SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 159195 May 9, 2005

MOBILE PROTECTIVE & DETECTIVE AGENCY and/or BENJAMIN AGUILAR, petitioners,

vs.
ALBERTO G. OMPAD, respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

The instant petition stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment or non-payment of
wages, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, separation pay, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and attorney's fees filed by respondent Alberto G. Ompad
against petitioners Mobile Protective & Detective Agency (Agency) and/or its president and general
manager, Benjamin C. Aguilar.

Respondent alleged that he was employed by the Agency as security guard in January 1990 and
was, since then, detailed to its various clients. He claimed having worked twelve (12) hours a day,
even during rest days and holidays, without receiving overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay,
service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. His daily wages of P138.00 since 1995
and P140.00 in 1997 were allegedly below the minimum wage.2

Sometime in June 1997, respondent inquired from the project manager of the Agency's client, Manila
Southwoods, if the latter had already paid their backwages to the Agency. When petitioners found
out about his query, respondent was allegedly relieved from his post and never given another
assignment.3

On September 23, 1998, petitioners allegedly promised that they would pay respondent his money
claims provided he signs a resignation letter. He was also told to copy in his handwriting the same
resignation letter. As he needed the money, he complied. Thereafter, petitioners would give him only
the meager amount of P5,000.00, which he rejected. Respondent filed the instant complaint the
following day. He claimed that he was illegally dismissed in October 19974 and prayed for
reinstatement with backwages or backwages with separation pay and money claims, as may be
determined by the Labor Arbiter.5

On the other hand, petitioners denied respondent's allegations. According to their version,
respondent was assigned to another client, the Valle Verde Country Club (VVCC), from August 29 to
October 31, 1997 after he was relieved from his post at Manila Southwoods.6 Respondent's co-guard
at VVCC, Merlyn V. Chavez, attested that respondent drove his own tricycle whenever he was not
on duty. He told her that if he engages in his tricycle operation full time, he would be earning well.7

On October 15, 1997, respondent reported for duty at VVCC limping due to an injury sustained from
his tricycle operation. He told his headguard, Wifredo D. Bialen, "(m)alabo na siguro ang balik ko
baka mamasada na lang ako ng aking tricycle" (My return is unlikely, I might just drive my own
tricycle). On October 16, 1997, respondent allegedly stopped reporting for work.8

On September 23, 1998, the operations manager of the Agency, Domingo A. Alonzo, saw
respondent in his office and asked him whether he was still available for posting. Respondent told
him that he "cannot accept any duty anymore because [he was] rheumatic and filing [his] partial
disability with SSS." Alonzo advised him that if he was no longer interested to work, he might as well
resign. Respondent submitted his handwritten resignation letter and left the office.9 He secured the
necessary clearance prior to his resignation which was signed by him and approved by petitioner
Aguilar. Petitioners pointed out that respondent stated in his resignation letters that he had no more
claims against the Agency. They also alleged that it took respondent at least a year to file the instant
complaint.10

In his Reply to [Petitioners'] Position Paper,11 respondent assailed the affidavits of the Agency's
employees as self-serving and contended that as employer, the Agency has the burden to prove
payment of salaries and benefits. In their Reply to [Respondent's] Position Paper,12 petitioners
submitted payrolls and petty cash vouchers to show that respondent received his salaries and
benefits for January to December 1996, January to May 1997 and September to October 1997. They
claimed that respondent's allegation that he was offered money for his resignation was a mere
"product of [his] imagination." In his Rejoinder,13 respondent submitted the Agency's Statement of
Account to its client Fil-Estate Development, Inc. (Fil-Estate) and a certification from the officer-in-
charge of Fil-Estate to show that he worked for 12 hours every day without rest day and even during
holidays. Finally, in their Rejoinder,14 petitioners averred that the certification submitted by
respondent was self-serving because the said officer-in-charge was separated after a brief
employment. They also argued that their billing to another client, Fil-Estate, is irrelevant to the case
at bar.

Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.15 He held that: "[i]t is
hard to believe that he (respondent) was coerced twice [into signing the resignation letters] and he
did nothing about it." He also gave credence to the official payrolls and vouchers submitted by
petitioners to prove that respondent was paid all his money claims. Labor Arbiter Madriaga further
held that if respondent was really aggrieved, he should have filed his complaint immediately and not
one year after.

Respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed the
decision of Labor Arbiter Madriaga as to the issue of illegal dismissal. The fallo of the decision
states:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Labor [A]rbiter dated 15 July 1999 is MODIFIED
declaring the dismissal of complainant illegal and ordering respondent to pay complainant his
separation benefits in lieu of reinstatement by reason of strained relationship of one (1)
month pay for every year of service based on the prevailing minimum wage times length of
service as well as backwages from the time his compensation was withheld on October 1997
up to February 2000.

SO ORDERED.16

The NLRC held that respondent, who "had been in the employ of [petitioner Agency] for almost eight
(8) years and his employment being his only source of living to support his family will not [in his] right
mind quit his employment if not for the fact as observed by the Labor Arbiter that he was relieved
from his post and never given any detail assignment after making inquiry [with] Manila Southwood[s]
about their unpaid backwages." It observed that the two identical resignation letters, one pro
forma and the other handwritten, were "lopsided[ly] worded" to free the Agency from liabilities. The
NLRC ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed from the time he was relieved from his post and
not given subsequent assignment. It held that the offer to sign the letters of resignation in exchange
for separation pay was the only option available to respondent at that time. It did not, however,
change the fact that respondent was "constructively dismissed" by the Agency. The NLRC, however,
agreed with the findings of the Labor Arbiter as regards the issue of money claims.17

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's decision, attaching respondent's daily
time records from August to October, 1997.18 After their motion was denied,19 they filed a Petition
for Certiorari20 with the Court of Appeals (CA).

