituteaninfringementonhisconstitutionalrighttodueprocessoflawand
not to be denied the equal protection of the laws. . . . Since the right of [an employee] to his labor is in itself a
property and that the labor agreement between him and [his employer] is the law between the parties, his
summary and arbitrary dismissal amounted to deprivation of his property without due process." Since then, we
haveconsistentlyheldthatbeforedismissinganemployeeforajustcause,hemustbegivennoticeandhearing
byhisprivateemployerasamatterofdueprocess.

Irespectfullysubmitthattheserulingsaremoreinaccordwiththeneedtoprotecttherightofemployeesagainst
illegaldismissals.Indeed,ourlawsandourpresentConstitutionaremoreprotectiveoftherightsandinterestsof
employees than their American counterpart. For one, to justify private due process, we need not look for the
factors of "sufficient governmental involvement" as American courts do. Article 1700 of our Civil Code explicitly
provides:

Art.1700.Therelationbetweencapitalandlaborarenotmerelycontractual.Theyaresoimpressedwith
publicinterestthatlaborcontractsmustyieldtothecommongood.Therefore,suchcontractsaresubjectto
thespeciallawsonlaborunions,collectivebargaining,strikesandlockouts,closedshop,wages,working
conditions,hoursoflaborandsimilarsubjects.

NordowehavetostrainonthedistinctionmadebyAmericancourtsbetweenpropertyandprivilegeandfollow
theirrulingthatdueprocesswillnotapplyifwhatisaffectedisamereprivilege.Itisourhoaryrulingthatlaboris
propertywithinthecontemplationofthedueprocessclauseoftheConstitution.Thus,inPhilippineMoviePictures
Workers Association vs. Premiere Productions, Inc.,26 private respondentemployer filed with the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) a petition seeking authority to lay off fortyfour of its employees. On the date of the
hearingofthepetition,attherequestofthecounseloftheprivaterespondent,thejudgeoftheCIRconductedan
ocular inspection in the premises of the employer. He interrogated fifteen laborers. On the basis of the ocular
inspection,thejudgeconcludedthatthepetitionforlayoffwasjustified.Wedidnotagreeandweruledthat"the
rightofapersontohislaborisdeemedtohepropertywithinthemeaningofconstitutionalguarantees.Thatishis
means of livelihood. He can not be deprived of his labor or work without due process of law. . . . (T)here are
certaincardinalprimaryrightswhichtheCourtofIndustrialRelationsmustrespectinthetrialofeverylaborcase.
Oneofthemistherighttoahearingwhichincludestherightofthepartyinterestedtopresenthisowncaseand
tosubmitevidenceinsupportthereof."

Iwishalsotostressthatthe1999RulesandRegulationsimplementingtheLaborCodecategoricallycharacterize
thispredismissalnoticerequirementasarequirementofdueprocess.RuleXXIIIprovides:

Sec.2.Standardsofdueprocess:requirementsofnotice.Inallcasesofterminationofemployment,the
followingstandardsofdueprocessshallbesubstantiallyobserved.

I.ForterminationofemploymentbasedonjustcausesasdefinedinArticle282oftheCode:

(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and
givingtosaidemployeereasonableopportunitywithinwhichtoexplainhisside

(b)Ahearingorconferenceduringwhichtheemployeeconcerned,withtheassistanceofcounselif
theemployeesodesires,isgivenopportunitytorespondtothecharge,presenthisevidenceorrebut
theevidencepresentedagainsthimand

(c)Awrittennoticeofterminationservedontheemployeeindicatingthatupondueconsiderationof
allthecircumstance,groundshavebeenestablishedtojustifyhistermination.

Incaseoftermination,theforegoingnoticesshallbeservedontheemployee'slastknownaddress.

II. For termination of employment as based on authorized causes defined in Article 283 of the Code, the
requirements of due process shall be deemed complied with upon service of a written notice to the
employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the Department at least thirty (30) days before the
effectivityofthetermination,specifyingthegroundorgroundsfortermination.

ThenewrulingofthemajorityisnotinconsonancewiththisRuleXXIII.

IfwearereallyzealousofprotectingtherightsoflaborascalledforbytheConstitution,weshouldguardagainst
everyviolationoftheirrightsregardlessofwhetherthegovernmentoraprivatepartyistheculprit.Section3of
ArticleXIIIoftheConstitutionrequirestheStatetogivefullprotectiontolabor.Wecannotbefaithfultothisdutyif
wegivenoprotectiontolaborwhentheviolatorofitsrightshappenstobeprivatepartieslikeprivateemployers.A
privatepersondoesnothaveabetterrightthanthegovernmenttoviolateanemployee'srighttodueprocess.To
besure,violationoftheparticularrightofemployeestosecurityoftenurecomesalmostalwaysfromtheirprivate
employers. To suggest that we take mere geriatric steps when it comes to protecting the rights of labor from
infringementbyprivatepartiesisfarthestfromtheintentoftheConstitution.Wetrivializetherightoftheemployee
ifweadopttheruleallowingtheemployertodismissanemployeewithoutanypriorhearingandsaylethimbe
heardlateron.Toadismissedemployeethatremedyistoolittleandtoolate.Thenewmajorityrulingisdoublyto
be regretted because it comes at a time when deregulation and privatization are buzzwords in the world being
globalized. In such a setting, the new gods will not be governments but nongovernmental corporations. The
greater need of the day therefore is protection from illegal dismissals sans due process by these non
governmentalcorporations.

Themajorityalsoholdsthatthe"thirdreasonwhythenoticerequirementunderArt.283isnotarequirementof
due process is that the employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause.
ThisisalsothecaseinterminationofemploymentforajustcauseunderArt.282."Again,withduerespect,Ibeg
todisagree.InanArticle283situation,dismissalduetoanauthorizedcause,theemployerisnotcalleduponto
actasanimpartialjudge.TheemployerisgiventhedutytoserveawrittennoticeontheworkerandtheDOLEat
leastonemonthbeforetheintendeddateoflayoff.ItistheDOLE,animpartialagencythatwilljudgewhetheror
nottheemployeeisbeinglaidoffforanauthorizedcaused.27Itisnottheemployerwhowilladjudgewhetherthe
alleged authorized cause for dismissing the employee is fact or fiction. On the other hand, in an Article 282
situation, dismissal for a just cause, it is also incorrect to hold that an employer cannot be an impartial judge.
Today, the procedure on discipline and dismissal of employees is usually defined in the parties' collective
bargaining agreement or in its absence, on the rules and regulations made by the employer himself. This
procedureiscarefullydesignedtobebiasfreeforitistotheinterestofboththeemployeeandtheemployerthat
onlyaguiltyemployeeisdisciplinedordismissed.Hence,wherethechargeagainstanemployeeisserious,itis
standardpracticetoincludeintheinvestigatingcommitteeanemployeerepresentativetoassuretheintegrityof
the process. In addition, it is usual practice to give the aggrieved employee an appellate body to review an
unfavorabledecision.Statedotherwise,theinvestigatorsaremandatedtoactimpartiallyfortodootherwisecan
bringhavoclesstotheemployeebutmoretotheemployer.Forone,iftheintegrityofthegrievanceprocedure
becomessuspect,theemployeesmayshunitandinsteadresorttocoercivemeasureslikepicketingandstrikes
that can financially bleed employers. For another, a wrong, especially a biased judgment can always be
challengedintheDOLEandthecourtsandcanresultinawardsofhugedamagesagainstthecompany.Indeed,
themajorityrulingthatanemployercannotactasanimpartialjudgehasnoempiricalevidencetosupportitself.
StatisticsintheDOLEwillprovethemanycaseswonbyemployeesbeforethegrievancecommitteesmannedby
impartialjudgesofthecompany.

Next,themajorityholdsthat"therequirementtohearanemployeebeforeheisdismissedshouldbeconsidered
simplyasanapplicationoftheJustinianprecept,embodiedintheCivilCode,toactwithjustice,giveeveryonehis
due, and observe honesty and good faith toward one's fellowmen." It then rules that violation of this norm will
render the employer liable for damages but will not render his act of dismissal void. Again, I cannot join the
majoritystance.Thefaultlineofthisrulingliesintherefusaltorecognizethatemployeremployeerelationshipis
governedbyspeciallaborlawsandnotbytheCivilCode.Themajorityhasdisregardedthepreceptthatrelations
between capital and labor are impressed with public interest. For this reason, we have the Labor Code that
speciallyregulatestherelationshipbetweenemployeremployeeincludingdismissalsofemployees.Thus,Article
279 of the Labor Code specifically provides that "in cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminatetheservicesofanemployeeexceptforajustcauseorwhenauthorizedbythisTitle.Anemployeewho
isunjustlydismissedfromworkshallbeentitledtoinstatementwithoutlossofseniorityrightsandotherprivileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computedfromthetimehiscompensationwaswithheldfromhimuptothetimeofhisactualreinstatement."This
provisionoftheLaborCodeclearlygivestheremediesthatanunjustlydismissedemployeedeserves.Itisnotthe
CivilCodethatisthesourceofhisremedies.

