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Perception and the Internal Senses

Investigating Medieval
Philosophy

Managing Editor
John Marenbon

Editorial Board
Margaret Cameron
Simo Knuuttila
Martin Lenz
Christopher J. Martin

VOLUME 5

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/imp


Perception and the Internal Senses

Peter of John Olivi on the Cognitive Functions


of the Sensitive Soul

By
Juhana Toivanen

Leidenboston
2013
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Toivanen, Juhana.
Perception and the internal senses : Peter of John Olivi on the cognitive functions of
the sensitive soul / by Juhana Toivanen.
pages cm. (Investigating medieval philosophy ; volume 5)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-25089-5 (hardback : alk. paper) ISBN 978-90-04-25090-1 (e-book)
1. Olivi, Pierre Jean, 1248 or 91298. 2. Soul. 3. CognitionPhilosophy. 4. Perception
(Philosophy) I. Title.

B765.O54T65 2013
121.34dc23
2013008185

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If someone should think that the study of the rest of the animal kingdom
is an unworthy pursuit, then he must hold entirely the same view about
himself.
 Aristotle, De partibus animalium, 645a27.
Contents

Preface................................................................................................................ xi
Abbreviations................................................................................................... xiii

Introduction..................................................................................................... 1

PART ONE

METAPHYSICS OF THE SOUL

Introduction to Part One.............................................................................. 21

I Spiritual Nature of the Soul................................................................. 25


1. Universal Hylomorphism................................................................ 25
2. Spirituality and Simplicity.............................................................. 30
3. Human Soul as a Spiritual Entity................................................. 38

II Souls Relation to the Body.................................................................. 43


1. Body as a Substantial Part of a Human Being.......................... 45
2. Plurality of Substantial Forms....................................................... 48
3. Soul as the Form of the Body........................................................ 62
4. Connection between the Soul and the Body............................ 70

III The Animal Soul...................................................................................... 77


1. Simplicity of the Animal Soul........................................................ 77
2. Essence of the Animal Soul............................................................ 82

IV Perceptual Powers of the Soul............................................................ 91


1. Powers as Constitutive Parts of the Soul................................... 91
2. The External Senses.......................................................................... 97
3. The Common Sense.......................................................................... 106
viii contents

PART TWO

THEORY OF PERCEPTION

Introduction to Part Two............................................................................. 115

V Criticism of Earlier Theories of Perception................................. 119


1. Passive Theories of Perception................................................... 120
2. Augustines Active Theory........................................................... 135

VI Active Nature of Perception............................................................. 141


1. Activity of the Powers of the Soul............................................. 141
2. Objects as Terminative Causes.................................................. 145
3. Intentional Directedness.............................................................. 151

VII Attention and the Common Sense................................................. 163


1. Necessity of Paying Attention.................................................... 164
2. Cognitive Centre of the Soul....................................................... 170
3. Degrees of Attention..................................................................... 179

VIII Bodily Changes and Perception....................................................... 193


1. Perception as a Psychological Process..................................... 195
2. Bodily Changes and colligantia potentiarum......................... 203
3. Functional Dualism in Perception............................................ 209

PART THREE

INTERNAL SENSES

Introduction to Part Three........................................................................... 225

IX Historical Background........................................................................ 231

X Unity of the Internal Senses............................................................. 247


1. Criteria for Distinguishing the Internal Senses..................... 247
2. Interconnectedness and Experiential Unity.......................... 258

XI The Common Sense............................................................................ 267


1. Combining and Comparing the Proper Sensibles................ 269
2. Perception of the Common Sensibles...................................... 272
contents ix

3. Second-Order Perception............................................................. 275


4. Bodily Self-Awareness and Reflexivity..................................... 281

XII Imagination............................................................................................ 293


1. Imagination and Its Objects........................................................ 293
2. Imagination as a Function of the Common Sense............... 296
3. Dreaming........................................................................................... 300
4. Compositive Imagination............................................................. 303

XIII Memory................................................................................................... 309


1. Retention of Memory Species.................................................... 310
2. Remembering Past Objects......................................................... 314
3. Recognising Familiar Objects..................................................... 317
4. Difference between Memory and Imagination..................... 319

XIV Estimation.............................................................................................. 327


1. Estimative Dispositions of the Common Sense.................... 328
2. Estimative Perception................................................................... 332

XV Cogitative Power.................................................................................. 341

Conclusion........................................................................................................ 345

Bibliography..................................................................................................... 353
Index................................................................................................................... 367
Preface

I have made a long journey with this book. It began when Professor Simo
Knuuttila suggested, several years ago, that I should consider preparing
my doctoral dissertation on Peter of John Olivis philosophical psychol-
ogy. I agreed because at the time I had the impression that Olivi is one of
those historical figures who is both philosophically very interesting and
also much understudied. Under the (perhaps unintentional) influence of
Professor Mikko Yrjnsuuri, I decided to concentrate on Olivis concep-
tion of the psychological functions of the sensitive soul. In other words,
I chose to find out what Olivi thinks of the psychological phenomena
that are common to human beings and other animals. Now that my jour-
ney with this book is coming to an end, it is clear to me that my original
impression was correct: Olivis philosophy does form a fascinating land-
scape, and even though the scholarly community has made great progress
in charting it during the past years, there are still places left to explore. I
hope that my modest contribution will help others to better understand
Olivis philosophy and perhaps to even investigate further his thought; it
clearly pays off.
My purpose has been to enrich the knowledge of medieval philosophi-
cal psychology and the theoretical framework used by medieval philoso-
phers in order to understand the animal/human boundary. I decided to
take a philosophical perspective on the topic, and thus the outcome is
a philosophical rather than historical reconstruction of Olivis cognitive
psychology. I tried my best to bring together all the relevant material scat-
tered throughout Olivis works; when I fail to do so, the blame is com-
pletely minealthough the fact that the material is quite well dispersed
may be an extenuating circumstance. Some results which constitute the
core of the present book were originally introduced in my dissertation and
in essays that I have published, but this volume is by no means merely a
repetition of these earlier works. An evolutionary process has taken over,
and only those ideas and results that have survived the academic pressure
during the past years have been preserved. This book is, if you allow, a
new animal.
I am grateful to have received generous financial support which
has permitted me to write this book. My deepest gratitude goes to the
leaders of the Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence Philosophical
xii preface

Psychology, Morality, and Politics, its predecessor CoE History of Mind, and
the ERC-funded project Subjectivity and Selfhood in the Arabic and Latin
Traditions. Part of the work was conducted while I was a visiting fellow
in Groupe danthropologie scolastique at lcole des hautes tudes en sci-
ences sociales, Paris. I would like to thank the Alfred Kordelin founda-
tion, La Mairie de Paris, and lInstitut franais de Finlande for funding this
research period; this work would not be the same without it, nor would I.
The final stages of this endeavour were carried out while I was working as
a fellow at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study with a scholarship
from Stiftelsen Riksbankens Jubileumsfond.
If I said that I produced this book, I would be simplifying the truth.
Works of this magnitude (all academic works, in fact) are always done
within various communities. People around me have contributed, know-
ingly or otherwise, to this work. There are several persons who have
been of great help and support during these past yearsmore than can
be named here. I would like to thank Sylvain Piron, Mikko Yrjnsuuri,
Simo Knuuttila, Henrik Lagerlund, Taneli Kukkonen, Jos Filipe Silva, Jari
Kaukua, Jarno Hietalahti, and Onni Hirvonen who have read and com-
mented on the text or parts thereof at different stages. In addition, I would
like to thank all the researchers with whom I have had the chance to
work during these years, especially those from SSALT, PMP, and GAS. I
have profited and enjoyed discussing with them, and I have learnt a great
deal from the academic and non-academic activities I have participated in
through them. These people are also living proof that there is an audience
for books on the history of philosophical psychology.
I am extremely grateful for my language editor, Jessica Slattery. She has
once again done an excellent job on a tight schedule. Research is worth-
less if unreadable, and Jessica has greatly improved the readability of my
research. The remaining peculiarities are mine, not hers.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends outside academia.
They have kept me in touch with the side of life which may not be more
real than academic life but which is in many ways more tangible. They
tolerated me when it was impossible to keep me away from this book,
and they kept reminding me that sometimes it is better to postpone the
publication by one day, if that day is well spent otherwise.

 January 2013, Uppsala


 Juhana Toivanen
Abbreviations

AFH Archivum franciscanum historicum


AHDLMA Archives dhistoire doctrinale et littraire du moyen
ge
an. quant. Augustine, De animae quantitate
AT C. Adam & P. Tannery, eds., uvres de Descartes
Canon Avicenna, Canon of Medicine (al-Qnn fl-tibb)
CCSL Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
DA Aristotle, De anima
Ep. Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Epistola ad fratrem R.
GA Aristotle, De generatione animalium
Gn. litt. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim
HA Aristotle, Historia animalium
lib. arb. Augustine, De libero arbitrio libri tres
Mem. Aristotle, De memoria et reminiscentia
mus. Augustine, De musica
OTh William Ockham, Opera Theologica
PA Aristotle, De partibus animalium
PL J.-P. Migne, ed., Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series
Latina
QDA Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de anima
QDV Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate
Quodl. Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Quodlibeta quinque
Responsio prima Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Responsio quam fecit Petrus
[Ioannis] ad litteram magistrorum, praesentatam sibi
in Avinione
Responsio secunda Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Responsio fratris Petri Ioan-
nis [Olivi] ad aliqua dicta per quosdam magistros
Parisienses de suis Quaestionibus excerpta.
Sens. Aristotle, De sensu et sensibilibus
Sent. De sensu Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato
Sent. DA Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia libri De anima
Shif De an. Avicenna latinus, Liber de anima seu Sextus de
naturalibus
Somn. Aristotle, De somno et vigilia
ST Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae
xiv abbreviations

Summa Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Summa quaestionum super Sententias


Summa I Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Quaestiones de Deo cognoscendo
Summa II Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum
Sententiarum
Summa III Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Quaestiones de incarnatione et
redemptione, Quaestiones de virtutibus
Summa IV Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Quaestiones de novissimis
Super Gen. Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Lectura super Genesim
Super Isaiam Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Postilla super Isaiam
trin. Augustine, De Trinitate libri quindecim
Introduction

It is a scientific fact that human beings are animals. Genetically we are


almost identical to other primates and the evidence for the psychologi-
cal and behavioural similarity between human beings and other animals
is continually increasing, as ethologists make new discoveries. Nowadays
it is extremely difficult to find a single feature or ability which would
set us apart. Still, we tend to conceive of ourselves as beings that differ
from animalsnot only because we are accustomed to thinking that our
psychological and other abilities differ in degree, but especially because
we think that we are qualitatively different. Despite scientific evidence,
we have adopted a profound cultural conception of a radical disparity
between us and them.
What are the origins of our cultural conception that there is such a dif-
ference between human beings and other animals? Why do we consider
animals as radically different from ourselves? The answers to these ques-
tions are difficult to find because the story is complicated and probably
quite ambiguous. However, it seems to me that one thing is certain: the
difference has not always been a part of our cultural imageryat least in
the form it has taken today. In the course of history, people have conceived
of the relationship between human beings and other animals in different
ways, and past people have not always shared our preconceptions.1
A striking effect of an alternative conception of the status of non-human
animals is the once conventional practice of trying them in courts of
justice.2 During the Middle Ages (and beyond),3 animals were commonly

1For historical perspectives on the relation between human beings and animals, see
Jennifer Ham & Matthew Senior, eds., Animal Acts: Configuring the Human in Western His-
tory (New York: Routledge, 1997); A.N.H.Creager & W.C.Jordan, eds., The Animal/Human
Boundary: Historical Perspectives, Studies in Comparative History (Woodbridge: University
of Rochester Press, 2002); Alain Boureau, LEmpire du livre: Pour une histoire du savoir sco-
lastique (12001380), Histoire 85 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2007), 18799.
2This curious practise has received little attention from modern scholars. The most
important studies are E.P.Evans, The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of
Animals (London/Boston: Faber and Faber, 1987) (originally published by William Hein-
emann, London: 1906); Walter Woodburn Hyde, The Prosecution and Punishment of Ani-
mals and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and Modern Times, University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 64:7 (1916): 696730; and William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What
Was It Like to Try a Rat? University of Pennsylvania Law Review 143:6 (1995): 18911905.
3The practise prevailed well beyond the Middle Ages. The majority of the cases, reports
of which are still extant, are from the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries. However, we can-
not conclude that it was more common to try non-human animals in the Early Modern
2 introduction

put on a trial because of the crimes they had committed: for example, rats
were prosecuted for destroying the crops, swine and dogs were charged for
murder, a rooster was accused of laying an egg, and insects were brought
to trial for devouring the vineyards. The variety of species of trialled ani-
mals and their alleged crimes is vast. The prosecuted animals were some-
times sentenced to death, sometimes excommunicated, and sometimes
imprisoned, but interestingly enough they were not always found guilty.
Thus, although one might be tempted to think that the practice was only
ceremonial, it was not. It was not obvious beforehand that the outcome of
the trial would turn out to be detrimental to the prosecuted animal, and
during the processes the culprits were considered as much persons in the
face of the law as any human being.4 The extant records of animal trials
show us that the difference between men and beasts was conceived of dif-
ferently in the medieval field of jurisprudence than it is done today. Also
the ordinary peoplefarmers whose fields had been ravaged by mice,
wine growers whose vineyards had been devastated by noxious insects,
and parents whose children had been devoured by murderous swine
who laid the charges against animals must have understood these crea-
tures in a way that differs from our modern perspective. They did not
see anything bizarre in this practice. They drew the boundary between
human beings and non-human animals in a different way than it is drawn
nowadaysregardless of whether we draw it on the basis of our cultural
conception, which places a radical disparity between the two, or on the
basis of scientific evidence, which diminishes the difference yet does not
incite us to try rats for alleged crimes.
As non-human animals were treatedto some extent at leaston a
par with human beings, so human beings were considered to be animals.
Medieval philosophers, especially from the thirteenth century onwards,
tended to follow the Aristotelian definition according to which human

period than in the Middle Ages on the basis of extant reports because in the Middle Ages
the registers of the courts were imperfectly kept and also because the archives have been
destroyed either partially or totally (Evans, The Criminal Prosecution, 137). It is probable
that the registers from the Early Modern period simply survived better than those of the
Middle Ages.
4Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I), 19025; Evans, The Criminal Prosecution,
1820, 3750, 15354, 298303. Evans lists cases of animal trials between the years 825 and
1906 (ibid., 26586). However extensive the list is, it seems to contain only the cases in
which the accused were found guilty (ibid., 136). It is important to note that in the Middle
Ages the owner of a sentenced animal was not held responsible for its actions. Quite the
contrary, sometimes the owner was remunerated for the loss of the executed beast (ibid.,
155).
introduction 3

beings are rational animals: our rationality marks us apart from other
animals, but we are animals nevertheless. We shall see below that this
issue was not only terminological, as many medieval authors thought that
human beings and other animals are quite similar to each other from a
psychological point of view as well. To be sure, they did not think that
there were absolutely no differences. Above all, human beings were usu-
ally taken to be the only bodily creatures who are capable of intellectual
understanding and of having a relation with God because human ratio-
nality and freedom was seen to mark humans off from the rest of the
bodily beings.5
Medieval philosophers and theologians wrote a vast amount of litera-
ture that pertains to philosophical psychology, and much of the material
can be approached from the point of view of the differences and similari-
ties they saw between human beings and non-human animals. Although
medieval philosophical psychology has recently been a subject of lively
scholarly attention, the sources have not been read from this point of
view.6 By examining the medieval conceptions of the psychological func-
tions which were understood to be common to human beings and other
animals, we obtain a finer understanding of the medieval way of conceiv-
ing their differences and similarities.
In the present study, I shall make a contribution to this thematic by
examining the thought of one of the most interesting and original philoso-
phers of the latter half of the thirteenth century, Peter of John Olivi.7 Olivi
was born in 1248 or 1249 in Srignan, near Bziers in Southern France,
and he entered the Franciscan order at the couvent of Bziers around

5One may say that there are exceptions to this thinking as well. For instance, tradition
has it that Franciscus of Assisi preached to beasts and considered them as confrres, as
fellow worshippers, and praisers of God (Bonaventure, The Life of St. Francis of Assisi, ed.
& trans. Manning (Rockford: Tan Books and Publishers Inc., 1988), 8, 7884.) Franciscus
is, of course, a radical case in many respects, and his attitude towards non-human animals
cannot be taken as a typical medieval way of thinking. Even so, viewing animals in light
of their relation to God or lack thereof is one aspect of the difference between medieval
and modern perspectives.
6Philosophical discussions concerning the similarities and differences between human
beings and non-human animals have been studied to some extent. See Richard Sorabji,
Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate, Cornell Studies in
Classical Philology 54 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UP, 1993); Thierry Gontier, LHomme et
lanimal: La philosophie antique (Paris: PUF, 1999); Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Inner Touch:
Archaeology of a Sensation (New York: Zone Books, 2007), 9199.
7We do not know for certain Olivis name in his native language. In the Latin form the
first name, Petrus, is followed by two names in the genitive case, Ioannis Olivi. I follow the
practice of reproducing the genitive, even though the result is somewhat awkward.
4 introduction

1260 at the age of twelve. He was later sent to Paris, where he studied
under Bonaventure from 1267 (or possibly 1268) to about 1271, after which
he seems to have remained there for some years, perhaps lecturing in
the Franciscan studium generale. He returned to Languedoc around the
middle of 1270s and worked first in the studium of the Franciscan convent
in Narbonne and later in Montpellier. He was following the path to fulfil
the criteria for promotion to higher academic studies at the University of
Paris, and during this time his career was on the rise. In 1279 he assisted
his provincial minister who took part in the commission that lead up to
the bull Exiit qui seminat, which is a major papal statement on Francis-
can poverty. His academic career ended abruptly, however, and he never
became a master of theology because his orthodoxy came under ques-
tion. The process began as a controversy between Olivi and a rival of his,
Arnaud Gaillard, which took place between 1279 and 1283. The dispute
was brought to the leaders of the Franciscan order when both parties
charged each other of holding heretical opinions, and it culminated in the
censure of several propositions taken from Olivis writings by a commis-
sion of seven Parisian scholars. Later, in 1285, Olivi defended himself suc-
cessfully, and he was rehabilitated in 1287, when the new minister general
Matthew of Aquasparta appointed him a lector at the Fransican studium
of Santa Croce in Florence. Olivi remained in Florence until 1289, when he
was sent back to Languedoc, to work as a lector in Montpellier. He spent
the final years of his life in Narbonne, where he died in 1298. His death did
not end the battle over his orthodoxy, however. In 1299, the Franciscan
order renewed the prohibition to read or detain his works, but they kept
circulating in Franciscan circles and among laymen in Southern France.
His orthodoxy continued to be disputed before and during the Council of
Vienne, and his works were condemned again by the Franciscan order in
1319. His Commentary on the Apocalypse received an official condemna-
tion only in 1326. Yet his works were circulating to some extent even in
the following decade.8

8For a more detailed biography, see David Burr, The Persecution of Peter Olivi, Trans-
actions of the American Philosophical Society 66 (1976): 517, 3544, 6790; Sylvain Piron,
Censures et condamnation de Pierre de Jean Olivi: enqute dans les marges du Vatican,
Mlanges de lcole franaise de Rome-Moyen ge 118:2 (2006): 31373; id., Franciscan Quod-
libeta in Southern Studia and at Paris, 12801300, in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle
Ages: The Thirteenth Century, ed. C.Schabel (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 40916; id., Le mtier
de thologien selon Olivi: Philosophie, thologie, exgse et pauvret, in Pierre de Jean
OliviPhilosophe et thologien, ed. C.Knig-Pralong, O.Ribordy & T.Suarez-Nani, Scrini-
um Friburgense 29 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 1785. For Olivis role in the usus pauper
introduction 5

There are a number of medieval authors whose conception of psycholog-


ical operations common to human and non-human animals would deserve
to be studied. Yet, Olivi is by no means an arbitrary choice, because his
role in the transition from medieval to Early Modern ways of thinking is
so important. Modern scholarship on medieval philosophical psychology
has mainly concentrated on Thomas Aquinas, but it is nowadays acknowl-
edged that from the perspective of later developments the thinkers from
the Franciscan order are far more significant. Within the lesser brothers,
there are two philosophers who have been extensively studied, namely,
John Duns Scotus and William Ockham; however, there are two others on
whom Scotus and Ockham appear to be leaning. These two stand out as
original thinkers who initiated changes that ultimately were to alter the
way we see ourselves and the world we live in. They are Roger Bacon and
Olivi. The transformation of natural philosophy into science owes much
to Bacon, and Olivis significance in the field of philosophical psychology
cannot be exaggerated. Olivi belongs to the first generation of Franciscan
scholars who had fair knowledge of Aristotelian natural philosophyfor
instance, he seems to be one of the earliest Franciscans to comment on
Aristotles Physics.9 However, as Olivi thinks that arguments from author-
ity do not have a place in philosophical discussions, he considers Aris-
totles ideas with a critical eye. Reading the philosophy of Ancient authors
may be useful if done in a correct way, but a true philosopher uses philo-
sophical ideas critically rather than believes them blindly: one needs to
think for himself.10 The same attitude characterises Olivis philosophy in
general, and although his philosophical ideas are often inspired by Augus-
tine, he remains an independent thinker who maintains a healthy dis-
tance from all authorities. This philosophical attitude is strengthened by
Olivis method of doing philosophical psychology. He thinks that philo-
sophical argumentation concerning human cognition has to be grounded
in experience.11 This phenomenological approach leads him to present

controversy, see David Burr, Olivi and Franciscan Poverty: The Origins of the Usus Pauper
Controversy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989) and id., The Spiritual
Franciscans: From Protest to Persecution in the Century After Saint Francis (Pennsylvania:
The Pennsylvania Sate UP, 2001), 43136.
9Piron, Le mtier de thologien selon Olivi, 2527; id., The Formation of Olivis
Intellectual Project, Oliviana 1 (2003), http://oliviana.revues.org/document8.html.
10This teaching is the core of Olivis De perlegendis Philosophorum libris, ed.
F.M.Delorme, Antonianum 16 (1941): 3744.
11A. Emmen has said about Olivi that: He excelled in introspection, often appealed
to experience, and was one of the first writers to use elements of the phenomenological
6 introduction

original ideas and makes him appear as an astonishingly modern thinker


on psychological issues. In order to see how important a figure Olivi is in
the field of philosophical psychology, one need only to point out that the
rise of voluntarism, often attributed to the thought of Scotus and Ockham,
was initiated by Olivis lengthy discussions concerning the freedom of the
will. However, other aspects of his philosophical psychology anticipate
later developments as well. As we shall see in the course of this study,
his way of understanding psychological processes and their relation to
the body appear to contain threads which will eventually become more
salient in the Early Modern period.
Despite its historical significance and philosophical originality, Olivis
thinking was neglected by scholars for a long period. The first decades of
the twentieth century witnessed the initial wave of serious scholarly inter-
est in his philosophy, and as a result the critical editions of some of his
major works were prepared. Interest in Olivi continued after this first wave
but remained somewhat in the margins until very recently. Within the last
fifteen years or so, the scholarly community has increasingly focussed on
it, and nowadays it is generally acknowledged that Olivi is a very impor-
tant figure in the history of philosophy and that his ideas are philosophi-
cally very innovative and interesting. Knowledge about his thinking is
rapidly increasing. Still, there is much work to be done in order to obtain a
clear understanding thereof. This applies also to the subject matter of the
study at hand. Some aspects of Olivis philosophical psychology have been
discussed to some extent in the literature, but there are topics that have
not been studied hitherto. One of them is his conception of the cognitive
functions of the sensitive soul and his understanding of the differences
and similarities between human beings and non-human animals.
Olivi is decidedly interested in psychological questions generally, and
his interest in the role of the human will leads him to explore minutely
the distinction between human beings and non-human animals. However,
from the point of view of the present study, the most important aspect of
his thought is that he extensively addresses questions that concern those
psychological capacities which were understood as being common to
human beings and other animals in the Middle Ages. For, medievals took
it that there is a psychological area which belongs to all animals, human
and non-human alike. In order to fully understand what this common

method. (The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5, ed. P.Edwards (New York: Macmillan &
Free Press, 1967), s.v. Olivi, Peter John.)
introduction 7

area is, we must begin by discussing shortly one of the most distinguished
features of the medieval approach to psychology, namely, the tendency
to explain psychological activity by appealing to the powers of the soul.
This approach helps to define the topic of the present study, and it also
enables us to understand how Olivis cognitive psychology paves the way
for modern patterns of thought.
One of the salient features of medieval philosophical psychology is that
the soul is conceived of as having a structure. Psychological operations
are not attributed to a unitary and undivided mind but to different pow-
ers of the soul which operate with relative independence and have their
own specific functions. For instance, we see an object by one power, and
we use a different power to imagine it and yet another to understand its
essence. Although it later became common to criticise this approachso-
called faculty psychologybecause it appears to multiply natural powers
unnecessarily,12 the central idea was not to postulate them arbitrarily but
only after a philosophical analysis had shown that they are necessary. By
analysing and dividing psychological processes into more specific sub-pro-
cesses which interact with each other and perhaps even causally trigger
one another into action, scholastics were engaged in a project of charting
the mental architecture of human beings and non-human animals.13
There are several ways in which the powers of the soul can be divided
and grouped. The basic distinction is the Aristotelian tripartite division
of kinds of souls: the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellectual. Each
of these types comes with a different set of powers. The powers of the
vegetative soul account for growth, taking on nutrition, and generating
offspring, and they are not psychological or mental in the modern sense.
Sensitive and intellectual powers can be further divided into two groups,
namely, cognitive powers and appetitive powers. The former are respon-
sible for the ability to acquire information about the world, and the latter

12For instance, Descartes employs this line of criticism against the method of explain-
ing the action of natural things by postulating substantial forms as explanans. See, e.g.,
Descartes letter to Regius (AT III, 506). Molire, in turn, ridicules the scholastic doctors
explanation for the effects of opium by attributing a virtus dormitiva to it (Molire, Le
Malade imaginaire, in Oeuvres compltes, vol. 2 (Paris: Gallimard, 2010), 713). Later still,
David Hume claims that the talk of faculties or occult qualities is nothing but a way of
concealing our ignorance of the true reasons (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed.
R.H.Popkin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), Part 4, 32).
13Peter King, The Inner Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism, Vivar-
ium 46:3 (2008), 25374.
8 introduction

group accounts for the beings engagement with and activity in the world.
By these two distinctions we can arrive at a fourfold division of the psy-
chological powers of the soul:

Cognitive Appetitive
Sensitive soul sensory cognition sensory appetite
Intellectual soul intellectual cognition intellectual appetite
(the will)

With this fourfold division, it is easy to point out the thematic scope of
the present study: I shall concentrate on the upper left section, that is, on
those cognitive functions that go with the sensitive soul. This section can
be further divided into two clusters of powers, namely, the external senses
(sight, hearing, taste, touch, and smell) and the so-called internal senses
(sensus interiores), which account for the higher cognitive processes of the
sensitive soul. The psychological functions which these powers perform
include all the different modalities of sensation, the ability to imagine
absent sensible things, the ability to fantasise about unreal things (uni-
corns, golden mountains, and the like), the ability to apprehend external
objects in relation to ones well-being, and memory.
In other words, the present study concerns the cognitive functions that
are available both to human and non-human animals. The exclusion of
the psychological capacities that are specific to human beings (reason
and will) does not mean that the discussion would not apply to human
beings. Medieval philosophers often thought that human beings are in
many ways similar to animals because in addition to the intellectual pow-
ers, the human soul provides the same set of psychological capacities as
the animal soul. Moreover, we are bodily beings, and even our rationality
is based to a great extent on the lower cognitive capacities shared with
other animals.14 To be sure, many a medieval philosopher thought that the

14Although medieval philosophers took up their cudgels for and against pure empiri-
cism, they were quite unanimous in thinking that human beings need empirical informa-
tion that comes through the sensitive powers of the soul in order to be able to perform
rational thinking. The disputed issue was whether or not rational thought is completely
based on abstraction from sense data. See, e.g., Joseph Owens, Faith, Ideas, Illumination,
and Experience, in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N.Kretzmann,
A.Kenny & J.Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982), 44059; Leen Spruit, Species
intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge, vol. 1, Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions
(Leiden: Brill, 1994).
introduction 9

sensitive powers are somewhat different in human beings and non-human


animals.15 One might think, following this lead, that because Scholastic
philosophy demarcates animality from humanity in rather specific terms
by appealing to rationality, the distinction between human beings and
animals would have also been conceived of as clear-cut. From a certain
point of view this is true, but on the other hand medieval philosophers
often based the distinction on activity rather than on essences. If one lives
the life of an animal, one is an animal; only by performing the functions
that are specifically human does one become truly human.16 Thus, from
the point of view of psychological activity, the difference is less clear. In
everyday life we rely quite a lot on the common powers, and we rarely
engage in theoretical speculation or make truly free decisions.
It is noteworthy that even when medieval philosophers emphasised
the difference between human beings and non-human animals, there
often remained a general tendency to see a strong psychological conti-
nuity between them. As Gareth Matthews has argued, it was not until
Descartes that human psychology was radically separated from animal
psychology.17 Before that, the prevailing idea was that nature forms a

15A famous proponent of this line of thought is Thomas Aquinas, who thinks that at
least the highest powers of the sensitive soul function differently in human beings than
in non-human animals. See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. P.Caramello
(Turin: Marietti, 194850) (hereafter ST), I.78.4. Also Albertus Magnus argues that even
though non-human animals perceive more acutely than human beings, humans have the
most perfect external senses because they convey more intellectual information (Alber-
tus Magnus, On Animals: A Medieval Summa Zoologica, vol. 2, trans. K.F.Kitchell Jr. &
I.M.Resnick (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1999), 1411.
16For discussion, see Luca Bianchi, Studi sullaristotelismo del Rinascimento, Subsidia
Mediaevalia Patavina 5 (Padua: Il Poligrafo, 2003), 4161; Joyce E. Salisbury, Human Beasts
and Bestial Humans in the Middle Ages, in Animal Acts, ed. Ham & Senior, 921; Gregory
B. Stone, The Philosophical Beast: On Boccaccios Tale of Cimone, in Animal Acts, ed.
Ham & Senior, 27. In De perlegendis Philosophorum libris Olivi mentions that a human
animal (animalis homo), who concentrates only on sensible reality, cannot understand
abstract truths, and that the spiritual truths are incomprehensible for an animal philoso-
pher: [...] crux mortificando sensus huius vitae veritatem habet in se spiritualissimam
et incomprehensibilem omni philosopho animali. (Olivi, De perlegendis Philosophorum
libris, 3839.) Albertus Magnus famous dictum: homo tantum est intellectus is a radical
formulation of the idea that without intellectual activity one is not a human being (Alber-
tus Magnus, De anima, ed. C.Stroick, Alberti Magni opera omnia, 7.1 (Aschendorf, 1968),
p.2). Also medieval commentaries on Aristotles Politics take up the idea that a human
being who does not live in a society is a beast because he is unable to realise the human
essence (see, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Politicorum, cura et studio fratrum prae-
dicatorum, Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita, 48 (Rome:
Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1971), 1.1/b, 15599).
17Gareth B. Matthews, Augustine and Descartes on the Souls of Animals, in From Soul
to Self, ed.M.J.C.Crabbe (London: Routledge, 1999): 9495; See also id., Animals and the
Unity of Psychology, Philosophy 53:206 (1978): 43754.
10 introduction

continuum with no sharp discontinuities or radical disparities.18 In the


Aristotelian picture, the shift from plants to the simplest of animals is
vague and comes only in degrees. The tripartite division of types of souls
is clear-cut, but Aristotle expressly thinks that ensouled beings cannot be
easily sorted into three distinct groups.19 Moreover, medieval philosophers
thought that animals do not form a homogenous group, because there are
significant differences between various species, and higher animals are
endowed with abilities that simpler ones are lacking. To boot, medieval
authors sometimes argued that there are beings who are midway between
humans and animals. Albertus Magnus, for instance, thinks that pygmies
are incapable of understanding universals, but they still have a shadow
of reason which allows them to participate in practical reasoning and
makes them in many ways similar to humans.20 To use Matthews expres-
sion, philosophers before Descartes adhered to a Principle of Psychologi-
cal Continuity.21 According to this principle, the shift from irrational to
rational animals involves no radical psychological discontinuity. Almost
all of the psychological operations and processes that human beings are
capable of can be found also in higher animals, at least in forms that
resemble much the ones we have.
One of the aims of the present study is to argue that Olivi adheres to
the principle of psychological continuity with respect to sensory cogni-
tion, even though he is not the first medieval philosopher who comes to
mind as a proponent of the similarity between human beings and non-
human animals. He was not particularly interested in animals because in
the domain of psychology his main concern was to arrive at a philosophi-
cally respectable account of human psychology that would not threaten
the fundamental doctrines of the Catholic faith as he understood them.

18The classical study of the idea of continuity in the scale of nature is Arthur Lovejoy,
The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP,
1936).
19Aristotles examples of these borderline cases include ascidians, sea anemones, testa-
cea, and sponges. For Aristotles idea of the continuous scale of nature, see Historia ani-
malium (hereafter HA) 7.1, 588a16b3; De partibus animalium (hereafter PA) 4.5, 681a1028;
De generatione animalium (hereafter GA) 3.11, 761a1531. I am using the Revised Oxford
Translation, ed. Barnes.
20Albertus Magnus, On Animals, vol. 2, 141622. For discussion, see Joseph Koch,
Sind die Pygmen Menschen? Ein Kapitel aus der philosophischen Anthropologie der
mittelalterlichen Scholastik, Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie 40:2 (1931): 194213;
Robert Bartlett, The Natural and the Supernatural in the Middle Ages: The Wiles Lectures at
the Queens University of Belfast, 2006 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008), 94110.
21Matthews, Augustine and Descartes, 95.
introduction 11

From this point of view it is understandable that he occasionally makes


asides such as the following:
This difficulty would require a more extensive consideration and explica-
tion, but I do not care much about it; in the present question we are directly
discussing only the human body, since its investigation concerns the Catho-
lic faith in some way.22
Moreover, he does not deviate from the common medieval position con-
cerning the differences between human beings and the rest of the ani-
mals. According to him, human beings are capable of many psychological
processes that are not available to other animals: we are intellectual, and
most importantly we are freeand the kind of freedom Olivi attributes
to human beings he utterly denies to all other animals. On one occasion,
he says that if human beings did not have free will (liberum arbitrium),
they would be nothing but intellectual beasts.23 They would lose none
of their cognitive capacitiesthey would remain rational animalsbut
due to the loss of their freedom they would cease to be what they truly
are: persons who are capable of directing their own lives by their own free
decisions.24 Human beings would still stand above other animals because
they would be intellectual, but that would not actually make much of a
difference in Olivis eyes. In fact, he thinks that: if somebody were given
an option to choose which of these he wants to be less, namely, whether
he would rather be reduced to an animal or to pure nothingness, every-
one would choose nothingness.25 It is better to not exist than to be an
animal. In a similar vein, the most important aspect in other people is

22Haec autem difficultas maiori indigeret tractatu et explicatione, sed de ea non mul-
tum curo, quia in quaestione hac non loquimur directe nisi de corpore humano, quia huius
inquisitio spectat aliquo modo ad catholicam fidem. (Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Quaestiones in
secundum librum sententiarum, ed. B.Jansen, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii
Aevi 46 (Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 192226) (hereafter SummaII), q.53, 224.)
On one occasion Olivi betrays his stance towards the value non-human animals by say-
ing that one intellectual mind is more valuable than an infinite number of brute animals
(Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Quaestiones de incarnatione et redemptione, Quaestiones de virtutibus,
ed. A. Emmen & E. Stadter, Bibliotheca Fransiscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 24 (Grotta-
ferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventura, 1981) (hereafter SummaIII), q.2, 140. See footnote 33
below for a citation scheme.
23Nec mirum, quia, ut ita dicam, id quod proprie sumus, personalitatem scilicet nos-
tram, a nobis tollit nihilque amplius nobis dat nisi quod simus quaedam bestiae intellec-
tuales seu intellectum habentes. (SummaII q.57, 338.)
24See Sylvain Piron, LExprience subjective selon Pierre de Jean Olivi, in Gnalogies
du sujet: De saint Anselme Malebranche, ed. O.Boulnois (Paris: Vrin, 2007), 4354.
25Unde si cui daretur optio in quod minus vellet redigi, scilicet, in unum animal aut in
purum nihil tantum: unusquisque vellet esse nihil [...] (SummaII q.57, 334.)
12 introduction

their freedom. Many think that they would want to cease from existing as
much as they would want to live here eternally without friendship (ami-
cabili societate).26 As true friendship is based on mutual love, and what is
truly loved is the freedom of ones friend, the freedom of others becomes
as crucial to ones own happiness as ones own freedom.27 This emphasis
on the connection between freedom and personhood is perhaps the most
striking aspect of Olivis thought, and the one that paved the way for a
modern individualist conception of the human being.28
Still, Olivi accepts the Aristotelian taxonomy and says explicitly that
human beings are animals.29 He writes extensively about the psychologi-
cal powers of the sensitive soul and about other topics which are relevant
to animal psychology, and he thinks that the differences in the psycholog-
ical processes that are common to humans and other animals are minor
if they exist at all.30 By emphasising the connection between personhood
and freedom Olivi in fact makes room for the similarity in the cognitive
operations because he does not need to underline differences in them in
order to distinguish human beings from the rest of creation. Human dis-
tinction does not permeate the field of psychology as a whole; it focuses
on a single feature of freedom. Otherwise, human beings and other ani-
mals are placed in a continuum.
On the whole, Olivis views concerning the psychological functions of
the sensitive soul alter our picture of medieval philosophical psychol-
ogy, as many aspects of his cognitive psychology come close to modern

26[...] multis videtur quod tantum vellent non esse quam in eternum hic vivere sine
omni amicabili societate. (Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Quaestiones de novissimis ex summa super
IV Sententiarum, ed. P.Maranesi, Collectio Oliviana 8 (Grottaferrata: Collegium S.Bona
venturae, 2004) (hereafter SummaIV), q.18, 133 (Maranesi, q.6).) See footnote 33 below
for a citation scheme.
27SummaII q.57, 31920. For an interpretation of Olivis conception of friendship, see
SharonM.Kaye, Why the Liberty of Indifference is Worth Wanting: Buridans Ass, Friend-
ship, and Peter John Olivi, History of Philosophy Quarterly 21:1 (2004): 2142.
28Mikko Yrjnsuuri, Locating the Self Within the Soul: Thirteenth-Century Discus-
sions, in Ancient Philosophy of the Self, ed. P.Remes & J.Sihvola, The New Synthese His-
torical Library 64 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 22541.
29See, e.g., SummaII q.73, 67; Summa IV q. 19, 160 (Maranesi, q. 7); Peter of John Olivi,
On Genesis, ed. D. Flood (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, 2007)
(hereafter Super Gen.), 88. Moreover, Olivi employs the term animal perfectus, and it is
clear that he counts human beings as such (SummaII q.62, 59091).
30Interestingly, Olivi once says that higher animals (such as dogs and lions) are almost
capable of amor amicitiaewhich for him is basically possible only for intellectual beings
(SummaII q.111, 282). To be sure, he denies that it is a genuine kind of amor amicitiae, but
it seems that he thinks that the feeling which these animals have towards their masters
comes pretty close to human friendship.
introduction 13

patterns of thought. He embraces the medieval fourfold division of the


powers of the soul and the distinction between internal and external
senses. At the same time he emphasises experiential unity by pointing out
that even though different kinds of psychological processes take place in
distinct powers, we have a phenomenological feeling that they belong to
us and that we are unitary subjects. To use Olivis expression, the same I
who understands also wills and sees.31 In the context of medieval faculty
psychology it is not obvious how this experiential unity comes about. Olivi
accounts for it by arguing that the soul must contain one power which
apprehends the acts of the other powers and brings about the experience
that they belong to one person. In other words, there has to be a cognitive
centre in the soula centre which gives me the experience that I am one
subject who sees and understands. In human beings the cognitive centre
is the intellect,32 but the same idea applies also to non-human animals.
They are endowed with a similar psychological structure, as they also have
one power which functions as the cognitive centre of the soul: the so-
called common sense (sensus communis), which is the highest cognitive
power of the animal soul. The ontological basis of animal psychology is
quite different from the one which Olivi attributes to human beings, but
the functional role of the highest cognitive power of the soul is similar in
these two types of creatures. This functional similarity accentuates a psy-
chological continuity between human beings and other animals.
Another aspect of Olivis thought which deserves to be singled out here
is related to the dualistic strands in his anthropology. Although he argues
strongly for the substantial unity of human beings, his anthropology is
based on a radical metaphysical distinction between the spiritual soul and
the body. This distinction forms the basis of what I call his functional
dualism: cognitive acts are functions of the soul, and bodily changes are
but concomitant to them. In effect, the role of the body in perception is
diminished to the point that it becomes difficult to see why the body is
needed in the first place. On the other hand, Olivis theory enables him
to underline the phenomenological aspects of perception in a way that
is unprecedented in medieval philosophy. He depicts perception both as
an active and intentional process, and his view is reminiscent of mod-
ern theories of intentionality and the phenomenology of perception. He
also underlines that cognitive processes depend on the minds attention.

31[...] ego idem qui intelligo volo et video [...] (SummaII q.54, 280.)
32Yrjnsuuri, Locating the Self Within the Soul, 22541.
14 introduction

When we direct our attention to different objects, the contents of our


cognitive acts are determined by the attention. Even when we are not
concentrating on our surroundings, the mind has a kind of latent atten-
tion towards the body and the external world, which explains why we
immediately notice bodily changes and vivacious objects around us. In
effect, Olivi develops a theory which shares many features with modern
discussions concerning selective attention and the distinction between
latent and active attention.
The idea that there are degrees of attention points to two important
features in Olivis philosophy. The first of them is his phenomenologi-
cal method, which I already mentioned above. Internal experience has a
central place in his philosophical methodology, and especially in psycho-
logical issues his method leads to original positions. The other important
feature is related to Olivis approach to philosophical problems in general.
Scholastic philosophy was often based on dichotomies: when encounter-
ing a difficult problem, the usual method was to try and solve it by mak-
ing a distinction. By contrast, Olivi often thinks in terms of gradation
and claims that in many cases reality does not bend to sharp theoretical
distinctions. Psychological concepts are especially flexible: there are vari-
ous degrees of attention, and our intellectual operations are sometimes
diminished but not completely removed. The same approach is also vis-
ible in the domain of metaphysics: substances admit of degrees, animality
is nobler in human beings than in other animals, and even potentiality
and actuality cannot be understood as mutually exclusive.
The general outline of the study is as follows. The first part is devoted
to the foundations of Olivis conception of the psychological functions of
the soul. It concentrates on the metaphysics of the soul and situates Oli-
vis view within a larger context of medieval theories. The central issues
that will be covered include the spiritual nature of the human soul, the
relation between the soul and body, the differences between human and
animal souls, and the nature of the sensory powers and their relation to
the essence of the soul. A central feature of Olivis view is that he under-
stands the human soul as a spiritual and simple entity. It is radically dif-
ferent from the corporeal body but nonetheless substantially united to
it. Olivi adheres to the plurality of substantial forms and argues that the
soul and the body are united by the sensitive form. He also thinks that
the human soul is essentially different from the animal soul, and there-
fore it may seem that the psychological processes cannot be similar in
human and non-human animals. In order to show that the metaphysical
introduction 15

difference does not lead to a rupture in psychological continuity, I shall


argue that both animal and human souls share one crucial property,
simplicity, which accounts for the ability to undergo psychological pro-
cesses.
Part two examines Olivis theory of perception. It begins with a detailed
discussion of his criticism towards some of the fundamental principles of
earlier theories and continues with an analysis of his own view. Olivi pre-
sented an original and innovative theory by accentuating the active nature
of the soul in the perceptual process. He also found ways of discussing
intentionality and the role of attention in the perceptual process. Accord-
ing to him, perception takes place when the percipient actively directs
her attention to the senses and through them to the external world. He
emphasises in an Augustinian tone that we do not perceive everything
that is in our perceptual field: if we pay attention to some other things,
even apparent changes in our visual field go unnoticed. The need for pay-
ing attention is also closely related to the idea of the cognitive centre of
the soul, as the subject perceives different things only if the highest power
of the soul is directed towards them. In addition to analysing these aspects
of Olivis theory, part two will show that even though Olivi works hard to
avoid falling into the pitfalls of radical dualism in his anthropology, many
features of his view question the role of the body. If analysed downright,
his theory of perception carries some dualistic strands within it.
Finally, the third part is devoted to the higher cognitive functions of the
sensitive soul. These include not only those aspects of sense perception
which cannot be accounted for by appealing to the external sensessuch
as the perception of perceptionbut also other post-sensory capacities.
Animals seem to have imagination and memory, and they are capable of
apprehending things in relation to their own well-being. These and simi-
lar functions that inhere in the area between simple perception and intel-
lectual understanding were traditionally attributed to the internal senses
(sensus interiores). Olivi argues that there is only one internal sense, the
common sense, which is the highest cognitive power of the sensitive soul.
All the higher cognitive processes take place in it. One of the reasons Olivi
proposes this idea is his willingness to ensure the psychological and expe-
riential unity, which has been mentioned above: despite the diversity of
mental activity, every psychological process appears to belong to a unitary
subject. The cognitive centre of the soul accounts for this experience, and
in the case of non-human animals, the experiential unity is brought about
by the common sense.
16 introduction

On the whole, the present study aims at a reconstruction of Olivis


philosophical views concerning the cognitive psychology of the sensitive
the soul. I pursue this goal by piecing together all the relevant ideas and
arguments that can be found across his writings. This methodological
approach involves certain obvious limitations: I do not pretend to adopt
a historical perspective to Olivis thought, delve in his sources, or to fully
situate his arguments in the historical context. It goes without saying that
he did not work in a vacuum but participated actively in contemporary
discussions, and in many cases it would be useful to take into account
more of the historical context of Olivis ideas. However, given the scope
of the study, the task of properly charting the historical aspect in addition
to the detailed analysis and philosophical interpretation of Olivis ideas
would have been too muchboth for the author and the reader. It is my
hope that the resulting philosophical understanding enables us to better
comprehend and appreciate the originality of Olivis thought even in the
absence of a complete picture of its historical significance.
I have for the most part used those of Olivis works which are available
as modern editions. Only about ten years ago, this would have been a con-
siderable demerit, but at the moment the situation is much improved. As
a result of the new enthusiasm in Olivis thinking, a considerable number
of his works have been edited. This gives good ground for an Olivi scholar
to draw a coherent picture without going through the pains of reading
manuscripts. From the point of view of the present study, the single most
important work is Olivis question-commentary on the Sentences of Peter
Lombard, the so-called Summa quaestionum super Sententias (hereafter
Summa), the second book of which has been edited completely in Quaes-
tiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, the extant questions from the
third book in Quaestiones de incarnatione et redemptione, Quaestiones de
virtutibus, and about half of what has survived of book four in Quaestiones
de novissimis and Quaestiones de perfectione evangelica. In addition, the
appendix Quaestiones de Deo cognoscendo in the third volume of Quaes-
tiones in secundum librum Sententiarum contains some of the few extant
questions from the first book of Summa.33 Other works of importance are

33I shall refer to Summa by indicating the number of the book (Summa I, II, III, or
IV), followed by the number of the question and the page number(s). When referring to
book IV, I shall use the original numbering, which can be found from Antonio Ciceri, Petri
Ioannis Olivi opera: Censimento dei manoscritti, Collectio Oliviana I (Grottaferrata: Colle-
gium S. Bonaventurae, 1999), 10313, but I shall provide the number of the question in the
Maranesi edition in parenthesis. The same goes for SummaI mutatis mutandis.
introduction 17

Quodlibeta quinque and the apologetic writings which Olivi wrote when
the orthodoxy of some of his ideas was questioned.34
When considering Olivis views on various matters, a caveat is in order
because in many cases he distances himself from the philosophical ideas
and arguments that he presents by attributing them to some unnamed
authors (quidam). It is not always a simple task to decide whether they
are his own views or not, especially because he states in his apologetical
writings that his works contain many philosophical ideas that he recites
only, without adhering to them.35 However, the concession he makes
in his apologetical writings may be just a prudential measure, and it is
often rather easy to see which ideas he favours, despite his strategy of
presenting them so as to maintain a healthy distance from uncertain
opinions. I shall indicate in due course when it is not clear that a certain
view belongs to Olivi. On the other hand, Olivis way of distancing himself
from the philosophical positions that he presents reflects his understand-
ing of the role of philosophy in the human endeavour for the truth. He
distinguishes questions which are purely philosophical from those that
bear also theological significance.36 In the former there is no place for any
other authority than human reason, and although Scripture is the final
authority in theological matters, theologically relevant philosophical ideas
must be explained so as to make the correct position clear to everyone.37
Olivis critical comments on Aristotelian philosophy must be understood
in this light: he does not criticise Aristotle but the excessive reliance on
the authority of Aristotle or even the idolatry of his views.38 In this way,

34Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Quodlibeta quinque, ed. S. Defraia, Collectio Oliviana 7 (Grotta-
ferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 2002) (hereafter Quodl.); id., Respon-
sio quam fecit Petrus [Ioannis] ad litteram magistrorum, praesentatam sibi in Avinione,
ed. D. Laberge in Fr. Petri Ioannis Olivi, O.F.M. Tria scripta sui ipsius apologetica annorum
1283 et 1285, AFH 28 (1935): 12630 (hereafter Responsio prima); id., Responsio fratris Petri
Ioannis [Olivi] ad aliqua dicta per quosdam magistros Parisienses de suis Quaestionibus
excerpta, ed. D. Laberge in AFH 28 (1935) (hereafter Responsio secunda); and id., Epis-
tola ad fratrem R., ed. S. Piron, C. Kilmer & E. Marmursztejn, AFH 91:12 (1998): 3365
(hereafter Ep.). Knig-Pralong et al. (eds.), Pierre de Jean Olivi, 46371 contains a useful
bibliography of modern editions of Olivis works.
35Responsio secunda, 405.
36See, e.g., Responsio secunda, 404.
37Quid igitur hic falsi senserim aut dixerim, per meo intelligere nescio. Si tamen in
his vel in aliis erro, paratus sum edoceri, sed meo iudicio ad edocendum tanta et talia
non sufficit dicere: hoc est falsum, sed debet subdi auctoritas cogens vel ratio, et con-
trariarum rationum et auctoritatum clara et plena dissolutio. (Responsio secunda, 390.)
See also ibid., 397.
38See, e.g., SummaII q.27, 479; ibid., q.53, 225.
18 introduction

he makes room for philosophical speculation. Philosophy must be under-


stood as a quest for truth which provides reasonable explanations and
conceptual clarity by comparing different ways of thinkingand also as a
tool for explicating the doctrines of faith.39 Sometimes Olivi declares that
purely philosophical questions have no importance for him, and it is true
that his motivations are primarily theological. Nevertheless it is clear that
he considers philosophy as a valuable tool, and judging from his works,
he seems to have been quite interested in philosophical speculation. The
present study aims to show how this interest lead Olivi to develop original
and interesting positions within the domain of philosophical psychology.

39For discussion, see David Burr, Petrus Ioannes Olivi and the Philosophers, Francis-
can Studies 31 (1971): 4171; id., Olivi and the Limits of Intellectual Freedom, Contempo-
rary Reflections on the Medieval Christian Tradition (1974): 18599; Franois-Xavier Putallaz,
Insolente libert: Controverses et condamnations au XIIIe sicle, Vestigia 15 (Fribourg/Paris:
ditions universitaires Fribourg Suisse/ditions du Cerf Paris, 1995), 12762; Piron, Le
mtier de thologien, 1785; Tiziana Suarez-Nani, La sagesse chrtienne comme instance
critique en philosophie: une introduction la lecture de De perlegendis Philosophorum
libris, in Pierre de Jean Olivi, ed. C.Knig-Pralong et al., 40929; Carter Partee, Peter
John Olivi: Historical and Doctrinal Study, Franciscan Studies 20 (1960): 25456 provides
a useful collection of quotations in which Olivi discusses his own strategy and relation to
philosophical matters.
Part One

Metaphysics of the Soul


Introduction to part one

Aristotelian natural philosophy had a profound effect on medieval philo-


sophical and theological discussions concerning the nature of the soul. It
was generally considered as scientifically promising and welcomed with
enthusiasm, but its adaptation was not unproblematic. During the late
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries Aristotles philosophy was explored
and interpreted in various ways, and by the middle of the thirteenth
century it had become clear that there were a number of problems that
needed to be reconciled in order to make Aristotelian natural philosophy
and certain theological doctrines compatible with each other.
Aristotles teaching of the soul especially caused trouble. According to
him, the soul is the form of a natural body having life potentially within
it.1 The soul and the body are not distinct entities but two aspects of
one and the same substancea human being, a non-human animal, or a
plant. Within the context of medieval Christianity, this position leads to
certain problems with respect to the human soul. The central problems
that were addressed from various perspectives were the relation between
the body and the soul, the substantial unity of human beings, the possibil-
ity of the existence of the soul after the separation from the body, and the
immaterial nature of the intellectual operations of the soul. For instance,
it is not clear at the outset how the soul can survive the body and how
the immateriality of the intellectual operations (which medieval authors
understood as an Aristotelian doctrine) can be accounted for, if the soul
is a form of the body. Medieval philosophers believed that the soul must
be capable of existing without the body, and thus they had to account
for the relation between the soul and the body in such a way that the
separate existence of the soul would be possible. Although they presented
different kinds of solutions, the idea that the soul is a form of the body
was often repeated, partly because it explains neatly the substantial unity
of a human being.
One possible way to combine Aristotles position with medieval Chris-
tian doctrines was suggested by Thomas Aquinas. He argued that the
human soul in itself is not an independent substance but a form of the

1Aristotle, De anima (hereafter DA), 2.1, 412a2021.