In its Decision dated March 21, 2003,21 the CA found the petition bereft of merit. It noted that the
decision of the Labor Arbiter took note of the allegations of respondent "that he (respondent) was
coerced into signing a resignation letter on September 23, 1998" and "that he was relieved from his
post at Manila Southwoods and never given an assignment after he inquired as to payment of
backwages to the agency by the client." The CA held that there is no voluntariness "[w]hen the first
resignation letter was a pro forma one, entirely drafted by the petitioner Agency for the private
respondent to merely affix his signature, and the second one entirely copied by the private
respondent with his own hand from the first resignation letter." The CA upheld the NLRC's findings
that the resignation letters were "lopsidedly worded" in favor of the Agency and gave credence to
respondent's version that he only signed those letters upon petitioners' assurance that he would, in
exchange, be given his separation pay. The fallo of the CA's decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated April 28, 2000, as well as the
Resolution dated August 31, 2000, is hereby AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.22

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching Duty Detail Order No. 9993,23 an order from
petitioner Aguilar assigning respondent to render security duties at VVCC from September 29 to
October 31, 1997. Their motion was denied,24 hence, they filed this appeal assigning the lone error
that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION AND
DENIED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY DISREGARDING THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.25

It is well-settled that in labor cases, the factual findings of the NLRC are accorded respect and even
finality by this Court when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and are supported by
substantial evidence. However, where the findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are in
variance, as in the case at bar, this Court may delve into the records and examine for itself the
questioned findings.26

In this case, petitioners maintain that the CA and the NLRC gravely erred in ruling that there was
illegal dismissal on the basis of respondent's "bare allegations." Allegedly, the two elements for a
valid resignation, viz, the formal act of resignation and the intent to resign, are present in this case.
First, petitioners contend that the resignation letters are the "hard evidence" that respondent
resigned. Second, the affidavits of Merlyn V. Chavez, Wilfredo D. Bialen, and Domingo A. Alonzo
proved respondent's intention to relinquish his position, as shown by his conduct proximate to his
tender of resignation. They contend that respondent merely "concretized his intention to sever his
relations" with the Agency by not reporting for duty for a period of almost one (1) year. Finally,
petitioners contend that respondent's claim that he was relieved from his post at Manila Southwoods
and never given any assignment after petitioners learned of his inquiry with Manila Southwoods
regarding its payment of backwages to the Agency is belied by petitioners' documentary evidence
consisting of Duty Detail Order No. 9993,27 payrolls28and daily time records. 29

We find the contentions unmeritorious.

First, it is a rule that quitclaims, waivers or releases are looked upon with disfavor and are
commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the measure of
a worker's legal rights.30

In this case, the subject resignation letters identically read:

Sept. 23/98
(Date)

The Manager
MOBILE PROT. & DET. AGENCY, INC.
E. Rodriguez Jr. Ave. cor. Atis St.,
Valle Verde I, Pasig City

Sir:

I have the honor to tender my resignation as Security guard under your Agency effective
today Sept. 23/98.

That I have regularly received all what is due me for the services rendered as Security Guard
under said Agency for the whole period of my employment.

That I have never incurred any injury during and in the course of my employment.

That the MOBILE PROTECTIVE & DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC. has no further obligation
due me, either for money or otherwise as a result of or arising out of my employment, and
that I have no claims or complaints against my employer or the Agency, judicial or
administrative.
 Hoping for your consideration on this matter.

Respectfully yours,

____________________

(sgd.) Security Guard

(Print Name)
ALBERTO G. OMPAD
Approved by:

_______________________________

(sgd.) COL. BENJAMIN C. AGUILAR

(ret)
President & General Manager31

We agree with the NLRC and the CA that the two resignation letters are dubious, to say the least. A
bare reading of their content would reveal that they are in the nature of a quitclaim, waiver or
release. They were written in a language obviously not of respondent's and "lopsidedly worded" to
free the Agency from liabilities. We uphold the CA's ruling that: "[w]hen the first resignation letter was
a pro forma one, entirely drafted by the petitioner Agency for the private respondent to merely affix
his signature, and the second one entirely copied by the private respondent with his own hand from
the first resignation letter, voluntariness is not attendant."32

Moreover, it is a rule that resignation is difficult to reconcile with the filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal.33Hence, the finding that respondent's resignation was involuntary is further strengthened
by the fact that respondent filed the instant case the day after the alleged tender of resignation.

Second, the affidavits of Chavez, Bialen and Alonzo are highly suspect as these affiants are under
the employ of the very agency which extracted the dubious resignation letters from respondent.
Even if we do give full credit to them, the following excerpts from the same affidavits put in grave
doubt petitioners' claim that respondent lost interest to work: First, Chavez appears to have no direct
personal knowledge of the real reason for respondent's absence. While she attested that respondent
"was proud of having acquired a tricycle" and that "when off duty, he drives his tricycle for fares," she
merely attested that on October 15, 1997, respondent "came in for duty limping" and that she
"suspected then, that the injury was possibly due to a motor accident, considering his off duty
tricycle operations."34 (emphases supplied) Second, headguard Bialen attested that respondent
approached him on October 15, 1997 and informed him that he (respondent) had a wound on his
foot and that "he may not be able to report for duty for a few days because of the condition of his
foot."35 (emphasis supplied) This shows that respondent assured Bialen that his absence was
temporary. Lastly, the Agency's operations manager Alonzo stated that on October 21, 1997, he was
told by respondent that he (respondent) had not been reporting for duty at VVCC. When Alonzo
reacted strongly for the respondent's failure to notify his office regarding the matter, the latter
allegedly told him "nakaligtaan ko babalik naman ako" (I forgot but I will be back).

Moreover, the claim that respondent absented himself from October 16, 1997 up to September 23,
1998 is absurd. Surely, respondent could not have possibly absented himself from an assignment
after it had already expired on October 31, 1997. The claim that respondent went on AWOL is also
unavailing. Again, even if we give full credit to the affidavits of the Agency's employees, respondent's
absence cannot be said to be without notice and unjustified. Petitioners' own evidence shows that
respondent approached his head guard on October 15, 1997 and told the latter that he could not
report for work because of the condition of his foot.36 This notice not being enough, headguard
Bialen allegedly told respondent that he should report his absence to the office "by phone or in
person."37 On September 21, 1997, respondent allegedly went to the office of the Agency to draw his
salary and upon inquiry, the operations manager of the Agency learned from respondent that he was
not reporting for duty at VVCC because he "figured in a motorcycle accidents (sic)."38 If notice may
be done by phone, with more reason should this be considered as sufficient notice to petitioners.