The majority also holds that lack of notice in an Article 283 situation merely makes an employee dismissal
"ineffectual" but not illegal. Again, the ruling is sought to be justified by analogy and our attention is called to
Article 1592, in relation to Article 1191 of the Civil Code. It is contended that "under these provisions, while the
power to rescind is implied in reciprocal obligations, nonetheless, in cases involving the sale of immovable
property, the vendor cannot rescind the contract even though the vendee defaults in the payment of the price,
exceptbybringinganactionincourtorgivingnoticeofrescissionbymeansofanotarialdemand."Theanalogy
ofthemajoritycannotbeallowedbothinlawandinlogic.Thelegalrelationshipofanemployertohisemployeeis
notsimilartothatofavendorandavendee.Anemployeesuffersfromadistinctdisadvantageinhisrelationship
with an employer, hence, the Constitution and our laws give him extra protection. In contrast, a vendor and a
vendeeinasaleofimmovablepropertyareateconomicparwitheachother.Toconsideranemployeremployee
relationship as similar to a sale of commodity is an archaic abomination. An employeremployee relationship
involvesthecommongoodandlaborcannotbetreatedasamerecommodity.AswellstatedbyformerGovernor
GeneralLeonardWoodinhisinauguralmessagebeforethe6thPhilippineLegislatureonOctober27,1922,"itis
opportunethatwestrivetoimpressuponallthepeoplethatlaborisneitherachattelnoracommodity,buthuman
andmustbedealtwithfromthestandpointofhumaninterests."

Next, the majority holds that under the Labor Code, only the absence of a just cause for the termination of
employmentcanmakethedismissalofanemployeeillegal.QuotingArticle279whichprovides:

SecurityofTenure.Incasesofregularemployment,theemployershallnotterminatetheservicesofan
employeeexceptforajustcauseorwhenauthorizedbythisTitle.Anemployeewhoisunjustlydismissed
fromworkshallbeentitledtoreinstatementwithoutlossofseniorityrightsandotherprivilegesandtohisfull
backwages,inclusiveofallowances,andtohisotherbenefitsortheirmonetaryequivalentcomputedfrom
thetimehiscompensationwaswithheldfromhimuptothetimeofhisactualreinstatement.

it is then rationalized that "to hold that the employer's failure to give notice before dismissing an employee . . .
results in the nullity of the dismissal would, in effect, be to amend Article 279 by adding another ground, for
consideringadismissalillegal."Withduerespect,themajorityhasmisreadArticle279.Tostartwith,thearticleis
entitled "Security of Tenure" and therefore protects an employee against dismissal not only for an unjust cause
butalsoforanunauthorizedcause.Thus,thephrase"unjustlydismissed"referstoemployeeswhoaredismissed
withoutjustcauseandtoemployeeswhoarelaidoffwithoutanyauthorizedcause.Asheretoforeshown,wehave
interpreteddismissalswithoutpriornoticeasillegalforviolatingtherighttodueprocessoftheemployee.These
rulings form part of the law of the land and Congress was aware of them when it enacted the Labor Code and
when its implementing rules and regulations were promulgated especially the rule ordering employers to follow
dueprocesswhendismissingemployees.Needlesstostate,itisincorrectforthemajoritytourgethatwearein
effectamendingArticle279.

Infurtherexplicationofitsruling,themajoritycontends"whatismore,itwouldignorethefactthatunderArt.285,
ifitistheemployeewhofailstogiveawrittennoticetotheemployerthatheisleavingtheserviceofthelatter,at
least one month in advance, his failure to comply with the legal requirement does not result in making his
resignation void but only in making him liable for damages." Article 285(a) states: "An employee may terminate
withoutjustcausetheemployeeemployerrelationshipbyservingawrittennoticeontheemployeratleastone(1)
month in advance. The employer upon whom no such notice was served may hold the employee liable for
damages."

Ineffect,themajorityviewisthatitsnewrulingputsatparboththeemployerandtheemployeeunderArticle
285,thefailureofanemployeetoprenotifyinwritinghisemployerthatheisterminatingtheirrelationshipdoes
notmakehiswalkoutvoidunderitsnewruling,thefailureofanemployertoprenotifyanemployeebeforehis
dismissaldoesnotalsorenderthedismissalvoid.Bythisnewruling,themajorityinashortstrokehasrewritten
thelawondismissalandtampereditsproemployeephilosophy.Undoubtedly,Article285favorstheemployeeas
itdoesnotconsidervoidhisactofterminatinghisemploymentrelationshipbeforegivingtherequirednotice.But
this favor given to an employee just like the other favors in the Labor Code and the Constitution are precisely
designedtoleveltheplayingfieldbetweentheemployerandtheemployee.Itcannotbegainsaidthatemployees
are the special subject of solicitous laws because they have been and they continue to be exploited by
unscrupulous employers. Their exploitation has resulted in labor warfare that has broken industrial peace and
slowed down economic progress. In the exercise of their wisdom, the founding fathers of our 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions as well as the members our past and present Congresses, have decided to give more legal
protectionandbetterlegaltreatmenttoouremployeesintheirrelationshipwiththeiremployer.Expressiveofthis
policyisPresidentMagsaysay'scallthat"hewhohaslessinlifeshouldhavemoreinlaw."Irespectfullysubmit
that the majority cannot revise our laws nor shun the social justice thrust of our Constitution in the guise of
interpretationespeciallywhenitsresultistofavoremployersanddisfavoremployees.Themajoritytalksofhigh
nobilitybutthehighestnobilityittostoopdowntoreachthepoor.

IV.NOUNJUSTRESULTSOFCONSIDERINGDISMISSALSWITHOUTPRIORNOTICEASILLEGAL

Themajorityfurtherjustifiesitsnewrulingbyholding:

Therefusaltolookbeyondthevalidityoftheinitialactiontakenbytheemployertoterminateemployment
eitherforanauthorizedorjustcausecanresultinaninjusticetotheemployer.Fornothavingbeengiven
notice and hearing before dismissing an employee, who is otherwise guilty of, say, theft, or even of an
attempt against the life of the employer, an employer will be forced to keep in his employ such guilty
employee.Thisisunjust.

ItistruetheConstitutionregardslaboras"aprimarysocialeconomicforce."Butsodoesitdeclarethatit
"recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides
incentivestoneededinvestment."TheConstitutionbidstheStateto"affordfullprotectiontolabor."Butitis
equally true that "the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self
destructionoftheemployer."Anditisoppressiontocompeltheemployertocontinueinemploymentone
whoisguiltyortoforcetheemployertoremaininoperationwhenitisnoteconomicallyinhisinteresttodo
so.

Withduerespect,Icannotunderstandthistotalturnaroundofthemajorityontheissueoftheunjustnessoflack
ofpredismissalnoticetoanemployee.Heretofore,wehavealwaysconsideredthislackofnoticeasunjusttothe
employee. Even under Article 302 of the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1882 as related by the majority, an
employerwhooptstodismissanemployeewithoutanynoticehastopayamesadaequivalenttohissalaryfor
one month because of its unjustness. This policy was modified by our legislators in favor of a more liberal
treatmentoflaborasourcountrycameundertheinfluenceoftheUnitedStateswhosemajorlaborlawsbecame
thematrixofourownlawslikeR.A.875,otherwiseknownastheIndustrialPeaceAct.Inaccordwiththeselaws,
andasaforediscussed,welaiddownthecaselawthatdismissalswithoutpriornoticeoffenddueprocess.Thisis
thecaselawwhentheLaborCodewasenactedonMay1,1974anduntilnowdespiteitsamendments.The1935
andthe1973Constitutionsdidnotchangethiscaselaw.Sowiththe1987Constitutionwhichevenstrengthened
therightsofemployees,especiallytheirrighttosecurityoftenure.Mr.JusticeLaurelinhisusualinimitableprose
expressedthisshiftinsocialpolicyinfavorofemployeesasfollows:

It should be observed at the outset that our Constitution was adopted in the midst of surging unrest and
dissatisfaction resulting from economic and social distress which was threatening the stability of
governments the world over. Alive to the social and economic forces at work, the framers of our
Constitutionboldlymettheproblemsanddifficultieswhichfacedthemandendeavoredtocrystallize,with
moreorlessfidelity,thepolitical,socialandeconomicpropositionsoftheirage,andthistheydid,withthe
consciousness that the political and philosophical aphorism of their generation will, in the language of a
greatjurist,"bedoubtedbythenextandperhapsentirelydiscardedbythethird."(ChiefJusticeWinslowin
Gorgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis., 327 133 N. W., 209). Embodying the spirit of the present epoch, general
provisions were inserted in the Constitution which are intended to bring about the needed social and
economic equilibrium between component elements of society through the application of what may be
termedasthejustitiacommunisadvocatedbyGrotiusandLeibnitzmanyyearsagotobesecuredthrough
the counterbalancing of economic and social forces and employers or landlords, and employees or
tenants,respectivelyandbyprescribingpenaltiesfortheviolationoftheorders"andlater,Commonwealth
ActNo.213,entitled"AnActtodefineandregulatelegitimatelabororganizations."28
Thisingrainedsocialphilosophyfavoringemployeeshasnowbeenweakenedbythenewrulingofthemajority.
ForwhilethisCourthasalwaysconsideredlackofpredismissalnoticeasunjusttoemployees,thenewrulingof
themajoritynowdeclaresitisunjusttoemployersasifemployersaretheonesexploitedbyemployees.Intruth,
thereisnothingunjusttoemployersbyrequiringthemtogivenoticetotheiremployeesbeforedenyingthemtheir
jobs.Thereisnothingunjusttothedutytogivenoticeforthedutyisareasonableduty.Ifthedutyisreasonable,
thenitisalsoreasonabletodemanditscompliancebeforetherighttodismissonthepartofanemployercanbe
exercised. If it is reasonable for an employer to comply with the duty, then it can never be unjust if non
compliancetherewithispenalizedbydenyingsaidemployerhisrighttodismiss.Infine,iftheemployer'srightto
dismiss an employee is forfeited for his failure to comply with this simple, reasonable duty to prenotify his
employee,hehasnothingtoblamebuthimself.Iftheemployerisestoppedfromlitigatingtheissueofwhetheror
notheisdismissinghisemployeeforajustoranauthorizedcause,hebroughttheconsequenceontohimself.
Thenewrulingofthemajority,however,inexplicablyconsidersthisconsequenceasunjusttotheemployerandit
merelywinksathisfailuretogivenotice.

