People vs. Silvestre and Atienza (Crim1)
People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza, defendants-
appellants.
En Banc
Villareal, December 14, 1931
Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission
Facts:
Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage
Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong,
Bulacan
On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn
complaint for adultery
After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal president of
Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint
The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live again
in Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)
On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the
justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case
The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Nio, in Paombong
About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in
Santo Nio and followed him home to Masocol (under the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves)
Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in the home of
Nicolas
On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were
gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of the house because he
was going to set fire to it
He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of
Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and Romana
Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him
Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late
The fire destroyed about 48 houses
Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire
The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson
Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1
day of cadena temporal)
Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor)
The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI
decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana:
The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice
The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient evidence, or
at least, of reasonable doubt
Issue:
Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice
Holding:
No.
Ratio:
Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who
does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it,
nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.
In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an
agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous
acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to
commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not
make her liable as an accomplice.
Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by Art. 14
of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to
which one has kept silent
Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana Silvestre, who
is acquitted.
People vs. Talingdan (Crim1)
The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto
Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma, accused-appellants
En Banc
Per Curiam, July 6, 1978
Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art. 3) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission
Facts:
Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag
No certificate or any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the
prosecution
They lived with their children in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra
Their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles for Teresa had deserted
her family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her
On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan has visited Teresa in their house while
Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old
daughter to go down the house and leave them
 Bernardo had gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Note: The court believed Corazon's testimony.
Teresa It is true that proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt;
About a month before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come she cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. She had no hand in the actual shooting. It is also
back for a period of more than 3 weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were not clear if she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof. But the court is convinced that she
seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time knew it was going to be done and did not object.
Just two days before Bernardo was killed (Thursday), Bernardo and Theresa had a violent There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the
quarrel; Bernardo slapped Theresa several times, resulting in Theresa seeking the help of the police offense committed.
Accused Talingdan, a policeman, came armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called She did not only order her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she also claimed to
him to come down; Bernardo ignored him; Talingdan instead left and warned Bernardo that someday he have no suspects in mind when the peace officers came into their house later to investigate
would kill him Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding the
On Saturday, June 24, 1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house conspiracy, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with her co-appellants
The defendants' and Corazon's accounts of what happened had variations These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime"
Corazon's version:
Friday morning: Corazon was in a creek to wash clothes. She saw her mother Teresa meeting Male appellants sentenced to death. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt is Teresa Domogma, sentenced to
with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras, and Pedro Bides in a small hut suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor
owned by Bernardo as maximum.
She heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"
When Teresa noticed Corazon, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will
kill him"
Saturday, after sunset: Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw her mother go
down the house to go to the yard where she again met with the other appellants.
She noted the long guns the appellants were carrying.
Teresa came back to the house and proceeded to her room.
Corazon informed Bernardo, who was then working on a plow, about the presence of persons
downstairs, but Bernardo paid no attention
Bernardo proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door
He was suddenly fired upon form below the stairs of the batalan
The four accused climbed the stairs of the batalan and upon seeing that Bernardo was still
alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again
Bides and Berras did not fire at that precise time but when Corazon tried to call for helo, Bides
warned her that he will kill her if she calls for help
Teresa came out of her room and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers,
the former threatened to kill the latter if she reveals the matter to anyone
The defendants'' version:
Teresa loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband never maltreated her.
Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan; an
illicit relationship never existed between them
Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing on June 24; he escorted the Mayor
in Bangued from June 22 to June 26
Tobias, Bides, and Berras claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan,
250-300 meters from the place of the killing
Issue:
Whether or not Teresa Domogma is an accessory to Bernardo's murder
It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the
conspuracy to kill her husband because there is no showing of actual cooperation on her part with co-
appellants in their culpable acts that led to his death
It is claimed that what is apparent is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval
thereof on her part, which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator
Holding:
Yes. She is an accessory to Bernardo's murder.
Ratio:

