20171125 MetaphorsofConceptualIntegration

LostinConceptualSpace:
MetaphorsofConceptualIntegration
L.DavidRitchie

PortlandStateUniversity

Ritchie,D.(2004)Lostinspace:metaphorsinconceptualintegrationtheory.MetaphorandSymbol,19,31
50.

Abstract

ConceptualIntegrationTheory(Fauconnier&Turner,19982002)isreexaminedinthe

lightofrecentcriticisms(e.g.,Gibbs,20002001).Itisarguedthattheassumptionoffour
independentcognitivespacesentersthemodelprimarilyasanentailmentofthespace,

blending,andconstructionmetaphors,leadstounnecessaryambiguity,andworksagainst
statementofthetheoryinaformthatsupportsderivationoftestablehypotheses.Several

examplesfromFauconnierandTurner(2002)areanalyzedtoshowthattheycanbeinterpreted

moresimply,withoutneedoffourseparatespaces.Suggestionsaremadeforreformulating
ConceptualIntegrationTheorywithouttheproblematicmetaphors.

LostinConceptualSpace:

MetaphorsofConceptualIntegration
ConceptualIntegrationTheory(CIT),alsoknownasConceptualBlendingTheory

(Fauconnier&Turner,19982002)hasbeenrecognizedasapowerfulmodeloflanguage
processingandapotentialsolutiontoanumberofproblemsincognitivetheory(Grady,2000
Gibbs,2000Harder,2003).Itpromisesanintegratedmodelofcognitiveactivitythatwillcombine

explanationsoflinguisticcreativitywithexplanationofotherlanguagebehavior,aswellasof
variousproductsofhumanimagination(Gibbs,2000).YetConceptualBlendingTheoryhasalso
beencriticizedbecauseithasnotbeenmadeclearhowaspectscouldbeformulatedfortesting

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andpotentialfalsification(Gibbs,20002001)andbecauseitseemstointroduceneedless

complexityintorelativelysimplelinguisticprocesses(Harder,2003).

InthisessayIexaminecrucialassumptionsofConceptualBlendingTheory,includingthe
assumptionthatintegrationalwaysinvolvesatleastfourdistinctconceptualspaces,includinga
genericspacecontainingelementscommontothetwoinputspaces.Iexaminetheentailments
ofthecentralmetaphors,mentalspaces,conceptualpackets,andconceptualblending,and

showthatthesemetaphorsobscureprocessesspecifiedbythemodel.IreviewFauconnierand
Turners(2002)responsestosomeofthecriticismsofConceptualBlendingTheoryandshowthat
theprincipalcriticismshavenotbeenadequatelyaddressed.Ishowhowtypicalexamplesusedto

explainandjustifyConceptualBlendingTheorycanbereadilyexplainedinlesscomplicatedand
morestraightforwardterms.Iconcludethatthemetaphorsusedtoexplainconceptualintegration

requireclosescrutinytoseparatemetaphoricalentailmentsfromtheactualrequirementsofthe

theory.

ConceptualBlending:TheModel

FauconnierandTurner(2002)explainConceptualBlendingTheoryintermsofmental
spaces,smallconceptualpacketsconnectedtolongtermschematicknowledgecalled

frames,aswellastolongtermspecificknowledge(p.40).Thementalspacesareillustratedby

circles,withrelevantcontentseitherdisplayediconicallyorlistedinabbreviatedform(seeFigure
1).Themodelpositsaminimumoffourmentalspaces:Twoinputspaces,agenericspacethat

containswhatthetwoinputshaveincommon,andablendedspacethatcontainssomeelements

fromeachinputspace.Theblendedspacemayalsocontainadditionalelements(emergent
structure)thatcanincludenewelementsretrievedfromlongtermmemoryorresultingfrom

comparisonofelementsdrawnfromtheseparateinputs,orfromelaborationontheelementsinthe

blendedspace(runningtheblend).

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Figure1

ThisdiagramcreatedusingInspiration7.5byInspirationSoftware,Inc.

Example:Amonkclimbingamountain.FauconnierandTurner(2002)frequentlyreturn

toalogicalpuzzledrawnfromKoestler,inwhichamonkclimbsamountainononeday,beginning
atdawnandarrivingatsunset,thenreturnsdownthemountainonasubsequentday,again
beginningatdawnandarrivingatsunset.Thetaskistoshowthatthereissomeplacealongthe

paththatthemonkoccupiesatthesamehourofthedayonthedifferentjourneys.Thesolution
preferredbyFauconnierandTurneristoimaginethemonkwalkingbothupanddownonthesame
day,ascenarioconstructedbytakingelementsoftwoseparateinputspaces,oneforthemonk

walkingupthemountainononedayandoneforthemonkwalkingdownthemountainona
differentday,andblendingthemintoasingleimage(blendedspace).Agenericspace,
containingeverythingthetwoinputspaceshaveincommon(themonk,themountainpath,anda

daybeginningatdawnandendingatsunset),isrequiredtosupporttheblend(Figure1).Inthe
blend,themountainslopeandthetwoseparatedaysarefusedintoasinglemountainslopeanda
singleday,butthetwomonkimagescannotbefused,becausetheymoveinoppositedirections,

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sotheymapintothefourth,blendedspace,astwoseparateindividuals.Whenwerunthe
blend,byimaginingthetwoindividualmonksprogressingalongthepath,weseethattheymust

inevitablymeet.

Example:MargaretThatcherforPresident.FauconnierandTurner(2002)citea
commonplaceobservationamongconservativecommentatorsintheearly1990s,thattheUnited
StatesneedsaMargaretThatcherbutthatshewouldnevergetelectedherebecauseof
oppositionfromlaborunions.FauconnierandTurnerclaimthat,tocomprehendthisargument,we

mustimagineThatcherrunningforU.S.presidentanddevelopthisscenarioinsufficientdetailto
perceivetheobstaclestoherelection.Thepointismadebysettingupasituation(theblend)
thathassomecharacteristicsofGreatBritain,somecharacteristicsoftheUnitedStates,andsome

propertiesofitsown(p.19).Inthisexample,thegenericspacecontainselementscommonto
MargaretThatcherandtheU.S.presidencysuchasworldleader.Theinputspace
correspondingtoMargaretThatchercontainsinformationaboutThatcher,includingthequalities

thatendearhertoconservativecommentators,alongwithherfamousstruggleswithBritishlabor
unions.TheinputspacecorrespondingtotheU.S.presidencycontainsinformationaboutthat
office,includingtheinfluenceoflaborunionsinelectoralpolitics.Therelevantinformationis

mappedfromthetwoinputspacesintoafourth,andentirelynew,blendedspace.Whenwerun
theblendwefirstperceivethatMargaretThatcherwouldmakeagreatpresidentbecauseofher
fabledqualitiesoftoughnessetc.thenweperceivethatshewouldfailasapresidentialcandidate

becausetheunionswouldblockhercandidacy.