V.ALASTWORD

Thenewrulingofthemajorityerodesthesanctityofthemostimportantrightofanemployee,hisconstitutional
righttosecurityoftenure.Thisrightwillneverberespectedbytheemployerifwemerelyhonortherightwitha
price tag. The policy of "dismiss now and pay later" favors monied employers and is a mockery of the right of
employees to social justice. There is no way to justify this proemployer stance when the 1987 Constitution is
undeniably more proemployee than our previous fundamental laws. Section 18 of Article II (State Policies)
providesthat"theStateaffirmslaborasaprimarysocialeconomicforce.Itshallprotecttherightsofworkersand
promote their welfare." Section 1, Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights) calls for the reduction of
economic inequalities. Section 3, Article XIII (Labor) directs the State to accord full protection to labor and to
guarantysecurityoftenure.Theseareconstitutionalpolestarsandnotmereworksofcosmetology.Ourodesto
the poor will be meaningless mouthfuls if we cannot protect the employee's right to due process against the
powerofthepesoofemployers.

To an employee, a job is everything. Its loss involves terrible repercussions stoppage of the schooling of
children, ejectment from leased premises, hunger to the family, a life without any safety net. Indeed, to many
employees,dismissalistheirlethalinjection.Merepaymentofmoneybywayofseparationpayandbackwages
willnotsecurefoodonthemouthsofemployeeswhodonotevenhavetherighttochoosewhattheywillchew.

Ivotetograntthepetition.

VITUG,J.,separate(concurringanddissenting)opinion

Thelawfulseverancebyanemployerofanemployeremployeerelationshipwouldrequireavalidcause.There
are,undertheLaborCode,twogroupsofvalidcauses,andthesearethejustcausesunderArticle2821andthe
authorizedcausesunderArticle2832andArticle284.3

An employee whose employment is terminated for a just cause is not entitled to the payment of separation
benefits.4 Separation pay would be due, however, when the layoff is on account of an authorized cause. The
amount of separation pay would depend on the ground for the termination of employment. A layoff due to the
installation of a labor saving device, redundancy (Article 283) or disease (Article 284), entitles the worker to a
separation pay equivalent to "one (1) month pay or at least one (1) month pay for every year of service,
whicheverishigher."Whentheterminationofemploymentisduetoretrenchmenttopreventlosses,ortoclosure
or cessation of operations of an establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses,theseparationpayisonlyanequivalentof"one(1)monthpayoratleastonehalf(1/2)monthpayfor
every year of service, whichever is higher." In the above instances, a fraction of at least six (6) months is
consideredasone(1)wholeyear.

Due process of law, in its broad concept, is a principle in our legal system that mandates due protection to the
basicrights,inherentoraccorded,ofeverypersonagainstharmortransgressionwithoutanintrinsicallyjustand
validlaw,aswellasanopportunitytobeheardbeforeanimpartialtribunal,thatcanwarrantsuchanimpairment.
Due process guarantees against arbitrariness and bears on both substance and procedure. Substantive due
processconcernsitselfwiththelaw,itsessence,anditsconcomitantefficacyproceduraldueprocessfocuseson
therulesthatareestablishedinordertoensuremeaningfuladjudicationsappurtenantthereto.

Inthisjurisdiction,therighttodueprocessisconstitutionalandstatutory.

Dueprocessinthecontextofaterminationofemployment,particularly,wouldbetwofold,i.e., substantive due


process which is complied with when the action of the employer is predicated on a just cause or an authorized
cause, and procedural due process which is satisfied when the employee has the opportunity to contest the
existence of the ground invoked by the employer in terminating the contract of employment and to be heard
thereon.Ifinditdifficulttoascribeeitherawantofwisdomoralackoflegalbasistotheearlypronouncementsof
this Court that sanction the termination of employment when a just or an authorized cause to warrant the
termination is clearly extant. Regrettably, the Court in some of those pronouncements has used, less than
guardedinmyview,theterm"dueprocess"whenreferringtothenoticesprescribedintheLaborCode5andits
implementingrules6thatcould,thereby,albeit unintendedly and without meaning to, confuse the latter with the
notice requirement in adjudicatory proceedings. It is not seldom when the law puts up various conditions in the
juridicalrelationsofpartiesitwouldnotbeaccuratetoconsider,Ibelieve,aninfractionthereoftoipsofactoraise
aproblemofdueprocess.Themerefailureofnoticeofthedismissalorlayoffdoesnotforeclosetherightofan
employee from disputing the validity, in general, of the termination of his employment, or the veracity, in
particular,ofthecausethathasbeeninvokedinordertojustifythattermination.Inassailingthedismissalorlay
off,anemployeeisentitledtobeheardandtobegiventhecorrespondingduenoticeoftheproceedings.Itwould
bewhenthisrightiswithheldwithoutcogentreasonsthat,indeed,itcanrightlybeclaimedthatthefundamental
demandsofproceduraldueprocesshavebeenundulydiscarded.

I do appreciate the fact that the prescribed notices can have consequential benefits to an employee who is
dismissed or laid off, as the case may be its nonobservance by an employer, therefore, can verily entitle the
employeetoanawardofdamagebut,torepeat,nottotheextentofrenderingoutrightlyillegalthatdismissalor
layoffpredicatedonvalidgrounds.Iwouldconsidertheindemnificationtotheemployeenotapenaltyorafine
againsttheemployer,thelevyofeitherofwhichwouldrequireanappropriatelegislativeenactmentrather,Itake
thegrantofindemnityasjustifiableasanawardofnominaldamagesinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofArticles
22212223oftheCivilCode,viz:

Art.2221.Nominaldamagesareadjudicatedinorderthatarightoftheplaintiff,whichhasbeenviolatedor
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiffforanylosssufferedbyhim.

Art.2222.Thecourtmayawardnominaldamagesineveryobligationarisingfromanysourceenumerated
inarticle1157,orineverycasewhereanypropertyrighthasbeeninvaded.

Art.2223.Theadjudicationofnominaldamagesshallprecludefurthercontestupontherightinvolvedand
allaccessoryquestions,asbetweenthepartiestothesuit,ortheirrespectiveheirsandassigns.

Thereisnofixedformulafordeterminingthepreciseamountofnominaldamages.Infixingtheamountofnominal
damages to be awarded, the circumstances of each case should thus be taken into account, such as, to
exemplify,the

(a)lengthofserviceoremploymentofthedismissedemployee

(b) his salary or compensation at the time termination of employment visavis the capability of the
employertopay

(c) question of whether the employer has deliberately violated the requirements for termination of
employmentorhasattemptedtocomply,atleastsubstantially,therewithand/or

(d)reasonsfortheterminationofemployment.

Imightstresstherulethattheawardofnominaldamagesisnotforthepurposeofindemnificationforalossbut
fortherecognitionandvindicationofaright.Thedegreeofrecoverythereforcandepend,ontheonehand,on
theconstitutionoftheright,and,upontheotherhand,ontheextentandmannerbywhichthatrightisignoredto
theprejudiceoftheholderofthatright.

Infine7

A.Ajustcauseoranauthorizedcauseandawrittennoticeofdismissalorlayoff,asthecasemaybe,are
requiredconcurrentlybutnotreallyequipollentintheirconsequence,interminatinganemployeremployee
relationship.

B. Where there is neither just cause nor authorized cause, the reinstatement of the employee and the
paymentofbacksalarieswouldbeproperandshouldbedecreed.Ifthedismissalorlayoffisattendedby
badfaithoriftheemployeractedinwantonoroppressivemanner,moralandexemplarydamagesmight
alsobeawarded.Inthisrespect,theCivilCodeprovides:

Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are just due. The same rule applies to
breachesofcontractwherethedefendantactedfraudulentlyorinbadfaith.

Art. 2232. In contracts and quasicontracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendantactedinawanton,fraudulent,reckless,oppressive,ormalevolentmanner(CivilCode).

Separationpaycansubstituteforreinstatementifsuchreinstatementisnotfeasible,suchasincaseofa
clearly strained employeremployee relationship (limited to managerial positions and contracts of
employment predicated on trust and confidence) or when the work or position formerly held by the
dismissedemployeeplainlyhassinceceasedtobeavailable.

C. Where there is just cause or an authorized cause for the dismissal or layoff but the required written
noticesthereforhavenotbeenproperlyobservedbyanemployer,itwouldneitherbelightandjustifiable
nor likely intended by law to order either the reinstatement of the dismissed or laidoff employee or the
paymentofbacksalariestohimsimplyforthelackofsuchnoticesif,andsolongas,theemployeeisnot
deprivedofanopportunitytocontestthatdismissalorlayoffandtoaccordinglybeheardthereon.Inthe
terminationofemploymentforanauthorizedcause(thiscausebeingattributabletotheemployer),thelaid
offemployeeisstatutorilyentitledtoseparationpay,unlikeadismissalforajustcause(acauseattributable
to an employee) where no separation pay is due. In either case, if an employer fails to comply with the
requirementsofnoticeinterminatingtheservicesoftheemployee,theemployermustbemadetopay,as
sohereinaboveexpressed,correspondingdamagestotheemployee.

