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Joumal of Economic Pmputiaa-vorume 17, Nurnber 2-spring 2003-paga 3-26
rom the start of the l9g0s until year-end 1ggg, Enron's stock rose
by
3llpercent, only modestly higher than the rate of growth in
the standard
& Poor's 500. But then the stock soared. It increased by 56 percent
in 199g
and a further 87 percent in 2000, compared to a 20 p.....r,
i.r...ur. and a
10 percent decline for the index during the same years.
By December g1, 2000,
Enron's stock was priced at $83.r3, and its market capitalization
exceeded $60 bil-
lion, 70 times earnings and six times book value, an indication
of the stock market,s
high expectations about its future prospects. Enron was rated
the most innorative
Iarge compan' in America in Fofturu magazine's sune\.
of NIost Admired companies.
Yet $jthin a I'ear. Enron's image rras in tatten and
ir srock price had plummeted nearlv
to zero Lxhibit I lists some of the crincal e'enls for Enron berrreen
.{ugr.ur and
December 2001-a saga of document shredding. resatemenu.
of eaming:, reg.uJaton.
investigarions, a failed merger and the compan\. filing
for bankruprcr.
\'t'e n'il] assess how govemance and incendve problems
conu-ibuted to Enron,s rise
and fall' A well-fi'mctioning capital market creates appropriate
lintages of ilformation,
incentives and governance between managers u.,d irr=rto.r.
This process is supposed
to be carried out through a network of intermediaries that include
professional
investors such as banks, mutual funds, insurance and
venture capitar firms; information
anallzers such as financial analysts and ratings agencies;
professionals such as
extemal auditors; and intemar governance agents such ^.r*r..
* .o.po*,. boards. These
parties, who are themselves subject to incentive
and governance problems, are regu_
lated by a lariety of institutions: the Securities and Exchange
commission, bank
regulators and prhate sector bodies such as the Financial
Accorriri.rg Standards Board,
the American Insdnrte of cerffied public Accountants
and stock exchanges.
M' R
lP1ul Healy i"s theJames Williston Professm of Business Ad,ministration and, Krkhna
G. Palcpu is the Ross Grahamwarker professm of
Bwiness Ad,ministration, both at Haruard,
Busi.ness school, Boston, Massachusetts. Their
e-mail addresses are (pnea$ohbs.ed.u) and.
(hpalepu@hbs.edu), respectiuely.
Exhibit 1
Timeline of critical Events for Enron in the period August Zfi)l to December 2001
Date Eumt
August 14, 2001 Jeff Skilling resigned as CEO, citing personal reasons. He was replaced by
Kenneth Lay.
Mid- to late August Sherron Watkins, an Enron vice president, wrote an a.non)rynous letter to
Kenneth Lay expressing concems about the firm's accounting. She
subsequently discussed her concerns withJames Hecker, a former colleague
and audit partner at Andersen, who contacted the Enron audit team.
October 12, 200f An Arthur Andersen lawyer contacted a senior partner in Houston to remind
him that company policy was not to retain documents that were no longer
needed, prompting the shredding of documents.
October f6, 2001 Enron announces quarterly eamings of $393 million and nonrecurring
charges of $1.01 billion after tax to reflect asset writedowns primarily for
water and broadband businesses.
October 22,2001 The Securities and Exchange Commission opened inquiries into a potential
conflict of interest between Enron, its directors and its special partnerships.
November 8, 2001 Enron restated its financials for the prior four years to consolidate partnership
arranBements retroactively. Earnings from lggT to 2000 declined by
$591 million, and debt for 2000 increased by g658 million.
November 9, 2001 Enron entered merger agreement with Dynegy.
November 28, 200f M4lor credit rating agencies downgraded Enron's debt to junk bond status,
making the firm liable to retire g4 billion of its 913 billion debt. Dynegy
pulled out of the proposed merger.
December 2, 2001 Enron filed for bankruptcy in New York and simultaneously sued Dynegy for
breach of contract.
