SECOND DIVISION

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) G.R. No. 170132

and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President
& General Manager,

Petitioners, Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
*
CORONA,

AZCUNA, and

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, GARCIA, JJ.

Respondent.

Promulgated:

December 6, 2006
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and its President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia (Garcia, for short) assail and
seek to nullify the Decision[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] dated June 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87220, as reiterated in its Resolution[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] of October 18, 2005 denying Garcias motion for
reconsideration.

The recourse is cast against the following setting:

1
 A four-day October 2004 concerted demonstration, rallies and en masse walkout waged/held in front of
the GSIS main office in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, started it all. Forming a huge part of the October 4 to
October 7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS personnel, among them members of the herein respondent
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (KMG or the Union), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file
employees. Contingents from other government agencies joined causes with the GSIS group. The mass actions
target appeared to have been herein petitioner Garcia and his management style. While the Mayor of Pasay City
allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of the participating GSIS employees was not covered by a prior
approved leave.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]

On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum
directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for
their participation in said rally. In reaction, KMGs counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said
directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience
to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the
filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif]

What happened next is summarized by the CA in its challenged decision of June 16, 2005, albeit the
herein petitioners would except from some of the details of the appellate courts narration:

Ignoring said formal charges, KMG, thru its President, Albert Velasco, commenced the instant suit on November
2, 2004, with the filing of the Petition for Prohibition at bench. On the ground that its members should not be
made to explain why they supported their unions cause, petitioner [KMG] faulted respondent [Garcia] with blatant
disregard of Civil Service Resolution No. 021316, otherwise known as the Guidelines for Prohibited Mass Action,
Section 10 of which exhorts government agencies to (1) harness all means within their capacity to accord
due regard and attention to employees grievances and (2) facilitate their speedy and amicable disposition
through the use of grievance machinery or (3) any other modes of settlement sanctioned by law and existing
civil service rules. Two supplements to the foregoing petition were eventually filed by KMG. The first, apprised
explained) [the CA] of the supposed fact that its Speaker, Atty. Molina, had been placed under preventive
suspension for 90 days and that the formal charges thus filed will not only deprive its members of the privileges
and benefits due them but will also disqualify them from promotion, step increment adjustments and receipt of
monetary benefits, including their 13th month pay and Christmas bonuses. The second, xxx manifested that, on
December 17, 2004, respondent [Garcia] served a spate (series / flood) of additional formal charges against 230
of KMGs members for their participation in the aforesaid grievance demonstrations.

In his December 14, 2004 comment to the foregoing petition, respondent [Garcia]
averred that the case at bench was filed by an unauthorized representative in view of the fact
that Albert Velasco had already been dropped from the GSIS rolls and, by said token, had
ceased to be a member much less the President of KMG. Invoking the rule against forum
shopping, respondent [Garcia] called [the CAs] attention to the supposed fact that the
allegations in the subject petition merely duplicated those already set forth in two petitions for
certiorari and prohibition earlier filed by Albert Velasco . Because said petitions are, in point
of fact, pending before this court as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 86130 and 86365, respondent [Garcia]
prayed for the dismissal of the petition at bench .[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] (Words in bracket
added.)

2
 It appears that pending resolution by the CA of the KMG petition for prohibition in this case, the GSIS
management proceeded with the investigation of the administrative cases filed. As represented in a pleading
before the CA, as of May 18, 2005, two hundred seven (207) out of the two hundred seventy eight (278) cases
filed had been resolved, resulting in the exoneration (release) of twenty (20) respondent-employees, the reprimand
of one hundred eighty two (182) and the suspension for one month of five (5).[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]

On June 16, 2005, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] holding that
Garcias filing of administrative charges against 361 of [KMGs] members is tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion which may be the proper subject of the writ of prohibition. Dispositively, the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition [of KMG] is GRANTED and

respondent [Winston F. Garcia] is hereby PERPETUALLY ENJOINED from implementing
the issued formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising from the same facts
and events.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

Unable to accept the above ruling and the purported speculative factual and erroneous legal premises
holding it together, petitioner Garcia sought reconsideration. In its equally assailed Resolution[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]
of October 18, 2005, however, the appellate court denied reconsideration of its decision.

