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Miss Pamela


Santhosh Kumar Gk
4th Trimester
Great Eastern Management B-School, Bangalore

Sr. No. Contents Page No.

1. Introduction 03
- Joint statement
- India’s separation plan 08

2. Need for nuclear deal 16

- History and background
- Current scenario 19
- Technical aspect
- Critics on indo-us civil cooperation 20
- Political aspects 22
- Power sector at a glance 24

3. Conclusion 33

4. References 34

5. Glossary 35

The Indo-US Agreement of 18 July 2005 and the subsequent agreement of 2
March2006, following the visit of President Bush to India, have been discussed
extensively in the Indian and US media for the past ten months. At present, the
US Congress is holding hearings on the proposed legislation to enable the US to
enter into civil nuclear energy cooperation with India and to allow the US
administration to approach the nuclear suppliers’ group to adjust its policies to
make an exception in the case of India. We shall certainly be hearing of both
support and opposition from various Senators and Congressmen. As of now it is
not clear if the US Congress will accord its approval before the June or July
deadline. There will be a recess thereafter and on reconvening, the US Congress
is expected to be busy with new elections. There is also a possibility that the US
Congress, even if it were to approve the legislation, may include some additional
conditions that India would have to accept. The Indian Government’s position is
that it stands by the agreements of 18 July 2005 and 2 March 2006 and that no
new conditions would be acceptable to the Government.


President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh today
expressed satisfaction with the great progress the United States and India have
made in advancing our strategic partnership to meet the global challenges of the
21st century. Both our countries are linked by a deep commitment to freedom
and democracy; a celebration of national diversity, human creativity and
innovation; a quest to expand prosperity and economic opportunity worldwide;
and a desire to increase mutual security against the common threats posed by
intolerance, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The
successful transformation of the U.S.-India relationship will have a decisive and

positive influence on the future international system as it evolves in this new

Reviewing the progress made in deepening the global partnership between the
United States and India since their Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, the
President and the Prime Minister reaffirm their commitment to expand even
further the growing ties between their two countries. Consistent with this
objective, the two leaders wish to highlight efforts the United States and India are
making together in the following areas, where they have:


(1) Agreed to intensify efforts to develop a bilateral business climate supportive
of trade and investment by:

 Welcoming the report of the U.S.-India CEO Forum, agreeing to consider

its recommendations aimed at substantially broadening our bilateral
economic relations, and directing the Chairs of the Indo-U.S. Economic
Dialogue to follow up expeditiously with the CEO Forum;
 Endorsing the efforts of the U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum to reduce
barriers to trade and investment with the goal of doubling bilateral trade in
three years;
 Agreeing to advance mutually beneficial bilateral trade and investment
flows by holding a high-level public-private investment summit in 2006,
continuing efforts to facilitate and promote foreign direct investment and
eliminate impediments to it, and enhancing bilateral consultations on
various issues including tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and
services, and preventing the illicit use of the financial system.
(2) Sought to expand cooperation in agriculture by:

 Launching the Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture with a three-year

financial commitment to link our universities, technical institutions, and

businesses to support agriculture education, joint research, and capacity
building projects including in the area of biotechnology.
 Endorsing an agreed work plan to promote bilateral trade in agriculture
through agreements that: lay out a path to open the U.S. market to Indian
mangoes, recognize India as having the authority to certify that shipments
of Indian products to the United States meet USDA organic standards,
and provide for discussions on current regulations affecting trade in fresh
fruits and vegetables, poultry and dairy, and almonds.
(3) Reaffirmed their shared commitment to completing the WTO Doha
Development Agenda (DDA) before the end of 2006, and agreed to work
together to help achieve this outcome.


(1) Welcomed the successful completion of discussions on India's
separation plan and looked forward to the full implementation of the
commitments in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement on nuclear cooperation. This
historic accomplishment will permit our countries to move forward towards our
common objective of full civil nuclear energy cooperation between India and the
United States and between India and the international community as a whole.

(2) Welcomed the participation of India in the ITER initiative on fusion

energy as an important further step towards the common goal of full nuclear
energy cooperation.

(3) Agreed on India's participation in FutureGen, an international public-

private partnership to develop new, commercially viable technology for a clean
coal near-zero emission power project. India will contribute funding to the project
and participate in the Government Steering Committee of this initiative.

(4) Welcomed the creation of the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean

Development and Climate, which will enable India and the U.S. to work together

with other countries in the region to pursue sustainable development and meet
increased energy needs while addressing concerns of energy security and
climate change. The Partnership will collaborate to promote the development,
diffusion, deployment and transfer of cleaner, cost-effective and more efficient
technologies and practices.

(5) Welcomed India's interest in the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program, an

international marine research endeavor that will contribute to long-term energy
solutions such as gas hydrates.

(6) Noting the positive cooperation under the Indo-U.S. Energy Dialogue,
highlighted plans to hold joint conferences on topics such as energy efficiency
and natural gas, to conduct study missions on renewable energy, to establish a
clearing house in India for coal-bed methane/coal-mine methane, and to
exchange energy market information.


(1) Emphasizing the importance of knowledge partnerships, announced
the establishment of a Bi-National Science and Technology Commission which
the U.S. and India will co-fund. It will generate collaborative partnerships in
science and technology and promote industrial research and development.

(2) Agreed that the United States and India would work together to
promote innovation, creativity and technological advancement by providing a
vibrant intellectual property rights regime, and to cooperate in the field of
intellectual property rights to include capacity building activities, human resource
development and public awareness programs.

(3) Agreed to continue exploring further cooperation in civil space,

including areas such as space exploration, satellite navigation, and earth
science. The United States and India committed to move forward with

agreements that will permit the launch of U.S. satellites and satellites containing
U.S. components by Indian space launch vehicles, opening up new opportunities
for commercial space cooperation between the two countries.

(4) Welcomed the inclusion of two U.S. instruments in the Indian lunar
mission Chandrayaan-1. They noted that memoranda of understanding to be
signed by ISRO and NASA would be significant steps forward in this area.

(5) Welcomed the U.S. Department of Commerce's plan to create a

license exception for items that would otherwise require an export license to end-
users in India engaged solely in civilian activities.


(1) Noted the enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation between the two
countries and stressed that terrorism is a global scourge that must be fought and
rooted out in every part of the world.

(2) Welcomed the increased cooperation between the United States and
India in the defense area, since the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense
Relationship was signed on June 28, 2005, as evidenced by successful joint
exercises, expanded defense cooperation and information sharing, and greater
opportunities to jointly develop technologies and address security and
humanitarian issues.