Despite thls elaborate corporate governance nen\'ork. Enron rras able to at6act
iarge sums of capital to fund a quesrionable br,r-siness model. concea-l its true perfor-
mance through a series of accounring and financing manew.ers, and hrpe its srock ro
urxustainable lerels. \\trile Enron presents an extreme exarnple. ir is also a usfi.rl test
case for potential
weaknesses in the U.S. capital market s\stem. \\'e beiieve that *re
Problems of governance and incenti!'es that emerged at Enron can also surface at many
other firms and may porenrially affect the entire capital marker. we will begrn by
discussing the evolution of Enron's business model in the late 1990s, the stresses that
this business model created for Enron's financial reporting, and how key capital market
intermediaries played a role in the company's rise and fall.
Enron's Business
Kenneth Lay founded Enron in 198b through rhe merger of Houston Natural
Gas and Internorth, two natural gas pipeline companies.l The merged company
owned 37,000 miles of intra- and interstate pipelines for transporting natural gas
1
Sources for information on Enron's business include Enron annual reports and IGIG for the period
1990-2000, Tufano (1994), Ghemawat (2000), and Salter, Levesque and Ciampa (2002).
between producers and utilities. In the early 1980s, most contracts between natural
gas producers and pipelines were "take-or-pay" contracts, where pipelines agreed
either to purchase a predetermined quantity at a given price or be liable to pay the
equivalent amount in case of failure to honor that contract. In these contracts,
prices were tlpically fixed over the contract life or increased with inflation. Pipe-
lines, in turn, had similar long-term contracts with local gas distribution companies
or electric utilities to purchase gas from them. These contracts assured long-term
stability in supply and prices of natural gas.
However, changes in the regulation of the natural gas market during the
mid-1980s, which deregulated prices and permitted more flexible alTangements
between producers and pipelines, led to an increased use of spot market transac-
tions. By 1990, 75 percent of gas sales were transacted at spot prices rather than
through long-term contracts. Enron, which owned the largest interstate network of
pipelines, profited from the increased gas supply and flexibility resulting from the
regulatory changes. Its returns on beginning equity in the years 1987 to 1990, when
it was primarily a pipeline business, were 14.2, 13.0, 15.9 and 13.1 percent, respec-
tively, compared with an estimated equity cost of capital of around 13 percent.2
In an attempt to achieve further grorath, Enron pursued a diversification
strategy. tt began by reaching beyond its pipeline business to become involved in
natural gas trading. It extended the natural gas model to become a financial trader
and market maker in electric power, coal, steel, paper and pulp, water and
broadband fiber optic cable capacity. It undertook international projects involving
construction and management of energ)'facilities. 81'2001, Enron had become a
conglomerate Lhat ortrred and operated gas pipelines. electriciq'plans, pulp and
paper plants. broadband a-ssec ard h-arer plants internationallr'and traded exten-
sivelv in financial markes for the same producr and senices. -{ summan' of
segmenr resulu for the compan\'. in Exhibit 2, shor*s horr'dramaricallv the domestic
trading and internarional businesses grelr during the late 1990s.5
This growth impressed the capital markets, and fert asked fundamental ques-
tions about the company's business strategy. Could Enron's expertise in owning
and managing energy assets, and then developing a trading model to help buyers
and sellers of energy manage risks, be extended to such a broad array of new
businesses? Moreover, was Enron's performance sustainable given the limited
barriers to entry by other firms that wished to mimic its success? To have a sense of
how Enron's business model evolved, it is useful to consider in more detail how is
operations expanded.
2
This estimate is based on the average 3O-year government bond rate for the period of 8.65 percent, a
market risk premium of 7 percent and an equity beta of 0.6. The cost of equity capital is calculated using
the capital asset pricing model: 8.65 Percent + (0.6 x 7 percent) : 12.85 Percent.
3
It is difficult to figure out which pars ofEnron's business model were working and which were not,
since the company provided minimal segment disclosure. In addition, its 2000 domestic trading
performance was affected by the California energy crisis, where illegal price manipulation by Enron and
others is being investigated.