Third, petitioners contention that Duty Detail Order No. 9993, the payrolls and daily time records
belie respondent's claim that he was relieved from his post and never given subsequent assignment
when petitioners learned of his inquiry with Manila Southwoods regarding Manila Southwoods'
payment of backwages to the Agency, is unconvincing.
All that the documentary evidence proves is that respondent was assigned to VVCC from September
29 to October 31, 1997 and that he stopped reporting for duty on October 16, 1997. Such
discrepancy, however, should not be overinflated. Notably, both petitioners and respondent point to
the same date in referring to the time when respondent ceased to work: October 1997. After this,
there was no pretense that he was given subsequent assignment. In fact, petitioners justified such
lack of assignment by claiming that respondent went on AWOL and that he intended to resign.
Besides, respondent's specific claim is that he was "relieved from his post and was never given any
assignment" when his "inquiry came to the knowledge of [petitioners]." (emphasis supplied) Surely,
this claim does not rule out the possibility that petitioners may have relieved him for this reason while
he was already assigned to VVCC. In short, the inconsistency only refers to the identity of the last
client to which respondent was assigned. This is of no consequence to the issue at bar: the reason
for his cessation of work.

What is more, respondent should be deemed as constructively dismissed when he tendered his
resignation letters on September 23, 1998. Constructive dismissal is "a quitting because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as, an offer involving a demotion in
rank and diminution in pay."39

Article 286 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 286. When employment not deemed terminated.-- The bona fide suspension of the
operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months, or the
fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty shall not terminate employment. In all
such cases, the employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of
seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from
the resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty.

This provision has been applied by analogy to security guards in a security agency who are placed
"off detail" or on "floating" status. In security agency parlance, to be placed "off detail" or on "floating"
status means "waiting to be posted."40 Pursuant to Article 286 of the Labor Code, to be put off detail
or in floating status requires no less than the dire exigency of the employer's bona fide suspension of
operation, business or undertaking. In security services, this happens when there is a surplus of
security guards over available assignments as when the clients that do not renew their contracts with
the security agency are more than those clients that do and the new ones that the agency gets.41

Again, petitioners only alleged that respondent's last assignment was with VVCC for the period of
September 29 to October 31, 1997. He was not given further assignment as he allegedly went on
AWOL and lost interest to work. As explained, these claims are unconvincing. Worse still, they are
inadequate under the law. The records do not show that there was a lack of available post after
October 1997. It appears that petitioners simply stopped giving respondent any assignment. Absent
any dire exigency justifying their failure to give respondent further assignment, the only logical
conclusion is that respondent was constructively dismissed.

And even assuming that petitioners were justified in not immediately giving respondent any
assignment after October 1997, the length of time that he was put on floating status made
petitioners' act tantamount to constructive dismissal.

We have recognized that security guards may be temporarily sidelined by their security agency as
their assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the latter with third parties.
However, the sidelining should continue only for six months. Otherwise, the security agency
concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal.42

In this case, records do not show that petitioners at the very least offered and that respondent
unjustifiably refused being assigned to another post after his last assignment in October 1997.
Petitioners' allegations show that the semblance of an offer came only on September 23, 1998 when
the Agency's operations manager allegedly saw respondent for the first time after October 1997 and
asked respondent if he was still available for posting.43 By then, however, more than eleven (11)
months had elapsed.

In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that the dismissal of
an employee is for a valid cause.44 Having based their defense on resignation, it is likewise
incumbent upon petitioners, as employer, to prove that respondent voluntarily resigned. From the
totality of circumstances and the evidence on record, it is clear that petitioners failed to discharge
this burden. We have held that if the evidence presented by the employer and the employee are in
equipoise, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.45Accordingly, the finding of illegal
dismissal must be upheld.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 62332 dated March 21, 2003 and its Resolution dated July 23, 2003, are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1The National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals were removed as
public respondents pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2 Rollo, pp. 46-47, 50.

3 Id. at 47.

4 Complaint Form; Id. at 43.

5 Id. at 47-48.

6 Id. at 52.

7 Affidavit of Merlyn V. Chavez; Id. at 57-58.

8 Affidavit of Wilfredo D. Bialen; Id. at 59-60.

9 Affidavit of Domingo A. Alonzo; Id. at 61-62.

10 Id. at 51-53.

11 Id. at 63-64.

12 Id. at 65-67.

13 Id. at 119.

14 Id. at 121.

15
Decision dated July 15, 1999; Id. at 123-127.

16 Id. at 137-138.

17 Id. at 132-137.

18 Id. at 139-146.

19 Id. at 148-149.

20 Id. at 151-169.

21 Id. at 36-41.

22 Id. at 41.
 23 Id. at 225.

24 Resolution dated July 23, 2003; Id. at 42.

25 Id. at 20-21.

26Tres Reyes v. Maxim's Tea House 398 SCRA 288, 298 (2003), citing Ropali Trading
Corporation v.National Labor Relations Commission, 296 SCRA 309, 314
(1998); Prangan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 289 SCRA 142, 146
(1998); Industrial Timber Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (5th Division),
273 SCRA 200, 209 (1997).

27 Rollo, p. 225.

28 Id. at 115-117.

29 Id. at 143-146.

30Phil. Employ Services vs. Paramio, G.R. No. 144786, April 15, 2004, citing Peftok
Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 293 SCRA 507 (1998).

31 Rollo, pp. 54-55.

32 Id. at 40.

33 Valdez vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 87, 94 (1998).

34 Rollo, pp. 52-53.

35 Id. at 59.

36 Memorandum of Petitioners; Id. at 185.

37 Id. at 59.

38 Id. at 61.

R.P. Dinglasan Construction v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156104, June 29, 2004, citing Jo Cinema
39

Corporation v.Abellana, 360 SCRA 142 (2001); Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, 390
SCRA 201 (2002).

OSS Security & Allied Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 325 SCRA 157, 165 (2000), citing Sentinel
40

Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 123, 131-132 (1998).