(3) Reaffirmed their commitment to the protection of the free flow of

commerce and to the safety of navigation, and agreed to the conclusion of a
Maritime Cooperation Framework to enhance security in the maritime domain, to
prevent piracy and other transnational crimes at sea, carry out search and
rescue operations, combat marine pollution, respond to natural disasters,
address emergent threats and enhance cooperative capabilities, including

through logistics support. Both sides are working to finalize a Logistics Support
Agreement at the earliest.

(4) Welcomed India's intention to join the Container Security Initiative

aimed at making global maritime trade and infrastructure more secure and
reducing the risk of shipping containers being used to conceal weapons of mass

(5) Reiterated their commitment to international efforts to prevent the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

(6) Building on the July 2005 Disaster Relief Initiative, noted the important
disaster management cooperation and their improved capabilities to respond to
disaster situations.

(7) Recognized the importance of capacity building in cyber security and

greater cooperation to secure their growing electronic interdependencies,
including to protect electronic transactions and critical infrastructure from cyber
crime, terrorism and other malicious threats.


(1) Recalled their joint launch of the UN Democracy Fund in September
2005 and offered the experience and expertise of both Governments for capacity
building, training and exchanges to third countries that request such assistance
to strengthen democratic institutions.

(2) Welcomed the decision of India and the United States to designate a
representative to the Government Advisory Board of the International Centre for
Democratic Transition (ICDT) located in Budapest to facilitate cooperative
activities with ICDT.

(3) Agreed that the Virtual Coordination and Information Centres set up in
September 2005 should be further strengthened and a bilateral meeting aimed at
developing a practical programme for utilization of its services be held soon.

(4) Expressed satisfaction at the expedited USFDA drug approval

processes that strengthen the combat against HIV/AIDS at the global level and
encourage greater corporate participation to meet this challenge, including the
establishment of the Indo-U.S. Corporate Fund for HIV/AIDS.

(5) Agreed to expand bilateral efforts and continue cooperation in the area
of medical research and strengthen technical capacity in food and drug
regulation in India as well as address the concern on avian influenza, including
agreement to reach out to the private sector, develop regional communications
strategies, and plan an in-region containment and response exercise. The
President welcomed India's offer to host the International Partnership on Avian
and Pandemic Influenza meeting in 2007.

(6) Welcomed India's membership in the Coalition Against Wildlife

Trafficking, a partnership through which we will collaborate in the fight against
illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife parts; we also welcome the opportunity to
strengthen longstanding work together on the conservation of wildlife through
cooperation on park management and ecotourism.

President Bush thanked Prime Minister Singh and the people of India for the
warmth of their reception and the generosity of their hospitality.

India's Separation Plan:

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has tabled in Parliament additional details

today on the Indian nuclear separation plan first unveiled on 7 March 2006.

Specifically, he has identified the 14 reactors which will go under IAEA

safeguards between 2006 and 2014, as well as the individual facilities within the
Nuclear Fuel Complex, Hyderabad, which will be offered for safeguards by 2008.

The 14 reactors to be safeguarded are the following:

2006: TAPS 1 and 2; RAPS 1 and 2 Kudankulam 1 and 2

2007: RAPS 5 (under construction)
2008: RAPS 6 (under construction)
2010: RAPS 3 and 4 (currently operational)
2012: KAPS 1 and 2 (currently operational)
2014: NAPS 1 and 2 (currently operational)

In other words, the thermal power reactors which will remain unsafe guarded are:
MAPS 1 and 2 at Kalpakkam (both 220 MWe) ; TAPS 3 and 4 (both 540 MWe) ;
and Kaiga 1, 2, 3 and 4 (all 220 MWe). Plus of course the fast breeders.

The Nuclear Fuel Complex facilities to be safeguarded are:

Uranium Oxide Plant (Block A)

Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (Palletizing) (Block A)
Ceramic Fuel Fabrication Plant (Assembly) (Block A)
Enriched Uranium Oxide Plant
Enriched Fuel Fabrication Plant
Gadolinia Facility

1. Through the initiation of a sustained dialogue to address energy security
concerns, the two countries sought to promote stable, efficient, predictable and
cost effective solutions for India's growing requirements. At the same time, they
also agreed on the need to develop and deploy cleaner, more efficient,
affordable and diversified energy technologies to deal with the environmental
implications of energy consumption. India had developed proven and wide-
ranging capabilities in the nuclear sector, including over the entire nuclear fuel
cycle. It is internationally recognized that India has unique contributions to make
to international efforts towards meeting these objectives. India has become a full
partner in ITER, with the full support of the US and other partners. India also
accepted the US invitation to join the initiative on Clean Development

2. Noting the centrality of civilian nuclear energy to the twin challenges of energy
security and safeguarding the environment, the two Governments agreed on 18
July 2005 to undertake reciprocal commitments and responsibilities that would
create a framework for the resumption of full cooperation in this field. On its part,
the United States undertook to:

• Seek agreement from the Congress to adjust US laws and policies to

achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation.
• Work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full
civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not
limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded
nuclear reactors at Tarapur.
• In the meantime, encourage its partners to consider fuel supply to Tarapur
• To consult with its partners to consider India's participation in ITER
• To consult with other participants in the Generation-IV International Forum
with a view towards India's inclusion.

3. India had conveyed its readiness to assume the same responsibilities and
practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading
countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States.
Accordingly, India for its part undertook the following commitments:

• Identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and

programmes in a phased manner.
• Filing a declaration regarding its civilian facilities with the IAEA.
• Taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under
IAEA safeguards, and
• Signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian
nuclear facilities.

4. Other commitments undertaken by India have already been fulfilled in the last
year. Among them are:

• India's responsible non-proliferation record, recognized by the US,

continues and is reflected in its policies and actions.
• The harmonization of India's export controls with NSG [Nuclear Suppliers'
Group] and MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] Guidelines even
though India is not a member of either group. These guidelines and
control lists have been notified and are being implemented.
• A significant upgrading of India's non-proliferation regulations and export
controls has taken place as a result of the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Act of May 2005. Inter-Ministerial consultations are ongoing to examine
and amend other relevant Acts as well as framing appropriate rules and
• Refrain from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to
states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit
their spread. This has guided our policy on non-proliferation.
• Continued unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and

• Willingness to work with the United States for the conclusion of a
multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

5. The Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, recognized that India is ready to
assume the same responsibilities and practices as other leading countries with
advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. India has an
impeccable record in non-proliferation. The Joint Statement acknowledges that
India's nuclear programme has both a military and a civilian component. Both
sides had agreed that the purpose was not to constrain India's strategic
programme but to enable resumption of full civil nuclear energy cooperation in
order to enhance global energy and environmental security. Such cooperation
was predicated on the assumption that any international civil nuclear energy
cooperation (including by the U.S.) offered to India in the civilian sector should,
firstly, not be diverted away from civilian purposes, and secondly, should not be
transferred from India to third countries without safeguards. These concepts will
be reflected in the Safeguards Agreement to be negotiated by India with IAEA.