Exhibit 2
Enron Segment and Stock Market perfonnance, lggS to 2000
Domestic: Pipelines
Revenues $1,466 $e76 $831 $806 $r,416 $r,84e $2,032 $2,955
Eamings' 382 403 359 570 580 637 685 732
Domestic: Tmding & Other
Revenus $6,624 $6,e77 $7,269 $10,858 $16,65e $23,668 $28,684 $7?,031
Eamings" 316 359 344 332 766 403 592 2,074
International
Rwenues $9r4 $1,380 $1,334 $2,027 $2,9$ $6,013 g9,936 $22,898
Eamings" 134 189 196 300 (36) 574 722 351
Stock Perfomance
Enron 25Vo 5% 257o 13% -4% 37% 56% 87%
s&P 500 7% -2% 34% 20Vo SlVo 27Vo 20Vo -t0%
M{or Business Events Teesside Begins Begins Acquires Acquires Creates Trading
opens electricity constnrc- Pordmd Wessex Enron- contmcxs
trading of
tion General Water Online double
Dabhol Corp. in U.K Calif.
plant energr
crisis
4
A swaP is a transaction that exchanges one security for another with different characteristics.
A forward
contract is for the purchase or sale of a specific quantity of a good at thc current (spot) price, but with
PaFnent and delivery at a sPecified future date. A futures contract is an agreement to bry specified
quantity of a good at a particular price on a specified future date. "
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All use subjet to JSTOR Tems and Conditiirns
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5
In the interest rate swap ma+el tw:
agree to make paymcnts to each
(or imaginary) quantity of principat. larties "truo other based on a notionar
ir,. p"yi-*" uy trre pr.,i., ,.. iirlJ ol 0,rr....,, inrerest
f#:: ftiloo, ";,' l'ro"Xflng:lgi::it
p"Gillj.d o,, u nxea inte rest ra-t.*,t,.,r,. rher makes
o
tnterest rate' Thus' swaps provide
and of hedging risk. a way of seeking lor...ort financing
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i3,i,".y,iit*Hfi I#1323,12:3spM
E
company's
for the construction and m:rnagement
where Enron had a core competence,
core expertise be extended to
of piperines,
but many o*rers were not. could the
other types of energy assets, such zrs
plants? Also, international diversification,
such as India and Ch.
particularly in developing economies
power
powerprojecti"r"J;,,:;1:::l,H'n,:,il1$*#:I#:ffi*;ff
project until that time in India, and .r,,1::;:
it attracted considerable political opposition
and controversy. Given its rimited
business experience in developing
did Enron have expertise in managing economies,
th.
its asset expropriated after constru"ctiJ,
ri* that any returns would be taxed or
or tn. prant? Even if Enron was successfur
in the inhrnational energy marke! questions
could be raised about whether the
company could create a sustainabre
advantage over competitors that
enter the market' Many existing prayers rater sought to
hai expertise in managing the construc-
Financial Reporting
.u*,11'J,'"ffi :1xTilxg,H1ffi'.ffiTr';1,:ffi
standards that require at least
s p....ri
i:,,:,*T:ff :i:::
,o u. of assers
by independent
equiry investors. By ignoring
"#.ato avoid
ni. ..qrri..*ent, Enron was able
ing these speciar purpose entities. consoridat_
As-a result, Enron,s nr"r..
liabilities and overstated its equityurrjiu.u-ings. .rr..t understated its
announced that restatem.rt on october 16,200I, Enron
io its financial statements for years
colrect these violations would 1gg7 to 2000 to
reduce earnit
n ( or 2 s
ri o p..;
; ;r re p o rte d o u J,., X;ifJ,ff
end of 2000 by g628 milion (6 -
o
p.*.;;;;.eporied
ff :-I?:L.J,"#J:,1 H:
r,",r,r,o., urd 5.5 percent of
reduce
;'.:il1.T:;klt 'q,,irl at the end or 2000 b'. si; i,iri", (10 percent
In addiuon to the accor,.rina f.;t,.-^. r
n rs re r a ri o,,
o i
", ",.
invesrors rhar ir had hedged :i .*[l ;t[:? :::?:.H:.