WHEREFORE,Ivotetohold(a)thatthelayoffinthecaseatbarisduetoredundancyandthat,accordingly,the
separationpaytopetitionershouldbeincreasedtoonemonth,insteadofonehalfmonth,payforeveryyearof
service,and(b)thatpetitionerisentitledtohisunpaidwages,proportionate13thmonthpay,andanindemnityof
P10,000.00 in keeping with the nature and purpose of, as well as the rationale behind, the grant of nominal
damages.

PANGANIBAN,J.,separateopinion

In the case before us, the Court is unanimous in at least two findings: (1) petitioner's dismissal was due to an
authorized cause, redundancy and (2) petitioner was notified of his dismissal only on the very day his
employment was terminated. The contentious issue arising out of these two findings is as follows: What is the
legal effect and the corresponding sanction for the failure of the employer to give the employee and the
DepartmentofLaborandEmployment(DOLE)the30daynoticeofterminationrequiredunderArticle283ofthe
LaborCode?

Duringthelastten(10)years,theCourthasansweredtheforegoingquestionbyrulingthatthedismissalshould
be upheld although the employee should be given "indemnity or damages" ranging from P1,000 to P10,000
dependingonthecircumstances.

The present ponencia of Mr. Justice Mendoza holds that "the termination of his employment should be
considered ineffectual and the [employee] should be paid back wages" from the time of his dismissal until the
Courtfindsthatthedismissalwasforajustcause.

Reexaminationofthe"IndemnityOnly"Rule

IamgratefulthattheCourthasdecidedtoreexamineourtenyeardoctrineonthisquestionandhasatleast,in
theprocess,increasedthemonetaryawardthatshouldgotothedismissedemployeefromanominalsumin
the concept "indemnity or damages" to "full back wages." Shortly after my assumption of office on October 10,
1995,Ialreadyquestionedthispracticeofgranting"indemnityonly"toemployeeswhoweredismissedforcause
butwithoutdueprocess.1IformallyregisteredreservationsonthisruleinmyponenciainMGGMarineServices
v.NLRC2andgaveitfulldiscussioninmyDissentsinBetterBuildingsv.NLRC3andinDelValv.NLRC.4

Without in any way diminishing my appreciation of this reexamination and of the more financiallygenerous
treatmenttheCourthasaccordedlabor,Iwritetotakeissuewiththelegalbasisofmyesteemedcolleague,Mr.
Justice Mendoza, in arriving at his legal conclusion that "the employer's failure to comply with the notice
requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the
terminationofemploymentwhichmakestheterminationofemploymentmerelyineffectual."Inshort,hebelieves
that(1)the30daynoticerequirementfindsbasisonlyintheLaborCode,and(2)thesanctionforitsviolationis
only"fullbackwages."

Withduerespect,Isubmitthefollowingcounterarguments:

(1)ThenoticerequirementfindsbasisnotonlyintheLaborCodebut,moreimportant,inthedueprocess
clauseoftheConstitution.

(2) Consequently, when the employee is dismissed without due process, the legal effect is an illegal
dismissalandtheappropriatesanctionisfullbackwagesplusreinstatement,notmerelyfullbackwages.It
is jurisprudentially settled, as I will show presently, that when procedural due process is violated, the
proceedingsinthiscase,thedismissalwillbevoided,andthepartieswillhavetobereturnedtotheir
statusquoantethatis,theemployeewillhavetobegivenbackhisoldjobandpaidallbenefitsasifhe
wereneverdismissed.

(3) In any event, contrary to Mr. Justice Mendoza's premise, even the Labor Code expressly grants the
dismissedemployeenotonlytherighttobenotifiedbutalsotherighttobeheard.

In short, when an employee is dismissed without notice and hearing, the effect is an illegal dismissal and the
appropriatereliefsarereinstatementandfullbackwages.Inrulingthatthedismissalshouldbeupheld,theCourt
majority has virtually rendered nugatory the employee's right to due process as mandated by law and the
Constitution. It implicitly allows the employer to simply ignore such right and to just pay the employee. While it
increasesthepaymentto"fullbackwages,"itdoctrinallydenigrateshisrighttodueprocesstoamerestatutory
righttonotice.

Letmeexplaintheforegoingbystartingwithashortbackgroundofourjurisprudenceontherighttodueprocess.

WithoutDueProcess,theProceedingsAreIllegal

In the past, this Court has untiringly reiterated that there are two essential requisites for an employer's valid
terminationofanemployee'sservices:(1)ajust5orauthorized6causeand(2)dueprocess.7Duringthelastten
years,theCourthasbeenquitefirminthisdoctrinalconcept,butithasbeenlessthanconsistentindeclaringthe
illegality of a dismissal when due process has not been observed. This is particularly noticeable in the relief
granted. Where there has been no just or authorized cause, the employee is awarded reinstatement or
separationpay,andbackwages.8Ifonlythesecondrequisite(dueprocess)hasnotbeenfulfilled,theemployee,
asearlierstated,isgrantedindemnityordamagesamountingtoameaslyP1,000uptoP10,000.9

Irespectfullysubmitthatillegaldismissalresultsnotonlyfromtheabsenceofalegalcause(enumeratedinArts.
282to284oftheLaborCode),butlikewisefromthefailuretoobservedueprocess.Indeed,manyarethecases,
labor or otherwise, in which acts violative of due process are unequivocally voided or declared illegal by the
Supreme Court. In PepsiCola Bottling Co. v. NLRC,10 the Court categorically ruled that the failure of
management to comply with the requirements of due process made its judgment of dismissal "void and non
existent."

ThisCourtinPeoplev.Bocar 11 emphatically made the following pronouncement, which has been reiterated in
severalcases:12

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basis constitutional rights, courts are ousted of
their jurisdiction. Thus the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue
(Gumabonvs.DirectoroftheBureauofPrisons,L30026,37SCRA420[Jan.30,1971])whichcannotbe
glossedoverordisregardedatwill.Wherethedenialofthefundamentalrightofdueprocessisapparent,a
decisionrenderedindisregardedoftherightisvoidforlackofjurisdiction(Aducayenvs.Flores,L30370,
[May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78 Shell Co. vs. Enage, L3011112, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any
judgmentordecisionrenderednotwithstandingsuchviolationmayberegardedasa"lawlessthing,which
can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs.
Flores,supra).

IntheearliercaseBacusv.Ople,13 this Court also nullified the then labor minister's clearance to terminate the
employmentofcompanyworkerswhohadsupposedlystagedanillegalstrike.Thereasonforthisrulingwasthe
denialofsufficientopportunityforthemtopresenttheirevidenceandprovetheircase.TheCourtexplained:14

Amerefindingoftheillegalityofastrikeshouldnotbeautomaticallyfollowedbyawholesaledismissalof
the strikers from their employment. What is more, the finding of the illegality of the strike by respondent
Minister of Labor and Employment is predicated on the evidence ascertained through an irregular
procedureconductedunderthesemblanceofsummarymethodsandspeedydispositionoflabordisputes
involvingstrikingemployees.

Whileitistruethatadministrativeagenciesexercisingquasijudicialfunctionsarefreefromtherigiditiesof
procedure, it is equally wellsettled in this jurisdiction that avoidance of such technicalities of law or
procedure in ascertaining objectively the facts in each case should not, however, cause a denial of due
process. The relative freedom of the labor arbiter from the rigidities of procedure cannot be invoked to
evadewhatwasclearlyemphasizedinthelandmarkcaseofAngTibayv.CourtofIndustrialRelationsthat
all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process.

In the said case, the respondent company was ordered to reinstate the dismissed workers, pending a hearing
"givingthemtheopportunitytobeheardandpresenttheirevidence."

InPhilippineNationalBankv.Apalisok,15PrimitivoVirtudazo,anemployeeofPNB,wasservedaMemorandum
statingthefindingagainsthimofaprimafaciecasefordishonestyandviolationofbankrulesandregulations.He
submittedhisAnswerdenyingthechargesandexplaininghisdefenses.

Later, two personnel examiners of the bank conducted a factfinding investigation. They stressed to him that a
formalinvestigationwouldfollow,inwhichhecouldconfrontandexaminethewitnessesforthebank,aswellas
presenthisown.Whatfollowed,however,wasaMemorandumnotifyinghimthathehadbeenfoundguiltyofthe
chargesandthathewasbeingdismissed.AfterseveralfutileattemptstosecureacopyoftheDecisionrendered
against him, he instituted against PNB a Complaint for illegal dismissal and prayed for reinstatement and
damages.

The trial court held that Virtudazo had been deprived of his rights to be formally investigated and to cross
examine the witnesses. This Court sustained the trial court, stating resolutely: "The proceedings having been
conductedwithoutaccordingtoVirtudazothe"cardinalprimaryrightsofdueprocess"guaranteedtoeveryparty
inanadministrativeorquasijudicialproceeding,saidproceedingsmustbepronouncednullandvoid."16

AlsoinFabellav.CourtofAppeals,17thisCourtdeclaredthedismissaloftheschoolteachersillegal,becausethe
administrative body that heard the charges against them had not afforded them their right to procedural due
process. The proceedings were declared void, and the orders for their dismissal set aside. We unqualifiedly
reinstated the schoolteachers, to whom we awarded all monetary benefits that had accrued to them during the
periodoftheirunjustifiedsuspensionordismissal.