6. India's nuclear programme is unique as it is the only state with nuclear

weapons not to have begun with a dedicated military programme. It must be
appreciated that the strategic programme is an offshoot of research on nuclear
power programme and consequently, it is embedded in a larger undifferentiated
programme. Identification of purely civilian facilities and programmes that have
no strategic implications poses a particular challenge. Therefore, facilities
identified as civilian in the Separation Plan will be offered for safeguards in
phases to be decided by India. The nature of the facility concerned, the activities
undertaken in it, the national security significance of materials and the location of
the facilities are factors taken into account in undertaking the separation process.
This is solely an Indian determination.

7. The nuclear establishment in India not only built nuclear reactors but promoted
the growth of a national industrial infrastructure. Nuclear power generation was

envisaged as a three-stage programme with PHWRs [pressurised heavy water
reactors] chosen for deployment in the first stage. As indigenous reactors were
set up, several innovative design improvements were carried out based on
Indian R&D and a standardized design was evolved. The research and
technology development spanned the entire spectrum of the nuclear fuel cycle
including the front end and the back end. Success in the technologies for the
back end of the fuel cycle allowed us to launch the second stage of the
programme by constructing a Fast Breeder Test Reactor. This reactor has
operated for 20 years based on a unique carbide fuel and has achieved all
technology objectives. We have now proceeded further and are constructing a
500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor. Simultaneously, we have launched
design and development of reactors aimed at thorium utilization and
incorporating inherent safety features.

8. Concepts such as grid connectivity are not relevant to the separation exercise.
Issues related to fuel resource sustainability, technical design and economic
viability, as well as smooth operation of reactors are relevant factors. This would
necessitate grid connectivity irrespective of whether the reactor concerned is
civilian or not civilian.

9. It must be recognized that the Indian nuclear programme still has a relatively
narrow base and cannot be expected to adopt solutions that might be deemed
viable by much larger programmes. A comparison of the number of reactors and
the total installed capacity between India and the P-5 brings this out graphically:

Country / Number of reactors / Total installed capacity

India / 15 / 3.04 GWe (2.8% of the total production)

USA / 104 (103 operational) / 99.21 GWe (19.9% of the total production)

France / 59 / 63.36 GWe (78.1% of the total production)
UK / 23 / 11.85 GWe (19.4% of the total production)

Russia / 31 / 21.74 GWe (1.6% of the total production)

China / 9 / 6.602 GWe (2.2% of the total production)

Source: Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington DC

10. Another factor to be taken into account is the small capacity of the reactors
produced indigenously by India, some of which would remain outside
safeguards. Therefore, in assessing the extent of safeguards coverage, it would
be important to look at both the number of reactors and the percentage of
installed capacity covered. An average Indian reactor is of 220 MW and its
output is significantly smaller than the standards reactor in a P-5 economy. The
chart below illustrates this aspect:

Country / Most common reactor / No. of such reactors

India / PHWRs 220 MWe / 12

USA / 69 PWRs and 34 BWRs. Most plants are in the range of range of 1000-
1250 MWe / 51 reactors in the range of 1000 MWe to 1250 MWe

France / PWRs of 900 MWe and 1300 MWe size / 34 PWrs of 900 MWe and
20 PWRs of 1300 MWe

UK / No standard size. AGR is the most common in the range of 600-700 MWe /
14 AGRs

Russia / 3rd Generation VVER-1000 PWRs and RBMK 1000 Light Water
Graphite Reactors / 9 third Generation VVER-1000 PWRs and 11 RBMK 1000
Light Water Fraphite Reactors

China / PWRs 984 MWe / Four

Source: Uranium Information Centre, Melbourne

11. The complexity of the separation process is further enhanced by the limited
resources that India has devoted to its nuclear programme as compared to P-5
nations. Moreover, as India expands international cooperation, the percentage of
its thermal power reactor installed capacity under safeguards would rise
significantly as fresh capacity is added through such cooperation.

12. India's approach to the separation of its civilian nuclear facilities is guided by
the following principles:

• Credible, feasible and implementable in a transparent manner;

• Consistent with the understandings of the 18 July Statement;
• Consistent with India's national security and R&D requirements as well as
not prejudicial to the three-stage nuclear programme in India;
• Must be cost effective in its implementation; and
• Must be acceptable to Parliament and public opinion.

13. Based on these principles, India will:

• Include in the civilian list only those facilities offered for safeguards that,
after separation, will no longer be engaged in activities of strategic

• The overarching criterion would be a judgment whether subjecting a
facility to IAEA safeguards would impact adversely on India's national
• However, a facility will be excluded from the civilian list if it is located in a
larger hub of strategic significance, notwithstanding the fact that it may not
be normally engaged in activities of strategic significance.
• A civilian facility would, therefore, be one that India has determined not to
be relevant to its strategic programme.

14. Taking the above into account, India, on the basis of reciprocal actions by the
US, will adopt the following approach:

(i) Thermal Power Reactors: India will identify and offer for safeguards 14
thermal power reactors between 2006 and 2014. This will include the 4
presently safeguarded reactors (TAPS 1&2, RAPS 1&2) and in
addition KK 1&2 that are under construction. 8 other PHWRs, each of
a capacity of 220 MW, will also be offered. Phasing of specific thermal
power reactors, being offered for safeguards would be indicated
separately by India. Such an offer would, in effect, cover 14 out of the
22 thermal power reactors in operation or currently under construction
to be placed under safeguards, and would raise the total installed
Thermal Power capacity by MWs under safeguards from the present
19% to 65% by 2014.

(ii) Fast Breeder Reactors: India is not in a position to accept safeguards

on the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder
Test Reactor (FBTR), both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast Breeder
Programme is at the R&D stage and its technology will take time to
mature and reach an advanced stage of development.

(iii) Future Reactors: India has decided to place under safeguards all
future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors,
and the Government of India retains the sole right to determine such
reactors as civilian.

(iv) Research Reactors: India will permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor,
in 2010. It will also be prepared to shift the fuel core of the APSARA
reactor that was purchased from France outside BARC [Bhabha
Atomic Research Centre] and make the fuel core available to be
placed under safeguards in 2010.