Manuel v. People
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
Lesson: Felony, Bigamy, Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death, malice, good faith as a valid defense
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
Laws Applicable: Art. 3 par 2 RPC, Art. 349 RPC, Art. 41 FC
FACTS:
July 28, 1975: Eduardo married Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati
o Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned
o Eduardo only visited 3 times and never saw her again
January 1996: Eduardo met Tina B. Gandalera, 21 year old computer secretarial student, in Dagupan City
while she looked for a friend during her 2 days stay
Later, Eduardo visited Tina, they went to a motel together and he proposed marriage and introduced her
to his parents who assures that he is single
April 22, 1996: Eduardo married Tina before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of
Baguio City and they were able to build a home after
1999: Eduardo only visited their home twice or thrice a year and whenever jobless Tina would ask for
money, he would slap her
January 2001: Eduardo packed his things and left and stopped giving financial support
August 2001: Tina through inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila and was
embarrassed and humiliated to learn that Eduardo was previously married
Eduardo claimed that he did NOT know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first
marriage before marrying Tina
RTC: Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from 6 years and 10 months, as minimum, to 10 years, as maximum and P200,000.00 by way of moral
damages, plus costs of suit
o Eduardos belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even
if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy
Eduardo appealed to the CA contending that he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent
whereas under Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable
for a felony
CA: affirming the decision of the RTC stating that Article 41 of the Family Code should apply that there
should have been a judicial declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the absent spouse and modified
minimum to 2 years and four months
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony:
o (a) he/she has been legally married; and
o (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed
with deliberate intent
o Malice -a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act WITHOUT legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury
o When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the
accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional
o For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an
evil intent.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea
GR: mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo;
such defense negates malice or criminal intent.
EX: ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.
o Ignorantia legis neminem excusat
burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married he was of the well-grounded belief that
his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975
o failed to discharge his burden since no judicial declaration as proof
Article 41 of the Family Code amended the rules on presumptive death on Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code which states that before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must
institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse,
without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
for being against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good
morals and the interest and general welfare of society

ISSUE: W/N Eduardo is guilty of Bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit).

People vs. Puno (Crim1)
HELD: YES. petition is DENIED. CA affirmed People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias "Beloy," and Enrique
Amurao y Puno, alias "Enry," accused-appellants
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. En Banc
o The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.
o Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the Regalado, February 17, 1993
personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance,
namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse
Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by
outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of
robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim
Facts:
The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually
January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal operating on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the case
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election
there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC This is not justified by the accused's intention
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision
He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual
Isabelo will temporarily take his place damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)
When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her
husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving
After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused
Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from
her
Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused
But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to
issue a check for P100,000
Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga
According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the
superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because according to
her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car
The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to
Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car
He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his
employer had gotten a ride
He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway
Issue:
1. Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged
2. Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD
No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
Holding:
1. No.
2. No.
Ratio:
1. There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior
to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the
extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty
In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders
This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention
2. Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our
country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law
against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage
Law was passed (this is the origin of the law on highway robbery)
 It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the
appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto
Bantas.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are related for modesto is an
adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the house
and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both armed stayed
put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.

Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and
alibi as their evidence against the charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?

Yes there is:

CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous
agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had
the same purpose and were united in its executed.
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and executed
with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed
and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto was
defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the three took
advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

HELD:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF HOMICIDE
(THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM
BELOW! MURDER TO HOMICIDE)

AUG 23, 2009

Criminal Law- People vs. Delim
This case is with regard to Art 8 and 13 of the Revised Penal Code
"the act of one is the act of all"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Delim

G.R. No. 142773 28January2003

FACTS OF THE CASE:

 At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong,
that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country with his business
associates, and that he and his business associates declared all the money they brought in and all declarations
were handed to and kept by him.
Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was
urged by his business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines.
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon
for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance
of the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the
prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments
found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such
foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the
trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations belonging to other people.
In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of
US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of
law. There is nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to
release the said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.

Padilla vs. Dizon (Crim1)

Alexander Padilla, complainant, vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, respondent.

February 23, 1988

Per Curiam

Facts:
Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai,
saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai
of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6,
Central Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take
out or transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without
an authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the
Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by
them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its
equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the
Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the
trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the
Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than
P50,000.00.
Magno vs. CA (Crim1)
Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

June 26, 1992

Paras, J:

Facts:
Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop
operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.
VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice
President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance
could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.
The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as
warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party who
could lend him that amount.
Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.
As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest
had no sufficient fund.
Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the
equipment.
Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.
Issue:
Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.
Held:
No Criminal Law- People of the R.P. vs. Pugay
Ratio: THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 3(2) & 8(2) OF THE R.P.C.
To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not
"A Conspiracy exists when two or more people come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did
felony and decide to commit it."
not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance.
"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment."

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay

No. L-74324 17November1988

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder
of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as
mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.

Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep
together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite.
Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they were drunk),
and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of
gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do the deed.
Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night
and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal
responsibilities of the accused?
There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous
agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had
the same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the
scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of
miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson
arising from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable
only for the act that was committed by him.

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.

Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising
from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. -
GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying
circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED
to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT
FOR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE
JUDGEMENTS.