Hence, this recourse by the petitioners ascribing serious errors on the appellate court in granting the
petition for prohibition absent an instance of grave abuse of authority on their part.

We resolve to GRANT the petition.

It should be stressed right off that the civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS,[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif]
or those created by special law.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] As such, employees of covered GOCCs
are part of the civil service system and are subject to circulars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general terms/conditions of employment, inclusive of matters
involving self-organization, strikes, demonstrations and like concerted actions. In fact, policies established on
public sector unionism and rules issued on mass action have been noted and cited by the Court in at least a case. [if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif]
Among these issuances is Executive Order (EO) No. 180, series of 1987, providing guidelines
for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. Relevant also is CSC Resolution No. 021316
which provides rules on prohibited concerted mass actions in the public sector.

There is hardly any dispute about the formal charges against the 278 affected GSIS employees a mix of
KMG union and non-union members - having arose from their having gone on unauthorized leave of absence
(AWOL) for at least a day or two in the October 4 to 7, 2004 stretch to join the ranks of the demonstrators
/rallyists at that time. As stated in each of the formal charges, the employees act of attending, joining, participating
3
and taking part in the strike/rally is a transgression of the rules on strike in the public sector. The question that
immediately comes to the fore (face), therefore, is whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by
said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action. If in the affirmative, then the
denounced filing of the administrative charges would be prima facie tenable, inasmuch as engaging in mass
actions resulting in work stoppage or service disruption constitutes, in the minimum, the punishable offense of
acting prejudicial to the best interest of the service.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] If in the negative, then such filing would
indeed smack of arbitrariness and justify the issuance of a corrective or preventive writ.

Petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural consequence of the service-
disrupting rallies and demonstrations staged during office hours by the absenting GSIS employees, there being
appropriate issuances outlawing such kinds of mass action. On the other hand, the CA, agreeing with the
respondents argument, assumed the view and held that the organized demonstrating employees did nothing more
than air their grievances in the exercise of their broader rights of free expression[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] and are,
therefore, not amenable to administrative sanctions. For perspective, following is what the CA said:

Although the filing of administrative charges against [respondent KMGs] members is well within [petitioner
Garcias] official [disciplinary] prerogatives, [his] exercise of the power vested under Section 45 of Republic Act
No. 8291 was tainted with arbitrariness and vindictiveness against which prohibition was sought by [respondent].
xxx the fact that the subject mass demonstrations were directed against [Garcias] supposed mismanagement
of the financial resources of the GSIS, by and of itself, renders the filing of administrative charges against
[KMGs] member suspect. More significantly, we find the gravity of the offenses and the sheer number of persons
charged administratively to be, at the very least, antithetical (opposing) to the best interest of the service.

It matters little that, instead of the 361 alleged by petitioner, only 278 charges were actually filed [and]
in the meantime, disposed of and of the said number, 20 resulted to exoneration, 182 to
reprimand and 5 to the imposition of a penalty of one month suspension. Irrespective of their
outcome, the severe penalties prescribed for the offense with which petitioners members were
charged, to our mind, bespeak (indicate) of bellicose (aggressive) and castigatory (penalizing)
reaction . The fact that most of the employees [Garcia] administratively charged were
eventually meted with what appears to be a virtual slap on the wrist even makes us wonder
why respondent even bothered to file said charges at all. xxx.

Alongside the consequences of the right of government employees to form, join or assist employees
organization, we have already mentioned how the broader rights of free expression cast
its long shadow over the case. xxx we find [petitioner Garcias] assailed acts, on the whole,
anathema (censure) to said right which has been aptly (appropriately) characterized as
preferred, one which stands on a higher level than substantive economic and other liberties,
the matrix of other important rights of our people. xxx.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] (Underscoring
and words in bracket added; citations omitted.)