22 part one

body. It is a special kind of form, which is able of subsisting without the


body, but still it is nothing but a form. Aquinas conception of the soul
and its relation to the body became influential, especially among his own
Dominican order, but it surely did not gain universal agreement. Quite the
contrary, it was attacked fiercely by more Avicennian-Augustinian minded
authors (mainly, but not solely, from the Franciscan order), who claimed
that although the soul is a form of the body, it is also an independent
substance. They drew from an earlier tradition in which the hylomorphic
union between the soul and the body was usually understood in line with
Avicennas (Ibn Sn, c. 9801037) Neoplatonic conception of the soul,
according to which the soul in itself is not a form but a substance, and
being a form of the body (or, being a perfection of the body) is just one of
the functions of the soul.2 This idea fits well with Augustinian conception
of the spiritual nature of the soul. In this way, Aristotles conception was
taken to be correct, but not without qualifications, and the resulting views
are more or less eclectic interpretations of Aristotle.
Olivi belongs to the latter group of thinkers. He thinks that the soul is
a spiritual entity, which is composed of several forms that inform the so-
called spiritual matter. As such, it is capable of existing without the body,
and it does not lose anything essential when it is separated from the body.
Yet, Olivi is quick to say that the soul does not have complete existence
(it is not an ens per se) without the body and it needs the body in order
for its actions to be perfect. Moreover, he argues that the soul is a form of
the body and that there is a substantial unity between the soul and the
body. In other words, he wants to avoid falling into substance dualism
as far as possible. However, he emphasises the distinction between the
spiritual soul and the corporeal body and the incorporeality of the souls
operations to the extent that he can be considered as coming close to
substance dualism. The soul has a high degree of independence from the
body, it belongs to an ontologically distinct class of spiritual beings, and
its psychological operations require the body only to a limited extent.

2In this study, I shall draw from Avicennas philosophy to some extent. Even though
Aristotle becomes increasingly central for understanding medieval thought towards the
end of the 13th century, Olivis thinking is in many respects closer to Avicennas than to
Aristotles. For Avicennas influence on psychological theories of medieval Latin philoso-
phers, see Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Avicennas De Anima in the Latin West: The Formation of
a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 11601300 (London/Turin: The Warburg Institute/Nino
Aragno Editore, 2000).
introduction 23

Olivis understanding of the metaphysics of the soul and the relation


between the soul and body have been examined to some extent in the
literature.3 Even though the nature of the intellectual human soul is not
at the core of the present study, Olivis theory of perception cannot be
understood in ignorance of the metaphysical basis on which it is grounded.
The present section is devoted to this topic. I shall proceed in a medieval
fashion, first by asking what kind of a thing the soul is in itself (chapter
one) and then by analysing Olivis understanding of the relation between
the soul and the body (chapter two). In these two chapters I shall discuss
two metaphysical commitments which he makes in order to secure the
incorporeality of the human soul, while endorsing the substantial unity
between the soul and the body. First, he argues that all created beings,
including angels and human souls, are composed of matter and formin
other words, he accepts the so-called doctrine of universal hylomorphism.
Second, he adheres to the doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms.4
Human and non-human animals have radically different kinds of souls
from a metaphysical point of view, according to Olivi. In chapter three
I shall consider the differences between these two types of souls, and
discuss the relevant passages in which he speaks about his view on the
nature of the animal soul. I shall argue that despite the metaphysical dif-
ferences, Olivi thinks that also the animal soul has the relevant properties
which are necessary for cognitive activity. In this way, the psychological
difference between human and non-human animals is almost nonexis-
tent, if we consider only the sensitive level.

3For discussion about Olivis conception of the metaphysics of the soul, see Roberto
Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralit des formes, Philosophes
mdivaux 2 (Louvain: ditions de linstitut suprieur de philosophie, 1951), 33342; Efrem
Bettoni, Le dottrine filosofiche di Pier di Giovanni Olivi, Pubblicazioni delluniversit catto
lica del S.Cuore, nuova serie, 73 (Milano: Societa editrice Vita e pensiero, 1959), 263379;
Ivo Tonna, La pars intellectiva dellanima razionale non la forma del corpo (Dottrina di
Pierre Jean-Olieu [Olivi] sullunione tra anima e corpo), Antionianum 65 (1990): 27789;
Robert Pasnau, Olivi on the Metaphysics of Soul, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 6
(1997): 10932; Vincenzo Mauro, La disputa de anima tra Vitale du Four e Pietro di Gio-
vanni Olivi, Studi medievali 38:1 (1997): 89138; Mikko Yrjnsuuri, The Soul as an Entity:
Dante, Aquinas, and Olivi, in Forming the Mind, ed. Lagerlund, 8289. Important texts
include but are not limited to the following: SummaII q.16, 291355; ibid., q.49, 123; q.50,
23101; q.51, 10198; q.59, 51868 (esp. 53742).
4Several scholars have analysed medieval discussions concerning these two doctrines.
One may begin with Carlos Bazn, The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aqui-
nas Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism, AHDLMA 64 (1997): 95126; DanielA.Callus,
The Origins of the Problem of the Unity of Form, The Thomist 24 (1961): 25785; Rich-
ardC.Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1995);
Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla.
24 part one

Finally, in chapter four, I shall discuss the relation between the soul
and its various powers, and the relation of these powers to each other.
We shall see that Olivi understands the soul as being an aggregate of its
powers and that he employs several criteria by which different powers can
be distinguished from each other.
Chapter one

Spiritual Nature of the Soul

Spirituality and simplicity of the soul play an important role in Olivis


anthropology. Not only does he think that the human soul can be immortal,
intellectual, and truly free only if it is incorporeal, but also his conception
of the lower psychological operations of the soulthe ones which take
place on the sensitive level, such as perceptionis based on the idea that
the soul is spiritual and simple. In the case of the human soul, spirituality
and simplicity are closely related to the doctrine of universal hylomor-
phism, and this doctrine will be discussed in the first section of the pres-
ent chapter. I shall point out that, according to Olivi, the soul considered
in itself is more than just a form of the body. It is a spiritual entity, which
is composed of several substantial formsan intellectual form and a sen-
sitive formwhich inform the so-called spiritual matter.
Sectiontwo deals with Olivis conception of spirituality and simplicity.
He uses these notions to rule out a special ontological class of spiritual
beings, and they are also central to his theory of cognition. The souls spir-
ituality and simplicity distinguish it from corporeal objects and enable it
to perform psychological operations. The overall argument of the present
chapter, which will be reached in section three, is that even though Olivi
endeavours to secure the substantial unity between the soul and the body
by arguing that the soul is a form of the body and by claiming that it is not
a complete being without the body, his conception of the soul as a spiri-
tual entity and the distinction he makes between spiritual and corporeal
beings carries a hint of substance dualism with it.

1.Universal Hylomorphism

Universal hylomorphism is a doctrine that all beings other than God are
composed of matter and form. This doctrine was introduced to the Latin
west by Dominicus Gundissalinus, who took it from Ibn Gabirols (known
as Avicebron for Latin authors) Fons Vitae. Gundissalinus claims that God
is the only absolutely simple being and although the soul is simple as
well, it is less simple than God because it consists of matter and from.
Many thirteenth century authors, such as Bonaventure and Roger Bacon,
26 chapter one

accepted the doctrine of universal hylomorphism, but not all. By the mid-
dle of the century some authors rejected the idea that the soul in itself
is composed of distinct parts. For instance, Thomas Aquinas argues that
the soul is nothing but a form of the bodyeven though it is a special
kind of form that is capable of existing without matterand that it does
not include a matter of its own.1 However, Aquinas position did not gain
universal agreement, and many thinkers opted for a hylomorphic compo-
sition of the soul also in the latter half of the century.
Olivi is one of the authors who argued against the Thomistic position.
Even though he did not follow Bonaventure and other proponents of uni-
versal hylomorphism in all the details, he accepted the idea that human
souls and angels are composed of matter and form:
To this question [viz. whether angels and all intellectual substances are
composed of matter and form] it must be said that although some have held
and still hold that there is no matter nor composition of matter and form
in intellectual substances, I believe in accordance with the more common
opinion that they are composed of matter and form.2
The argument for the necessity of matter in spiritual beings is based on
the idea that all created beings are potential in many respects. The soul
is capable of receiving various accidents which it did not previously have,
and it can act in various waysfor instance, the soul can actualise its
potency to see or to think. Olivi thinks that the soul must contain the
potentiality to these changes in itself. However, a form alone cannot pro-
vide the potentiality, because forms are nothing but pure actuality. Thus,
he argues, the soul has necessarily a material component in addition to a
formal one, as matter is the principle of change.3
It may seem that Olivi has in mind the intellectual operations of the
soul, which are not realised in the corporeal matter of the body and thus
require potentiality in the soul itself. However, his idea is also related to

1Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 13112; Bazn, The Human Soul, 10626.
2Ad quaestionem istam dicendum quod licet aliqui tenuerint et teneant in substan-
tiis intellectualibus non esse materiam nec compositionem materiae cum forma, credo
tamen iuxta communiorem opinionem in eis esse compositionem materiae cum forma.
(SummaII q. 16, 304.)
3SummaII q.16, 31120. See also ibid., 342. For Olivis conception of matter, see ibid.,
qq.1621, 291388; Tiziana Suarez-Nani, Introduction, in Pierre de Jean Olivi, La matire,
trans. T.Suarez-Nani et al. (Paris: Vrin, 2009), 748; Olivier Ribordy, Materia spiritualis.
Implications anthropologiques de la doctrine de la matire dvelopp par Pierre de Jean
Olivi, in Pierre de Jean Olivi, ed. C.Knig-Pralong et al., 181227.
spiritual nature of the soul 27

the acts of the sensitive part of the soul.4 All the powers of the soul require
potentiality, because otherwise they could not perform their acts nor be
directed and inclined in various ways:
The powers of the soul mean in themselves something formal. However,
they necessarily mean also something material, because otherwise they
could not receive their own acts in themselves and they could not receive
various inclinations and they could not be directed in various ways. I do
not mean that there are diverse [kinds of] matter or diverse material parts
but that the powers of the soul mean some formal nature with the matter
of the soul.5
Powers of the soul are forms. They can act and be subject to various kinds
of changes, and the potentiality that is necessary for these changes is pro-
vided by the matter of the soul.
Olivi uses a similar argument as Gundissalinus when he claims that
intellectual souls and angels are necessarily composed of metaphysically
distinct parts because God is the only being that is absolutely simple. If
the soul and angels were not composed of matter and form, they would be
as simple as God.6 The composition of matter and form was not the only
option available for someone who wanted to reject the absolute simplicity
of the soul. Some authors suggested that the soul is composed of a genus
and differentiae, and others appealed to a composition from quod est and
quo est.7 Olivi thinks, however, that matter is a necessary component of
every being that is not absolutely simple:
Diverse parts can constitute one thing only if [1] one is a form of another; or
[2] both are informed by one form; or [3] they concur in the same matter.
Thus, there has to be matter and form in all compositions of parts. For if
the parts are material, they are capable of being united by themselves, but

4SummaII q.16, 31516; ibid., q.58, 513.


5[...] potentiae animae de se dicant aliquid formale, oportet nihilominus quod dicant
aliquid materiale; alias non possent recipere actus suos intra se nec varias inclinationes et
conversiones suscipere. Nec intendo quod in anima sunt diversae materiae aut diversae
partes materiales, sed quod potentiae dicant aliquam naturam formalem cum materia ani-
mae [...] (SummaII q.54, 25657.) See also ibid., q.16, 312; q.51, 113.
6Omnis enim forma quae non est in alio a se recepta et participata vel saltem ita
se habens, quantum est ex parte sua, ac si esset in alio recepta et participata est abso-
lutissima, simplicissima, universalissima et infinitissima, et breviter est summum ens et
ipsimet Deus. (SummaII q.16, 320.) For Olivis argumentation, see ibid., 32025. See also
Quodl. 3.1, 17071.
7See, e.g., Albertus Magnus, De homine, ed. H.Anzulewicz & J.R.Sder, S.Alberti Magni
Operum Omnium 27.2 (Aschendorf, 2008), 92. For discussion, see Dales, The Problem of the
Rational Soul, 3 & 1819.
28 chapter one

the act of uniting is not from their essence but from something formal. And
if the parts are formal, one part must be the form of the other part and the
other the matter of the first, or they are united because they concur in the
same matter. There are no other ways in which many parts can be united
to constitute one thing.8
Although Olivi accepts here the possibility that two forms can be substan-
tially united to each other if one is the form of another, he argues against
this option in another context.9 Thus, his argument is that if we want to
avoid attributing godlike simplicity to creatures, we must admit that no
creature lacks matter.10
In order to account for the souls material basis Olivi appeals to the
notion of spiritual matter. The idea that matter can be divided into
two different kindscorporeal and spiritualwas suggested earlier by
Bonaventure. Olivi finds support for this notion also from Augustine,
Anselm of Canterbury, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and Gundissa-
linus De unitate et uno (which was falsely attributed to Boethius).11 He
rejects the Aristotelian idea of matter as pure potentiality and attributes
to it a certain level of actuality: The essence of matter means some act
or actuality, which is nevertheless sufficiently distinct from the act which
is a form.12 Matter is in potentiality with respect to forms, and in itself
it is an ens indeterminatum, but it is more than pure potentiality because
even in itself it has an essence: it is matter.13 In this way, matter has a

8[...] partes diversae non possunt aliquod unum constituere, nisi una sit forma alte-
rius vel ambae una forma informentur aut nisi concurrant in eadem materia; et sic in
omni compositione partium semper oportet esse materiam et formam. Si enim sunt partes
materiales, per se quidem possunt esse unibiles, sed actus unionis non erit de essentia
earum, sed potius aliquid formale. Si vero sunt partes formales, oportebit quod una sit
forma alterius et altera materia eius aut quod pro tanto uniantur, quia in eadem materia
concurrunt. Nec est plures modos dare quomodo plures partes uniri possunt ad constitu-
endum aliquod unum. (SummaII q.16, 323.) See also ibid., q.12, 222; q.20, 373. In ibid.,
q.49, 23 Olivi makes a restriction: a corporeal form cannot inform several distinct heaps
of corporeal matter.
9SummaII q.51, 11011; ibid., app., 142; q.16, 320.
10These possible combinations between material and formal parts are important also
for Olivis theory of the union between the soul and the body. See chapter two below.
11 Ribordy, Materia spiritualis, 18997.
12[...] materia secundum suam essentiam dicit aliquem actum seu actualitatem, dis-
tinctam tamen sufficienter ab actu qui est idem quod forma. (SummaII q.16, 3056.) It is
notable that Olivi does not reject Aristotle but certain 13th century interpretations of Aris-
totles metaphysics. See Anna Rodolfi, Pietro di Giovanni Olivi e il dibattito sullattualit
della materia, in Pierre de Jean Olivi, ed. C.Knig-Pralong et al., 25393.
13Olivis definition of matter can be found from SummaII q.17, 358. Note, however,
that human beings are incapable of understanding the essence of the matter without any
forms (ibid., q.16, 31011).
spiritual nature of the soul 29

certain level of actuality. Yet it is not actual in the same sense as the forms
are actual. In order to become a certain determined thing, it needs to be
actualised by a form:
Now, it must be known that if actuality is taken generallyin such a way
that it is analogous to the essence of matter, form, and their composite, and
to the essence of accidentsthen [the concept of] form is not as general as
[the concept of] actuality. Rather, form adds some special property (ratio)
to actuality. A form is not just any kind of actuality but actuality which
determines and is indeterminable. This kind of actuality does not include
any potentiality, but the actuality of matter does. This is why we distinguish
the actuality of a form from the actuality of matter like an actuality from
potentiality.14
There are several levels of actuality. Forms are purely actual, and they do
not contain any potentiality, whereas matter is, one might say, actual only
in the slightest way and therefore in potentiality with respect to various
forms. Matter can be equated with potentiality because it is not actual in
the same sense as a form is actual.
The idea that matter has an essence and a certain level of actuality
enables Olivi to make a distinction between two essentially different
kinds of matter, namely, corporeal matter and spiritual matter. Corpo-
real matter is extended and divisible, whereas spiritual matter is unex-
tended, simple, and indivisible.15 The division of labour between these
two essentially different kinds of matter is that extended and corporeal
beings are constituted of corporeal matter, and spiritual matter func-
tions as the material part of spiritual beings, such as angels and human
souls. In fact, Olivi argues that it is impossible for corporeal matter to be
informed only by spiritual forms and for spiritual matter to be informed
only by corporeal forms.16 Corporeal matter cannot be made unextended

14Sciendum quod si actus sumatur generaliter secundum quod est analogum ad


essentiam materiae, formae et compositi et ad essentias accidentium, sic forma non est
ita commune sicut actus, immo addit aliquam specialem rationem ad ipsum. Forma enim
non est actus qualiscunque, sed solum actus determinativus et indeterminabilis; et quia
huiusmodi actus nullam habet in se potentialitatem, sicut habet actus materiae: ideo illum
actum distinguimus ab isto sicut actum a potentia [...] (SummaII q.16, 309.)
15In SummaII q.20, 370, Olivi presents a quod sic argument, which states that: materia
corporalis differt essentialiter a spirituali per simplex et compositum et per habens partes
et non habens partes et per corporale et spirituale. He seems to accept this characterisa-
tion although he denies the intended consequence that corporeal and spiritual matter
would be two species of matter, differentiated by differentias materiales. See also ibid.,
q.16, 343; q.20, 37679; q.51 app., 176; Ribordy, Materia spiritualis, 22023.
16See, e.g., SummaII q.16, 343.
30 chapter one

and simple, and the essence of the spiritual matter requires that it be
informed by spiritual forms. He leaves room for the possibility that cor-
poreal matter can be informed by a spiritual form, if it is at the same time
made extended and divisible by a corporeal form, because the bodies of
human and non-human animals are informed by the sensitive (part of )
the soul, which is spiritual and simple. (I shall return to this topic below.)
In this way, the spiritual nature of the human soul is based not only on the
formal but also on the material constituent of the soul. Spiritual beings
differ from corporeal ones because they have different kinds of forms, but
the distinction is based also on two essentially different kinds of matter.17
The crucial metaphysical distinctions which separate different kinds of
beings are spirituality and corporeality on one hand, and extension and
simplicity on the other. These metaphysical distinctions have important
consequences on Olivis theory of cognition, as we shall see.

2.Spirituality and Simplicity

Even though Olivi explicitly deals with the relation between the soul and
the body and provides lengthy questions pertaining to the metaphysical
doctrines which are essential for his conception of the nature of the soul,
he is not a very systematic author, and he often uses notions which he
never properly defines. Two such notions are spirituality and simplicity.
Although they play a central role in Olivis theories of cognition and the
metaphysics of the soul, as well as in his theological discussions, they usu-
ally function as unquestioned premises and as explanatory factors rather
than as features that should be explained.18
However, a careful reading of Olivis texts reveals that he uses these
notions to rule out a special ontological class of things. He distinguishes
corporeal and extended objects from spiritual and simple entities in a way
that is reminiscent of Descartes res extensa and res cogitans.19 The soul
and its cognitive acts have a simple and spiritual being, that is, an ani-
mated, living, and sensitive being. This kind of being cannot be attributed
to corporeal matter, since:

17SummaII q.20, 37679.


18I have shortly discussed Olivis conception of the notions spirituality and simplicity
in Jos Filipe Silva & Juhana Toivanen, The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception:
Robert Kilwardby and Peter Olivi, Vivarium 48 (2010): 26466.
19Katherine H.Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology
and the Foundations of Semantics 12501345 (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 46; Yrjnsuuri, The Soul
as an Entity, 84.
spiritual nature of the soul 31

to give such kind of being is to elevate corporeal matter to a participation of


the most united kind of being, which transcends all corporeal and extended
being. It would give the matter a kind of substantial being that is much
higher than some corporeal being.20
Simple and spiritual entities are different from corporeal and extended
objects, because the former are animated, living, capable of perception,
incorporeal, and unextended.
On the basis of the previous quotation it may seem that spiritual-
ity and simplicity are synonymous. It is true that they often go hand in
hand, but Olivi seems to think that neither of them can be reduced to the
other. There are simple things which are not spiritual, and since there
are various types of simplicity, not all spiritual beings are simple in the
same way or in all the possible senses of simplicity. In order to understand
what is the relation between these two notions, let us first look at what he
says about spirituality and then see how it relates to his ideas concerning
simplicity.
The term spiritus has many different meanings in medieval philosophi-
cal, theological, and medical discussions. In medieval vocabulary, spiritus
may mean quite different things, ranging from ordinary respiration to the
intellectual part of the soul. Marie-Dominique Chenu has pointed out that
there were at least four distinct senses in which the term was used in the
twelfth century: spiritus was identified as (1) wind, respiration, movement
of air; (2) refined matter that accounts for life functions and cognitive
processes in the body (so-called spiritus vitalis/animalis); (3) the psycho-
logical power of imagination; or (4) the intellectual soul or the intellectual
part of the soul.21 Instances of all these different senses can also be found
in thirteenth century texts, including in those of Olivi. On one occasion
he points out that:
Sometimes anima is taken to stand only for the inferior part of the soul and
spiritus for the superior part [...] sometimes spiritus is taken to stand only
for the imaginative part [...] Sometimes it is taken to stand for the breath or
breathing of the mouth, sometimes only for the third person of God, some-
times for the whole substance of the Trinity.22

20[...] esse simplex et spirituale, id est, animatum seu vivum et sensitivum; quia dare
tale esse est elevare materiam corporalem ad participationem esse unitissimi transcen-
dentis omne esse corporale et extensum, et ideo hoc est dare materiae quoddam esse
substantiale longe altius quam sit aliquod esse corporale. (SummaII q.73, 88.)
21Marie-Dominique Chenu, Spiritus: Le vocabulaire de lme au XIIe sicle, Revue des
sciences philosophiques et thologiques 41 (1957): 22327.
22[...] aliquando sumitur anima pro sola sua parte inferiori et spiritus pro superiori
[...] aliquando sumitur spiritus pro sola parte imaginativa [...] Aliquando vero sumitur
32 chapter one

Here we see that he recognises the meanings (1), (3), and (4) plus few
additional theological meanings. None of these, however, are very impor-
tant for his philosophical psychology. The major distinction for him is the
one between spiritus as a kind of refined matter and physical medium
by which the corporeal functions of the soul are realised in a material
bodythat is, spiritus animalis23and spiritus as a spiritual substance.
The latter meaning covers not only the intellectual soul but also other
spiritual beings such as demons and angels.24
Olivi calls the soul a spiritus and attributes a spiritual being to it in
order to distinguish it from corporeal objects. The distinction between
spiritual entities and corporeal objects is ultimately based on a Neopla-
tonic ontological hierarchy, which he inherited from Augustine. Augus-
tine thinks that the human soul is ontologically superior to corporeal
objects. Considered in itself, it is a spiritual entity which is not dependent
on the body. It animates the body and provides it with psychological func-
tions but remains ontologically distinct from it.25 Olivi seems to accept
this general picture, and although he perhaps emphasises the substantial
unity between the soul and the body more than Augustine, he makes it
clear that considered in itself the human soul is a spirit and, as such, radi-
cally different from and ontologically superior to corporeal objects. For
instance, he places the questions in which he expounds most fully his
theory of cognition under the heading: Questions concerning the actions
which occur in the human or angelic spirit and in their powers.26 The
human soul is placed in the same category as angelsin fact, Olivi seems
to think that the only difference between the human soul and angels is
that the soul contains a sensitive part and is inclined to be joined to a

pro ventu seu flatu oris, aliquando pro sola tertia persona Dei, aliquando pro tota sub-
stantia Trinitatis [...] (SummaII q.51 app., 18384.) See also ibid. q.52, 198; q.58, 501.
For other authors, see, e.g., Jean de la Rochelle, Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentia-
rum animae, ed. P.Michaud-Quantin, Textes philosophiques du Moyen Age 11 (Paris: Vrin,
1964), 2.54.
23See, e.g., the following: In spiritibus vero est vis non solum vivifica, sed etiam inten-
tionum animae et sensuum eius delativa. Unde Augustinus [...] dicit quod in dormien-
tibus in cerebro consopitur via sentiendi quae intentionem animae ducit ad oculos [...]
Non potest autem duci nisi in aliquo corpore subtili quod spiritus vocamus. (SummaII
q.49, 9.) See chapter three, section two below.
24See, e.g., SummaIV q.19, 149 (Maranesi, q.7); SummaII q.16, 303; ibid., q.72, 1.
25Gerard ODaly, Augustines Philosophy of Mind (London: Duckworth, 1987), 779.
26De actionibus quae fiunt in spiritu humano vel in angelico et in eorum potentiis
aliqua quaesituri. (SummaII, vol. 3, p. 1.) The questions included are qq.7286. It must
be noted, though, that the explicit statements that the human soul is a spirit are not as
common as one might expect.
spiritual nature of the soul 33

body.27 We shall see below that the ontological superiority of the soul
plays a crucial role in Olivis theory of cognition, because it is the reason
why the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal objects.
Olivi does not explain what constitutes the difference between spiritual
and corporeal beings. One possible explanation is that spiritual beings are
constituted out of spiritual matter. This seems to be true to the extent
that all beings which do not have corporeal matter are spirits. Yet, there
are borderline cases which point out that Olivi did not hold the distinc-
tion between spiritual and corporeal beings as clear-cut as this rule of
thumb suggests. First, the human soul is spiritual even though it is the
form of the corporeal body which is made out of corporeal matter. Sec-
ond, and more crucially, Olivi sometimes calls the souls of non-human
animals spirits, even though their constitution does not include spiritual
matter: By the word anima everybody generally means the whole sub-
stance of a living spirit, which is in one animal or human being.28 Also, it
is not clear whether the spiritus animalis counts as spiritual or corporeal,
because Olivi suggests that it can occupy the same place as the matter of
the body, and this ability seems to be reserved for spiritual beings.29 These
cases show that Olivi presents no precise distinctions between spiritual
and corporeal beings. The notion of spirituality is used to separate lifeless
matter from spiritual substances and to place these two extreme cases
in two ontologically separate groups. Human souls, angels, and demons
belong to a sphere of spiritual beings, which is ontologically superior to
corporeal objects. Yet, the line between these clear cases is indistinct.
Let us now turn to the concept of simplicity, which is not a unitary con-
cept either. There are different types and degrees of simplicity, some of
which are co-extensive with spirituality. By analysing the different types
and degrees of simplicity we may arrive at a better understanding of the
difference between spiritual and corporeal beings.
We may begin by noting that according to Olivi, the human soul is
simple. He refers to simplicity of the soul over and over again in various
contexts. For instance, when he argues that the soul informs the whole
body, one of his arguments is based on the parts of the body being united
in such a way that they make one complete being. Yet, the parts of the

27SummaII q.48, 75659; ibid., q.56, 3014.


28[...] omnes autem per nomen animae communiter sumunt totam substantiam
spiritus vivi qui est in uno animali vel homine [...] (SummaII q.51 app., 182.) See also
footnote 31 below.
29Quodl. 3.7, 18687.
34 chapter one

body cannot be joined to constitute a whole nature of one animal, unless


they all are united and perfected by one soul [...] Therefore, it is neces-
sary that one simple form, which we call the soul, does this.30
It may come as a surprise that Olivis argument is based on the sim-
plicity of the soul, as the central reason for his adherence to the doctrine
of universal hylomorphism is to deny the godlike simplicity of the soul.
How can the soul be simple, if it is composed of matter and form
especially since the main reason to attribute spiritual matter to the soul
was to ensure that it not be simple? The explanation lies in the gradational
nature of simplicity. According to Olivi, there are various degrees of sim-
plicity. God is the only absolutely simple being, but spiritual substances
are also simple in a way that is repugnant to corporeal objects. Moreover,
there are various degrees of simplicity within spiritual beings:
The simplicity of spiritual [beings] has many diverse grades. To wit, the
simplicity of the sensitive soul is very different from the simplicity of the
rational soul or of an angel, and the simplicity of the common sense is very
different from that of the particular senses. The simplicity of the souls of
perfect animals differs greatly from the simplicity of the souls of imperfect
animals, and the simplicity of the sensitive [soul] differs from the simplicity
of the vegetative [soul] which is in plants.31
Here Olivi gives an incomplete list of things that are simple. It contains
only spiritual thingswe shall see below that there are also non-spiritual
simple thingsand lacks God, but we can see that angels, rational souls,
the sensitive souls of human beings and non-human animals, the cogni-
tive powers of the sensitive soul, and even the vegetative souls of plants
are simple. Yet there are various levels of simplicity, ranging from angels
and the rational soul (most simple) to the vegetative soul of plants (least
simple).

30Sed partes corporis ad unam naturam totalem animalis constituendam non pos-
sunt congregari, nisi omnes uniantur et perficiantur per unam animam [...] ergo oportet
quod hoc sit per unam formam simplicem quam dicimus animam. (SummaII q.49, 8.)
See also ibid., 13.
31[...] in simplicitate spiritualium est gradus valde multiplex et diversus; multum
enim distat simplicitas animae sensitivae a simplicitate animae rationalis vel angeli mul-
tumque simplicitas sensus communis a simplicitate sensuum particularium multumque
simplicitas animae animalium perfectorum a simplicitate animae animalium imperfec-
torum multumque simplicitas sensitivae a simplicitate vegetativae quae est in plantis.
(SummaII q.31, 569.) See also ibid., q.51 app., 15253 (the sensitive form of the soul is
simple); q.58, 402, 456 & 500 (the souls of brute animals are simple); q.54, 28283 (the
powers of the soul are simple and spiritual); q.16, 328 (spiritual matter is simple); q.58,
412 (the acts of the intellectual part of the soul are simple); q.58, 5023 (the acts of the
sensitive part of the soul are simple).
spiritual nature of the soul 35

Only God is simple in the strictest sense, which means that he is not
composed of essentially distinct parts; no created being is absolutely sim-
ple in this way.32 But some created beings are simple in another way,
which does not exclude metaphysical composition: Although the soul is
simple with respect to extensional quantity, it is not simple with respect
to its essential parts.33 The soul contains formal and material parts, but
it is not extended in space. The central feature of simplicity of the soul
appears to be the lack of extension. In fact, Olivi thinks that extensionality
and simplicity are general differentiae of being:
The matter of the body, having parts that are in different places, is in itself
divisible, and it does not acquire any other kind of simplicity from the sensi-
tive [form] than a formal simplicity, which is nothing other than to have a
simple sensitive form. Thus, matter should not be called simple or have a
simple being, because this would mean that it is simple in itself and abso-
lutely, as simplicity and extension are the general differentiae of being.34
The idea that the body remains extensional even though it receives a for-
mal simplicity from the sensitive soul or form may sound idiosyncratic, as
it suggests that human beings and non-human animals are both simple
and extended. Yet, in a way this formulation captures well a central fea-
ture of Olivis conception of simplicity. His idea is that the body remains
an extended object even when it is animated by the soul, and the simplic-
ity of the soul explains why the body is alive and capable of psychological
operations. The soul in itself is not extended even though it is a form of an
extended body; the body in itself is not simple, even though it is informed
by a simple form. The simplicity of the sensitive soul is not repugnant
to a quantity of intension and formal levels according to which it can be
called perfect or imperfect, but only to extensional quantity according to
which it could be called long or wide.35

32See, e.g., SummaI q.4, 53134 (Jansen, q.3).


33[...] licet anima respectu quantitatis extensivae sit simplex, non tamen respectu
partium essentialium. (SummaII q.49, 14.)
34[...] materia corporis est de se divisibilis habens partes secundum situm differentes
et non acquirit aliam simplicitatem a sensitiva quam suam formalem, quod non est aliud
quam habere formam sensitivam simplicem. Unde ipsa materia non debet [...] dici sim-
plex vel habere esse simplex, quia per hoc significaretur quod ex se et absolute esset sim-
plex, quia simplicitas et extensio sunt generales differentiae entis. (SummaII q.51 app.,
153.) See also ibid., q.20, 37576.
35Simplicitas autem animae sensitivae non repugnat quantitati intensionis et gra
duum formalium secundum quam potest dici perfecta vel imperfecta, sed solum quantitati
extensivae secundum quam posset dici longa vel lata. (SummaII q.31, 566.)
36 chapter one

However, even though the lack of extension is a central feature of


Olivis conception of the simplicity of the soul, it is not a definitive feature.
The soul and its powers are in themselves unextended, but their simplic-
ity means more than the lack of extension. The simplicity that Olivi attri-
butes to the soul marks off a special ontological class of beings, because he
makes a further distinction between what he calls spiritual or intellectual
simplicity and the simplicity of a point (simplicitas spiritualis/intellectualis,
simplicitas punctalis). He mentions this distinction several times, and he
makes it in order to underline that the simplicity of the soul should not
be understood only as the lack of extension. As he puts it:
the soul is not simple by the simplicity of smallness, which is the kind of
simplicity of a point [...] Rather, it is simple by a spiritual simplicity, and
it has in itself the magnitude of essence, power, and composition of diverse
formal natures.36
Unlike a point, which lacks extension but still belongs to the genus of
quantity and does not exclude corporeality,37 the soul and its powers are
simple in a spiritual way, and the spiritual simplicity distinguishes them
from the lower ontological level of corporeal objects. Although Olivi does
not explicitly say it anywhere, we may assume that he understands spiri-
tual simplicity and spirituality as co-extensive. Spiritual beings are simple
in a spiritual way, and the lack of extension is not a sufficient condition
(although it seems to be a necessary condition) for spirituality.
We may conclude that Olivi uses the concept of simplicity in altogether
three different senses: the absolute simplicity of God, the spiritual simplic-
ity that marks off spiritual beings, and simplicity as the lack of extension.
Moreover, spiritual simplicity allows for different levels in such a way that
the intellectual soul is simpler than the sensitive soul, and the animal soul
is simpler than the soul of a plant.
I claimed above that Olivis distinction between simple and spiritual
things and extended corporeal things is reminiscent of Descartes idea
of two ontologically distinct substances. According to Descartes, the pri-
mary attributes of res extensa and res cogitans are, as the names indicate,

36Anima non est simplex simplicitate parvitatis, qualis est simplicitas punctalis [...]
sed potius est simplex simplicitate spirituali habente in se magnitudinem essentiae et vir-
tutis et compositionem diversarum naturarum formalium. (SummaII q.49, 17.) See also
ibid., 14; q.37, 66162; Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Quid ponat ius vel dominium, ed. F.Delorme,
Antonianum 20 (1945), 321.
37SummaII q.58, 456.
spiritual nature of the soul 37

extension and thinking.38 In a similar vein, Olivi thinks that being extended
is an essential feature of corporeal mattereven though he thinks that a
point is not extended in space, it still belongs to the genera of quantity
and corporealityand that the central feature which defines spiritual and
simple beings is that they are alive and capable of cognition:
If corporeal form and matter have size (sunt quantae) accidentally, and if
quantity differs from them in such a way that they can be thought of with-
out quantity, they can be truthfully thought of as being simple by a spiritual
simplicity. But God can make without any contradiction whatever we can
truthfully think of. Therefore, God could make corporeal forms and matters
simple and spiritual preserving their species, and then simple and spiritual
would belong to the same lowest species (speciei specialissimae) with cor-
poreal forms and matters, in such a way that simple and intellectual white-
ness would belong to the same species as the whiteness of this wall. As all
spiritual matter is apt to receive life and every spiritual form is, according
to Augustine, a form that lives in some manner, that whiteness would be
alive.39
Olivi does not further develop the idea of the essential connection
between spiritual simplicity and being alive, but according to what he
says in this passage, being spiritual and simple equals being alive. There
is a notable difference between Descartes and Olivi, however: Descartes
claims that the only res cogitans is the human soul, whereas Olivi puts the
demarcation lower on the scale of being, as he allows the spirituality and
simplicity of the sensitive souls of non-human animals and even those of
plants.

38See, e.g., Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia 2 (AT VII, 28) and Principia
philosophiae 2.22 (AT VIII-1, 52). For discussion, see, e.g., John Cottingham, Cartesian
Dualism: Theology, Metaphysics, and Science, in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes,
ed. J.Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992), 23657; Gordon Baker & Katherine
J.Morris, Descartes Dualism (London: Routledge, 1996).
39Ergo si forma et materia corporalis per accidens sunt quantae, et si quantitas sic
differt ab eis quod possint intelligi sine ea: ergo possunt veraciter intelligi ut simplices sim-
plicitate spirituali. Quicquid autem potest a nobis veraciter intelligi potest a Deo absque
omni contradictione fieri. Ergo Deus poterit formas et materias corporales salva sua specie
facere simplices et spirituales, et tunc simplex et spirituale erit eiusdem speciei specialis-
simae cum formis et materiis corporalibus, ita quod albedo simplex et intellectualis erit
eiusdem speciei cum albedine huius parietis. Et cum omnis materia spiritualis sit apta
ad suscipiendam vitam, et omnis forma spiritualis sit forma aliquo modo viva secundum
Augustinum, illa albedo erit viva. (SummaII q. 58, 44142.) Olivi argues that extension is
an essential, not accidental feature of bodies in ibid., q.58, 44049.
38 chapter one

The link between cognitive action and spirituality is also clear on the
basis of Olivis discussion of cognition (I shall return to this below), and
occasionally he mentions the connection in passing:
Namely, even though some spiritual accidents of the soul are together with
the soul in several parts of the body, they are not primarily and in them-
selves in the parts of the body, and they do not give a simple and spiritual
being, that is, an animated, living, and sensitive being to the body.40
The idea remains undeveloped, but it is clear that Olivi sees an essen-
tial connection between spiritual simplicity, life, and cognitive functions
of the soul. In this way, spirituality and simplicity seem to be definitive
features of every living being and only living beings; and extension is an
essential feature of every corporeal object.

3.Human Soul as a Spiritual Entity

In general, medieval philosophers did not accept the most radical forms
of substance dualism. They did not equate the human being with the soul,
and they usually rejected the idea that the soul in itself is a complete
entity which only inhabits the body. This kind of dualistic position was
attributed to Plato and rejected because it gives too little weight to the
bodily nature of human beings. However, dualistic ideas were not com-
pletely extinct in the Middle Ages. Augustines Neoplatonic anthropology,
which influenced also thirteenth century authors, supports a radical onto-
logical difference between the soul and the body. Moreover, according
to medieval Christianity, the soul remains alive between the death and
resurrection of the body. In fact, most medieval authors (at least before
Aquinas)41 were ready to give the soul a relatively independent status
with respect to the body, especially because they were unanimous that it
has to be capable of existing without the body. Whether substance dual-
ism follows from this position is a far more complicated question, and the
answer depends both on the details of each authors theory and on our

40Quamvis enim quaedam spiritualia accidentia animae sint cum ea in pluribus par-
tibus corporis sui, non sunt ibi immediate nec primo et per se nec dant ipsi corpori esse
simplex et spirituale, id est, animatum seu vivum et sensitivum. (SummaII q.73, 88.)
See also ibid., q.31, 531; q.54, 24849; and q.73, 100, where Olivi writes: [...] cum omne
spirituale sit vivum [...].
41The dualism of body and soul was maintained by all masters prior to Aquinas, and
except for Roland of Cremona, Peter of Spain, and Albert the Great, required that the body,
as body, had a form of its own (Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 194.)
spiritual nature of the soul 39

definition of dualism. Thus, in deciding whether a certain author upholds


dualistic anthropology, we have to carefully qualify what exactly are
the dualistic strands in his thought.
Thirteenth century theories can be approached by using two heuristic
models. In both models a human being is a composite of the soul and the
body. The models differ from each other with respect to the nature of the
soul. In the first model the soul is a form and the body is its matter. In
this case the soul is not an entity and it makes little sense to talk about
its independence with respect to the body. Of course the authors who
adhered to this model had to explain how the soul could survive the death
of the body, but even in doing so they tended to emphasise the essential
need of the body to a human being. By contrast, in the other model the
soul is more independent with respect to the body. Both the soul and
the body are composed of form (or forms) and matter, and they belong
to two ontologically distinct categoriesspiritual and corporeal beings.
These heuristic models can be called Aristotelian and Augustinian, but it
is important to note that there were no clearly defined groups of medieval
Aristotelians or Augustinians, and arguably no-one adhered to either of
these models in their purest forms. Rather, elements from both of these
models were mixed in various ways, resulting in an array of philosophical
positions with respect to the nature of the soul.
We have seen that Olivi conceives of the human soul as being onto-
logically superior to the body and in many ways independent from it. The
doctrines of universal hylomorphism and the plurality of substantial forms
make his position much more dualistic than, say, Aquinas hylomorphism.
The soul does not need the body in order to be an individual, and it is
capable of quite a normal kind of existence without the body, because it
is capable of performing most of its functions without it.42 Moreover, Olivi
seems to think that we are primarily self-reflexive minds instead of living
bodies, and that human subjectivity is rooted in the soul rather than in the
body.43 Thus, it is clear that even though Olivi underlines the substantial
unity between the soul and the body, he sees it as a union between two
distinct entities, and his view is very close to the Augustinian model.
To be sure, he is careful in his formulations, and he rarely says directly
anything that could be seen as an acceptance of substance dualism. He
explicitly rejects the idea that the soul is an ens per se, or a complete

42See chapter eight below.


43Yrjnsuuri, The Soul as an Entity, 8292.
40 chapter one

being, when it exists without the body: The rational soul is not an ens a
se, and it does not have an absolute mode of being, and by consequence it
is not a complete whole or a subject (suppositum) before the composition
[of the soul and the body].44 He underlines the substantial unity between
the soul and the body, and he makes it clear that a human being cannot
be equated with the soul.45 Moreover, he underlines several times that
the soul is not a complete substance and does not have a complete being
without the body. In one of his clearest statements he says that: although
the rational soul has spiritual matter, it should not be said to be a com-
plete substance but an incomplete one, because it also has an essential
relation to a human body just like a form has to its matter.46 We shall
see in chapter two that this is not only a prudent measure on his part.
Although his conception of the metaphysics of the soul causes him some
trouble in accounting for the substantial unity between the soul and the
body, he claims that he is able to safeguard the substantial unity to the
extent that his theory is not dualistic in the Platonist sense.
Despite these concessions that qualify Olivis position, he sees a radi-
cal ontological gap between the soul and the body, which is occasionally
manifested in explicit statements. Consider, for instance, the following:
It should not be said that the human body becomes a different being when
the soul arrives at it. Rather, it should be said that the body becomes a part
of another being, and it ceases to be a being per se. And when the soul leaves
the body, it should not be said that the body becomes a different being from
the one that it was before, because it was not an ens per se before. Rather,
it should be said that when the soul leaves, the body that was a part of a
human being or another animal becomes a being per se.47

44Anima autem rationalis nec est ens a se, nec ante compositionem habet modum
essendi absolutum ac per consequens nec plenam rationem totius aut suppositi. (Respon-
sio secunda, 14041.) See also SummaII q.51 app., 174.
45SummaII q.16, 336. See chaptertwo below.
46Dicendum quod quamvis anima rationalis habeat materiam spiritualem, quia
tamen praeter hoc habet essentialem respectum ad corpus humanum tanquam forma ad
suam materiam: idcirco nunquam debet dici per se substantia completa, sed potius incom-
pleta. (SummaII q.16, 352.) This clarification is an answer to the following argument: Si
enim [anima rationalis] habet materiam, prout est separata a corpore seu separabilis, ergo
ipsa est potius quaedam substantia completa quam pars substantiae et ita non erit pars
hominis. (ibid., 3023.) The argument is quite interesting, not least because it identifies a
human being more with the body than with the soul. Question 16 of Summa is one of the
questions which Olivi wrote with the so-called Latin Averroism in mind (see Sylvain Piron,
Olivi et les averrostes, Freiburger Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie 53:1 (2006):
256), and the edge of the argument which Olivi refutes is that universal hylomorphism
leads to an Averroist position.
47Corpus ergo humanum, cum advenit sibi anima, non debet dici quod fiat aliud ens,
sed quod fit pars alterius entis et desinit esse per se ens; nec cum abscedit ab eo anima,
spiritual nature of the soul 41

When the soul and the body are joined together, they are substantial parts
of a human being. But without the soul the body is an ens per sean
independent and complete substance. The body cannot exist (for long)
without the soul, and the soul does not have a complete mode of exis-
tence without the body, but nevertheless the soul and the body appear to
be distinct from each other.
It is symptomatic of Olivis thinking that even when he emphasises the
necessity of the body to a perfect existence of the soul, he ends up pre-
senting a picture which actually underlines how clearly he diverges from
Aristotelian hylomorphism. He opposes an idea that the intellectual part
of the soul is in itself a form of the body because in that case the com-
pound of the two would be the root of our personalitythat is, the root
of what we truly are. This position is not possible, because (according to
Olivi) the hylomorphic combination of the intellectual part of the soul
and the body is not intellectual, free, capable of self-reflexion, or immortal
in itself. Olivi continues:
And this is contrary to our deepest experience of our own nature. We sense
that we consist of the root of our free choice per se and in the highest way
and that it supports everything else in a higher way than the heart or the
brain support the other parts of the body. It is not against this [position]
that we say that the soul is not a perfect person (habere perfectam rationem
personae) without the body. The reason for this is not that the soul and
the body would constitute some third [thing] which would be the root of
our subsistence. Rather, it is as if we were to say that the roots of a tree are
not a perfect being of its species or even a perfect individual without the
branches, or that our body is not a perfect body without feet and hands,
and still the hands and the rest of the body do not constitute a third [thing]
which would be the root of the subsistence of the rest of the body. In the
same way, the rational soul is said to be an imperfect person without the
body and the sensitive [part] by which it informs the body, because without
the body it does not have all the necessary parts of its nature, its personal
liberty, and existence.48

debet dici quod fiat aliud ens quam prius esset, cum prius non esset ens per se; sed debet
dici quod abscedente anima corpus quod erat pars hominis vel alterius animalis fit per se
ens. (SummaII q.50, 37.)
48Estque istud contra experimentum naturae nostrae intimum quo sentimus nos in
radice liberi arbitrii per se et altissime consistere et omnia alia in ipsa stabiliri altiori modo
quam partes corporis in corde vel cerebro. Nec est contra hoc quod animam sine corpore
non dicimus habere perfectam rationem personae; quia hoc non est propter hoc quod ex
anima et corpore constituatur aliquod tale tertium quod sit radix nostrae subsistentiae.
Sed sicut si diceremus quod radix arboris non est perfectum ens suae speciei seu etiam
individui sine ramis, aut sicut si diceremus quod corpus nostrum non est perfectum cor-
pus sine pedibus et manibus, et tamen ex manibus et corpore residuo non constituitur tale
42 chapter one

Once again Olivi emphasises that we are not complete persons without
our bodies. Yet, it is illustrative how he expresses the idea that our person-
ality consists of the rational part of our soul and is not primarily rooted to
the compound of the soul and the body. Just as our body is not a perfect
and complete body without a foot, the soul is not complete person with-
out the body. This is a clear statement in favour of the need of the body
to complete personhood, but at the same time it is easy to see that the
body is not a very significant part of us. Losing ones foot is a hindrance,
a shortcoming, a deficiency, but it does not change the nature of the rest
of the body, and we can come along quite well without our feet after all.
Similarly, Olivi says, the separated soul is not a complete person and does
not have a complete mode of existence, but it is an existing person nev-
ertheless. Just like the body is a body even without a foot, we are persons
even without our bodies.

tertium quod sit radix subsistentiae corporis residui: sic, quia anima rationalis non habet
omnes partes debitas suae naturae et suae personali libertati et existentiae sine corpore,
dicitur non esse perfecte persona sine corpore et sine sua sensitiva per quam corpus infor-
mat. (SummaII q.51, 121.)
Chapter two

Souls Relation to the Body

Despite the dualistic aspects of his conception of the nature of the soul,
Olivi emphasises that a human being is a composite of the soul and the
body and that the body is a substantial part of a human being: Who could
define a human being without mentioning the human body, not only as
a correlative but also as an essential part of a human being? Only some-
one who would say that a human being is nothing but the soul of the
human body.1 In the Middle Ages the idea that a human being could
be equated with the soul was known as a Platonic and Manichaeist doc-
trine, and it was commonly rejected as heretic, mainly because medieval
authors believed in the Catholic doctrine of the resurrection of the body
on Judgement Day. A human being was thought to be a combination of a
soul and a body.2 It is to no surprise, therefore, that Olivi also repeatedly
emphasises that humans are essentially bodily beings.
Yet, there is a certain tension within Olivis conception of the spiritual
nature of the soul and his emphasis on the importance of the body. How
can the soul be a spiritual entity and still be substantially united to a cor-
poreal body? Olivis theory of the relation between the soul and the body
can be seen as an attempt to reconcile the following two ideas:

1Alias quis posset definire hominem nulla facta mentione de corpore humano, non
solum per modum correlativi, sed etiam per modum partis hominis essentialis? Nonnisi
qui diceret quod homo non sit aliud quam anima corporis humani. (SummaII q.16, 336.)
See also ibid., q.50 app., 55 & 132. The question of whether the human body enters the
definition of man arises with respect to Aristotle, who in Met. 7.10 seems to answer in the
negative. Medieval authors usually opposed this interpretation and argued that Aristotles
intention is not to exclude the body from the definition of man. By contrast, Olivi argues
that Aristotle excludes the body but errs in doing so. It has been suggested that Olivi
is opposing Albertus Magnus in the cited text. See Catherine Knig-Pralong, Olivi et le
formalisme ontologique. Lectures dAristote, dAverros, et critique dAlbert? In Pierre de
Jean Olivi, ed. C.Knig-Pralong et al., 13565.
2Although the heyday of Manichaeism was in Late Antiquity, thirteenth-century Latin
authors had more recent ideas in mind, for they considered Cathars as one kind of Man-
icheans. See Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee: A Study of the Christian Dualist
Heresy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982 [1947]); John Inglis, A Rationale for Material Ele-
ments of Christs Human Cognition: Reading Aquinas Within His Dominican and Political
Context, Traditio 58 (2003): 262. For an extensive analysis of the medieval discussions
concerning the resurrection of the body, see Caroline Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body
in Western Christianity, 2001336 (New York: Columbia UP, 1995.)
44 chapter two

1. The incorporeality of the intellectual soul (which is a requirement for


immortality, freedom and intellectuality).
2. Substantial unity between the intellectual soul and the body.
Olivis intention is not original. Rather, he tries to uphold the most fun-
damental ideas concerning the metaphysical structure of a human being
current in his time. Yet he thinks that earlier attempts have not been
successful. He develops his view with an eye to two positions, which he
finds unsatisfactory in this respect. According to the first position, the
soul (or the intellectual part of the soul) is a hylomorphic form of the
body. The most well-known proponent of this view is Thomas Aquinas,
but it was defended also by many authors who rejected the Thomistic
idea that human beings have only one substantial form. The other prob-
lematic position is posed by the so-called Latin Averroists, who argue that
the intellectual soul is not at all a substantial part of a human being but
a separate substance. Olivi thinks that the former position fails to safe-
guard the incorporeality of the soul, whereas the Averroist viewquite
obviouslydoes not succeed in accounting for the substantial unity.
Olivis own solution, which is an attempt to find a middle ground
between these two positions, is based on the doctrine of the plurality of
substantial forms. He thinks that the body is informed by several substan-
tial forms in addition to the soul and that the soul in itself is composed of
several forms. As the intellectual form cannot be a form of the body, the
substantial unity of a human being is caused by the sensitive form, which
is united to the body as its form. Olivi argues for this kind of complex
structure because he thinks that it is the only way to secure the two afore-
mentioned ideasthe only way to reject the idea that the intellectual
part of the soul is the form of the body without falling into the pit-hole
of Averroism.
I shall proceed as follows. In sectionone I shall shortly discuss the pas-
sages where Olivi avows the importance of the body. Section two deals
with Olivis argumentation against the hylomorphic union between the
intellectual part of the soul and the body, and it explores his understand-
ing of the plurality of substantial forms. Section three analyses Olivis view
on the metaphysical relation between the soul and the body. Finally, sec-
tionfour is devoted to analysing the concept of colligantia. Olivi accepts
the Augustinian ontological superiority of the soul and denies the pos-
sibility of a direct causation from the body to the spiritual soul. His view
seems to lead to a problematic consequence that, say, the perception of
heat cannot be caused by the rise of the temperature in the body. The
souls relation to the body 45

concept of colligantia is designed to save the commonsensical view that


bodily changes are related to changes in the soul.