41 Sentinel Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, supra.

Soliman Security Services, Inc. v. CA, 384 SCRA 514, 519 (2002), citing Agro Commercial
42

Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, 175 SCRA 790 (1989).

43 Rollo, p. 62.

44 R.P. Dinglasan Construction, Inc. vs. Atienza, supra.

45 Asuncion vs. NLRC, 362 SCRA 56, 68 (2001).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 FIRST DIVISION
BMG RECORDS (PHILS.), G.R. No. 153290
INC. and JOSE YAP, JR.,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
AIDA C. APARECIO and
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, Promulgated:
Respondents.
September 5, 2007

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
November 20, 2001 Decision[1] and April 26, 2002 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. SP No. 65403 affirming the August 23, 2000
Decision[3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed
and set aside the October 27, 1998 Decision[4] of the Labor Arbiter finding that
private respondent voluntarily resigned and was not illegally dismissed.

Petitioner BMG Records (Phils.), Inc. (BMG) is engaged in the business of

selling various audio records nationwide. On September 2, 1990, it hired private
respondent Aida C. Aparecio (Aparecio) as one of the promo girls in
its Cebu branch. For working from Monday to Sunday, she received a salary
of P181.00 per day.

On May 25, 1998, Aparecio filed a complaint against BMG and its Branch
Manager, Jose Yap, Jr., co-petitioner herein, for illegal dismissal and non-payment
of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for rest day, 13 th month pay, service
incentive leave, and separation pay.[5] In her Position Paper, she alleged:

xxx
 b. That she was illegally dismissed or terminated [from] employment on April 30,
1998; that before said date[,] however, she was asked by respondent to
resign and will be paid (sic) all her benefits due like a one-month pay for
every year of service, payment of services rendered, overtime and holiday
pay, rest day, 13th month, service incentive leave and separation pay and to
[execute] a letter of resignation;

c. That in view of respondents insistence to prepare and [execute] a letter-

resignation[,] even without proper accounting of any accountability, the
complainant was lured, induced and compelled to submit a letter of
resignation believing on respondents promise and assurance to pay all the
benefits due her as aforesaid;

d. That after executing said resignation letter, the respondent did not make good its
promise and [instead] did an accounting by themselves in the absence of
herein complainant and arrived on a computation that complainants liability
per their accounting reached to the staggering amount of P8,000.00; that
since they offered to pay a separation pay of only P12,000.00, minus
complainants alleged accountability of P8,000.00, they are ready to pay the
balance thereof any time;

e. That herein complainant was under respondents employ for seven (7)
years, seven (7) months and twenty-eight (28) days when illegally
terminated [from] her employment xxx. [6]

Petitioners, however, proffer a different version of the facts. They narrate that
Aparecio was initially performing well as an employee but as years passed by she
seemed to be complacent in the performance of her job and had been comparing the
salaries of promo girls in other companies. It appeared that she was no longer
interested in her job. In April 1998, Aparecio and two other promo girls, Jovelina V.
Soco and Veronica P. Mutya, intimated to their supervisor that they were intending
to resign and were requesting for some financial assistance. BMG made it clear that,
as a company policy, an employee who resigns from service is not entitled to
financial assistance, but considering the length of their service and due to
humanitarian consideration it would accede to the request after they secure their
respective clearances. Forthwith, the three employees tendered their resignations,
which were accepted. When they processed the required individual clearance, it was
found out that they had incurred some shortages after inventory. Per agreement, said
shortages were deducted from the amounts due them. Thus, Soco and Mutya
received their last salary, a proportion of the 13th month pay, tax refund and financial
assistance less the deductions, and they executed their releases and quitclaims.
Except for the financial assistance, Aparecio also obtained the same yet refused to
sign the release and quitclaim, protesting the amount of P9,170.12 deducted from
the financial assistance. She was adamant but BMG stood by the previous
agreement.

Attached to petitioners Position Paper[7] were the sworn statements of Jose

Yap, Jr. and Evangeline A. Magno, supervisor of BMG.
 On October 27, 1998, the labor arbiter dismissed Aparecios complaint. Since
the letter of resignation showed no signs that it was made through duress or
compulsion, it was concluded that the severance of her employment in BMG was
brought about by her resignation and not by the illegal dismissal supposedly
committed by the latter. Nonetheless, realizing petitioners promise to pay financial
assistance to Aparecio, the labor arbiter ordered the payment of P18,824.00 (fixed
at half month pay for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six [6] months
being considered as one year) instead of P9,170.12 which was not amply
substantiated.[8]

Upon appeal, however, the NLRC found that Aparecio was illegally dismissed
from service, disposing in its August 23, 2000 Decision[9] thus:

WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing consideration, the

Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one ENTERED finding the dismissal of complainant illegal thus ordering the
respondent to pay her backwages from April 30, 1998 up to date hereof and in lieu
of reinstatement, the respondent is further ordered to pay complainant separation
pay computes at the rate of one (1) month pay for every year of service from date
of hiring on September 2, 1990 up to the finality of this decision.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[10]

The NLRC admitted its dilemma in determining whether Aparecio offered to

resign on the condition that she would be paid with termination benefits or whether
the resignation was triggered by BMG which offered the monetary consideration.
While saying that Aparecio offered no other evidence except her bare allegations, it
was held that the sworn statement of Magno was not sufficient to establish the
position of petitioners. For the NLRC, the testimonies of Soco and Mutya would
have been helpful had these been presented by either side. Notwithstanding the
scanty data available, it concluded:

x x x We find that the elements of a valid resignation are not obtaining in

this case. It must be stressed that resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the
complaint. Moreover, even in the absence of physical force, duress or compulsion
applied upon complainant when she executed the alleged resignation letter, factual
circumstances tend to show the strong and irresistible economic pressure
originating from respondent if only to push the complainant into accepting the offer.
For, as ever, [i]n the matter of employment bargaining, there is no doubt that the
employer stands on higher footing than the employee. First of all, there is greater
supply than demand for labor. Secondly, the need for employment by labor comes
from vital, and even desperate, necessity. Consequently, the law must protect labor,
at least, to the extent of raising him to equal footing in bargaining relations with
capital and to shield him from abuses brought about by the necessity of survival. It
is safe therefore to presume that an employee or laborer who waives in advance any
benefit granted him by law does so, certainly not in his interest or through
 generosity, but under the forceful intimidation or urgent need, and hence, he could
not have done so acted freely and voluntarily. xxx (citations omitted)[11]

A motion for reconsideration of the Decision was filed by petitioners.