ApproachestoConceptualIntegration.Itseemsobviousthatexamplesofreasoning
suchasthemonkpuzzleandtheMargaretThatcherforPresidentquiprequirethatdisparate
concepts(includingimages,schemata,andnarratives)becombinedinsomeformofconceptual

integration.However,conceptualintegrationcouldbeaccomplishedinmanyways.Considerfirst
thedegreeofconnectedness:Integrationmightmeanthatseparateconceptsbecomeconnected
orlinkedinmemory,justasonemightconnectastereosettoacomputer.Alternatively,features

orelementsoriginallyassociatedwithoneconceptmightbeaddedinmemorytoadifferent
concept,justasstereocomponentssuchastheFMreceiverandcdplayermightbewiredtoa
computer.Finally,anentirelynewconceptmightbeconstructedinmemory,combiningelements

similartosomeelementsofeachinputconcept,justasonemightpurchaseseveralentirelynew
stereoandcomputercomponentsandconnectthemtogetherinaseparateroom,apartfromthe

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roomscontainingtheoriginalstereoandcomputer.Neurologically,theseconnectionsmightbe
accomplishedinvariousways,suchasalteringthepatternofsynapticconnectionsbetween
neurongroups(Calvin,1996Deacon,1997Phillips,1997),changingthelevelofactivationin

connectedneurongroups,orsynchronizingthespiketrainsofsomeneurongroupswiththoseof
others(Fotheringhame&Young,1997Phillips,1997).Constructionofanoutputspace,distinct
fromtheinputspaces,wouldinvolveconstructingparallelneuralcircuitsinseveralpartsofthe

brain,sincelanguageprocessingisusuallydistributedacrossareasassociatedwithmotoractivity
andvarioussensorymodalitiesaswellaswithsemanticmemory(Deacon,1997).

Conceptualintegrationmighttaketheformoflinksamongdiscreteconceptualelements,
justasoneuseswiresorcablestoconnectcomponentsofastereoset,or,astheblending

metaphorsuggests,conceptualelementsdrawnfromeachmightbemerged,inthefashionofthe
compositedrawingsofasuspectcreatedbypoliceartists,orinthefashionofcertainproductsin
whichcircuitsfromaGPS(GlobalPositioningSystem)receiverordigitalcameraandcircuitsfrom

atwowayradioorcellulartelephoneareimprintedonasinglechip,actuallyfusedintoasingle
newproductthatduplicatessomebutnotallfeaturesoftheoriginalproducts.Althoughtheactual
mechanismsareunclear,thistypeofblendingisconsistentwiththeobservationthatoneneuron
mightbeinvolvedinrepresentingseveralfeatures(Fotheringhame&Young,1997)andwith

Calvins(1996)speculationsaboutDarwinianprocessesincognition.

Calvin(1996)pointsoutthatneuronsarebundledinminicolumnsofabout100,and
suggeststhatthespatiotemporalfiringpatternsofagroupofneuronsmightrepresentaconcept,
word,ormetaphor.Basedonamixtureofresearch,mostlyinthevisualcortex,Calvinarguesthat

lateralinhibitioncreatesaringofdepressedactivityaroundanactivatedneuron,andthatoncetwo
cellsorsetsofcellsarefiringrepeatedly,inaparticularfiringpattern,thereshouldbeatendency
torecruitanothercellabout0.5mmaway,leadingtoaroughlyhexagonalpatternofspreading

activation.Thesepatternsmaydieawayasexcitationweakens,maybesuppressedbyinhibiting
signals,ormaybereinforcedbyconsonantsignals,accordingtoDarwinianprinciplesofselection.
IfindeedtheseDarwinianprinciplesare,asCalvinbelieves,responsiblefortherefinementand

clarificationofperceptionsandconcepts,then,itisalsopossiblethattwopatternsoffiring,
representingdistinctconcepts,couldformanoverlayorcomposite(Calvin,1996,pp.115120).
ThisprocesscouldprovideaneuralmechanismforFauconnierandTurners(2002)modelof

conceptualblending.

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CriticismsofConceptualBlendingTheoryandResponsestoCriticisms

InresponsetotheobjectionthatConceptualBlendingTheoryhasyettobespecifiedwith
sufficientprecisionthatitcanbeempiricallytested,FauconnierandTurner(19982002)andtheir
variouscolleagues(seeforexampleCoulson&Matlock,2001)haveproducedempiricalevidence

thatisconsistentwithConceptualBlendingTheory.However,theevidencetodatestillfailseither
tojustifythecomplexitiesofConceptualBlendingTheoryortodifferentiatebetweenConceptual
Blendingandothertheorieswithwhichitisalsoconsistent.Themoredetailedexpositionof

ConceptualBlendingTheoryinFauconnierandTurner(2002)goesalongwaytowardspecifyinga
unifiedtheory,butitdoesnotsatisfactorilyaddresstheissuesoffalsificationandofeliminatingrival

hypotheses.Tothecontrary,FauconnierandTurner(2002)dismissthecallforfalsifiabilityby

claimingacomparisontoscienceslikeevolutionarybiologythatarenotaboutmakingfalsifiable
predictionsregardingfutureevents.Theythenshiftthegroundsoftheargument,claimingthat

wehavealreadyfalsifiedexistingaccountsofcounterfactualsbyshowingthecentralityof

counterfactualsliketheIronLady,whichsuchtheoriesareonprincipleunabletohandle(pp.54
56).

Whileitistruethatevolutionarybiologyandcosmologydonotmakepredictionsthatare

directlyfalsifiable,bothdependontheoriesthatdomakefalsifiablepredictions.Moreover,
FauconnierandTurner(2002)failtoconsiderotherpossibleexplanationsfortheIronLady

(MargaretThatcherforPresident)exampleinanydetailand,asIwillshow,theIronLadyexample

isreadilyexplainedbyasimplerandmorestraightforwardintegrationprocess,withnoneofthe
metaphoricalbaggageassociatedwithmentalspaces.AtestofwhetherFauconnierand

Turnersaccountmakespredictionsaboutactualhumanbehaviorthatareuniquelysupportedby
empiricalevidenceisstilllacking,andrelianceonthespaceandblendingmetaphorsseemsto

workagainstthekindofprecisespecificationthatwillsupportmeaningfulempiricaltests.