InPeoplev.SanDiego,18Peoplev.Sola,19Peoplev.Dactrdao,20Peoplev.CaloJr.21andPeoplev.Burgos,22
this Court similarly voided the trial court's grant of bail to the accused upon a finding that the prosecution had
beendeprivedofproceduraldueprocess.

InPeoplev.Sevilleno,23theCourtnotedthatthetrialjudge"hardlysatisfiedtherequisitesearchinginquiry"due
theaccusedwhenhepleadedguiltytothecapitaloffensehehadbeenchargedwith.Wethusconcludedthat"the
accusedwasnotproperlyaccordedhisfundamentalrighttobeinformedoftheprecisenatureoftheaccusation
leveled against him." Because of the nonobservance of "the fundamental requirements of fairness and due
process," the appealed Decision was annulled and set aside, and the case was remanded for the proper
arraignmentandtrialoftheaccused.

Recently, the Court vacated its earlier Decision24 in People v. Parazo25 upon realizing that the accused "a
deafmute,amentalretardate,whosementalage[was]onlyseven(7)yearsandnine(9)months,andwithlow
IQ of 60 only" had not been ably assisted by a sign language expert during his arraignment and trial. Citing
People v. Crisologo,26 we ruled that the accused had been deprived of "a full and fair trial and a reasonable
opportunitytodefendhimself."Hehadineffectbeendeniedhisfundamentalrighttodueprocessoflaw.Hence,
wesetasidethetrialproceedingsandgrantedtheaccusedarearraignmentandaretrial.

Oflate,wealsosetasideaComelecResolutiondisallowingtheusebyacandidateofacertainnicknameforthe
purpose of her election candidacy. The Resolution was issued pursuant to a letterpetition which was passed
upon by the Comelec without affording the candidate the opportunity to explain her side and to counter the
allegations in said letterpetition. In invalidating the said Resolution, we again underscored the necessity of the
observance of the twin requirements of notice and hearing before any decision can be validly rendered in a
case.27

Clearlydeduciblefromourextantjurisprudenceisthatthedenialofaperson'sfundamentalrighttodueprocess
amountstotheillegalityoftheproceedingsagainsthim.Consequently,heisbroughtbacktohisstatusquoante,
notmerelyawardednominaldamagesorindemnity.

Ourlaborforcedeservesnoless.Indeed,theStaterecognizesitasitsprimarysocialeconomicforce,28towhich
itisconstitutionallymandatedtoaffordfullprotection.29Yet,refusingtodeclaretheillegalityofdismissalswithout
due process, we have continued to impose upon the erring employer the simplistic penalty of paying indemnity
only.Hence,Isubmitthatitistimeforustodenouncethesedismissalsasnullandvoidandtograntourworkers
theseproperreliefs:(1)thedeclarationthattheterminationordismissalisillegalandunconstitutionaland(2)the
reinstatementoftheemployeeplusfullbackwages.ThepresentrulingoftheCourtismanifestlyinconsistentwith
existing prudence which holds that proceedings held without notice and hearing are null and void, since they
amounttoaviolationofdueprocess,andthereforebringbackthepartiestothestatusquoante.

Exception:WhenDueProcessIsImpracticalandFutile

IamfullyawarethatinalonglineofcasesstartingwithWenphilv.NLRC,30theCourthasheld:wherethereis
justcauseforthedismissalofanemployeebuttheemployerfailstofollowtherequirementsofproceduraldue
process, the former is not entitled to back wages, reinstatement (or separation pay in case reinstatement is no
longerfeasible)orotherbenefits.Instead,theemployeeisgrantedanindemnity(orpenaltyordamages)ranging
from P1,00031 to as much as P10,000,32 depending on the circumstances of the case and the gravity of the
employer'somission.Sincethen,Wenphilhasperfunctorilybeenappliedinmostsubsequentcases33involvinga
violationofdueprocess(althoughjustcausehasbeendulyproven),withoutregardforthepeculiarfactualmilieu
ofeachcase.Indemnityordamageshasbecomeaneasysubstitutefordueprocess.

Beitremembered,however,thatthefactsinWenphilclearlyshowedtheimpracticalityandthefutilityofobserving
the procedure laid down by law and by the Constitution for terminating employment. The employee involved
thereinappearedtohaveexhibitedaviolenttemperandcausedtroubleduringofficehours.Inanaltercationwith
acoemployee,he"slapped[thelatter's]cap,steppedonhisfootandpickeduptheicescooperandbrandishedit
against [him]." When summoned by the assistant manager, the employee "shouted and uttered profane words"
instead of giving an explanation. He was caught virtually in flagrante delicto in the presence of many people.
Under the circumstances action was necessary to preserve order and discipline, as well as to safeguard the
customers' confidence in the employer's business a fastfood chain catering to the general public where
courtesyisaprizedvirtue.

However, in most of the succeeding cases, including the present one before us in which the petitioner was
dismissedontheverydayhewasservednotice,therewereampleopportunitiesfortheemployerstoobservethe
requisites of due process. There were no exigencies that called for immediate response. And yet, Wenphil was
instantlyinvokedanddueprocessbrushedaside.

IbelievethatthepricethattheCourthassetfortheinfringementofthefundamentalrighttodueprocessistoo
insignificant,tooniggardly,andsometimeseventoolate.Ibelievethatimposingastiffersanctionistheonlyway
toemphasizetoemployerstheextremeimportanceoftherighttodueprocessinourdemocraticsystem.Such
rightistoosacredtobetakenforgrantedorglossedoverinacavalierfashion.Toholdotherwise,asbysimply
imposing an indemnity or even "full back wages," is to allow the rich and powerful to virtually purchase and to
therebystifleaconstitutionalrightgrantedtothepoorandmarginalized.

It may be asked: If the employee is guilty anyway, what difference would it make if he is fired without due
process?Bythesametoken,itmaybeasked:Ifintheend,afterduehearing,acriminaloffenderisfoundguilty
anyway,whatdifferencewoulditmakeifheissimplypenalizedimmediatelywithoutthetroubleandtheexpense
oftrial?Theabsurdityofthisargumentistooapparenttodeservefurtherdiscourse.34

Worker'sRighttoNoticeIsConstitutional,NotMerelyStatutory

AccordingtotheponenciaofMr.JusticeMendoza,the"violationofthenoticerequirementcannotbeconsidered
a denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff." He argues that the due
process clause of the Constitution may be used against the government only. Since the Labor Code does not
accordemployeestherighttoahearing,ergo,heconcludes,theydonothavetherighttodueprocess.

Idisagree.True,aspointedoutbyMr.JusticeMendoza,traditionaldoctrineholdsthatconstitutionalrightsmay
be invoked only against the State. This is because in the past, only the State was in a position to violate these
rights,includingthedueprocessclause.However,withtheadventofliberalization,deregulationandprivatization,
the State tended to cede some of its powers to the "market forces." Hence, corporate behemoths and even
individualsmaynowbesourcesofabusesandthreatstohumanrightsandliberties.Ibelieve,therefore,thatsuch
traditionaldoctrineshouldbemodifiedtoenablethejudiciarytocopewiththesenewparadigmsandtocontinue
protectingthepeoplefromnewformsofabuses.34a

IndeedtheemployeeisentitledtodueprocessnotbecauseoftheLaborcode,butbecauseoftheConstitution.
Elementary is the doctrine that constitutional provisions are deemed written into every statute, contract or
undertaking. Worth noting is that "[o]ne's employment, profession, trade or calling is a property right within the
protectionoftheconstitutionalguarantyofdueprocessoflaw."35

In a long line of cases involving judicial, quasijudicial and administrative proceedings, some of which I
summarizedearlier,theCourthasheldthatthetwinrequirementsofnoticeandhearing(or,attheveryleast,an
opportunity to be heard) constitute the essential elements of due process. In labor proceedings, both are the
conditiosinequanonforadismissaltobevalidlyeffected.36TheperceptiveJusticeIreneCorteshasaptlystated:
"Onecannotgowithouttheother,forotherwisetheterminationwould,intheeyesofthelaw,beillegal."37

EventheLaborCodeGrantstheRighttoaHearing

Besides,itisreallyinaccuratetosaythattheLaborCodegrants"noticealone"toemployeesbeingdismisseddue
toanauthorizedcause.Article277(b)38ofthesaidCodeexplicitlyprovidesthattheterminationofemployment
bytheemployeris"subjecttotheconstitutionalrightofworkerstosecurityoftenure[]...withoutprejudicetothe
requirementofnoticeunderArticle283ofthisCode,theemployershallfurnishtheworkerwhoseemploymentis
soughttobeterminatedawrittennoticecontainingastatementofthecausesforterminationandshallaffordthe
latter ample opportunity to be heard . . . ." Significantly, the provision requires the employer "to afford [the
employee]ampleopportunitytobeheard"whentheterminationisduetoa"justandauthorizedcause."Isubmit
thatthisprovisionon"ampleopportunitytobeheard"appliestodismissalsunderArticles282,283and284ofthe
LaborCode.