ao":lr,aJ^i
l;:l;]"J;1,1..T:I" ..J
l: ;J'ffi :: *i: f :
lni' ;l:,,:*,
tees ro carrv .", ;:i,:'i:;'.Tt
an
Hi:-.:tri,T::,,:::l^ilrr3::::: ilT
Enron alrorved se'era.t r.1 .*p"l=.,1-.,,0,"*
i:H:,'ff#Lffi;:".., its chier
rnsubsequen,*";';.:,I[i!]::ffi :T.:il,ffi'.1]: j[::"*:x*x:
employees profited handsomery, .aising
their fiduciary responsibility uborrt ql..rt"r. *t.tt..;.y had fulfilled
to E.r.or,i ,1olihoro.r.,
8
In this discussion' we do not consider profits Enron
allegedly earned illegally through the manipula-
tion of electricity prices in california. r ,n.r"
p.ono *"re excluded, Enron,s performance would
been even worse. have
7 Exhibit 3
The Links Between Managers
and Investors
accounting performance,
I1*:x':t"H*r*1;:-J$,iT,*Hid{fI;:T[l,:HiT.:il:rr::
;:i::::1,:I",i.".,p-so.,,,;._:.-T;l;+[I#T"'ffi l::J.H,],,;*;j
medium-
".
i;;*::;T,tr ifi}fi'j'trJ:;i'"n.i;",l'., 0,, ar to'.."utl
RoIe of Audit Committees
usuallv meetjust a
,n.r.?*#iiff9itt"**ittees few times during the
year, and
i',tt.#:#.?l:',^il.1ffi:1tiil:i']"',xJ,k;iil,:l*ru:il.1i::l:;
the audit ."*.",u.. is fraudulent or the
audito.r;;i,
Enron's
o."ilii;;:JlT"gementa',..i,riJ
Dr.-RobertJaedicke of ""0::'.oJ,HIfil:
stanford
Y::'"expertise than
0."i,.", rast enough.
many. tt inclidea
u.rir..ri,ott
andrormeideanorstanro.ou",r.*i.JnJ.fjJii,.il::::,:ffi
University of rexas' nn.
dent and chief executive
,. a"a.r*;;;... center; pu,rro p...i.u, :;::Jf.fl**:
officer or ,rr. Jat. Bank former presi_
wakeham, formerrr.Kg.*."o of Rio * 1rr.o" in Brazir;
wendv t*"r,;,, C#..
,1.
"iil,. il;;;;#;;,",
John
a Hong Kong
i"J':ffil};and .r,ui. or-'s.
Futures rrad- i"--lo,ry
But Enron's audit committee
seemed to share the
common pattern of a
:'*lHi,:. *.:: : t":: u *
few
.,."- 0,.,
,ry;!ff.TTf, :il T.iff co n sid e .,h e
fiU:t
require full disclosure
that were primarily moti\/ated
potential conflicts
by accounting
in related party transactions and
"r,r,.r.Lrsactions (powers, iroubh and winokur,
"ii;;;tl;iilifi61'+'#[y""J,.rJ,],r;l#1323:'2:3epM
16 Joumal of Economi.c pa.spectiaa
r0
For example, Nelson, Eliott and rarptey (2002) show that
mechanical accounting rules for structured
finance transactions lead to more carnings management.
#:,.,.#m:**
[f"ffiil::;uJ,,no,,.assumed***::":J,ffi:1ffi
*t*'**tilrt*r*:i.","--rT#ilJr"',"':.".THffi
company that begins wi& ffi f -:
retum on the current book value
in this
the .*p..ia
and then incorporates
about the g.o*rt oruook lalue and the assumptions
.oltut
di scoun tin"g,r,.,. l*,,-s .,n. o..IIl;[+. :XT.:ilTX [
assess the embedded expecrarions
Enron's cost of equity *u,
back
t" f".i1, , ,r".u pii., o.iri'by ffi;r,
urr.r*irrg that
*,
tz p....ri, ,;;; as a horizontat
Iines on the graph showing..,r." tirr-. i., Exhibit 4.12 The
.o"riry r.ra revenue are based
up unt, 2000; after that pli.,t,
tt.y ""u..',i*.d on actual data
justify the stock price of on what r.u.r, *orra be
$bo t,
needed to
wouldjusri' this price would ^"gr.,2rio. tr, .,-,.t, a framework, one scenario that
hai;..;;.. Enron to earn a ret
,::"r". ::Tj
I; ;
sro rr re, e n u e s rro m s r 0 0 b i r i o n
annual gror'-th rate) and-
r . d
; ; r:T ;,,ffi T:I.."t
cenr per r.u, *...uitJpound grlrr'r;'r:.r-,res by l0 per-
These assumprioru are
h_rqhri aggressir-e. For
on equin rras lg percenr exa,mpre, Enron,s acruar
in tggO, 2l;'r... return
12 peicent rn reei-rhus,
i-,
;;"fi'ff:j;:r,:::.1?.i.TTHll.,l11#:
". r, r".."...'rh. ..u..r.-g.;-*l..oed
in rerurn on equiry and sustain
Enron's peak stock price to jusrift
r'ould n"* ..0"r.* a dramadc-extension
of its bruiness
ffi:1,,ffi.,,i1T;l another u.,.r,'J-i
for the ..^.,;;i;;.,-, or*...