1.Body as a Substantial Part of a Human Being

Olivi is not the fiercest proponent of the bodily nature of human beings.
One of the most controversial aspects of his anthropology is precisely
the status of the body and the relation between the soul and the body.
It was questioned during his lifetime,3 and when the Council of Vienne
condemned the view that the rational or intellectual soul is not a form of
the body, the intention was to forbid asserting, defending, and accepting
Olivis theory about the relation between the soul and the body. The cen-
sors misunderstood his position, to be sure, but these affairs show that
his theory of the union between the soul and the body raised some seri-
ous doubts.4 Olivi himself thinks that his view is philosophically sound
and that it does not offend the officially accepted theological doctrines
concerning the metaphysics of a human being. As can be seen from
his answers to the accusations he faced during his lifetime, he is strict
in claiming that there is a substantial union between the intellectual
soul and the body: I know perfectly well that to say that the intellectual

3In the year 1283, Bonagratia of St. John in Persiceto, the minister general of the Fran-
ciscan order, ordered a commission of seven Parisian masters and bachelors to examine
Olivis writings. The commission came up with a document, the so-called Letter of the
seven seals (Littera septem sigillorum), which consists of twenty-two articles stating the
orthodox view on various matters about which Olivi was thought to be mistaken. Article
8 pertains to the relation between the rational soul and the body, and it goes as follows:
Item anima rationalis secundum quod est rationalis, est forma corporis humani, nec
propter hoc sequitur quod non sit substantia vel quod sit extensa vel mortalis vel quod
nihil, cum conferat corpori esse immortale; et contrarium est erroneum. (P.G.Fussenegger,
ed., Littera septem sigillorum contra doctrinam Petri Ioannis Olivi edita, AFH 47 (1954):
52.) Olivi was censured, but he defended himself in 1285 and was rehabilitated a couple of
years later in 1287. In 1299, soon after Olivis death, the minister general John of Murrovalle
condemned Olivis works again. For discussion, see Burr, The Persecution of Peter Olivi,
3544, 6774; Piron Censures et condamnation, 31373.
4The condemnation goes as follows: Rebrobamus [...] quod quisquis deinceps asse
rere, defendere seu tenere pertinaciter praesumpserit, quod anima rationalis seu intel-
lectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tamquam haereticus sit
censendus. (Clement V, Fidei catholicae fundamento, in Enchiridion symbolorum: Defi-
nitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, ed. H.Denzinger & A.Schnmetzer
(Barcelona: Herder, 1976), 902 (p. 284).) Olivis name does not appear in the decree, and
thus there have been disputes about whether the condemnation was aimed at him. For a
discussion, see Piron, Censures et condamnation, 33233 & 34049.
46 chapter two

part [...] does not constitute one being and one substance together with
the human body is very dangerous to the faith.5 In this way he empha-
sises that his intention is not to deny the substantial unity of the intellec-
tual soul and the body. Quite the contrary: he tries his best to work out a
theory which does not jeopardise this doctrine. This can be seen also from
Summa, where he writes, for example, that:
Nobody with a sane mind denies that the nature by which we live, the nature
by which we perceive, the nature by which we have the intellect and free
will, and also all the members and parts of our bodieseven those without
which we can exist, such as the fingers, nails, hair, and many othersare
substantial to us. For, every part of a substance belongs to the substantial
integrity of the whole, at least as long as it is in the whole as its part.6
In addition, Olivi explicitly argues against Plato, Origen, and the Pythag-
oreans and says that the body is not an obstacle or a disadvantage to
the intellectual soul, and he also denounces the Manichaeist view that
the union of the soul to the body is harmful to the former.7 He accepts the
idea of a substantial union between the body and the soul and thinks that
the body is a substantial part of a human being.
There are many similar passages which show that Olivi conceives of
humans as essentially bodily beings. However, he does not try to provide
a deductive proof for the centrality of the body. Instead, he thinks that our
bodily nature can be provenor at least supportedby phenomenologi-
cal considerations. It is phenomenologically evident to us that we are not
just immaterial souls. When he argues in favour of the doctrine that the
soul informs the whole body, he makes two interesting statements which
show his stance towards the relation between a human subject and the
body. He writes that: Likewise, a human being perceives that he (or a
certain vital subsistence of his) exists in the whole body taken together,
and just a few lines below we find him claiming: And [this is also proved

5Bene enim scio quod dicere quod pars intellectiva [...] cum corpore humano unum
ens et unam substantiam non constituat, est valde periculosum in fide. (Responsio
secunda, 155.) See also Responsio prima 8, 128; Ep. 7, 5051; SummaII q.50 app., 47101;
ibid., q.51 app., 13698.
6Sic nullus sanae mentis dicit quin natura per quam vivimus et natura per quam sen-
timus et natura per quam habemus intellectum et liberam voluntatem sint nobis sub-
stantiales et etiam omnia membra corporis nostri et omnes partes ipsorum, etiam illae
sine quibus possumus esse, ut sunt digiti et ungues et pili et plura alia. Omnis enim pars
substantiae est de subtantiali integritate sui totius, saltem quamdiu est in ipso sicut pars
eius. (SummaII q.50 app., 51.)
7SummaII q.51, 119; Quodl. 5.11, 325.
souls relation to the body 47

by] the affection by which a human being naturally loves all the parts of
his bodynot as external and alien to his nature but rather as intrinsic
parts of himself.8 We perceive ourselves to exist in the whole body and
feel an affection towards our bodies to the extent that they appear as parts
of ourselves.
It must be noted that there are passages which somehow modify this
picture, as they show that Olivi does not regard the body highly especially
when he discusses the role of the body in transmitting original sin. There
is no need to discuss his view in detail, but it is enlightening to see how
he downgrades the body in quite a radical manner in this context. To put
it shortly, he deems original sin as being inherent in the body of a human
being: the soul gets infected by original sin when it enters the body. Now,
one might ask, does God not act badly in infusing the soul into such a
body and thus contaminating it? Olivi responds in the negative, but he
takes up an interesting allegory:
But the foregoing makes the answer to another typical objection obvious,
namely, if someone would knowingly put an apple or wine into a chamber
pot, it would be said that he defiled it and did not do well in putting it in
such a vile place, and it seems that the same can be said of God. It must
be said that this cannot and should not be said when the agent has the best
reason for and intention in his workings.9
The objection identifies the soul with wine and the body with a chamber
pot that contaminates the wine that is poured into it. Now, even though
Olivi denies the conclusion (that is, he thinks that God does well in infus-
ing the soul into the body), he does not criticise the allegory. The body
appears as a poor vessel which does no good to the soul, although the
final outcome of this union may be beneficial. Of course we should not
overemphasise this passage since Olivis intention here is not to present a
comprehensive anthropological view.

8Item, homo sentit se ipsum seu quandam vitalem subsistentiam suam in toto cor-
pore simul sumpto existere [...] et rursus affectus quo homo naturaliter diligit omnes
partes corporis sui non tanquam extrinseca et aliena a sua natura, sed potius tanquam
intrinsecas sui partes. (SummaII q.49, 1213.)
9Ex praedictis autem patet responsio ad quandam aliam obiectionem quae solet dari,
scilicet, quod si quis scienter poneret pomum vel vinum in luto, ipse diceretur ipsum foe-
dasse et non bene fecisse ponendo illud in loco tam vili. Sic videtur posse dici de Deo.
Dicendum enim quod illud non potest nec debet dici, quando agens habet rationem et
intentionem optimam hoc faciendi [...] (SummaII q.112, 303.)
48 chapter two

In short, Olivi does not conceive of the living body as a part of the
external world, as a mere dwelling for the soul, but as a genuine and sub-
stantial part of a complete human being. The body is not something we
have; it is something we are. And clearly this principle applies a fortiori to
non-human animals because he embraces the Aristotelian hylomorphic
view that animals are nothing but living bodies.10

2.Plurality of Substantial Forms

From a historical perspective, Aquinas conception of the relation between


the soul and the body was original. Before him the soul was typically
understood both as an independent substance (hoc aliquid) and as a form
or perfection of the body. Aquinas rejected this eclectic conception of
the nature of the soul and argued that the soul is not an independent
substance but only the form of the body. In order to account for the pos-
sibility of the souls existence after death, he stretched Aristotelian meta-
physics and invented a new kind of form, a subsistent substantial form,
which is capable of existing after it is separated from matter. Aquinas
view did not gain universal agreement. Far from that, his conception of
the nature of the soul was criticised heavily from many directions. Yet
there was one general idea which was shared by many: authors before
and after Aquinas usually thought that the relation between the soul and
the body can be understood in terms of a form and matter. The soul was
commonly taken to be a form (or perfection) of the body, even though the
nature of the soul was understood in various ways.11
One question which was much debated concerned the number of sub-
stantial forms. The initial tendency among the Latin authors was to favour
the pluralistic position according to which each complex substance has
many substantial forms instead of only oneat least if one counts a com-
pound form as plural. In fact, the question was not considered central
before Aquinas, but in the latter half of the thirteenth century the dispute

10See chapter three below.


11 Bazn, The Human Soul, 10317; id., 13th Century Commentaries on De anima:
From Peter of Spain to Thomas Aquinas, in Il commento filosofico nelloccidente latino
(secoli XIIIXV), ed. G.Fioravanti, C.Leonardi & S.Perfetti, Rencontres de Philosophie
Mdivale 10 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2002), 11984; Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul,
13191; John Haldane, Soul and Body, in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy
vol. 1, ed. R. Pasnau, 296303.
souls relation to the body 49

over unity versus the plurality of the substantial forms escalated.12 Aquinas
was the first thinker to explicitly argue in favour of the unity of the sub-
stantial form, and he was followed by others, such as Giles of Rome and
Giles of Lessines. He rejected the plurality of substantial forms partly
because he thought that it threatens to destroy the unity of the human
being, but also because Aristotelian metaphysics does not seem to allow
several substantial forms for one being. According to Aquinas, a substan-
tial form gives being to a substance and makes it the kind of substance
that it is. There can be but one substantial form, because the substantial
form actualises and determines the being completely; all the other forms,
which inform the already existing substance, are accidental. In the case
of human beings there is no other substantial form than the intellectual
soul. It is a structural principle which actualises the human body as the
kind of body that it is, animates the body by providing the vegetative func-
tions, and gives sensitive and intellectual powers. Similarly, a non-human
animal is a bodily being which is capable of sense perception, emotions,
life functions and so forth, and all this is due to the sensitive soul, which
is the only substantial form it has.13
In contrast to Aquinas, the authors who favoured the pluralistic posi-
tion shared the general idea that a substantial form does not necessarily
fully determine a being. The other forms which come after the first sub-
stantial form are not always accidental.14 For instance, the human body
has its own substantial form or forms through which it is a certain kind
of body. The body is further informed by a sensitive form, which provides
it with the ability to perceive, to have emotions, and so on, but this does
not replace the earlier forms. Finally, a human being is made complete by
the intellectual form.
Despite the metaphysical simplicity of the Thomistic position, and its
compatibility with Aristotelian metaphysics, many authors defended plu-
ralism because it has certain philosophical and theological strengths. In
particular, substantial change is in many cases easier to account for by
appealing to the plurality of substantial forms. When an animal dies, it is
natural to think that the remaining body is substantially the same body

12Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 2. For a detailed exposition of the background
of the debate and of the various positions, see Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla, 213503.
See also Robert Pasnau, Form and Matter, in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philoso-
phy, vol. 2, ed. R.Pasnau, 64446.
13See, e.g., ST I.76.4 & 118.2; Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla, 24872; Dales, The Prob-
lem of the Rational Soul, 13849.
14Callus, The Origins of the Problem, 258.
50 chapter two

that the animal had when it was alive. According to the Thomistic position,
however, neither the body that remains nor the properties thereof can be
numerically the same, because the soul of the animalthe substantial
form which made the body the body that it washas ceased to inform
it. A pluralist can argue that the body remains the same, because the sub-
stantial form of the body is not affected by the death. This metaphysical
problem has also theological consequences: for instance, a defender of the
unity of the substantial form needs to explain how it is possible that the
body of Christ remained the same when he died.
There was no consensus even amongst the pluralists about how the
many substantial forms are related to each other and to the body. Roberto
Zavalloni has shown that there were two general ways of construing the
relation.15 Some proponents of the pluralist position argued that all the
forms directly inform the matter and they are only indirectly related to
each other. Each form perfects the matter in such a way that the mat-
ter becomes capable of receiving the next form, and so forth, until the
last form arrives and makes the being perfect. Thus, the intellectual form,
which is the final perfection of a human being, is a form of the body, but
not before the body has been perfected by the lower forms. According to
the other view which Zavalloni presents, a superior form is related to an
inferior form as a form is related to matter. Understood in this way, the
intellectual form is a perfection of the sensitive form, and only the lowest
form informs the matter directly.
Olivis position can be understood against this background.16 He rec-
ognises altogether three possible but problematic ways to construe the
relation between the intellectual soul (or the intellectual form) and the
body:
1. The unity of substantial form: the soul is the only form of the body.
2. The plurality of substantial forms:
a. The intellectual form is the form of the body.
b. The intellectual form is the form of the sensitive form.
As usual, he does not name his sources, and therefore we can identify
them only with some amount of uncertainty. His initial arguments against
the first position are probably written with Aquinas in mind, but the most
detailed argumentationwhich applies both to (1) and (2a)can be

15Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla, 31215. Olivi presents these views briefly in SummaII
q.51, 1078.
16For Olivis theory of the plurality of substantial forms, see Zavalloni, Richard de
Mediavilla, 33340.
souls relation to the body 51

found from an appendix to question 51 of Summa, which is a response


to a Franciscan theologian Vital du Four (d. 1327).17 The pluralistic posi-
tion was defended by several authors, and sometimes it is difficult to see
which of the two versions each author prefersespecially because the
distinction between them was not articulated clearly in the early stages
of the controversy over the number of substantial forms. Possible sources
for Olivi are at least Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta,18 and Roger
Bacon.19
All these positions explain the substantial unity between the intellec-
tual soul and the body neatly, but Olivi cannot accept them for several
reasons. Although he concentrates more on the first two positions (1, 2a),
he finds metaphysical problems also in the third (2b). He argues, for
instance, that the sensitive form cannot be informed by the intellectual
form because that would mean that the sensitive form would include a
material aspect in itself:
If a form could be informed by another [form] (especially if it could be
informed primarily and by itself), then that kind of form would have in itself
a formless, potential and material character (ratio informis et possibilis et
materiae). Then it would necessarily be composed of actuality and potenti-
ality, and of a form and matter, and it would be a form of a form.20

17For Aquinas, see, e.g., ST I.76.1. In the latter text Olivi uses the expression: positores
unitatis formarum (SummaII q.51 app., 191). The plural reflects the fact that by the middle
of 1290s there were several authors who had accepted the Thomistic view. For an account
of the dispute between Olivi and Vital du Four, see Mauro, La disputa de anima, 89138;
Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla, 34042. Vital du Fours critique was erroneously attrib-
uted to John Duns Scotus and published among his works (Antonie Vos, The Philosophy
of John Duns Scotus (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006), 10710). For Vitals text, see Vitalis
de Furno, De rerum principio, in Joannis Duns Scoti Opera omnia vol. 4 (Paris: Vivs, 1892),
267717; id., Le cardinal Vital du Four: Huit questions disputes sur le problme de la con-
naissance,, ed. F.Delorme, AHDLMA 2 (1927): 151337. According to Sylvain Piron, Olivi
wrote questions 50 and 51 in 127778 (or partially in 127879) and appedices in 129495
(Sylvain Piron, Parcours dun intellectuel franciscain. Dune thologie vers une pense sociale:
loeuvre de Pierre de Jean Olivi (ca. 12481298) et son trait De contractibus, an unpublished
dissertation, cole des Hautes tudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris 1999). Mauro dates Vitals
critique to 129596, but this dating seems to be incorrect. According to Vos they are writ-
ten between 129295 (Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, 108).
18Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de anima XIII, q.6, ed. Zavalloni in Richard de
Mediavilla, 2056.
19For discussion, see Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla, 36871. Zavalloni counts John
Peckham, Robert Kilwardby, William de la Mare, Roger Marston, and Richard of Media-
villa, among others, as defenders of the position (2b). See also Dales, The Problem of the
Rational Soul, 7580.
20Si enim forma potest informari ab alia et maxime primo ac per se, tunc forma
talis habebit in se vere rationem informis et possibilis et materiae; et tunc necessario erit
52 chapter two

It is not possible for the higher forms to inform the lower ones. All the
forms of the body inform the same matter, and similarly, the forms of the
spiritual matter of the soul directly inform the spiritual matter:
The first form is perfected by the last form only indirectly. Namely, when the
last form arrives, it perfects the matter more fully than the first form and is
more fully the actuality, vivification, and purification of the matter [...] The
first and the last form do not strictly speaking become one as perfectible and
perfection do, but they are called one form and one act because they concur
in perfecting the same matter in an ordinate fashion.21
In other words, when a being has several substantial forms, their mutual
relation must be understood in such a way that each successive form
directly informs the matter and only indirectly the earlier forms. Every
form prepares the matter of the body so that it is able to receive a higher
form, and the higher form, in turn, informs not the inferior form but the
matter thus prepared.22
The two other options (1, 2a) receive a more versatile yet no less critical
treatment from Olivi. He explicitly rejects the first position according to
which a human being has only one substantial form. He points out that
there are authors who hold that:
there is only one simple substantial form in every being. They hold that
only the intellectual soul gives a corporeal, vegetative, and sensitive being
to human beings. But this is not my opinion; rather, I hold it as a brutal
error, because it contradicts not only manifold and clear reasons but also
the senses and includes many things that are contrary to Catholic faith.23

composita ex actu et potentia et ex forma et materia et erit formae forma. (SummaII q.51,
110.) See also ibid., 11011; q.51 app., 142.
21Forma prima non perficitur ab ultima nisi quodam modo indirecte. Forma enim
adveniens eo ipso quo perficit materiam plenius quam prima et est eius plenior actualitas
et vivificatio et purificatio. [...] Ex prima ergo forma et ultima non fit unum proprie sicut
ex perfectibili et perfectione; sed pro tanto dicuntur una forma et unus actus, quia ordi-
nato modo concurrunt ad unam materiam perficiendam. (SummaII q. 50, 3940.)
22SummaII q.50 app., 50; ibid., q.57, 335.
23[...] in nullo ente est nisi unica et simplex forma substantialis. Isti enim tenent
quod in homine sola anima intellectiva dat esse corporeum et vegetativum et sensitivum.
Sed hoc pro opinione non habeo, sed potius pro brutali errore; quia non solum rationi
apertae et multiplici, sed etiam ipsi sensui contradicit et multa catholicae fidei contraria
in se includit [...] (SummaII q.71, 637.) The soul also makes the body a kind of body
that it is: Quidam dicunt quod in nulla re sunt plures formae, unde dicunt quod in cor-
pore humano non est aliqua forma substantialis nisi anima rationalis et quod haec virtute
continet in se omnes rationes aliarum formarum inferiorum, et ideo per ipsam corpus est
corpus et elementare et mixtum, complexionatum et organizatum. (ibid., q.50, 29.) See
also q.49, 1314. For Olivis argumentation for the possibility of a single substance to have
several substantial forms, see q.50 app., 4756.
souls relation to the body 53

This Thomistic position falls into various problems, some of which belong
to natural philosophy, while others are theological. Olivis arguments
are not original since they follow closely those presented earlier by other
pluralists.24 The general idea that he tries to uphold is that the existence
of the body as a material object does not depend on the soul. Where
Aquinas thinks that the soul not only vivifies the body but actualises it
as the kind of body that it is, the pluralists tend to see the body as an
independent entity. The soul comes into a body already actualised, and
although the body cannot survive long after the soul leaves it, its existence
as a body is not caused by the soul.
Olivis first arguments against the unity of the form are related to a
substantial change in human development. Medieval authors in general
thought that the intellectual soul is created by God and does not exist in
the beginning of the formation of the foetus. It is infused only after the
foetus has reached a certain stage of development. There were various
ways to account for this process. Aquinas solution was that when the
human soul is infused by God, the previous substantial form of the foetus
is destroyed and replaced by the intellectual soul. Olivi argues that this
account is problematic because it renders the beginning of the develop-
ment of the foetus unnecessary. The destruction of the prior substantial
form of the foetus reduces it to prime matter, and the soul will inform
prime matter directly. In principle, there is no reason for this kind of
change of substantial form to take place only in the human foetus and
not in any other existing substance.25
The second argument raises traditional problems concerning human
corruption and death. Olivi points out that the Thomistic position has
trouble in accounting for the source of the new substantial and accidental
forms which come to inform the body when the soul is separated from it.
A pluralistic position does not run into this problem, as the bodies of dead
animals and human beings are essentially the same as the ones they had
when they were alive.26 This seems intuitively plausible, because it seems
strange to claim that my body is not the same material object after I die
and this is exactly what strict Aristotelians have to claim as a logical con-
sequence of their view. Olivi finds also several theological problems from

24See Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla, 31519; Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul,
1398.
25SummaII q. 37, 670; ibid., q.50, 2930; q.50 app., 5661.
26SummaII q.50, 3031; ibid., q.50 app., 6368.
54 chapter two

the Thomistic position,27 but in this connection the most important line
of criticism is based on the distinction he makes between the spiritual
soul and the corporeal body. The soul cannot be the only substantial form
of the body, because in that case it would be a corporeal and extended
form. The body is extended, corporeal, organised in a certain way, and
made of flesh and bone. If the soul is the only substantial form of the
body, all these properties are caused by it and in a certain way belong to
it. However, the soul cannot have these properties as it is simple, unex-
tended, and spiritual.28 One form cannot account for the two natures of
man, spiritual and corporeal.
Having rejected the idea of the unity of the substantial form on these
grounds Olivi goes on to his most thorough critique, which applies both to
the doctrine of the unity of substantial form (1) and to the first pluralistic
position (2a). Although these two views are metaphysically very different,
they share one common feature: they both depict the intellectual soul or
the intellectual part of the soul as a form of the body. The edge of Olivis
criticism is aimed precisely against this claim. He thinks that the incorpo-
reality of the intellectual soul cannot be maintained if it is a form of the
body. Therefore, the idea that the intellectual part or form of the soul is a
form of the body directly and in itself must be rejected.29
To be sure, it was a medieval truism that the intellectual operations of
the soul are incorporeal. The origin of this idea is in Aristotles De anima,
where it is stated that:
Observation of the sense-organs and their employment reveals a distinction
between the impassibility of the sensitive power and that of the power of
thought. [...] while the power of sensation is dependent upon the body,
thought is separable from it.30
This statement was understood as meaning that the intellectual opera-
tions do not take place in the body and that they are not realised as
bodily changes in a bodily organ. There were various ways to explain what
incorporeality amounts to, and also those who defended the view that the
intellectual (part of the) soul is a form of the body accepted this idea. For
instance, Aquinas thinks that although the soul is a form of the body, the

27SummaII q.50, 3233; ibid., q.50 app., 76101.


28SummaII q.50, 3132.
29A concise argumentation can be found from SummaII q.59, 53842.
30DA 3.4, 429a29b5. See also ibid., 3.5 & 2.1, 413a47; Lloyd P. Gerson, The Unity of
Intellect in Aristotles De Anima, Phronesis 49:4 (2004): 34873.
souls relation to the body 55

intellectual operations of the soul are incorporeal because they do not


take place in a bodily organ.31
Olivi thinks that Aquinas position is untenable. He presents several
arguments, which he divides into three groups: the formal union between
the intellectual (part of the) soul and the body leads to problems with
respect to (1) the body, (2) the soul, and (3) the combination of these two.
I shall not present all the arguments here, because Olivis philosophical
position becomes clear already on the basis of a few of them. The central
idea in his argumentation is that the formal union between the intellec-
tual (part of the) soul and the body leads to a dilemma: either the body is
intellectual, free, and immortal; or the intellectual soul is none of these.
As neither of these consequences is acceptable, the formal union must be
rejected. With respect to the first horn of the dilemma he argues in the
following way:
If the intellectual part were the form of the body then it followssince all
matter is actualised by its formthat just as a human body is made truly
sensory and living by the sensitive soul, so it would be made truly intellec-
tual and free by the intellective part. But it is impossible to give (commu-
nicari) these [properties] to the body because such [properties] can belong
(competere) only to matter which is simple and spiritual, or intellectual,
ingenerable, and incorruptible with respect to such being.32
If the intellectual form is the form of the body, the body must of necessity
be intellectual, free, and immortal. However, this is not the case, because
neither the body as a whole nor any part of it is intellectual and free,33
and the mortality of the body can be regarded as given because human
bodies die and decay.
This argument is based on Olivis conviction that every form necessarily
transfers its essential properties to the matter. He rejects the possibility
which is central to Aquinas and later to Vital du Four, namely, that a form
can actualise matter in such a way that some of its powers remain inde-
pendent of matter: it is impossible for a form to combine (communicet)

31ST I.75.2. See chapter eight for a more detailed discussion.


32Si enim pars intellectiva est eius forma, cum omnis materia fiat in actu per suam for-
mam: tunc sicut corpus humanum est vere sensitivum et vivum per animam sensitivam,
sic erit vere intellectivum et liberum per partem intellectivam. Sed hoc est impossibile cor-
pori communicari, quia tale non potest competere nisi materiae simplici et spirituali seu
intellectuali et ingenerabili et incorruptibili respectu talis esse. (SummaII q.51, 1045.)
33SummaII q.51, 1067.
56 chapter two

itself with matter as an essence and not as a power.34 Thus, the intellec-
tual (part of the) soul cannot be the form of the body without rendering
it intellectual, free, and immortal. Also the functions and operations of a
form are necessarily realised in matter, and if the intellectual part of the
soul were a form of the body, the intellectual operations would of neces-
sity be realised in the body:
Every form transfers (communicat) some operation and some power to oper-
ate to its matter. [...] Therefore, the body would have an intellectual and
free operation and a power of understanding and willing; for the intellectual
part does not have any other operations than these.35
As it was commonly thought that the intellectual functions of the soul are
not realised in the body, this consequence is unthinkable.
Olivis conception of the relation between the soul and its powers rein-
forces his argumentation because he thinks that the essence of the soul is
not beyond the powers of the soul. The powers are partial forms, which
together constitute the essence of the soul.36 However, he thinks that even
if we grant that there is a distinction between the essence of the soul and
its powers, the intellectual functions are necessarily realised in the body,
if the intellectual (part of the) soul is its form:
Moreover, given that a power differs from the essence, it is nevertheless
certain that the power always follows the essence and is rooted where the
essence is rooted, and it belongs to the same thing to which the essence
belongs. Therefore, if the essence of the intellectual form is rooted in the
body and is the form of the body, the powers of the intellectual soul are
rooted in the body as well, and they can be called powers of the body.37
Olivi does not provide a detailed analysis of the way in which the powers
are rooted in the body even if they are distinct from the essence of the
soul. Nevertheless he thinks that even the distinction between the essence

34Impossibile etiam est quod forma communicet se materiae, ut est essentia et non ut
est potentia [...] (SummaII q.51 app., 167.) Ibid., 14951 & 16068; ST I.76.1; Vital du Four,
De rerum principio, q.9, 40629.
35Omnis forma communicat suae materiae aliquam operationem et aliquam poten-
tiam operandi. [...] Ergo corpus habebit operationem intellectualem et liberam et
potestatem intelligendi et volendi; alias enim operationes non est dare parti intellectivae
nisi istas [...] (SummaII q.51, 109.)
36See chapter four below.
37Praeterea, posito quod potentia differat ab essentia, certum tamen est quod eam
semper sequetur et ibi radicabitur ubi et ipsa et eius erit cuius et ipsa. Si ergo essentia
formae intellectivae radicatur in corpore et est forma corporis, ergo et potentiae eius radi-
cabuntur in corpore et poterunt dici esse potentiae eius [...] (SummaII q.51, 108.)
souls relation to the body 57

and the powers of the soul does not make the formal relationship between
the intellectual (part of the) soul a viable option. The first horn of the
dilemma is untenable.
Then again, if someone maintains that the intellectual (part of the) soul
is a form of the body but refuses to accept that the body is thereby made
intellectual, free, and immortal, he has to grasp the second horn of the
dilemma, according to which the soul does not have these properties: If
the intellectual soul or form is a form of the body, it is impossible for it to
be intellectual, free, immortal and separable from the body.38 The con-
sequence is of course problematic, and Olivi gives several kinds of argu-
ments in order to underline the impossibility of the position.
The first group of Olivis arguments deals with the intellectual opera-
tions of the soul.39 It begins by echoing the traditional idea that the intel-
lect cannot be actualised in a corporeal organ because its objects are
abstracted from matter. It can act with respect to a certain object only by
intentionally directing itself in such a way that the matter of the intellec-
tual form is virtually moved towards the object. Olivi goes on:
Therefore, if the body were the matter of the intellectual form, the intel-
lectual form could not turn towards its objects other than by turning and
directing the corporeal matter to them. However, it is impossible to turn or
direct the body to anything other than to those [things] which are in bod-
ies. [...] According to this position, then, the intellectual form could not
understand anything that is separate from a body, and it could not under-
stand universals or intelligible [things] which are not actually in external
particular bodies.40
If the intellect were a form of the corporeal matter of the body, the only
way it could direct itself towards any object would be by moving that
matter. This would restrict the scope of intellectual acts to particular cor-
poreal objects. Even though Olivi thinks that the intellect is capable of

38Si est enim forma corporis, impossibile est quod sit intellectualis et libera et immor-
talis et a corpore separabilis. (SummaII q.51, 111.)
39SummaII q.51, 11115.
40Si igitur forma intellectiva habet corpus pro materia: ergo non poterit converti ad
sua obiecta nisi per conversionem et aspectum materiae corporalis ad illa. Sed impossibile
est quod conversio et aspectus corporis possit se habere nisi ad ea quae sunt in corporibus.
[...] Secundum hoc igitur forma intellectiva, quamdiu saltem esset in corpore, non posset
intelligere aliquid quod esset a corpore separatum aut universalia et intellectualia quae
non sunt actu extra in corporibus particularibus. (SummaII q. 51, 112.) It should be noted
that Olivi does not speak about directing the matter but about directing the aspectus of the
matter. For a detailed analysis of the concept of aspectus, see chapter six, section three.
58 chapter two

understanding particulars,41 it understands also universals and incorpo-


real things. In order to be able to do this it has to be incorporeal, and
therefore it cannot be a form of the body.
The other argument is based on Olivis conception of reflexivity. He
examines reflexivity fairly extensively in his writings, mainly on the ques-
tions which deal with self-consciousness and the freedom of the will, and
he maintains that in order to be capable of reflexivity, the intellectual soul
of a human being must be spiritual and unextended because an entity
can reflexively turn towards itself only if it is not corporeal or extended in
space. These conditions limit the scope of genuine reflexivity to non-cor-
poreal powers, and thus it is reserved for unextended spiritual entities like
angels and intellectual souls. One reason to deny that genuine reflexivity
takes place in corporeal powers is the essence of corporeal matter. It was
commonly believed in the Middle Ages that corporeal matter is unable to
turn towards itself. As Olivi puts it:
According to this [viz. if the intellectual form were a form of the body], it
could not reflexively turn towards itself, since [if it could] then corporeal
matter would have to be able to be reflexively turned towards itself. But it is
not possible for corporeal matter to directly turn towards something that is
not external to itselfnot only essentially but also with respect to position
and location; that is why a part of the body cannot directly turn towards
itself but only to another part that is close to it. The intellects reflexion
upon itself is nothing other than its turning towards itself and directing and
fixing its gaze (aspectus) towards itself.42
Reflexivity plays a central role also in Olivis explanation for the lack of
freedom that would be a consequence of the formal union between the
intellectual (part of the) soul and the body. Namely, the freedom of the
will requires reflexivity. In order to be free, the will has to be able to direct
itself towards itself in a similar way as the intellect, but it requires a fur-
ther level of self-reflexivity, because it has to be capable of moving itself

41Camille Brub, La connaissance de lindividuel au Moyen ge (Montreal/Paris:


Presses de lUniversit de Montral/PUF, 1964), 100106.
42Secundum hoc etiam non posset reflectere super se, quia tunc oporteret quod mate-
ria corporalis posset reflecti super se. Impossibile est autem quod materia corporalis possit
immediate converti nisi ad aliquid quod est extra se non solum secundum essentiam, sed
etiam secundum positionem et situm; unde pars corporis non potest converti immediate
ad se ipsam, sed solum ad partem aliam sibi propinquam. Intellectum autem reflecti super
se non est aliud quam ipsum converti ad se et aspectum suum dirigere et figere in se [...]
(SummaII q.51, 11213.)
souls relation to the body 59

to act.43 As corporeal matter is repugnant to reflexivity, a corporeal power


cannot be truly free.44
Finally, the human soul is necessarily mortal, if it is a form of the
body:
If the intellectual and free form is by itself immortal, and it gives (communi-
cat) its being to the body as to its matter, it seems that it gives immortality
to the body. If it does not give immortality to the body, either it is not the
form of the body or it is not immortal in itself.45
In sum, Olivi thinks that even though a formal union between the intel-
lectual (part of the) soul and the body would account for the substantial
unity of a human being (doctrine two, presented in the beginning of the
chapter), it entails problematic consequences with respect to the incorpo-
reality of the intellectual soul (doctrineone), thus jeopardising the intel-
lectual nature, freedom, and immortality of the soul. Substantial unity
is an important doctrine, but if it is conceived of in the wrong wayif
the unity it too tight, one might sayit becomes problematic. The idea
that the intellectual (part of the) soul is a form of the body fails to bal-
ance on the thin line between these two doctrines, and therefore it is not
an acceptable view. Olivi thinks that only by denying the formal union
between the intellectual part of the soul and the body can the doctrine(1)
be preserved.
The background for Olivis discussion concerning the relation between
the intellectual part of the soul and the body in question 51 of Summa
is the well-known controversy over the unity of the intellect.46 The core of
the controversy is whether the intellect is numerically one for all human

43Mikko Yrjnsuuri, Free Will and Self-Control in Peter Olivi, in Emotions and Choice
from Boethius to Descartes, ed. H.Lagerlund & M.Yrjnsuuri, Studies in the History of
Philosophy of Mind 1 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002): 1023. Olivis prime contribution to the
history of the philosophy of mind is his revolutionary view of human will and its abil-
ity to reflexively move itself to act. This idea is the first and foremost principle of Olivis
philosophical anthropology: the freedom of the will, understood as the wills power to be
the origin of human action.
44SummaII q.51, 115.
45Si forma intellectiva et libera est secundum se habens esse immortale, ergo si secun-
dum se communicat suum esse corpori tanquam suae materiae, videtur quod communi-
cabit sibi esse immortale. Si autem non communicat sibi, ergo aut non est eius forma aut
ipsa non habet de se esse immortale. (SummaII q.51, 118.)
46Sylvain Piron, Olivi et les averrostes, 251309. For the controversy see, e.g., Deb-
orah Black, The Nature of Intellect, in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy,
vol. 1, ed. R.Pasnau, 32632; Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 11380; Luca Bianchi,
Guglielmo di Bagniole, Tommaso dAquino e la condanna del 1270, Rivista di storia della
filosofia 3 (1984): 50320.
60 chapter two

beings and, as such, not a human power at all, or whether every individual
soul has its own intellect. The Latin Averroists, such as Siger of Brabant
and Boetius of Dacia, held the former view; other authors, most notably
Thomas Aquinas, attacked their position because they saw serious philo-
sophical and theological problems in it.
One culmination point in the controversy was reached when tienne
Tempier, the bishop of Paris, issued his famous condemnations of 1270
and 1277. The doctrine of the unity of the intellect was included among
the condemned doctrines, and teaching of this doctrine was disallowed.
When Olivi wrote question 51 of Summa, in 1277, the controversy was not
over. In fact, Olivis adherence to the plurality of substantial forms can be
seen as a reaction to the Averroist position.
It is noteworthy that even the proponents of the Averroist conception
of the unity of the intellect did not want to jeopardise the unity of the
human being. They thought that the human soul is substantially united to
the body. The intellect is not, but that is not a problem, because it is not
a part of an individual human being. To be sure, from the perspective of
Aquinas and other defenders of the idea that the intellect must of neces-
sity be a part of the human soul, the Averroist view appeared problematic
because it fails to account for the unity between the intellect and the rest
of the human soul.
Even though Olivi rejects the formal union between the intellectual
part of the soul and the body, he explicitly and repeatedly claims that the
intellect is a substantial part of a human being: every individual has her
own intellect.47 Olivis discussion revolves around a question concerning
the origin of the sensitive form of a human being. He begins by asking
whether or not it originates in her parents and answers in the negative:
the sensitive part of the human soul is created and infused by God. Yet,
some have said and still say, following the Physics of Aristotle and the
Saracen Averros, that the sensitive [form] of a human being comes from
the parents and that it is not rooted in the substance or the matter of the
rational soul.48
Although the question is explicitly aimed against the Averroist position,
to some extent it applies also to authors such as Roger Bacon, as I already

47See, e.g., Responsio secunda, 155.


48Quidam dicere voluerunt et volunt sequentes Aristotelis physicam et Averrois
Saraceni quod sensitiva hominis sit a generante et quod non sit radicata in substantia seu
materia rationalis animae [...] (SummaII q.51, 104.)
souls relation to the body 61

mentioned. The argumentative structure of question 51 reveals that the


discussion is partly directed against those who accept that the intellect
is a part of a human being but who defend the dual origin of the human
soulthat is, those who claim that the intellectual part of the soul is cre-
ated by God while the vegetative and sensitive parts are educed from the
matter by natural causes.49
The overall structure of Olivis argument is to point out that the posi-
tion that the sensitive form comes from the parents leads to a dilemma.
The first horn of the dilemma is that the intellectual soul or the intel-
lectual part of the soul is a form of the bodythis view is defended by,
for instance, Aquinas and Bacon, and we have already seen what kind of
problems Olivi sees in it. The other horn of the dilemma is that there is
no substantial unity between the intellect and the human body, which is
an Averroist position and, as such, unacceptable. Olivi writes:
The other consequence of this position [viz. that the sensitive form origi-
nates in the parents] is that the sensitive [form] is not rooted in the sub-
stance or in the spiritual matter of the intellectual part. I believe that this is
not only false but also dangerous to the faith, just like the first consequence
[viz. that the intellectual part is a form of the body]. For, the intellectual part
cannot be the form of the bodythis is sufficiently proved above. And there
is no way for it to be substantially united with the body and to constitute
one entity (ens) with it, unless it has in itself some formal nature by which
it informs the body. And there are no other possibilities than the sensitive
and vegetative forms. Thus, to claim that the sensitive part is not rooted in
the nature of the intellectual part is clearly the same as to claim that the
intellectual part is united to the body only as a mover to a moved.50
In other words, if the sensitive form originates in the parents, the only
way to avoid ending up with the Averroist position is to claim that the

49For Bacons view, see Jeremiah Hacket, Roger Bacon, in Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (2007), section 4.7; Theodore Crowley, Roger Bacon: The Problem of the Soul
in His Philosophical Commentaries (Louvain/Dublin: Editions de lInstitut Suprieure de
Philosophie/James Duffy & Co., 1950), 12426; Z.Kuksewicz, The Potential and the Agent
Intellect, in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 595601, esp. 598600.
50Secundum autem quod ex hac positione sequitur est quod sensitiva non sit radi-
cata in substantia seu in spirituali materia partis intellectivae. Quod, ut credo, non solum
est falsum, sed etiam in fide periculosum, sicut et primum. Si enim pars intellectiva non
potest esse per se forma corporis, sicut ex praehabitis satis patet, et non est dare viam
quomodo possit uniri corpori substantialiter et cum eo constituere unum ens, nisi habeat
intra se aliquam naturam formalem per quam informet corpus, et aliam non sit dare nisi
sensitivam et vegetativam: ponere quod sensitiva non sit radicata in natura partis intel-
lectivae est manifeste ponere quod pars intellectiva non uniatur corpori nisi ut motor
mobili. (SummaII q.51, 12122.)
62 chapter two

union between the intellectual form and the body is a union of a form
and matter. Either there is no substantial unity between the intellectual
soul and the body and thus the doctrine(2) is questioned, or there is too
close a union between the twoa formal union, which makes upholding
doctrine(1) impossible.
We are now in a position to see the fundamental reasons for Olivi
adhering to the doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms. He navigates
between Thomistic and Averroist positions and claims that the whole soul
is created by God, the intellectual part of the soul is not a form of the
body, and yet there is a substantial union even between the intellectual
part of the soul and the body. He clings to the plurality of forms in order
to account for the substantial union and to reject the formal one.

3.Soul as the Form of the Body

Acknowledging the substantial unity between all the metaphysical parts


of a human being while holding that the intellectual part of the soul
is completely incorporeal is not an easy task, but Olivi thinks that he
manages to do it by appealing to the plurality of substantial forms. He
acknowledges that: if the soul were one nature, a simple essence [...] I
believe that it would be necessary to hold that it is the form of the body
by its whole essence.51 However, the human soul is not a simple essence
as it consists of several substantial forms or parts. Yet the soul as a whole
can be considered as the form of the body, because the body is informed
by the sensitive part.
Before the sensitive part can inform the body, however, the latter has to
be constituted by a succession of corporeal forms. Olivi does not provide
a systematic account of them, and therefore it is difficult to say for certain
what his detailed view is. However, we can arrive at a rough picture on the
basis of several passages where he mentions the composition of human
and animal bodies.
Olivi thinks that the body is composed of corporeal matter which is
informed by several substantial forms.52 He seems to follow the gen-
eral scheme that was formed in discussions concerning the Aristotelian

51Fateor tamen quod si anima esset una natura, simplex essentia [...] oporteret, ut
credo necessario, tenere quod anima secundum totam suam essentiam informaret corpus
[...] (Ep. 7, 51.)
52SummaII q.49, 13; ibid., q.50 app., 70.
souls relation to the body 63

conception of the nature of elements and mixtures. According to this gen-


eral scheme, the parts and organs of a human bodyfor example its head
and limbsare composed of homogenous mixtures, such as hair, bone,
nerve, blood, and brain tissue. These mixtures, in turn, consist of the four
elements of fire, air, water, and earth.53 Olivi thinks that first the elemen-
tal forms prepare the four elements. These elements are then combined
under the so-called forma mixti so as to produce various kinds of matters.
The elemental forms do not disappear completely but remain in the mix-
ture in a lesser degree of actuality.54 A further form, a forma complexionis
makes organic matterflesh, bone, blood, nerve, and so forthfrom the
mixtures of elements. The organs of the body, in turn, are constituted out
of organic matter, and every organ has its own substantial form, which
Olivi calls forma organizationis.55 Finally, he seems to think that all the
various organs of the body are connected to each other by an organising
form of the whole body.56
The lower forms dispose the matter in such a way that the higher forms
can be received. The new form becomes the form of the matter, which is
prepared by the lower forms, and it informs the lower forms only indi-
rectly. In this way, the soul can become the form of the body only if the
body is made suitable for receiving the soul by the corporeal forms.57

53HA 1.1, 487a210; 3.2, 511b110; PA 1.2, 640b1829; GA 2.6, 743a136. See Rega Wood &
Michael Weisberg, Interpreting Aristotle on Mixture: problems about elemental compo-
sition from Philoponus to Cooper, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 35 (2004):
68184.
54See SummaII q.22, 39499; ibid., q.23, 39496; q.53, 214; q.54, 281. Olivis position
is reminiscent of Richard Rufus, who argues that the elemental forms admit of different
degrees of actuality. They are less actual in the mixture than when they are on their own.
(Wood & Weisberg, Interpreting Aristotle on Mixture, 698704.)
55SummaII q.50, 28 & 31; ibid., q.50 app., 84; q.51 app., 13941 & 164; q.56, 302. Accord-
ing to Bonaventure, a forma complexionis is a further form, which informs the forma mixti
and thus prepares organic matter. See Peter King, Bonaventures Theory of Individua-
tion, in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation,
11501650, ed. J.J.E.Gracia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 150.
56SummaII q.54, 282; Sicut enim corporalis forma nasi non dicit totam formam cor-
poralem corporis humani, cum forma totalis ipsius corporis complectatur in se omnes
formas substanciales parcium corporis sui tamquam partes suas formales, sic suo modo
unus habitus voluntatis vel intellectus non dicunt proprie eius formam totalem, sed tota
coordinacio habituum totam faciem cordis ordinate replencium et decoracium, debet
pocius censeri pro una forma plena seu pro una forma totali. (Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Lec-
tura super librum De angelica hierarchia, cap.6, Vaticano BAV. Urb. lat. 480, fol. 146va.) I
thank Sylvain Piron for providing me with a transcription of the manuscript.
57SummaII q.16, 332; ibid., q.17, 356 & 362; q.22, 400-401; q.50, 29 & 40; q.51, 12829;
q.72, 12.
64 chapter two

The contrast with the Thomistic picture is striking, because up to this


point the body is formed without any recourse to the soul. The body, con-
sidered as such, is an independent substance. Yet, Olivi thinks that the
explanation for the metaphysical formation of the body which is based on
the plurality of substantial forms is in fact faithful to Aristotle. He argues
that:
the formation of the body cannot be the work of the vegetative [form] or the
sensitive [form], because if it were, they would prepare their own matter,
and they would be the actuality of their own matter before the matter were
disposed and appropriated to them, and then the soul would not just be the
actuality of an organic body but also of a non-organic body.58
The point of the argument is that if the soul is defined as the first actual-
ity of a body which has organsas Aristotle defines itthe body and its
organs have to exist before the soul becomes their actuality. To be sure,
this is a peculiar interpretation of Aristotles view, but it shows how Olivi
conceives of the body as formed by substantial forms which prepare the
body for the infusion of the soul.
Also the soul is composed of several substantial forms, as we have
already seen. The spiritual matter of the soul is informed by intellectual,
sensitive, and vegetative forms.59 The unity between the different parts of
the soul is provided by the spiritual matter: Several forms, which come
together in one matter, are substantially united and inclined to each other
only because they come together in matter to which they are substantially

58Formatio enim corporis non potest esse opus vegetativae nec sensitivae; tum quia
tunc formarent sibi propriam materiam et essent actu in sua materia antequam esset dis-
posita et appropriata ad ipsas, et tunc anima non solum esset actus organici corporis, sed
etiam non organici. (SummaII q.51 app., 12930.) See also ibid., q.51 app., 164 where he
argues that Aristoteles generaliter definiens animam, prout est communis ad omnem ani-
mam informantem corpus, dicit quod anima est actus corporis organici physici, potentia
vitam habentis, id est, vivificabilis seu ad vitam possibilis. Ergo secundum eum anima, in
quantum forma corporis, directe et essentialiter respicit ipsum ut organicum.
59See, e.g., SummaII q.51 app., 18198. Actually, Olivi is not certain if the vegetative
and the sensitive forms are distinct from each other or one form (ibid., q.71, 63744).
The same question is later raised, e.g., by Ockham, who answers that there is no need
to think that they are distinct. See William Ockham, Quodlibeta septem 2.11 (Guillelmi de
Ockham Opera Philosophica et Theologica ad fidem codicum manuscriptorum edita. Opera
Theologica IX, Editiones Instituti Franciscani Universitatis S.Bonaventurae (St.Bonaven-
ture, N.Y., 196786) (hereafter OTh) IX, 164). Olivi speaks about forms and Ockham about
souls, but the heart of the question is the same: does there have to be a separate principle
for the vegetative functions, or are they provided by the sensitive soul/form.
souls relation to the body 65

inclined.60 This idea reflects Olivis way of understanding different types


of substantial union. As we have seen, he thinks that there are altogether
three types of substantial union: (1) between matter and form; (2) between
two parts of matter, which are informed by one form; and (3) between
two forms informing the same matter.61 The substantial unity of a human
being can be accounted for by appealing to these three types, and the
sensitive part of the soul plays a central role in Olivis explanation.
The various parts of the body are substantially united because the sen-
sitive part is the form of the whole body.62 The soul is substantially united
to the body, because the sensitive form of the soul informs the body:
The human body is disposed to receive the sensitive [form], which is rooted
in the intellectual [form], and thereby it is disposed to receive the rational
soul, because to unite the rational soul to the body is the same as to inform
the body by the sensitive [form] of the soul.63
The union between the sensitive form and the body is substantial because
form and matter make one substance. Also the union between the spiri-
tual matter of the soul and the corporeal matter of the body is substantial
because they both are informed by the sensitive form.64 Finally, the intel-
lectual and sensitive forms are substantially united to each other in the
third of the aforementioned ways: they are forms of the same spiritual
matter.
In this way, all the metaphysical parts of a human being are substan-
tially united to each other. The only problematic connection is the one
between the intellect and the body, which is indirect and mediated by the
sensitive form. Olivi argues, however, that it is substantial:
It is easy to grasp how this union can be understood and how it can be
consubstantial without being formal, if we suppose that the sensitive [part]
is united to the intellectual part in the same spiritual matter (or at least
in one, so to say, subject of the rational soul). Since the sensitive part is a

60Plures enim formae in una materia concurrentes non per aliud ad se invicem sub-
stantialiter uniuntur et inclinantur nisi per hoc quod in una materia concurrunt ad quam
substantialiter inclinantur. (SummaII q.51, 117.)
61See footnote 8 above.
62See, e.g., SummaII q.49, 8.
63Eo ipso quod corpus hominis est dispositum ad susceptionem sensitivae radica-
tae in intellectiva, eo ipso est dispositum ad susceptionem animae rationalis, quia non
est aliud animam rationalem uniri corpori quam per suam sensitivam informare ipsum.
(SummaII q.51, 128.)
64SummaII q.51, 134; ibid., q.50, 43.
66 chapter two

substantial form of the human body (or rather, the rational soul is the form
by the sensitive part) and these are united substantially to each other like
a form and matter, and since the intellectual and sensitive parts are united
as two formal natures in one matter or in one subject and in one substance
of the soul and these are consubstantial to each other like two substantial
parts of one substantial form of the soul, then the intellectual part and the
body are necessarily substantially united to each other in one subject of the
rational soul, as its substantial parts.65
It is important to note that Olivi does not base the unity between the
intellectual form and the body on any of the three types of substantial
unity presented above. Intellectual form is not a form of the body, it is
not a form of any other form, and it is not matter. So, the union between
the intellectual part of the soul and the body is secured by appealing to
the principle of transitivity:
And even if everything [that I have said above] is deficient, still no-one
will doubt that if a thing [A] is substantially inclined and united to another
thing [B], which is substantially inclined and united to a third thing [C],
then the first thing [A] is thereby substantially inclined and united to the
third thing [C] and the other way around. Therefore, if the human body is
united and inclined to the sensitive form, which is inclined and united to
the intellectual form; and the intellectual form is essentially united to the
sensitive form, which is inclined to the body; then by the same token the
intellectual form and the body are necessarily substantially united to
each other. Still, this does not mean that they will be united as form and
matter.66

65Quomodo autem haec unio possit intelligi et esse consubstantialis, ita quod non
sit formalis, facile est capere, supposito quod sensitiva sit unita cum parte intellectiva
in una spirituali materia seu saltem in uno, ut ita dicam, supposito rationalis animae.
Cum enim sensitiva sit forma substantialis humani corporis seu potius anima rationalis
per partem sensitivam, et ita sint ad se invicem substantialiter unitae tanquam forma et
materia, pars autem intellectiva et sensitiva sint unitae tanquam duae naturae formales in
una materia seu in uno supposito et in una substantia animae et ita invicem sibi consub-
stantiales tanquam partes substantiales unius formae substantialis animae: oportet quod
pars intellectiva et corpus sint sibi substantialiter unita in uno supposito rationalis animae
tanquam partes eius substantiales. (SummaII q.59, 539.) See also ibid., q.51, 12122; q.59,
541; Responsio secunda, 155.
66Et posito quod omnia haec mihi deficerent: nemo dubitabit quod quicquid incli-
natur et unitur substantialiter alicui, prout illud est substantialiter inclinatum et unitum
alicui tertio, quod primum eo ipso est substantialiter inclinatum et unitum illi tertio et
e contrario. Si ergo corpus hominis est unitum et inclinatum sensitivae, prout illa est
inclinata et unita intellectivae, etsi intellectiva est essentialiter unita sensitivae, prout illa
est inclinata ad corpus: necessario oportet quod eo ipso intellectiva et corpus sint sibi
substantialiter unita, et tamen non propter hoc oportebit quod sint unita sicut forma et
materia. (Summa II q.51, 134.) See also ibid., q. 51 app., 149; Pasnau, Olivi on the Meta-
physics of Soul, 125.
souls relation to the body 67

Olivi applies the principle of transitivity to the case of substantial unity.