Attached therein were the sworn statements of Soco and another promo girl, Marietta
Cinco, both dated September 21, 2000, confirming Aparecios voluntary resignation.
The NLRC, however, resolved to deny the motion.[12]

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the judgment of the NLRC. In its November 20,
2001 Decision,[13] the appellate court held:

xxx

Based on the evidence submitted, the [petitioners] failed to support [their]

claim that [Aparecios] resignation was made out of her own volition.
Granting arguendo that [Aparecio] executed a resignation letter, it appears that she
did it in consideration of the separation pay and other benefits promised by the
petitioner.

Resignation, moreover, is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for

illegal dismissal. It would have been illogical for the employee to resign and then
file a complaint for illegal dismissal x x x Thus, had the private respondent been
determined to resign and relinquish her position in the petitioner company, she
would not have commenced an action for illegal dismissal.

It must be remembered that the petitioner is in a more advantageous position

than [Aparecio] considering the ratio of the demand for workers and the number of
unemployed persons, so much so that the employee is vulnerable to submit to
whatever offer the employer may give. Most often than not, employees are placed
in a position where there is only one choice which is to accede to the employers
proposal.[14]

xxx

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied on April 26,

[15]
2002; hence, this petition.

In a Resolution dated August 12, 2002, this Court initially resolved to deny
the petition for:

(a.) failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution as
to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate
jurisdiction in this case; and

(b.) failure of the petition to show extraordinary circumstance justifying a

departure from the established doctrine that findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are well-nigh conclusive on this Court and will not be reviewed or
disturbed on appeal.[16]
 Considering, however, the Motion for Reconsideration[17] filed and the
Comment[18] as well as the Reply[19] thereon, this Court resolved[20] on April 23,
2003 to reinstate the petition and require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.

The petition is meritorious.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in and resolved by this Court
on petitions brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The reason being that the
Court is not a trier of facts; it is not duty-bound to re-examine and calibrate the
evidence on record. Moreover, findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies like the
NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.[21] In
exceptional cases, however, we may be constrained to delve into and resolve factual
issues when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of
the tribunal or court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced
from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties.[22] The present case is an
exception to the rule. Hence, this Court finds the need to review the records to
determine the facts with certainty not only because the NLRC and the labor arbiter
have come up with conflicting positions but also because the findings of the NLRC,
as supported by the CA on substantial matters, appear to be contrary to the evidence
at hand.

Reading through the records would ineluctably reveal that the evidence upon which
both the NLRC and the CA based their conclusion rests on rather shaky foundation.
After careful analysis, this Court finds and so holds that the submissions of Aparecio
in all her pleadings failed to substantiate the allegation that her consent was vitiated
at the time she tendered her resignation and that petitioners are guilty of illegal
dismissal.

In her memorandum of appeal before the NLRC, Aparecio asserted in main:

xxx The arbiter should have seriously considered the temper of the time in
relation to our deteriorating economy on the issue [of] whether or not the
resignation letter was voluntary. But he did not. To the arbiter[,] resignation letter
can only be set aside if it is shown that it was made through duress or compulsion.
What about FRAUD? The complainant did not offer to resign. She was offered by
respondents that all labor standard benefits including but not limited to payment of
overtime, salary differentials and separation pay should be given if she [would]
resign. This she was made to believe by the respondents. And complainant really
believed them. Unfortunately, however, complainant found herself jobless and
penniless. Her resignation was obtained through fraud xxx It is clear that
complainant submitted her resignation letter not because she has some
accountabilities but because of respondents offer which was hard to resist xxx[23]

On the other hand, her Comment before the CA stated further:

 xxx
At any rate, respondents wish to point out that the finding of the NLRC that
private respondent (employee) did not voluntarily resign but was illegally
dismissed is well-supported by evidence. The following considerations clearly
show this, to wit:

One. It is admitted by both petitioners and the respondents that the supposed
resignation of private respondent was conditional in nature. It was premised on
petitioners (employers) performance of certain prestations or petitioners
compliance with certain conditions.

Two. The supposed decision of private respondent to tender a resignation

is vitiated by vices of consent. The resignation letter was wrongfully obtained
from private respondent on petitioners inducement and promise to pay employment
benefits and financial assistance without any deductions. However, it is now very
clear that right from the start, petitioners did not intend to comply with their
promise. After private respondent handed in a resignation letter, petitioners raised
all obstacles to prevent private respondent from actually receiving the promised
employment benefits and financial assistance. Accordingly, it can be easily said
that fraud vitiated private respondents consent.

Three. The resignation letter was also obtained from private respondent
through undue pressure and influence which again vitiates the same. The
respondent NLRC made this finding:

Moreover, even in the absence of physical force, duress or compulsion

applied upon complainant when she executed the alleged resignation letter, factual
circumstances tend to show the strong and irresistible economic pressure
originating from respondent if only to push the complainant into accepting the
offer. (NLRC Decision, 23 August 2000, p. 5; underscoring ours)

Four. At the very least, it could be easily said that the decision to resign is
vitiated by mistake. It is unrebutted that private respondent handed in a resignation
letter on the firm belief that petitioners would pay her the promised employment
benefits and financial assistance without deductions. Resignation is also a form of
contract. Like any other contracts, it can be vitiated by mistake and other vices of
consent x x x

Five. Finally, it could also be said that the resignation letter was ineffective
because there was no meeting of the minds on the matter of resignation. As
pointed out earlier, it is an admitted fact that the supposed resignation
was conditional in character in the sense that it was premised on certain conditions.
Accordingly, the resignation letter could only be considered as a mere offer. Since
the petitioners obviously did not accept the conditions attendant to the offer to
resign, there is no resignation to speak of. (emphasis supplied) [24]

xxx

In a nutshell, Aparecio submits that fraud, undue influence, intimidation,

and/or mistake were attendant upon her resignation from BMG. As her consent was
allegedly vitiated, the act of resigning became involuntary; hence, petitioners are
guilty of illegal dismissal.