Bill of Rights
Ivler vs. San Pedro

G.R. No. 172716November 17, 2010

FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the
death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty
to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
 The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-
offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under
the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition
for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including
the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this
Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as
of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when
the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the
beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is
more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light
offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress
can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the
most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as
grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of
culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of
Petition granted.
respondent Ponces husband.

RULING:

The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the
prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense
of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses.
294 SCRA 751, August 31, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling," ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA, TEODULO
ALEGARBES and EUFEMIO CABANERO, accused, ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling" and
ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA, accused-appellants.

Fact: Beronga, Sabalones, Alegarbes, and Cabanero were convicted after a shooting incident in Cebu in
1985 which led to the death of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, and fatal injuries of Nelson Tiempo,
Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores. The victims were asked to bring the car of a certain Stephen Lim who
also attended a wedding party. Nelson Tiempo drove the car with Rogelio Presores. Alfredo Nardo drove
the owner-type jeep along with Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo to aid the group back to the party after
parking the car at Lims house. When they reached the gate, they were met with a sudden burst of gunfire.
The accused were identified as the gunmen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Sabalones and Beronga appealed.

Crime Committed: Two counts of murder, and three counts of frustrated murder

Contention of the People: Prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores testified about the
shooting and identified the faces of the accused. Presores was riding in the car that is behind the jeep. He
positively identified Sabalones as one of the gunmen. When the gunmen fired at the car, driver Nelson
Tiempo immediately maneuvered and arrived at Major Juan Tiempos house from which they have
escaped death.

Contention of the Accused: Accused-appellants Sabalones and Beronga denied their presence during the
commission of the crime. Sabalones presented numerous witnesses who stated that he was sound asleep
when the incident took place [since he got tired watching over his brothers wake]. While Beronga
testified that he attended a cock-derby in Cebu, and was fetched by his wife at 7 pm, arrived home by
10:30 pm to sleep. Sabalones even escaped from place to place to flee from the wrath of Maj. Juan
Tiempo, the father of the two victims. The defense even pointed out errors from the testimonies of the
witnesses arguing that the place where the incident happened is dim and not lighted.

RULING: The appeal is DENIED. Costs against appellants.

Issue 1: Whether the prosecution witnesses and evidences are credible?

Yes. RTC findings were binding to court with appreciated testimonies of two witnesses. There was
positive identification by survivors who saw them when they peered during lulls in gunfire. The place was
well-lit, whether from post of cars headlights. The extrajudicial confession has no bearing because the
conviction was based on positive identification. It is binding though to the co-accused because it is used as
cirmustancial evidence corroborated by one witness. The inconcistencies are minor and inconsequential
which strengthen credibility of testimony. Furthermore, in aberratio ictus [mistake in blow], mistake does
not diminish culpability; same gravity applies, more proper to use error in personae. Alibi cannot prevail
over positive identification by the prosecution witnesses.

Issue 2: Whether the alibis are acceptable?
No. It was still quite near the crime scene. It is overruled by positive identification. Using the case of
People v. Nescio, Alibi is not credible when the accused-appellant is only a short distance from the scene
of the crime. Furthermore, flight indicates guilt.
Issue 3:Whether the correct penalty is imposed?
No. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, to
death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the appellate court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder. The CA erred in
computing the penalty for each of the three counts of frustrated murder. Under Article 50 of the RPC, the
penalty for frustrated felony is next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated
felony. Because there are no mitigating or aggravating conspiracy between the two accused. It does not
matter that the prosecution has failed to show who was between the two who actually pulled the trigger
that killed the child. They are liable as co-conspirators since the act of a conspirator becomes the act of
another regardless of the precise degree of participation in the act.
Also there was a presence of treachery, because of the circumstances that the crime was done at night time
and that the accused hid themselves among the bamboo. Evident premeditation is also an aggravating
circumstance [the accused had planned to kill the victim some days before].
GEMMA JACINTO vs PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 162540 13July2009 592SCRA26
FACTS: In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of Mega Foam, a post dated checked
worth P10,000 as payment for Babys purchases from Mega Foam International, Inc. The said check was
deposited to the account of Jacqueline Capitles husband-Generoso. Rowena Recablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was looking for
Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited had been dishonored. Thereafter, Joseph
Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell that the BDO Check bounced. However, Baby said that she had already
paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed a
criminal case for qualified theft against the two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.
RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of the sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five
(5) months and Eleven (11) days to Six (6) years, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible Crime.
HELD: Yes, Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioners act of receiving the cash
replacement should not be considered as continuation of the Theft.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:
1. That the Act performed would be an offer against persons or property;
2. That the act was alone with evil intent; and
3. That the accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.
The time that petitioner took a possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the
acts to consummate that crime of theft had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an
impossible crime and suffer the penalty of Six (6) months of arresto mayor and pay courts.
 The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a
crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention
will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.