If A and B are substantially united to each other, and B is substantially
united to C, then A is substantially united to C. The application of the
principle to the case of the intellectual form and the body is in itself
unproblematic, and it explains neatly how these two extremes are united
to each other. The intellectual form and the body are not separate from
each other but constituents of a single entity, a human being. However,
the metaphysical structure of this entity is quite complicated, because the
relations between the different metaphysical parts must be such that the
incorporeality of the intellectual part can be upheld. Different kinds of
metaphysical relations entail different kinds of mutual operations of the
parts: whereas a formal unity makes the operations common to both of
the parts, the transitional unity that holds between the intellectual part
and the body does not, but still it counts as a substantial unity.
Olivis theory is not simple. It is not surprising that it received a mixed
reaction and provoked sharp criticism from certain philosophers and
authorities of his order. It is based on a fine distinction between the ratio-
nal soul on one hand, and the intellectual part of the rational soul on the
othera distinction which is made possible by the plurality of substan-
tial forms within the soul and by the doctrine of universal hylomorphism.
Olivis censors misunderstood his view and took what he says about the
intellectual part of the soul as concerning the whole rational soul.67 Olivi
underlines this misunderstanding when he defends himself against the
charges. He clarifies in his Responsio secunda that he had never intended
to jeopardise the substantial unity of the rational soul and the body:
I say there [in SummaII, q.51 and 59] that the intellectual part of the soul is
not united to the body as its form, even though it is substantially united to
it. I also say there that the rational soul is a form of the body, but it is not a
form of the body by all parts of its essence, to wit, not by its matter or mate-
rial part and not by its intellectual part, but only by its sensitive part.68
The rational soul as a whole can be considered as a form of the body, even
though some of the constitutive forms of the soul are not forms of the
body. Olivi even points out that:

67Piron, Censures et condamnation, 33334.


68Ibi enim dico quod pars animae intellectiva non unitur corpori ut forma, quamvis
uniatur ei substantialiter; ibi etiam dico quod anima rationalis sic est forma corporis quod
tamen non est hoc per omnes partes suae essentiae, utpote non per materiam seu per
partem materialem, nec per partem intellectivam sed solum per partem eius sensitivam.
(Responsio secunda, 155.) See also Ep. 7, 5051.
68 chapter two

It is more proper to say that the whole rational soul is a form of the body
rather than only the sensitive part of the soul, because absolutely speaking a
form means the whole form rather than a part of a form. Similarly, it is more
proper to say that a human being speaks than to say that a tongue speaks
although a human being speaks only by the tonguebecause action is more
properly attributed to the whole subject (suppositum) than to a part.69
The intellectual soul is constituted by distinct formsor formal parts
but it can be considered as one whole form with respect to the body.70
Similarly, the various forms of the soul are partial forms of the spiritual
matter, and together they constitute one total form:
He [viz. Vital du Four] says that because I claim that the intellectual form is
not the form of the body, it cannot integrate one form with the other forms.
What he says is extremely ridiculous and falls in the same absurdity too
frequently. It suffices for the integration that all the formal parts of the soul
inform the same spiritual matter, and thus they all make one total form of
the spiritual matter.71
Thus, the various forms of the soul make together one total form, which
is the soul, and the various forms of the body (including the soul) make
together one total form of the body. Olivi thinks that this is possible, even
though some of the partial forms (or formal parts) do not inform the body,
and some of them do not inform the spiritual matter of the soul.72 As the
various substantial forms of a human being are not completely separate
from each other, Olivi is able to say that the attribution of several sub-
stantial forms does not result in attributing several separate beings (esse)
to one substance.73

69[...] tota anima rationalis dicitur forma sui corporis potius quam sola sua pars sen-
sitiva, quia forma simpliciter dicta potius significat formam totalem quam partem ipsius,
iuxta quod et magis proprie dicitur homo loqui quam lingua, quamvis homo non loquatur
nisi per linguam, quia actio potius attribuitur toti supposito quam parti. (SummaII q.51,
144.) See also ibid., 146.
70Idcirco simpliciter teneo in corpore humano praeter animam esse alias formas reali-
ter differentes ab ipsa et etiam credo omnes gradus formales qui in eo sunt concurrere ad
unam perfectam formam constituendam [...] (SummaII q.50, 35.)
71Quod vero iste dicit quod intellectiva non potest cum aliis integrare unam formam,
quia secundum nos non est forma corporis, nimis est ridiculosus et nimis frequenter in
idem ridiculum rediens. Sufficit enim ad hoc quod omnes formales partes animae infor-
ment eandem materiam spiritualem, ita quod ex omnibus fiat una totalis forma eius.
(SummaII q. 51 app., 184.) See also ibid., q.48, 758; q.50, 36; Vital du Four, De rerum prin-
cipio q.11, 46368; Tonna, La pars intellectiva, 28486.
72SummaII q.51 app., 176.
73Quod enim primo dicitur quod si in aliquo sunt plures rationes formales realiter
distinctae, quod illa res habebit plura esse: dicendum ad hoc quod quaelibet illarum ratio-
souls relation to the body 69

It has been argued that the idea of partial forms which together con-
stitute one complete form makes Olivis view almost identical with the
Thomistic view of the relation between the soul and the body. Aquinas
makes a distinction between the powers of the soul and the souls essence,
and he thinks that although the intellectual soul as a whole is a form of
the body, the intellectual powers of the soul are not actualised in bodily
organs. He speaks about powers where Olivi prefers to use the term parts,
but it is easy to think that this difference is only verbal: both argue that
the soul is a form of the body and that the intellectual powers are incor-
poreal, and while Olivi claims that the intellectual part of the soul is not a
form of the body, Aquinas argues that the soul does not inform the body
by its intellectual powers.74
By contrast, Robert Pasnau has pointed outcorrectly, in my opinion
that although the positions of Olivi and Aquinas seem to be identical
at the outset, the picture is in fact more complex, because Olivi cannot
accept the form of hylomorphism that Aquinas proposes.75 As I shortly
mentioned above, Olivi rejects the difference between the essence of the
soul and its powers. The soul does not have any essence over and above
(or under and below) its powers. Hence, the soul cannot inform the body
by its essence without informing it by at least some of its powers. More-
over, as we have seen, Olivi claims that it is absurd to say that a form
could inform matter without giving its powers to that matter. Thus, even

num formalium, quando est in re per se et sine aliis, tunc est forma rei substantialis et ideo
tunc dat ei esse per se; quando autem est cum aliis, non est forma, sed pars formae, et ideo
tunc earum non est dare esse per se, sed totalis formae. (SummaII q.50, 3536.). [...]
licet anima et formae corporales non sint simpliciter unum per essentiam et secundum
se, respectu tamen corporis humani son sunt nisi una forma completa. Et sicut ex corpore
et anima rationali vere fit unum per essentiam, non ita quod unum sit alterum vel quin
unum non possit separari ab altero: ita dico quod anima rationalis cum ceteris formis cor-
poris sunt unum per essentiam. [...] Sicut autem illa quae ultimo advenit dicitur proprie
forma rei, et aliae praecedentes habent se ad ipsam sicut partes ad totum et sicut ad suam
radicem [...] sic similiter anima debet dici proprie forma hominis, aliae vero quasi partes
eius et instrumenta. (SummaII q.50, 38.)
74See Bettoni, Le dottrine filosofiche, 37679; Tonna La pars intellectiva, 288; Bazn,
13th Century Commentaries, 17884. Aquinas states that: Non enim dicimus animam
humanam esse formam corporis secundum intellectiuam potentiam [...] (Thomas Aqui-
nas, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, Cura et studio fratrum praedicatorum, Sancti
Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita 43 (Rome: Editori di San Tom-
maso, 1976), 3, 37880. See also ST I.76.1; ibid., 77.5 & 79.1. In ST I.77.1 Aquinas distinguishes
the essence of the soul from the powers. Dales, The Problem of the Rational Soul, 13849.
Olivi paraphrases Aquinas view in SummaII q.51, 107.
75Pasnau, Olivi on the Metaphysics of Soul, 11821.
70 chapter two

if we admitted that the powers are distinct from the essence of the soul,
they are necessarily actualised in the body.76
The most significant difference between these two authors is, how-
ever, their understanding of the nature of the powers (or parts) of the
soul.77 Unlike Aquinas, Olivi thinks that they are substantial forms, which
together constitute the substance of the soul. Thus, when Pasnau claims
echoing Efrem Bettoni and in agreement with Ivo Tonnathat: As far as
the soul itself is concerned, Olivi and Aquinas are in general agreement
that it is a single form, containing various powers or parts,78 he fails to
realise that despite the superficial similarities between the views of Olivi
and Aquinas, there are profound underlying metaphysical differences.79 If
we look more closely at Olivis theory of the relation between the soul
and the body and his discussion concerning the spiritual nature of the
soul, we see that it differs radically from that of Aquinas. The soul is a
spiritual entity, which is composed of several substantial formsforms,
which are also powers of the souland substantially joined to the body
only by some of them. This view is in many ways closer to Augustines
Neoplatonism than to the most faithful medieval interpretations of
Aristotles hylomorphism.

4.Connection between the Soul and the Body

One important consequence of Olivis conception of the ontological supe-


riority of the spiritual soul with respect to the body is that he rejects direct
efficient causality from the latter to the former. Bodily changes cannot
directly cause anything in the soul, not even acts of the sensitive part of

76Praeterea, posito quod potentia differat ab essentia, certum tamen est quod eam
semper sequetur et ibi radicabitur ubi et ipsa et eius erit cuius et ipsa. Si ergo essentia
formae intellectivae radicatur in corpore et est forma corporis, ergo et potentiae eius radi-
cabuntur in corpore et poterunt dici esse potentiae eius sicut et pars intellectiva forma
earum. (SummaII q.51, 108.)
77See chapter four for a more detailed discussion.
78Pasnau, Olivi on the Metaphysics of Soul, 119. For Bettoni and Tonna, see footnote
74 above.
79Pasnau also claims that Olivi does not at least officially identify the powers of the
soul as forms (Pasnau, Olivi on the Metaphysics of the Soul, 119). Yet, on the very next
page he admits that Olivi repeatedly calls them forms. Pasnau puts emphasis on the pas-
sage in the appendix to question 51, which says that it is more proper to call the whole
soul a form of the body rather than the sensitive part of the the soul (SummaII q.51 app.,
144). However, there are several other texts which show that Olivi conceives of the powers
of the soul as being distinct forms. See, e.g., ibid., 148, 176 & 18284.
souls relation to the body 71

the soul.80 However, he allows a kind of indirect causation between the


body and the soul. This causation, which takes place through what he
calls the via colligantiae is meant to explain why and how bodily changes
can bring about changes in the spiritual soul without subjecting the soul
to the body. (Sometimes Olivi uses also the expression colligantia poten-
tiarum, because the same kind of connection holds between the various
powers of the soul.)
The concept of colligantia figures prominently in Olivis account for
the union of the soul and the body and for the relation between superior
and inferior powers of the soul, but it is used also to account for certain
physical phenomena. For instance, when a flat and polished stone stands
on another similar one, and the upper stone is lifted in such a way that
it is not tilted, the lower stone rises as well. Olivi employs the concept of
connection to explain how this happens, and his point is that the one
who lifts the upper stone does not directly act on the lower. The other
stone rises (contrary to its natural inclination) because the impossibility
of a vacuum brings about a natural connection between the two stones.
There is no direct causal connection between the lifters action and the
rising of the lower stone.81
Similarly, the soul and the body are connected to each other in such
a way that changes in one of them bring about changes in the other by
way of a connection. When a corporeal agent causes changes in the body,
the soul is affected as well, but the soul in itself is not subjected to direct
causal influence from without.
Olivi presents altogether four different types of cases in which acting
on the body changes the soul by way of a connection. In the first case, the
souls mode of being (modus existendi) may change due to bodily changes.
For instance, when a human being dies because her body loses its proper
harmony (the body is injured), the soul enters into a new mode of being,
where it is separated from the body. The separate existence of the soul is
a consequence of the changes in the body, but these changes cannot be
understood in terms of causal influence on the soul. The second case per-
tains to the souls habitual state (modum se habendi). The soul is infected
by original sin when it enters the body, and it becomes impossible for
the soul to be completely virtuous because its habitual state is related to

80For a detailed discussion, see chapter eight below.


81SummaII q.72, 67.
72 chapter two

the body.82 Similarly, the soul enjoys certain tastes, odours, and musical
genres, because of the disposition of the body. Given a different disposi-
tion, the same soul would have different likings.83 However, the change
in the disposition of the body does not directly cause any change in the
soul. The third type is related to the souls attention (aspectus): when
someone turns a persons eyes (supposedly by turning her head) in a
certain direction, that persons power of vision and the attention thereof
are directed in that direction as well. Finally, the fourth case is that of
a local motion. If someone were to carry my body to another room, by
the same token he would carry my soul as well, but he would not be act-
ing directly upon my soul.84 The connection between the soul and the
body is an important part of Olivis explanation for the incapability of free
action that can be seen in the cases of fools, children, and persons who are
asleep. The will is impeded from free action, and this impediment results
per viam colligantiae from the bodily state of the subject.85
Olivi emphasises that the changes which the body brings about in the
soul should not be understood in terms of efficient causality. He distin-
guishes the colligantia from proper efficient causality:
There are two types of efficient causality. One of them takes place by direct-
ing and elevating an active power to the recipient (patiens) so that the power
is drawn to the recipient in a dominative way. The sun acts upon inferior
things in this way, as do other agents that imprint their species onto other
things. The other type is by a connection or by some natural succession.86

82For Olivis conception of original sin, see SummaII qq.11018, 261452.


83For a discussion concerning Olivis view on the bodily dispositions and their rel-
evance for enjoyment and suffering, see Juhana Toivanen, Peter of John Olivi on the Psy-
chology of Animal Action, Journal of the History of Philosophy 49:4 (2011): 42338.
84SummaII q.72, 3033. The passages where Olivi discusses the concept of colligantia
are the following: SummaII q.29, 503; ibid., q.51 app., 14546; q.57, 36970; q.58, 500506;
q.59, 54654; q.72, 610, 1517, 3035; q.77, 15556; q.87, 200202; q.111, 27380; Quodl. 1.4,
1518. For discussion, see Fraois-Xavier Putallaz, La connaissance de soi au XIIIe sicle: De
Matthieu dAquasparta Thierry de Freiberg, tudes de philosophie mdivale 67 (Paris:
Vrin, 1991), 99102; Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle-Ages (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), 17778.
85SummaII q.59, 54647.
86Duplex est enim modus efficiendi ad praesens. Quorum unus est per conversionem
et erectionem virtutis activae in patiens, ita quod aspectu dominativo fertur in illud. Et
hoc modo sol agit in inferiora et cetera agentia quae imprimunt suas species in alia. Alius
modus est per colligantiam seu per quandam naturalem consequentiam. (SummaII q.111,
27374.)
souls relation to the body 73

The body affects the soul in the latter way, but as it is not proper effi-
cient causality, it does not undermine the ontological hierarchy between
them.87
Although Olivi says that the primary reason for the existence of this
kind of connection is the formal union between the soul and the body,88
he does not mean that the connection is a hylomorphic functional
relationthat is, he does not think that the bodily changes are identical to
the changes in the soul in such a way that they would be only two differ-
ent descriptions of the same phenomenon. Bodily changes may influence
the soul, but the only example Olivi gives of this influence that is even
slightly reminiscent of a hylomorphic relation concerns the mutual rela-
tion between the powers of the soul, as they are forms of the souls spiri-
tual matterand even then he seems to think that the material changes
somehow give rise to an act of the soul rather than being identical to it.
Thus, even in the case of mutual influence between the powers of the
soul, Olivi seems to deny that the material changes and the psychological
acts are identical. He gives two possible accounts for the way in which the
powers of the soul may be affected by one another, as they are connected
to each other (and although it is not apparent how his discussion about
the relation between the powers of the soul is supposed to tell us anything
about the relation between bodily changes and psychological processes,
Olivi seems to think that it does). The first of them comes in the form of
an illustration:
Some, however, add another mode [of connection], namely, when an act of
one power [of the soul] follows from an act of another. For example, when
an act of judging in the common sense and an act of understanding in the
intellect follow from an act of seeing [...] Like the blade of a sword cuts by
a vibrating motion which is given to its matter, so (because the matter of the
powers of the soul is the same) an act of one power is like a kind of move-
ment of its matter (which is common to both powers) by which the other
power is as it were applied to its act.89

87SummaII q.111, 27677.


88SummaII q.72, 34
89Quidam autem addunt alium modum, scilicet, cum actio unius potentiae sequitur
ad actionem alterius, ut, cum ad actum videndi sequitur in sensu communi actus iudicandi
et in intellectu actus intelligendi [...] sicut acies gladii incidit per motum vibrationis suae
materiae datum, sic, quia materia potentiarum animae est eadem, idcirco actio unius est
sicut quaedam motio suae materiae communis utrique potentiae, per quam altera poten-
tia quasi applicatur ad actum suum. (SummaII q.72, 3334.)
74 chapter two

The illustration is quite difficult to understand. Perhaps Olivis idea is that


the iron from which the sword is made has two powers: cutting and vibrat-
ing. Somehow the vibrating motion of the blade makes the sword also
cut in such a way that there is a kind of connection between these two
powers of the sword. Olivi thinks that this example is in certain respects
similar to the relation between the various powers of the soul. However
we understand the details of the illustration, I think that the overall idea
is clear. Namely, the crucial point in this description is that an act of one
of the powers of the soul brings about an act of another power or at least
incites the other power to act. The reason for this connection is that the
powers of the soul are forms of the same spiritual matter, and therefore
the movement of the matter caused by one power brings about an act of
another power.
The other version is explained in the following way:
But according to others an act of one power [of the soul] is never directly
caused by [an act of] another because in that case it would not be an action
but only a passion or a motion of the power in which it is caused by the
other power and its action [...] Rather, it should be said that an act of the
superior power follows an act of the inferior power like it follows its object:
the inferior act causes the superior act like an object which terminates the
superior act and the first gaze (aspectus) of the superior power.90
According to this version an act of a higher power of the soul is not caused
by an act of a lower power (say, an act of the intellect is not caused by an
act of vision). Rather, the higher power apprehends the act of the lower
one as an object.
Thus, the two versions of via colligantiae between the powers of the
soul that Olivi takes up are the following:
1. The common material basis of two powers transmits an act from one
power to another.
2. One power forms an act, which is an object for the act of another
power.

90Sed secundum alios actio unius potentiae nunquam immediate causatur ab alia;
quia tunc non esset actio, sed tantum passio vel motio illius potentiae in qua ab altera
potentia et ab eius actione fieret [...] Potius ergo debet dici quod actus potentiae supe-
rioris sequitur ad actum inferioris tanquam ad suum obiectum, ita quod superior actus
causatur ab inferiori sicut ab obiecto terminante actum superiorem et primum aspectum
potentiae superioris. (SummaII q.72, 33.)
souls relation to the body 75

Olivi seems to favour the latter version of connection in his explanation


of the relation between different powers of the soul and the former when
he accounts for the relation between the bodily changes and the souls
apprehension thereof.91 However, he does not have to make a final deci-
sion between them because they concur on one important point: neither
of them is efficient causality in the proper sense of the term. The inferior
powers of the soul do not directly cause the acts of the higher powers,
and the changes in the body are not efficient causes of the cognitive acts
of the soul.

91Ulterius sciendum quod colligatio spiritus ad corpus propter quam motus vel dis-
positio unius redundat in alterum consistit principaliter in formali unione spiritus ad cor-
pus tanquam ad suam materiam et corporis ad ipsum tanquam ad suam formam. [...]
Utrobique autem est identitas materiae causa quare ad impressionem directe factam in
corpore sequatur aliquis effectus in anima, acsi prima impressio facta in corpus esset
quaedam motio ipsius animae. Est enim pro tanto motio eius, pro quanto est motio suae
materiae corporalis. (SummaII q.72, 3435.)
Chapter three

The Animal Soul

The spiritual nature of the soul is not important only from the point of
view of the highest powers of the human soul or its immortality. Olivis
theory of sensory cognition rests on the principle that the soul is active
and causes its own acts.1 At the outset it seems that this ability requires
that the soul be spiritual and incorporeal. Yet, Olivi sees no major differ-
ences between human beings and other animals with respect to sensory
cognition. All animals are capable of complex cognitive processes. This
psychological continuity suggests a metaphysical affinity, but in fact the
animal soul is radically different from the human soul from a metaphysi-
cal point of view. It is not constituted out of spiritual matter, and there-
fore it is nothing more than a form of a body.
It is difficult to see how the tension between the functional similarity
and the metaphysical difference can be solved, given that Olivi does not
provide an explicit account of the nature of the animal soul. Yet there are
many passages where he touches upon the issue. At any rate, he thinks
that the animal soul is simple even though it is a form of a corporeal
body. This kind of simplicity makes it capable of cognitive activity, as I
shall argue in sectionone. In sectiontwo I shall point out and discuss the
passages in which Olivi deals with the essence of the animal soul and its
relation to the body. These passages do not convey a coherent position,
but they allow us to see some central ideas that Olivi takes up.

1.Simplicity of the Animal Soul

In order to fully understand what Olivi means by the simplicity of the


animal soul, we need to shortly look at his understanding of the essential
difference between human beings and other animals. As I have already
shown, he argues rigorously for a distinctive view of human metaphysics
according to which a human being is composed of two kinds of matter:

1See chaptersix below for a detailed discussion.


78 chapter three

the corporeal matter of the body and the spiritual matter of the soul, both
of which are informed by several substantial forms. In contrast to this,
non-human animals do not have spiritual matter.2 They are composed
only of corporeal matter which is informed by several substantial forms:
corporeal forms make up the physical body, and vegetative and sensitive
forms animate it. The sensitive soul of a non-human animal is a corporeal
form which is produced (educitur) from the matter of the body by natural
causes, and it vanishes when the body is dissolved.3 The human soul and
the animal soul are metaphysically different: the human soul is a spiritual
entity, and the animal soul is a hylomorphic form of the body.
Because the human soul is an actualisation of spiritual matter, it is
capable of operations which are not possible for physical entities: it is
immortal, free, self-reflexive, and so on. It also seems at the outset that
Olivis theory of perception is based on the active nature of the soul
which, in turn, requires spirituality on the part of the soul. He argues
that the soul must bring about the acts of perception because external
objects are incapable of acting upon the ontologically superior soul. He
also seems to acknowledge that the impossibility of an external object
to act upon the soul is rooted both on the intellectual nature of the soul
and on the spiritual nature of the matter of the soul.4 From this view, it
is only a short stepindeed, apparently not a step at allto think that
the cognitive powers of non-human animals are not active. Were this the
case, many central aspects of Olivis theory of perception would not apply
to beasts at all.
Due to the differences in the metaphysics of the soul which Olivi pos-
its between human beings and non-human animals, we may ask whether
animals perceive in the same way as human beings. The metaphysical
difference suggests that Olivis theory of perception cannot apply to non-
human animals, but in fact it does.5 A revealing text in this respect is
his answer to a counter-argument which claims that external objects can
affect the sensitive powers of the soul, both human and animal, because:

2See, e.g., SummaII q.58, 512; ibid., q.59, 542. On one occasion Olivi doubts whether
the animal soul and its powers could be connected to spiritual matter (ibid., q.56, 304).
3SummaII q.31, 56370; ibid., q.51, 101 & 12627; q.53, 210 & 218; q.54, 270.
4SummaII q.72, 17.
5The issue has been shortly touched on by Mikko Yrjnsuuri, who points out that Olivi
attributes some properties of spirituality to non-human animals even though they do not
have spiritual matter (Yrjnsuuri, The Soul as an Entity, 83).
the animal soul 79

what is capable of [acting upon] the whole substance is also capable of [act-
ing upon] its power [...] But the essence of the sensitive soul is produced by
virtue of a corporeal body ( fit a virtute corporis), namely, by virtue of semen
or celestial bodies. Therefore, these can change the powers of the sensitive
soul, at least accidentally. But a corporeal object can bring about in our
sensitive powers everything that it can bring about in the sensitive pow-
ers of animals because we are similar to them when it comes to accidental
changes. Therefore, etc.6
The idea here is that since the sensitive soul of a non-human animal is
generated by the power of semen or by the celestial bodies (the objector
may have spontaneous generation in mind, or he may refer to the influ-
ence that the celestial bodies have on a developing foetus),7 and since the
soul itself is affected by these corporeal powers, the possibility of influ-
ence from without to the powers is not ruled out.
Olivi answers this argument in the following way:
A thing that generates the sensitive souls of brute animals can [act upon]
the powers of the soul in a similar way as it can [act upon] the substance
of the soul, namely, by producing (educendo) both of them from the matter.
But from the fact that it can produce both of them from corporeal matter,
it does not follow that it could directly influence either of them once they
are already produced. The reason for this is the following: it produces both
of them by influencing only the corporeal matter, and it influences them
by a corporeal gaze and inflow (aspectum et influxum). By contrast, it could
influence the powers of the soul (once they are already produced) only by a
spiritual gaze and inflow. This influence would not be immediately directed
and inclined to corporeal matter. Rather, it would be primarily directed to
the simple powers and to the simple substance of the soul. And the reason
why it would be a greater and higher thing to generate a cognitive act in the
soul of a beast than to produce the soul from corporeal matter is clear on

6Item, quod potest in totam substantiam potest et in eius potentiam [...] sed essentia
animae sensitivae fit a virtute corporis, scilicet, a virtute seminali vel corporum caeles-
tium, ergo possunt eius potentias variare, saltem accidentaliter; sed quod potest a corpore
fieri in potentiis sensitiviis animalium potest et in nostris sensitivis, quia in accidentalibus
variationibus eis conformamur; ergo et cetera. (SummaII q.72, 4.)
7See Maaike van der Lugt, Le ver, le dmon et la vierge: Les thories mdivales de la
gnration extraordinaire (Paris: Belles-Lettres, 2004). An illuminating example of the
medieval understanding of spontaneous generation and of the influence of the celestial
bodies is Pseudo-Albertus Magnus De secretis mulierum. See Pseudo-Albertus Magnus,
Womens Secrets: A Translation of Pseudo-Albertus Magnuss De Secretis Mulierum with
Commentaries, ed. & trans. H.R.Lemay (New York: State University of New York Press,
1992), 8098.
80 chapter three

the basis of this argument (unless perhaps the opinion of those be true who
say that the souls of beasts can be made solely by God).8
The allusion to the simplicity of the animal soul in this passage is not
unintentional on the part of Olivi. He really thinks that the sensitive souls
of non-human animals are simple and, as such, beyond the influence of
external objects:
It is impossible that an extended form or essence, which is divisible with
regard to the extension of its parts, is entirely the same as a simple essence,
which is the same (secundum idem) in diverse parts of extended matter and
which is not there by its diverse parts. But the essence of the sensitive soul
of animals is simple in this way.9
However, simplicity does not require that the soul be devoid of formal
parts. Although the animal soul is simple, it is composed of distinct pow-
ers, which have a special relation to various parts of the body. Each power
is in itself a form of its own organ and not a form of other parts of the
body. Yet, the soul is not extended, because the powers themselves are
simple and spiritual, and the simplicity of the parts of the soul suffices to
make it simple and unextended. Together the powers make up one com-
plete form, which is the soul.10

8Eo modo quo generans animam sensitivam brutorum potest in eius substantiam
potest et in eius potentiam, utramque scilicet de materia educendo. Sed ex hoc non sequi-
tur quod sicut potest utramque de materia corporali educere, quod sic in utramque iam
eductam possit directe influere. Cuius ratio est: quia utramque educit influendo solum in
materiam corporalem et hoc per aspectum et influxum corporalem, in potentiam vero ani-
mae iam eductam non posset directe influere nisi per aspectum et influxum spiritualem;
qui non esset immediate directus et inclinatus in materiam corporalem, immo prius et
potius in simplicem potentiam et substantiam animae. Et ex hoc ipso patet ratio quare
maius et altius esset generare actum cognitivum in anima brutorum quam sit ipsam edu
cere de materia corporali, nisi forte sit vera opinio quorundam dicentium animas bruto-
rum non posse fieri nisi a solo Deo. (SummaII q.72, 45.) Olivi seems to think that the
souls of non-human animals are not directly created by God (Super Gen., 8788).
9Impossibile est quod forma seu essentia divisibilis secundum extensionem partium
seu extensa sit omnino id ipsum quod essentia simplex quae secundum idem est in diver-
sis partibus materiae extensae et non secundum diversas partes sui; sed anima sensitiva
animalium est secundum suam essentiam hoc modo simplex. (SummaII q.31, 53031.)
See also ibid., 56668; q.58, 500. He also argues that the body of a living being would lack
unity without unam formam animae simplicem ad quam omnes partes corporis substan-
tialiter connectuntur, and this argument applies also to non-human animals (ibid., q.49,
13; see Henrik Lagerlund, The Unity of the Soul and Contrary Appetites in Medieval Phi-
losophy, in The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology, ed. T.M.Lennon & R.J.Stanton, Studies
in the History of Philosophy of Mind 7 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 8485).
10SummaII q.54, 28283.
the animal soul 81

The passages in which Olivi discusses the simplicity of the animal soul
show that, despite the metaphysical difference between the human and
animal soul, the central features of his theory of perception apply also
to non-human animals. The preceding citation already shows us the way
in which the animal soul is simple: it is not divisible, and it is present in
every part of the body as a whole. By contrast, corporeal matter is not
simple because it can be divided into pieces, and it is extended in such a
way that one part is in one place and other parts are adjacent to it. The
simplicity of the sensitive soul accounts for the ability of an animal to be
the subject of simple cognitive acts.
It is true that the sensitive powers of animals need corporeal matter
in order to act, because no form can act without matter, and corporeal
matter is the only kind of matter that non-human animals have. Still, the
acts are received in the powers of the soul rather than in the matter of
the organs:
Fourth, [the organs] are necessary for the reception of the acts, because
such acts (and memorative or imaginative species) cannot be received in
the souls of brute animals other than by receiving them in the organs of the
powers, as their souls do not have any spiritual matter in which the acts and
species could be received. However, Augustine says that they are received
in their powers because the organs are not susceptible to such simple acts
or species unless they are informed by simple powers. [...] Since the acts
are simple [...], the subject in which they are received must have some kind
of substantial simplicity by which it can be prepared to receive and to sus-
tain them. This is the simplicity of the soul and its powers and the simple
actualisation (informatio) of the organs by the powers. Thus, although the
organs are extended, they are capable of having the nature of a single sub-
ject (habere rationem unius subjecti), which is, as it were, simple in relation
to the acts, insofar as they have one simple substantial form and one simple
sensitive being.11

11Quarto, sunt necessaria propter receptionem ipsorum actuum, in animabus enim


brutorum aut in potentiis earum non possunt recipi huiusmodi actus nec species memori-
ales seu imaginariae, nisi per hoc quod recipiuntur in organis earum, cum ipsae de se non
habeant aliquam materiam spiritualem in qua possint recipi. Dicuntur tamen ab Augus-
tino recipi in earum potentiis, quia organa non sunt susceptiva huiusmodi actuum aut
specierum simplicium, nisi prout sunt informata ipsis potentiis simplicibus. [...] Quia cum
ipsi actus sint simplices [...] oportet quod subiectum in quo recipiuntur habeat aliquam
simplicitatem substantialem per quam possit ordinari ad receptionem et sustentationem
illarum. Haec autem est simplicitas ipsius animae et potentiarum eius et simplex informa-
tio organorum ab eis. Unde licet ipsa organa sint extensa, prout tamen habent unam for-
mam substantialem simplicem et unum esse sensitivum simplex, possunt habere rationem
unius subiecti quasi simplicis respectu ipsorum actuum. (SummaII q.58, 51213.) This
82 chapter three

On the basis of this, it seems that spirituality, understood as being consti-


tuted of spiritual matter, is not the crucial factor in explaining why exter-
nal objects cannot affect the powers of the soul. Rather, it is the simplicity
of the soul that serves as the explanans, and in that respect the animal
soul is similar to the human soul: both are simple and indivisible even
though they inform the extended body.
Because the animal soul is simple, Olivi sees little difference between
human perception and animal perception. Although in the case of non-
human animals the organs are necessary for cognitive activity, the pri-
macy of the formal changethe idea that the cognitive acts take place
primarily in the soul and secondarily in the organs of the bodyputs
animals on par with humans in this respect. Thus, despite the metaphysi-
cal difference between human and animal souls, they share the crucial
feature of simplicity, and the cognitive processes of these two kinds of
creatures are similar from a psychological perspective.

2.Essence of the Animal Soul

On the basis of the foregoing it may seem that Olivis conception of


the nature of the animal soul is rather straightforward: the soul is a sim-
ple hylomorphic form of the body. However, if we look more closely at
the scant remarks he makes with respect to the animal soul, the picture
becomes more complicated. We are told that the soul of an animal is pro-
duced out of the matter of the body, but when it reaches a certain level
of complexity it becomes a simple form, and its functions transcend the
influence of external physical objects. Somehow its action is realised in
the corporeal matter of the body, but still the acts are simple in a way that
is repugnant to extended matter. How should these ideas be understood?
Olivi does not provide us with a detailed discussion of the essence of
the animal soul, but he makes several claims which complete and compli-
cate the picture. He argues that:
1. The sensitive soul is simple, yet
2. it has formal parts by which it informs the organs of the body.
3. The sensitive soul is the form of the whole body, yet
4. it informs principally the heart and only secondarily the rest of the body,
and
5. it animates the body by mediation of the spiritus animalis.

passage concerns non-human animals. Soon afterwards Olivi explains how the explanation
is different for human beings because they have also spiritual matter (ibid., 402 & 500).
the animal soul 83

At the outset, it is difficult to see how these five claims can be combined in
order to form a coherent theory of the essence of the animal soul. As Olivi
presents them in various contexts and gives different argumentative roles
to them, they are not necessarily even meant to convey a theoretical view,
and the texts in which they appear must be approached with caution. Yet,
I tend to think that Olivi had a more or less developed view about the
nature of the animal soul. It was an eclectic combination of Aristotelian
hylomorphism and the medical theories of his time, and the five claims
are simply different aspects of the soul and its relation to the body. The
simplicity of the soul and its unity with the body are explained from a
metaphysical point of view by appealing to Aristotelian hylomorphism,
and the physiological side of the story makes use of the spiritus animalis
and the primacy of the heart. Olivis view includes some interpretative
problems, and it is not completely clear whether the metaphysical and the
physiological aspects can coexist in a philosophically sound theory, but
historically speaking this kind of eclectic combination was quite typical
in the thirteenth century.
Let us begin by looking more closely at the first two claims. We have
already seen that Olivi conceives of the sensitive soul of non-human ani-
mals as simplein other words, it is indivisible and unextended. How-
ever, he also argues that it has formal parts which inform the different
organs of the body. The following text is illuminating:
A soul of a plant or a soul of an animal does not transmit all its actions to
every part [of the body] [...] Therefore, I seek the reason why it does not
transmit all its actions. And certainly the cause is that not every part [of the
body] has all the powers of the soulthat is, not every part is informed by
all the powers of the soul. For, the power of vision does not inform the ears
but the eyes; if it were to inform the ears in a similar way as it informs the
eyes, it would see with the ears as well as with the eyes. Therefore, the cause
of the soul not transmitting all its actions is that it does not inform every
part [of the body] by the whole of its informative and active power.12
Although the soul is simple, it has distinct powers by which it informs the
organs of the body. The rationale behind this idea is the obvious fact that

12Anima plantae et animalis non communicat omnes actiones suas cuilibet parti [...]
Quaero igitur causam quare non cuilibet communicat omnes actiones. Et certe, causa est,
quia quaelibet pars non habet omnes potentias eius, id est, quia non informatur ab omnibus
potentiis eius; potentia enim visiva non informat aurem, sed oculum; si enim informaret sic
aurem sicut oculum, sic videret per aurem sicut per oculum. Ergo causa non-communicandi
omnes actiones suas est, quia non secundum totam suam vim informativam et activam
informat quamlibet partem [...] (SummaII q.51 app., 16162.)
84 chapter three

the powers of the soul are not realised in the whole body but only in their
own organs. Animals see with their eyes and hear with their earsnot the
other way around.
Thus, Olivi accepts both claims (1) and (2): the soul is simple, and yet it
informs different organs of the body by different powers. Olivis concep-
tion of the human soul enables us to understand how these ideas can
be reconciled. As we have seen, he thinks that simplicity does not mean
lack of substantial parts. The animal soul is simple although it has many
substantial parts which perfect distinct organs of the body:
Forms or formal natures perfect the whole matter by themselves (if they are
simple) or by their parts (if they are composed). The nature of the sensitive
[soul or part of the soul], which aggregates in itself the common sense and
particular senses, is of this kind. Also the organisation of the body, which
aggregates in itself all the partial forms of the organs and members, is of
this kind. One who says that a form which perfects diverse parts of matter
by its diverse parts is an extended form does not seem to understand what
he is saying, because this does not follow unless the parts of the form are in
the parts of the matter under extension or as extended. Sight, hearing, and
taste are not in the parts of the body in this way, because they are simple
and spiritual forms.13
According to the next claim (3), the soul informs the whole body.
There are several arguments Olivi gives in favour of this viewin fact,
he devotes an entire question to the issuebut we do not need to enter
into the details of the arguments. It suffices to know that he considers it
necessary that the soul informs the whole body because otherwise the
integrity of the body could not be accounted for, and it would not be alive
as a whole.14 The soul unifies distinct parts of the body into one integrated
being and vivifies the whole body.
The combination of (2) and (3) is not problematic in the case of human
beings, because the various powers of the human soul are substantially
united in the spiritual matter. The soul in itself has the unity which renders

13[...] formae aut naturae formales, quae per se, si sunt simplices, vel per suas partes,
si sunt compositae, perficiunt totam materiam. Et talis est natura sensitiva aggregans in
se tam sensum communem quam sensus particulares, talis etiam est organizatio corporis
aggregans in se omnes formas partiales organorum et membrorum. Dicens autem quod
forma quae per diversas partes sui perficit diversas partes materiae suae est forma extensa
non videtur se ipsum intelligere, quia hoc nullo modo sequitur, nisi quando partes formae
in partibus materiae sunt sub extensione seu extensae. Visus autem et auditus et gustus
non sunt sic in partibus corporis, cum sint formae simplices et spirtuales. (SummaII q.54,
28283.)
14See SummaII q.49, 810.
the animal soul 85

it capable of uniting the parts of the body together. However, in the case
of non-human animals the combination is trickier. The animal soul is
nothing but an aggregate of its powers,15 and it does not contain spiritual
matter. Thus, it is difficult to see the basis of the substantial unity of the
soul, which would enable it to unite the parts of the body. In fact, Olivi
seems to think that the unity of the animal soul depends on the unity of
the body, and not the other way round as in the case of human beings.
The previous quotation shows that the body is already an integrated
whole due to the highest corporeal form. Yet, the animal soul should be
considered as some kind of a whole, which brings the animal to its com-
plete integration and vivifies the body as a whole. Olivi does not offer an
explanation to this problem.
The next idea, item (4) of the above list, must be understood from the
point of view of the medieval physiological theory. Olivi argues that
the soul informs principally the heart (and other principal parts of
the bodyan expression that suggests the brain and other vital organs)
and only secondarily the rest of the body:
The soul informs and vivifies the principal and instrumental parts of the
body differently. It informs principally the heart and the brain, and then the
other principal parts without which it cannot remain in the body. It informs
less principally the hands and feet and other parts similar to them. [...] And
the soul vivifies the hands, the feet, and the like only by their connection to
the heart, and by the influx of the heart and soul to them.16
At the outset, this idea seems to be inconsistent with (3). If the soul is a
form of the body, it should be understood as a kind of structural principle
which actualises the body as the kind of body it is. An Aristotelian form
is not diffused throughout the body in any way; it is the essence of the
being, and it does not make sense to claim that the essence somehow
flows from the heart to the rest of the body. The reason for Olivi under-
lining the special type of connection between the soul and the principal

15See chapter four below.


16Anima differenter informat et vivificat partes corporis principales et partes instru-
mentales. Sicut enim anima principalius informat cor et cerebrum et deinde alia membra
principalia sine quibus in corpore subsistere non potest quam manus et pedes et con-
similia [...] Et sicut manus et pedes et consimilia non vivificat nisi per continuationem
earum ad cor et cordis et sui influxus ad eas [...] (SummaII q.53, 21314.) See also ibid.,
q.49, 22; q.51, 132; q.62, 59091; q.73, 88. The idea appears also in Avicenna: see Avi-
cenna latinus, Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus, ed. S.vanRiet (Louvain/Leiden:
E.Peeters/E.J.Brill, 196872) (hereafter Shif De an.) 5.7, 17677, and it has Aristotelian
background in De motu animalium 10, 703a4b1; Met. 7.10, 1035b2030.
86 chapter three

parts of the body is the empirical fact that animals die if the heart or
brain is destroyed, but they may stay alive if some less important part is
cut off. The existence of the soul or the connection between the soul and
the body is dependent on the principal organs, although it is the form of
the whole body.
Olivis idea seems to be that the soul is the form of the whole body, but
its vivifying function resides in the heart and is dispersed throughout the
body from there. However, sometimes he seems to equate the soul with
an influx from the heart. For instance, in one of the arguments which is
designed to prove that the soul informs all the parts of the body he says
that:
the natural connection of all the parts of the body to the soul and to the
heart shows that the soul is the form of the whole body. [...] All the parts
[of the body] are connected to the heart so as to participate in its life by the
mediation of the heart and its influx. However, the life of the heart is the
same as the soul, or it is an internal and simple act of the soul which flows
from it as if from an immediate form.17
In order to understand Olivis position we have to note that (4) is based on
medieval medical theory, according to which fine corporeal matter called
spiritus vitalis originates in the heart, and flows to the whole body through
the arteries, thus vivifying it. Spiritus vitalis flows also to the brain, where
it is further refined and turned into spiritus animalis, which is dispersed to
the body through the nerves and which accounts for the functions of the
animal soul. This Galenic theory of a physical spirit which fills the blood
vessels and, in a refined form, the nerves and the ventricles of the brain
originated in the Stoic conception of pneuma, and it was further devel-
oped by Arabic authors and transmitted to the Latin world by translations
in the twelfth century.18
Olivi accepts the medical theory of the corporeal spirit as the carrier of
the sensitive powers of the soulthat is, he accepts item(5) of the above

17Quarto ostendit hoc ordo naturalis connexionis omnium partium corporis ad ani-
mam et ad cor. [...] Item, omnes partes [corporis] connectuntur cordi, ut ipso et eius
influxu intermediante participent vitam eius; sed vita eius est idem quod anima aut est
actus eius internus et simplex manans ab ea sicut a forma immediata. (SummaII q.49,
11.) This passage is ambiguous because it is not obvious whether the pronouns (eius) refer
to the heart or to the soul.
18For the medical theory of spiritus animalis, see RuthE.Harvey, The Inward Wits: Psy-
chological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (London: The Warburg Institute,
1975).
the animal soul 87

list19but he interprets the theory in a special way. In question seven


of his third quodlibet he addresses a question concerning the possibility
of two bodies existing simultaneously in the same place. He answers in
the positive, against Aristotelian physics.20 He claims that there are many
ways in which two bodies can occupy the same place. One of them is
important from our perspective:
Fifth, from the diffusion of the spirits to the whole body. The vital and ani-
mal vigour is derived from the heart and dispersed to the members of the
body by the spirits. Although there are channels in the body, nevertheless it
seems that the spirits enter into the density of the flesh and nerves in such
a way that the spirits are in the same location (simul) as them.21
This passage draws on the theory of the spiritus vitalis (or spiritus ani-
malisOlivi does not seem to care about this distinction) but deviates
somewhat from the standard theory: the spiritus is not confined to the
arteries and nerves but penetrates the whole body thus vivifying it.22
This is an instance of two bodies existing simultaneously in one and the
same place because the spiritus is material, a body of a kind. It is not an

19See SummaII q.49, 9; ibid., q.50 app., 6970; q.51, 112; q.58, 494 & 506; q.59, 528 &
550; q.62, 595; q.73, 97; Quodl. 1.4, 17.
20See, e.g., Phys. 4.1, 209a57; For discussion, see Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space &
Motion: Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel (London: Duckworth, 1988), 6078.
21Quinto, ex diffusione spirituum per totum corpus hominis per quos uigor uitalis
et animalis a corde ad membrum deducitur; licet enim in corpore sint pori, nihilominus
uidetur quod spiritus etiam subintrent densitatem carnis et neruorum, ita quod sint simul
cum eis. (Quodl. 3.7, 186.)
22For instance, Avicenna thinks that the spiritus is confined to the cavities of the organ-
ism (Shif De an. 5.8, 175; Alain de Libera, Le sens commun au XIIIe sicle: De Jean de
La Rochelle Albert le Grand, Revue de metaphysique et de morale 4 (1991): 48283). The
same idea is adhered to in De differentia spiritus et animae, a short work which was written
in Arabic by Costa ben Luca (a.k.a. Qusta ibn Luqa) probably during the last third of the
9th century and translated into Latin by John of Seville during the 12th century. The work
was enormously popular in the Latin West: it circulated with the works of Aristotle, and
statutes from the middle of the 13th century attest to its use in universities. For discussion,
English translation, and the edition of the Latin translations of Costa ben Lucas work,
see Judith Carol Wilcox, The Transmission and Influence of Qusta ibn Lucas On the Dif-
ference Between Spirit and the Soul, an unpublished dissertation (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1985).
Interestingly enough, Olivis conception of the spiritus resembles in certain respects the
Stoic concept of pneuma. Of course this is not a surprise given that the Latin term spiritus
was originally used to translate the Stoic term, but it is somewhat staggering to find a 13th
century author who does not only accept the medieval medical theory about spiritus but
also some of the features of the distant ancestor of that theory. According to the Stoics, a
special property of pneuma is that it can be in the same place with the corporeal matter
of the body. Pneuma animates the body, vivifies it, and bestows it with sensitivity. See, e.g.,
Anthony Long, Stoic Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 22939.
88 chapter three

immaterial substance but very fine matter, although strictly speaking it


does not obey the laws of matter, because it can occupy the same place
as, say, the muscles of the arm.
Olivi seems to think that the relation between the spiritus and the sen-
sitive soul is a very close one. We can obtain some idea of this relation by
looking at a passage where he says that the sensitive soul has parts which
inform different parts of the animal body:
Therefore they say that the soul of an earthworm (annulosus) is actually
simple by lack of extension and of extended parts, but, nevertheless, it really
has in itself parts which relate it (respicit) to diverse parts of its extended
body. This is why (they say) we also see in perfect animals that the sensitive
soul informs one part of the body by the auditory power, another part by
the power of vision, and so on with the others [...] However, in this respect
annular animals and animals whose parts live when disconnected are differ-
ent from animals whose parts cannot live when disconnected: in the latter
case all the parts of the body are virtually connected to one [part of the
body], without the influence of which they cannot participate in the soul.
In that one part, the power is in such a high degree of simplicity and unity
that if that part is divided, it corrupts straightaway because it totally loses
its power. In the former group of animals, the parts of the soul and parts of
its body do not have such a unity or such a connection to any one part of
the body or to the soul.23
The immediate context of this passage is to solve the often repeated prob-
lem which arises from the observation that parts of a worm continue to
live even after the worm has been torn into several pieces. The explana-
tion Olivi gives for this phenomenon is that in the case of worms the dif-
ferent parts of the body are not connected to a single centre from which
the vivifying influence of the soul is dispersed, whereas in higher animals

23Isti igitur dicunt quod sic anima annulosorum actu est simplex per carentiam exten-
sionis et partium extensarum quod nihilominus vere habet intra se partes secundum quas
respicit diversas partes corporis sui extensi; unde, ut dicunt, nos videmus etiam in ani-
malibus perfectis quod anima sensitiva aliam partem corporis informat per potentiam
auditivam, aliam per visivam et sic de aliis [...] In hoc tamen est differentia animalium
annulosorum et eorum quorum partes vivunt divisae ab iis quorum partes divisae vivere
non possunt quod in istis omnes partes corporis continuantur virtualiter ad unam sine
cuius influentia animam participare non possunt. Et in illa una parte est virtus in tali
altitudine simplicitatis et unitatis quod, si pars illa dividatur, statim corrumpitur, pro eo
quod totaliter deficit a suo vigore. In illis vero aliis partes animae et partes corporis eius
non habent tantam unitatem nec tantam colligationem ad aliquam unam partem corporis
et animae [...] (SummaII q.31, 569.) See also ibid., q.49, 1415; q.59, 539; q.73, 88. Despite
the impersonal expression, it is beyond doubt that Olivi accepts this idea.
the animal soul 89

(including human beings) they are. Thus, if my hand is cut off, it dies
because it loses its connection to my heart; but pieces of a worm do not
die because their body does not have any centre which is the primary
seat of the soul. On the basis of Olivis ideas, we can conclude that my
hand dies because it does not receive the spiritus vitalis/animalis from the
heart, but in the case of worms the spiritus is diffused to the whole body
homogenously and not dependent on any central organ.
We can see that Olivi adheres to the medical theory of his time. How-
ever, it is not clear how the idea about the dispersion of the vivifying influ-
ence of the soul through the spiritus vitalis/animalis can be conflated with
the Aristotelian idea that the soul is the form of the body. That is, how
can (3) be compatible with the combination of (4) and (5)? It seems to me
that it cannot, at least if (3) is understood in a strictly Aristotelian man-
ner. In this respect, Olivi seems to put forth an eclectic view which incor-
porates some features from both Aristotelian hylomorphism and Arabic
medical theory.
Olivis eclecticism is not surprising, though. First, the idea that the cor-
poreal spirit functions as a mediator between the soul and the body was
typical in medieval philosophical psychology before the breakthrough of
Aristotelianism in the middle of the thirteenth century, and it did not
disappear abruptly.24 And second, Olivi defends the plurality of substan-
tial forms. The central feature of this doctrine is that the soul is not a
structural principle of the body because the body is already structured by
the corporeal forms before the soul is elevated from it. The animal soul
is a higher principle than the corporeal forms of the body: The soul of
a brute animal is naturally superior to its body and the corporeal forms
of the body.25 It only vivifies the body and provides it with psychologi-
cal functions. From this point of view, it is only natural to think that the

24Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon


Press, 2004), 21718; Boyd H. Hill Jr., The Grain and the Spirit in Mediaeval Anatomy,
Speculum 40:1 (1965): 6466. This idea was criticised heavily by Aquinas, who does not
seem to be very fascinated by the medical theory. There are only three concordances of
the term spiritus animalis and eight concordances of the term spiritus vitalis in the whole
Corpus Thomisticum and only one of them is directly related to psychological issues
although it must be admitted that this concordance explicitly states that the spirit is the
proximate instrument of the soul (Thomas Aquinas, Commentum in quartum librum Sen-
tentiarum magistri Petri Lombardi, in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia 7/2 (Parma:
Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1858), d. 49, q.3, a. 2).
25[...] anima etiam eorum est naturaliter superior suo corpore et corporalibus suis
formis. (SummaII q.115, 320.)
90 chapter three

proximate instrument of the sensitive soul is the corporeal spirit, which


penetrates the whole body.26
Even though the details of Olivis view of the metaphysics of the animal
soul remain somewhat obscure, it is clear that he stresses the simplicity
of the animal soul in order to provide non-human animals with an ability
to perceive and to perform other psychological functions. Whatever the
exact nature of this simplicity, one thing seems to be clear: the bodily
changes which realise the acts of the sensitive powers of the soul take
place in the spiritus animalis, and because it is a peculiar kind of matter,
it is not repugnant to simplicity. Non-human animals are thus capable of
performing cognitive acts, and Olivis theory of perception applies also to
them.