The argument is not tenable.

 Based on the pleadings, this Court finds nothing to support Aparecios
allegation that fraud was employed on her to resign. Fraud exists only when, through
insidious words or machinations, the other party is induced to act and without which,
the latter would not have agreed to.[25] This Court has held that the circumstances
evidencing fraud and misrepresentation are as varied as the people who perpetrate
it, each assuming different shapes and forms and may be committed in as many
different ways. Fraud and misrepresentation are, therefore, never presumed; it must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence and not mere preponderance of
evidence.[26] Hence, this Court does not sustain findings of fraud upon circumstances
which, at most, create only suspicion; otherwise, it would be indulging in
speculations and surmises.[27]

In this case, Aparecio alleged that her resignation was wrongfully obtained
when petitioners did not keep the promise of giving her employment benefits and
financial assistance without any deductions. Without a showing of the nature and
extent of such inducement, however, such submission fails to establish that there
was in fact a deception on the part of petitioners. Even if it is considered that there
was an assurance given by petitioners and that they later reneged on their promise,
this Court still finds no injustice made since Aparecio, who only questioned the
manner by which the inventory was conducted that it was held without her presence
but did not categorically deny her accountabilities with BMG, would unjustly be
enriched without the deduction.

Likewise, Aparecio did not adduce any competent evidence to prove that force
or threat was applied by petitioners. For intimidation to vitiate consent, the following
requisites must be present: (1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given;
(2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious,
there being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men
can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do
as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the
person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the
threatened injury to his person or property. In the instant case, not one of these
essential elements was amply proven by Aparecio. Bare allegations of threat or force
do not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding of forced resignation.[28]

On the contrary, petitioners correctly point out that the NLRC finding, which
the CA erroneously affirmed, of a strong and irresistible economic pressure
originating from [petitioners] if only to push [Aparecio] into accepting the offer is
not supported by any evidence in the records but is merely based on conjectures and
guesswork. Truly, the factual circumstances upon which the legal conclusion was
based were lacking as no less than the NLRC itself admitted the absence of proof of
any kind of pressure, economic or otherwise, that petitioners applied to force
Aparecios resignation. What is clear is that there is no concrete evidence, direct or
circumstantial, showing that undue influence was used by petitioners in such a way
that it took improper advantage of its power over the will of Aparecio and deprived
the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice.[29] Granting for the sake of argument
that BMG was in a more advantageous position, as the CA had opined, it would
nonetheless be unfair to presume that it utilized the same against Aparecio. Indeed,
the allegation of exploitation is a very serious matter and should not be taken lightly.
Proof is absolutely essential.

Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where

one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of
the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment.
It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of
relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to
relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee
before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether
in fact, he or she intended to sever from his or her employment.[30]

Thus, this Court agrees with petitioners contention that the circumstances
surrounding Aparecios resignation should be given due weight in determining
whether she had intended to resign. In this case, such intent is very evident:

First, Aparecio already communicated to other people that she was about to
resign to look for a better paying job since she had been complaining that employees
like her in other companies were earning much more;

Second, prior to the submission of her resignation letter, Aparecio and two
other promo girls, Soco and Mutya, approached their supervisor, intimated their
desire to resign, and requested that they be given financial assistance, which
petitioners granted on the condition that deductions would be made in case of
shortage after inventory;

Third, Aparecio, Soco, and Mutya submitted their duly signed resignation
letters, which were accepted by petitioners; and

Fourth, Aparecio already initiated the processing of her clearance; thus, she
was able to receive her last salary, 13th month pay, and tax refund but refused to
receive the financial assistance less the deductions made.

The foregoing facts were affirmatively narrated and attested to in the notarized
affidavit of Soco and Cinco and have remained incontrovertible as they were never
denied by Aparecio. The NLRC, thus, erred when it did not give probative weight
to their testimonies even if belatedly presented in petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
 Now, the acceptance by petitioners of Aparecios resignation rendered the
same effective.[31] Upon such acceptance, it may not be unilaterally withdrawn
without the consent of petitioners.[32] When the employee later signified the intention
of continuing his or her work, it was already up to the employer to accept the
withdrawal of his or her resignation. The mere fact that the withdrawal was not
accepted does not constitute illegal dismissal, the acceptance of the withdrawal of
the resignation being the employers sole prerogative. As held in Intertrod Maritime,
Inc. v. NLRC:[33]

Once an employee resigns and his resignation is accepted, he no longer has

any right to the job. If the employee later changes his mind, he must ask for approval
of the withdrawal of his resignation from his employer, as if he were re-applying
for the job. It will then be up to the employer to determine whether or not his service
would be continued. If the employer accepts said withdrawal, the employee retains
his job. If the employer does not x x x the employee cannot claim illegal dismissal
for the employer has the right to determine who his employees will be. To say that
an employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed, is to encroach upon the right
of employers to hire persons who will be of service to them.[34]

Subsequently, in Philippine Today, Inc. v. NLRC,[35] it was further held that:

Obviously, this is a recognition of the contractual nature of employment

which requires mutuality of consent between the parties. An employment contract
is consensual and voluntary. Hence, if the employee "finds himself in a situation
where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from
his employment". If accepted by the employer, the consequent effect of resignation
is severance of the contract of employment.