While its decision and resolution do not explicitly say so, the CA equated the right to form associations
with the right to engage in strike and similar activities available to workers in the private sector. In the concrete,
the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining or assisting
employees organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging
(conducting) or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such
mass action. Citing what Justice Isagani Cruz said in Manila Public School Teachers Association [MPSTA] v.
Laguio, Jr.,[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] the appellate court declared:
4
It is already evident from the aforesaid provisions of Resolution No. 021316 that employees of the GSIS are not
among those specifically barred from forming, joining or assisting employees organization such as [KMG]. If only
for this ineluctable fact, the merit of the petition at bench is readily discernible.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]

[if !supportLineBreakNewLine]

[endif]

SC RULING

We are unable to lend concurrence to the above CA posture. For, let alone the fact that it ignores what
the Court has uniformly held all along, the appellate courts position is contrary to what Section 4 in relation to
Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 021316[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] provides. Besides, the appellate courts invocation
of Justice Cruzs opinion in MPSTA is clearly off tangent (line), the good Justices opinion thereat being a dissent. It
may be, as the appellate court urged that the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the
government for a redress of grievances stand on a level higher than economic and other liberties. Any suggestion,
however, about these rights as including the right on the part of government personnel to strike ought to be, as it
has been, trashed. We have made this abundantly clear in our past determinations. For instance, in Alliance of
Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment,[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] a case decided under the aegis
of the 1973 Constitution, an en banc Court declared that it would be unfair to allow employees of government
corporations to resort to concerted activity with the ever present threat of a strike to wring benefits from
Government. Then came the 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government
personnel to self-organization[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] to complement the provision according workers the right to
engage in peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif]

It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved
Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr.,[if
!supportFootnotes][22][endif]
that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes or in concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of
unions or associations, without including the right to strike.

Jacinto v. Court of Appeals[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] came next and there we explained:

Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in Association of Court
of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and of assembly,
there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and]
the overriding considerations of national security . . . .

As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the
provision in accordance with law. This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law,
regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180
which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for
instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service by stating that the Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be observed.
5
 (Emphasis and words in bracket added; citations omitted)

And in the fairly recent case of Gesite v. Court of Appeals,[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] the Court defined the limits of
the right of government employees to organize in the following wise:

It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that
employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other
forms of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.
The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike,

adding that public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass actions may
be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Significantly, 1986 Constitutional Commission member Eulogio Lerum, answering in the negative the poser of
whether or not the right of government employees to self-organization also includes the right to strike, stated:

When we proposed this amendment providing for self organization of government employees, it does not mean
that because they have the right to organize, they have also the right to strike. That is a different matter. xxx[if
!supportFootnotes][25][endif]

With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondents members
launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same
thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase prohibited concerted activity refers to any collective activity
undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees organization, with the intent of
effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or
otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] Indeed, for
four straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out and waged or
participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main office building.
The record of attendance[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] for the period material shows that, on the first day of the protest,
851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the main office (1,756) took
to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] leaving the other employees to
fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day. On the second
day, 707 employees left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the third
day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.

To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services remained at the usual level of
efficiency at the GSIS main office during those four (4) days of massive walkouts and wholesale absences would
be to understate things. And to place the erring employees beyond the reach of administrative accountability
would be to trivialize the civil service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of professionalism exacted of
civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. [if
6
!supportFootnotes][29][endif]

The appellate court made specific reference to the parliament of the streets, obviously to lend
concurrence to respondents pretension that the gathering of GSIS employees on October 4-7, 2004 was an
assembly of citizens out only to air grievances, not a striking crowd. According to the respondent, a strike
presupposes a mass action undertaken to press for some economic demands or secure additional material
employment benefits.

We are not convinced.

In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in October 2004, the stubborn fact
remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities during their free time, had
taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As events evolved, they
assembled in front of the GSIS main office building during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even
tried to convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-delivery disruption, the
very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government personnel.[if
!supportFootnotes][30][endif]

The Court can concede hypothetically that the protest rally and gathering in question did not involve
some specific material demand. But then the absence of such economic-related demand, even if true, did not,
under the premises, make such mass action less of a prohibited concerted activity. For, as articulated earlier, any
collective activity undertaken by government employees with the intent of effecting work stoppage or
service disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise, is a
prohibited concerted mass action[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif] and doubtless actionable administratively.
Bangalisan even went further to say the following: [i]n the absence of statute, public employees do not have the
right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.

To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the authority and responsibility,
under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline
GSIS personnel for cause.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the filing
of administrative charges against the absenting participants of the October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely
performed a duty expected of him and enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when
he signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and doubtless within his
jurisdiction.