26Sometimes Olivi seems to indicate that the spiritus animalis is the immediate matter
of the sensitive (part of the) soul. For instance, when he speaks about one of the powers
of the soul, he says that: Exigitur enim ad suum debitum statum debita quantitas et dis-
positio organi et debita dispositio et existentia spirituum animalium, pro eo quod ista, in
quantum talia, sunt eius materia immediata. (SummaII q.59, 550.)
Chapter four

Perceptual Powers of the Soul

Now that we have started to understand Olivis conception of the


nature of the soul (both human and non-human) and its relation to body,
there remains only one topic to consider before turning to his theory
of perception. Namely, we have to examine the relation between the
soul and its cognitive powers and the relation of those powers to each
other.
In the first section of the present chapter I shall point out that Olivi
rejects the complete identification of the soul with its powers, but he
nevertheless thinks that the powers are more than accidents of the soul.
He argues that the powers of the soul are constitutive parts of the soul
and that the soul is an aggregate of its powers. We have already seen
Olivi arguing that the soul is composed of several partial forms, and even
though he often writes only about two main partsthe intellectual and
the sensitivein fact he thinks that the powers of the soul are the partial
forms thereof. In sections two and three I shall deal with Olivis argumen-
tation concerning the mutual relations between the cognitive powers of
the sensitive soul. He argues that a perfect animal has altogether six per-
ceptual powers: the five external senses, and the common sense, which
combines the information from the external senses. I shall analyse his
argumentation in favour of the position that the external senses are not
different modalities of one perceptual capacity but distinct powers of the
soul. Finally, I shall argue that Olivi sees a close functional unity between
the common sense and the external senses.

1.Powers as Constitutive Parts of the Soul

Olivi construes his conception of the relation between the soul and its
powers in relation to two opposing theories. According to the first theory,
the powers of the soul are identical to the essence of the soul. They do
not differ from each other essentially but only insofar as they pertain to
different objects and have different kinds of acts. The other theory claims
92 chapter four

that the powers are accidents of the soul and therefore differ from each
other and from the substance of the soul.1
Olivi rejects both of these views. With respect to the first one he argues
as follows:
Although I find this view very difficult to disprove efficaciously, it does not
seem to be perfectly intelligible. For, it is impossible that a thing which is
identical with itself (idem a se ipso) could be made actually separate or that
it could be really and essentially distinguished from itself. Therefore, if God
can make two things essentially and in reality separate and distinct from
each other, these things can never be the same without any real difference;
they can be the same only by some composition or union. If, therefore, God
can make the intellect, the will, and the rest of the powers essentially dis-
tinct and separate in reality, they will never be identical without any real
difference. But the first is possible for God.2
There is a real and essential difference between the various powers of
the soul, and therefore they cannot be identical to each other or equated
with the essence of the soul. The powers of the soul are not only different
aspects of essentially one and the same thing, but really separate parts,
which can (at least in principle) exist independently of each other.
The other theory is easier to disprove, according to Olivi. The central
idea in his argumentation is that because the accidents of the soul do not

1 Olivi presents the first theory in Summa II q. 54, 23643 and the second in ibid.,
23036 & 248. The former view was defended by William of Auvergne (De anima, in Opera
omnia, vol. 2, ed. F. Hotot (Orlans-Paris, 1674; reprint Frankfurt am Main, 1963), 3.6,
pp. 9193) and later by Vital du Four (De rerum principio q. 11, 46869). The latter seems
to be the view of Aquinas, as he contrasts the powers of the soul and the essential fea-
tures and/or the essence of the soul, thus rendering the powers accidents or properties
(proprietates) of the soul. See Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de anima, ed.
B.-C. Bazn, Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita 24.1 (Rome/
Paris: Commissio Leonina/Les ditions du Cerf, 1996) (hereafter QDA) q. 12. For discussion
and references, see Dag Nikolaus Hasse, The Souls Faculties, in The Cambridge History of
Medieval Philosophy, vol. 1, ed. R. Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010), 30510; King,
The Inner Cathedral, 25374; Alain Boureau, De vagues individus: La condition humaine
dans la pense scolastique, Histoire 93 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2008), 13154; Partee, Peter
John Olivi, 25153; Bettoni, Le dottrine filosofiche, 38997.
2Iste autem modus, licet meo iudicio ad improbandum efficaciter sit valde difficilis,
non tamen videtur bene intelligibilis. Impossibile enim est quod idem a se ipso possit fieri
diversum in actu seu a se realiter et essentialiter distingui. Quaecunque igitur a Deo pos-
sunt fieri secundum essentiam et rem diversa et distincta nunquam possunt nec poterunt
esse idem per omnimodam indifferentiam realem, sed solum per aliquam compositionem
vel unionem. Si igitur intellectus et voluntas et ceterae potentiae possunt a Deo fieri secun-
dum rem et essentiam distinctae et diversae, nunquam secundum se poterunt esse idem
per omnimodam indifferentiam realem; sed primum Deo est possibile. (Summa II q. 54,
243.) See ibid., 24348, 27383; q. 51 app., 19192.
perceptual powers of the soul 93

belong to its essence, many properties which he conceives of as being


essential to the soul would turn out to be accidental and, as it were, exter-
nal to it:
It is certain that the soul understands and loves itself and other things by
its powers. If the powers were accidents, or completely different in essence
from the substance of the soul, understanding and loving oneself and other
things would be, as it were, accidentally attributed to the soul. For, the soul
would not properly be the one who understands or loves itself or other
things; rather, these would belong to some of its accidents.3
Olivi rejects this position also on metaphysical grounds and by appealing
to the contents of our self-cognition and to experiential considerations:
our relation to our mental powers is so intimate that they cannot be acci-
dental to us. They have to be part of our substance.4
Having rejected these two views, Olivi finds a middle ground between
them: the powers are constitutive parts of the soul. They differ from the
soul as parts differ from the whole, and they differ from each other just
like a hand differs from another hand.5 The comparison of the powers of
the soul to the parts of the body is illuminating. The parts of the body are
not accidents of the body, the body is not something that underlies and
supports its parts, and the parts are not identical with the body as a whole
either. Rather, the body is an aggregate of its parts. Similarly the soul is
nothing but an aggregate of its powers, which are substantially united to
each other.6 The powers are not accidents, because they are substantial
parts, but they cannot be completely equated with the whole substance
of the soul or with each other, because none of the powers signify the
whole soul.

3Certum est enim quod anima per has potentias cognoscit et diligit se et alia. Si
autem ista sunt accidentia seu omnino aliud secundum essentiam a substantia animae,
tunc cognoscere et diligere se et alia quasi per accidens dicentur de ipsa. Non enim ipsa
proprie erit cognoscens et diligens se vel alia, sed quaedam eius accidentia. (Summa II
q. 54, 251.)
4Olivis argumentation can be found in Summa II q. 54, 24852 & 26072. He also
rejects a view which is quite similar to his own: the substance of the soul is the root of its
powers in such a way that the powers are the same as the substance of the soul, but they
are different essentially and by definition. Bettoni points out that this is Bonaventures
view (Bettoni, Le dottrine filosofiche, 393; see also Boureau, De vagues individus, 13645).
Olivi criticises Bonaventure on metaphysical grounds (Summa II q. 54, 25356).
5[...] quod potentiae sint partes animae constitutivae et quod ita differunt ab anima
sicut pars a suo toto, a se ipsis vero sicut pars a parte vel ut manus a manu. (Summa II q.
54, 253.) See also ibid., 25556; Ep. 6, 50.
6In tota parte intellectiva non est dare alias formas aut formales essentias quam for-
mas et formales essentias potentiarum. (Summa II q. 51 app, 108.)
94 chapter four

We get a better picture of the various aspects of Olivis view by looking


at the following text, which is the most detailed definition he gives of the
nature of the powers of the soul:
[powers] are constitutive parts of the soul. They signify principally certain
formal natures, and they comprehend also a material aspect (ratione mate-
riam) in some way. They are called powers insofar as they signify a rela-
tion to an act and object. They are partially the same as the substance and
essence of the soul, and partially they are differentnot in such a way that
they would add something real to the substance of the soul, but because
they do not signify the whole substance of the soul. This is the way in which
a part is said to differ from the whole.7
There are several important points in this text. First, Olivi says that the
powers of the soul are parts and formal natures, by which he means that
they are forms. This idea goes well together with the doctrine of the plu-
rality of substantial forms. Even though Olivis view on the substantial
unity between the soul and the body is based on a distinction between
the sensitive part and the intellectual part of the soul, it seems that these
parts themselves are clusters of distinct powers. Ultimately, the powers
are the partial forms which together make the one whole form of the soul.
Second, the powers of the soul include a material aspect. We have already
seen that one of the reasons for spiritual matter being a necessary con-
stituent of the human soul is that the ability to act and undergo changes
requires potentiality.8 Even though the powers of the soul are principally
forms, they connote also the matter in which they are realised. The third
important idea in the preceding quote is that the powers of the soul are
called potentiae (which has a connotation with potentiality) because they
are spoken of with respect to the acts, actuality, and objects. The parts of
the soul are powers insofar as the soul is capable of acting by them.
However, the most important aspect of Olivis view is that he under-
stands the powers of the soul as being essentially different from each other.
Even though they come together to form a substantial unity, they retain a
certain level of independency with respect to each other. I emphasise this
because sometimes it seems that Olivi gives more unity to the powers of

7[...] sunt partes animae constitutivae, dicentes principaliter aliquam naturam for-
malem et comprehendentes aliquo modo in sui ratione materiam, sed dictae potentiae,
prout cum his dicunt relationem ad actum et ad obiectum, et sic quod sunt partim idem
cum substantia et essentia animae, partim diversa, non per hoc quod aliquid reale addant
ultra substantiam animae, sed quia non dicunt totam substantiam animae. Hic est enim
modus quo pars dicitur differre a suo toto. (Summa II q. 54, 25859.)
8See chapter one, section one above.
perceptual powers of the soul 95

the soul than he actually does. In particular, it may seem that he conceives
of them as different aspects of the soul, which are not really distinct from
the soul but rather different ways in which we can think of the soul. In
other words, one might think that the soul is similar to God, whose intel-
lect and will are not really distinct from each other. The technical term
that Olivi employs in discussing Gods powers is rationes reales.9 This con-
cept allows him to explain how we can truthfully think of various aspects
of objects which are in reality indivisible. For instance, we may think of
the essence of a particular object without thinking of its individuality. Our
ability to think these two aspectsrationes realesof one and the same
object does not mean that they are distinct from each other in reality.10
Similarly, we can think of Gods will and intellect separately even though
they are not really distinct in God:
When I say that these rationes are not the same, I do not mean that they are
not absolutely the same thing and wholly the same in reality. I mean that
none of these rationes as such signify the divine essence in the totality of
its perfection or in its whole signification. Each of them signifies the same
whole, but none of them signify it totally. When I say that one ratio is not
another and that they are not identical but diverse, I refer to this defect of
the totality or the lack of the signification of the whole.11
Our concepts (will and intellect) refer to different aspects of God. They
are not arbitrary, because these aspects, or rationes reales, are real in the
sense that they are based on the essence of God. We are also capable
of making conceptual or mental distinctions that are not based on the
nature of the object, but Olivi makes it clear that these kinds of distinc-
tions are not rationes reales: I said rationes reales, because also some
[other] concepts are attributed to things, concepts which do not name
anything real or anything that is in the thing itself (a parte rei) but only


9For discussion, see Bettoni, Le dottrine filosofiche, 23643; Piron, Parcours dun intel-
lectuel franciscain, chapter 2.1.
10Summa II q. 13, 249.
11 Quando enim dicimus quod rationes in quantum tales non sunt eedem rationes, non
intendimus simpliciter significare per hoc quin sint simpliciter eadem res et quin sint reali-
ter omnino idem, sed intendimus significare per hoc quod nulla earum in quantum talis
dicit divinam essentiam secundum totalitatem sue perfectionis seu secundum totam suam
significatam. Unde omnes dicunt idem totum sed nulla earum dicit idem totaliter. Defec-
tum ergo totalitatis seu totalis significationis qui per alias rationes suppletur intendimus
significare per hoc quod dicimus quod una ratio est non est alia et quod non sunt eedem
sed diverse. Sensus enim est: una non est alia, idest una non dicit illud totalitatis quod alia
dicit (Summa I q. 6, B.A.V. Borgh. 358, fol. 165ra, quoted in Piron, Parcours dun intellectuel
franciscain, chapter 2.1.) See also Summa II q. 7, 143; Olivi, Quid ponat ius, 318.
96 chapter four

in the intellect, or according to the intellect.12 Nowadays we might say


that the Morning star and Evening star are concepts which do not sig-
nify anything real on the planet Venus, and as such they are not rationes
reales. The distinction between Morning star and Evening star is concep-
tual because it is not based on the essence of Venus. By contrast, there is
more than a conceptual distinction between the powers of God (or the
essence and individuality of a particular object), because the will and the
intellect are real aspects of God, and the distinction between them is not
an invention of our intellectand yet the reality of these different aspects
does not mean that there is any real plurality in God.
It is not easy to see what exactly constitutes the difference between
real and conceptual rationes, but the idea seems to be that the former
are partial definitions, which define the whole thing correctly but not
completely, whereas the latter are not definitions in the strict sense of
the word because they are not based on the essence of the thing itself.
The Morning star is not a definition of Venus, but we can give a true
(although partial) definition of Venus by referring either to its individual-
ity or to its essence, because Venus is an individual, and it has a particular
essence. As Sylvain Piron has pointed out, rationes reales do not signify
modi intelligendi but modi intelligibilitatis:
When two rationes are comprehended in one simple essence, this essence
can be understood according to one of these rationes without understanding
it according to the other; although the essence is not understood accord-
ing to its whole intelligibility, unless it is understood according to all the
rationes which it has.13
The rationes reales can be understood as modes of partial intelligibility,
which are based on the essence of the object in such a way that there is,
in the object, a kind of aptitude to be understood in the ways represented
by them.14
Now, on the basis of the foregoing one might be tempted to think that
the powers of the human soul are just like Gods powers: rationes reales,

12Dixi autem rationum realium, quia quaedam rationes sunt rebus attributae quae
nihil dicunt reale seu a parte rei, sed solum a parte intellectus seu secundum intellectum.
(Summa II q. 54, 247.)
13Quando enim in una simplici essentia duae rationes comprehenduntur, illa essen-
tia potest intelligi secundum unam illarum rationum, non intelligendo eam secundum
alteram, quamvis secundum totam intelligibilitatem suam non intelligatur, nisi intelligatur
secundum omnes rationes suas quas habet. (Summa I q. 2, 49798 (Jansen, q. 1).) See also
Summa II q. 7, 144; ibid., q. 13, 251; Summa I q. 6, B.A.V. Borgh. 358, fol. 165va.
14Piron, Parcours dun intellectuel franciscain, chapter 2.1.
perceptual powers of the soul 97

which do not imply any real distinction within the soul but are only dif-
ferent aspects thereof.15 This is true in the sense that the soul is one sub-
stance, which is not multiplied by the fact that it contains several powers,
and sometimes Olivi says that we can think the whole soul through its
various powers.16 However, there is a clear difference between the pow-
ers of God and those of created beings. In the case of God, the powers
do not signify any essential distinctions, but in the case of created beings
they do because the powers of the creatures are essentially different from
each otherGod could create one power of the soul without creating oth-
ers, but Gods own intellect and will cannot be separated in this manner.17
Thus, when Olivi writes that it is not necessary that every diversity of
real rationes makes a real composition or essential diversity,18 he seems
to leave room for cases in which there is at least some kind of essential
diversity. When we think of the partial forms which constitute the soul,
we distinguish them from each other because they are essentially distinct.
However, they are not distinct in such a way that they would jeopardise
the substantial unity of the soul by making the soul more like pile of
stones than one complete entity.

2.The External Senses

There are two possible ways to construe the relation between the various
external senses, on the one hand, and between the external senses and the
common sense on the other. One of them is that these powers are not dis-
tinct in reality. There is only one perceptual capacity, which has different
modes of acting (represented by the external senses). Although Aristotle
is not explicit on the matter, it is widely accepted among modern scholars
that he did not understand the five external senses as being independent
powers but rather asto use a famous metaphor that was introduced by
Alexander of Aphrodisiasthe radii of a circle, the centre of which is the
koin aisthsis (the predecessor of the power that was to become the Latin
sensus communis). There is only one perceptual capacity, and it perceives

15Bettoni, Le dottrine filosofiche, 396.


16Summa II q. 54, 274.
17See footnote 2 above. Olivi also argues that if the intellectual soul does not have
essentially distinct parts, it is necessarily the form of the body (see chapter two, foot-
note51). We have already seen that this position is untenable, according to him.
18[...] non oportet quod omnis diversitas rationum realium faciat compositionem
realem seu diversitatem essentialem (Summa II q. 54, 280; emphasis mine.)
98 chapter four

different qualities as if through different channels. The external senses


represent separate modes of perceiving external things, and they are not
independent powers.19 The same view was presented also by some medi-
eval authors. Avicenna, for instance, thought that there is only one per-
ceptual capacity in the soul and that the external senses are only different
aspects of it: And this power is the one that is called the common sense,
which is the centre of all the senses, and from which branches are drawn
and to which the senses return, and it is that which truly senses.20 The
external senses are not independent powers but branches of the common
sense. Activity of any of the senses is in fact also activity of the common
sense, and the perceptual capacity as a whole does the perceiving.
In contrast to Avicenna, many Latin scholars of the thirteenth century
adhered to the alternative view according to which the perceptual power
of the soul is not one. The soul contains several different powers, which
can, at least in principle, act independently of each other. One of the rea-
sons to hold this position was probably related to discussions concerning
the perception of perception, which was considered as an essential fea-
ture of the ability to perceive. The idea that no sensitive power is capable
of apprehending its own activity was widespread, and thus the power
that perceives the activity of the senses was often thought to be distinct
from them.

19 The most important passages in which Aristotle presents the idea of the unity of the
perceptual capacity are DA 3.12 & 7; Sens. 7, 449a519; and De somno et vigilia (hereafter
Somn.), 2, 455a1222. For discussion, see, e.g., Heller-Roazen, The Inner Touch, 2155; Charles
Kahn, Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotles Psychology, Archiv fr Geschichte der
Philosophie 48 (1966): 5259 (reprinted in Articles on Aristotle 4: Psychology & Aesthetics,
ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield & R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth 1979): 131); Juha Sihvola,
The Problem of Consciousness in Aristotles Psychology, in Consciousness: From Percep-
tion to Reflection in the History of Philosophy, ed. S. Heinmaa, V. Lhteenmki & P. Remes,
Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 5 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 4965. The
metaphor of the radii of a circle was first suggested by Alexander of Aphrodisias. See Heller-
Roazen, The Inner Touch, 4749; Cristina DAncona, Degrees of Abstraction in Avicenna:
How to Combine Aristotles De anima and the Enneads, in Theories of Perception, ed. S.
Knuuttila & P. Krkkinen, 4771. For later developments of Aristotelian ideas, see, e.g., Simo
Knuuttila, Aristotles Theory of Perception and Medieval Aristotelianism, in ibid., 817.
20Et haec virtus est quae vocatur sensus communis, quae est centrum omnium sen-
suum et a qua derivantur rami et cui reddunt sensus, et ipsa est vere quae sentit. (Shif
De an. 4.1, 5.) The idea of the spiritus animalis as a physiological vehicle for the psychologi-
cal powers of the soul, which was employed by Avicenna among others, goes well with the
position that there is only one perceptual capacity: spiritus animalis comes from the brain
and is diffused to the sense organs through the nerves. It receives different complexiones
due to the organs in which it exists. In this way, there is one spirit which is essentially the
same, but it is diversified to different functions by the organs. (See, e.g., de Libera, Le sens
commun, 483; Harvey, The Inward Wits, 2130.)
perceptual powers of the soul 99

In the thirteenth century, Aristotle was sometimes interpreted as being


a proponent of the view that the external senses and the common sense
are distinct powers of the soul. This is quite understandable, given that
he often discusses the external senses as if they were not the same, and
he even provides a criterion for distinguishing the powers of the soul
which may be taken as entailing the distinction thereof. This criterion,
widely employed by medieval Aristotelians, is based on the differences
in the objects of apprehension. It claims that the powers of the soul are
diversified by their acts, which are in turn diversified by the objects that
cause the acts.21 Different kinds of perceptual qualities are apprehended
by different kinds of acts, and these acts must be brought about by dis-
tinct powers. This criterion was used to distinguish different modes of
perception from each other (seeing from hearing) and to indicate that
there must be several powers in the soul to perform these functions.
Colours and sounds do not directly affect the same perceptual capacity
but they pertain to different powers (sight and hearing) and affect the
common sense only through them. Following this lead, Aquinas thinks
that the external senses differ from each other and from the common
sense. There are altogether six perceptual powers in the soul: five exter-
nal senses and the common sense. These are in reality distinct from each
other, and the activity of the external senses is not the same as the activity
of the common sense.22
Olivi addresses the question concerning the distinctness of the per-
ceptual powers of the soul in questions 60 and 62 of the second book of

21 See, e.g., DA 2.4, 415a1622. The idea about the priority of objects to acts and acts to
powers was in general use in the Middle Ages. See, e.g., Anonymous, De potentiis animae
et obiectis, ed. D.A. Callus, in The Powers of the Soul: An Early Unpublished Text, Recher-
ches de thologie ancienne et mdivale 19 (1952): 14748; ST I.77.3.
22See, for example, ST I.78.4; Thomas Aquinas, QDA q. 13; Thomas Aquinas, Quaes-
tiones disputatae de veritate, cura et studio fratrum praedicatorum, Sancti Thomae de
Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita 22.2 (Rome: Ad Aanctae Sabinae/Editori
di San Tommaso, 1972) (hereafter QDV), q. 15.1 arg. 3 & ad 3. Occasionally Aquinas employs
the metaphor of a circle and radii (see, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones de quolibet, ed.
R.A. Gauthier, Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita 25 (Rome/
Paris: Commissio Leonina/ditions du Cerf, 1996), VII.1.2 ad 1; Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia
libri De anima, ed. R.A. Gauthier, Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII
P.M. edita 45.1 (Rome/Paris: Commissio Leonina/Vrin, 1984) (hereafter Sent. DA), 3.6), but
he also explicitly denies the theory that the powers are the same (Sentencia libri De sensu et
sensato, cura et studio fratrum praedicatorum, Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia iussu
Leonis XIII P.M. edita 45.2 (Rome/Paris: Commissio Leonina/Vrin, 1985) (hereafter Sent. De
sensu), 1.18). For discussion, see Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philo-
sophical Study of Summa theologiae Ia 7589 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002), 19596 &
footnote 26.
100 chapter four

Summa, but he touches the issue occasionally in other contexts as well.


He dissents from the view of Avicenna and agrees with Aquinas and oth-
ers, as he does not accept the unity of the perceptual powers of the soul.
He argues that the external senses are not different aspects of one percep-
tual capacity and denies the association of the common sense with the
external senses.23 The common sense and the external senses are separate
powers that differ from each other due to their particular and distinct
modes of acting that pertain to different kinds of objects. The plurality of
the external senses is also phenomenologically clear:
Sense experience proclaims the plurality of the senses and the powers of the
senses in three ways. First is the restriction of the senses to certain objects
and certain acts. For we see that the power which is in the eye cannot per-
ceive sounds, odours nor flavours, and neither can the sense of hearing per-
ceive light or colours but only audible [qualities].24
The second way is related to the organs of the senses, and the third
which I shall discuss belowis based on the nature of the acts in
themselves.
Although Olivi thinks that different senses pertain to different kinds
of perceptual qualities, it is not evident whether he accepts the criterion
according to which the plurality of powers can be inferred from the plu-
rality of kinds of perceivable objects. At the outset, he seems to straight-
forwardly reject it, because he claims that each of the external senses is
capable of apprehending objects which belong to different species and
genera. The bright light of the sun, the dim light of a candle, and the vari-
ous colours are all apprehended by the power of sight. Sight also perceives
transparency (perspicuitas transparentium), which belongs to yet another
genus than that of light and colour. Similarly, other senses are capable of
apprehending various kinds of objects that belong to different genera.25

23Summa II q. 60, 56973; ibid., q. 62, 58696. Sometimes Olivi employs Avicennas
illustration and speaks as if the external senses were branches of the common sense (ibid.,
q. 51 app., 194; q. 62, 592), but he does not accept the idea that there is only one perceptual
capacity which receives different modes of acting from the different sense organs: the
powers of the soul are not limited by their organs (see especially ibid., q. 62, 59293; q. 51
app., 15859). See chapter four below.
24Quod pluralitatem sensuum et potentiarum ipsorum sensualis experientia clamat et
hoc quoad tria. Primum est ipsorum limitatio ad determinata obiecta et ad determinatos
actus. Videmus enim quod potentia quae est in oculo non potest percipere sonos nec
odores nec sapores, nec auditus lucem et colores, sed sola audibilia. (Summa II q. 60,
57071.)
25Non omnis diversitatis speciei vel generis obiectorum probat vel includit diversi-
tatem potentiarum nostrarum; alias tot erunt in nobis potentiae intellectivae quot sunt
perceptual powers of the soul 101

As it is possible for one and the same power to apprehend different kinds
of objects, we cannot infer the diversity of the powers of the soul from the
diversity of objects.
However, sometimes Olivi suggests that the diversity of objects indi-
cates a diversity of senses: The diversity of the powers can be taken from
the diversity of objects when one of the powers is essentially limited to
one genus of objects and another power to another genus.26 In order
to belong to one genus, the objects must have some kind of underlying
similarity, but it is not clear whether Olivi thinks that the objects which
are apprehended by one of the external senses have this kind of similar-
ity or not. There are two options: either he thinks that the objects of one
sense are somehow similar to each other, in which case the senses can be
distinguished from each other on the basis of their objects; or the objects
themselves do not have anything in common, in which case the criterion
does not apply.
Olivi discusses at length a common denominator or common feature
(communis ratio) to which all the objects of one sense must pertain. Many
times he says that despite the diversity of the objects which can be appre-
hended by one sense (light, colour, and transparency in the case of sight),
there must exist a real unity between these objects. He admits that we
do not know what the common denominator is; we simply know that it
exists because we apprehend a diversity of objects by the same external
sense. Moreover, at one point he states that the common denominator
is a real property of the objects.27 Understood in this way, there really is
something in the objects themselves which makes them similar to each
other so that they can be perceived by one of the external senses. The fact

species et genera scibilium. Secundum hoc etiam quilibet sensus particularis esset plures
potentiae, quia nullus est quin habeat plura obiecta diversorum generum; lux enim et
color differunt genere. Multa etiam sunt species et genera sonorum, et multa sunt genera
tangibilium et gustabilium. (Summa II q. 55, 292.)
26Diversitas potentiarum tunc potest ex diversitate obiectorum accipi, quando una
earum est essentialiter limitata ad unum genus obiectorum et alia ad aliud. Ab illa etiam
generali unitate obiectorum potest argui unitas potentiae, ad cuius totalem ambitum
potentia secundum ultimatam et substantialem specificationem suam sumpta attingit, et
hoc uno modo sibi substantiali et specifico et non pluribus substantialibus modis diversi
generis vel speciei. (Summa II q. 61, 583.)
27Igitur sufficit quod ex specificatione potentiae seu ex aliquo uniformi respectu ad
eam sumatur una communis ratio omnium obiectorum suorum quae respectu immedia-
torum obiectorum aliquam naturam vel proprietatem realem ponit in obiectis secundum
quam conveniunt, licet illa saepe sit nobis incognita et innominata, nisi solum per respec-
tum ad potentiam cuius sunt obiecta, iuxta quod omnia obiecta visus vocamus visibilia et
auditus audibilia et tactus tangibilia. (Summa II q. 61, 584.)
102 chapter four

that different kinds of objects fall under the scope of one power would in
this case be only an indicator of some underlying similarity in the objects
themselves.
Olivi is meticulous in his attempt to find the common denominator
in the case of every external sense, but he failsexcept for in the case
of the sense of touch. This is interesting, given that it was precisely the
sense of touch which was so often a difficult issue for medieval philoso-
phers. There was an ongoing discussion concerning the unity of the sense
of touch, and no consensus was reached on whether it should be consid-
ered as one power or as a genus of several powers. The number of exter-
nal senses was regarded as disputable because it was thought that the
qualities that are perceptible by the sense of touch (hardness/softness,
heat/cold, etc.) are so different from each other that it is problematic to
relate their perception to a single power. The unity of the other senses was
generally considered unproblematic.28 Olivis thinking is an exception in
this regard. He made an ingenious move by claiming that the common
denominator which gathers together the various qualities that are per-
ceived by the sense of touch is their effect on the organ of touch (that is,
the flesh or the whole body of the perceiving subject) and its well-being.
All the qualities which are apprehended by touch affect the body of the
percipient in ways that either perfect or destroy it, and that is why those
qualities are perceived by one and the same sense. The sense of touch is
one power exactly because its objects have a common denominator, a
property that makes them similar to each other in the relevant respect.29
Finding a common denominator in the case of the other senses is
more problematic. To be sure, the various kinds of objects that pertain
to one of the external senses have at least one thing in common, namely,
they are all apprehended by one and the same sense. For instance, by

28See, e.g., Shif De an. 1.4, 8385; Avicenna, The Canon of Medicine (al-Qnn fl-tibb),
ed. L. Bakhtiar, trans. O.C. Gruner & M.H. Shah (Great Books of the Islamic World, inc.,
1999) (hereafter Canon), 8.1, 55455, 163. The same approach applies also to 13th cen-
tury authors. For instance, Pietro dAbanos thorough and well-known work Conciliator
contains a short discussion of the unity of the sense of touch (Pietro dAbano, Conciliator
differentiarum philosophorum et precipue medicorum (Venice: Juntas, 1565), fol. 64va). By
contrast, the work does not contain a similar discussion with regard to the other senses, at
least on the basis of the index of the renaissance edition. See also, e.g., Jean de la Rochelle,
Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae, 2.4.
29Summa II q. 61, 579, 585; Mikko Yrjnsuuri, Perceiving Ones Own Body, in Theories
of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. S. Knuuttila & P. Krkkinen,
Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 6 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 10116. Olivis
conception of the sense of touch is dealt with in detail in chapter 11, section four below.
perceptual powers of the soul 103

experience we know that colours, transparency, and light are perceived


by sight,30 but Olivi argues that the common denominator behind these
qualities is unknown to us. The same goes for the other senses. Thus, it
seems that Olivi wants to adhere to the view that there must be some
common denominator in the objects of each of the senses, although we
do not know what it is.
If we look closely at what Olivi says in the following passage, where he
most explicitly addresses this issue, we get a confusing picture about the
nature of this common feature:
The species and genera of sounds are manifold, and various are the genera
of touchable and tasteable [qualities]. One might say that they are not so
diverse that they would not be univocally under some common denomina-
tor of some very general or subaltern genus. But this too is false because
a ray or radiation of light that issues forth from fire or from the sun is not
univocal with it [viz. the light from which it issues] but is only analogical,
and still they both [viz. the ray and the light] are apprehended by sight.
Therefore, it suffices that they converge in some analogous property [...]
But what are these properties in themselves? Not all of them are known to
us or have a name, except in relation to the power to which [their appre-
hension] belongs. For instance, when we say that the property of visibility
is that in which all visible [qualities] converge in relation to sight, and the
property of touchability is that in which all tangible [qualities] converge in
relation to touch.31
The objects of sight cannot belong to the same genus generalissimus:
the radiation of light is only analogous to the light from which it issues.
Hence, in the end it seems that there is no need for any real similarity in
the qualities that are apprehended by one sense. They converge only in
some analogous property, which is in some cases unknown to us.

30Praeterea, perspicuitas transparentium differt genere a luce et colore, et tamen ipsa


vere videtur a visu penetrante et cernente perspicua. Quia tamen sub uno aspectu aspi
ciunt visum et aspiciuntur ab eo, ideo in una communi ratione visibilitatis conveniunt.
(Summa II q. 61, 584.)
31 Multa etiam sunt species et genera sonorum, et multa sunt genera tangibilium et
gustabilium. Si dicatur quod non sunt sic diversa quin in aliqua communi ratione alicuius
generis generalissimi vel subalterni univocentur: etiam hoc est falsum, quia radius seu
radiositas lucis igneae vel solaris non habet univocationem cum ipsa, sed solum ana-
logiam, et tamen utraque visu apprehenditur. Sufficit ergo quod in aliqua una ratione
analoga conveniant [...] Quaecunque autem sint secundum se huiusmodi rationes: nobis
tamen in omnibus non sunt notae vel nominatae nisi solum per respectum ad potentiam
cuius sunt; ut cum dicimus quod ratio visibilitatis est illud in quo conveniunt omnia visi-
bilia respectu visus, et ratio tangibilitatis est illud in quo respectu tactus omnia tangibilia
conveniunt [...] (Summa II q. 55, 29293.) See also ibid., q. 64, 606.
104 chapter four

Olivi makes recourse to our experience of our perceptual powers. Even


though we do not know the common denominator, we know that we per-
ceive certain objects by sight and others with the other senses. Despite his
principally positive stance towards the criterion of distinguishing external
senses from each other on the basis of their objects, he approaches the
issue from the point of view of powers and their acts, modes of acting,
and types of acts: It is impossible for a created being to be a principle of
acts or effects, which belong to different genera, by one power; thus we
deem the powers of the soul to be essentially distinct because they have
different acts.32 It is obvious that the difference in the acts is not due to
the objects they pertain to (even though, as we have seen, in many cases
this is also true). Olivis idea about what makes the acts different becomes
clearer if we look at the following passage:
Even though one power can produce acts which differ in species, it can-
not produce acts which differ in genera. This is because acts receive their
species from the objects or from their relation (habitudine) to the objects,
but they receive their genus from the power. [...] An illustration of this
(although not completely similar) can be given in the case of light, which
is generated by sunlight. It receives different shapes from vases that partici-
pate in the light while retaining the unity of specific clarity, which it receives
from the sunlight.33
Sunlight illuminates several dissimilar vases and thus generates shiny sur-
faces of different shapes. These lights are of a different species because
they have different shapes, but they remain in the same genus of light
because they are all generated by the sun. Similarly, the acts of one power
belong to the same genus (acts of seeing, or acts of understanding, for
example), but they can be different in kind due to the difference of objects
they pertain to. Thus, every sense has its own proper mode of apprehend-
ing, which is particular to it. The power of sight sees, the power of hearing
hears, and so on. As long as different kinds of acts and objects fall under
one mode of apprehending, the power to which they belong is the same.

32Impossibile est enim in aliquo creato quod secundum eandem virtutem sit princi-
pium diversorum actuum vel effectuum diversorum genere; unde potentias animae per
actus diversos iudicamus esse diversas secundum essentiam. (Summa II q. 50, 31.)
33Quamvis actus differentes specie possent esse ab eadem potentia, non tamen
genere; quoniam actus speciem sortiuntur ex obiectis seu ex habitudine ad obiecta, genus
vero a potentia. [...] Exemplum autem huius, licet non omnino consimile, potest dari in
lumine genito a luce solari quae varietatem figurarum accipit a vasis lumen ipsius partici-
pantibus, retinendo unitatem claritatis specificam quam trahit a luce solari. (Summa II
q. 54, 27576.)
perceptual powers of the soul 105

Olivis position is a deviation from the Aristotelian approach, in


which there are as many external senses as there are different types of
real perceptual qualities in the world: we have to begin with the objects
of perception, then go on to the acts, and finally contend with the pow-
ers of the soul. The order is from objects to acts and from acts to powers.
Olivi reverses this order because he thinks that the distinctness of powers
and their activity is at least experientially prior to the distinctness of the
objects. By experience we know that there are five modalities of percep-
tion, and on the basis of this experience we may start to inquire whether
there are corresponding features in the worldwhether the properties of
the world we perceive by one of the senses have something in common
or not.
The experiential first-person point of view and the emphasis on the
powers are most clearly present in a further argument which supposedly
proves that the five external senses are distinct from each other. Namely,
Olivi argues that the acts of different senses, considered in themselves,
differ from each other:
The third [proof] is the sensible diversification of the acts of hearing and
seeing, taken in themselves and in an absolute manner, and likewise of the
other acts of different senses. Namely, there is a sensible difference between
hearing and seeingnot only because hearing is about audible objects but
also because hearing as hearing differs from seeing as seeing. This is to say
that these acts differ by species sensibly, already due to the natures (rationes)
which they have solely from their powers, without various specifications
received afterwards from their special objects, in such a way that a vision of
black differs specifically from a vision of white. Thus, if per impossibile the
same sound were visible to the eyes, audible to the ears, and tasteable to
taste, still seeing it would differ specifically from hearing and tasting it, and
it would not be heard by the eyes, but only by the ears, and it would not be
seen by the ears, but only by the eyes.34

34Tertium est sensibilis diversificatio actuum audiendi et videndi secundum se et


absolute sumptorum, et sic de aliis actibus diversorum sensuum. Nam audire, non solum
in quantum est talis obiecti, differt sensibiliter a videre, immo etiam audire, in quantum
audire, differt a videre, in quantum videre. Quod est dicere quod huiusmodi actus sensi-
biliter differunt specie secundum solas rationes quas a solis suis potentiis habent absque
diversis specificationibus quas postmodum a suis specialibus obiectis accipiunt, iuxta
quod visio nigri differt specie a visione albi. Unde si per impossibile idem sonus esset visi-
bilis ab oculo et audibilis ab aure et gustabilis a gustu: adhuc videre ipsum differt specie
ab eius auditu et gustu, nec audiretur ab oculo, sed a sola aure, nec videretur ab aure, sed
a solo oculo. (Summa II q. 60, 57172.)
106 chapter four

The five external senses differ from each other because their acts or modes
of acting differ from each other. The crucial point is that even if all the
external senses were able to apprehend one and the same quality, each
of them would apprehend it in a way proper to it. Even though we can, to
some extent, judge by the objects that the five senses are separate powers,
the fundamental difference between them is not due to their objects but
to their modes of apprehension. Seeing is an activity of its own kind, and it
differs from hearing and tasting, and this is evident to us by experience.
Thus, in principle Olivi accepts the criterion that different kinds of
objects require different powers, since he employs it to some extent in the
case of external senses. However, he does not present it as comprehensive
and, arguably, does not benefit from it. He simply begins with the powers
that human beings and higher animals have and ends up claiming that
there must be some common denominator behind the objects of a particu-
lar external sense. In the case of touch he finds the common denominator,
but in the case of the other senses he makes recourse to the senses them-
selves, to their different kinds of acts, and also to our experience of this
difference. The decisive factor which differentiates the powers of the soul
from each other is their way of apprehending, or their modes of acting.

3.The Common Sense

In question 62 of the second book of Summa Olivi asks whether the com-
mon sense is the same power as the external senses. His answer is nega-
tive, even though at the outset his discussion seems to go somewhat off the
declared topic. The arguments he presents in his responsio are designed
to prove the existence of the common sense as a power which controls
the external senses, apprehends their acts, and combines the information
provided by them. None of the arguments give any explanation for the
distinctness of the common sense from the external senses.
This apparent perplexity can be accounted for by taking into heed
Olivis discussion of the external senses. He has already rejected the essen-
tial sameness of the external senses and the Avicennian idea of a single
perceptual capacity, which has different modes of perceiving. It is there-
fore sufficient for him to prove the existence of a power that somehow
brings together the different external senses. This power cannot be any of
the external senses because they are not capable of apprehending the acts
and objects of the other four senses. Hence, it is clear that Olivi under-
stands the combining power, the common sense, as a power that differs
from the external senses.
perceptual powers of the soul 107

The relation between the common sense and the external senses is
more complicated than it seems at the outset, however. In his response
to the counter-arguments, Olivi draws a vague picture of the mutual rela-
tionship between the perceptual powers. He begins by pointing out that
the organs of the external senses are rooted in the heart and brain, which
are the organs of the common sense.35 This physiological connection,
Olivi remarks, has led some authors to think that the common sense and
the external senses are not essentially different powers, but the external
senses are rather like streams flowing from the fountain of the common
sense.36 In other words, Olivi refers again to the Avicennian view, accord-
ing to which there is only one perceptual capacity, which is limited to
different modes of acting in different organs of the senses.
He does not accept this view. He puts forward a few counter-arguments,
which are of a metaphysical nature, and concludes that the external
senses and the common sense are numerically, specifically, and essen-
tially different from each other.37 But he continues and says something

35Sic organa quinque sensuum seu organizatio ipsorum procedit a corde et cerebro et
iterum in illa sicut in radicem suae subsistentiae impendent et reflectuntur seu recolligun-
tur. (Summa II q. 62, 592.) See also ibid., q. 51, 123. In appointing the seat of the common
sense, Olivi wavers between the Galenic theory (which was further developed in Arabic
medicine and accepted in the medical knowledge of Olivis time) that the common sense
is located in the brain and the Aristotelian view (accepted by Aristotelian-minded think-
ers, such as Aquinas) that the common sense is in the heart. In q. 58 of Summa, he writes
that: organum sensus communis est totum cerebrum, sicut et organum visus est oculus
totus cum nervis visualibus et sicut organum sensus tactus sunt nervi sensuales per totum
corpus diffusi seu totum corpus. Secundum autem diversos aspectus quos habet in cerebro
diversos sortitur actus. (Summa II q. 58, 510; see also Responsio secunda, 405.) Then again,
he sometimes remains somewhat indecisive on this matter: Unde secundum ordinem
naturae impossibile est oculum informari a potentia visiva vel aurem ab auditiva, nisi prius
naturaliter in corde vel cerebro sit sensus interior seu communis. Et consimiliter supremae
partes corporis, puta, cor et cerebrum, sunt naturaliter priores partibus inferioribus, puta,
manu et pede [...] (Ibid., q. 51 app., 194; emphasis mine.) Finally, he also claims that the
organ of the common sense has two roots: the heart and the brain: In animalibus autem
perfectis duplicem radicem habere noscuntur sic ad invicem ordinatam quod habent vim
unius completae radicis, et prima est fundamentalis ad secundam, secunda vero complet
quod deest primae. Prima autem est cor et secunda est cerebrum. (Ibid., q. 62, 590.) See
also q. 49, 22 and chapter ten, footnote 14 below. For discussion of the medieval debate
over the location of the higher cognitive powers of the soul, see Knuuttila, Aristotles
Theory of Perception and Medieval Aristotelianism, 1113; de Libera, Le sens commun,
48589.
36Summa II q. 62, 592.
37Olivi points out that the essence of every sense is to be essentially ordered to its
objects, which requires that it is differentiated from the others by substantial differences.
Substantial differences change species, and thus the senses belong to different species and
cannot be one power. See Summa II q. 62, 59293.
108 chapter four

quite idiosyncratic and even frustrating, namely, that there is something


in common between his own view and the one he is opposing:
However, both explanations agree in that the common sense is within the
five external senses, and those five are in it by a kind of radical identity of
essence or by an essential connection and coexistence. And so, even though
the common sense is principally in the heart and in the brain, nevertheless
its secondary and subsidiary existence is in all the organs of the five external
senses and in all the parts thereof. And similarly, the senses of sight, hear-
ing, taste, and smell are not in their proper organs in such a way that their
existence would not extend as radically (conradicabiliter) all the way to the
radical organ of the common sense. And no wonder because their organs
are not unextended nor simple. Quite the contrary, they are composed of
and combined with diverse [parts] and stretched radically all the way to the
brain and to the heart by mediation of the brain, inasmuch as it is the organ
of the common sense.38
The external senses are not confined to their proper organs but are within
the sensory nerves and even in the brain, and the common sense extends
towards the organs of the external senses. Olivi thinks that this physiologi-
cal overlapping is necessary because otherwise the common sense would
not be able to apprehend the acts of the senses immediately when they
take place.39 It seems that although Olivi considers the common sense
as essentially distinct from the external senses, he does not think that

38Uterque tamen modus in hoc concordat quod vel per quandam radicalis essentiae
identitatem vel per essentialem cohaerentiam et coexistentiam est sensus communis
intra quinque sensus et ipsi quinque in eo. Et ideo, licet sensus communis principalius
sit in corde et in cerebro, nihilominus eius secundaria et supprincipalis existentia est in
omnibus organis quinque sensuum et in qualibet parte illorum. Et consimiliter visus et
auditus et gustus et odoratus non sic sunt in suis propriis organis quin eorum existentia
conradicabiliter attingat usque ad radicale organum sensus communis. Nec mirum, quia
organa eorum non sunt punctalia nec simplicia, immo ex diversis composita et connexa
et usque ad cerebrum radicaliter pertingentia illoque mediante pertingunt ad cor, prout
est organum sensus communis [...] (Summa II q. 62, 59394.) Virtutes sensuum particu-
larium radicaliori modo respiciunt cerebrum et nervos interiores quam organa exteriora,
ut oculos, aures, nares et consimilia; et tamen actus earum aliquo modo respiciunt prius
et immediatius exteriora organa quam interiora, licet non ita radicaliter. (ibid., q. 51, 114.)
See also ibid., q. 58, 510; q. 73, 97. Olivi even uses the metaphors of streams flowing from a
fountain, and the centre and radii of a circle: nam sensus communis est superior sensibus
particularibus, et tamen isti radicantur in illo quasi sicut rivi in suo fonte et sicut diversae
lineae radiosae in suo puncto centrali et fontali. (ibid., q. 51 app., 194.) He also repeatedly
calls the common sense a radix of the external senses (for example, in ibid., q. 62, 592). As
I have already stated, this terminology was widely used.
39See, e.g., Summa II q. 51, 132; ibid., q. 58, 5023.
perceptual powers of the soul 109

the bodily realisation of the common sense should be completely discon-


nected from the organs of the external senses.
Olivis discussion about these matters is far from comprehensive, but
the overall picture is that the external senses and the common sense are
distinct powers, even though the boundary between their organs is vague.
This is a bit confusing because the concession to the rivalling Avicennian
view seems to undermine the entire effort of making a distinction between
the powers of the soul. The idea about the vague boundary may reflect the
medieval medical theory according to which spiritus animalis flows in the
ventricles of the brain and from there to the sensory nerves and organs
of the senses. It is impossible (or at least highly arbitrary) to indicate a
certain point at which this carrier of the sensory powers changes into
another power. Olivi, however, does not relate his idea to any physiologi-
cal considerations, so we are left with nothing but conjectures.
It is noteworthy that Olivi does not consider it a problem that two
distinct powers are actualised in one and the same organ. For instance,
he thinks that the sense of touch exists in the whole body, including the
organs of other external senses.40 Moreover, he seems to think that in
simple animals, such as worms (annulosi vermes), there is no difference
between the organs of touch, which is the only external sense that they
have, and the organ of the common sense because worms do not have a
central organ which could be appointed as its seat. Even so, he seems to
think that even in the case of worms these powers differ from each other.41
Similarly, the common sense and the external senses may overlap also in
the case of higher animals and human beings.
One of the reasons for Olivi to think that external senses must be sepa-
rate from the common sense is that he approaches the question of unity
and distinctness from the point of view of the soul and not from the point
of view of physiology. The powers cross the boundaries of organs in all
possible ways: there are powers that are realised in multiple organs (the
common sense is both in the heart and in the brain), and there are organs
that incorporate many distinct powers (the senses of touch and sight in
the eyes). Even though Olivi sometimes appeals to physiology when he
discusses the difference between powers of the soul, physiological facts
are clearly of a secondary importance for him. The soul is composed of

40Summa II q. 51 app., 167.


41 Summa II q. 62, 590; Summa III q. 5, 260.
110 chapter four

different powers, and the reasons for holding two powers as separate from
or identical with each other are related either to psychological or to meta-
physical considerations. The psychological difference, say, between an act
of seeing and feeling pain in the eye and the possibility of independent
activity are good enough reasons for Olivi to conclude that there must be
two distinct powers, even within the same organ.
Despite the separation of the common sense from the external senses,
Olivi thinks that there is a close functional relation between these powers.
The common sense perceives external objects only through the external
senses and their acts. The only thing it apprehends directly is the activity
of the senses. By apprehending the acts of the senses, it apprehends also
the external objects:
It must be known first, therefore, that the common sense cannot imme-
diately apprehend any real and present object except for the acts of the
external senses, by which it apprehends the objects of those acts. This is
because the acts of the senses cohere with their objects and take them into
themselves in such a way that by apprehending the act, the object of that
act is also apprehended.42
The common sense needs the external senses, which it uses to perceive
external objects. It is the centre in which all the external senses converge,
but it does not apprehend anything external directly by itself. At the out-
set, this idea seems to lead into a representational theory of perception,
but we shall soon see that this is not what Olivi has in mind. Rather, his
idea is that the common sense, being the centre of perceptual activity,
somehow uses the external senses in order to reach the external objects.
It does not perceive the external object in the acts of the senses but
by them.

We have now seen how Olivi understands the metaphysics of the soul.
The human soul is a spiritual entity, composed of spiritual matter and
several substantial forms, which are its powers. The soul is substantially
united to the body by its sensitive part, but remains independent of it

42Sciendum ergo primo quod sensus communis nullum obiectum reale et praesen-
tiale potest immediate apprehendere nisi tantum actus particularium sensuum per quo-
rum actus apprehendit obiecta eorum; quia actus eorum sic cohaerent suis obiectis et sic
tenent illa intra se quod eo ipso quo apprehenditur actus apprehenditur et eius obiectum.
(Summa II q. 62, 594.) See also ibid., q. 61, 58283; q. 32, 58889. To be precise, the com-
mon sense is capable of apprehending also actuales aspects (a term which I shall discuss
belowsee chapter six, section three) of the external senses, and even reflexively its own
acts (ibid., q. 62, 595; see chapter eleven below).
perceptual powers of the soul 111

in many ways. The animal soul, by contrast, is nothing but a form of the
body. Yet it shares the central features of the human soul and is thus capa-
ble of cognitive operations, which are in a relevant way similar to those of
human beings. We are now in a position to move on and start to analyse
Olivis theory of perception.
Part Two

Theory of Perception
Introduction to part two

Perception is the most fundamental cognitive relation we have to the


world around us. Without the ability to perceive, we would be hindered
from all other types of cognitive activity as well. The importance of per-
ception was emphasised also by medieval philosophers. Especially in the
latter half of the thirteenth century, after the incorporation of Aristote-
lian and Arabic natural philosophy into university curricula, it became
typical to think that even though we are capable of understanding the
intellectual structure of the world by reason we nevertheless need our
senses in order to actually do so. Empirical information was taken to be
necessary for rational understanding. Other psychological processes were
thought to be based on perception as well: we can remember only things
we have perceived before, and even though we are able to imagine things
that we have never perceived, we can do so only insofar as the imagined
things are constructed out of perceptual features that we have perceived
before. Moreover, our emotional life requires perception, since our emo-
tions were thought to be necessarily related to things we are familiar with
through sensations. In short, perception was taken to be a foundation for
all our cognitive and psychological.
The ability to perceive is also important from the point of view of
the psychological continuity between human beings and other animals.
Aristotle already thought that animals are distinguished from plants by
the ability to perceive. Even though not all species of animals have all the
five external senses, the capacity of perception is endowed by the sensi-
tive soul, and as such it is common to all animals. To be an animal is to
be capable of perception, and in this regard there is no difference between
rational and irrational animals.1
Medieval philosophers share this Aristotelian view. All higher animals
are endowed with the same set of external senses, and thus their cognitive
relation to the external world is very similar to ours. To be sure, medieval
thinkers know that the acuteness of the senses varies between different
species of animals, but this is taken to be only a matter of quantitative
difference, not a qualitative one.