Computability.Apotentialcriticismofanymodeloflanguageisbasedonwhetherit
specifiesoperationsthatcanbecarriedoutinsuchawaythattheywillactuallyproduceresults

consistentwiththemodel(computability).VealeandODonoghue(2000)demonstratethat

FauconnierandTurners(1998)modeliscomputable,inthesensethatacomputerprogram
basedonitproducesresultsconsistentwiththemodel.However,theprimarysenseinwhicha

modelmustbecomputationalisthatanymodelofhumanlanguageusemustbecomputablebya

humanbrain.AsVealeandODonaghuesdiscussionillustrates,computationalmodelsof

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languagearethemselvesoftenmetaphorical(notmerelymetonymical),inasmuchastheydifferin
fundamentalwaysfromhowhumanbrainsprocessinformation(Winograd&Flores,1986).

Anexampleofhowfarafieldcomputermodelingcantakethetheoristappearsinthe
discussionofsemanticnetworksinVealeandODonoghue(2000).InFigure1(page257)they

diagramsemanticrelationsbetweenNetscapeandMicrosoftandinFigure2(page258)they

diagramsemanticrelationsbetweenCokeandPepsi.(CocaColacreatesCokeCanscreate
CokeMarketaffectsPepsiMarketaffectsPepsiCo.)Itisnotclearfromwhencetheauthors

obtainedthedatarepresentedinthesediagrams,butitseemsunlikelythateitherdiagram

representsthenetworkofassociationsbywhichtheseconceptsarelinkedinatypicalcustomers
mindor,forthatmatter,eveninamarketingmanagersmind.Ontheotherhand,amorerealistic

setofassociationswouldbeverydifficulttorepresentinadiagramthatwouldfitonasinglepage

ofanacademicjournal,ortoprogramintoacomputerdatabase.

AsVealeandODonoghue(2000)pointout,anycomputationalalgorithmthatistorunona

computerrequiresaclearandprecisestoppingrule(seealsoSperber&Wilson,1986),andthat

ispartofwhatCITprovides.However,itisnotevidentthatthehumanbrainworksquitethatway:
Itisdifficulttopredictfullytheextenttowhichanindividualwillelaborateonafigureofspeechor

onasituation,althoughfactorssuchashaste,involvement,andneedforcognitionallcontribute

(Petty&Cacioppo,1981).Oftenahearerwillnotevenbothertoteaseoutthemeaningofa
metaphor,especiallyifitissomewhatobscureatothertimes,thesamepersonmaymulloverthe

possibleentailmentsandimplicationsofaninterestingmetaphor,joke,orstoryforseveralhours(a
cognitivelinguistmaythinkaboutaturnofphraseformanyyears).Itisquitepossiblethatsome

studentsinthephilosophyseminarinFauconnierandTurners(1998)examplewillprocessthe

professorsdebatewithKantpurelyintermsoftheevidenceandcounterevidence,entirely
ignoringthesupposeddebate,whileotherswillbetakenwiththeamusingideaofImmanuelKant

sittingtherenexttoProfessorJones,andelaborateonthestoryuntiltheyquitelosethethreadof

thelecture.Thehumanbrainprobablyhasseveralwaystostopitselffromfallingintothesortof
endlessloopthatcomputerprogrammersworryabout,includingboredomanddistractionbya

moreinterestingidea.Noneofthisistodenytheusefulnessandinterestofeffortslikethose

reportedbyVealeandODonoghue(2000),butitdoesraisethequestion:Howmuchdoesthis
sortofmodelingcontributetoourunderstandingofhumanlanguageprocessing?

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DoesConceptualBlendingapplytoSimpleCognitiveProcesses?Accordingto
Fauconnier(1994),thecognitivespacemodelwasoriginallydevelopedinreactiontoasetof

formalisttheoriesofmeaning,theoriesthatassumethatnaturallanguagesemanticscanbe
adequatelystudiedwiththetoolsofformallogic(Lakoff&Sweetser,1994,p.ix),andassuchit

hasprovidedausefulbridgetoamorecognitivemodeloflanguage.Harder(2003)applaudsthe

conceptualspaceapproachbecausepreviouslydisparatepropertiescanbebroughttocoexistin
thesamementalspacewithpropertiesthatwerefoundinneitheroftheoriginalspaces(p.91),

butobjectstoattemptstoextenditfromcomplextosimplecognitiveprocesses.

Harder(2003)givestheexampleoffakegun,claimingthat,unlessitisaguninonespace,
itcannotbecalledafakeinanother(p.91).Butthisseemsdisingenuousanextendedindex

fingerisnotaguninanyspace,butisfrequentlyusedasaniconicrepresentationofagun,and

occasionally,hiddeninacoatpocket,serves(atleastinthemovies)toconvinceavictimthatareal
gunispresent.Norisitapparentwhyfakewouldrequireatreatmentdifferentfromblack,

which,accordingtoHarder,doesnotrequireblendingfromseparateconceptualspaces.Bothare

qualifiers:Blackaddsinformationaboutthecolorofthemetal,fakeaddsinformationabout
constraintsontheobjectsaffordances.Inadditiontodescriptorsofcolor,shape,andmaterial

(blackgun,snubnosegun,pearlhandledgun,plasticgun),thereisacontinuumofdescriptors

thatspecifyoperationalcharacteristicsoftheobject(singleshotgun,dartgun,startersgun,flare
gun,capgun,watergun,toygun,andfakegun).Somedescriptors(handgun,shotgun,machine

gun)specifybothphysicalappearanceandoperationalcharacteristics.

Thecontinuumbetweenrealandfakeissimilartothecontinuumofmetaphoricity(Ritchie,

2003)andraisessimilarissues.Inthecaseofatoygun,theexpectationofbeingtreatedasifit

werearealguniscreatedbythecontainedreality(orlayer)ofplayinthecaseofafakegunused
inarobbery,itiscreatedbytheconstructedreality(orlayer)ofdeception(cf.Clark,1996).Abb

guncanbeusedtokillsmallanimals,anditcanoccasionallybedeadlytohumansisitarealgun

oratoygun?Ifblackgundoesnotrequireblendingfromtwoseparatespaces,thenitisdifficultto
seeexactlywherealongthiscontinuumblendingwouldbegintoberequired.Bycontrast,if

conceptualintegrationisaccomplishedthroughasimplerprocessofalteringthestrengthofneural

connections,allthatneedhappenasweprogressalongtherealfakeorliteralmetaphorical
continuumisthattheneuralconnectionsbecomedenser,moreextended,andmorecomplex.