(v) Upstream facilities: The following upstream facilities would be identified

and separated as civilian:
• List of those specific facilities in the Nuclear Fuel Complex, which will be
offered for safeguards by 2008 will be indicated separately.
• The Heavy Water Production plants at Thal, Tuticorin and Hazira are
proposed to be designated for civilian use between 2006-2009. We do not
consider these plants as relevant for safeguards purposes.
(vi) Downstream facilities: The following downstream facilities would be
identified and separated as civilian:
• India is willing to accept safeguards in the `campaign' mode after 2010 in
respect of the Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant.
• The Tarapur and Rajasthan `Away From Reactors' spent fuel storage
pools would be made available for safeguards with appropriate phasing
between 2006-2009.

(vii) Research Facilities: India will declare the following facilities as civilian:

(a) Tata Institute of Fundamental Research

(b) Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre
(c) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics

(d) Institute for Plasma Research
(e) Institute of Mathematics Sciences
(f) Institute of Physics
(g) Tata Memorial Centre
(h) Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology
(i) Harish Chandra Research Institute

These facilities are safeguards-irrelevant. It is our expectation that they will play
a prominent role in international cooperation.

15. Safeguards:
(a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel
to India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States
has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to
have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its implementation
of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking
agreement from the U.S. Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with
friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create
the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel
market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies
from firms in several nations.

(b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is
prepared to take the following additional steps:

(i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel

supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy
under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to
the U.S. Congress.
(ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an
India-specific fuel supply agreement.

(iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic
reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the
lifetime of India's reactors.

(iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs,

the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly
supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the
United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to

(c) In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-
specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the
IAEA providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded
nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for
corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation
of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel
supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear
facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an
appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.

16. This plan is in conformity with the commitments made to Parliament by

the Government.


The resumption of full civilian nuclear energy cooperation between India

and the United States arose in the context of India's requirement for adequate
and affordable energy supplies to sustain its accelerating economic growth rate
and as recognition of its growing technological prowess. It was preceded by
discussions between the two Governments, particularly between President Bush
and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, of the global energy scenario and the
long-term implications of increasing pressure on hydrocarbon resources and
rising oil prices. These developments led to the announcement in April 2005 of
an Indo-US Energy Dialogue that encompassed the entire spectrum of energy
options ranging from oil and gas to coal, alternative fuels and civilian nuclear


To understand the whole gamut of issues involved, it is important to recall

the background to the 18 July 2005 agreement. This agreement itself sought to
redress the anomalous situation India enjoyed in the global non-proliferation
regime. India refused to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), which
came into being in 1968, at the initiative of USA, USSR and the UK. The NPT
defined a cutoff date of 1 January 1967 and recognized those countries which
had carried out a nuclear test prior to that date as nuclear weapon states (NWS),
and all other countries as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).

Initially, the NPT was conceived to deny the countries that launched the
second world war, namely Germany, Japan and Italy permanently of the ability to
make nuclear weapons. As it turned out, the NPT legitimized USA, USSR, the
UK, France and China as NWS (incidentally, the same five states are also the
five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council with veto

powers) and required other states to give up their rights to acquire nuclear
weapons for all times. India termed the NPT discriminatory and refused to join it
from the very beginning. Pakistan, though receiving substantial military and
economic assistance from USA, also refused to join the NPT, on the ground that
India had chosen to keep itself out of it. Israel also kept itself out of the NPT and
managed to build up a nuclear weapon capability during the 1970s and 1980s.
Israel did receive assistance from France, Britain and USA in its nuclear
weapons programme. USA and many countries of the world have accepted the
Israel argument that its nuclear deterrent is an existential necessity, as it is
surrounded by a number of countries Who are not reconciled to its very

India built its first research reactor Apsara, pretty much on its own in 1956.
It was the first research reactor in Asia Outside the Soviet Union. India started its
first heavy-water production facility at Nangal in 1962 and its first plutonium
separation plant in Trombay in 1965. At the Second United Nations Conference
on the peaceful uses of atomic energy held in Geneva in 1958.
Bhabha outlined India’s three-stage nuclear power programme –the
first stage consisting of natural uranium-fuelled heavy water-moderated
reactors, to be followed by fast reactors using plutonium from the spent
fuel of the first-stage reactors, producing more plutonium from uranium-
238 or uranium-233 from thorium. In the third stage, either thermal or fast
reactors would operate on the uranium-233–thorium cycle.

The logic for this approach has the rather limited resource base of
uranium in India (recognized even at that point of time) and the large reserves of
thorium in the country. The importance of developing capability of producing
heavy water on the one hand and separating plutonium from spent fuel was
obvious. India also undertook all activities to exercise full control over the entire
fuel cycle. Mining for uranium commenced in the 1960s, though earlier to this,
uranium was extracted from the monazite sands. Fuel fabrication for the

research reactor CIRUS was taken up in the early sixties, followed by fuel
required for the pressurized heavy-water reactors.

During the same period, plants were set up to produce nuclear-grade zirconium
and zirconium alloys required for fuel assemblies. A plant for vitrification of long-
lived nuclear waste coming out of the spent fuel reprocessing facility was also
built. With regard to nuclear power plants, the first twin-reactor unit at Tarapur,
incorporating boiling-water reactors, was commissioned in 1969 using the US
reactor technology. At about the same time, a twin-unit pressurized heavy-water
reactor using Canadian technology was built in Rajasthan. The third nuclear
power station at Kalpakkam was designed and built as a total Indian venture.

India undertook the Peaceful Nuclear Experiment (PNE) in 1974 and in its wake
both the US and Canada imposed embargoes on nuclear commerce with India.
The US, which had contracted to supply low enriched uranium fuel for Tarapur,
told India that it could not supply the fuel due its domestic laws under the nuclear
non-proliferation act. In undertaking the PNE, India had violated no agreements
with USA or Canada. Plutonium produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS
reactor was used for the PNE, but at that time both USA and USSR were
themselves carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The nuclear embargoes certainly affected adversely the execution of the Indian
nuclear power projects. They were all delayed considerably as a whole new
nuclear industrial infrastructure had to be built up in the country. During the same
period, USA working with its allies and partners, set up the nuclear suppliers
group and the restrictive supply regimes known as ‘Wassenaar’ and ‘Energy’.
Many research institutions and industrial establishments in India came under the
‘Entities list’ of the US Department of Commerce. In spite of the impediments
posed by nuclear isolation, India made steady progress in building nuclear power
plants, heavy-water production plants, fuel fabrication facilities and reprocessing
facilities, in addition to wide-ranging research and development across the entire

spectrum of nuclear sciences. In parallel, radiation technologies and isotopes
were used extensively in the fields of health, industry and agriculture.