1De sensu et sensibilibus (hereafter Sens.) 1, 436b1013; DA 2.3, 414a29b5; DA 3.12,


434a30b9.
116 part two

Olivi accepts the fundamental role of perception and in this respect the
similarity between human and non-human animals.2 He also thinks in
keeping with a long tradition, that the perceptual capacity of higher ani-
mals (including human beings) is divided into five external senses: sight,
hearing, smell, taste, and touch. In addition, the sensitive soul provides
one internal sense, the common sense (sensus communis), in which all
the different perceptual aspects converge. However, when it comes to the
details, it is clear that he deviates from the theories of perception that
prevailed at the time. His theory is a critical reaction to the so-called spe-
cies theories of perception, which are based on the idea that something
issues from a perceived object to the sense organs and to the soul of the
percipient. It deviates also from Augustines view, although Augustine is
his main source of inspiration. Olivis critique towards the earlier theories
will be the topic of chapter five.
Olivi defends an intentional theory of perception in which the active
nature of the soul plays a central role. He emphasises that we perceive
only if we pay attention to our environment and concludes on the basis
of this that rather than being passive recipients we are active participants
in the process of perception. He rejects the Aristotelian conception of
perception as a passive process and incorporates Neoplatonic elements
from Augustine into his theory. Olivis view on the active nature and the
intentionality of perception will be addressed to in chapter six.
The idea that the soul needs to pay attention in order to perceive will
be discussed in chapter seven, where I shall analyse the functional rela-
tion between the external senses and the common sense and the role of
attention in the process of perception. The acts of the common sense are
necessary for the perceptual process, and they account for the unified per-
ceptual experience. In this way, the common sense functions as a cogni-
tive centre of the sensitive soul. I shall also point out that the attention
that the soul has to pay in order to perceive comes in degrees. Even when

2The most extensive discussions concerning sense perception in Olivis works can be
found in questions 58 and 7274 of the second part of Summa. Question 58 was written
between 127779 in Narbonne, and it is directed against some unnamed Averroists (Syl-
vain Piron, Olivi et les averrostes, 256). According to Piron, questions 7274 date from
128182, when Olivi was in Montpellier. Olivis theory of perception has received quite a lot
of scholarly attention. Recent works include the following: Pasnau, Theories of Cognition,
12124, 13034, 16881; Dominik Perler, Thories de lintentionnalit au Moyen ge (Paris:
Vrin, 2003), 4375; Spruit, Species intelligibilis, 21524; Silva & Toivanen, The Active Nature
of the Soul, 26077; Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 3954. A classic presentation of the
historical development of theories of vision is David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from
al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
introduction 117

the subject does not perceive anything, there remains a kind of undeter-
mined general attention which enables her to notice patent changes in
her surroundings and direct her attention to them in order to actually
perceive them.
Chapter eight is dedicated to the manifestation of dualistic currents in
Olivis theory of perception. Although he is keen to reject flagrantly dual-
istic anthropological views, I shall argue that many features of his theory
of perception betray a dualistic strand in his anthropology: perception is
a psychological process which takes place in the soul and is tied to bodily
processes only accidentally. External objects are capable of causing some
kind of physiological changes in the organs of the senses, but in the end
these changes do not have anything to do with perception. Perception is
brought about by the soul, and even though perceptual acts are realised
as physiological changes in the organs of the senses, these changes are not
necessary for perception. In other words, perception is an activity of the
soul, and the body has only a subordinate role in the process.
Chapter five

Criticism of Earlier Theories of Perception

The spiritual nature and the ontological superiority of the soul with respect
to the body play a central role in Olivis theory of perception, which he
develops in a critical engagement with earlier positions. Many thirteenth
century authors followed Aristotle and thought that perception is a passive
process in the sense that the organs and the powers of the senses are acted
upon by perceptible objects, either directly orespecially after the works
of Robert Grosseteste and Roger Baconby the so-called sensible species
(species sensibiles) which issue from the object and actualise the power of
the soul, which is potentially what the object is in actuality.
Olivi argues against the idea that the soul is passive and claims that
external objects cannot cause perceptual acts of the soul. He puts forth
a theory in which the soul is active and brings about its own acts of per-
ception. This idea is closely related to his conception of the freedom of
the will and thus theologically loaded, but it has also philosophical con-
sequences. (I shall return to this topic in chapter six.) The ontological dis-
tance between the soul and material reality forms the core of his view. He
thinks that the cognitive powers and acts of the soul are spiritual and sim-
ple, and therefore they cannot be caused by external material objects:
For an extended and corporeal species cannot cause a simple and spiritual
act by influx (influxive gigni). But all cognitive acts are simple and spiri-
tual. This is clear because [...] every being which is capable of cognition,
as such, exceeds infinitely everything that lacks cognition and a cognitive
power. It is clear also from the immediate subject of an act of cognition. As
has been said, an act of cognition can primarily and immediately exist only
in a simple and spiritual power of the soul.1

1Quarto, quia actus simplex et spiritualis non potest influxive gigni a specie extensa
et corporali. Sed omnis actus cognitivus est simplex et spiritualis. Quod clamat non solum
communis ratio cognitionis, quae in tantum est nobilis ut Deo proprie ascribatur et per
quam omne cognoscens, in quantum tale, in infinitum excedit omne quod caret cogni-
tione et potentia cognoscendi. Immo etiam clamat hoc eius immediatum subiectum, quia
sicut dictum est, non potest primo et immediate esse nisi in simplici et spirituali potentia
animae. (Summa II q. 73, 8384.) See also ibid., q. 58, 43761 & 479; q. 7274, 1135; Quodl.
1.4, 1617.
120 chapter five

Olivi speaks here about corporeal species, but the central idea is more
general: external material objects cannot directly affect the spiritual pow-
ers of the soul in any way. They may cause changes in the organs of the
senses, but they cannot be efficient causes of cognitive acts because they
are incapable of acting directly upon the soul: For, a corporeal species,
which has location and extension, cannot produce a simple, spiritual, and
vital (vivus) act of seeing. But the species which is generated by the object
in the organ is corporeal.2
The other direction from which Olivi criticises earlier theories of per-
ception is related to epistemological questions. One of the main lines of
his criticism against the theories which incorporate sensible species is that
they fall into epistemological problems of representationalism. If percep-
tion takes place by a mediating species, we do not actually perceive the
object but the species, and the perception thereof veils the object rather
than enables us to receive reliable information from it. Thus, Olivi argues,
species theories are inadequate in accounting for cognitive processes.
Coming from these two directions, Olivi ends up rejecting not only
species theories but all theories which share the common idea that per-
ception is a passive process. In the present chapter I shall first discuss
his criticism against this general approach, although the main emphasis
will be on the species theories (section one). In section two I shall point
out that although Augustine considered perception as an active process,
Olivi rejects his view on philosophical grounds. His epistemological wor-
ries lead him to criticise Augustinian theories of perception and even to
reject Augustines own view.

1.Passive Theories of Perception

Olivi is known as the first thinker to present a thorough criticism of the


species theories of perception that were prevalent at the time he devel-
oped his own thought. His rigorous attack against these theories is partly
motivated by his fear that the belief in the passivity of the powers of the
soul endangers the freedom of the will by making it more acceptable
that the will too is a passive power. Still, it is evident that his interest in

2Quia a specie corporali situm et extensionem habente non potest produci actus
videndi simplex et spiritualis et vivus. Sed species genita in organo ab obiecto est huius-
modi. (Summa II q. 58, 489; see also ibid., q. 73, 8384.) By contrast, species which figure
in imaginative and memorative acts are simple and unextended (ibid., q. 58, 5028).
criticism of earlier theories of perception 121

t heories of perception (and theories of cognition in general) is not just


subordinate to his theological and philosophical worries concerning abso-
lute freedom.
I shall begin by outlining some of the central tenets of the passive the-
ories of perception which Olivi opposes and then move on to show on
what grounds he rejects them. However, my intention here is not to give
a comprehensive and detailed analysis of any single theory of perception,
because Olivi wrote at a time when the variety of proposed theories was
wide. The Aristotelian influence was heavy in all the rivalling theories
of the time, to be sure, but also Arabic innovationsespecially in the
development of a new perspectivist approach to visionand Augustinian
(Neoplatonic) ideas of the active nature of the soul played a role in the
resulting variety of different theories. There was no single theory that
could be labelled the medieval theory of perception. Markedly, there was
no single theory that could be labelled the species theory of perception.
Rather, there was an assortment of competing theories which have some-
thing in common but which differ in many details.
Olivis criticism reflects this situation. It is mostly aimed at certain gen-
eral principles which are common to these competing views. Even though
the main targets of his attack are probably Roger Bacon, John Peckham,
and other developers of a new perspectivist theory of perception (the
so-called perspectivists),3 he does not have only one particular theory in
mind. Thus, in order to understand Olivis critique and the basic principles
of his view, it is necessary here to take up only those features which are
fundamental to the rivalling theories and which Olivi explicitly opposes.
With this in mind, the most important and pervasive feature common
to Aristotelian theories (such as the one presented by Aquinas) and the
new perspectivist theories is the idea that the cognitive powers of the
soul are passive recipients of external stimuli. The process of percep-
tion is depicted as the cognitive powers of the soul being acted upon by
external objects: an external object actualises a potency inherent in the
soul, and the actualisation of a perceptual power amounts to perception.
These theories areto use David Lindbergs well known classification4
intromissive theories, in which the direction of causality is from the exter-
nal object into the soul and its cognitive powers.

3Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 3940; Olivier Boulnois, tre et reprsentation: Une
gnalogie de la mtaphysique moderne lpoque de Duns Scot (XIIIeXIVe sicle), Epim-
the (Paris: PUF, 1999), 5667.
4Lindberg, Theories of Vision, passim.
122 chapter five

The idea that external objects actualise sense powers raises a problem,
since it was commonly assumed that an agent must be present to the
recipient to act on it. This problem was especially burning with respect
to the sense of sight. One might ask how seen objects are capable of actu-
alising the potency to see in the eyes through a distance, and how the
cognitive content of a perceptual act can be the same as the quality that
belongs to the perceived object. How do the colours of a distant object
reach the eyes of the percipient? Arguably, there must be some kind of
causal link between the object and the sense of sight. In order to account
for the causal connection, many thirteenth century authors appealed to
the sensible species (species sensibiles).
There were different possible ways of understanding the nature of the
sensible species and the way in which they actualise the perceptual pow-
ers. The central idea was that the sensible species bring the information
of the perceptual qualities of the objects to the external senses by first
actualising the medium between the object and the sense organ, and then
actualising the power which is realised in the organ. The sensible species
were thought to be images, similitudes, likenesses, or forms which could
account for the causal link between perceived objects and the powers of
perception. They were sometimes understood as kinds of corporeal enti-
ties that actually travel from the objects to the organs of the senses; some
claimed that they are accidental forms of objects and that the same form
that exists as colour on the surface of the objects actualises the transpar-
ent medium (illuminated air and water) and the power of sight. Perspec-
tivists such as Bacon argued that the sensible species are multiplied in
the medium: the perceptible quality of the object generates a species in
the adjacent medium. This species, in turn, generates a further species
in the contiguous part of the medium along a straight line. The propaga-
tion of the species is a process of successive actualisation of the medium,
and when the species happens to meet a sense organ, it actualises the
cognitive power that is realised in the organ; the actualisation is an act of
sensation.5 This idea became quite popular, and even those who refused

5For the reception and development of the perspectivist account which introduced
the idea of the multiplication of the species in medio, see Tachau, Vision and Certitude,
326. For discussion and references on medieval theories of perception, see Knuuttila,
Aristotles Theory of Perception and Medieval Aristotelianism, 817; Martin M. Tweedale,
Origins of the Medieval Theory That Sensation Is an Immaterial Reception of a Form,
Philosophical Topics 20:2 (1992): 21531. The idea about the multiplication of species is
introduced in the Latin West by Grosseteste (Lindberg, Theories of Vision, 94102), but
its main developer was Roger Bacon. See also Spruit, Species intelligibilis, 1255. When
Olivi discusses the multiplication of species, he rejects the doctrine, partly on the basis
criticism of earlier theories of perception 123

the multiplication of species oftentimes accepted the existence of sensible


species as the explanans for the connection between the senses and the
objects of sensation.
Many medieval authors thought, in an Aristotelian manner, that the
sensible species are received in the cognitive powers without matter, and
they followed Averros expression when they claimed that the sensible
species have a spiritual or intentional existence in the medium and in the
cognitive powers. For instance, Thomas Aquinas argues that:
A change is spiritual when the form of the cause of the change is received
in the subject of change according to a spiritual existenceas the form of a
colour is in the eye, which does not thereby become coloured. An operation
of a sense involves a spiritual change.6
Aquinas point is that the form or species of colour must have a different
kind of existence in the medium and in the eye than in the external object
because it does not make the medium between the bodily organ and the
object coloured, and the eyes do not become red when a red apple is
seen. Different authors understood the notions of reception without mat-
ter and spiritual existence in different ways, but the overall idea remains
the same. On the other hand, Bacon seems to have understood the sen-
sible species as corporeal entities. Although they can be called spiritual
because they cannot be perceived and they can occupy the same physical
space in the medium without interfering with each other, they are cor-
poreal and do not have a real spiritual existence.7 Yet he shares the view

that perception must take place in an instant. See Summa II q. 26, 44852; William Duba,
Pierre de Jean Olivi et laction instantane, in Pierre de Jean Olivi, ed. C. Knig-Pralong
et al., 17176.
6Spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum
esse spirituale; ut forma coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem
autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis [...] (ST I.78.3.) A well known controversy
over Aquinas conception of the relation between spiritual existence and cognitive opera-
tions has ensued in modern scholarship. The problematic idea is that Aquinas seems to
equate spiritual existence and cognition, which leads to an untenable position that the
medium also cognises. For discussion, see chapter eight below. For Aquinas theory of
perception, see, e.g., Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), 24476; Pasnau,
Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, 17199; Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, Topics in
Medieval Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1993), 3140.
7Roger Bacon, Perspectiva, in Roger Bacon and the Origins of Perspectiva in the Middle
Ages, ed. & trans. D.C. Lindberg (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1.6.4; Lindberg, Introduc-
tion, in Roger Bacon and the Origins of Perspectiva, lxxix; Tachau, Vision and Certitude,
2223. Bacons view had little effect, though, and the idea of spiritual being prevailed in the
Middle Ages (Calvin Normore, The Matter of Thought, in Representation and Objects of
Thought in Medieval Philosophy, ed. H. Lagerlund, Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 12627).
124 chapter five

that perception is the reception of information from without. Olivi rules


out Bacons idea that corporeal species could cause our perceptual acts
by claiming that it leads to untenable consequences, but the crux of his
criticism is that regardless of whether the species are corporeal entities or
have a spiritual existence (whatever that means), they cannot account for
the perceptual process.8
It is important to note that the Aristotelian species theories do not
intend to introduce sensible species as kinds of representational entities
which would be the immediate objects of cognitive acts. Rather, they are
causal intermediaries which account for the causal relation between an
external object and a cognitive power, and the object that is perceived
is the external object itself. In this way, these theories at least pretend to
avoid representationalism and adhere to direct realism.9
This, however, is one of the points Olivi clings to. Being probably the
first scholastic philosopher to question their existence,10 he sternly attacks
theories that employ sensible species. He claims that if species were to be
understood as representations of external objects, they would necessarily
be the primary and immediate objects of our cognition and that if percep-
tion were to occur by the mediation of sensible species, we would actually
be hindered from perceiving external objects altogether. In other words,
Olivi argues that some of the species theories lead into epistemological
problems of representationalism.
Yet, he does not think that this kind of critique applies to all theories
which make use of sensible species. He discusses many different theo-
riessome of which do not even appeal to speciesand refutes only
some of them on the basis that they run into epistemological problems.11


8Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 4346. Olivi takes up the two possible ways of inter-
preting the metaphysics of the speciesthat they have an esse naturale et sensibile or an
esse intentionale et spirituale et simplexin Summa II q. 73, 87.

9The standard interpretation of Aquinas theory of perception goes along these lines.
See, e.g., Kenny, Aquinas on Mind, 3536. This interpretation has been questioned by Pas-
nau, who argues that the sensible species are objects of perception and not only causal
intermediaries (Theories of Cognition, 195219). Pasnau has further supported his reading
in Robert Pasnau, Id quo cognoscimus, in Theories of Perception, ed. S. Knuuttila & P.
Krkkinen, 13149, but his interpretation is not generally accepted.
10Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 27. In many contexts, Olivi discusses intellectual and
sensitive cognition without making a clear distinction between the two, and he rejects the
species in both cases.
11 When dealing with Olivis critique against species theories, Robert Pasnau claims
that: Olivis strategy is to advance through a series of ever-more-serious charges against
the species theory. His attack culminates in the claim that the theory would leave us
epistemologically isolated from the external world. (Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 236.)
criticism of earlier theories of perception 125

The list of different positions which Olivi discusses is as follows:12


1. Cognitive acts are caused directly by external objects.
2. Cognitive acts are caused by species, which are
a. caused by objects.
b. caused by objects, but in such a way that the powers of the soul
co-operate in causing the acts.
3. Cognitive acts are caused by species, which are
a. caused by the powers of the soul.
b. caused by the powers of the soul when objects excite the powers.
Olivi does not identify the sources of these views. In fact, the list is made
of philosophical positions which can, at least in some cases, be attri
buted to several authors. Even when he rarely refers to other philoso-
phers, his intention is not to give a detailed exposition of their views. He
does mention, however, that the proponents of position (1) support their
view by appealing to Aristotle, and the quod non argument to which he
is answering when he presents this list refers to Aristotles idea that the
very same accidental form actualises the perceived object and the per-
ceptual power.13 Aristotles argument may be interpreted as meaning that
the object directly actualises the power without any intermediaries. Olivi
may have also been thinking of authors who had accepted the general
Aristotelian view without addressing the question concerning the nature
of the causal link between the object and the sensory soul. The general
idea of (2a) was maintained by several authors: for instance, Roger Bacon
and Thomas Aquinas both agree on it, despite other differences in their
theories.14 Theory (2b), which attributes some activity to the soul, may
come from Bonaventure, who understands perception as involving two
separate stages, namely, the reception of a species and a judgement. Both
of them belong to the compound of the organ and the sensory power,
but the former belongs to it on account of the organ whereas the latter
on account of the power.15 The two last positions consider the soul as an

Although he also recognises that Olivis critique of this kind applies only to certain versions
of species theory (ibid., 23839), he does not deal with Olivis reaction to other versions of
species theory and thus leaves an impression that Olivi opposes only representationalist
theories of cognition.
12Summa II q. 58, 46162.
13DA 3.2, 425b27426a19; Summa II q. 58, 4034.
14Bacon, Perspectiva, 1.5.1; Lindberg, Introduction, lxviiilxxxvii. For Aquinas, see, e.g.,
ST I.14.2 & 78.4; Sent. DA 1.10.
15Bonaventura, Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum, Opera omnia IIV (Florence,
18821889) 2, d. 8, p. 1, a. 3, q. 2; ibid., d. 25, p. 2, a. unicus, q. 6 resp. See also John Fran-
cis Quinn, The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventures Philosophy (Toronto: Pontifical
126 chapter five

active principle in the acts of perception. Position (3a) was defended by


Matthew of Aquasparta and somewhat later by Roger Marston,16 and Olivi
may have taken view (3b) from William of Auvergne.17
The focal point of Olivis discussion of these theories of cognition is to
question the widely accepted assumption that powers of the soul (other
than the will) are passive in relation to their objects, that is, the powers
are actualised by their objects one way or another. The belief in the pas-
sivity of the powers of the soul is risky, because it makes it easier to think
that the will is passive as well: My impression is that the main reason
why many have come to believe that our will is completely passive has
been and is that they hold it as certain that all the other powers [of the
soul] are passive.18 Olivi thinks that the will can be genuinely free only
if it is active, which means that it has to be capable of causing its own
acts,19 and in order to defend this idea he adopts a strategy of arguing
that all the powers of the soul can be thought to be active.20 This line of

Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1973), 37074; Helen Marie Beha, Matthew of Aquaspartas
Cognition Theory, Franciscan Studies 21 (1961): 1216.
16 Bettoni, Le dottrine filosofiche, 47980. See Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones dis-
putatae de cognitione, in Quaestiones disputatae de fide et de cognitione, Bibliotheca Fran-
ciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 1 (Florence: Colleqium S. Bonaventurae, 1957), q. 3, 25667;
Roger Marston, Quaestiones disputatae de anima, in Quaestiones disputatae de emanatione
aeterna, de statu naturae lapsae, et de anima, Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii
Aevi 7 (Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1932), q. 8, 38696; Beha, Aquaspartas Cog-
nition Theory, 46; Spruit, Species intelligibilis, 219, 22831, 23537. Robert Kilwardbys
theory in De spiritu fantastico resembles position (3a). According to Kilwardby, perception
involves a passive element because external objects cause changes in the sense organs,
but the efficient cause of perception is the soul which actively causes species in itself. See
Robert Kilwardby, On Time and Imagination, part 2, ed. A. Broadie (Oxford: Oxford UP,
1993), 103 (p. 94); Jos Filipe Silva, Robert Kilwardby on Sense Perception, in Theories of
Perception, ed. S. Knuuttila & P. Krkkinen, 8799; Silva & Toivanen, The Active Nature
of the Soul, 24960.
17 Beha, Aquaspartas Cognition Theory, 910. See William of Auvergne, De universo,
in Opera omnia, vol. 1, ed. F. Hotot (Orlans-Paris, 1674; reprint Frankfurt am Main, 1963),
2.2.76, pp. 92930; id., De anima, 7.89, pp. 21316 (The Soul, 45058). It must be noted,
however, that when William employs the concept excitation, he is mostly dealing with
intellectual cognition. For a discussion, see J.-B. Brenet, Introduction, in Guillaume
dAuvergne. De lme (VII.19) (Paris, 1998), 2031.
18 Quia autem illud quod meo iudicio super omnia movit multos ad credendum quod
voluntas nostra sit totaliter passiva fuit et est hoc quod pro firmo tenent omnes alias
potentias esse passivas. (Summa II q. 58, 461.)
19 Bonnie Kent, Aristotle and the Franciscans: Gerald Odonis Commentary on the Nico-
machean Ethics (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1984), 184205; Yrjnsuuri, Free Will and Self-Control,
99128.
20Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 3940. Because Olivis principal motivation to present
an alternative theory of perception was to ensure the freedom of the will, it is natural that
he does not hold fast to the criticism he presents against species theories of perception.
criticism of earlier theories of perception 127

argumentation goes against the theories belonging to groups (1) and (2),
and the critique of representationalism that is aimed against the latter
group is subordinate to Olivis worry about the passivity of the powers
of the soul. Theories of the type (3) are rejected, although they attribute
a certain kind of activity to the soul, because ultimately they make the
species superfluous: perceptual processes can be accounted for without
employing the species. Although I shall present the main lines of Olivis
criticism against all these different types of theories, I shall concentrate
on his charge against (2) because it contains the most philosophically
interesting ideas, and because his arguments against the other types, as
Katherine Tachau describes: remain sketches, a skeleton begging for flesh
on the bones.21
Olivi rejects the theories of the type (1) by claiming that perception
is a process in which the perceiving subject is active. It is something the
subject does, not something he or she undergoes. His general idea is that
action should be attributed to the agent, not to the recipient. If cognitive
acts were caused solely by external objects, the acts should be attributed
to them and not to the cognising subject: Because then understanding,
perceiving, and desiring taken actively should be attributed to the objects
and not to the powers, just as enlightening and heating are attributed to

This is especially true in his apologetical writings (Responsio prima, Responsio secunda,
and Ep.) but also in Summa. In Responsio prima 10, 128, and Responsio secunda, 4045
Olivi concedes that these questions are only philosophical and that he does not care how
they should be understood; in Ep. 13, 5556 he points out that in Summa he only presents
the views of some other thinkers. These statements are in agreement with his wording in
Summa II q. 58: he uses impersonal expressions when he presents his alternative to the
species theory, and he explicitly states that it is presented only to show that the freedom of
the will can be defended also in that way (Summa II q. 58, 461 & 515). It is, however, quite
clear that Olivi prefers his alternative account of perception because on another occasion
he writes that: actus cognitivus efficiatur ab ipsa potentia tanquam a vi activa, probatur.
Primo eisdem rationibus quibus probatur quod voluntas est potentia activa. Nam et princi-
pales rationes, quibus philosophantes conantur probare potentias cognitivas non esse acti-
vas sed passivas, non minus probant hoc de voluntate. Et tamen ex hoc sequitur destructio
libertatis ac per consequens et omnis boni moralis [...] (ibid., q. 74, 124.) That is, the
arguments which prove the passivity of other powers of the soul necessarily apply also
to the will. Since he is not prepared to allow the passivity of the will, he must also reject
the passivity of other powers and thus deny species theories. He also explicitly adheres to
the alternative account of perception and to the criticism against species theories (ibid.,
q. 72, 17; q. 73, 63103). In this way, the arguments Olivi presents in questions 58 and 7274
give us firm ground to conclude that it is Olivi himself who conceives of all the powers of
the soul as active in regard to their objects and that he upholds the criticism of species
theories despite the impersonal manner in which he presents it.
21Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 4849. Olivis rejection of views (1), (2), and (3) can be
found in Summa II q. 58, 46377. See also ibid., 48789; q. 73, 83103; q. 74, 12224.
128 chapter five

the sun or to fire rather than to the illuminated air.22 His claim amounts
to saying that if an act of seeing a tree is caused by the tree in such a
way that the power of sight is only a passive recipient of the act, we should
say that the tree is seeing (or, at least, that the tree is doing something
while the percipient is not), because it is the active party in the process.
Moreover, he argues that an act receives its essence completely from
the agent that produces it, and thus there would be no reason to think
that only human and non-human animals are capable of cognition if the
action of the object were sufficient to produce a cognitive act. A percep-
tual object should in this case, in principle, be capable of bringing about
an act of cognition not only in our cognitive powers but in everything else
it happens to act upon.23 This argument is a reductio ad absurdum, to be
sure, and it is perhaps not very convincing, because in fact it presupposes
the active nature of perception as a premise without proving it. Yet, it
shows how strongly Olivi conceives of perception as an activity and thinks
that it is necessary to give at least some role to the cognitive powers of the
soul in the process of perception.
He supports this idea also by appealing to our intimate experiences.
When we are having acts of perception (or understanding, for that mat-
ter), we feel that we are active in their production. It is an experiential fact
that the acts come from us, not from objects: Moreover, we experience
inwardly within ourselves that those acts [viz. acts of the powers of our
souls] issue from us and that we really perform them.24 On the basis of
these arguments, which remain rather sketchy, Olivi comes to the conclu-
sion that external objects are not the sole cause of cognitive acts.
Theories of the type (2) receive the most versatile treatment of all
the theories Olivi opposes.25 Although his critique against such theories
is largely based on his claim that they lead to problems of representa-
tionalism and ultimately leave us in epistemological isolation, this line of
criticism is not the only one he advances. For instance, in opposition to
(2a) he repeats the idea that if the acts were completely produced by the
species, there would be no reason to say that we perceive since any activ-
ity must be attributed to the agent rather than to the recipientin this

22Quia tunc intelligere aut sentire vel appetere active accepta potius deberent attribui
ipsis obiectis quam ipsis potentiis, sicut et illuminare aut calefacere potius attribuitur soli
vel igni quam aeri illuminato. (Summa II q. 58, 463.)
23Summa II q. 58, 46366.
24Praeterea, nos intime experimur in nobis actus istos procedere a nobis et quod nos
vere operamur illos. (Summa II q. 58, 46364.) See also ibid., q. 72, 24 & 38; q. 74, 124.
25For discussion, see also Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 23647.
criticism of earlier theories of perception 129

case to the species generated by the perceptual object. His rejection of


(2b) is less straightforward. It comes in many versions since the role of the
species can be understood in many ways. Olivi presents altogether four
options: a sensible species is a partial cause of a cognitive act, a disposition
without which a power cannot bring itself to act, a representation of the
object, or a proximate cause of a cognitive act with the power being the
ultimate cause. None of these satisfy Olivi, and he briefly criticises all of
them by pointing out technical and metaphysical problems. Just to show
what kind of arguments he utilises, we may take up one that he presents
against the idea that species are dispositions which enable the cognitive
powers to bring about their own acts. He argues that dispositions are last-
ing modifications of the powers, whereas species cannot remain in the
powers after the object which causes them is removed from their scope.
He draws a conceptual distinction between a species and a disposition
and thus rejects the idea that they are the same. This argument and other
similar ones prove, in his eyes, that species cannot be even partial effi-
cient causes of our cognitive activity.
We can see already from this argument that Olivi opposes many ver-
sions of species theories that fall within the general lines of (2) and that
different versions are rejected on different grounds. It seems apparent,
however, that the main targets of his charge are the species theories
I outlined in the beginning of this chapter: the perspectivist theories
which depict species as corporeal entities that are multiplied in the
medium, and the Aristotelian theories in which the species have spiritual
existence both in the medium and in the soul. As he puts it, species can
be understood in two ways: Some also say in accordance to the forego-
ing that every sensible object generates two kinds of species: one hav-
ing a natural and sensible being and the other having only intentional,
spiritual, and simple being.26 The first option must be rejected because
it fails to explain everything it purports to explain: a corporeal species can
perhaps account for the rectilinear propagation of light and vision, but
it falls short of being able to bring about a cognitive act. Corporeal and
extended objects can cause only corporeal and extended effects, and as
they are incapable of causing anything directly in the soul, they cannot be
efficient causes of cognitive acts.27

26Iuxta quod et quidam dicunt quod a quolibet obiecto sensibili gignuntur duo genera
specierum, una scilicet habens esse naturale et sensibile et alia habens solum esse inten-
tionale et spirituale et simplex [...] (Summa II q. 73, 87.)
27Summa II q. 58, 43739, 45256, 461515; ibid., q. 72, 1824; q. 73, 8290.
130 chapter five

It is notable that Olivi does not deny that corporeal objects can cause
changes in the sense organs. The body is corporeal, and therefore there
is nothing problematic in the idea that external objects act upon it. Olivi
seems, for instance, to account for the fact that the eyes can be destroyed
by looking too long at the sun by appealing to changes that the sun causes
in the eyes, and he allows for other kinds of influences as well.28 What he
denies is that the bodily changes that external objects cause in the sense
organs would amount to perception, because the cognitive acts belong
primarily to the soul and not to bodily organs.
Moreover, he does not reject the existence of species altogether. He
accepts the existence of memory species (species memorialis), which are
of high importance for his account of the psychological processes of imag-
ination and recollection (see chapters twelve and thirteen below). He also
accepts the species in medio even though he does not give them any role
in cognitive processes. In this respect his explanation in one of his apolo-
getic works, Epistola ad fratrem R., is telling. He was accused of holding:
that things do not multiply their species, but the soul cognises them by
its essence.29 Olivi explicates his view as follows:
Sight so perceptibly proves the multiplication of species in the case of sun-
rays and in the shining out of illuminated colours that he who denies it
earns a punishment, and may God show mercy to those who have imposed
this [denial] to me, for I assert this fact everywhere [...] I have never said
that the soul cognises things by its own essence, as if it were an exemplar
and similitude of all things.30
We see that Olivi does not deny the existence of species, but we also see
that he understands them in quite a different manner than does, say,
Aquinas. Species in medio seem to be identified with beams of light, which
are perceptible in themselves. For example, when the sun shines through
a small window of a dark room, it is possible to see a bright sunbeam in
the air of the room without seeing the sun; if there is a stained glass in the
window, its colours shine in a similar manner. Perhaps Olivi has cases like

28See, e.g., Summa II q. 58, 480 & 484; ibid., q. 61, 582.
29Quod res non multiplicant species suas sed ab anima per essentiam cognoscuntur.
(Ep. 13, 55.)
30Multiplicationes specierum in solis radiis et in refulgentia colorum irradiatorum
visus ita sensibiliter comprobat, quod quasi pena indiget qui hoc negat, et parcat Deus
illis qui hoc mihi imposuerunt, cum ego hoc ubique asseram [...] Nunquam etiam dixi
quod anima per essentiam cognoscat res, quasi ipsa esset exemplar et similitudo omnium
rerum. (Ep. 13, 55.) See also Responsio prima 10, 128. The idea that someone needs punish-
ment instead of argumentation comes from Aristotle (Topics 1.11, 105a29).
criticism of earlier theories of perception 131

this in mind.31 Clearly, this view differs radically from the Thomistic posi-
tion that the species have a spiritual existence not only in cognitive pow-
ers but also in medio. Olivi denies the possibility of a spiritual existence of
species in medio, and he explicitly says that if the species in medio exist,
they are corporeal.32 His basic assumption is that corporeal and extended
objects cannot produce spiritual and unextended species. And since it is
not necessary to posit corporeal species in order to account for percep-
tion, the theories of the type (2) cannot be correct. Only a spiritual and
unextended species may be capable of acting upon the cognitive powers
of the soul.33
On the other hand, Olivi admits that if species are simple and spiritual,
they are capable of representing external objects. Yet, he argues that spe-
cies: are not needed to represent an object, and still this is for what they
seem to be needed the most.34 He does not accept this kind of represen-
tationalist version of (2), and it receives his most attention and sharpest
criticism.35 He opposes this version of species theory because he thinks
that it entails problematic epistemological consequences. According to
him, sensible species that are understood as representations by which our
cognitive powers are meant to apprehend external objects would hinder
us from perceiving the objects which they represent. In the end, this idea
would lead to sceptical conclusions in relation to the reliability of our
senses. If an act of perception were to take place by the mediation of a
sensible species, the species would be the first and immediate object of
our perception:
Moreover, a species would never actually represent the object to the power,
unless the power regarded it by directing and fixing its gaze (aspectum) to it.
But the thing to which the gaze of the power is directed is an object (habet
rationem obiecti), and the thing to which it is first directed is a primary
object. Therefore, these species would rather be objects than intermediate
or representative principles. Moreover, a power apprehends and cognises

31 See also Summa II q. 73, 84.


32Lux aut aliae formae corporales non possunt gignere speciem in aliquo puncto aeris
quae sit simplex simplicitate intellectuali. Unde si aliquo modo gignerent ibi speciem sim-
plicem, non esset simplex nisi simplicitate punctali, quae non est extra genus quantitatis
nec extra genus corporalium. (Summa II q. 58, 456.)
33Summa II q. 73, 8384. For discussion see Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 4347; Nor-
more, The Matter of Thought, 13031.
34[species] non exigitur ad repraesentandum obiectum, et tamen hoc est illud pro
quod magis videbatur exigi. (Summa II q. 74, 122.)
35Olivi criticises the representationalist versions of species theories in many places.
See especially Summa II q. 58, 46970; ibid., 487502; q. 74, 12223.
132 chapter five

as an object that thing towards which it turns in order to regard it. So, if it
regards the species, it cognises it as its object [...] and so we would always
cognise the species before the thing that is in front of us.36
Here Olivi lays out the most fundamental ideas of his criticism. A sen-
sible species cannot represent an external object to a perceptual power
other than by being the object of perception. The only way a sensible
species can affect the powers of the soul is by becoming an object of per-
ception, and as such it would also be the first object. It is clear that by
this expression Olivi does not mean temporal priority. Rather, his idea is
that the first object of perception is what is perceived as an object, and,
crucially, if this is how perception takes place, the external object is not
perceived at all. Thus, in Olivis view this kind of species theory results
in a complete inability to apprehend the external object because as an
intermediary object of apprehension the sensible species: would rather
veil the thing and impede us from seeing it as present and in itself than
help us in doing so.37
Olivis way of interpreting the species theory is flagrantly representa-
tionalist. It portrays perception as similar to a case in which a person sees
a painting and claims to see the thing that the painting is about. When
I see one of the self-portraits of Vincent van Gogh, I do not see van Gogh
but only an image of him; similarly, Olivi thinks, the species theory entails
that when, say, a cat sees a mouse, it does not actually see the mouse but
an internal representation of the mousewhich may or may not be truth-
ful. The representational species would be apprehended as such, and this
position leads to epistemological problems and even to sceptical conclu-
sions. As I am in no position to judge whether van Gogh really looked like
his self-portrait, the cat would have no access to the visible qualities of
the real mouse. Alternatively, if the external object were apprehended in
itself in addition to the apprehension of its sensible species, the percipient
would, as it were, see the same object twice: first as represented by the

36Praeterea, nunquam species actu repraesentabit obiectum ipsi potentiae, nisi poten-
tia aspiciat ipsam, ita quod convertat et figat aspectum suum in ipsam. Sed illud ad quod
convertitur aspectus potentiae habet rationem obiecti, et illud ad quod primo convertitur
habet rationem primi obiecti. Ergo species istae plus habebunt rationem obiecti quam
rationem principii intermedii seu repraesentativi. Praeterea, illud ad quod aspiciendum
potentia convertitur, ab ipsa potentia apprehenditur et cognoscitur tanquam eius obiec-
tum. Si igitur aspicit ipsam speciem, ergo cognoscit eam tanquam suum obiectum [...]
et ita semper primo cognosceremus speciem quam ipsam rem obiectam. (Summa II q.
58, 469.)
37[...] potius velaret rem et impediret eam praesentialiter aspici in se ipsa quam ad
hoc adiuvaret. (Summa II q. 58, 469.)
criticism of earlier theories of perception 133

species, and then directly. This clearly is not the case, according to Olivi,
and if it were, it would also prove that the external object can be seen
without the mediating species.38
In his criticism, Olivi also appeals to the experiential difference between
various psychological operations. It is obvious that the psychological
operations of imagining and remembering an absent object are phenom-
enologically quite different from seeing a present object. Yet, Olivi claims
that if the power of sight does not reach the external object but only an
internal representation of it, this phenomenal difference disappears:
Moreover, when a power regards a species, it either directs or does not
direct its gaze (aspectus) beyond the species to regard the object. [...] But if
the power does not direct its gaze, then it does not see the object as present.
It sees it only in the way we say a thing is seen when it is cognised as absent
by gazing at a memory species which is placed under our gaze instead of at
the thing itself. In this way, all vision [...] would be like remembering or
imagining an absent thing rather than seeing it.39
The focal idea is that if perception were to take place by sensible spe-
cies that represent external objects, there would be no explanation for
the phenomenal difference. Given that the difference exists, perception
cannot take place by sensible species.
Olivis criticism is perspicacious, but it is based on the idea that species
are representations, and not all medieval proponents of species theories
would have accepted this interpretation. For instance, Aquinas repeatedly
states that species are not perceived at all. They are not signs, paintings, or
images of the external objects in virtue of which those objects would be
brought to mind. Rather, species are causal intermediates which explain
our direct cognition of the external world. We can see that Olivis criticism
of representationalism is not aimed against theories which hold species as
causal intermediaries by looking at the internal structure of his discussion:
when he advances to the problems of representationalism in question 58
of Summa, he is explicitly discussing only the theories of the type (2b),
and he also explicates what kind of theories he has in mind:

38Summa II q. 58, 469; ibid., q. 73, 89.


39Praeterea, quando potentia aspicit speciem, aut ultra eam transit suus aspectus
ad aspiciendum rem aut non. [...] Si autem non transit, igitur non videt praesentaliter
obiectum nisi solum illo modo quo dicimur videre rem, quando eam cogitamus absentem,
aspiciendo speciem memorialem obiectam nostro aspectui loco rei, et sic omnis visio [...]
potius erit recordatio aut imaginatio quasi de re absenti quam visio. (Summa II q. 58,
46970.)
134 chapter five

Perhaps it is said that [...] species are needed for representing the object
to the power [...] and that an act of cognising is said to be from the spe-
cies to the extent that the representation it provides is required in order to
produce the act.40
The species is not a causal intermediate but a representation of the object,
as if a kind of image, and the power of the soul perceives the object by
perceiving the species. The epistemological problems of representational-
ism are taken up primarily against this particular version of species the-
ory, and we may ask whether Olivis criticism applies to Aquinas view in
which species are not representationalist objects of perception but causal
intermediaries. In a way it does not, for Olivi himself sometimes says that
cognitive acts can be understood as being sensible species and similitudes
of the objects.41 So, at the outset it seems that if species are understood
only as causal intermediates, there is nothing controversial in them.
This affinity does not mean, however, that Olivi would accept Aquinas
version of the species theory, for the latter is committed to other ideas
that Olivi finds problematic. Most importantly, he denies (as we have
seen) the idea that speciesor a cognitive actcould be produced by
an external object. All species theories are committed to the passivity of
the powers of the soul, and Olivi cannot accept this. Thus, the concession
he makes concerning the identity of a cognitive act and a species is a ter-
minological one. We may call the acts of our cognitive powers species if
we wish, but they are after all very different than the species in Aquinas
theory. This concession in fact accentuates his rejection of the role of spe-
cies in cognitive processes because it amounts to saying that there are no
species but only cognitive acts.
Finally, the criticism Olivi directs against theories of the type (3a) is
based on the principle of parsimony. If the powers of the soul are capable
of producing a species which then brings about a cognitive act, why are
the powers not capable of producing an act of cognition in the first place?
Olivis answer is that they are. He thinks that even though not all versions
of species theory lead to epistemological isolation by distancing us from
the external world, sensible species are still superfluous. If we are able to
perceive external objects by the mediation of species (so that species do

40Forte dicetur quod [...] species exigitur ad repraesentandum obiectum ipsi poten-
tiae [...] et quod pro tanto dicatur esse actus cognoscendi ab ipsa specie, quia eius
repraesentatio praeexigitur ad productionem ipsius. (Summa II q. 58, 467.)
41 See Summa II q. 58, 47073; ibid., q. 25, 43946; Responsio secunda, 405; Ep. 13, 5556.
criticism of earlier theories of perception 135

not veil the object from us), we are able to perceive them also without
the species.42
The same idea is also used against (3b) but in a slightly different way.
Olivi begins by pointing out that the only way external objects can (even
in principle) excite the powers of the soul is by their similitudes. Under-
stood in this way, there is no difference between (3b) and (2), and the
critique against the latter applies also to the former. Moreover, in order
to have any role in the process of perception, the excitative activity of
the objects must somehow affect the powers of the soul. Otherwise they
are futile. Olivi argues that there are only two options: either the soul
perceives the excitation or not. In the latter case the excitation has no
role whatsoever, and in the former case we fall back to the problems of
theories of the type (2).
The overall view Olivi presents to us is that if the external objects can-
not be apprehended directly, they cannot be apprehended at all; and if
they can be apprehended directly, the species become superfluous. Hence,
he discards species theories of cognition because either species have too
salient a role in cognitive processes, or they have no role whatsoever.43
Olivis criticism towards the Aristotelian and perspectivist theories of
perception is motivated by his need to support the activity of the will. For
this purpose he presents an alternative theory of cognition in which cog-
nitive powers are active. In this way he opposes one of the central tenets
of medieval species theories: cognitive powers are not passive receptors
of external stimuli. In a critical tone so typical of him, he rejects this idea,
which is central to Aristotelian theories of his time: Aristotle provides
insufficient evidence, nay, almost no evidence at all for his claim, but he
is believed without reason, as if a god of this age.44

2.Augustines Active Theory

Augustine is the most important author to transmit a Neoplatonic con-


ception of the active nature of the soul to the Middle Ages. He is also
one of the most important sources for Olivis critical reaction towards

42Summa II q. 58, 473; ibid., q. 74, 12223.


43Spruit, Species intelligibilis, 219. Spruit discusses Olivis reaction to species theories
of intellection, but Olivi does not see any crucial difference between sensitive and intel-
lectual cognitions in this regard. Thus the same point applies to both levels.
44Aristoteles nulla sufficienti ratione, immo fere nulla ratione probat suum dictum,
sed absque ratione creditur sibi tanquam deo huius saeculi. (Summa II q. 58, 482.)
136 chapter five

passive theories of perception. Although Augustine does not present a


systematic theory of his own, several of his worksespecially De Genesi
ad litteram, De trinitate, De quantitate animae, and De musicaoffer two
general accounts of how we come to know external reality. The first of
them is based on the idea that the soul sends forth so-called visual rays
which reach external objects and thus enable it to perceive those objects.
According to the other view, external objects cause bodily changes in
the organs of the senses, and the soul perceives the external objects by
reacting actively to these changes. Augustine expresses the latter view by
defining sensation as: a bodily change (passio corporis) that does not go
unnoticed by the soul.45
Olivi is inspired by Augustines conception of the ontological supe-
riority of the soul with respect to the body and the idea of the active
nature of perception, but he does not accept his two general accounts of
perception.46 He notices that Augustine did not present a unified theory
of perception47 and argues that his ideas need not be accepted: it is not
necessary to follow Augustine in this matter.48 Olivi is willing to reject
Augustine on philosophical grounds when he sees that the bishop defends
an untenable position.
The visual ray theories were fairly popular in Antiquity, but medieval
philosophers did not usually regard them as valid alternatives. Olivi does
not devote much to rejecting them due to the fact that (according to his
own words) no-one defended them during his time. He incorporates some
psychological elements from extramissive theories into his own view, but

45[...] sensus sit passio corporis per seipsam non latens animam. (Aurelius Augusti-
nus, De quantitate animae, in Sancti Aureli Augustini Opera, sect. I pars IV, ed. W. Hrmann,
Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 89 (Wien: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1986)
(hereafter an. quant.) 25.48.) See also an. quant. 23.41; id., De musica liber VI: A Critical Edi-
tion with a Translation and an Introduction, ed. & trans. M. Jacobsson, Acta Universitatis
Stockholmiensis, Studia Latina Stockholmiensia 47 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell Inter-
national, 2002) (hereafter mus.) 6.5.912. For discussion, see M.A.I. Gannon, The Active
Theory of Sensation in St. Augustine, The New Scholasticism 30 (1956), 15480; ODaly,
Augustines Philosophy of Mind. For discussion about different versions of extramissive
theories and the reasons they were considered plausible, see Lindberg, Theories of Vision,
passim.
46For Olivis criticism on Augustine, see Silva & Toivanen, The Active Nature of the
Soul, 27073.
47Medieval scholastics were not unanimous as to whether Augustine had proposed an
extramissive visual ray theory or not (Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 131). Olivi writes, in a
polite manner, that: Augustinus circa actum particularium sensuum more dubitantis et
hinc inde fluctuantis aliqua dixit [...] (Summa II q. 74, 113.) See ibid., q. 73, 5562.
48[...] in hac parte non est necessarium Augustinum sequi. (Summa II q. 58, 484.)
criticism of earlier theories of perception 137

he diverges from two central ideas, which Augustine suggests in some of


his texts. He paraphrases Augustines position as follows:
On this matter [Augustine] said something that nobody follows these days.
One of these things is the idea of corporeal rays proceeding from the eye
all the way to the objects. He says that these rays are kinds of bodieslike
rods that are emitted from the eyes and invigorated by them [...] He also
says that an act of vision takes place in the place where the object is seen
(that is, where the rays are terminated) rather than in the eyes, whence the
rays spring forth.49
We can see that Olivi explicitly rejects two central principles: the idea
that there is a real emission of corporeal particles from the eyes through
the medium to the object and the ensuing idea that the act of perception
takes place in or at the object. He agrees that the powers of the soul must
reach the objects somehow, but he denies the existence of visual rays. He
distinguishes between what he calls virtual and essential presence. The
powers of the soul must be present to their objects, but they send noth-
ing real to them; rather, they attend to them only virtually. We shall see
below that this distinction amounts to an assertion that powers of the
soul are intentionally directed at external objects. Thus, although Olivis
manner of discussing the virtual reaching out of the powers of the soul is
reminiscent of extramissive theories, it diverges from them because no
real extramission takes place. Moreover, he argues that an act of the soul
cannot be where the soul is not, and since the soul can only be in the
body (leaving aside separate existence after death), the perceptual acts of
the soul can take place only where the body is. Our experience attests to
this as well, since we feel that our acts of perception are in the organs of
our bodies.50
Olivi does not accept Augustines other position either. Even though
he sees nothing problematic with the idea that external objects cause

49In hac materia [Augustinus] quaedam dixit quae nullus hodie sequitur, ut est illud
de radiis corporalibus ab oculo usque ad obiecta progredientibus. Quos radios dixit esse
quaedam corpora quasi quasdam virgas ab oculis emicantes et ab eis vegetatas [...] Dixit
etiam quod actus visionis potius fit in loco ubi est res visa, ubi scilicet terminantur isti
radii, quam in loco oculi, unde scilicet erumpunt isti radii. (Summa II q. 58, 482.) See also
ibid., q. 73, 5563. Olivi reads Anselm of Canterbury as an advocate of this theory as well
and refers to his De veritate 6, but he later hesitates in making even this attribution (see
ibid., 5859, and 62, respectively). In the passage Olivi refers to, Anselm is discussing per-
ceptual errors which he attributes not to external senses but to the interior sense. He does
not seem to say anything definitive about the mechanism of sight. (Anselm of Canterbury,
Dialogus de veritate, ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 158.)
50See, e.g., Summa II q. 58, 48294; ibid., q. 73, 5569.
138 chapter five

changes in the organs, as we have seen, he repeatedly points out that


these changes are not identical to perception. More crucially, they do not
play any causal role in the perceptual process. He takes up the Augustin-
ian idea that sensation is a bodily change that does not go unnoticed by
the soul.51 In Olivis eyes Augustine means that an external object causes
a bodily change which the soul notices, thus perceiving the object which
has caused the change. He makes only a brief comment on this idea, but
it is loaded with philosophical acuteness:
Yet this formulation seems to mean that the bodily change (passio corporis)
is the object that is perceived [...] Furthermore, does not go unnoticed by
the soul (non latere animam) means [1] only absence of unnoticing, or it
means [2] some actual knowledge on the part of the soul in addition to the
absence of unnoticing. But the former [viz. (1)] cannot be true, since there
cannot be absence of unnoticing when there is no knowledge and since it
would then not add anything real to the definition [of perception]. It can-
not be true also because the reason why Augustine adds this clause is the
nature (ratio) of actual knowledge: there are frequently many passions in
our senses that do not appear to us. This is patent in the case of a sleeper
who sleeps with his eyes, ears and nostrils wide open. Passions that occur
in his senses then are not actual perceptions, even though they are spe-
cifically (secundum speciem) the same passions that occur in those who are
awake. But if it means actual knowledge [viz. (2)] in addition to the absence
of unnoticing, this actual knowledge means the whole essence of an act of
perception. Therefore, it adds a complete act of perception to the bodily
change, and not just in any way, but in such a way that the bodily change is
the object of the act. Therefore, this definition has a vice of contrariety, and
in addition it has a vice of being nonsense.52

51 [...] sensus est passio corporis per se ipsam non latens animam. (Summa II q. 58,
484.) Olivi refers to mus. 6 [= 5.910] and an. quant [= 23.41].
52Et tamen in hoc dicto includi videtur quod ipsa passio sit ipsum obiectum quod sen-
titur [...] Hoc etiam, scilicet, non latere animam, aut dicit solam negationem latentiae aut
ultra hoc dicit aliquam actualem notitiam ipsius animae. Primum autem nullo modo stare
potest; tum quia negatio latentiae non potest esse ubi nulla est notitia; tum quia tunc nihil
reale adderet in definitione; tum quia causa qua Augustinus motus est ad addendum ibi
illam particulam est ratio actualis notitiae, quia frequenter multae passiones fiunt in nos-
tris sensibus quae nobis non apparent, sicut patet in dormiente apertis oculis et auribus et
naribus. Passiones enim quae tunc fiunt in sensibus non sunt actuales sensus, quamvis sint
eaedem passiones secundum speciem cum illis quae fiunt in vigilantibus. Si autem ultra
hoc dicit actualem notitiam, sed illa actualis notitia dicit totam essentiam actus sentiendi.
Ergo ad passionem additur totus actus sentiendi, et hoc non qualitercunque, sed ut habens
ipsam passionem pro obiecto. Ergo haec definitio habet in se vitium contrarietatis et ultra
hoc vitium nugationis. (Summa II q. 58, 484.) See also ibid., q. 74, 11314 & 12324.
criticism of earlier theories of perception 139

In short, Olivis idea is that non latere animam may mean either (1) absence
of unnoticing without any actual noticing, in which case it means nothing,
or (2) some kind of actual noticing of the bodily change. The first option
cannot be true on the grounds that it does not add anything to the defini-
tion of perception: a bodily change that does not go unnoticed would be
the same as a bodily change, and a bodily change which the soul does
not notice in any way does not explain perception, as the case of a sleep-
ing person shows. The soul has to notice the change. But the problem
with this second option is that in order to notice the bodily change, the
soul has to bring about a cognitive act, the object of which is the bodily
change. Olivi argues that this cannot be how perception takes place, since
it would amount to perceiving only the change in the body, not the object
that has caused it. It is easy to see how, in Olivis view, this leads at the
very least to problems of representationalism; at the worst it prevents us
from seeing even a representation of an external object, for bodily changes
are (supposedly) quite different from the objects which cause them.
Olivi sees an important tension within the Augustinian theories of per-
ception. Corporeal objects are incapable of acting directly on the soul, due
to the ontological superiority of the soul. Even though they are capable of
causing bodily changes, these changes still remain on a lower ontological
level, and, as such, they cannot actualise the powers of the soul. The soul
needs to notice the bodily changes in order for them to have any effect
on it, and Olivi points out that in order for the soul to be able to perceive
the bodily changes, it has to be fully capable of cognitive action by itself.
It has the ability of cognising things that are external to it, and it cannot
be aided by anything corporeal in its cognitive processes. Olivis idea is,
Augustine notwithstanding, that the ontological superiority of the soul
makes bodily changes superfluous. This consequence may seem counter-
intuitive, but as we shall see, Olivi is willing to accept it.
Chapter six

Active Nature of Perception

Olivi thinks that perception should not be understood as a passive


reception of external stimuli but as an active process. Perception is not
something that happens to us but something that we do. In order to
understand this position, we need to examine what Olivi means by the
activity of the powers of the soul. I shall point out, in section one, that
the conception of the ontological superiority of the soul and the ensuing
view that the acts of the soul are spiritual lead him to argue that the souls
powers are the efficient causes of their own acts.
In order to make this position plausible, Olivi needs to find an expla-
nation for two problematic issues. First, he has to account for the role
of the objects in perception. Although he denies that the things which
we perceive can affect the powers of the soul, he attributes to them a
certain kind of causal role by arguing that they are terminative causes
which function as the end-terms of our cognitive acts. The other problem
is related to the connection between the perceived object and the soul.
How is the soul able to reach the object and receive information from it?
I shall argue that Olivis explanation makes him a proponent of an inten-
tional theory of perception, as he bases his answer on a virtual connec-
tion between the object and the perceptual power. The virtual connection
is possible because the powers of the soul can be intentionally directed
towards distant objects. These ideas will be discussed in sections two and
three respectively.