In addition, to say that the termination is "simply ineffectual" for failure to comply with the 30day written notice
and,atthesametime,toconcludethatithas"legaleffect"appearstobecontradictory.Ineffectualmeans"having
nolegalforce."39Ifadismissalhasnolegalforceoreffect,theconsequenceshouldbethereinstatementofthe
dismissedemployeeandthegrantoffullbackwagesthereto,asprovidedbylawnotthelatteronly.Limiting
the consequence merely to the payment of full back wages has no legal or statutory basis. No provision in the
LaborCodeoranyotherlawauthorizessuchlimitationofsanction,whichMr.JusticeMendozaadvocates.

Themajoritycontendsthatitisnotfairtoreinstatetheemployee,becausetheemployershouldnotbeforcesto
accommodateanunwantedworker.IbelievehoweverthatitisnottheCourtthatforcestheemployertorehire
theworker.Byviolatingthelatter'sconstitutionalrighttodueprocess,theformerbringsthissanctionuponitself.
Isitunfairtoimprisonacriminal?No!Byviolatingthelaw,onebringsthepenalsanctionupononeself.Thereis
nothingunfairorunusualaboutthisinevitablechainofcauseandeffect,ofcrimeandpunishment,ofviolationand
sanction.

DueProcessBeginsWithEachofUs

Torepeat,dueprocessbeginswiththeemployer,notwiththelabortribunals.AnobjectivereadingoftheBillof
Rightsclearlyshowsthatthedueprocessprotectionisnotlimitedtogovernmentactionalone.TheConstitution
does not say that the right cannot be claimed against private individuals and entities. Thus, in PNBv. Apalisok,
which I cited earlier, this Court voided the proceedings conducted by petitioner bank because of its failure to
observeApalisok'srighttodueprocess.

Truly, justice is dispensed not just by the courts and quasijudicial bodies like public respondent here. The
administrationofjusticebeginswitheachofus,inoureverydaydealingswithoneanotherand,asinthiscase,in
theemployers'affordingtheiremployeestherighttobeheard.Ifwe,asapeopleandasindividuals,cannotorwill
not deign to act with justice and render unto everyone his or her due in little, everyday things, can we honestly
hope and seriously expect to do so when monumental, lifeordeath issues are at stake? Unless each one is
committed to a faithful observance of daytoday fundamental rights, our ideal of a just society can never be
approximated,nottosayattained.

Inthefinalanalysis,whatisinvolvedhereisnotsimplytheamountofmonetaryaward,whetherinsignificantor
substantial whether termed indemnity, penalty or "full back wages." Neither is it merely a matter of respect for
workers'rightsoradequateprotectionoflabor.Thebottomlineisreallytheconstitutionallygrantedrighttodue
process. And due process is the very essence of justice itself. Where the rule of law is the bedrock of our free
society,justiceisitsverylifeblood.Denialofdueprocessisthusnolessthanadenialofjusticeitself.

InAdditiontoReinstatementandBackWages,DamagesMayBeAwarded

One last point. Justice Vitug argues in his Separate Opinion that the nonobservance of the prescribed notices
"canverilyentitletheemployeetoanawardofdamagesbut...nottotheextentofrenderingoutrightlyillegal
thatdismissalorlayoff...."I,ofcourse,disagreewithhiminsofarashedeniestheillegalityofthedismissal,
becauseasIalreadyexplained,aterminationwithoutdueprocessisunconstitutionalandillegal.ButIdoagree
that,wheretheemployeeprovesthepresenceoffactsshowingliabilityfordamages(moral,exemplary,etc.)as
provided under the Civil Code, the employee could be entitled to such award in addition to reinstatement and
back wages. For instance, where the illegal dismissal has caused the employee "physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similarinjury"duetothebadfaithoftheemployer,anawardformoraldamageswouldbeproper,inadditionto
reinstatementandbackwages.

Summary

Toconclude,Ibelievethateveniftheremaybeajustoranauthorizedcauseforterminationbutdueprocessis
absent,thedismissalproceedingsmustbedeclarednullandvoid.Thedismissalshouldstillbebrandedasillegal.
Consequently,theemployeemustbereinstatedandgivenfullbackwages.

On the other hand, there is an exception. The employer can adequately prove that under the peculiar
circumstancesofthecase,therewasnoopportunitytocomplywithdueprocessrequirementsordoingsowould
havebeenimpracticalorgravelyadversetotheemployer,aswhentheemployeeiscaughtin flagrante delicto.
Under any of these circumstances, the dismissal will not be illegal and no award may properly be granted.
Nevertheless, as a measure of compassion, the employee may be given a nominal sum depending on the
circumstances,pursuanttoArticle2221oftheCivilCode.

Depending on the facts of each case, damages as provided under applicable articles of the Civil Code may
additionallybeawarded.

WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition. Ruben Serrano should be REINSTATED and PAID FULL BACK
WAGESfromdateofterminationuntilactualreinstatement,plusallbenefitshewouldhavereceivedasifhewere
neverdismissed.

Footnotes
1TSNoftestimonyofpetitioner,pp.24,7678,April24,1992.

2Petitioner'sPositionPaper,AnnexCRecords,p.19.

3Id.,AnnexBid.,p.21.

4Records,p.2.

5Decision,datedApril30,1993,ofLaborArbiterPabloC.Espiritu.Petition,AnnexARollo,p.30.

6Id.,pp.3536.

7Petition,p.10id.,p.16.

821SCRA652(1992).

9Id.,at662.

10G.R.No.131108,March25,1999.

11ShellOilWorkersUnionv.ShellCompanyofthePhilippines,Ltd.,39SCRA276,284285(1971).

12AsianAlcoholCorporationv.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,G.R.No.131108,March25,1999.

13TSN,p.61,April24,1992.

14CONST.,ART.XIII,3.

15E.g.,AuroraLandProjectsCorporationv.NLRC.,266SCRA48(1997).

16248SCRA532(1995).

17Thisprovisionreads:

Terminationbyemployer.Anemployermayterminateanemploymentforanyofthefollowing
causes.

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employerorrepresentativeinconnectionwithhiswork:

(b)Grossandhabitualneglectbytheemployeeofhisduties

(c)Fraudorwillfulbreachbytheemployeeofthetrustreposedinhimbyhisemployerorduly
authorizedrepresentative

(d)Commissionofacrimeoroffensebytheemployeeagainstthepersonofhisemployeror
anyimmediatememberofhisfamilyorhisdulyauthorizedrepresentativeand

(e)Othercausesanalogoustotheforegoing.

18Bk.VI,Rule1,oftheOmnibusRulesandRegulationstoImplementtheLaborCodeprovidesinpertinent
parts:
Sec.2.Securityoftenure....

(d)Inallcasesofterminationofemployment,thefollowingstandardsofdueprocessshallbe
substantiallyobserved.

ForterminationofemploymentbasedonjustcausesasdefinedinArticle282oftheLabor
Code:

(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for
termination,andgivingsaidemployeereasonableopportunitywithinwhichtoexplainhis
side.

(ii)Ahearingorconferenceduringwhichtheemployeeconcerned,withtheassistance
of counsel if he so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
evidence,orrebuttheevidencepresentedagainsthim.

(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.

ForterminationofemploymentasdefinedinArticle283oftheLaborCode,therequirementof
dueprocessshallbedeemedcompliedwithuponserviceofawrittennoticetotheemployee
andtheappropriateRegionalOfficeoftheDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentatleastthirty
daysbeforeeffectivityofthetermination,specifyingthegroundorgroundsfortermination...

xxxxxxxxx

19Sebuguerov.NLRC,248SCRAat547.

20170SCRA69(1989).

21Id.,at7576.

22E.g.,Aureliov.NLRC,221SCRA432(1993)(dismissalofamanagerialemployeeforbreachoftrust)
Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 421 (1990) (dismissal for absenteeism, leaving the work
placewithoutnotice,tamperingwithmachines)Shoemart,Inc.v.NLRC,176SCRA385(1989)(dismissal
forabandonmentofwork).
23Sebuguerov.NLRC,248SCRA536(1995)(terminationofemploymentduetoretrenchment).

24 E.g., Worldwide papermills, Inc. v. NLRC, 244 SCRA 125 (1995) (dismissal for gross and habitual
neglectofduties).

25E.g.,Retav.NLRC,232SCRA613(1994)(dismissalfornegligenceandinsubordination).

26110Phil.113,118(1960).

27138SCRA166,170(1985).

28Art.302oftheCodeofCommerceprovided:

Incasesinwhichnospecialtimeisfixedinthecontractsofservice,anyoneofthepartiesthereto
maydissolveit,advisingtheotherpartythereofonemonthinadvance.

Thefactoryorshopclerkshallbeentitled,insuchcase,tothesalarydueforsaidmonth.

29R.A.No.1052,asamendedbyR.A.No.1787,provide:

Sec.1.Incasesofemploymentwithoutadetermineperiod,inacommercial,industrial,oragricultural
establishment or enterprises, the employer or the employee may terminate at any time the
employment with just cause or without just cause in the case of an employee by serving written
noticeontheemployeratleastonemonthinadvance,orinthecaseofanemployerbyservingsuch
noticetotheemployeeatleastonemonthinadvanceoronehalfmonthforeveryyearofserviceof
theemployee,whicheverislonger,afractionofatleastsixmonthsbeingconsideredasonewhole
year.
Theemployer,uponwhomnosuchnoticewasservedincaseofterminationofemploymentwithout
just cause shall be entitled to compensation from the date of termination of his employment in an
amountequivalenttohissalariesorwagescorrespondingtotherequiredperiodofnotice.
30Abev.FosterWheelerCorp.110Phil.198(1960)MalateTaxicabandGarage,Inc.v.CIR,99Phil.41
(1956).