It bears to reiterate at this point that the GSIS employees concerned were proceeded against - and
eventually either exonerated, reprimanded or meted a one-month suspension, as the case may be - not for the
exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of grievance, but for engaging in what
appeared to be a prohibited concerted activity. Respondent no less admitted that its members and other GSIS
employees might have disrupted public service.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif]

To be sure, arbitrariness and whimsical exercise of power or, in fine, grave abuse of discretion on the
part of petitioner Garcia cannot be simplistically inferred from the sheer (pure) number of those charged as well as
the gravity or the dire (terrible) consequences of the charge of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, as the appellate court made it to appear. The principle of accountability demands that
every erring government employee be made answerable for any malfeasance or misfeasance committed. And lest
(in case) it be overlooked, the mere filing of formal administrative case, regardless of the gravity of the offense
7
charged, does not overcome the presumptive innocence of the persons complained of nor does it shift the burden
of evidence to prove guilt of an administrative offense from the complainant.

Moreover, the Court invites attention to its holding in MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., a case involving over 800
public school teachers who took part in mass actions for which the then Secretary of Education filed
administrative complaints on assorted charges, such as gross misconduct. Of those charged, 650 were dismissed
and 195 suspended for at least six (6) months The Court, however, did not consider the element of number of
respondents thereat and/or the dire consequences of the charge/s as fatally vitiating or beclouding the bona fides of
the Secretary of Educations challenged action. Then as now, the Court finds the filing of charges against a large
number of persons and/or the likelihood that they will be suspended or, worse, dismissed from the service for the
offense as indicating a strong and clear case of grave abuse of authority to justify the issuance of a writ of
prohibition.

The appellate court faulted petitioner Garcia for not first taping existing grievance machinery and other
modes of settlement agreed upon in the GSIS-KMG Collective Negotiations Agreement (CAN) before going full
steam ahead with his formal charges.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]

The Court can plausibly accord cogency to the CAs angle on grievance procedure but for the fact that it
conveniently disregarded what appears to be the more relevant provision of the CNA. We refer to Article VI
which reads:

The GSIS Management and the KMG have mutually agreed to promote the principle
of shared responsibility on all matters and decisions affecting the rights, benefits and interests
of all GSIS employees . Accordingly, the parties also mutually agree that the KMG shall not
declare a strike nor stage any concerted action which will disrupt public service and the GSIS
management shall not lockout employees who are members of the KMG during the term of
this agreement. GSIS Management shall also respect the rights of the employees to air their
sentiments through peaceful concerted activities during allowable hours, subject to reasonable
office rules .[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] (Underscoring added)

If the finger of blame, therefore, is to be pointed at someone for non-exhaustion of less confrontational
remedies, it should be at the respondent union for spearheading a concerted mass action without resorting to
available settlement mechanism. As it were, it was KMG, under Atty. Alberto Velasco, which opened fire first.
That none of the parties bothered to avail of the grievance procedures under the GSIS-KMG CNA should not be
taken against the GSIS. At best, both GSIS management and the Union should be considered as in pari delicto.

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss at length the legal standing of
Alberto Velasco to represent the herein respondent union and to initiate the underlying petition for prohibition.
Suffice it to state that Velasco, per Joint Resolution No. 04-10-01 approved on October 5, 2004 by the KMG Joint
Executive-Legislative Assembly, had ceased to be member, let alone president, of the KMG, having previously
been dropped from the rolls of GSIS employees.[if !supportFootnotes][36][endif] While the dropping from the rolls is alleged
to have been the subject of a CA-issued temporary restraining order (TRO), the injunction came after Atty.
Velasco had in fact been separated from the service and it appears that the TRO had already expired.

As a final consideration, the Court notes or reiterates the following relevant incidents surrounding the
8
disposition of the case below:

1. The CA had invoked as part of its ratio decidendi a dissenting opinion in MPSTA, even going to the
extent of describing as instructive and timely a portion, when the majority opinion thereat, which the appellate
court ignored, is the controlling jurisprudence.

2. The CA gave prominence to dispositions and rattled off holdings[if !supportFootnotes][37][endif] of the Court,
which appropriately apply only to strikes in the private industry labor sector, and utilized the same as springboard
to justify an inference of grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, it only gave perfunctory treatment if not
totally ignored jurisprudence that squarely dealt with strikes in the public sector, as if the right to strike given to
unions in private corporations/entities is necessarily applicable to civil service employees.