1.Activity of the Powers of the Soul

Olivi incorporates a Neoplatonic element in his theory of perception by


emphasising the active role of the soul in perception. This emphasis may
have been inspired by various sources that were well known to medieval
authors, such as Augustine, Avicenna, and Nemesius of Emesa,1 but the

1For references, see Knuuttila, Aristotles Theory of Perception and Medieval Aristo-
telianism, 911 & footnote 25.
142 chapter six

theory he puts forth is not similar to anything presented before him, and
he is well aware of its originality:
In this way they answer to the fifteen arguments [...] by which the cogni-
tive powers were proven to be totally passive. Although they agree with cer-
tain great doctors in some of their claims and they agree with other doctors
who are also great in some other matters, still they completely disagree with
everybody in other things, and as far as I know they do not agree with any
solemn doctor when all ideas are taken together.2
Despite the impersonal mode of expression, Olivi clearly prefers this the-
ory. He presents it as one option and does not assert the truth, but it is
obvious that the theory he presents is his own.3 He takes his inspiration
from earlier authors, to be sure, but does not follow them blindly.
The central idea in Olivis theory is that the cognitive powers of the soul
are not passive but active, which presupposes that they are not affected
from without. External objects cannot act on the cognitive powers of the
soul nor can they be efficient causes of cognitive acts, because they are
ontologically below the soul. This idea becomes clear if we look at Olivis
answer to a long and complicated argument which is designed to prove
that external objects can act on the powers of the soul.4 The argument
endeavours to establish this claim by showing that sensible objects are
capable of producing simple and unextended effects. In other words, by
proving that external objects can produce effects that are proportional
to our senses, the argument strives to show that perception is a passive
process in which the objects actualise the senses.5
Olivi agrees with the crux of the argument, namely, that an external
object must be able to produce simple and spiritual effects in order to
affect the senses, but he flatly denies this possibility by invoking the
authority of Augustine and by providing a lengthy philosophical criticism
against the arguments of the opposing view.6 The core of his criticism

2Sic igitur respondent isti ad istas quindecim probationes [...] quibus probabatur
potentias apprehensivas esse totaliter passivas. Licet autem isti in aliqua parte dictorum
suorum concordent quibusdam magnis doctoribus et in aliqua alia parte aliis etiam magnis:
in quibusdam tamen omnino discordant ab omnibus, et in omnibus in simul sumptis cum
nullo, quod sciam, doctore sollemni concordant. (Summa II q. 58, 515.)
3See chapter five, footnote 20 above.
4[...] obiecta possunt in eis agere (Summa II q. 58, 400.) The entire argument includes
nine proofs of this premise, and it covers pages 4003.
5Olivi develops his argumentation further in Summa II, 7274, but the central idea
becomes clear already in question 58.
6Olivis argumentation is scattered throughout different questions. The most impor-
tant passages are the following: Summa II q. 58, 43739, 45256, 461515; ibid., q. 72, 1824;
q. 73, 8290.
active nature of perception 143

is that external objects are unable to produce simple and unextended


effects, and therefore they cannot actualise our senses nor be the efficient
causes of our perceptual acts.7
Powers of the soul are not passive recipients of external stimuli; they
are active.8 Olivi thinks that this is, to use a modern expression, phenom-
enologically evident to us. He acknowledges that the experience we have
of our cognitive acts is, as it were, bidirectional. On the one hand, we
feel that we are active in the process of perception, because we expressly
perceive that our acts of seeing and cognising come intrinsically from,
or are produced by, the innermost part of us,9 but on the other hand,
the external world seems to imprint itself onto our senses. In fact, Olivi
believes that most thinkers who have proposed a passive theory of per-
ception have been led astray because they have put too much weight on
one side of this bidirectional phenomenological experience and neglected
the other:
Further, it must be known that because the two aforementioned causes
come together in a cognitive act, we experientially feel in it two as if contrary
aspects (rationes). For, insofar as the act comes from an internal cognitive
principle, we feel that it is our action and a kind of activity of ours which
issues from us and, as it were, tends towards the object and is directed to
it. By contrast, insofar as the act is produced by the object to which it is
terminated, it appears to be, as it were, a kind of being-acted-upon (passio)
by the object, a passion which enters us with the object, as if the object were
impressed and imprinted inside our [cognitive] power. And almost all who
have said that cognitive and affective acts flow from and are impressed by
their immediate objects are moved by the latter experience, and they have
not paid attention to the first one.10


7Summa II q. 58, 43761. Augustines view is presented in pp. 43739, and the rest of
the passage is devoted to disproving the opposing view. See also ibid., 489; q. 72, 1530.

8For discussion, see Kent, Aristotle and the Franciscans, 200; Sraphin Belmond, Le
mcanisme de la connaissance daprs Pierre Olieu, dit Olivi, La France franciscaine 12
(1929): 294. For the external senses, see Summa II q. 58, 461515. Although Summa II qq.
7274 deal with spirits (spiritus), the sensitive powers are not excluded. Olivi prefers to use
the term spiritus over anima probably because he also wants to discuss angels who strictly
speaking do not have a soul.

9[...] quia nos expresse sentimus nostros actus videndi vel cognoscendi exire seu
produci a nostris intimis et hoc intime. (Summa II q. 72, 24.) See also ibid., q. 58, 46364;
q. 72, 38; q. 74, 124.
10Ulterius sciendum quod quia ad actum cognitivum concurrit duplex causa praedicta:
idcirco experimentaliter sentimus in ipso duas rationes quasi oppositas. Nam pro quanto
exit ab interno principio cognitivo, sentimus quod est actio nostra et quoddam agere nos-
trum a nobis exiens et quasi in obiectum tendens et in illud intendens. Pro quanto vero fit
ab obiecto tanquam a terminante, videtur nobis esse quasi quaedam passio ab obiecto et
cum ipso obiecto intra nos illapsa, acsi ipsum obiectum esset in intimo nostrae potentiae
144 chapter six

The latter kind of experience is also genuine because objects contribute


to the production of the cognitive acts, but it does not mean that they
actualise our cognitive powers.11 By emphasising the first experience Olivi
wants to draw attention to the active nature of the cognitive powers of
the soul.
The activity of the powers means that they are able to produce their
acts by themselves. A power that is actualised by something external to
itself is not active but passive, whereas a power that is not actualised by
something external but is actualised by itself is active. This distinction
becomes clear when Olivi endeavours to prove that the will is an active
power. After presenting several more or less untenable positions, he
explains that: the will is totally active in respect to its acts in such a way
that it receives absolutely nothing from the object or from the intellect. It
is the sufficient, efficient principle of its own acts, both free and unfree.12
The will is a completely active power, because it does not receive anything
from without when it produces its own acts. However, Olivi specifies that
he does not intend to deny all passivity from the will (and from the other
powers of the soul): it is passive in the sense that its acts take place in
the will itself and thus actualise a potency inherent in the will. Thus, the
central question is whether the acts are produced by external objects, by
powers themselves, or by both of them together.13
Importantly, Olivi does not think that activity presupposes freedom.
The will is active even when it is not able to produce free actsfor exam-
ple, when the subject is asleep or mentally disturbedbecause even in
such a state it is not actualised by anything external to it. By contrast,
freedom presupposes that the will produces its own acts. A power can-
not be free unless it is active; therefore, activity is a necessary but not

impressum et illapsum. Et propter hanc secundam experientiam moti sunt fere omnes illi
qui dixerunt actus cognitivos et etiam affectivos influi et imprimi a suis obiectis immedia-
tis, non attendentes primam experientiam [...] (Summa II q. 72, 38.)
11 Summa II q. 72, 43. I shall return to this topic below.
12Voluntas est totaliter activa respectu actuum suorum, ita quod penitus nihil recipit
ab obiecto nec ab intellectu, sed ipsa est sufficiens principium effectivum actuum suorum,
sive liberorum sive non liberorum. (Summa II q. 58, 410.) Praeter hoc autem specialiter
probant hoc de voluntate secundum hoc quod est non libera, quod scilicet ipsa sit activa
sufficienter respectu actuum suorum, in quantum est non libera. (ibid., 478.)
13Non est igitur intentio nostra hic quaerere an ipsa [sc. voluntas] quantum ad hoc
sit potentia passiva quod vere in se seu in sua materia recipiat actus et habitus suos [...]
sed potius an actus sui sint totaliter producti ab ipsa aut totaliter ab aliis agentibus, upote,
ab obiectis et consimilibus, aut partim producantur ab ipsa, partim ab aliis. (Summa II
q. 58, 410.) Here Olivi explicitly discusses only the will, but it becomes clear that this is
the meaning of the term activity in relation to sensitive powers as well.
active nature of perception 145

s ufficient condition for freedom. In addition to being active, the will has
to be able to reflexively turn to itself and move itself to act in such a way
that it is also able to refrain from doing so. And even beyond this, the will
has to be able to reflexively turn to its own act of willing, which means
that one has to will ones willing, at least potentially. Only then is the will
also free. The unfree acts of the will lack the reflexive aspects, but even
they are caused by the will.14
As we have seen, Olivi applies this kind of activity to all the powers of
the soul, not only to the will. By denying that it is possible for external
objects to actualise the powers of the soul, he espouses the view that the
powers are active with respect to their acts and efficient causes thereof.
Yet all the powers of the soul are not capable of self-reflexively moving
themselves into actionat least it seems that Olivi attributes the ability
to refrain from acting, when the conditions for acting are met, only to the
will. If the cognitive powers of the soul were capable of refraining from
acting, they should be considered free, and this is not what Olivi wants
to do. Rather, when a power is confronted with an adequate object, it is
immediately actualised.15 The crucial idea is that even though the power
cannot refrain from acting, its acts are not caused by the object.

2.Objects as Terminative Causes

We may ask whether Olivi obviates the role of external objects in per-
ception altogether, since they are not efficient causes of perceptual acts.
It seems quite natural to assume that the perceived object or its visible
qualities have some role in the process of perception. Otherwise there is
no reason for a perception of a particular object to be about that object,
and it becomes difficult to explain how the sensory power of the soul can

14Ad actus enim liberos necessario exigitur triplex aspectus, qui esse non possunt
nisi liberum arbitrium maneat in sublimi et potestativa et elevata consistentia super se et
super suum obiectum et super inferiores potentias. Exigitur enim unus aspectus quo sit
conversum ad obiectum. Et alius aspectus quo sit conversum ad se ut agens ad patiens,
quia non potest se movere, nisi prius sit conversum ad se ut movens ad mobile; actus
autem non est in eo liber, nisi exeat ab eo movendo se libere [...] tunc autem apparet
quod movet se libere, quando potest se ab illo motu retinere. Tertius aspectus exigitur
[...] quo videlicet sit conversum ad se ut ad obiectum vel saltem quod possit converti
super se et super suum actum sicut super obiectum, pro eo quod nunquam aliquid volu-
mus libere, nisi cum volumus nos velle, aut saltem cum statim possumus nos velle actum
illum. (Summa II q. 59, 55253.) See also ibid., q. 58, 429; Yrjnsuuri, Free Will and Self-
Control, 1023 & 11821.
15See, e.g., Summa II q. 58, 468; ibid., q. 59, 552; Quodl. 1.5, 19.
146 chapter six

produce an act by which the percipient cognises the very object that she
cognises.
In fact, Olivis view is not so counterintuitive that he would completely
deny any role to the object. He explicitly claims that an act of perception
presupposes an object.16 Without the presence of any object, we would
be unable to perceive anything, and in this sense an object is a necessary
element in perception. However, since Olivi denies the efficient causal
role of the object in the process of perception, he has to account for its
role in some other way. In order to see how, let us begin by looking at an
explanation which he gives in Epistola ad fratrem R.:
In the question Whether the will is an active power, in an answer to an argu-
ment, I recite at length a certain position which says that the apprehensive
powers of the soul are total efficient causes of their own acts, although the
objects co-operate with them not by way of an efficient [cause] but by way
of an object. In the same place it is said that the acts of the powers and the
species which are in the intellect (in acie intelligentie) are the same.17
Here Olivi repeats his idea that the acts of the cognitive powers can be
understood as species, but at the moment the two other ideas are more
important: the powers of the soul are total efficient causes of their acts,
and the external objects co-operate in cognitive processes without having
any efficient role whatsoever. The objects are necessary for cognitive acts
to take place, and they partake in the process per modum obiecti.18 Olivi
does not give a more detailed account of his position in this context, but
if we look at the following passage from his Summa, we can find an expla-
nation for the perplexing expression and for the role of objects in percep-
tion, or in cognitive processes in general:
an object, to the extent that the gaze (aspectus) and the act of a power are
terminated at it, co-operates in their specific production [...] Namely, the
cognitive actand the gazeis fixed (figitur) to the object and it absorbs
the object intentionally to itself. This is why a cognitive act is called the
apprehension of, and the apprehensive extension to, the object. In this

16Summa II q. 74, 11516; ibid., q. 72, 39; q. 58, 415.


17In quaestione vero an voluntas sit potentia activa, in responsione cuiusdam argu-
menti recito diffuse quandam positionem que dicit quod potentie anime apprehensive
sint tota causa efficiens actuum suorum, quamvis obiecta eis cooperentur, non per
modum efficientis, sed per modum obiecti. Ibidemque dicitur quod actus potentiarum et
species que sunt in acie intelligentie sint omnino id ipsum. (Ep. 13, 55.) The reference is
to SummaII q. 58, 461515.
18Olivi points out that not everything that is necessary for producing something is the
efficient cause of it (Summa II q. 58, 419).
active nature of perception 147

extension and absorption the act becomes intimately conformed and assim-
ilated into the object. The object presents itself or appears as being present
to the cognitive gaze, and the object is a kind of representation of itself by
an act which is assimilated to it. As an actual illumination of a spherical
or quadrangular vase becomes spherical or quadrangular only because the
light source generates the illumination in conformity with the figure of the
object which receives and confines it; so also, because a cognitive force gen-
erates a cognitive act with a certain formative absorption of the act towards
the object, and with a certain signet-like and inward (sigillari et viscerali)
extension of the object, thereforebecause it is generated thusthe act
becomes a similitude and a signet-like expression of the object.19
The efficient cause of a cognitive act is the power, but the object
co-operates in the production of the act by functioning as a terminus.
The act is fixed (figitur) to the object andimportantlythe object is
intentionally absorbed into the act. Olivis manner of expressing his idea
is idiosyncratic, but the idea is clear enough even on the basis of this pas-
sage: a cognitive act is intentionally directed towards an object, and this
intentional relation enables the act to become a similitude of the object.
Although Olivi speaks about the cognitive act becoming a similitude of
the object, he does not mean that it is an internal representation of the
object. His idea is that the cognitive acts being about object E can be
expressed by calling the act a similitude of E, but the act does not become
an intentional object E that would have some kind of mental existence.
It is just the intentional act of cognising E. There is no representational

19[...] obiectum, in quantum terminat aspectus et actus potentiarum, cooperetur


specificae productioni eorum [...] Nam actus et aspectus cognitivus figitur in obiecto et
intentionaliter habet ipsum intra se imbibitum; propter quod actus cognitivus vocatur
apprehensio et apprehensiva tentio obiecti. In qua quidem tentione et imbibitione actus
intime conformatur et configuratur obiecto; ipsum etiam obiectum se ipsum praesentat
seu praesentialiter exhibet aspectui cognitivo et per actum sibi configuratum est quaedam
repraesentatio eius. Sicut enim actualis irradiatio vasis sphaerici vel quadrati fit sphaerica
vel quadrata ex hoc solo quod lux generat illam cum conformitate ad figuram sui sus-
cipientis et continentis: sic, quia vis cognitiva generat actum cognitivum cum quadam
informativa imbibitione actus ad obiectum et cum quadam sigillari et viscerali tentione
obiecti, idcirco eo ipso quod sic gignitur, fit ipsa similitudo et sigillaris expressio obiecti.
(Summa II q. 72, 3536.) Traditionally the relation between the powers of the soul and
the objects thereof was illustrated by saying that the power is like a piece of wax and the
object a signet ring that imprints its image into the power. On two occasions Olivi turns
this picture upside down and speaks about active wax that imprints itself to the signet ring
(ibid., q. 58, 41516 & 5067.) The metaphor of the active wax was presented by Robert
Kilwardby in De spiritu fantastico (see Robert Kilwardby, On Time and Imagination, 103,
p. 94), but it is uncertain whether Olivi knew this work. In any case, the context and the
argumentative role that Olivi assigns to the metaphor are different from those that we
find in Kilwardby.
148 chapter six

entity between the act and the objectthis is what Olivi has in mind
when he says that the object reveals itself to the act and, as it were, rep-
resents itself.20
As the acts of the cognitive powers of the soul become similitudes of
the objects, the content of a cognitive act is the particular external object
to which the act is intentionally directed.21 The act of perception becomes
a similitude of the object because: the objects are the end-points of the
powers and their acts in such a way that the acts receive their species from
them due to this kind of termination.22 As we have already seen, Olivis
idea is that the acts of various cognitive powers of the soul receive their
genera from the power and their species from the object.23 This means
that an act of seeing, say, a mouse is an act of seeing because it is brought
about by the power of sight and realised in the eyes, and it is an act of
seeing the mouse because the mouse provides the content of the act.
The object, therefore, plays a crucial role in cognitive processes because
it is a necessary end-term of an intentional cognitive act, and it deter-
mines the content of the act. But one might still ask how the object figures
in the process if it does not play any causal role. In the passage above,
Olivi employs the Neoplatonic imagery of Augustine24 and metaphori-
cally describes how an object makes an act a similitude of itself without
having any causal role: the sun shines and enlightens vases of different

20Olivi is explicit in this regard: Praeterea, nulla species ita repraesentat obiectum
sicut ipsummet obiectum repraesentat se ipsum. (Summa II q. 58, 469.) It has been
recently argued that Olivis idea of the cognitive act being a similitude of the object
makes him a proponent of an internalist theory of cognition (Han Thomas Adriaenssen,
Peter John Olivi on Perceptual Representation, Vivarium 49 (2011): 336352). I am not
fully convinced that the externalist/internalist distinction can be applied to Olivis theory
unproblematically.
21 Rursus sciendum quod quia actus cognitivus obiecti individualis est terminatus in
ipsum, in quantum est hoc individuum et non aliud: ideo de essentia talis actus est quod
sit propria similitudo huius individui, in quantum huius, et quod non sit similitudo alio-
rum individuorum eiusdem speciei, pro quanto individualiter differunt ab isto. Quod igitur
actus iste repraesentet individualem rationem et proprietatem sui obiecti, non habet ex
hoc quod sit in materia corporali aut ex hoc quod fluat a forma corporali ad hic et nunc
limitata, sicut Aristotelici dicunt, immo potius ex hoc quod terminatur ad obiectum indi-
viduale, in quantum individuale, et hoc sub modo praedicto. (Summa II q. 72, 37.)
22[...] ipsa obiecta sic sunt terminativa potentiarum et actuum quod actus trahunt
speciem ab eis propter huiusmodi terminationem [...] (Summa II q. 58, 514.)
23See chapter four and Summa II q. 54, 27576; ibid., q. 72, 1718 & 3540. According
to him, trahere speciem suam ab aliquo potest esse tripliciter: aut sicut a principio intrin-
seco et essentiali aut sicut a principio effectivo aut sicut a termino obiectivo seu obiecto
terminativo. (Summa II q. 58, 414.) The cognitive acts receive their species from objects
in the third way.
24Kent, Aristotle and the Franciscans, 198.
active nature of perception 149

shapes, and the light which falls upon the surface of each vase becomes
similar in shape to the vaseslight on the surface of a round vase is also
round. Olivi thinks, reasonably, that the vase has no causal role in the
generation of the light, because the light on the vase is produced solely
by the sun. But the lights being a particular shape is due to the vase onto
which it falls. In this way, the vase does not play any causal role in the
generation of the light, but once generated and projected to the vase the
light becomes a kind of similitude of the vase because it enlightens its
surface.25 This is principally what happens in the case of cognitive acts
as well, according to Olivi: an act is directed to a certain object, and
its existence as a cognitive act is caused entirely by the cognitive power to
which it belongs. But the object to which the act is intentionally directed
renders the act a similitude of the object.
Yet, even on the basis of the Augustinian imagery, it seems that the
object must have some kind of a causal role. It is difficult to see how an
object could affect the content of a cognitive act without being a cause of
some kind. On one occasion Olivi admits that: Although the object [...]
is not absolutely and properly an efficient [cause] [...] it can nevertheless
be loosely enumerated among the efficient causes.26 However, it is clear
that this concession does not mean that the object would be a proper
efficient cause because he repeatedly denies that possibility elsewhere. In
one instance he locates the causality of the object in the genus of a final
cause, but it is not clear whether it fits there any better. Modern commen-
tators give different interpretations of Olivis position. Some think that the
object is a final cause whereas others argue that he invents a new kind
of cause which is different from the four Aristotelian causes.27 Arguably,
Olivi realises that he is postulating a kind of cause which does not fall
under any of the Aristotelian causes. When he says that the object belongs
to the genus of a final cause, he specifies that the object should properly
be called a terminative cause:

25Olivi uses the same illustration in several places: Summa II q. 54, 276; ibid., q. 58, 415.
See also ibid., 45253.
26[...] licet obiectum [...] non habeat simpliciter et proprie rationem efficientis [...]
nihilominus potest large connumerari inter causas efficientes. (Summa II q. 72, 10.)
27Kent and (apparently) Pasnau think that the object functions as a final cause (see
Kent, Aristotle and the Franciscans, 19295; Robert Pasnau, Olivi on Human Freedom,
in Pierre de Jean Olivi (12481298): Pense scolastique, dissidence spirituelle et socit, ed.
A. Boureau & S. Piron, tudes de philosophie mdivale 79 (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 20; id., Theo-
ries of Cognition, 171). By contrast, Franois-Xavier Putallaz thinks that it is not (Putallaz,
Insolente libert, 146).
150 chapter six

The objective cause can be properly considered as belonging to the genus of


a final cause, orif you want to call it by a more proper nameit can be
called a terminative cause. For, a material cause has the true nature (ratio)
of a cause with respect to the thing that is educed from it or received in
it, although it is not properly an efficient cause of the thing. Similarly, the
terminative cause has the true nature of a cause, although it is not properly
an efficient cause of the actions that are terminated at it.28
It seems to me that, strictly speaking, terminative causality is not a spe-
cies of final causality, at least in the Aristotelian sense of the term. A final
cause is, according to Aristotle, the end for the sake of which something
is done, or the realisation of a form in natural development.29 The object
in a cognitive process is neither. One way of expressing that X is a final
cause of Y is to say that X is what Y is for. By contrast, Olivis terminative
cause could be expressed as X is what Y is about. A mouse is not what
a cats act of seeing is for; it is what the act of seeing is about. A final cause
must at least be understood in a wide sense, should terminative causality
be included in it.
By postulating this new kind of cause, Olivi is able to explain how the
cognitive powers can be total efficient causes of their acts while the objects
still affect the contents of the cognitive acts. His way of accounting for the
role of the object may sound idiosyncratic, but we have to remember that
he is dealing with a psychological phenomenon that Aristotelian psychol-
ogy does not recognise: the intentionality of cognitive acts. Because he
understands perception in terms of intentional directedness of the mind
towards the world, he necessarily faces the problem of accounting for the
causality of the object in perceptual process. His explanation may be val-
ued as being one of the first serious attempts to solve the problem which
arises when the mind is understood as capable of intentionally reaching
the external world without any causal intermediaries.

28Potest autem causa obiectiva proprie poni in genere causae finalis aut, si propriori
nomine vis eam vocare, vocetur causa terminativa. Sicut enim causa materialis habet vere
rationem causae respectu educti ex ea vel recepti in ea, quamvis non sit proprie causa
efficiens eius: sic causa terminativa habet vere rationem causae, quamvis non sit proprie
causa efficiens actionis terminatae in ipsa. (Summa II q. 72, 3637.) Of the four Aristote-
lian causesmaterial, efficient, formal, and finalthe first two are dismissed: an object
is not a material cause of a cognitive act because cognitive acts take place in the powers
of the soul and not in the object (see, e.g., ibid., q. 51, 113; q. 58, 410), and Olivi explicitly
denies the possibility that an object could be an efficient cause, as we have seen. An object
cannot be a formal cause either because if it were it should be able to act on the soula
position which Olivi denies. In this respect, he differs from, e.g., Aquinas, who thinks that
an object, or its species, is a formal cause of a cognitive act.
29Met. 5.2; Phys. 2.3; David Ross, Aristotle (London: Routledge, 1923), 7477.
active nature of perception 151

3.Intentional Directedness

Understood in the way described above, Olivis theory is not counterintui-


tive after all. Our acts of perception are produced by the senses, but their
content comes from the objects. The only thing that is hard to reconcile
with Olivis view is that if we take his Neoplatonic metaphor literally, we
get a confusing picture: the metaphor seems to suggest an extramissive
theory in which something issues from the power of sight into the object
and becomes a similitude of the object not in the eyes but in the object.
The sun does not become triangular when it illuminates a triangle; it is
the light of the sun on the surface of the triangle that does. Similarly, fol-
lowing the metaphor, when an act of seeing is terminated at an external
object, it is not the power of sight that receives the perceptual qualities
thereof but the act of seeing, which somehow takes place in the object.
This picture is confusing because it goes clearly against what Olivi says
about perception. He thinks that an act of vision takes place in the power
of sight which is in the eyes, and not in the object.30 Thus, although Olivi
employs the Neoplatonic metaphor, he rejects two of its central supposi-
tions, namely, that something issues from the powers of the soul to the
objects of perception and that perceptual acts take place in the object.
The metaphor helps us to understand how the object functions as a ter-
minative cause for the acts of perception, but it leaves open one central
question: how does the act reach the perceptual qualities of the object?
What kind of a linkcausal or otherwiseis there between the power,
its act, and the object? Had Olivi accepted some kind of causal influence
coming from the object to the senses (such as sensible species), he could
appeal to this influence. But, as we have seen, he denies that intromission
has anything to do with perception. Thus, he has to appeal to some other
kind of explanation.
Olivi does have an answer to this problem. He thinks that cognitive
powers are able to virtually reach out to the objects, and he appeals to
this virtual reaching out when he accounts for the way in which an act of
perception grasps its object:
A power can be present to something either essentially or virtually. This is to
say that it can be present to something in such a way that its essence really
is beside that thing, or in such a way that the gaze (aspectus) of its power

30As I have indicated in chapter five above, Olivi argues that the acts of the soul take
place in the powers themselves. See also Summa II q. 73, 60; ibid., q. 72, 12.
152 chapter six

is so efficaciously directed to the thing that it, as it were, really touches the
thing. If the power is not present to its object or recipient (patienti) in this
second way, it cannot act, even if it were present to it by its essence or
according to the first way. The visual power is present to a thing that is seen
from a distance in this [second] way. [...] This [kind of] presence suffices
for an act of seeing.31
There are two ways in which a cognitive power may be present to its object.
Either it is present to it essentially, which means that there is a real con-
nection between the power and its object, roughly in the way my sense of
touch is in contact with the keyboard as I write this text; or it is present
to its object virtually. We shall see below how the latter takes place and
what the meaning of the central term aspectus is, but it is already clear by
now that the virtual presence is a necessary condition for perception. If a
power of the soul is not virtually present to an external object, it cannot
produce an act of perceiving that object. It is also a sufficient condition
for perception, as the example concerning the power of sight shows: if
the power of sight is virtually present to an object, it is thereby capable of
producing an act in relation to the object and of apprehending it.
The term virtual excludes a need for a real connection between the
object and the power. The power of sight does not have to be in contact
with the object in order to perceive it.32 Olivi thinks that by distinguish-
ing between real and virtual presence he is capable of rejecting both the
species theories and extramissive theories of perception, both of which
require that there has to be a real connection between the powers of the
soul and their objects. Species theories bridge the gap by postulating spe-
cies as mediating entities, and extramissive theories claim that the power
somehow reaches the object by itself. By contrast, Olivi thinks that the
cognitive powers of the soul do not have to be in real contact with their
objects, because they are able to virtually reach out to them.

31 Virtus aliqua potest esse praesens alicui aut essentialiter aut virtualiter, hoc est
dictu, quod potest esse praesens alicui per hoc quod sua essentia est vere iuxta istum
aut per hoc quod aspectus suae virtutis ita efficaciter est directus in ipsum acsi realiter
attingeret ipsum. Si autem hoc secundo modo virtus non sit praesens suo obiecto vel
patienti, non poterit agere, etiamsi per essentiam suam seu iuxta primum modum esset
praesens illi. Hoc autem modo virtus visiva est praesens rei visae distanti ab ipsa. [...]
haec praesentia sufficiat ad actum videndi [...] (Summa II q. 58, 48687.) Olivi applies
this distinction also when he confronts an interpretation of Augustines view that the soul
really exists where its intention is fixed. He answers that: verba illa metaphorica sunt.
Non enim sumus ibi realiter seu substantialiter, sed solum virtualiter seu intentionaliter.
(ibid., q. 37, 657 & 672.)
32Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 16881 (especially pp. 17275).
active nature of perception 153

This idea is very important for Olivis theory of perception, and it fig-
ures also in his discussion of the possibility of external objects affecting
the powers of the soul. We have seen that Olivi discards the species theory
of cognition partly because the species are superfluous for cognition. Even
if an external object could per impossibilem affect the powers of the soul,
that would not amount to actually perceiving the object because a cogni-
tive act which bears information concerning an external object becomes
possible only by the souls own activity and reaching out to the object:
However much a cognitive power is informed by dispositions (habitus) and
species that differ from the cognitive act, it cannot proceed to a cognitive act
unless it first actually tends (intendat) towards an object in such a way that
the gaze (aspectus) of its intention is actually turned and directed to it. And
so, given that a species preceding a cognitive act flows from the object, the
power must still actually tend towards and intellectually regard (aspiciat)
the object in addition to this; for it is not possible that it would produce a
cognitive act in itself without this [tending].33
In order to apprehend their objects, cognitive powers must tend or intend
(intendat) towards them. When a power reaches out and is directed
towards an object, it is virtually present to it without actually moving any-
where. The virtual presence enables the power to have a cognitive relation
to the object.
Olivi accounts for this virtual tending by appealing to an aspectus of
the cognitive power. This concept figures repeatedly in his psychological
texts,34 and we can see that it has a focal role also in the two previous

33Quantumcunque potentia cognitiva per habitum et species ab actione cognitiva


differentes sit informata, non potest in actionem cognitivam exire, nisi prius intendat
actualiter in obiectum, ita quod aspectus suae intentionis sit actualiter conversus et direc-
tus in illud. Et ideo dato quod species praecurrens actionem cognitivam sit influxa ab
obiecto, adhuc praeter hoc oportet quod potentia actualiter intendat et intellective aspi-
ciat in obiectum; nam impossibile est quod absque hoc producat in se actum cognitivum.
(Summa II q. 72, 910.) Olivi discusses this idea in many places: see, e.g., ibid., q. 34, 62021;
q. 58, 466; q. 73, 89; q. 74, 123; q. 76, 148. See also Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 21, 13034,
16881.
34Olivi also uses other terms, namely, intentio and attentio as synonyms for aspectus.
A very illuminating text in this respect goes as follows: Causa igitur mutui impedimenti
[potentiae] est unitas intentionis in qua radicantur et a qua regulantur. Propter hoc enim
nimia attentio auditus impedit visum, quia sensus communis nimium intendens actui et
obiecto auditus cessat ab intendendo actui et obiecto visus, deficiente autem sensu com-
muni ab intendendo actui et obiecto alicuius sensus deficit necessario et ipse particularis
sensus ab intendendo suo obiecto. Eo enim ipso quo sensus communis retrahit aspectum
suum a tali sensu, retrahitur aspectus talis sensus, pro eo quod sensus communis est radix
eorum. (Summa II q. 59, 555; emphases mine.) However, Intentio and attentio are used
rarely.
154 chapter six

assages. According to the former passage, a virtual presence of a cogni-


p
tive power is achieved by directing the aspectus of the power to the object.
In the latter passage, Olivi speaks of it as a necessary condition for a cogni-
tive act and as an explanation for the way in which the powers of the soul
tend towards their objects.
Unfortunately he does not provide any detailed explanation of the
nature of aspectus. There are some passages which help us to understand
the concept, but we must content ourselves with some amount of uncer-
tainty about his final view. At any rate, this is how he defines aspectus on
one occasion: By this aspectus I mean the virtual or intentional directing
(conversio) of a power to an object.35 In another place, where he dis-
cusses Gods ability to create, he gives a similar definition by arguing that
God is:
able to act without any recipient or terminative object, and he does not
need any matter for his action, and he acts without any aspectus, that is,
without virtually extending and directing or determinately applying himself
to any place, to anything that is external to himself, or to any real end-term,
which would be the end of his virtual aspectus.36
By themselves these definitions are not particularly helpful, given that
Olivi does not tell us what he means by the terms virtual and inten-
tional. Yet it is quite clear that he refers to the idea that was present in
the two passages cited above, namely, that the power does not actually
cross the distance between itself and the object but reaches the object by
tending towards it cognitively. The fact that he uses the term intentio in
the passages where he discusses this cognitive reaching out is telling, as
Olivis view is very close to modern intentional theories of cognition. He
sees intentionality as a fundamental feature of cognition, which cannot
be reduced to other more elementary features. From this perspective it is
quite natural that he does not give a precise definition for the concept of
aspectus and only characterises the phenomenon of the virtual reaching
out of the cognitive powers of the soul.37

35Aspectum autem hic voco conversionem virtualem seu intentionalem potentiae ad


obiectum. (Summa II q. 59, 543.)
36[...] nullo patiente aut obiecto terminante nec aliquo materiali ad suam actionem
eget potest agere et agit absque omni aspectu, id est, absque virtuali protensione et con-
versione seu determinata sui applicatione ad quemcunque locum vel ad quodcunque
forinsecum vel ad quemcunque realem terminum sui virtualis aspectus terminativum.
(Summa II q. 1, 7.)
37Perler, Thories de lintentionnalit, 4371.
active nature of perception 155

Although Olivis idea of intentionality is in many ways original and


exceptional in the thirteenth century, it is not entirely without precursors.
The concept itself is derived from Augustine, and it was used in differ-
ent ways by various medieval authors. The Augustinian idea that the soul
somehow pays attention to the changes in the body can be understood as
an intentional relation between the soul and the body. Even if perception
of an external object requires a change in the body, as Augustine seems
to think, the act of the soul by which the soul apprehends the change is
intentional. To be sure, Olivi goes further than Augustine as he claims
that the soul is capable of paying attention directly to external objects
across a distance, but both authors take the philosophically crucial step
and account for the souls ability to cross the line between the spiritual
soul and the corporeal world by appealing to an intentional relation.38
Olivis idea of intentional directedness, which he so often expresses
by using the term aspectus, resembles in many ways modern intentional
theories of cognition. In some respects his theory comes close to the one
Franz Brentano claimed to have found from his medieval sources.39 Yet
there are also certain disparities. For instance, Olivi does not accept the
special ontological status of intentional objects. Brentano thinks (argu-
ably) that intentional objects are in the subjects mind, but Olivi argues
that perception is directly about external objects. Another central differ-
ence is that where Brentano and many other modern authors think that
intentionality is a distinctively mental phenomenon, Olivi uses the con-
cept of aspectus also to account many physical phenomena:

38Also some other medieval theories employ the Augustinian idea. See Silva &
Toivanen, The Active Nature of the Soul, 24775. Olivis position has been criticised by
modern scholars. For example, Leen Spruit argues that Olivi: does not give a reasonable
justification for the objective reference of mental content. [...] [the] intentional outward
projection appears insufficiently argued for to guarantee an effective cognitive grasp of
the sensible world. (Spruit, Species intelligibilis, 22324.) However, if this criticism holds
in relation to Olivi, I cannot see any reason why it would not hold in relation to all inten-
tional theories of cognition. Surely he is not the only philosopher who can be blamed for
thinking that the relation between the mind and the external world cannot be accounted
for by appealing only to efficient causality from without: he thinks that the intentional
relation is a sufficient explanation for the objective reference.
39Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, ed. L.L. McAlister, trans.
A.C. Rancurello et al. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), e.g., on p. 8889. For a dis-
cussion, see, Perler, Thories de lintentionnalit, 1219; id., What Are Intentional Objects?
A Controversy among Early Scotist, in Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, ed.
D. Perler, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 76 (Leiden: Brill, 2001),
20326.
156 chapter six

The aspectus of the inclination of fire, by which fire moves upwards, is turned
towards its local end-term rather than towards the moving thing [viz. fire].
The same applies to the impulse of a thrust stone or an arrow, according
to which a motion immediately follows; for the aspectus of an inclination,
which the catapult or the bow (proiector) gives to them, is vigorously turned
towards the end-term of the motion. As the creator gives the elements their
inclinationthe aspectus of which is directed towards the natural place of
the elementsaccording to which the movement of the elements natu-
rally follows, and as the projectiles (proiectis) receive their [inclinations]
from their movers or thrusters (proiector), so the apprehensive and appeti-
tive powers receive from the nature or from the will an aspectus which is
directed towards the objects of these powers and according to which appre-
hensive and appetitive acts follow.40
We can see that the term aspectus has a very wide range of usages. Heavy
things have an inclination, the aspectus of which is directed towards the
centre of the earth,41 and light things have an inclination, the aspectus of
which is directed upward. The inclination and the impulse a stone receives
from a catapult and an arrow from a bow have an aspectus towards the
places the stone and the arrow are about to fly. In another context, Olivi
says further that the light of the sun also has an aspectus to the objects
it illuminates and that a magnet has an aspectus towards a piece of iron
it attracts. The light of the glorified bodies of the saints and angels has
an aspectus which can vary in such a way that they become visible to
some people while remaining invisible to others. And finally, the organs
of the senses and the powers of the soul have an aspectus towards their
objectseven the senses of touch and taste function by directing an aspec-
tus, although it does not proceed further than to the organs.42 Generally,

40Inclinatio enim ignis per quam movetur sursum potius habet aspectum suum con-
versum ad suum terminum localem quam ad ipsum mobile, scilicet, ignem. Et idem est
de impulsu lapidum vel sagittarum proiectarum ad quem immediate sequitur motus; incli-
natio enim data eis a proiectore aspectum suum habet fortiter conversum ad terminum
motus. Sicut autem ipsis elementis datur a generante inclinatio habens aspectum conver-
sum ad sua naturalia loca, ad quam naturaliter sequitur motus eorum, et sicut proiectis
datur a suis motoribus seu proiectoribus: sic potentiis apprehensivis et appetitivis datur,
sive a natura sive a voluntate, aspectus conversus ad sua obiecta, ad quos sequitur actus
apprehensionis vel appetitus. (Summa II q. 58, 42021.) See also footnote 42 below.
41 Olivi acknowledges that the earth is round. See Summa II q. 23, 423.
42Summa II q. 58, 489; ibid., q. 73, 7682. The idea that all created agents must nec-
essarily have an aspectus towards the recipient of their action is presented by Olivi in
several places. For example, he writes that: Dixerunt enim quod virtus solis et cuiuslibet
agentis in longinquum agit per virtualem aspectum seu per virtualem conversionem et
directionem in longinquum, et ideo quantum ad efficaciam virtualis aspectus et directio-
nis praesens est toti medio in longinquum protracto usque ad terminum ultra quem non
potest agere. Sicut enim proiectis, quando proiciuntur, datur quidam impulsus per quem
active nature of perception 157

all the created powerswhether they are natural, such as the light of the
sun, or belong to the realm of psychologyfunction by aspectus.43
All these various cases have something in common: an action is
directed to something which is external to the agent. The sun illuminates
a distant object; a thrust stone flies towards a certain location, and it has
an inclination which is directed at that location; a magnets attraction is
directed to a piece of iron; and finally, the cognitive powers of the soul
are directed towards their objects. If an agent has an ability to act on a
recipient through a distance, it must direct its power to that recipient in
order to be able to do so. Also, if an agent is able to grasp something from
an object that is not immediately in contact with the agents power, the
agent must direct its power to the objectthis is how, say, vision func-
tions. In all these cases, the power of the agent is directed towards the
object in relation to which it produces an act, in which it produces an
effect, or towards which it is moving.
The fact that Olivi explains all these phenomena by appealing to aspec-
tus shows that he thinks that there is something fundamentally similar in
all of them. Being directed towards something is essentially the same phe-
nomenon in flying arrows as in perceptual actsit is the same in all cases
where there is a distance between the agent and the recipient, and it is
not confined to the psychological activities of the powers of the soul. This
is clearly a difference compared to modern conceptions of intentionality,

habent inclinationem usque ad terminum ad quem per impulsum illum tendunt [...] sicut
etiam visus aliquando dirigitur per aspectum in rem propinquam, aliquando vero ultra
in longinquum et iterum aliquando ulterius, sicut in nobis sensibiliter experimur; sic isti
dixerunt quod omnis virtus naturaliter agens, saltem corporalis, habet aspectum virtualem
non solum ad superficiem corporis sibi immediate praesentis, sed ad totum medium usque
ad terminum ultra quem ab eo nulla potest sequi impressio. (Ibid., q. 23, 42425.) See also
ibid., q. 1, 12 & 18; q. 18, 363; q. 53, 215; q. 87, 202.
43The term aspectus is difficult to translate because of its wide usage. Pasnau translates
it as attention , which is a legitimate translation in the case of the aspectus of the common
sense and the intellect, but cannot be used when discussing the sun or an arrow. A pos-
sible translation might be to use a direct derivative from the latin word, namely, aspect.
The word has, even in modern English, a suitable meaning: we can say, for example, that
a house has a southern aspect, i.e., it has a position facing southwards. Another possible
translation might be orientation. Both of these, however, are quite clumsy and lead easily
astray. Finally, we could use inclination, but that would lose the voluntary aspect that is
central to Olivi. Therefore, in order to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding, I shall
leave the term mostly untranslated, knowing that this solution renders the text less read-
able and less elegant. As far as I am able, I shall use expressions such as direct oneself,
directedness, and direction, but when these turn out to be too artless, I shall restrain
myself to aspectus. This will be the case especially in the translations of Olivis texts: aspec-
tus is a noun, and directedness is a clumsy translation almost without exception.
158 chapter six

where intentionality is regarded as a distinctive mark of the mental, as


Brentano puts it.
It has been argued that the Olivian idea of virtual directedness is equiv-
alent to action at a distance.44 As far as the physical effects that are caused
by distant objects are concerned, such as the light of the sun on a trian-
gular shape here on Earth, this characterisation is just.45 However, it is
important to keep in mind that the case of cognitive powers is somewhat
different. The power which reaches out virtually to the object does not
act at a distance. It directs itself towards a distant object and produces its
own act in itself, but it does not act upon the object.46 Therefore, there is
no real action at a distance in the case of the cognitive powers.47 To be
sure, since the perceptual acts become similitudes of the objects to which
they are directed through a distance, something must take place between
the object and the power, and because Olivi denies that this happens by
any kind of action at a distance, he makes recourse to the phenomenon
we call intentionality. If we admit that intentionality is a plausible expla-
nation for a cognitive relation, we should not be puzzled about the lack
of causal intermediaries between the powers of the soul and external
objects.
We are now in a better position to understand Olivis idea about how
the cognitive powers of the soul are directed to their objects. However,
there are still a couple of texts that are worth looking at because they
clarify the picture further. First, Olivi explicitly states that neither the
powers of the soul nor the aspects thereof really travel to the object:
The essence of the visual aspectus always stays around the part of the
organ in which its power is formally fixed, although it virtually extends

44B. Jansen, Die Erkenntnislehre Olivis (Berlin: Duemmlers, 1921), 118, quoted in Pasnau,
Theories of Cognition, 174.
45In Summa II q. 23, 42433 Olivi presents two views concerning the virtual reaching
out of physical powers, such as the light of the sun. In the first view the agent acts directly
on the adjacent part of the medium, this part acts on the next part, and so on until the
influence reaches the recipient. In this case the agent does not act directly on a distant
recipient. In the other view the agent acts directly on a distant recipient, and therefore acts
at a distance. Olivi does not determine which of these views is correct.
46See, e.g., Summa IV q. 13, 76 (Maranesi, q. 1).
47In this sense, Olivis theory differs quite radically from the one that William Ockham
presented later. Ockham thinks that the object actualises our sensory powers by action at
a distance. For Ockhams view, see, e.g., Eleonore Stump, The Mechanisms of Cognition:
Ockham on Mediating Species, in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. P.V. Spade
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), 17895.
active nature of perception 159

outside or retracts inside.48 The aspectus of a power of the soul is capable


of virtually and intentionally tending towards external objects, but it does
not actually cross the distance. An aspectus may also be retracted from
the external world. I shall return to this idea in chapter seven, but the
basic idea is that when the aspectus is completely retracted, the power in
question is incapable of acting.
Second, Olivi presents a metaphor by which he tries to illustrate the
term aspectus:
First we must discuss what is the aspectus by which a cognitive power
regards its remote or nearby object, or by which a power that has influence
on things (virtus influxiva) regards a nearby or remote recipient. In order
that this be grasped by the simple-minded, I explain it by using an unsophis-
ticated example from the sensory realm. Just as a piece of iron is sometimes
restrained like a formless mass that is wrapped in itself, and sometimes it
is sharpened by stretching its parts after the fashion of a sword; likewise a
cognitive power sometimes remains restrained and wrapped in itself in such
a way that its intentional power (vis intentiva) is not directed to any object,
and sometimes it is so stretched in itself and sharpened by stretching that
it becomes sharply intent on something exposed to it. This [latter] mode of
existence and behaving (se habendi) I call its actual aspectus.49
Olivi goes on to say that the directing of a power (conversio potentiae)
either precedes and causes the aspectus or is identical to it. He does not
say which of these options is true. Either way, the metaphor suggests that
the powers of the soul resemble a piece of iron that is either an informed
mass which is not directed to anything at all or like a sword that points
to something. Although this metaphor has its problemsone might argue
that the sword, like a guiding arrow, does not point anywhere by itself
but must be interpreted as such by an intentional mind that has acquired
certain cultural ways of conceiving swords (and guiding arrows) in such a
way that they point in some directionit is clear that Olivis meaning is

48Aspectus visualis secundum suam essentiam semper stat circa illam partem organi
in quo eius potentia formaliter est affixa, quamvis virtualiter protendatur ad extra vel
retrahatur ad intra. (Summa II q. 32, 588.) See also ibid., q. 73, 5961.
49[...] est primo attendendum quid sit ille aspectus quo virtus cognitiva aspicit suum
obiectum remotum vel propinquum aut quo virtus influxiva aspicit in patiens propinquum
vel remotum. Ut autem hoc a rudioribus facilius capi possit, utamur ad hoc sensibili et
grosso exemplo. Sicut enim ferrum aliquando recusum est velut massa informis et versus
se involuta, aliquando vero per protensionem suarum partium acuitur in modum ensis: sic
potentia cognitiva aliquando stat velut recusa et in se involuta, ita quod sua vis intentiva
in nullum obiectum intendit, aliquando vero sic intra se protenditur et protendendo acui-
tur quod est acute ad aliquod sibi obiectum intenta. Hunc autem modum existendi et se
habendi vocamus eius actualem aspectum. (Summa II q. 73, 6364.)
160 chapter six

to show how the powers of the soul are sometimes intentionally directed
to different directions and objects. The power of sight is intrinsically an
intentional power. It can be directed to the coffee mug on my desk, to the
lake behind the window, or to this text on the screen of my computer, and
it apprehends the mug, the lake, or the text, depending on the direction
in which it is turned.
Finally, the intentional directing of a power of the soul is not identical
to a cognitive act but a necessary precondition for the act:
It is clear that our volitional or cognitive power cannot produce a cognitive
act or a volition without an accidental aspectus which is actually terminated
at some object and that no created power can produce an act without the
presence of a recipient and without a virtual aspectus that is extended to
and terminated at the recipient.50
Percipients are capable of directing their powers without apprehending
anything at all. The presence of an object is necessary for actual percep-
tion, but the directing of aspectus does not require an object. For instance,
when someone is in complete darkness and tries to see, she directs her
power of sight to the external world. Yet, since her sight is incapable
of reaching any object due to the darkness, she does not see anything.
In such a case, the power of sight is intentionally directed (that is, its
aspectus is directed to the external world), but an act of seeing cannot
be achieved.51 If the lights are then turned on, the aspectus reaches an
object which happens to be present and is terminated at it. This enables
the power of sight to bring about an act of apprehension which is, in turn,
terminated at the object and becomes a similitude of it, thus allowing the
subject to actually perceive it.52 We are in control of the powers of our
soul to the extent that we are able to direct them as we please, but if we
happen to direct them to an object that is present, an act of apprehension
follows automatically.53 In other words, we can use our powers, but we
cannot voluntarily control their acts.

50Constat quod absque accidentali aspectu in obiectum aliquod actualiter terminato


non potest nostra potentia volitiva vel cognitiva aliquem actum cognitivum vel volitivum
producere, nec aliqua potentia creata potest aliquem actum producere absque praesentia
patientis et absque virtuali aspectu in ipsum protenso et terminato. (Summa II q. 74, 130.)
Aspectus does not belong to the genus of action (ibid., q. 28, 491).
51 Summa II q. 73, 6869.
52Summa II q. 61, 577; ibid. q. 58, 473; q. 32, 574; q. 72, 12.
53[...] ad conversionem aspectus, si obiecta sint alias debito modo praesentia [...]
semper sequitur aliquis actus apprehensionis. (Summa II q. 59, 552.) The powers of the
active nature of perception 161

We have now seen Olivis understanding of the process of perception.


Although he employs idiosyncratic terminology, his basic idea is clear. In
order to act, the powers of the soul must be intentionally directed to their
objects, but neither they nor their acts are actually drawn to the objects.
Cognitive acts convey information about their objects by being virtually
present to them. All in all, according to Olivi there are three elements
which are needed for cognitive operations: the power of the soul which
is intentionally directed at the object, the cognitive act itself, and the
object at which the aspectus and the act are terminated. Olivi simplifies
the metaphysics of cognition by discarding the species and proposing an
intentional theory of perception, and thus he deviates from other theories
of cognition of his time.

human soul are controlled and directed by the will (see, e.g., ibid., q. 72, 26), and non-
human animals are moved by the sensitive appetite.
Chapter seven

Attention and the Common Sense

One of the main reasons why Olivi accentuates the need for intentionally
directing the cognitive powers is his conviction that we do not perceive
things within the reach of our senses unless we pay attention to them.
As he so strongly emphasises this aspect of the perceptual process, it is
crucial to understand exactly how the souls attention functions in Olivis
theory of perception. This will be the topic of section one.1
When Olivi discusses the need for paying attention in order to perceive
things in our perceptual reach, he makes an important move. He thinks
that the soul has a kind of cognitive centrethe highest cognitive power
of the soulwhich accounts for the ability to pay attention and provides
a unified experience of various cognitive acts which are brought about
by the other powers. Perhaps the best way of understanding this idea is
by considering again the medieval conception of the soul as being struc-
tured. The soul contains various powers which have their own psychologi-
cal operations. Medieval authors sometimes considered how the acts of
different powers could be related to each other and why we experience
a kind of unity within themthat is, why we apprehend them as acts of
one and the same subject. A possible solution to these questions is that
the soul itself functions as the unifying principle, but Olivi cannot accept
this view, because he thinks that the soul is nothing but an aggregate of
its powers. He argues instead that the intellect, being the highest cognitive
power of the soul, apprehends all the acts and objects of the other cogni-
tive powers and thus enables the experiential unity. In section two we
shall see that Olivi attributes a similar kind of role to the common sense,
which is the cognitive centre of the sensitive soul.
Finally, section three will address Olivis discussion concerning the
various degrees of attention. His idea is that even when we do not actu-
ally perceive anything, the soul pays constant attention to the body and
to the external world. We are not aware of this kind of general attention

1For discussion concerning the role of attention, see, e.g., Deborah Brown, Augustine
and Descartes on the Function of Attention in Perceptual Awareness, in Consciousness,
ed. S. Heinmaa et al., 15375; Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 13233.
164 chapter seven

because it is not accompanied by a cognitive act, but it explains how the


soul can come to notice apparent changes, such as loud noises, within the
perceptual field.