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Harders(2003)objectiontoconceptualblendingtheoryisprimarilyoneofscope:he

proteststhatblendingcannotbetheexplanationforsimplerprocessesofgrammar.Tosupporthis

objection,hecitesevidencefromexperimentsshowingthatchildrenbegintodistinguishbetween
theactualcolorofagreencatandtheapparentcolorofagreencat,coveredbyaredfiltersoasto

lookblack,onlyataboutagefourwellaftertheyhavelearnedbasicsyntax.Fromthis,heinfers

thatchildrenlearnsyntaxbeforetheylearntodistinguishtheseparateconceptualspacesoccupied
bytheactualgreenimageofthecatandtheperceptuallyalteredimageperceivedthroughthe

filter.Butveryyoungchildrenseemquitecapableofdistinguishingbetweenadoll(toybaby)anda

realbaby,astuffedanimal(toypuppy)andarealanimal,etc.,evenastheyconstructelaborate
playscenariosandcarryonapparentconversationswiththesetoys.Theprobleminthegreen

catexperimentsmaybewiththeunfamiliarityandartificialityoftheexperimentaltask.Thisisnot

todenythatcognitivetasksdifferinthecomplexityofconceptualintegrationtheyrequire:Tothe
contrary,Iwouldsuggestthattheyrangecontinuouslyfromconnectionssosimpleastoescape

notice(integrating,orbindingacolorsuchasblack,alongwithothersensoryperceptionssuchas

weightandhardness,withanobjectsuchasagun)throughtoconnectionssocomplexthatwe
marvelatthem(e.g.,themonkpuzzlecitedbyFauconnier&Turner,[2002],AliceinWonderland

[Carroll,1923],andimaginarynumbers).

Myownquestionshavetodowithwhetherthefullconceptualapparatus,includingatleast

fourdistinctspacesforeachinstanceofconceptualintegration,andmanymoreforcomplex

operationsthatrequirelongsequencesofintegrations,isnecessaryforconceptualintegration.I
willsuggestthatmanyoftheseelementsderive,notfromtherequirementsofneurologically

embodiedcognitiveprocesses,butfromtheentailmentsofthefocalmetaphors,spacesand

blending.

MetametaphorsofCognitiveProcesses

FauconnierandTurner(19982002)useavarietyofmetaphorstodescribeconceptual

integration,andsomeofthesehaveconflictingentailments.Mentalspacesmightbeinterpreted

asametaphoricalconnectiontoamodelsuchasmultidimensionalscaling,oravectormodelsuch
asthatofKintsch(1998Kintsch&Bowles,2002),inwhichconcepts,perceptions,motoractivities,

etc.areunderstoodasvectors,meaningsareunderstoodasdimensionsinsemanticspace,

andsimilarity,connectedness,andcoactivationbetweentwoconceptsareunderstoodintermsof
proximityincognitivespace.Kintsch(1998)linkshisvectormodeloflanguageprocessingtothe

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strengthofconnectionsamongtheneuralrepresentationsofcognitiveelementsthedimensionsof

avectorassociatedwithaword,phrase,orconceptcorrespondinsomewaytothestrengthofthe

neuralconnectionstohundredsofotherwords,phrases,andconcepts,and,inprinciple,to
embodiedexperience(perception,motoraction,etc.).However,becauseKintschhasbeenunable

tooperationalizelinkagestononlanguageexperiences,Kintschsmodelremainsungrounded

(Gibbs,1999).

FauconnierandTurneralsolinktheirmodelexplicitlytoanetworkorconnectionistmodel:

Intheneuralinterpretationofthesecognitiveprocesses,mentalspacesaresetsofactivated
neuronalassemblies,andthelinesbetweenelementscorrespondtocoactivationbindingsofa

certainkind(2002,p.40).However,theydonotexplainhowtheelementsoftheirmodelmightbe

realizedinconnectionsamongneuronalassemblies,andmuchoftheirdiscussionisinconsistent
withanetworkmodel.

Inthesamesection,FauconnierandTurneralsolinktheideaofmentalspacestolong

termschematicknowledgecalledframes(2002,p.40)and,byimplication,tothekindof
organizednetworksofgeneralknowledgeabouttheworldoftenreferredtoasschemasand

scripts.However,conceptualpacketsandmentalassemblies,alongwithFauconnierand

Turnersuseofcirculardiagramstoillustratementalspacesandtheirdescriptionoftheprocess
throughwhichrelevantcontentsoftwoinputspacesarecopiedintoaseparateblendedmental

space,suggestsmoreofaconduitorcontainermetaphor(Reddy,1993),inwhichmeanings

areconceptualizedasobjectsthatcanbeputintowordsandphrasesandconveyedtoareader
orlistenerwhogetsthemeaningoutofthem.

AlthoughFauconnierandTurner(2002)statethatconceptualintegrationisrelatedtoa
networkmodeloflanguageprocessing,andattempttolinktheirmodeltoneuralprocesses,

metaphorssuchasspace,packets,andblendingworkagainstanetworkorconnectionist

understandingoflanguage.Thecreationofanentirelynewblendedspace,whichcontainsthe
relevantconceptsduplicatedfromtheinputspacesandmappedontotheblendedspace,isa

directentailmentofthespacemetaphor,asisthepositingofagenericspaceastheinput

connectingprinciple,ratherthanaprocessofselectionandsuppressioninworkingmemory
(Gernsbacheretal.,2001Kintsch,1998).Theuseofcirclesandboxesinillustrationsofthe

model(seeFigure1)reinforcestheideaofboundariesseparatingthevariousconceptual

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elementsandtheneedforreplicationofelementswithinaseparatespaceratherthanconnection

ofexistingelementsinanewcompositepattern,aswouldbeentailedbyanetworkmetaphor.

Allofthisimpliesthat,whenconceptsareintegratedduringlanguagecomprehension,the

patternsassociatedwitheachconcept(howevertheyarerepresentedinthebrain)mustbe

duplicatedinanewpatternwithitsownindependentrepresentation.Butconsider(1):

(1)Heusedwhathethoughtwasafakegunintheholdupbutitturnedoutthatitreallywasagun
andtheclerkbehindthecounterwasanundercoverpoliceofficersohewaschargedwitharmed
robberyandassaultingapoliceofficer.

Interpretingacomplexnarrativesuchas(1)wouldrequirecreationofalongsequenceofentirely

separatespaces(representations),eachfullyduplicatingtherelevantfeaturesofthepreceding

spaces.Unlesstheseindependentmentalspacesaredissolvedasnewonesaregenerated,the
loadoncognitivecapacitymustexpandquiterapidly.