n*trical averages for u.S. p,ruri.-.o.rrpanies expec_
period 1979-199g: i/erage over the
",llll return on equity of ll percen,, u-ra*.r_y.ar average
ll This approach to valuation
is equivalent to the discountedcash
flow varuation approach,
;'#:Liliffi bers ins tead
"r
.*n n.*,. i*'i,l,i1[.,",, .; ;]; ;;#,i,1tf , but reries on
rr.o,, Heary and
12
Enron in 2000 was a diff
iJJl".':#:lnlh.,3flit';'.T'.TJJi1,.,iH,::':T;ili.::'.1;lT::[:";:X;3.."1ffi".,,;
.-:3r*iffi
fl -;"41i:i#J'iH#l;.:li:,":.,*x*:1,:** j:*:::;tllg,.Jl;
ror tle a--",i. i'. i"^,r,. ,to.r.',nu.r.*
rn*.ro..,'*. #:},:'i::l"t
ili """i::H:li,il;;$lil:t:fii;.:#:"T# "J-ffi], this period,
.,,.-;;;;;"*#i',.ouna we
lj.-"r::" 5 percent
l2 percent. white rhis number + 1.7 * 4 percent, or approximarely
frame' it is based on a different
r..r"'r".r, i,,}rtr; l;"t^f:ttt"t
company's cost of capital
set of assumptions. t, ,rrJ !r.rr.l',1,n1
I
Exhibit 4
Forecasted Retum on Equityand Rerrenues forEnr,on Consistentwith
a $90 Stockprice
Forecasted
EI
o
&
25.0%
20.0%
15.0Vo
to.0%
5.OVo
a [^'3 -r-- Return on Equity
600 e
5oo H
!
4oo e
200 &
o
o
300 oe
Revenues 100
0.0%
,otn"o*ro*9$$$reqr$rdirsrss*slq.sbq.sobq;s$q.os$$ff
v: nw{r.
ffi#.qgffiArO * @"oqi r*#
r, * *r * . ..y
*..,:",
r* ;;;:?.'ff##r;lr.:#HH*i
perrorm we, in
benchmark and capitar
w,l frow ,;;;;. tunds. rr, .orri*,, u risk_averse
;lirff.ll fJ:J' the crowd *,i"", u. rewarded for foreseeing
manager
whenrhe,,o.uu,'ul,Lt,filffi
:fl ::H:Ifl ft .;:nlj*l*];t"..*
the probrems at
k**.:i:T.T*,,,n:p:,,:"3..,,..H1,?,11.,,.i11?,,,i]:*J"[*,",ff
\th'rr'ere anarrsts so slorr' to
recognize the problems
ffi'[:*jJt*#S[#1*T'XH;,ili'r;::1,":fx-*^#H#
ranu,eceiv.a;;'.:ij.';ff
To the impact of investment
assess
l.HX:iffin:*mru*;,;::'J
anallrts' we co'ected tr,.i. rurri.irrg **..,
n .ru.orr""ri o.r., price "r""rr.orr,, sell-side
estima,.,
January l, 2001,
through October ,U, ZOOi, ,o. the period
accounting and business rh.r, Err.orr.."."f.i*. extent
problems. Four analysts of irs
worked ro.-i*, that did not
provide significant,inves]ment
banking services: A. G.
commerzbank and pNC Edwards, Bernstein Research,
Advisors--Nii. urruryrts
Enron investmenr banking worked ro. i.-, that worked on
a.ut, ura two anarysts worked
investment banking uut
wei.
for firms that did
".r"mrru,.a with Enron. iliil
analysts, 5 presents
il:ffi:1L."+n?recas..