In the 1980s, intelligence information revealed that Pakistan had advanced a

great deal in setting up a centrifuge uranium-enrichment plant. By the end of the
decade of 1980, A. Q. Khan had boasted to a few Indian journalists that Pakistan
had some nuclear weapons in its basement. The strong and ongoing
collaboration between China and Pakistan in nuclear matters was an open
secret. This situation required India to respond appropriately to secure its
national interests. It was under these circumstances that India began its
programme of weaponization.

However, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed to the special session on

disarmament of the United Nations that the NWS agree to a time-bound
programme on universal nuclear disarmament. A timetable of fifteen years was
suggested. While this proposal was welcomed by President Gorbachev of the
USSR, USA rejected this proposal outright. It then became clear to policy
makers in India that it had no option but to embark on a nuclear weapons
programme, given the China–Pakistan nuclear axis. There was an attempt to
conduct a weapons test in the mid-nineties, when Narasimha Rao was the
Prime Minister.

But this decision appears to have been countermanded reportedly under US

pressure. It was in May 1998 that India carried out its tests under the leadership
of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Later that month, Pakistan also carried
out its tests. India also announced its policy of building a credible minimum
deterrent, of no first use and a voluntary moratorium on further tests. Predictably,
sanctions followed at the initiative of the US. But it was found that the Indian
economy had become sufficiently robust and could survive the sanctions without
any discomfort. Contrary to the expectation that with India going overtly nuclear,
Indo-US relations would be damaged severely, after the lapse of a short

interregnum, Indo-US relations entered a more mature phase based on
pragmatic considerations.

During the Clinton administration, Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh met in a
number of places around the world to work out a new architecture of Indo-US
relations, including the nuclear area. India repeatedly pointed out about the need
to enlarge its nuclear electric capacity and how it was constrained by the denial
of civilian nuclear technology. The situation from the Indian perspective
appeared unfair when China, once considered by the US as an adversary, could
access civilian nuclear technology from the West and Russia. The legal
argument that it had signed the NPT, although as a NWS, was simply a fig leaf,
in India’s view. In the Talbott–Singh negotiations, according to reports, US
insisted on India putting all its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as
a precondition for resuming civilian nuclear energy cooperation.

The visit of President Clinton to India was a big publicity event with his address
to the joint session of Parliament being a crowning event, when Clinton was
mobbed by our parliamentarians. However, there were no substantive
agreements that were then signed and certainly no narrowing of the US–India
nuclear differences.

Current scenario of indo-us nuclear deal

It was in this background that discussions on the nuclear issue between India
and the US were resumed under the leadership of President Bush and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh. There were some impressive achievements in the
nuclear field in India that preceded these discussions. In the period 2000–05, the
nuclear power units began to operate with high capacity factors, one of them
even creating an international record. The heavy-water plants and nuclear fuel

facilities were turning in excellent performance. The fast breeder test reactor
using Indian-developed mixed carbide fuel operated well, giving confidence to
launch the construction of the 500 MW prototype fast breeder reactor in 2004. In
March 2005, unit no. 4 of the Tarapur atomic power station, India’s largest
reactor and largest single-unit generating-plant attained criticality. The time was
appropriate to launch a much larger nuclear power programme. However, there
were some constraints which are as follows:

Technical constrains:

The first related to availability of uranium in the country. As of now, India

possesses only relatively low-grade uranium ores which cost some four or five
times the international price to extract.

The total quantity available is also limited. The internationally accepted nuclear
power units have a capacity of 1000 MW or more and employ low enriched
uranium – an option barred to India due to the extant rules governing nuclear

Thirdly, there is an inevitable time lag before thorium can be used as a source of
energy, as a sufficient capacity of fast reactors using the plutonium–uranium
cycle have to be built before thorium can be utilized.

A parallel development at a political level was the initiative of President George

Bush to change the relationship between USA and India into a strategic one,
recognizing the commitment to democracy in India and its continuing economic
growth at 7 to 8% per annum. In this context, the role of making adequate
quantities of energy, alternative to hydrocarbons, was recognized as urgent and

The 18 July 2005 agreement noted that India was a responsible country with an
advanced nuclear programme and had an impeccable non-proliferation record.
The US undertook to change its laws to permit full civil nuclear cooperation with
India and to work with its friends and allies in the nuclear suppliers group to
make an exception in the case of India, to allow its members to engage in
nuclear trade with India.
As a reciprocal measure, India agreed to separate its civilian and military
facilities in a phased manner and to place the civilian facilities under IAEA
safeguards. For this purpose, India would negotiate an additional protocol with
the IAEA. In the agreement reached on 2 March 2006 in Delhi between India and
USA, India agreed to put fourteen of the twenty-two reactors, now in operation
and under construction, under IAEA safeguards, retaining eight reactors outside
the civilian safeguarded regime.
India also kept the fast-breeder test reactor and the prototype fast-breeder
reactor outside the safeguards regime. The fourteen reactors would be brought
under safeguards progressively by 2014. Future civilian reactors, including the
breeder-type, will be placed under IAEA safeguards. The agreement recognizes
India’s right to build new facilities committed to its security requirements. The
agreement also provides for application of IAEA safeguards on the upstream and
down-stream facilities like fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities when
handling safeguarded fuels.

Critics on indo-us civil nuclear cooperation :

India has also declared nine research facilities as civilian. The Indo-US
agreement, as negotiated on 18 July 2005 and 2 March 2006, has drawn a wide
spectrum of responses both in India and USA. We shall discuss the reactions in
India first. A number of persons who have been a part of the nuclear
stablishment have taken great interest in this matter. This is to be welcomed, as
these pioneers have formulated the past policies and worked on its
implementation. They have built up a strong nuclear technology base under

difficult conditions. Naturally, the entire nuclear community wants to ensure that
the gains made against formidable odds are not frittered away now. One set of
these critics feel that the earlier situation of total independence of the programme
must be preserved at all costs into the indefinite future. They are prepared for a
slow growth of nuclear power for the next two or three decades and an
acceleration later, based largely on fast breeder reactors and thorium based

In this view, the freedom of the country with respect to the size and diversity of
the nuclear deterrent would be maintained fully. It is not adequately appreciated
that a small nuclear power programmes continuing for another two or three
decades may well result in a loss of interest and an eventual abandonment of the
programme. It could be argued that deploying the cream of India’s S&T
manpower on a programme of limited near-term impact was simply not in the
country’s interest.
On the other hand, India’s energy appetite is growing amidst many supplyside
constraints. First, the pressure on hydrocarbons is growing globally and India
has had to depend heavily on the politically volatile Middle East. Indian coal has
high ash content and new mine locations are mostly in areas classified as
reserve forests, thus creating a conflict situation in land use. Moreover,
increasing dependence on fossil fuels is adding to the reenhouse problem. So
India has to use more of nuclear energy, hydroelectric energy and non-
conventional sources of energy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The mandate of the Department of Atomic Energy is to produce increasing
quantities of nuclear energy to power the Indian economy. Thus an important
section of the nuclear community favours civil nuclear co-operation with other
nuclear dvanced countries so long as India’s credible minimum nuclear
deterrentis protected fully.
In his suo motu statement of 7 March 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
stated that: ‘I might mention:

(i) That the separation plan will not adversely affectour strategic programme.
There will be no capping of our strategic programme and the separation plan
ensures adequacy of fissile material and other inputs to meet the current and
future requirements of our strategic programme, based on our assessment of the
threat scenarios. No constraint has been placed on our right to construct new
facilities for strategic purposes. The integrity of our nuclear doctrine and our
ability to sustain a minimum credible nuclear deterrent is adequately protected.
Our nuclear policy will continue to be guided by the principles of restraint and
(ii) The separation plan does not come in the way of the integrity of our three-
stage nuclear programme, including the future use of our thorium reserves. The
autonomy of our research and development activities in the nuclear field will
remain unaffected. The fast-breeder test reactor and the prototype fast-breeder
reactor remain outside safeguards. We have agreed, however, that future civilian
thermal power reactors and civilian fast-breeder reactors would be placed under
safeguards, but the determination of what is civilian is solely an Indian decision’.
In an article in The Asian Age of 15 April 2006, P. K. Iyengar (former Chairman,
Atomic Energy Commission) and M. Gupta have taken strong objection to putting
a number of research facilities, including the Tata Institute of Fundamental
Research, Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre, Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics
and the Institute of Plasma Research under the civilian list. They have gone on
to say: ‘An international “license-permit raj” on Indian scientific creativity will be
here to stay and the army of IAEA inspectors will invade all related public and
private sector entities, sometimes even without prior intimation. At the very least,
it would guarantee that scientists and engineers would be endlessly tied up in
bureaucratic red-tape so as to satisfy an infinite number of equerries so that very
little constructive work is actually achieved’. It is necessary to recall that the
research facilities identified as civilian now, have in fact figured in the ‘Entities
lists’ of the US Department of Commerce and are unable to obtain dual use
equipment, except on a case-to-case clearance basis. These restrictions are
also imposed by other supplier nations under the ‘Wassenaar’ and ‘Energy’

guidelines. By declaring them as civilian facilities, these restrictions will not
apply; nor is there any bar on these facilities collaborating freely with institutions
in other parts of the world in an unfettered manner.

The question of IAEA inspection arises only if fissile materials, namely uranium-
235, plutonium-239 or uranium-233 are in use in significant quantities or if work
is in progress on uranium enrichment or on spent fuel-reprocessing or if activities
involving weapons research are undertaken. None of the nine listed facilities
have been involved in these activities in the past nor will they be so involved in
the future. Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic
Research,Raja Ramanna Centre for Advanced Technology and other strategic
facilities are outside the list of facilities accessible to IAEA inspection.

While in the early stages of the programme, the civilian and strategic activities
were taken up in the same premises, this is no longer the situation. Also using
dedicated S&T personnel and technicians for strategic activities is a reality now
and does not in any way weaken this effort. So the concerns expressed by
Iyengar are grossly exaggerated and do not have any basis in reality. So far as
the strategic community is concerned, the response indeed covers a wide
spectrum. A number of them with a strong media presence, have stressed the
importance of an emerging strategic relationship between India and USA. They
have been critical and impatient about the rigidity of the nuclear establishment
during the negotiations and have, unfairly in my view, accused the latter of
derailing the agreement.

There is another segment of the strategic community at the other end, which
wants the present totally autonomous, some say, autarchic position on
independence of India’s nuclear policy to continue. They would pitch for a large
nuclear arsenal and matching missile capabilities. The sober middle ground finds
a larger measure of support. They agree that it is good for India to end nuclear
isolation and use civil nuclear cooperation with other advanced countries to

rapidly increase nuclear power capacity, without compromising on the nuclear
deterrence or the freedom to pursue the three-stage programme, including
thorium utilization.

Political aspect of n-deal :

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in her testimony to the US Congress on

5 April 2006, has strongly supported this agreement and urged the support of the
United States Senate. Rice has argued that the agreement is good for America
as also for India. President Bush said in New Delhi: ‘India in the 21st Century is a
natural partner of the United States because we are partners in the cause of
human liberty’. Rice elaborated this point and said, ‘It (India) is a vibrant,
multiethnic, multi-religious democracy characterized by individual freedom, the
rule of law, and a constitutional government that owes its power to free and fair
elections’. She also went on to recognize that India is a rising global power and a
pillar of stability in a rapidly changing Asia. She forecasted that by 2025, India
will most likely rank among the world’s five largest economies.

Since a large part of India’s civil nuclear facilities will be open to IAEA inspection,
the agreement is seen as a gain to the pursuit of nonproliferation, with India
becoming a full partner in achieving this objective. Rice stressed that the nuclear
agreement was a key element of the growing strategic partnership between the
US and India and that the two countries would cooperate in many areas to
mutual benefit. She opined that if the agreement did not go through, all the
hostility and suspicions would be doubled. India and the US would then continue
to be ‘estranged democracies’.

In the testimony, India’s needs for energy to sustain high rates of economic
growth have been noted and the importance of measures to reduce dependence
on hydrocarbons (especially from volatile regions of the world) and equally to

reduce greenhouse gases has been stressed. Certain suggestions made from
the US in the past few weeks, however, have caused concern in India. There has
been a suggestion that India define the size of its credible minimum deterrent.
India has rightly refused to do so, as none of the other nuclear weapon powers
have done so.

Moreover, the Indian Parliament itself is fiercely protecting the pursuit of

economic development and is not known to support jingoistic proposals for
acquisition of military might for its own sake. A second suggestion has been
made to include a provision for fore-swearing future nuclear weapon tests in the
bilateral agreement between India and the US. This suggestion is also not
acceptable to India, which has reiterated its voluntary moratorium on future tests.
However, a new situation would arise if some other states, especially in India’s
neighborhood were to undertake a test in future.

Regarding the fissile material cut-off treaty, India has stated that it will join
negotiations with other countries, in good faith, in the conference on
disarmament; however, this matter was not a bilateral issue between India and
the US. India continues to support universal nuclear disarmament, whenever the
global community is ready for it. As Rice told the US Senate, the agreement in its
present form should go through, as renegotiation would just not be possible. As
of the time of writing (May 2006), it is not clear when and in what manner the US
Congress will approve the agreement.