Bycontrast,aschemadrivenconnectionistmodelmightpositthataculturallylearned
robberyschema(embodiedasaparticularpatternofneuralconnections)isactivated,thenaltered

asthenarrativeprogressesbyaddingorchangingconnectionswithotherschemas(e.g.,forfake

gunandundercoverpoliceman)andfinallywithacriminaltrialschema.Thesechangesinthe

connectionsaretemporaryduringanyparticularnarrative,butcanbestrengthenedwithrepeated

useuntiltheybecomepartofthebasicschemaandare,ineffect,lexicalizedasundercover
policemanprobablyisformanycrimefictionbuffs.Theactivationanddeactivationofsynaptic

connectionsrequiredbyaconnectionistmodelseemsinprinciplesimplerthanthereallocationof

entiregroupsofneuronsentailedbythecognitivespacemetaphor.

Thespacemetaphorisparticularlytroublesomeinanexamplesuchasthemonkpuzzle,

becausethemonkinthestoryactuallymovesthroughasinglephysicalspace,butthenarrative
positstwodistinctlocationsinspacetime,thuscreatinganapparent,butunnecessary,paradox.

Theextensionofphysicalspace(themountainwithitspath)toconceptualgenericspace(the

elementscommontothetwohalvesofthestory)seemsnaturalandunproblematic.Oncethis

connectionismade,itseemstofollowthatthetwojourneysinphysicalspacecanbecompared

onlybymatchingthesharedelementsinthegenericspace(thecognitiverepresentationofthe

mountainandthepathleadingupthemountain),andmergingthetwoconceptualspaces,
includingrelevantelementsuniquetoeachoftheinputconceptualspaces(therepresentationof

themonktravelingupthephysicalspaceofthemountainandtherepresentationofthemonk

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travelingdownthephysicalspaceofthemountain).Butiftheseparateconceptualspacesare

mergedintoanewspace,thepreviousspacesarelost,sothespacemetaphorrequiresthatan

entirelynewblendedspacebecreated,duplicatinginformationfromtheinputspaces.

Allofthisisaconsequenceofconflatingphysicalspace(themountain)withconceptual

space,anddoesnotnecessarilyhaveanythingtodowithactualneurologicalprocessesor

eventsinthepuzzlesolversbrain.Onlybystrippingthetheoreticalaccountofitsmetaphorical

languagecanweseethatprocessingthepuzzleneednotinvolveentirelyseparatesetsof

activatedneuronalassemblies(Fauconnier&Turner,2002,p.40)butmayrequirenomorethan

creatingnewlinkagesorchangingtheactivationlevelsofexistinglinkageswithinandbetweenthe
preexistingactivatedneuronalassembliesfortheinputconcepts.

Thespacemetaphoralsocontributestoconfusionaboutlevelsofanalysis.Fauconnier

andTurnerdefinementalspaceintermsofactivatedneuronassemblies.Buttheyalsodefineit

asasocialandculturalphenomenon,forexample,Inculturalpractices,theculturemayalready

haverunablendtoagreatlevelofspecificityforspecificinputs,sothattheentireintegration
networkisavailable,withallofitsprojectionsandelaborations(2002,p.72).Evenasidefromthe

questionofwhetherablendisacognitiveoraculturalphenomenon,itisnotatallclearwhatit

wouldmeanforaculturetorunablendortomakeavailableanentireintegrationnetwork.The

phrasesuggestsacomputermetaphor,e.g.,blendedspaceiscomputersoftware,butitisnot

clearhowtheblendedspace/softwarewouldactuallyberuninanindividualmind,muchlessin

aculture.

ItappearsherethatFauconnierandTurner(2002)areattemptingtoachievemuchthe

sameobjectiveasmemetheorists,namely,aunitaryaccountoftheculturaltransmissionofideas

(Dawkins,1993Blackmore,1999forcriticalappraisalsseeAunger,2000Kuper,2000Sperber,

2000).Intuitivelyweknowthatintricateconceptualcombinationsarelearnedfromothers:Difficult

asstudentsmayfindittolearncalculus,forexample,itwasmuchmoredifficulttoinventit.But

simplypositingaconceptsuchasablendedspacethatcrossestheindividual/sociallevelsof
analysisscarcelyprovidesanexplanationofculturaltransmission,anymorethanitdoestoposita

genelikeunitofmeaningandcallitameme.

AlternativeInterpretations.

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ManyoftheexamplesprovidedbyFauconnierandTurner(2002)relyonaneedlessly

awkwardoridiosyncraticinterpretationoffigurativelanguage.Itisusefultoconsideralternative

viableinterpretationsoftheseexamples(Ritchie,2003),bothtoseewhethertheexplanatory
apparatusofconceptualblendingisstillrequiredandtounderstandhowtheunderlyinglogicofthe

modelworksinpractice.

TheMonkClimbingtheMountainRevisited.Forexample,amorestraightforward

solutiontotheriddleofthemonkistodrawagraphwiththemonkselevation(ordistancefrom

home)ononeaxisandthetimeofdayontheother,andplotthetwojourneysonthegraph.The

completedgraphwilllooklikearectangle,withthejourneysrepresentedbydiagonals(not
necessarilystraight).Nomatterhowthetwodiagonalsaredrawn,theymustintersect.Thereisno

needforafancifulnarrativeinwhichthemonkmeetshimselfmidway,andthetroublesome

ambiguityoftheconcept,space(physicalspace,conceptualspace,ormathematicalspace)

isavoidedalongwiththequestionofwhetherthemonkhastostepasidetolethimselfpass.

Thesameresultcanbeachievedwithinanarrativeframebyaddingaqualifyingmarkerto
partofthenarrative.Consider,

(2)WhenItouredthebattlefieldatGettysburgIwashauntedbyallthesoldierswhodied

there.

In(2)thehearereasilydistinguishesbetweenthespeakersvisittoGettysburg,representedas

real,andtheghostsofdeadsoldiers,representedasmetaphorical,withinasinglenarrative
thereisnoapparentreasonwhydistinguishingbetweenfactualandfancifulrequireseitherspeaker

orlistenertoconstructaseparatespace.Similarly,onthewaybackdownthemountain,wecan

readilyimaginethatatsomepointthemonkmightremarktohimself,

(3)Atthishourafewdaysago,Iwaspassingthisverysamerock.