3171SCRA470,480(1976).

3277SCRA321(1977).

33CIVILCODE,ART.19.

34 Art. 1191: "The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors
shouldnotcomplywithwhatisincumbentuponhim.....

Art. 1592: "In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon
failuretopaythepriceatthetimeagreedupontherescissionofthecontractshallofrighttakeplace,
thevendeemaypay,evenaftertheexpirationoftheperiod,aslongasnodemandforrescissionof
the contract has been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial act. After the demand, the
courtmaynotgranthimanewterm.
35DelaCruzv.Legaspi,98Phil.43(1955)Tagubav.Vda.deLeon,132SCRA722(1984).

36SeeMaximov.Fabian,G.R.No.L8015,December23,1955,(unpub.),98Phil.989.

37Emphasisadded.

38Art.285reads:

Termination by employee. (a) An employee may terminate without just cause the employee
employerrelationshipbyservingawrittennoticeontheemployeratleastone(1)monthinadvance.
Theemployeruponwhomnosuchnoticewasservedmayholdtheemployeeliablefordamages.

(b)Anemployeemayputanendtotherelationshipwithoutservinganynoticeontheemployerfor
anyofthefollowingjustcauses:

1.Seriousinsultbytheemployerofhisrepresentativeonthehonorandpersonofthe
employee

2.Inhumanandunbearabletreatmentaccordedtheemployeebytheemployerorhis
representative

3.Commissionofacrimeoroffensebytheemployerorhisrepresentativeagainsttheperson
oftheemployeeoranyoftheimmediatemembersofhisfamilyand

4.Othercausesanalogoustoanyoftheforegoing.

39210SCRA277(1992).

40Art,II,18.

41Id.,20.

42Art.XIII,3.

43ManilaTradingandSupplyCo.v.Zulueta,69Phil,485,487(1940)(perLaurel,J.)Accord,Villanuevav.
NLRC, 293 SCRA 259 (1998) DI Security and General Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 264 SCRA 458 (1996)
Floresv.NLRC,256SCRA735(1996)SanMiguelCorporationv.NLRC,218SCRA293(1993)Colgate
PalmolivePhilippines,Inc.v.Ople,163SCRA323(1988).

BELLOSILLO,J.,separateopinion
1G.R.No.13086616September1998,295SCRA494.
2Exh."B,"Records,p.21.

3Rollo,p.63.

4 Sebuguero v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 115395, 27 September 1995, 248 SCRA
536Almodielv.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,G.R.No.100641,14June1993,223SCRA341.

5 De Ocampo v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 101539, 4 September 1992, 213 SCRA
652,662.
6G.R.No.73287,18May1987,149SCRA641.

7Art.XIII,Sec.3,1987Constitution,reiteratedinArt.3,LaborCode.

8Art.3,LaborCode.

9Alcantara,SamsonS.,ReviewerinLaborandSocialLegislation,1993Ed.,p.347.

10Art.227,LaborCode.

11Art.283.Closureofestablishmentandreductionofpersonnel.Theemployermayalsoterminatethe
employmentofanyemployeeduetotheinstallationoflaborsavingdevices,redundancy,retrenchmentto
preventlossesortheclosingorcessationofoperationoftheestablishmentorundertaking...byservinga
writtennoticeontheworkerandtheMinistryofLaborandemploymentatleastone(1)monthbeforethe
intendeddatethereof....
12Sec.1.Art.III,1987Constitution.

13Fernando,EnriqueM.,TheBillofRights,1972,ed.,p.71.

14Id.,p.78.

15Id.,pp.8081.

16Id.,p.94.

17Id.,p.96.

1869Phil.635(1940).

19G.R.No.117565,18November1997,282SCRA146147.

20G.R.No.80587,8February1989,170SCRA69.

21G.R.No.115394,27September1995,248SCRA535.

22G.R.No.122666,19June1997,274SCRA379.

23G.R.No.116473,12September1997,279SCRA45.

24Shoemart,Inc.v.NLRC,G.R.No.74229,11August1989,176SCRA385Theemployeewasfound
to have abandoned his job but for failure to observe the notice requirement, the employer was fined
P1,000.00 Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Alonzo, G.R. No. 78090, 26 July 1991, 199 SCRA 617 The employee
violatedcompanyrulesandregulationsbutbecauseofprocedurallapsethecompanywasfinedP1,000.00
Aureliov.NLRC,G.R.No.99034,12April1993,221SCRA432Themanagerialemployeebreachedthe
trust and confidence of his employer but for failure to observe the notice requirement the company was
fined P1,000.00 Worldwide Papermills Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113081, 12 May 1995, 244 SCRA 125
Theemployeewasfoundguiltyofgrossandhabitualneglectofhisdutiesandofexcessiveabsences.For
failure to comply with the notice requirement the company was fined P5,000.00 Reta v. NLRC, G.R. No.
112100, 27 May 1994, 232 SCRA 613 The employee was guilty of inefficiency negligence and
insubordinationbutthecompanywasfinedP10,000.00forfailuretoobservethenoticerequirement. 1 w p h i1 .n t

25 Sebuguero v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115394, 27 September 1995, 248 SCRA 532 The employees were
retrenched in order to prevent further losses but the company failed to observe the notice requirement,
hence was fined P2,000.00 for each employee Balbalec etal. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 107756, 19 December
1995,251SCRA398Theemployeeswereretrenchedtopreventbusinesslossesbutthecompanywas
finedP5,000.00foreachemployeeforfailuretoobservethenoticerequirement.
26SeeNote21.

PUNO,J.,dissentingopinion
1Schwartz,AdministrativeLaw,1991ed.,p.224citingPainterv.LiverpoolGasCo.,3Ad.&EI.433,449,
11Eng.Rep.478(K.B.1836).

2KingsizeManufacturingCorp.vs.NLRC,238SCRA349(1994).

3Ibid.

4170SCRA69.

5248SCRA532,545(1995).

6Ibid.,p.546.

7Opcit.,p.76.

8Opcit.,pp.7475.

9Opcit.,p.76.

10TSN,August4,1992,pp.30,3738,4249.

11Afifthauthorizedcauseis"diseaseoftheemployee"providedinArticle284oftheCode.

12Sebuguero,supra.

13InternationalHardware,Inc.v.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,176SCRA256,259(1989).

14Sebuguerov.NLRC,supra.

15WiltshireFileCo.v.NLRC,193SCRA665,676(1991).

16Balbalecv.NLRC,251SCRA398,406(1995).

17110Phil113(1960).

18Schwartz,opcit.,pp.273274.

19Supra.

20SeealsoJGBandAssociates,Inc.vs.NLRC,254SCRA457(1996)PhilippineSavingsBankv.NLRC,
261SCRA409(1996)PasudecoInc.vs.NLRC,272SCRA737(1997)P.I.Manpower,Inc.vs.NLRC,267
SCRA 451 (1997) Canura v. NLRC, 279 SCRA 45 (1997) International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. NLRC,
287SCRA213(1998)MabuhayDevelopmentIndustriesvs.NLRC,288SCRA1(1998),allponencias of
Mr.JusticeMendoza.
21 Art. 283. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment without a definite
periodforanyofthefollowingjustcauses:

(a)Theclosingorcessationofoperationoftheestablishmentorenterprise,orwheretheemployer
has to reduce his work force by more then onehalf (1/2) due to serious business reverses, unless
theclosingisforthepurposeofcircumventingtheprovisionsofthischapter

(b) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the orders of his employer or
representativeinconnectionwithhiswork

(c)Grossandhabitualneglectbytheemployeeofhisduties
(d) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
representative

(e) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediatememberofhisfamilyorrepresentativeand

(f)Othercausesanalogoustotheforegoing.
22 Art. 284. Reduction of personnel. The termination of employment of any employee due to the
installationoflaborsavingdevices,redundancy,retrenchmenttopreventlosses,andothersimilarcauses,
shallentitletheemployeeaffectedtherebytoseparationpay....

23 Art. 285. Disease as a ground for termination. An employer may terminate the services of an
employee who have been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is
prohibitedbylaworisprejudicialtohishealthaswellastothehealthofhiscoemployees....
24TheadjustmentofthenumberingoftheArticlesisduetothefactthattherearetwo(2)Article238.

2571SCRA470(1976).

2692Phil.843(1953).

27InternationalHardware,Inc.vs.NLRC,176SCRA256(1989)Sebuguerov.NLRC,supra.

28ConcurringopinioninAngTibayetal.vs.CourtofIndustrialRelations,etal.,69Phil.635(1940).