of Enron,s stock price
keyfirrdings emerge. Firrt,
d.fi";;;;;;
actuar price on the
interest r.o* i.ru.ll .o*irt.rr-,#*-oo,.ntial conflicts
of
expected,",..*:fl.#,:T:ll.#ili=-f{},f_.r}::ff
24 percent for analysts that
at for investmen, uurrr.r. This
""ri,iri difference is
ffiH***i
Second, price appreciation
x11T:J-r'fff;T', expected bv anarvsts of invest-
:urre.nruu,,ru.,g,.L1:i$;-1:r-".1,::i::";=ltH*##*,H
:ll'ff ffilli ;i t:^,=:, ; ilJ;;,;. potentiat rorr,,t,.. business as much as
a,, were,,or..i,J l[,#l1l
ilf ffifi: # T,:: ;ilr,**f
explain bias in analysts, forecasts :-, i*,trtI
,.1"^_endations.
The interdependence of ""0
sell-side u.ruryro with investment
a relativery recenr developmen. banking business is
uo Igib, broke;;^;;.
commissions for trading
and used ,o_."",r, charged fixed
in-house selr-side r,aly.t",
of tlese funds to firl
*nr.n *.f ot.Lur,.a free to,".*.
In May 1g75, fixed commissions
,,".. d...g,rlated and begu, to
rrrTririffiiT:"I
revenue, leading brokerage bring in much less
ho,ses to a search ror othe-r
research (Strauss' .o,r..a. of funding for
t"-: re'pondea bv charging clients
research Horr'ever.':iii ri1*
br rhe ea-ri\ 1gg0s. rhe earnings directi'for
of inie.il,enr banking from
e r n n in c i a: ou,.o.
;1T HJ,] i i::: :' iill::I':::":*-:,h o o s h ad be c o m
"
e
A ranse oi
"."a.-i.';,:;.;
alrss are influenced
f.'fiH ;'"::*r::,0 e,,idence drai se.*ide
br their an-
0..*_,;-;;:,
,l3i?"li;I-:l*5,;:[*Jf ::l'xff ffi ::iiJ,:fl:r'1JT);',X;T
;i,jfi:[#;::1,I:T#iHlfi jTlT:,,T,tT:.;H[.f;:IT#,T;
tosether
analysts to mainhin ;;;.;; with a desire by
;,:;:::j'companies,
-,Ji
*i*:,'.";::l:[rq,T:,i,"^Tfi i:'ilr::]*#r.::::;:ll;*ff
:i**[tr*;1,,r11;:,:x,..ffi ;::]':..JJjr*;:l':l;m$,il1
Sell-side analysts f
,*.*i'.,f o;::'J,HHtT:,r,"':ilTI11r,r"TT:::T,ff##.T::Hl
"inside" information and
feedbacu ." *it. and research models. Manage_
,. "ralysis
ffi:t#lI.ll1.il.".::"'o'access ";;t; thar are critical orrnanagement
and
vi ded nro rm r.
i
*Xl::i ;ffi :: ;:, H;[T;H e n t pro_
"
rise to Regulation",.
Fair Disclosu.. i" o.;;;;;
:]:*,f:g:-
zooo, rvtrictr required
-ilffifil;
Exhibit 5
SeII-Side Anarynsts'
7 Oneyear Ahead price
Forecasts for Enron
2.10
o
I
1.90
o. +r +A
o 1.70 +l
++ +'+ I
o + +
+ a*
d
U
1.50 +
t
f+ tt
o
L 1.30- + 4 +t .+ +
c)
+++ +
+
I + +
o. { AA A
+
'd(!
o 0.90 A
d + Affiliated I,/B
d
.o
o.70 A Non-I,/B
r Unaffiliated I/B
0.50
7/9/2007 2/28/2oor /ts/zoot urr)r*, ,Eii nili,
Naras.. Analysts, price fo
are made during the
are deflatei by'E;;;;:"':'^ts. p.1." PlriodJanuary I'
,r,l'i".".;rc 2001' to october I5,
I) those rhat work ro. olut1ul "n 200r, and
3.dtr#,:.;:rf.i#51;:*,'ll.:x'l}ffi
_.^ ror firms ,rr", a"
t*F$irffJ:";ffi Hl:::*;:;;;r'"
"#,I;1"";";;;*#T[.J"lffifj?rJ,:,'
so,,r.; rnvesrex;:.