In(3)bothspeakerandhearereasilydistinguishbetweenthemonkscurrentlocation,represented
aspresentandthemonkspriorlocation,representedasremembered.Allthatisneededisa

connectiontothemonksmemoryofthejourneyupthemountain,withamarkertodistinguish

presenteventfromrememberedevent.(Anactualexampleofsuchamarkedconnectionbetween

twojourneysisprovidedbyKrakauer[1998],whenheobserves,atonepointinhisflighttoNepal,

thattheairplaneisactuallycruisingatanaltitudebelowthatofthetopofMt.Everest.)Tobring

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thesetwosolutionstogether,wecanalsoimaginethemonk,ashejourneysbacktowardhiscell,

recallingthetimethathepassedeachlandmarkalongthetrailonthewayupthemountain:Four

p.m.,threethirtyp.m.,threep.m.,andsoon,untilheuttersatimethatmatchesthereadoutofhis
digitalwatch.

Itisnotclearwhatismeantbyablendedspace,asdistinctfrommerelyaddingor

strengtheninglinksbetweentwoneuronalnetworks(orbetweentwopartsofthesamenetwork),or

whatconstructionofathird,independentnetworkwouldaddtothecomprehensionprocess.Noris

itclearwhatismeantbyagenericspace.Atfirstglance,itseemsclearenoughinthemonk
climbingamountainexample,butasIpointedoutinthediscussionofmetaphoricentailments,the

apparentobviousnessoftheneedforagenericspaceisatleastinpartaresultofconfounding

themetaphor,mentalspacewiththeliteralspaceoccupiedbythemonkonthemountain.

Comparethisactofconceptualintegrationwiththeactthatoccurswhenanobjectisdescribed:

Thegunisblackconnectstheperceptualconcept,black,withtheobjectconcept,gun.There

isnoreasontosupposethattheconcepts,blackandgun,needtohaveanyelementsin
commonasabasisforintegratingthem.Noristhereanyreasontothinkthatconnectingsuch

elementsleadstothecreationofanewrepresentationthatistotallyindependentofthediscrete

concepts(ablendedspace).Studiesofbrainactivationduringlanguageprocessingshowthat

processingapassageinwhichinformationfrommultiplesensorymodalitiesisintegratedentails

activationofseparateareasofthebrainassociatedwitheachmodality(Deacon,1997).Tobe

sure,itisasyetunknownhowtheinformationfromtheseseparateareasisboundtogether
(Phillips,1997),butthereisnoreasontothinkthatsuchbindingrequiresthereplicationof

conceptualstructurefromeachinanovelstructure.Giventheabilityofmosthumanstospinout

fancifulnarratives,andtoconstructcomplexlogicalarguments,thecreationofanentirelynew

blendedspaceforeachactofconceptualintegrationwouldmultiplyconceptualrepresentationsin

thebraintothepointthatmemorycapacitywouldquicklybeexhausted.

MargaretThatcherforPresidentRevisited.AccordingtoFauconnierandTurners
analysis,ablendedspaceisrequiredtoprocessthecounterfactualelementsofthescenario

impliedbythequipaboutMargaretThatcherThatcherisnotaU.S.citizen,hencecouldnot

legallybeelectedPresident.Butitisnotevidentthatthecounterfactualelementsneedenterinto

thecomprehensionprocessatall.Itissimplerandmorestraightforwardtoviewthisasacaseof

metonymy,inwhichMargaretThatcherstandsmetonymicallyforasetofqualitiesassociatedwith

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thepersonofthatname(cf.Glucksberg&McGlone[1999],CambodiahasbecomeVietnams

Vietnam).

Considerhowtheconversationamongagroupofpoliticallyconservativeactivistsmightgo,

shouldoneofthemdrawattentiontothecounterfactualnatureofthequip:

(4)WhatthiscountryneedsisaMargaretThatcherbutshecouldneverbeelected

herebecausetheunionscantstandher.

(5)ButMargaretThatchercouldneverbeelectedintheUnitedStatesanyway,
becausesheisntaU.S.citizen.

Sentence(5)wouldberegardedaseitherdeliberatesabotageoftheconversationorevidenceof

politicalnaivete(Grice,1975Sperber&Wilson,1986).Similarly,in

(6)ImgoingtowriteinHomerSimpsonforpresident.

(7)Butacartooncharactercantbeelectedpresident!

Sentence(7)wouldberegardedasevidenceeitherofadesiretosabotagetheconversation,orof

atotallackofhumor.

Onthefaceofit,(4)simplypositsthatcertaincharacteristicsassociatedwithMargaret

ThatcherwouldfitwellwiththerolerequirementsofPresidentoftheUnitedStates.Likewise,(6)
invitesthehearertotakecertaincharacteristicsassociatedwiththe(fictional)personofHomer

SimpsonandassociatethemwiththeroleofPresidentoftheUnitedStates.ConsiderthePat

PaulsenforPresidentcampaignontheoldSmothersBrothersTVprogram,beginningin1968.A

nativebornU.S.Citizen,Paulsenmettheconstitutionalrequirementsfortheoffice,sotherewas

nothingcounterfactualaboutthescenario.YetPaulsensactualdeclaredcandidacywasnomore

seriousthantheimaginedcandidacyofMargaretThatcher.Neitherproposalwasintendedtobe
takenseriouslybothproposalswereintendedasacommentaryonthestateofU.S.politics.

Althoughmentionofafamiliarconcept(likeMargaretThatcherorPatPaulsen)willordinarilylead

toincreasedactivationofmultiplelinkstootherinformation(suchasThatchersnationalityandher

famoushandbag,orPaulsensdrollpoliticalcommentaries),allbuttherelevantlinkswillbe

suppressedbythecontextualinformationinshorttermmemorybeforetheyrisetoconsciousness

(Deacon,1997Gernsbacheretal.,2001Kintsch,1998).TheconstitutionalbarrierstoThatchers

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electionandthepracticalbarrierstoPaulsenselectionareunlikelytobeprocessedunlessthey

arerelevanttotheconversation.Thereisnoneedtoposittheexistenceoffourdistinct
representationsormentalspaces.

Peoplearecapableofentertainingelaboratelycounterfactualscenarios,andsometimesthe

counterfactualnatureofthescenarioispartofthefunaswiththecandidacyofPatPaulsenor

HomerSimpson.Evenforwellelaboratedimaginativescenarios,however,allthatisneededisa

processinwhichrelevantknowledgeisactivatedinshorttermmemory,irrelevantconnections

suppressed,andnewconnectionsaremadeorstrengthenedamongrelevantaspectsof
simultaneouslyactivatedknowledgenetworks.Thesenewconnectionsthenremainactivein

workingmemoryforatime,andinfluencethewaysubsequentinformationisprocessed(Deacon,

1997Gernsbacheretal.,2001Kintsch,1998).