If it is approved in its present form, India will benefit from civil nuclear
cooperation and expand the nuclear energy base rapidly. Isolation in the nuclear
field, imposed on India in unnatural circumstances, will end. India can then
participate fully in international developments leading to global energy security. If
the initiative were to fail because of unacceptable conditions that the US
Congress may impose, then India will continue its autonomous nuclear energy
programme, even if in the near term, the growth of nuclear energy may be slow.

The relationship between India and the US may grow in other areas but it is
unlikely that a fully grown, mature relationship will emerge. So the stakes are
high both for India and the US, and it is hoped that the US Congress will take a
balanced and mature view.



Power Sector at a Glance "ALL INDIA" 27th Oct , 2006

1.Total Installed Capacity:
Power for All by 2012
Sector MW %age
State Sector 70,569 55.3
Central Sector 41,673 32.6
Private Sector 15,431 12.1
Total 1,27,673

Fuel MW %age
Total Thermal 83,982 65.8
Coa 69,198 54.2
Gas 13,582 10.6
Oil 1,202 0.09
Hydro 33,600 26.3
Nuclear 3,900 3.1
Renewable 6,191 4.9
Total 1,27673
2.High Voltage Transmission Capacity:

Capacity MVA Circuit KM

765/800 KV -- 1,774
400 KV 87,387 70,295
220 KV 1,48,977 1,10,707

HVDC 3,000 5,872

3.Per Capita Consumption of Electricity:

(Year 2004-05) 606 KWH / Year

[Pl. Dn.]
4.Rural Electrification:

No. of Villages (Census 1991) 593,732

Villages Electrified (30th May 439,502

Electrification %age

Rural Households (Census 2001) 138,271,559

Having access 60,180,685

Electrification %age 44%

[RE. Dn.]
5.Power Situation: (April 2006-September 2006)

Demand Met Surplus/

Energy 334,330 MU 307,537 MU -8.0 %
Peak Demand 95,583 MW 83,933 MW -12.2 %
[OM Dn.]
MW: Mega Watt
MVA: Mega Volt Ampere
MU:Million Unit

Power Generation In India
The total Installed capacity as on 31st Jul 06 is as follows:-

Mode of Capacity
Generation ( in MW) Load Factor Percentage

Thermal 83,772 65% 66.50%

Hydro 32,976 On water storage 26.65%

Gas 13,582 Very high, but 10.7%

Gas shortage

Oil 1202 NA 0.95%

Nuclear 3900 40% 3.07%

Renewable 6191 20 % 4.88%

Total Generation is 1,26,839 MW as on 31st Jul 2006.

Average Load Shortage is –8.7%

Peak Load Shortage is -12.8%

The existing data is in favour of Thermal Generation as on to date.

Let me take each sector and discuss in detail:

Thermal: Coal available in India, is of extremely low grade, with ash content
of over 40%, most of the coal for our plants is imported from Australia. The
performance of Thermal plants is more or less based on capacity and vintage.
Most of the 100 /110 MW plants are operating at 20 to 22% load factor, and have
outlived their service life. The 220MW & 500 MW plants are operating with very
high load factor, similarly, plants operating in UP & Bihar, irrespective of vintage,
have much lower efficiency, than say, Andhra Pradesh.The last technology
partnership BHEL had with Semen’s,germany, ensured mastering of
technology for 500 MW generators

The world has moved over to most efficient generators based on Super critical
thermal plant technology, with 660 MW capacity as the standard, this technology
ensures a conversion ration as high as 60% as compared to 45% of conventional
thermal plants. . The super critical thermal plants reduce the cost of generation
by whopping 15 to 20%. However, till date no single plant has been built on this
technology in India for various reasons including costs of erection. The question
of Co2 emissions is also some thing we need to bother.

Hydro: Though the installed capacity is large, actual power production is

fluctuating for want of stored water. Only in 2005, record Hydel power has been
generated, thanks to the max storage levels for over 5 months. The cost of
electricity produced is very low for depreciated plants like Nagarjuna Sagar Dam,
it works out to be just 32 paise per unit. However, it was only in 2005, Nagarjuna
Sagar had complete storage for 6 months, thanks to floods in Maharastra &
Karnataka. With environmentalists being over active, two major multipurpose

dams are getting delayed, thereby, enhancing the carrying costs of the project.
Therefore, the cost of production of electricity is going to be very high.

Gas : The gas based plants are the fastest to come up, however, they are worst
hit on account of perennial shortage of gas as well as fluctuating costs. The gas
finds in various parts of the country has not given enough confidence for any one
to dare and set up plants. All those who announced large-scale plants have
quietly buried them. The Gas find in Krishna basin is a hope, provided we are
able to harness it, very few countries know, how to handle very high pressure
source, this place has gas pockets with pressure over 10,000 Psi .


The renewable energy scenario was boosted by the government scheme

of allowing 100% depreciation in first year it self for Wind turbines, the installed
capacity of Wind turbines is 5th largest in the world. However, the efficiency of the
plants is around 20 to 22%. The corridors having good winds have been
saturated and still whatever potential is left, is being exploited. A technological
revolution can change the scenario, rather than finding new corridors with
perineal winds. The installation cost per MW of Wind Turbine works out to be Rs
4 to 4.5 crores.The cost per unit of power from solar power works out to be Rs
11/-….down from Rs 15/- few months back, still its, too expensive to be consider
on large scale.


The installed capacity and the power load factor indicate a different story. The
whole debate of Indo –US Nuclear deal will be a silly talk, considering the
installed capacity of the Nuclear power plants in India of 3900MW and the load
factor of 40% of capacity. The reasons vary from technical shortcomings to
shortage of fuel.

Essentially, the Nuclear establishment in India has met the national
objective of :

 Making India a Nuclear weapon statea

 Ensured continuous R&D, despite complete isolation in the world.

 Developed to some extent successfully indigenous Nuclear fuel.

 Developed alternate proto type reactors, with our own design including
fast breeder under construction at Kalpak am.

If we analyze our Nuclear establishments, we can carefully conclude:

 Only a imaginary line separating its civilian & military establishments.

 Been isolated for too long from the world, to know the actual changes
taking place.

 The Power sector much beyond the schedule time frame, the ambition
of10,000 MW of power never meet the goal.

Hard Reality

The needs for stable reliable power supply, for the growth of other sectors of
the economy, cannot be over looked for too long, in the name of self reliance,
and at the same time gains of Indigenisation cannot be withered away by a deal.