3. As couched, the assailed CA decision perpetually bars respondent Garcia and necessarily whoever
succeeds him as GSIS President not only from implementing the formal charges against GSIS employees who
participated in the October 4 - 7, 2004 mass action but also from issuing other formal charges arising from the
same events. The injunction was predicated on a finding that grave abuse of discretion attended the exercise of
petitioner Garcias disciplinary power vested him under Section 45 of RA 8291.[if !supportFootnotes][38][endif] At bottom
then, the assailed decision struck down as a nullity, owing to the alleged attendant arbitrariness, not only acts that
have already been done, but those yet to be done. In net effect, any formal charge arising from the October 4-7,
2004 incident is, under any and all circumstances, prejudged as necessarily tainted with arbitrariness to be slain at
sight.

The absurdities and ironies easily deducible from the foregoing situations are not lost on the Court.

We close with the observation that the assailed decision and resolution, if allowed to remain
undisturbed, would likely pave the way to the legitimization of mass actions undertaken by civil servants,
regardless of their deleterious effects on the interest of the public they have sworn to serve with loyalty and
efficiency. Worse still, it would permit the emergence of a system where public sector workers are, as the
petitioners aptly put it, immune from the minimum reckoning for acts that [under settled jurisprudence] are
concededly unlawful. This aberration would be intolerable.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the writ of prohibition issued by that court is NULLIFIED.

No Cost.

SO ORDERED.

9
[G.R. No. 102084. August 12, 1998]
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER AND COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, petitioner, vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, Undersecretary of Labor and Employment; ROLANDO S.
DE LA CRUZ, Med-Arbiter Regional Office No. IV, DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL
CENTER AND COLLEGE OF MEDICINE SUPERVISORY UNION-FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner De La Salle University Medical Center and College of Medicine (DLSUMCCM) is a hospital and
medical school at Dasmarias, Cavite. Private respondent Federation of Free Workers De La Salle University
Medical Center and College of Medicine Supervisory Union Chapter (FFW-DLSUMCCMSUC), on the other
hand, is a labor organization composed of the supervisory employees of petitioner DLSUMCCM.
On April 17, 1991, the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), a national federation of labor unions, issued a
certificate to private respondent FFW-DLSUMCCMSUC recognizing it as a local chapter. On the same day, it
filed on behalf of private respondent FFW-DLSUMCCMSUC a petition for certification election among the
supervisory employees of petitioner DLSUMCCM. Its petition was opposed by petitioner DLSUMCCM on the
grounds that several employees who signed the petition for certification election were managerial employees and
that the FFW-DLSUMCCMSUC was composed of both supervisory and rank-and-file employees in the
company.[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
In its reply dated May 22, 1991, private respondent FFW-DLSUMCCMSUC denied petitioners allegations.
It contended that
2. Herein petition seeks for the holding of a certification election among the supervisory employees of
herein respondent. It does not intend to include managerial employees.
....
6. It is not true that supervisory employees are joining the rank-and-file employees union. While it is true that both
regular rank-and-file employees and supervisory employees of herein respondent have affiliated with FFW, yet
there are two separate unions organized by FFW. The supervisory employees have a separate charter certificate
issued by FFW.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
On July 5, 1991, respondent Rolando S. de la Cruz, med-arbiter of the Department of Labor and
Employment Regional Office No. IV, issued an order granting respondent unions petition for certification
election. He said:
. . . . [petitioner] . . . claims that based on the job descriptions which will be presented at the hearing, the covered
employees who are considered managers occupy the positions of purchasing officers, personnel officers, property
officers, cashiers, heads of various sections and the like.