Example:DiggingyourownGrave.Anotherusefulexampleisthefamiliaridiom,You

arediggingyourowngrave.FauconnierandTurner(2002)claimthatthismetaphorical
expressionrequiresamorecomplexinterpretation(adoublescopenetwork),becausedigginga

gravedoesnotcauseonesdeath,andinanyeventonesgraveisordinarilydugbysomeone

else.Theyclaimthatthemetaphorcombinesthecausal,intentional,andinternaleventstructure

ofanunwittingfailurescenariowiththeconcretestructureofgraves,digging,andburial,froma

diggingthegravescenario(pp.132133).Buttheymaysimplyhavemisconstruedthemetaphor.

Diggingyourowngraveisrelatedtootherfamiliarexpressions,includingdiggingyourself
intoahole,diggingitdeeperanddeeper,gettinginoveryourhead,andgettingintoodeep.

Whileitistruethatpeoplerarelyknowinglydigtheirowngraves,withtherareoccasionof

prisonersinatotalitarianregime(Fauconnier&Turner,2002,p.132),andthatthemereactof

havingagravereadydoesnotcausedeath,itisalsotruethataholedugforanotherpurposecan

spectacularlyandunintentionallybecomethediggersgrave,asinthecaseofmineandtunnel
caveins.Sucheventshappenalltoofrequentlyand,whentheyhappen,theyremainsalientinthe

newsfordaysorevenweeks,andsometimesbecomememorializedinmusicorfolklore(Dickens,

1972Seeger,1958).Theexampleofanoffspringbeingwarnedaboutriskyfinancialventures

(Fauconnier&Turner,2002,p.131133)seemsdirectlyrelatedtothissortofdisaster.Throughhis

riskyinvestments,theoffspringismetaphoricallydiggingaholeforhimselfwhich,although

intendedtobecomeagoldminemayinsteadprovetobehisgrave.Closelyrelatedmetaphors

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20171125 MetaphorsofConceptualIntegration

includehisplansfelldownaroundhim,hewasburiedunderamountainofdebt,andthe

poignanttitletoFriedmans(1992)biographyofJanisJoplin,BuriedAlive.

Digginginpursuitofwealthisacommonplacemetaphorinoursociety,anddeathornear

deathbycaveinsissufficientlyfrequentandsufficientlynotoriousastobereadilyaccessibleinthe

longtermmemoryofmostpeople.Somewhatlessspectacularly,itisrelativelyeasytodigahole

sufficientlydeepthatitisdifficulttoclimboutofwithoutexternalassistance.Comprehensionof

diggingyourselfintoaholeordiggingyourowngraveiseasilyexplainedintermsofcontextual
activationandsuppressionofcommonknowledgebyelementspresentinshorttermworking

memory.Muchofthiscommonknowledgehasbecomemoreorlesslexicalizedthroughrepeated

reference:Yourediggingyourselfintoaholemayormaynotevokeavisualimageofsomeone

standinginapitanddeepeningitbythrowingevenmoredirtoutofthebottom,andstuckinarut

mayormaynotevokeavisualimageofapersondrivingavehicledownamuddyanddeeply

ruttedroad.

ADifferentApproachtoConceptualIntegration.

Analysisofthediggingmetaphorssuggestsadifferentapproachtoconceptual

integration,atleastwithrespecttofigurativelanguage.Digginginthegroundinsearchofwealth

andtheassociatedrisksofcaveinsandotherdisasterhasbecomecloselyassociatedwiththe

immoderatepursuitofwealthaswellaswithselfgeneratedrisk.Moremundanely,peoplealso,at
onetime,routinelydugwells,basements,androotcellarsandsometimesexperienceddifficulty

gettingoutofaholetheyhaddug.Thus,diggingbecameassociatedinmemorywithabstract

conceptsincludingthesearchforwealth,dangerfromunexpectedevents,andtheironyof

committingactions(digging)thatledtolaterdifficulties(requiringhelptoclimboutofadeephole).

Thesescenariosweresufficientlycommon,eitherindirectexperienceorvicariouslythroughthe

mediaofnewspapers,entertainmentmedia,andsoforth,andtheyarousedsufficientlycommon
emotionsandexpectations,thattheyprovidedareadyexpressionformoreabstractideasand

experiencesthatarousesimilaremotionsandexpectations.

Thevividimagesofdigging(arootcellaroracoalmine)becomeconnectedwiththe

expectations,motoractions,perceptions,andemotionsassociatedwith,respectively,ironicself

entrapmentandsudden,catastrophicdeath.Thisconnection,strengthenedthroughrepeated

exposure,becomesreadilyavailabletoexpressthehumiliationofspeakingwithexcessivecandor

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orneedinghelptoovercomeasetback(Yourediggingyourselfintoahole)ortheexpectationof

catastrophiclossassociatedwithariskyventure(Yourediggingyourowngrave.)Asthe
metaphoricalassociationsareused,thedirectneurologicalconnectionsbetweenthesemantic

expressions,thesocialsituationstowhichtheyapply,andtheexpectationsandemotionsthey

evokebecomeincreasinglystrong,untiltheexpressionsbecomelexicalized,andthevividimagery

thatlentpowertothesemetaphorsinthefirstplacemayfadeaway.Often,theimagesthat

underliemetaphoricalidiomsbecomedisassociatedbecausetheexperienceonwhichtheyare

basedbecomesuncommon.Itisunlikelythatmanypeopleinmodernsocietyhavedrivena
vehicledownamuddyanddeeplyruttedroad,makingitallbutimpossibletoturnthevehicle:For

manypeople,inarutmayhaveentirelylostitsmetaphoricalgrounding,andthusbecomeopento

alternativeandevenoppositeinterpretations,inawaysimilartothemetaphoricalidiomsstudied

byKeysarandBly(1999).

Similarly,diggingyourowngravemayhavebecomelargelylexicalized,tothepointthat
peoplewhousethisidiommaynotthinkof,ormaynotevenbeawareof,theconnectionto

hazardousoccupationssuchasmining,welldigging,andtunnelconstruction.Thereisanentire

setofidiomsassociatedwithdiggingandrelatedmetaphors,anditseemslikelythatthe

metaphorsinthisgroup,likesomeoftheconceptualmetaphorsdiscussedbyLakoffandJohnson

(1980),areatleastlooselyassociatedwitheachother(Ritchie,2003).Totheextentthatthese

expressionshavebecomelexicalizedandhavelosttheirgrounding,theassociationislikelytobe
ratherweak,buttheremainingexpectations,emotions,perceptions,etc.thatareassociatedor

linkedtoconceptssuchasdigging,hole,andgravepreservethepoweroftheseexpressionsto

evokestrongimagesandemotionalresponses.Thatisnottosaythatmetaphoricalidioms

necessarilyimplicatesingularunderlyingconceptualmetaphors:AsVervaekeandKennedy(1996)

havepointedout,almostanymetaphoricalexpressionsupportsawidevarietyofinterpretations.