Further, factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been
committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality
the crime was impossible of commission.

Petition GRANTED, respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is
hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay
the costs.

SULPICIO INTOD vs. CA (G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992)

SEP TEMBER 9, 2016 / RUSSELL J AY

Subject: Criminal Law 1- Impossible Crime (Legal vs. Factual Impossibility)

Ponente: Justice Jose C. Campos Jr.
Doctrine: Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
FACTS: Some time in February of 1979, the petitioner, together with three other armed men, went to
Salvador Mandayas house and fired gunshots at his bedroom. Unknown to them, Mandaya was not in his
bedroom, and the house was occupied by his son-in-law and his family.
RTC convicted Intod of attempted. Petioner raised the case to CA but the same affirmed the decision.
Petitioner now contends that he is only responsible for an impossible crime under par. 2, art. 4 of RPC.

ISSUE: WON is guilty of impossible crime only.

RULING: YES. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act;
(3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to this
category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim
was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
 Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but
not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal

conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the
time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to
take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which
the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote
Urbano v. IAC
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
Facts: unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place where
operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act
he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to
or condition is the proximate cause."
see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that
he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his
bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an
amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano
was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be
caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano
was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of
Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that
he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied;
hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latters death

Held:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous
chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the
symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however,
died on the second day from theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound
was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently,
 Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal

jurisdiction of the receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested,
Liang v. People prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On
G.R. No. 125865 March 26, 2001 the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, that is, only those

necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its purposes.
Lesson: Criminal acts not immune o officials and employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts,

notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity

Laws Applicable: Vienna Convention o If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to certify by the DFA

FACTS:

2 criminal informations for for grave oral defamation were filed against Jeffrey Liang, a Chinese national

who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by Joyce V. Cabal, a

member of the clerical staff of ADB

MTC: dismissed the complaint stating that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes

RTC: Upon a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People of the Philippines annulled and set

aside the order of MTC

SC: Denied petition for review on the ground that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB

is not absolute and is limited on the official capacity and immunity CANNOT cover the commission of a

crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty

A motion of reconsideration is filed

ISSUE: W/N the crime of oral deflamation enjoys immunity

HELD: NO

slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity

issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to

determine

PUNO, J., concurring:

the nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is
 Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729
G.R. No.L-18924 October 19, 1922
ROMUALDEZ, J.

FACTS:
appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
Lower court dismissed the case

ISSUE: W/N the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters

HELD: The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.
YES.
2 fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law
1. French rule-according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not
be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed
UNLESS: their commission affects the peace and security of the territory
2. English rule
-based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States
-according to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the
country within territory they were committed.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction
or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship
where the crime in question was committed belongs.
mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts,
because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against
the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being
used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates
avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly
a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects
within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the
aforesaid repressive statute.
 Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729
G.R. No.L-18924 October 19, 1922
ROMUALDEZ, J.

FACTS:
appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
Lower court dismissed the case

ISSUE: W/N the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters

HELD: The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.
YES.
2 fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law
1. French rule-according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not
be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed
UNLESS: their commission affects the peace and security of the territory
2. English rule
-based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States
-according to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the
country within territory they were committed.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction
or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship
where the crime in question was committed belongs.
mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts,
because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against
the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being
used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates
avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly
a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects
within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the
aforesaid repressive statute.
"B.P. Blg 22- Bouncing Checks Law"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Ladonga

G.R. No. 141066 17February2005

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.

The RTC, convicted both Evangeline Ladonga and her spouse Adronico, both are regular customers in the
pawnshop business of Mr. Oculam in Tagbilaran City, Bohol; sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga
spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check
No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990
and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between
May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by
UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon
presentment for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT"; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the
check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

In this case Evangeline Ladonga is trying to contest her conviction on the grounds that she was not a party
to the agreement and that she was not a signatory to the checks and that the decision of the Court of
Appeals with regard to her being a co-conspirator is w/o merit.

In determining if she is liable for the same crime it must be proven that there was conspiracy
It was not proven by direct evidence even by the witness testimony that Evangeline Ladonga was merely
present at the time of the issuance of the checks. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean
concurrence with the criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself
amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime
with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
Criminal liability cannot be incurred based on general allegation of conspiracy. In criminal cases, moral
certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the
evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt
with the requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases.

HELD:

The instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, of the Court of Appeals convicting the
petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline
Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.