A resigned employee who desires to take his job back has to re-apply
therefor, and he shall have the status of a stranger who cannot unilaterally demand
an appointment. He cannot arrogate unto himself the same position which he earlier
decided to leave. To allow him to do so would be to deprive the employer of his
basic right to choose whom to employ. Such is tantamount to undue oppression of
the employer. It has been held that an employer is free to regulate, according to his
own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment including hiring. The law,
in protecting the rights of the laborer, impels neither the oppression nor self-
destruction of the employer.[36]

Certainly, what transpired here was caused by an employees error of judgment

and not by the employers application of means vitiating the consent to resign. It
would be utterly unfair to attribute to petitioners the commission of illegal dismissal
and to impose upon them the burden of accepting back Aparecio who unequivocally
manifested her intent and willingness to sever her employment ties.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the November 20, 2001

Decision and April 26, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No.
65403 affirming the August 23, 2000 Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The October 27, 1998
Decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that private respondent was not illegally
dismissed is hereby REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos, with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Rodrigo V.
Cosico concurring.
[2]
Rollo, p. 41.
[3]
Penned by Commissioner Bernabe S. Batuhan, with Commissioners Irenea E. Ceniza and Edgardo E.
Enerlan concurring.
[4]
Penned by Ernesto F. Carreon.
[5]
CA rollo, p. 49.
[6]
Id. at 95.
[7]
Id. at 73-79.
[8]
Id. at 29-32.
[9]
Id. at 33-35.
[10]
Id. at 35.
[11]
Id. at 37.
[12]
Id. at 39.
[13]
Id. at 197-202.
[14]
Id. at 200-201.
[15]
Id. at 208-215, 224.
[16]
Rollo, p. 51.
[17]
Id. at 53-60
[18]
Id. at 64-70.
[19]
Id. at 5-81.
[20]
Id. at 83-84.
[21]
Acevedo v. Advanstar Company, Inc., G.R. No. 157656, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 656, 664.
[22]
Pascua v. NLRC (3rd Div.), 351 Phil. 48, 61 (1998).
[23]
Id. at 124-125.
[24]
CA rollo, pp. 153-155.
[25]
See Art. 1338, New Civil Code.
[26]
Solidbank Corporation v. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation, G.R. No. 153535, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 409,
426; Republic of the Philippines v. Institute for Social Concern, G.R. No. 156306, January 28, 2005, 449
SCRA 512, 521-522; Spouses Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123586, August 12, 2004, 436
SCRA 213, 223; and Maestrado v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 418, 435 (2000).
[27]
Republic of the Philippines v. Institute for Social Concern, id. and Maestrado v. Court of Appeals, id.
[28]
St. Michael Academy v. NLRC, 354 Phil. 491, 509-510 (1998) and Callanta v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 105083, August 20, 1993, 225 SCRA 526, 535.
[29]
See Art. 1337, New Civil Code.
[30]
Fortuny Garments v. Castro, G.R. No. 150668, December 15, 2005, 478 SCRA 125, 130.
[31]
See Shie Jie Corporation/Seastar Ex-Im Corp. v. National Federation of Labor, G.R. No. 153148, July 15, 2005,
463 SCRA 569, 575.
[32]
See Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Soriano, G.R. No. 166039, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA, 704,
743 and Philippine Today, Inc. v. NLRC, 334 Phil. 854, 877 (1997), citing Intertrod Maritime, Inc. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 81087, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 318.
[33]
Supra.
[34]
Id. at 324.
[35]
Supra.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 150668 December 15, 2005

FORTUNY GARMENTS/JOHNNY CO., Petitioner,

vs.
ELENA J. CASTRO, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed before the Court on petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56153 granting the petition of Elena J. Castro and nullifying the rulings of
the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Then 58-year old Elena J. Castro was employed as a sewer by the Fortuny Garments Corporation
sometime in 1985. Petitioner Johnny Co was then its president. Elena was paid her salaries and
other emoluments for the period up to December 21, 1996.2

On December 16, 1996, Elenas daughter gave birth by caesarian operation. Since nobody would
take care of her daughter, she then went on leave of absence.

When Elena reported to work on December 23, 1996, Elsa Co, co-manager of the company and wife
of petitioner, told her that she had to stop working because "she was already old." Elena insisted that
she could still work and perform her duties despite her age. She was told, this time, that she was
already dismissed because of her failure to report for work for several days after her leave of
absence. Nevertheless, Elena reported for work during the first week of January 1997, only to be
informed again that she had already been dismissed.3

Elena forthwith filed a complaint against the corporation and Johnny Co, for illegal dismissal and
payment of monetary benefits inclusive of unpaid overtime pay.

For his part, the petitioner averred that the complainant was not dismissed but that she resigned
voluntarily, as evidenced by a cash voucher dated January 30, 1996.4

By way of reply, the complainant alleged that sometime in 1995, she and her co-workers were made
to sign blank vouchers, allegedly as proof that their employer had paid their Social Security Service
(SSS) premiums. She insisted that she could not have resigned on January 30, 1996 because she
was still working for the corporation up to December 23, 1996 when she was illegally
dismissed.5 She did not receive a centavo from the petitioner by way of separation pay, salary,
allowance, bonus or overtime pay.

On December 21, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering the dismissal of the
complaint, holding that Elena had voluntarily resigned.6 The Labor Arbiter reasoned out that:

Moreover, complainants desire to resign was spurred by the giving birth of her child through
caesarian operations, and obviously complainant cannot take care of her grandchild and attend to
her job at the same time. In all probability, complainant gave priority to her family by opting to resign
to give her time, love and care to her daughter and grandchild, but at the same time receiving
separation benefits for the years she devoted to the company.

As regards complainants money claims, it is clear that she entered into a package deal with
respondents. Basic [is] the fact that when one resigns, the worker forfeits whatever benefits she is
entitled to on account of the past services she has rendered to the company, unless there is an
agreement policy or practice in the company granting separation benefits to the resigning worker. In
this regard, complainant failed to prove the existence of the same.

Upon the other hand, respondents presented a document whereby complainant admitted that
"during her stay with Fortuny Garment Manufacturing Co., she was treated well and fairly; that she
was given all her salaries, allowances, bonuses and overtime [pay] rendered from the time she
started working up to the last day of her service. In addition, complainant acknowledge[d] receipt of
the sum of P35,000.00. (Annex A, ibid).