Forexample,thegrassisalwaysgreenerontheothersideofthefencecanbeinterpretedin
termsofcattleinafencedpastureorsuburbanitescomparingtheirneighborslawntotheirown

(Ritchie,2003).Evenstuckinarutmightconceivablybeinterpretedintermsofthereproductive

biologyofelkandotherbiggameanimals,whichareoftenunableeventoeatduringmating

season.

Interpretationofmetaphorsandidioms,liketheotherexamplescitedbyFauconnierand
Turner(2002),certainlyinvolvesintegratingconceptsinsomeway,andFauconnierandTurner

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20171125 MetaphorsofConceptualIntegration

provideawealthofusefulinsightsaboutthisprocess.Moreover,althoughIhavearguedthat
manyoftheirexamplescanbeanalyzedmorestraightforwardly,itisnonethelesstruethathumans

arecapableofspinningelaboratecounterfactualtales,suchasthescenarioofamonkmeeting

himselfonatripdownamountain,amodernyachtracingwiththeghostofa19thcenturyclipper

oraphilosophyprofessorengaginginanargumentwithKant.Myfatherhasbeendeadforover

fifteenyears,butIcaneasilyimagineaconversationwithhimaboutIraqoraboutthedirectionmy
careerhastakensincehisdeath.Allofthesefeatsofimaginationrequiretheintegrationof

complexnarrativesandscenariosinawaythatdefieseverydaylogic,andmuchofFauconnierand

Turnersaccountofconceptualintegrationishelpfulinseeinghowweaccomplishthem.However,

thespaceandblendingmetaphorsintroduceentailmentsthatareinatleastsomecases

misleading,andthatneedlesslycomplicatethemodel.Metaphorsbasedonnetworksorwebs

mightalsoleadtoproblematicentailments,buttheywouldatleastrequirefewerunsupported
assumptionsabouttheactualfunctioningofsynapticconnectionsinthebrain.

ConcludingRemarks

ConceptualIntegrationTheory(Fauconnier&Turner,19982002)providesapotentially

powerfulmodelforexplainingawiderangeofcognitiveprocessesthatbuildconnectionsamong

differentsortsofideassuchasamonkclimbingupamountain,thesamemonkdescendinga

mountain,andtwolinesonagraph.However,theauthorsrelianceonthemetaphoricallanguage
ofspaceandblendingobscuresasmuchoftheunderlyinglogicoftheprocessasitilluminates,

andleadstoentailmentsthatareambiguousandevencontradictory,suchastheentailmentthat

conceptualintegrationrequiresthepresenceofagenericspaceindependentofthetwoinputs,

andleadstocreationofaseparateblendedspace.Formanyoftheexamplesanalyzedby

FauconnierandTurner(2002),asimplerandmorestraightforwardanalysisseemssufficient.No

independentconceptualstructure(blendedspace)isneeded.Somethinglikeagenericspace
mayplayaroleinsomeinstances,butsometimesitinvolveselementscommontotheinputs(asit

doesinFauconnierandTurnerssolutiontothemonkpuzzle),andatothertimesitinvolvesother

connectingprinciples.Forexample,inthegraphicsolutiontothemonkpuzzlethemonks

journeysonthemountainmustbemappedontotwolinesonagraph.Theconnectingprincipleis

betterdescribedasalearnedschemaorconventionforspatialrepresentationofsequentialevents,

andisnotwellcapturedbythemetaphorofagenericspace.

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20171125 MetaphorsofConceptualIntegration

ThemetaphoricallanguageusedbyFauconnierandTurner(19982002)mayhelpto
facilitateinitialunderstandingofthetheory,butitmayalsoleadthenoviceastray.Whatis

necessaryistorecognizethelimitationsandpitfallsofsuchmetaphoricallanguage,andto

elaboratethetheorywithouttheirrelevantandevencontradictoryentailmentsofthemetaphors.

Reconceptualizedwithouttheentailmentsofthespaceandblendingmetaphorsandtheir

entailments,ConceptualIntegrationTheorypromisestocontributetomajoradvancesinour

understandingoflanguageprocessing,andofmetaphorinparticular.Aformulationofthetheoryin
termsofneuralconnectionsorotherphysiologicallyrealizablemechanismswouldhelpprovidea

basisforspecifyingfalsifiablehypotheses,andforlinkingthemodeltotheworkofothercognitive

theoristsandtoresearchonneurologicalprocessesinthehumanbrain.

TheHazardsofEvocativeMetaphors.Asimilarcriticismcanbeleveledagainstthe

metaphoricalentailmentsofKintschs(1998)connectionistmodeloflanguagelearningand
processing.ItappearsfromaclosereadingofthetextthatKintschoriginallyintroducedavector

representationofconceptmeaningsasawayofmetaphoricallyrepresentingthestrengthof

synapticconnectionsamongneuronsorneurongroupsincomputableform.However,inlater

sectionsofthesamebook,andinotherwritings(Kintsch,2000Landauer&Dumais,1997),

Kintschandhiscolleaguesseemtoreifythevectorrepresentationbytreatingitasamoreorless

literalmodelofwordmeanings.

Hutchins(1995)hassharplycriticizedtheentirecomputermetaphorforcognition,arguing

thatithasledcognitivescientiststofocusonanartificiallyconstrainedmodelofinformation

processingthatdisregardsthecrucialcontributionsofsocialandculturalstructuretocognitionin

thewild.Wearestillalongwayfromunderstandinghowcomplexconceptsarerepresentedin

humanmemory,andconsequentlyfromunderstandinghowcomplexconceptsarecombinedand

appliedinprocessingdiscourse,figurativeorotherwise.Untilwehavedetailedknowledgeofthese
processesattheneuronallevel,wewillalmostcertainlyhavetorelyonevocativemetaphorsto

helpusunderstandandreasonaboutcognitiveprocesses.Rigorouscriticismofourown

metaphorswillberequiredifwearenottobecomeenmeshedintheirunintendedbutseductive

entailments.

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AuthorsNote

IwishtothankRayGibbs,EricJensen,andananonymousreviewerfortheirinsightfuland

helpfulcommentsonearlierdraftsofthisessay.Allremainingmistakesandomissionsare,of

course,entirelymyownresponsibility.

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