VITUG,J.,separate(concurringanddissenting)opinion
1Art.282.Terminationbyemployer.Anemployermayterminateanemploymentforanyofthefollowing
causes:

(a)Seriousmisconductorwillfuldisobediencebytheemployeeofthelawfulordersofhisemployer
orrepresentativeinconnectionwithhiswork

(b)Grossandhabitualneglectbytheemployeeofhisduties

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorizedrepresentative

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediatememberofhisfamilyorhisdulyauthorizedrepresentativeand

(e)Othercausesanalogoustotheforegoing.
2Art.283.Closureofestablishmentandreductionofpersonnel.Theemployermayalsoterminatethe
employmentofanyemployeeduetotheinstallationoflaborsavingdevices,redundancy,retrenchmentto
prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the
closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the
workersandtheMinistryofLaborandEmploymentatleastone(1)monthbeforetheintendeddatethereof.
In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected
therebyshallbeentitledtoaseparationpayequivalenttoatleasthisone(1)monthpayortoatleastone
(1)monthpayforeveryyearofservice,whicheverishigher.Incaseofretrenchmenttopreventlossesand
incasesofclosuresorcessationofoperationsofestablishmentorundertakingnotduetoseriousbusiness
lossesorfinancialreverses,theseparationpayshallbeequivalenttoone(1)monthpayoratleastonehalf
(1/2)monthpayforeveryyearofservice,whicheverishigher.Afractionofatleastsix(6)monthsshallbe
consideredone(1)wholeyear.
3Art.284.Diseaseasgroundfortermination.Anemployermayterminatetheservicesofanemployee
who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by
law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his coemployees: Provided, That he is paid
separationpayequivalenttoatleastone(1)monthsalaryortoonehalf(1/2)monthsalaryforeveryyear
of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole
year.
4SeeSanMiguelCorporationvs.NLRC,255SCRA580.Section7,RuleI,BookVI,oftheOmnibusRules
ImplementingtheLaborCodeprovides:
Sec.7.Terminationofemploymentbyemployer. The just causes for terminating the services of
an employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of the Code. The separation from work of an
employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the termination pay provided in Code, without
prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and privileges he may have under the applicable
individual or collective bargaining agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or
practice.
5SeeFootnote2.

6 Sec. 1, Rule XXIII, of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code clearly states that "(i)n cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for just or authorized
causesasprovidedbylaw,andsubjecttotherequirementsofdueprocess.

Sec.2,I,ofthesameRuleprovidesthatincaseofterminationofemploymentbasedonjustcauses
underArticle282oftheLaborCode,isitrequiredthattherebe

(a)Awrittennoticeservedontheemployeespecifyingthegroundorgroundsfortermination,
andgivingtosaidemployeereasonableopportunitywithinwhichtoexplainhisside

(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of
counseliftheemployeesodesires,isgivenopportunitytorespondtothecharge,presenthis
evidenceorrebuttheevidencepresentedagainsthimand

(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.

IncasesofterminationbasedonauthorizedcausesunderArticle283oftheLaborCode,Section2,
II, of the same Rule mandates that there be "a written notice to the employee and the appropriate
Regional Office of the Department (of Labor and Employment) at least thirty days before the
effectivityofthetermination,"specifyingtheground/stherefor.
7SeeMGGMarineServices,Inc.vs.NLRC,259SCRA664.

PANGANIBAN,J.,separateopinion

1SeePanganiban,BattlesintheSupremeCourt,1998ed.,p.155etseq.

2259SCRA665,July29,1996.

3 283 SCRA 242, December 15, 1997. In that case, I proposed to grant separation pay in lieu of
reinstatementbecause,bytheemployee'sacts,hehadmadereinstatementimproper,afactnotpresentin
theinstantcase.
4296SCRA283,September28,1998.

5Art.282oftheLaborCodeprovides:

Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
followingcauses:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employerorrepresentativeinconnectionwithhiswork

(b)Grossandhabitualneglectbytheemployeeofhisduties

(c)Fraudorwillfulbreachbytheemployeeofthetrustreposedinhimbyhisemployerorduly
authorizedrepresentative

(d)Commissionofacrimeoroffensebytheemployeeagainstthepersonofhisemployeror
anyimmediatememberofhisfamilyorhisdulyauthorizedrepresentativeand

(e)Othercausesanalogoustotheforegoing.

6Arts.283&284provide:

Art.283.Closureofestablishmentandreductionofpersonnel.Theemployermayalsoterminate
the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation or operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by
servingawrittennoticeontheworkersandthe[Department]ofLaborandEmploymentatleastone
(1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor
saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalenttoatleasthisone(1)monthpayortoatleastone(1)monthpayforeveryyearofservice
whicheverishigher.Incaseofretrenchmenttopreventlossesandincasesofclosuresorcessation
of operations of establishments or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to as least onehalf (1/2)
monthpayforeveryyearofservice,whicheverishigher.Afractionofatleastsix(6)monthsshallbe
consideredone(1)wholeyear.

Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination. An employer may terminate the services of an
employeewhohasbeenfoundtobesufferingfromanydiseaseandwhosecontinuedemploymentis
prohibitedbylaworisprejudicialtohishealthaswellastothehealthofhiscoemployees:Provided,
Thatheispaidseparationpayequivalenttoatleastone(1)monthsalaryortoonehalf(1/2)month
salary for every year of service, whichever is greater a fraction of at least six (6) months being
consideredasone(1)wholeyear.
7 Mapalo v. NLRC, 233 SCRA 266, June 17, 1994 Ala Mode Garments, Inc. v. NLRC, 268 SCRA 497,
February17,1997PizzaHut/ProgressiveDevelopmentCorp.v.NLRC,252SCRA531,January29,1996
MGG Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 259 SCRA 664, July 29, 1996 Ranises v. NLRC, 262 SCRA 671,
September24,1996.

8 Conti v. NLRC, 271 SCRA 114, April 10, 1997 Alhambra Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, 238 SCRA 232,
November 18, 1994 JBG and Associates, Inc. v. NLRC, 254 SCRA 457, March 7, 1996 Samillano v.
NLRC,265SCRA788,December23,1996.
9 Alhambra Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, ibid. Segismundo v. NLRC, 239 SCRA 167, December 13, 1994
Sebuguero v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 532, September 27, 1995 Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69,
February8,1989.
10210SCRA277,286,June23,1992,perGutierrezJr.,J.

11138SCRA166,170171,August16,1985,perMakasiar,CJ.

12AmongthoseareGalmanv.Sandiganbayan,144SCRA43,87,September12,1986Peoplev.Albano,
163SCRA511,July26,1988Saldanav.CourtofAppeals,190SCRA396,403,October11,1990Paulin
v.Gimenez,217SCRA386,392,January21,1993.
13132SCRA690,October23,1984,perCuevas,J.

14Ibid.,p.703.

15199SCRA92,July12,1991,perNarvasa,J.,(laterCJ).

16Ibid.,p.101.

17282SCRA256,November28,1997.

1826SCRA252,December24,1968.

19103SCRA393,March17,1981.

20170SCRA489,February21,1989.

21186SCRA620,June18,1990.

22200SCRA67,August2,1991.

23G.R.No.129058,March29,1999,perBellosillo,J.

24G.R.No,121176,May14,1997.
25July8,1999ResolutionontheMotionforReconsideration,perPurisima,J.

26150SCRA653,656,June17,1987,perPadilla,J.

27Villasorav.Comelec,G.R.No.133927,November29,1999.

2818,ArtII,1987Constitution.

293,Art.XIII,ibid.

30170SCRA69,February8,1989,perGancayco,J.

31InWenphilCorp.v.NLRC,ibid.SampaguitaGarmentsCorp.v.NLRC,233SCRA260,June17,1994
Villaramav.NLRC,236SCRA280,September2,1994Rubberworld(Phils.),Inc.v.NLRC,183SCRA421,
March21,1990KwikwayEngineeringWorksv.NLRC,195SCRA526,March22,1991,andseveralother
cases.
32InRetav.NLRC,232SCRA613,May27,1994andAlhambraIndustries,Inc.v.NLRC,238SCRA232,
November18,1994.

33SeahorseMaritimeCorp.v.NLRC,173SCRA390,May15,1989Rubberworld(Phils.),Inc.v.NLRC,
supra Cario v. NLRC, 185 SCRA 177, May 8, 1990 Great Pacific Life Assurance Corp. v. NLRC, 187
SCRA 694, July 23, 1990 Cathedral School of Technology v. NLRC, 214 SCRA 551, October 13, 1992
Aurelio v. NLRC, 221 SCRA 432, April 12, 1993 Sampaguita Garments Corp. v. NLRC, 233 SCRA 260,
June17,1994Villaramav.NLRC,supra.
34 See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Better Buildings, Inc. v. NLRC, 283 SCRA 242, 256,
December15,1997.

34aSeePanganiban,LeadershipbyExample,1999ed.,pp.6061.

35WallemMaritimeServices,Inc.v.NLRC,263SCRA174,October15,1996perRomero,J.Bernas,The
1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines:ACommentary,1996ed.,p.101.
36RCPIv.NLRC,223SCRA656,June25,1993Samillanov.NLRC,265SCRA788,December23,1996.

37SanMiguelCorporationv.NLRC,173SCRA314,May12,1989.

Art.277....

(b)Subjecttotheconstitutionalrightofworkerstosecurityoftenureandtheirrighttobeprotected
againstdismissalexceptforajustandauthorizedcauseandwithoutprejudicetotherequirementof
notice under Article 283 of this Code the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is
sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and
shallaffordthelatterampleopportunitytobeheardandtodefendhimselfwiththeassistanceofhis
representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated
pursuanttoguidelinessetbytheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment.Anydecisiontakenbythe
employershallbewithoutprejudicetotherightoftheworkertocontestthevalidityorlegalityofhis
dismissalbyfilingacomplaintwiththeregionalbranchoftheNationalLaborRelationsCommission.
The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the
employer. The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment may suspend the effects of
the termination pending resolution of the dispute in the event of a prima facie finding by the
appropriate official of the Department of Labor and Employment before whom such dispute is
pendingthattheterminationmaycauseaseriouslabordisputeorisinimplementationofamasslay
off.
39 The New World Dictionary, Second College Ed (1974), defines effectual as "having legal force valid."
Thus,ineffectual,beingitsopposite,meanshavingnolegalforceornotvalid.

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