All short term means of producing power have proved too expensive on long
terms, see ,what's happening in Dhabol. The fuel prices may stabilize to 80 to
100 Dollars in medium to long term , therefore generation will become highly
expensive , we know the politics of Iranian Gas pipeline, simillarly, cost of
imported coal may one day, make the thermal power costly and highly

Iran & Oman have pledged us Gas, however, with rising prices,they have gone
back on accords, reached earlier, and have since asked for re-negotiations.
Bangladesh has Gas reserves in Chitagong tracks, but politically, no formation in
bangladesh has seen the economic benefits in sharing it with India. The
proposed Iranian pipeline will remain a pipe dream with so many uncertainties of
the region and lack of international guarantee of supply at fair price.

Global Scenario on Nuclear Power.

The 17 % of worlds power needs are meet by 442 Nuclear plants all over the
world, if we consider the complete energy basket, the break up of fuel source is
as follows:-

Fossil Fuels 85.96%

Nuclear 8.13%

Renewable 6.06 %

Break up Nation Wise Nuclear Power

 US have 103 Nuclear plants producing 78,020 MW of power, which is

approximately 20 % of its power needs.

 France has 56 Nuclear plants meeting 76% of power needs, mostly on

technology of American pressurized light water plants.

 Japan has 53 Nuclear plants generating 42,369 MW of power.

 K has 16 plants, meeting 20 % of power requirements.

 China has 31 operating plants with installed capacity of 21,743 MW and

adding two 1000MW of Nuclear plants every year till it achieves 23% of
the total power requirements.

 Similarly Germany & Russia have a large portion of power coming from
Nuclear plants.

 The largest single Nuclear power reactor is under construction in Finland,

its capacity is 1600 MW.


Looking at the prospects and the reality, It’s hard to discount Nuclear power as
an option.

The Nuclear power plants have long gestation periods, but remain in service for
more than 40 years, the cost of power of depreciated plants will be very low and
for new plants, it will be comparable with thermal plants.

The World's Major Disasters

On 26th Apr 1986, Chernobyl Nuclear station’s unit 4, a 1000 MW plant had a
blast, which lead to exposure of radiations in the atmosphere, across long

The accident was caused by an experiment conducted by Electrical Engineers

with no knowledge on Nuclear physics, they were interested in drawing electricity
from the generator when no longer driven by the reactor, but spinning inertially.
They carried out rapid loading & unloading operations, to save time, as the
planed experiment was delayed by few hours by a heavy demand of power for
few hours, therefore, these men did rapid unloading, when the instability set in
put sudden loads leading to a cycle of instability and failure of cooling pumps. It
was all about negligent operations; the pressures build up let to the throwing up.
The pressures built up were 150 times what is permitted. The complete
experiment defies the Nuclear physics.

On 28th Mar 1979,Unit 2 of Three Mile Island, Middletown, Pennsylvania, had

partial melting of core, most of the radioactivity was captured with in containment
building, however, some radioactive material escaped into atmosphere. The fault
was again attributed to the operators, for not knowing the operations connecting
to safety. It also exposed the study conducted by probability risk assessment
team, which predicted an accident once in every 1,000,000 reactor–years of
operation, but it happened with in 17,000 reactor-year of operation. This single
incident was good enough for US to stop licensing new plants.

Understand the policy is being reviewed due to changing scenario of world fossil
fuels, especially the price of crude oil shooting the roof. Two new nuclear pants
are going to be licensed soon.

Despite the above incidents, Nuclear power is much safer; the question of the
fuels reaching critical mass for atomic explosion is just not possible as the fissile
material used for initiation of chain reaction is enriched just to 4 to 5% and the
equired mass is also not available. To make a nuclear device, the plutonium 239
has to be more than 93% enriched to sustain chain reaction.

What we need to do:

  Look pragmatically the options open to us through the deal.

 Safeguard the Fast breeder program of indigenous experimental reactor

of 500 MW at Kalpakam from international scrutiny.

 Insulate, our Nuclear establishments for the gains we had on strategic


 Launch massive projects of say Rs 2, 00,000 Lac Crores for power

generation through Nuclear power plants over a period of 10 years, as we
have done for golden quadrilateral project.

 America needs as much as we need them, it’s a pure economic need of

us, and for US, it’s the pressure from companies like GE, who are
supposed to be pioneers, loosing out on expertise as well as on markets.

Mr George Bush is the best bet, we need to force a decision before the term of
congress expires, its open secret that next congress will be Democrat
dominated, and for reasons un-know, they are for non-proliferation regime.

Russia & France are waiting in the wings to sell their plants.

Let our Nuclear establishments work concentrated towards developing hybrid

reactor with Thorium as primary fuel. We all know the advantage of Thorium as
fuel , it can be easily converted to fissile material U 233, hence like U238 is fertile
and better than U235 & Plutonium 239 as fissile material. Slow bombardment of
Th 232 with neutrons will produce U 233 and has higher Neutron yield. The fuel
for hybrid breeder essentially will consists of 20% enriched central/ inner seed
and the blanket of Thorium232 & U238.

India and Australia have half of world’s Thorium deposits ready to be exploited.
The most conservative estimate says, the deposit, will last for 2500 years.

The Scientific community fears stoppage of funds once commercial Nuclear

power plants are constructed. The fear is genuine and need to be addressed as
a national policy, to continue our march for self-reliance.

The Scientific community should also realize, whatever they know now on
technology front,was based on knowledge gained out of old projects with
Canada & America, perhaps long time back. The new technology will help over
come technological gaps, and who knows, one day, India will be the world’s
source for trained manpower for running Nuclear establishments.

I have deliberately avoided discussing politics; The aim of the twin papers is for
the readers to know the facts on the ground.


 We in India have little option but to grab the offer, looking at bleak power
scenario considering future growth of our economy at 8%.

 Enough countries are waiting in the wing to supply power plants, with
open credit lines.

 India to safe guard its R& D and Military establishments on Nuclear

energy( we have achieved success in this field)

 We need not worry to much about unilateral moratorium, if we are

economically strong we can break it at will and still no one will complain.
Might is always right, goes with out saying.

 We can be world’s manpower source for operating nuclear plants.

 The experimental 500MW plant at Kalpakam to be shielded from

inspection, as it can be potential winner.

 Hurry up the legislation in US congress, as George Bush is over best bet.

 Need to take up new Nuclear projects at the scale of China to meet 20%
of power needs by 2020 AD

 And stop politics on national issues concerning common good


Articles by Sidharth Vardharajan

Articles by Prafful Bidwai

Indian Statistical Institute data

Min of power data


NPT: Non-proliferation treaty

It was initiative of USA,UK and USSR. The NPT defined a cutoff date of 1
January 1967 and recognized those countries which had carried out a nuclear
test prior to that date as nuclear weapon states (NWS), and all other countries as
non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).

NWS: nuclear weapon states

USA, USSR, UK, France and china

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Association

NSG: Nuclear supplier group