In addition, as proof that complainant was paid her benefits like 13th month pay, and weekly salary,
respondents attached samples of the payrolls (Annexes B, B-1 to B-23) to show compliance with the
Labor Standard benefits.7

Elena appealed the decision to the NLRC, which rendered judgment on July 21, 1999 affirming the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.8 This prompted Elena to file a petition for certiorari with the CA for the
reversal of the decision. On June 28, 2001, the appellate court rendered judgment granting the
petition and reversing the assailed decision. It held that the only documentary evidence presented to
prove that the respondent had voluntarily resigned, in fact, belied the petitioners claim.9

The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision, alleging that it even issued a
certification and filed the same with the SSS to the effect that the respondent was no longer
connected with the company effective January 31, 1996.10 The appellate court denied the said
motion.11
The petitioner thus filed the instant petition, alleging that

THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
REVERSED THE NLRC AND THE LABOR ARBITER, THEREBY REPLACING THEIR FINDINGS
OF FACTS WITH SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND INFERENCES WHICH ARE MANIFESTLY
MISTAKEN.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN FINDING RESPONDENT TO BE ENTITLED TO HER MONEY CLAIMS,
INCLUDING ATTORNEYS FEES.12

The petition has no merit.

A perusal of the petition shows that the petitioners arguments are a mere reiteration of its
arguments before the CA. The petitioner was burdened to prove its defense that the respondent had
voluntarily resigned and was not dismissed from her employment, and relies principally on the cash
voucher which the respondent purportedly signed, to wit:

R.C. No. . No. ______

Date CASH VOUCHER

Place Date January 30, 1996

Paid to Elena Castro

Address _______________________________

PARTICULARS

I, Elena J. Castro voluntarily tendered my resignation as employee of Fortuny Garment

Manufacturing. That during my stay with Fortuny Garment Mfg., I was treated well and fairly; that I
was given all my salaries, allowances, bonuses and overtime rendered from the time I started
working up to the last day of my service.

That thru the generosity of my said employer, I was given the amount of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P35,000.00) for consideration and separation fee (sic).

RECEIVED from FORTUNY GARMENT MFG. the amount of PESOS THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND
ONLY (P35,000.00) in full payment of amount described above.

By: _____SIGNED)____

Signature (Illegible) ELENA J. CASTRO13

Approved

Thus, it appears in the cash voucher that the respondent resigned on January 30, 1996 which was
approved by the petitioner, and that she received separation pay of P35,000.00 on the same date.
The petitioner maintains that the respondent ceased reporting for work after January 30, 1996.

Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that
personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and has no other
choice but to dissociate from employment. Resignation is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment
of an office, and must be made with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act
of relinquishment.14 A resignation must be unconditional and with the intent to operate as such.15

Moreover, the intention to relinquish an office must concur with the overt act of relinquishment. The
act of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered to determine
whether in fact, he or she intended to relinquish such employment. If the employer introduces
evidence purportedly executed by an employee as proof of voluntary resignation and the employee
specifically denies the authenticity and due execution of said document, the employer is burdened to
prove the due execution and genuineness of such document.16

In the present case, no less than the petitioner adduced documentary evidence consisting of payrolls
showing that the respondent reported for work and received her salary/wages up to December 21,
1996, or shortly before she went on leave of absence after her daughter gave birth on December 23,
1996. Based on the petitioners documentary evidence itself, the respondent did not resign or
receive P35,000.00 on January 30, 1996. The records show that the respondent was still an
employee of the petitioner as late as December 21, 1996. It was only in January 1997 when the
petitioner terminated the respondents employment and told her not to report for work again. The
only reason why the petitioner terminated the respondents employment was because she failed to
report for work after her daughter gave birth.

That the petitioner signed the cash voucher is undisputed. However, the Court is inclined to believe
the respondents claim that she was made to sign the cash voucher only to make it appear that the
petitioner had paid its share in the SSS premiums of its employees.

Incredibly, despite the documentary evidence to the contrary, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
declared that the respondent had voluntarily resigned.

The Court notes that the respondent filed her complaint against the petitioner in the NLRC shortly
after she was told by Elsa Co to stop reporting for work. Indeed, voluntary resignation is difficult to
reconcile with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.17

The Court concurs with the following ruling of the CA:

First, the fact is clear that the alleged resignation letter written on a "Cash Voucher" does not contain
any reason, explanation or motive why the petitioner wanted to sever her employment from private
respondents, which ordinarily and normally appears in a voluntary letter of resignation. Rather the
said resignation letter contains statements which would exculpate private respondents from its
obligation under the labor laws. This observation strengthens petitioners assertions that she,
together with other co-employees, was made to sign blank vouchers and the private respondents
merely filled up the column "PARTICULARS" and made it appear that said petitioner voluntarily
resigned and was paid all her benefits. (Rollo, p. 21). The Labor Arbiter speculated that petitioners
resignation was spurred by the giving birth of petitioners daughter through caesarian operation
(Rollo, p. 31) disregarding the blatant facts on record that the alleged resignation occurred on
January 30, 1996 (Rollo, p. 50) whereas, complainants daughter gave birth on December 16, 1996
(Rollo, p. 29) or barely less than one year after the alleged resignation.

More important is the fact that while the alleged letter of resignation was executed on January 30,
1996 (Rollo, p. 50), still, herein petitioner continued to receive her salaries for the month of
September, 1996 (Rollo, pp. 71, 72, 73, 74), for the month of November 1996 (Rollo, p. 63) and for
the month of December, 1996 (Rollo, p. 60). Again, this inconsistency, supports petitioners claim
that she was engaged to work at private respondents company until December 23, 1996 (Rollo, p.
35) and, on the other hand, it completely destroys private respondents allegation that herein
petitioner voluntarily resigned from her employment.18

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De La Cruz, with Associate Justices Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. and Josefina Guevara-Salonga, concurring; rollo, pp. 70-75.

2 CA rollo, pp. 59-60.

3 Id. at 35.

4 Id. at 41.

5 Id. at 75-76.

6 Id. at 28-33.

7 Id. at 31-32.

8 Id. at 20-25.

9 Id. at 157-162.

10 Id. at 171.

11 Id. at 211.
12 Rollo, p. 15.

13 CA Rollo, p. 50.

14Molave Tours Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 112909, November 24, 1995, 250 SCRA
325.

15 Azcor Manufacturing, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117963, February 11, 1999, 303 SCRA 26.

16 Id.

Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad, G.R. No. 159195, May 9, 2005, 458
17

SCRA 308.

18 Rollo, pp. 72-73.