[Petitioner] also argues that assuming that some of the employees concerned are not managerial but mere
supervisory employees, the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) cannot extend a charter certificate to this group of
employees without violating the express provision of Article 245 which provides that supervisory employees shall
not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form
separate labor organizations of their own because the FFW had similarly issued a charter certificate to its rank-
and-file employees.
....
In its position paper, [petitioner] stated that most, if not all, of the employees listed in . . . the petition are
considered managerial employees, thereby admitting that it has supervisory employees who are undoubtedly
qualified to join or form a labor organization of their own. The record likewise shows that [petitioner] promised to
present the job descriptions of the concerned employees during the hearing but failed to do so. Thus, this office
has no basis in determining at this point in time who among them are considered managerial or supervisory
employees. At any rate, there is now no question that [petitioner] has in its employ supervisory employees who are
qualified to join or form a labor union. Consequently, this office is left with no alternative but to order the holding
of certification election pursuant to Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended, which mandates the holding of
certification election if a petition is filed by a legitimate labor organization involving an unorganized
establishment, as in the case of herein respondent.
As to the allegation of [petitioner] that the act of the supervisory employees in affiliating with FFW to whom the
rank-and-file employees are also affiliated is violative of Article 245 of the Labor Code, suffice it to state that the
two groups are considered separate bargaining units and local chapters of FFW. They are, for all intents and
purposes, separate with each other and their affiliation with FFW would not make them members of the same
labor union. This must be the case because it is settled that the locals are considered the basic unit or principal
10
with the labor federation assuming the role of an agent. The mere fact, therefore, that they are represented by or
under the same agent is of no moment. They are still considered separate with each other.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
On July 30, 1991, petitioner DLSUMCCM appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, citing
substantially the same arguments it had raised before the med-arbiter. However, its appeal was dismissed. In his
resolution, dated August 30, 1991, respondent Undersecretary of Labor and Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma
found the evidence presented by petitioner DLSUMCCM concerning the alleged managerial status of several
employees to be insufficient. He also held that, following the ruling of this Court in Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v.
CIR,[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] unions formed independently by supervisory and rank-and-file employees of a company
may legally affiliate with the same national federation.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was denied. In his order dated September 19, 1991,
respondent Laguesma stated:
We reviewed the records once more, and find that the issues and arguments adduced by movant have been
squarely passed upon in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered. Accordingly, we find no legal justification to
alter, much less set aside, the aforesaid resolution. Perforce, the motion for reconsideration must fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby denied for lack of merit and the resolution of this
office dated 30 August 1991 STANDS.
No further motions of a similar nature shall hereinafter be entertained.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner DLSUMCCM contends that respondent Laguesma gravely abused his discretion. While it does
not anymore insist that several of those who joined the petition for certification election are holding managerial
positions in the company, petitioner nonetheless pursues the question whether unions formed independently by
supervisory and rank-and-file employees of a company may validly affiliate with the same national federation.
With respect to this question, it argues:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT, HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA,
UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, IN A CAPRICIOUS, ARBITRARY AND
WHIMSICAL EXERCISE OF POWER ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO ACTING WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE DENIED THE
PETITIONERS APPEAL AND ORDERED THE HOLDING OF A CERTIFICATION ELECTION
AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE SUPERVISORY UNION EMPLOYED IN PETITIONERS
COMPANY DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID SUPERVISORY UNION WAS AFFILIATED WITH THE
FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS TO WHICH THE RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF THE SAME
COMPANY ARE LIKEWISE AFFILIATED, CONTRARY TO THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE 245 OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]
The contention has no merit.
Supervisory employees have the right to self-organization as do other classes of employees save only
managerial ones. The Constitution states that the right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law, shall not be abridged. [if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif]
As we recently held in UnitedPepsi-Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma,[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] the
framers of the Constitution intended, by this provision, to restore the right of supervisory employees to self-
organization which had been withdrawn from them during the period of martial law. Thus:
Commissioner Lerum sought to amend the draft of what was later to become Art. III, 8 of the present Constitution:
....
MR. LERUM. . . . Also, we have unions of supervisory employees and of security guards. But what is tragic about
this is that after the 1973 Constitution was approved and in spite of an express recognition of the right to organize
in P.D. No. 442, known as the Labor Code, the right of government workers, supervisory employees and security
guards to form unions was abolished.
....
We are afraid that without any corresponding provision covering the private sector, the security guards, the
supervisory employees ... will still be excluded and that is the purpose of this amendment.
....
In sum, Lerums proposal to amend Art. III, 8 of the draft Constitution by including labor unions in the guarantee
of organizational right should be taken in the context of statements that his aim was the removal of the statutory
ban against security guards and supervisory employees joining labor organizations. The approval by the
Constitutional Commission of his proposal can only mean, therefore, that the Commission intended the absolute
right to organize of government workers, supervisory employees, and security guards to be constitutionally
guaranteed.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
Conformably with the constitutional mandate, Art. 245 of the Labor Code now provides for the right of
supervisory employees to self-organization, subject to the limitation that they cannot join an organization of rank-
and-file employees:

11
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees
but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
The reason for the segregation of supervisory and rank-and-file employees of a company with respect to the
exercise of the right to self-organization is the difference in their interests. Supervisory employees are more
closely identified with the employer than with the rank-and-file employees. If supervisory and rank-and-file
employees in a company are allowed to form a single union, the conflicting interests of these groups impair their
relationship and adversely affect discipline, collective bargaining, and strikes.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] These
consequences can obtain not only in cases where supervisory and rank-and-file employees in the same company
belong to a single union but also where unions formed independently by supervisory and rank-andfile employees
of a company are allowed to affiliate with the same national federation. Consequently, this Court has held in Atlas
Lithographic Services Inc. v. Laguesma[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] that -
To avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file or where the supervisors labor
organization would represent conflicting interests, then a local supervisors union should not be allowed to affiliate
with a national federation of unions of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively participates in union
activities in the company.
As we explained in that case, however, such a situation would obtain only where two conditions concur:
First, the rank-and-file employees are directly under the authority of supervisory employees.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif]
Second, the national federation is actively involved in union activities in the company.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] Indeed,
it is the presence of these two conditions which distinguished Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma from
Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v. CIR[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] where a different conclusion was reached.
The affiliation of two local unions in a company with the same national federation is not by itself a negation
of their independence since in relation to the employer, the local unions are considered as the principals, while the
federation is deemed to be merely their agent. This conclusion is in accord with the policy that any limitation on
the exercise by employees of the right to self-organization guaranteed in the Constitution must be construed
strictly. Workers should be allowed the practice of this freedom to the extent recognized in the fundamental law.
As held in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc.:[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif]
The locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining
power between the employer and their employee members in the economic struggle for the fruits of the joint
productive effort of labor and capital; and the association of locals into the national unionwas in furtherance of the
same end. These associations are consensual entities capable of entering into such legal relations with their
members. The essential purpose was the affiliation of the local unions into a common enterprise to increase by
collective action the common bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the locals
remained the basic units of association, free to serve their own and the common interest of all, and free also to
renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought it to
existence.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
The questions in this case, therefore, are whether the rank-and-file employees of petitioner DLSUMCCM
who compose a labor union are directly under the supervisory employees whose own union is affiliated with the
same national federation (Federation of Free Workers) and whether such national federation is actively involved in
union activities in the company so as to make the two unions in the same company, in reality, just one union.
Although private respondent FFW-DLSUMCCMSUC and another union composed of rank-and-file
employees of petitioner DLSUMCCM are indeed affiliated with the same national federation, the FFW, petitioner
DLSUMCCM has not presented any evidence showing that the rank-and-file employees composing the other
union are directly under the authority of the supervisory employees. As held in Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v.
CIR,[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] the fact that the two groups of workers are employed by the same company and the fact
that they are affiliated with a common national federation are not sufficient to justify the conclusion that their
organizations are actually just one. Their immediate professional relationship must be established. To borrow the
language of Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v. CIR:[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
We find without merit the contention of petitioner that if affiliation will be allowed, only one union will in fact
represent both supervisors and rank-and-file employees of the petitioner; that there would be an indirect affiliation
of supervisors and rank-andfile employees with one labor organization; that there would be a merging of the two
bargaining units; and that the respondent union will lose its independence because it becomes an alter ego of the
federation.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]
Mention has already been made of the fact that the petition for certification election in this case was filed by
the FFW on behalf of the local union. This circumstance, while showing active involvement by the FFW in union
activities at the company, is by itself insufficient to justify a finding of violation of Art. 245 since there is no proof
that the supervisors who compose the local union have direct authority over the rank-and-file employees
composing the other local union which is also affiliated with the FFW. This fact differentiates the case from Atlas
Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma,[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] in which, in addition to the fact that the petition for
certification election had been filed by the national federation, it was shown that the rank-and-file employees were

12
directly under the supervisors organized by the same federation.
It follows that respondent labor officials did not gravely abuse their discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Melo, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Puno- no part.

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