"lii"
make all materiai r
f"*:;:::,;$1#i;r:,,.#:::ffi,::1il:J:Jl,:::.::il;j,*;,Ttr,x11
*:tl ;.;; ;,# i::', f,,,:Xf,::,;;,., ",h. ;; ;' .",;
rHnr#i';::;::y.:t'.,*-,Jj;11?:f*,'&ti[T:I#iX
owned by key i,,.tr,,rtio.,ur
anall'sts whose crients
;#?.;:..,.r:ff;::.:::T*ff " stock that is
in recommendations
serr-side ".. p,i;;;;..;,;i::'"::t:::'^:::'rather than institutions? bv
^ "";i;;t'#',:H:Xj';'#',::1""^
or ongoing ..t"tio.,rr,ip, in.isoladon, but in a
nerwork
management of the ""ii".iro.;:':]:.::.'"s bankers ar their n.-r,
.r;o;;';;';:::l"vestment
:ompanies that they cover and ,:r. ,r,.
reports. .,rr,o,.,.., who read their
RoIe of Accomti.g
Regrrlation
::: :,:it#
financial
:ffi :::*ilH:il1' ;'J:J':
mechanicar and inn exib,e
that this approach
c,ear-
engineering designed modvates
specifica,y tu
,J::L: "
clrcurlVent
is well understood i" these knife_edge rules,
,-frJ * ,ir.."*..7 . accounting for some as
of it" ,p..iut
ra
Hutton (2002b) examine
guidance," ror nrms whose manasers
""t;;;;#,]f:fiil,f:"t#3.,Iij::T: activery provided
Responses
-oii;;d*fr .#rfi,{i,il,y"T,"rJ,yil"1ot323:12:3epM
This content domloaded Aom 123.2
The Fatt of Enron 23
:::io:;ffi
tocus on maximizing
:"1"*T.S::;:,i:r"[;;".::1i j*m,*r:rfffi
the value'of 5
beyond a boiremlate
certification or ""orJ"rr,r-"r.ry,
in*-*""r, audits that go
rru.ro* conformity
but alrow a more complete
..n..tio, oiii. i.rrigtrt or *,r, ,.."rrting standards,
trre auaitor on the crient,s
performance and risks.
,11.. ,*rrr
"fp."".i, audir firms *r, i.-*o.. likery to craft
:,1+H:J111: flo{'itio1'' t';';*s;',erect segment or crienrs rather than
we,h-i n k ;;;.J;HLTiil.T,;, .; ;,
",;
L*[ii:[:r;;
audir committees are reformed h app e n wh en
*.,,.-r" ;;;.il
can onty be achieved ^
when audito*;.; ;;;;
committees as"roi]lr*o.pendence
their real clients, not
i1;i't::;'i"H;t',*il:t*:[,;*"'::!1ii;:ilT,ffi i:ff.H**;
business rur,r..r. ;"r;'^'l'.I: "tto to rethink the way or
th1oush,, u*"
inves ro
perrorman ce .;;;
'#*i;JI*#
rs, .,rt o a.or. rli# r' .l''j:r."^::lo-T rd"l from sop his d in tionat ri c ate d ru
:;,L,il.r
s
ffi:H: H f
ffiT.:: T:ilil:.l; J l[**i*nrrffi"i;:ffiffi:Tiilff
*: * :l ::l^,;;:;;ff ;.th.re,h.ugh, rn
auditors and anarysts.,,. i.,...iu.. or
il:.., -
. The case of Enron has illustrated AJ;;;;
incentives know surrisingly little
and information problem, about the
capital market intermediarie, ,rru, u.irlTis*ts
Sovernance and tunctioning of
tainabrejumps in stock
*Jil;;;'::^_Tjt
marker prices, *..rrrli il.':ffi;;:ll:";Tlx:f,
more bioadlv, ro. *ir.,,u,,ug.a
nrms.
HH
wh,e quick fixes like
':'iLffif*::*t
l.:rtr[x**'H5:."1,,HH*r*:T[.*#tr#i**.T*::*:.i#i
References