1.Necessity of Paying Attention

We may begin unfolding Olivis view by noticing that the aspectus of a


corporeal power is composed of a corporeal and a spiritual component:
For, as a sense is composed of a power of the soul and a corporeal organ,
so its aspectus is composed of a spiritual aspectus of its power and a cor-
poreal aspectus of its organ.2 This distinction means that two conditions
must be fulfilled in order for me to perceive, say, a coffee mug on my
desk: (1) my eyes must be directed towards the mug, and (2) the spiritual
aspectus of my power of sight must be directed towards the mug. The first
of these conditions is quite obvious: I cannot see the mug unless my eyes
are directed in such a way that it falls within my visual field. The corporeal
aspectus refers to this kind of directedness of the organs of the senses. The
spiritual aspectus, by comparison, refers to the intentional directedness of
the power of sight and ultimately to the intentional directedness of my
attention.
One of the reasons why Olivi proposes this idea of a double aspectus
is his critical attitude towards theories of perception which are based on
the supposition that perception amounts to reception of external stimuli.
If this supposition were true, he claims, we should see equally well when
we actually look at an object as when we are engrossed in some other
activity (such as listening to music) with the object just happening to be
in front of our eyes. Sensible species do not cease from acting on our cog-
nitive powers when we concentrate on something, and if perception is a
passive reception thereof, we should see no matter where our attention
is directed.3
However, we actually do not see everything in our visual field all the
time. For instance, when a bird flies past my window (which is in my
visual field while I write this text), I do not necessarily become aware

2Nam sicut sensus est compositus ex potentia animae et organo corporeo: sic aspectus
eius est compositus ex spirituali aspectu suae potentiae et ex corporali aspectu sui organi.
(Summa II q. 67, 61819.)
3As we have seen, Olivi applies this line of criticism not only towards certain versions
of species theories but also towards Augustines view that perception is a bodily change.
See chapter five above.
attention and the common sense 165

of it. All that is needed for me to fail to perceive the bird is that I am
too intensely attending to this text, to my thoughts concerning the next
sentence, or to the music I listen to when I should be working instead.
Olivis distinction between the corporeal and spiritual aspectus functions
as an explanation for this phenomenon. Although my eyes are actually
directed in such a way that the window and the bird fall within my visual
field, there is still the possibility that my power of sight remains, to use
Olivis own words: like a formless mass that is wrapped in itself.4 In this
case, I do not see the bird because my power of sight is not intentionally
directed towards it.
The clearest example of this phenomenon is a person who is asleep:
even when the eyes of a sleeping person are open, she does not see what
happens in her bedroom. Olivi repeatedly uses this example to prove that
an aspectus of the power of sight is needed in order to perceive. Consider
the following:
For, it is certain that [in the case of] a sleeper, who has his ears and nostrils
open and whose sense of touch is present to the clothes that are near, spe-
cies have the power to flow from the objects that are present to the open
organs of the senses; yet, this is not sufficient for seeing and hearing or for
the sensation of smelling and touching unless the actual aspectus of the
senses is awake and tends there.5
When the eyes of a sleeping person are open, external objects can affect
them. Yet the sleeper does not see anything because the corporeal aspec-
tus of the organ alone does not suffice for perception if the aspectus of the
power of sight is missing. The lack of a spiritual aspectus explains why a
sleeping person does not perceive.
Olivis view is that the lack of the spiritual aspectus is due to the fact
that a sleeping person does not pay attention to her surroundings either
because she is busy seeing dreams or because she is sleeping so deeply
that she does not have cognitive activity at allthe attention of the soul
is directed to dream images or it remains wrapped in itself and is not
directed to anything. The directing of the spiritual aspectus of the power
of sight is ultimately done by the directing of ones attention.

4See chapter six, footnote 49.


5Constat enim quod dormiens, auribus apertis et naribus et tactu praesente vestibus
sibi iunctis, habebunt fluere species a praesentibus obiectis in aperta organa sensuum;
et tamen non sufficit ad videndum et audiendum vel ad sensum odoratus et tactus, nisi
actualis aspectus sensuum pervigiliter ibi intendat. (Summa II q. 73, 89.)
166 chapter seven

We can see some of the details about the way in which this directing
of ones attention takes place by looking at an intriguing yet difficult pas-
sage from Olivis Quodlibeta. In question seven of the first quodlibet, he is
faced with a question: Why are people who are half asleep (the Latin term
is semidormientes, and I take it that it means sleepwalkers) capable of
seeing, hearing, speaking, walking, and conducting other similar actions
even better than when they are awake? From the point of view of a mod-
ern reader, Olivis answer is a bit disappointing because he misses many
philosophically interesting issues that might be addressed in relation to
this question. He responds shortly that these actions are possible for a
sleepwalker because the common sense is active to some extent. After
providing this answer, Olivi goes on to parade Augustine in support of
his answer and then appeals to our experience. The central idea is that
the functioning of the common sense is necessary for the activity of the
external senses:
The external senses cannot be awake, and they cannot act unless the com-
mon sense acts with respect to their acts and to the objects of the external
senses. (Augustine says this explicitly in Super Genesim, book XII, chap-
ter25, where he states: There can be no bodily vision without the spiritual.
Spiritual vision, on the other hand, can occur without the bodily kind. By
spiritual vision, he means the vision of phantasy (fantasie)the text makes
this explicitly clear. Namely, Augustine makes a distinction between spiri-
tual and intellectual vision in his text, and a little further, in the subsequent
chapter, he says that the spiritual vision is in between the intellectual and
corporeal visions.) A sign of this is that our external senses do not per-
ceive anything we would know, not even their most easily discernible and
manifest objects, when our interior intention is totally directed and turned
towards something. This is why we do not remember anything about them
later unless we see or have perceived them some other time.6

6Quod autem sensus particulares non possint esse uigiles, seu in suo actu, nisi sen-
sus communis sit in actu respectu illorum actuum et obiectorum sensus particularis, dicit
expresse Augustinus, XII Super Genesim, capitulo XXV, ubi dicit quod Corporalis uisio sine
spirituali esse non potest. Spiritualis uero usio sine corporali fieri potest. Vocat autem ibi
spiritualem uisionem, uisionem fantasie, sicut ibi expresse patet. Nam ibi ponit differen-
tiam inter ipsam et intellectualem. Et paulo post in capitulo sequenti dicit quod est media
inter intellectualem uisionem et corporalem. Huius autem signum est quia, cum nostra
interior intentio totaliter ad aliqua est intenta et conuersa, tunc nostri sensus particulares
etiam suis obiectis patuli et aperti nihil penitus de illis percipiunt quod nos sciamus. Vnde
nec de illis postmodum recordamur nisi alias uidemus aut senserimus illa. (Quodl. 1.7,
2526.) For a discussion, see Alain Boureau, Pierre de Jean Olivi et le semi-dormeur: Une
laboration mdivale de lactivit inconsciente, Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse 48 (1993):
23138. The passage Olivi refers to is in Aurelius Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram libri
duodecim, ed. J.-P. Migne, PL 34 (hereafter Gn. litt.), 12.24.51. The translation of Augustines
attention and the common sense 167

There are a couple of important issues in this text. First, the text gives us
a more detailed picture of the way we are sometimes hindered from per-
ceiving things in our surroundings. According to Olivi, the external senses
are incapable of acting if the common sense does not act in relation to
them. Even a sleeping person may perceive her surroundings if her com-
mon sense has some level of activity in relation to the external senses. In
this case, we speak of a sleepwalker. Olivi does not say whether or not
the sleepwalker is aware of her surroundings, but at least she is capable
of acting appropriately.
The other idea that this excerpt reveals is that sleeping persons are
not the only ones who sometimes fail to perceive external objects. The
same phenomenon takes place also when we are awake. At the end of
the passage, Olivi supports his idea that the common sense has to have
some kind of activity in order for a person to perceive her surroundings by
drawing from our experience. Often we are not aware of external objects
because our attention is directed elsewhereOlivi uses the expression
interior intention by which he denotes the intentional directing of atten-
tion. In this way, a sleeping person who does not perceive her surround-
ings is similar to a person who is awake but intent on one thing and thus
fails to perceive other things. Olivis idea is that the common sense must
be involved in the process in order for the subject to be aware of the
objects within the reach of her external senses.
These examples reveal an important and philosophically insightful fea-
ture in Olivis theory, namely, the need for attending or paying attention
to external senses and their objects. We are not only passive recipients of
external stimuli but our soul (and the souls of non-human animals) must
actively direct itself in order to perceive. This property shows that the soul
is intentional in its operations, and intentionality explains why sleeping
persons do not perceive anything at all and why those who are awake do
not necessarily notice everything that is within the reach of their senses.
In both of these cases the reason for the failure to perceive is the same: the
soul apprehends only those things to which it directs its attention.
In order to see how the activity of the common sense is related to
the activity of the external senses and how paying attention takes place,
we may look at Olivis discussion concerning the mutual hindrance of the
external senses. He draws on the experience that when our attention is

text is taken from On Genesis, trans. E. Hill & M. OConnell, The Works of Saint Augustine:
A Translation for the 21st Century I/13 (New York: New City Press, 2002).
168 chapter seven

directed to an object of one external sense, we often do not notice the


objects of other senses. For instance, if I concentrate on listening to
music, I may fail to notice the changes in my visual field. Olivi is not by
any means the only thinker who has paid attention to this phenomenon.
Perhaps the most well-known discussion comes from Augustine (I shall
relate Olivis view to that of Augustine below) but the idea appears also
in other thinkers and contexts. For instance, our inability to use all of our
senses simultaneously equally well is one of the reasons why the percep-
tual capacity was understood as unitary in the Aristotelian-Avicennian
tradition. The idea was that we do not have several distinct powers but
only one perceptual capacity which uses different channelsthe exter-
nal sensesto reach different perceptual qualities. Understood in this
way, when the perceptual capacity uses the channel of sight excessively,
it cannot at the same time use other channels to perceive, and the noises
around us go unnoticed. According to this interpretation, external senses
cannot be separate powers because if they were, they would not hinder
each other.
Olivi recognises the phenomenon, but he does not think that it neces-
sitates the conclusion that there is only one perceptual capacity. His
explanation for the mutual hindrance of the external senses is based on
directing ones attention instead of using one and the same power in dif-
ferent ways or through different channels. A strong focus on an object of
one of the external senses hinders us from cognising the objects of other
senses, and according to Olivi:
the cause of mutual impediment is the unity of the intention (intentionis) in
which [the powers] are rooted and by which they are regulated. This is why
excessive auditory attention (attentio auditus) impedes vision: the common
sense which tends (intendens) excessively towards an act and object of the
sense of hearing ceases from tending towards an act and object of vision,
and when the common sense ceases from tending towards an act and object
of some [external] sense, the external sense itself also necessarily ceases
from tending towards its object. By the very fact that the common sense
withdraws its aspectus from such a sense, the aspectus of that sense is with-
drawn because the common sense is the root of them [viz. the senses].7

7Causa igitur mutui impedimenti est unitas intentionis in qua radicantur et a qua
regulantur. Propter hoc enim nimia attentio auditus impedit visum, quia sensus commu-
nis nimium intendens actui et obiecto auditus cessat ab intendendo actui et obiecto visus,
deficiente autem sensu communi ab intendendo actui et obiecto alicuius sensus deficit
necessario et ipse particularis sensus ab intendendo suo obiecto. Eo enim ipso quo sensus
communis retrahit aspectum suum a tali sensu, retrahitur aspectus talis sensus, pro eo
attention and the common sense 169

Olivi employs rather fluctuating terminology, but all the terms, inten-
tio, attentio, intendo, and aspectus, seem to refer to the directing of the
aspectus of the common sense.8 The external senses hinder each other
not because they are aspects of one and the same power but because we
must pay attention to them in order for them to function. This is done
by directing the aspectus of the common sense towards them, and it can-
not be directed simultaneously to all of them with an equal intensity. If
the aspectus of the common sense is altogether directed away from the
external senses and their objects, the subject is not aware of the things in
her visual field, of the noises that actually surround her, and so forth.9 So,
depending on the external sense which is in the focus of our attention, we
perceive different things. We see if we pay attention to our eyes, to their
activity, and to visible objects; we hear if we pay attention to our ears, to
their activity, and to audible objects. The aspectus of the common sense is
responsible for the direction to which our attention is drawn.
In a passage that repeats the idea of the mutual impediment of the
external senses, Olivi makes it clear that the spiritual directedness of the
external senses is rooted in the aspectus of the common sense:
As the powers are naturally connected to each other, so are their radical
aspects. This is why the act of vision is impeded when the aspectus of the
common or interior sense is totally turned away from the objects and acts
of vision. This happens sometimes when the whole actual intention of the
interior sense is directed towards an act and object of the sense of hearing or
touch, or when it is totally withdrawn inside because of slumber. Therefore,
the fact that various powers of the soul impede one another from their acts
is not because they would have one simple and, as it were, point-like root
of their essences but rather because of their mutual connection and because
the aspectus of a superior power is related to the aspectus of inferior powers,
as a root is to branches.10

quod sensus communis est radix eorum. (Summa II q. 59, 555.) See also ibid., q. 58, 484;
q. 62, 58996; q. 66, 613; Quodl. 1.7, 2526; Juhana Toivanen, Peter Olivi on Internal Senses,
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15:3 (2007): 43234.

8All these different terms are synonymous with aspectus, at least in the contexts
where Olivi discusses the idea of directing ones attention. See chapter six, footnote 34.

9[...] aliquando potest esse tanta retractio quod totaliter deficit et prostratur aspec-
tus. Et tunc nulla potest esse apprehensio nec per consequens aliquis alius actus, cum
aspectus necessario praeexigatur ad actum apprehensionis. (Summa II q. 59, 552.) See
also ibid., q. 62, 59596.
10Sicut autem potentiae sunt sibi invicem naturaliter colligatae, sic et earum radi-
cales aspectus; et ideo cum aspectus sensus communis seu interioris totaliter avertitur ab
obiectis et actibus ipsius visus, tunc impeditur actus videndi; fit autem hoc aliquando, cum
tota actualis intentio sensus interioris convertitur ad actum et obiectum auditus vel tactus
170 chapter seven

The overall picture is that the common sense can be intentionally directed
towards different external sensesthis amounts to directing ones
attentionand the aspects of the external senses are directed towards
external objects only if the aspectus of the common sense is directed
towards them. The aspects of the external senses are, in a way, exten-
sions of the aspectus of the common sense.
By appealing to the necessity of paying attention, Olivi is able to under-
pin his idea about the activity of perception. The relation of the cognitive
powers of the soul to the external world is like acting: the world is there,
available for us to perceive, and we direct our intentional attention to it in
a selective way. We perceive things which fall under our attention; other
things go unnoticed from us.

2.Cognitive Centre of the Soul

Olivis way of depicting perception as an intentional and active process,


which is based on the ability to pay attention to ones surroundings means
that every cognitive act comes from within the percipient and, so to speak,
goes towards the external world. In this kind of view it is natural to think
that the soul contains one central power which initiates the process of
perception, uses the other powers to reach the external world, functions
as a kind of cognitive centre of the soul, and is ultimately responsible for
the contents of perceptual awareness. Olivi thinks that the common sense
is this kind of cognitive centre of the soul. It combines all the information
from other powers and provides a unified experience. We shall see below
(in Part three) that experiential unity is one of the reasons which lead him
to think that there is only one internal sense, but the idea of a unifying
centre figures also in his theory of perception.
The soul is constituted by its powers, and the sensitive powers are
seated in different organs and parts of the body. Their acts are realised
in the organs, but at the same time they are already in the soul: the act
of sensing heat in the foot takes place in the foot, but it is also present in
the soul.11 However, in order to actually perceive the heat in the foot, one

vel cum per somnum tota revocatur ad interiora. Quod igitur diversae potentiae animae
impediant se aliquando in suis actionibus non provenit ex una simplici et quasi punc-
tuali radice suarum essentiarum, sed potius ex mutua colligantia ipsarum et ex eo quod
aspectus superioris potentiae se habet ad aspectus potentiarum inferiorum sicut radix ad
ramos. (Summa II q. 50 app., 54.)
11See, e.g., Summa II q. 49, 12.
attention and the common sense 171

has to pay attention to it, and this is done by directing the aspectus of the
common sense to the sense of touch and to the foot. The sense of touch
brings about the act by which the heat is perceived but not without the
common sense. In fact, Olivi argues in his Quodlibeta that the external
senses cannot act without the common sense: The external senses cannot
be awake, and they cannot act unless the common sense acts with respect
to their acts and to the objects of the external senses.12 (I shall point out
below that in contrast to this claim, Olivi resolves a specific problem in
Summa by implying that there can be acts in the external senses without
an act of the common sense. However, even in that case he seems to think
that the common sense must act before the person actually perceives the
objects of those sensations.13)
Of course, acts of the external senses are necessary for perceiving exter-
nal objects because the common sense cannot immediately apprehend
any real object which is present other than the acts of the particular senses
by which it apprehends their objects,14 but Olivi repeatedly claims that
the common sense accounts for the activity of the senses by directing its
aspectus. For instance, he writes:
According to the different [directions of] the aspectus which the common
sense has in the brain, different acts are attained. For, according to the
attention which it has towards the eyes, it apprehends visible [qualities],
and following the attention towards the ears it apprehends audible [quali-
ties]. The same goes for all the other senses.15
The common sense appears to be the proper subject of perception. More-
over, as we have seen, the spiritual aspectus, the lack of which hinders
a sleeping person from perceiving things around her, comes ultimately
from the common sense. Perception requires that the common sense is
directed towards the external senses and through them to the perceptual
qualities in the world, for we do not perceive things which are outside

12Sensus particulares non possint esse uigiles, seu in suo actu, nisi sensus communis sit
in actu respectu illorum actuum et obiectorum sensus particularis [...] (Quodl. 1.7, 25.)
13See section three below.
14Sciendum ergo primo quod sensus communis nullum obiectum reale et praesentiale
potest immediate apprehendere nisi tantum actus particularium sensuum per quorum
actus apprehendit obiecta eorum. (Summa II q. 62, 594.)
15Secundum autem diversos aspectus quos [sensus communis] habet in cerebro diver-
sos sortitur actus. Nam secundum aspectum quem habet versus oculos apprehendit visi-
bilia, secundum autem aspectum ad aures apprehendit audibilia et sic de aliis sensibus.
(Summa II q. 58, 510.) See also ibid., q. 32, 589; q. 84, 183.
172 chapter seven

the scope of the aspectus of the common sense.16 The activity of the com-
mon sense is necessary for perception, and the direction of its aspectus
accounts for the contents thereof.
The role of the common sense as the centre of cognition becomes clear
if we consider once more the case in which a person is completely with-
out cognitive activity, for instance during a dreamless sleep:
Sometimes there can be such a retraction that the aspectus is totally missing
and completely paralysed (prostratur). In this case, there can be no appre-
hension, and by consequence there cannot be any other act because the
aspectus is necessarily needed for an act of apprehension. This applies to an
infant when it is in uteroespecially at the beginning of its formation
and this happens also in the deepest of sleep. If the aspectus is not totally
paralysed but retracted in a similar way without being retracted totally, then
there are some acts.17
Here Olivi answers a question concerning the acts of the intellectual part
of the souls of children, madmen, and sleeping persons. He thinks that
sometimes their intellects function (though never freely), sometimes not,
and the lack of the activity is accounted for by appealing to the retraction
of the aspectus. A few pages earlier, Olivi says that by the term retraction
he means the withdrawing of the intentional directing of the sensitive
powers of the soul from the external world, as in the case of a sleeping
person who does not see even though her eyes are open.18 The aspec-
tus can be retracted from its intentional directedness either partially or
totally, and when it is totally retracted there is no act of apprehension
whatsoever.
While it is true that the power Olivi is discussing in the passage is the
intellect, the same idea applies to the sensitive powers of the soul. This
is evident for two reasons. First, he speaks about a foetus in utero: he
thinks that foetuses do not have intellectual souls at the beginning of their

16Oportet ergo quod virtualis aspectus sensus communis intime attingat usque ad actus
sensuum exteriorum et etiam usque ad loca obiectorum suorum. (Summa II q. 73, 99.)
17Aliquando potest esse tanta retractio quod totaliter deficit et prostratur aspectus. Et
tunc nulla potest esse apprehensio nec per consequens aliquis alius actus, cum aspectus
necessario praeexigatur ad actum apprehensionis. Et hoc modo contingit in infante, dum
est in utero, maxime in principio formationis, et hoc quidem in somno profundissimo. Si
autem non totaliter prostratur, sed sic retrahitur quod tamen non totaliter, tunc aliquos
actus habet. (Summa II q. 59, 552.) See also ibid., 5023, 54950 & 559.
18Summa II q. 59, 54950. For Olivis conception of madness, see Vesa Hirvonen, Men-
tal Disorders in Late Medieval Philosophy and Theology, in Mind and Modality: Studies in
the History of Philosophy in Honour of Simo Knuuttila, ed. V. Hirvonen, T.J. Holopainen &
M. Tuominen (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 17188.
attention and the common sense 173

development.19 Second, when he defines the term retractio he makes it


explicit that he has in mind the sensitive powers (virtutes animales seu
sensitivae). Now, it is important to remember that the complete retraction
of external senses is due to the retraction of the aspectus of the common
sense. The external senses cannot provide any sort of cognition to the
subject if the common sense is completely retracted from them, and all
the other cognitive acts (imagination, memory, etc.) depend on it as well.20
All cognitive activity of the sensitive soul requires the common sense.
The common sense enriches the perceptual experience by adding
aspects which the external senses do not provide. A good example is the
perception of pain and pleasure. Olivi thinks that we feel pain when our
body undergoes harmful changes and pleasure when the changes are
beneficial to us.21 The experiences of pain and pleasure, however, are not
brought about by the sense of touch alone. The common sense has to be
involved in the process:
Moreover, the act of pain which a human being has in the external senses
when the organs of the senses are badly damaged is a simple and spiritual
act because pain does not seem to be extended or corporeal. [...] But the
common sense apprehends these acts.22
The sense of touch perceives the bodily changes, but because it is inca-
pable of apprehending its own acts, it cannot account for the perception
of pain. Becoming aware of pain results from the activity of the common
sense.
The distinction between sensing a change in the body and experienc-
ing this change as painful reflects Olivis manner of understanding the
common sense as the centre of cognition. It renders our perception of
the bodily changes complete by adding the experience of painfulness. But

19 Summa II q. 51, 13031


20See Part three below.
21 See Summa II q. 61, 583; ibid., q. 54, 27778; q. 62, 588; q. 64, 6045; Summa IV q. 13,
1078 & 112 (Maranesi, q. 1). I shall discuss Olivis view on the sense of touch in chapter
eleven, section four.
22Praeterea, actus doloris quem homo habet in sensibus particularibus, quando forti-
ter laeduntur organa eorum, est actus simplex et spiritualis, dolor enim non videtur dicere
aliquid extensum aut corporale. [...] Sed isti actus apprehenduntur ab ipso sensu com-
muni [...] (Summa II q. 58, 503.) In ibid., q. 70, 635 we find a discussion concerning the
hunger and suffering that hunger causes. One of Olivis points is that the sense of touch
senses the emptying of the body, and the common sense apprehends the painfulness of
this phenomenon. For Olivis view on the perception of pain, and his conception of the
sense of touch as a self-reflexive power, see Toivanen, Peter of John Olivi on the Psychol-
ogy of Animal Action, 42832; Yrjnsuuri, Perceiving Ones Own Body, 10516.
174 chapter seven

pain is not, strictly speaking, an object of perception. It is a subjective


experience which accompanies the perception of harmful changes in the
body. In some cases there can be an experience of pain without any harm-
ful change. Olivi asks in the fourth book of Summa whether a separated
soul suffers from corporeal fire. He responds that it is heretical to think
that it does not suffer, and then he goes on to present four alternative
explanations as to how the suffering takes place. One of theminspired
by certain passages from Gregory the Great and Augustinehas it that
corporeal fire really burns the soul, and the suffering is due to actual burn-
ing. Olivi rejects this solution:
Although Gregory says that the fire burns the spirit and although both Peter
and Augustine say that the spirits will burn and enter [a state of] eternal
combustion, it is nave to believe that [the fire] would literally burn and
consume them. [...] By invisible or spiritual burning [Gregory] refers to the
living experience of sensible burning. This becomes clear from what he says
next, namely: the soul suffers not only by seeing but also by experiencing
the burning. [...] On the basis of this, it is clear that by burning and suffer-
ing from fire he means the experiential sensation and vision of fire.23
In a separated soul there cannot be any bodily change which would
account for the pain. Moreover, the soul itself does not really burn because
corporeal fire cannot affect the spiritual soul directly. The soul suffers pain
because it has a living experience of burning, even though it does not
undergo any real change. Olivis way of explaining the experience that the
separated soul has in eternal fire resembles modern ideas of phenomenal
consciousness. The soul has a subjective feeling of burningto use the
common idiom, it feels something like for the soul to be in the middle
of the flames. Although Olivi speaks about a special case of perception in
this context, his idea seems to be that not only the experience of pain but
all cognitive acts include this kind of phenomenal and experiential aspect,
and that perception involves this aspect also when the soul is united to
the body.
Of course the comparison between modern ideas of phenomenal con-
sciousness and Olivis position should not be stretched too far. Medieval

23[...] licet Gregorius dicat quod ignis exurat spiritum, et licet tam Petrus quam
Augustinus dicant eos arsuros et in combustionem eternam ituros, nimis tamen rude est
credere quod ad litteram exurantur et ardeant et comburantur. [...] Per ardorem aut invi
sibilem seu spiritualem [Gregorius] intelligit vivam experientiam ardoris sensibilis, sicut
patet per illud quod subdit, quod scilicet anima non solum videndo sed etiam experiendo
incendium patiatur. [...] Ex quo patet quod cremari et pati ab igne accipit pro sensu et
visu ignis experimentali [...] (Summa IV, q. 19, 15455 (Maranesi, q. 7).)
attention and the common sense 175

philosophers did not have a single equivalent for the modern concept
of consciousness. The term consciousness, a derivative from the Latin
conscientia, received a technical philosophical meaning during the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries. Before that, consciousness was not
an explicit topic of philosophical inquiry. Moreover, the concept is by no
means well-defined even in modern philosophy of mind. A glance at mod-
ern discussions shows that the cluster of phenomena that it covers is rich:
intentionality, phenomenality, reflexivity, selective attention, selfhood,
experiential ownness, experiential unity, and so forthall these aspects
are taken to be important for understanding what consciousness is. How-
ever, these problems do not undermine the fact that medieval philosophi-
cal texts are a rich source of material relating to the phenomena that are
nowadays treated under the term consciousness, even though medieval
authors did not necessarily think that all these phenomena could be gath-
ered under one and the same concept. Some of the roots of our notion of
consciousness go back to the Middle Ages (and even beyond), and in this
limited sense we can say that medieval philosophers were interested in
questions related to consciousness.24 Thus, when I claim that Olivi rec-
ognises the phenomenal aspect of cognitive actsan aspect which can
be characterised as a kind of raw experience of the object of a cognitive
act from a first-person point of viewI do not mean that he uses the
modern concept, that his theoretical interests are similar to ours, or that
consciousness is an explicit topic of philosophical speculation for him.
But I do claim that his ideas sometimes come close to modern ideas of
phenomenality.25
For instance, on one occasion Olivi draws a connection between the
acts of the common sense and the perception of the fact that the senses
are awake, and his idea seems to be that this kind of perception involves
awareness. After arguing that the common sense directly apprehends

24For discussion, see the introduction in Consciousness, ed. Heinmaa et al., 126.
25Robert Pasnau has suggested that: When premodern philosophers try to explain the
various forms of cognition (sensory and intellectual), they take for granted that they are
trying to explain what we call consciousness. (Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature,
197.) Unfortunately in this connection he does not specify what he means by the term
consciousness. See also Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 122, where it is stated that: [Olivi
and Ockham] agree [...] that our perceptions have a certain phenomenological feel. Ele-
onore Stump also finds a kind of consciousness in Aquinas and Ockhams discussions con-
cerning cognition (Stump, The Mechanisms of Cognition, 16981). For a methodological
discussion of the possibility of reading phenomenal consciousness from historical authors,
see Jari Kaukua & Vili Lhteenmki, Subjectivity as a Non-Textual Standard of Interpreta-
tion in the History of Philosophical Psychology, History and Theory 49 (2010): 2137.
176 chapter seven

nothing other than the acts of the senses, he presents a counter-argu-


ment which draws from Augustines De Genesi ad litteram: the common
sense perceives directly and by itself the state of the external senses and
their organs. The central idea in the counter-argument is that the power
of sight of a blind person (or a person whose eyes are closed) does not
function at all but the intention (intentio) of the common sense goes to
the eyes and the person perceives by the common sense that her eyes are
awake even though they do not act.26 Olivi answers this argument in the
following way:
Yet, Augustine does not say that this happens only by the common sense.
On the contrary, his example and experience prove the opposite because
such [a person] is awake naturally prior to his perception that he is awake.
The act of tending is in the closed eyes before it is perceived to be there,
and it cannot actually tend anywhere unless it actually tends towards some
object or, at least, towards some place by a general aspectus. That kind of
aspectus belongs primarily and immediately to the external sense. There-
fore, the actual aspectus, which is awake, is around the organs of the exter-
nal senses before a human being perceives that he is awake there and tends
in an attentive way (vigiliter). It is impossible to have this kind of aspectus
without some act of perceiving, at least a confused one. And thus we should
rather say that a blind person who is awake perceives the movements of the
spirits or nerves by the sense of touch, which is situated around the eyes.27
Olivis view is that if a blind person is awakeand especially if she tries
to seeher eyes are active. When she pays attention to her eyes, she
perceives the movement of the spirits and becomes aware that there is
something going on in her eyes and that she is awake even though she
does not see. From our perspective, the most important idea is that the
aspectus and even the acts of the senses exist before we perceive them but
awareness of them results from the act of the common sense.

26Summa II q. 62, 594.


27Attamen Augustinus non dicit quod fiat per solum sensum communem, immo ex
suomet exemplo et experimento contrarium probatur, quia talis prius naturaliter vigilat
quam vigilare se sentiat. Actus etiam intendendi prius est in clausis oculis quam sentiatur
ibi esse nec potest actu intedere, nisi actu intendat in aliquod obiectum aut saltem nisi
quodam aspectu generali versus aliqua loca intedat. Talis autem aspectus spectat primo
et immediate ad sensum particularem. Ergo pervigil et actualis aspectus sensuum par-
ticularium est prius circa organa ipsorum quam homo sentiat se ibi vigilare et vigiliter
intendere. Impossibile est autem talem aspectum dare sine aliquo actu sentiendi, saltem
confuso. Et ideo potius oportet dici quod caecus vigilans quodam sensu tactus circa oculos
conradicato ibi sentit primo motus spirituum vel nervorum. (Summa II q. 62, 595.)
attention and the common sense 177

In another text, Olivi endeavours to prove that not only the external
senses but also the common sense function by directing their aspects.
He claims that the common sense extends itself to the external senses and
objects by reaching out its aspectus and that this is why the acts of the
common sense appear as if they were acts of the senses:
Moreover, the common sense perceives so intimately the objects of the
external senses in their places that many acts of the common sense appear
as acts of the external senses. This is clear because it seems to us that the
pictures of diverse clothes and members in a painting have different thick-
nesses and are placed over each other, as if the colours of the painting
were solid bodies. They appear to us in this way because the estimation
of the interior sense has shown this to be the case in human beings who
are depicted in the paintings. Likewise, when a burning brand is whirled
in a circle, it appears as if we were seeing a kind of a circle of fire. And
yet [the power of] vision does not see the circle in any instantneither
when it is made nor after it has been madebut it sees only one part of
it after another and never the two at the same time. But the interior sense
apprehends the circle by the memory which preserves past things and offers
things that have recently been done or seen as if they took place now and
were seen now. There are numerous other things that are apprehended or
estimated only by the interior sense, and yet they are ascribed to the exter-
nal senses because of the intimacy of the interior sense with the external
senses. It must be, therefore, that the virtual aspectus of the common sense
intimately extends all the way to the acts of the external senses and even all
the way to the objects of the external senses.28
The idea that the common sense is involved in the perception of things
that do not actually exist in the external world (such as the circle of fire
that appears when a lit torch is whirled quickly around) comes from
Avicenna.29 Olivi accepts this idea, but he also draws from our experience

28Ulterius, sic intime sentit eorum obiecta in suis locis quod multi proprii actus eius
videntur esse proprii actus sensuum particularium; sicut patet, cum picturae diversarum
vestium et membrorum alicuius imaginis videntur nobis varias densitates sibi invicem
superpositas habere, acsi colores imaginis essent corpora spissa. Quod ideo nobis videtur,
quia aestimatio sensus interioris sic probavit in hominibus quorum sunt imagines illae.
Sic etiam, cum titio ignitus sphaerice giratur, videmur nobis videre quendam circulum
igneum; cum tamen visus in nullo uno instanti videat illum circulum, nec cum fit, nec
post factum, sed solum unam partem videt post aliam sic quod nunquam duas simul. Sed
interior sensus illum circulum apprehendit per memoriam retinentem praeterita et offe
rentem recenter acta et visa, quasi adhuc fiant et videantur. Innumera etiam alia sunt quae
a solo sensu interiori apprehenduntur vel aestimantur, quae tamen sensibus ascribuntur
particularibus propter intimitatem illius cum istis. Oportet ergo quod virtualis aspectus
sensus communis intime attingat usque ad actus sensuum exteriorum et etiam usque ad
loca obiectorum suorum. (Summa II q. 73, 99.)
29Shif De an. 1.5, 8889.
178 chapter seven

and argues that even though perceiving the circle of fire is due to an act of
the common sense, it appears to us as if we were really seeing it with our
eyes. The common sense combines the act of vision with a memorative
act and thus provides us with a phenomenal experience of seeing a circle,
but in our experience the acts of the sight and those of the common sense
are indistinguishable. It is also notable that at the end of the passage Olivi
claims that the virtual aspectus of the common sense extends itself all the
way to the objects of the external senses. It cannot do this without the
external senses but still the common sense seems to be the proper subject
of the acts of perception.
All these ideas accentuate that Olivi understands the common sense
as a centre of cognition which renders our perceptions complete by add-
ing elements which the external senses cannot apprehend. When I see
someone whirling a torch, I experience that I see a circle of fire. In this
way, my subjective perceptual experience is determined by the common
sense and not by the external senses. This point becomes clearer from the
following text, in which Olivi explains why an external object appears to
us as one even though we have two eyes and the object is reached by two
visual aspects:
Also because the uniformity of the concurrence of the double aspectus of
the two eyes on one and the same object appears (occurrit) to the common
sense as if one in reality, and yet according to the duality of the eyes there
are really two aspects and two visions of the same thing. This is why the
common sense judges the object to be one in a sensory wayor rather the
thing is presented through the two visions to the common sense as one,
just as it is really one thing. However, the common sense readily perceives
one act to be in one eye and the other in another eye, which is also why it
perceives that one act of seeing is taken away, and the other remains when
one of the eyes is closed.30
Our eyes see external objects from different angles because of the dis-
tance between them, but our visual experience does not contain two
images. We have an impression of seeing one object by one vision, and
this impression is due to the act of the common sense which contains

30Quia etiam uniformitas concursus gemelli aspectus duorum oculorum super idem
obiectum occurrit sensui communi acsi realiter una, cum tamen secundum dualitatem
oculorum sint vere duo aspectus et duae visiones eiusdem rei: idcirco sensus communis
sensibiliter iudicat esse unam, vel potius res per ambas visiones non offertur tunc sibi
nisi ut una, sicut et est vere una. Sed tamen bene sentit alium actum videndi esse in uno
oculo et alium in alio, unde et cum unus eorum clauditur, sentit unum actum videndi esse
subtractum alio remanente. (Summa II q. 73, 94.)
attention and the common sense 179

the information from both eyes. The content of our perceptual experi-
ence is not determined by the two acts of our two eyes but by the act of
the common sense which combines these acts. Moreover, when we close
one of our eyes, we see only the aspect of the object which is reached
through the open eye, and we are aware that the act of the other eye is
missing. Also this awareness, which is a part of our perceptual experience,
is brought about by the common sense.31

3.Degrees of Attention

The idea that external objects can be perceived only if the subject pays
attention to them is not unproblematic. One obvious problem is that
sometimes loud noises and other unusual objects attract our attention.
For instance, when I am fully concentrated on writing this text, I do not
perceive the background noise in my room, but if a loud noise suddenly
bursts out, it catches my attention and I notice it. This phenomenon is
difficult to explain if the only way to perceive loud noises is by first pay-
ing attention to them. Another problem is related to the way in which the
external senses hinder each other. When I focus intensively on the music
I am listening to, I do not become temporarily blind. Perhaps I fail to
notice everything in my visual field, but there is a difference between lis-
tening to music with eyes open and listening to it with eyes closed. If the
strong focus on the music prevented the functioning of the power of sight,
as Olivi argues, there would not be any difference. Finally, we may also ask
how the souls attention towards certain objects instead of others within
ones perceptual field comes about, and how we are able to pay attention
to external objects before we perceive them.
Olivi deals with the first of these problems only. His solution is based
on an idea that the souls attention admits of degrees and that we pay
attention to our environment even when we are intensively concentrating
on something else. However, together with certain other passages which
deal with various types and degrees of attention that the soul has towards

31This idea is closely linked to Olivis view concerning the perception of perception.
See chapter eleven, section three below. It must also be noted that in the case of human
beings, the intellect functions as the ultimate centre of cognition because it provides us
with a unified experience of all of our cognitive activity. See Summa II q. 37, 659; ibid.,
q. 51, 122; q. 54, 241 & 280; q. 58, 464; q. 59, 540; q. 74, 126.
180 chapter seven

the external world, this solution gives us tools to answer the other two
problems as well.
We may begin unfolding this aspect of Olivis thinking by comparing
his ideas to a well-known passage from Augustines De Trinitate. In this
passage Augustine gives an explanation for the fact that sometimes we
do not hear the noises around us if we concentrate strongly on thinking
about something else. He writes:
When someone is speaking to us and we are thinking of something else, it
often appears as if we had not heard him. But this is not true; we did hear,
but we did not remember, because the speakers words slipped immediately
away from the perception of our ears, being diverted elsewhere by a com-
mand of the will which is wont to fix them in the memory. And, therefore,
when something of the kind occurs, it would be more correct to say, We
did not remember, rather than, We did not hear.32
We have already seen (in chapter seven) that Olivi discusses the same
phenomenon when he presents his explanation for how excessive atten-
tion to one of the external senses hinders the subject from perceiving
through the other senses. There are similarities in the views of these two
authors, but there is also an important way in which their accounts for the
phenomenon differ. Augustine does not think that we would not perceive
the objects of our senses when we concentrate on something else. We do
hear the words even though we do not pay attention to them, but because
our attention is directed elsewhere, the words do not leave any traces
in the memory. The content of the speech slips from our mind without
leaving any marks behind, and we have the impression that we did not
hear because we do not have any recollection. In the Augustinian view,
the ears do not cease from acting even though we do not concentrate on
listening.
In contrast to Augustine, Olivi seems to think that the ears do not func-
tion at all if attention is altogether directed away from them. We have
already seen that in his Quodlibeta Olivi says that a sleepwalker can see or

32[...] cum saepe coram loquentem nobis aliquem aliud cogitando non audisse nobis
uidemur. Falsum est autem; audiuimus enim sed non meminimus subinde per aurium
sensum labentibus uocibus alienato nutu uoluntatis per quem solent infigi memoriae.
Verius itaque dixerimus cum tale aliquid accidit: Non meminimus, quam: Non audivi-
mus. (Aurelius Augustinus De Trinitate libri quindecim, ed. W.J. Mountain, CCSL 50/50A
(Turnhout: Brepols, 1968) (hereafter trin.) 11.8.15.) The translation is taken from Augustine,
On the Trinity, books 815, ed. G. Matthews, trans. S. McKenna, Cambridge Texts in the
History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002), 78.
attention and the common sense 181

hear only if her common sense is awake to some extent because otherwise
the external senses do not function. We have also seen that paying atten-
tion is a necessary condition for the acts of the senses and that paying
attention to one of the senses hinders others from acting. To boot, Olivi
argues several times in his Summa that the external senses do not func-
tion unless the aspectus of the common sense is directed to them.33 Thus,
his idea is more radical than Augustines. The latter thinks that when we
do not pay attention to what we perceive, perception leaves no trace in
the memory; by contrast, Olivi claims that perception itself is hindered
due to the lack of attention.
On the face of it Olivis theory leads to the counterintuitive conse-
quence that if my attention is retracted from my eyes, my visual field turns
black, and I see nothing, but a closer reading reveals that Olivi accepts the
simultaneous functioning of the senses. Even a strong attention to one
of them does not make all the other senses completely inactive. On some
level the souls attention is always directed to the external world through
all the senses. This holds true even when we are asleep. The crucial point
is that souls attention comes in degrees. When I concentrate on listening
to music, I do not withdraw my whole attention from the other senses,
and this allows the other senses to function.
This idea may sound striking, given the foregoing discussion about the
relation between the common sense and the external senses. The bulk
of the evidence shows Olivi thinking that if the aspectus of the common
sense is completely directed away from one of the senses, that sense can-
not function.34 However, Olivis position becomes clear if we take into
heed the crucial distinction that he makes between aspectus and actus:
the apprehensive and appetitive powers receive from the nature or from
the will an aspectus which is directed towards the objects of these powers,
and the apprehensive and appetitive acts follow this aspectus.35 Directing
the aspectus and producing a cognitive act are two different things. An
aspectus is a necessary condition for the act, but the former can exist with-
out the latter. The aspectus needs to be terminated at an object before the

33As above, in footnote 10.


34See, e.g., Summa II q. 50 app., 54; ibid., q. 62, 59596.
35[...] potentiis apprehensivis et appetitivis datur, sive a natura sive a voluntate,
aspectus conversus ad sua obiecta, ad quos sequitur actus apprehensionis vel appetitus.
(Summa II q. 58, 421.) See chapter six, footnotes 33, 40, and 53.
182 chapter seven

cognitive power can act. Olivi repeatedly says that the external senses
cannot act if the aspectus of the common sense is altogether retracted
from the senses. But if the common sense has some kind of aspec-
tus towards the external senses they may function and produce acts of
sensation.
Even though the external senses cannot act when the aspectus of
the common sense is completely directed away from them, they do act
without the acts of the common sense. We can see this by looking at
Olivis answer to the first problem that I presented in the beginning of
this section: how can external objects catch our attention if perception
presupposes that we pay attention? Olivi formulates the problem in the
following way:
We see that loud noises wake sleeping persons, or persons who are pay-
ing attention to something else (intendentes), and draw them to listen. The
same happens when a light is suddenly carried in front of sleeping persons.
This would not happen if objects did not have a power to excite the powers
of the soul and draw the powers to themselves.36
If we assume that the attention of a sleeping person is altogether retracted
from the senses and that this retraction hinders the activity of the senses
completely, there seems to be no way of accounting for the possibility
of sensing external noises while asleep. And yet I do wake up when the
alarm clock on my bedside table rings.
Olivis answer to this problem goes as follows:
The sensitive powers are not retracted inside in slumber so completely that
the aspectus which remains in them could not be terminated at vivacious
objects so powerfully that an act of hearing is produced from the terminat-
ing [of the aspectus] [...] this powerful and intense act of hearing presents
itself to the aspectus of the common sense in such a way that the common
sense apprehends it very powerfully. This powerful apprehension leads the
whole aspectus of the common sense towards the external things, and so the
whole human being wakes up, and because this process happens quickly,
the human wakes up quickly. Light would not awake closed eyes unless its
brightness touched the aspectus of the eye through the interstice between

36Nos videmus quod dormientes aut in aliud intendentes per fortem vocem vocati exci-
tantur et ad audiendum convertuntur, et idem est, quando lumen subito apportatur coram
dormientibus; sed hoc non posset fieri, nisi obiecta ipsa haberent virtutem potentiarum exci-
tativam et ad se conversivam. (Summa II q. 58, 407.) See also ibid., q. 72, 26 & 33.
attention and the common sense 183

the eyelids in such a way that when the aspectus of the eye is terminated at
the brightness, the eye produces an act of vision in itself.37
The explanation is based on the idea that the external senses may appre-
hend powerful objects even when the person is asleep, because they are
not completely retracted from the external world. When I am asleep there
remains an aspectus in my power of hearing, and this aspectus may be
terminated at the loud noise of my alarm clock. This enables my power of
hearing to produce an act of sensing the sound of the clock. Subsequently,
the acts of the senses are apprehended by my common sense (I perceive
that there is something going on in my senses), and then the common
sense directs its attention to the external world and when it does so, I per-
ceive the noise and wake up. External senses are capable of acting before
the common sense acts in relation to them. On one occasion Olivi even
says that the common sense is incapable of acting if the external senses
do not act beforehand.38 Now, as acting in relation to something is not the
same thing as directing the aspectus towards that thing, it is possible that
the common sense pays attention to some extent to the external senses
even when the person is asleepin fact, it has to do so, because other-
wise it could not apprehend the acts of the senses when they take place.
However, one may still ask how this explanation is supposed to work,
given that Olivi repeatedly speaks about the inability of the external senses
to act when the aspectus of the common sense is retracted from them. If
there remains an aspectus towards the external senses even when the sub-
ject is asleep, why does a sleeping person not perceive things around her?
Why does intensive concentration on the objects of one of the senses hin-
der the subject from perceiving through the other senses? This is where
the levels of attention come into play. For, there are a number of places

37Potentiae sensitivae non sunt ita totaliter in somno ad interiora retractae quin
a vivacibus obiectis possit ita fortiter terminari ille aspectus qui eis remanet quod
generabitur ex tali terminatione seu ad talem terminationem actus auditus [...] et etiam
ipse actus sic fortis et intensus ita se ingeret aspectui sensus communis quod fortissime
apprehendetur ab ipso. Quae apprehensio sic fortis totum aspectum sensus communis
ad exteriora deducet, et sic totus homo evigilabit, et quia haec omnia fiunt subito, ideo
subito evigilabit. Lux vero oculos clausos ad vigiliam non reduceret, nisi aliqualiter eius
claritas per locum divisionis palpebrarum aspectum oculi attingeret, ut sic, aspectu eius
terminato in ipsam, actum visionis in se produceret. (Summa II q. 58, 500.) See also ibid.,
q. 62, 595.
38Sicut autem sensus communis non potest agere, nisi prius fuerit actio sensus par-
ticularis [...] (Summa II q. 31, 564.) Note, however, that Olivi does not consider here the
possibility of remembering or imaginingacts which are performed by the common sense
alone and as such do not require the acts of the external senses.
184 chapter seven

in which Olivi discusses our ability to be attentive to our surroundings


without actually perceiving things around us. One of the most important
passages that conveys this idea comes from his Lectura super librum De
angelica hierarchia. The text deals with the way in which angels commu-
nicate with each other, but Olivi draws from human experience in order
to explain his position:
We notice in ourselves that when we look at or listen to something atten-
tively, nevertheless we immediately hear a voice that resounds in a part of
the air from which we seem to be averted, and we hear it in such a way that
the attention of our heart is drawn to it. In this way, they say, this takes
place in angels (in their own manner).
As for evidence for this, it must be known that although the intellect or
the power of hearing is directed powerfully to somewhere, nevertheless
in the power of hearing remains some latent (occulta) directedness to the
whole hemispherein such a way that if a vehement sound goes off some-
where, the power of hearing perceives it quickly. The power of hearing does
not need to be directed to the sound anew because the preceding latent
directedness suffices for perception. Because the sound presents itself objec-
tively (obiective) and powerfully to the power of hearingin such a way
that the power of hearing necessarily generates a vivacious act of hearing
in itselfit [viz. the power of hearing] draws the attention of the heart to
itself and to its object powerfully. An angels power of hearing or power that
apprehends the speech of another angel must be understood [to function]
similarly. It is not directed to something in such a way that there would not
remain some kind of general attention (generalis aspectus) to other things
that are present or accessible to it.39
Although we need not consider angel speech here, it is of some impor-
tance to see how human experience serves as a simile which can help

39Sicut enim videmus in nobis quod quamquam simus ad aliqua videnda vel audienda
attente conversi, nihilominus si fiat aliqua vox fortis in illa parte aeris a qua videmur aversi,
statim audimus eam ita quod per hoc fortiter revocatur attencio cordis nostri ad illam, sic
suo modo dicunt esse in angelo. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod licet intellectus vel
auditus sint ad aliud fortiter conversi, nihilominus remanet in ipso auditu quedam occulta
conversio ad totum emisperium ita quod si ibi fiat vehemens sonus, subito percipit illum,
non preeunte aliqua nova conversione auditus ad illum, quia sufficiebat ad hoc predicta
conversio occulta, quia vero ille sonus obiective se ingerit cum multa efficacia ipsi auditui,
ita quod ipse auditus habet vivacem actum audiendi in se necessario generare, idcirco
habet attencionem cordis ad se et ad suum obiectum fortiter trahere. Et consimiliter est
intelligendum de potentia angeli auditiva seu apprehensiva locucionum alterius angeli,
quod scilicet non est ita conversa ad alia quin remaneat sibi quidam generalis aspectus ad
alia sibi presentia vel pervia. (Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Quaestio de locutionibus angelorum,
ed. S. Piron, Oliviana 1 (2003): 3132 (= Lectura super librum De angelica hierarchia, cap.
7, q. 7.) For a presentation of this text, see Sylvain Piron, Petrus Johannis Olivi: Quaestio
de locutionibus angelorum, Oliviana 1 (2003).
attention and the common sense 185

us understand the way spiritual entities perceive and communicate with


each other. From our perspective, the most important idea Olivi presents
here is that even when I concentrate on looking at something, my power
of hearing is all the time attentive to my surroundings. It is directed to
the whole hemisphere in such a way that I am not aware of the actual
sounds around meI perceive neither them nor the attention that I pay
to my surroundings as the directing of my hearing is occultabut its
latent attentiveness enables me to perceive and become aware of appar-
ent changes (such as loud noises) around me, whenever they take place.
The crucial term that figures in this text is aspectus generalis. It means
a kind of general attentiveness of the powers of the soul which enables
them to react to vehement changes within their scope. When a power
of the soul is in this kind of attentive state, it does not produce acts of
sensation, but after the aspectus generalis is terminated at a particular
object and specified by it, a cognitive act follows:
It should also be said that the powers [of the soul] have a double aspectus.
One of them is indeterminate in relation to its objects as when we tend
towards the external [world] in such a way that the power of vision is applied
to seeing by the will or by nature, and the eye is awake but kept closed, or
we are in darkness. Because of the unsuitable condition of the medium, or
because of the impediment of some obstacle, the power of sight does not
tend determinately towards any object. The other aspectus is a determina-
tion (determinativus vel determinatio) of the first aspectus because the first
one is related to the other as a root to a branch and a sensation is caused
from the first when an object is present. For example, given that nothing
but a man whose eyes are open would have been created before everything
else and he would strive (with all effort) to tend to see by his eyes as if there
were external visible things: it is clear that in that case his aspectus would
not be terminated at or determinately carried to any external object. If after
a while all the external things (which exist now) were created, thereby the
first aspectus of the eyes would be fixed on external objects.40

40Dicendum etiam quod potentiae habent duplicem aspectum. Unus est ex se inde-
terminatus ad haec vel illa obiecta, ut, cum oculus stat pervigil et clausis oculis vel in
tenebris intedimus in exteriora, ita quod potentia visiva est a voluntate vel a natura appli-
cata ad videndum, sed propter indispositionem medii vel propter impedimentum alicuius
obstaculi non intendit determinate in aliquod obiectum. Secundus est determinativus vel
determinatio primi, nam primus se habet ad secundum sicut radix ad ramum et ex primo
cum praesentia obiecti causatur sensus; ut verbi gratia, detur quod solus homo apertis ocu-
lis esset ante omnia creatus et sic toto conatu niteretur per oculos intendere ad videndum
acsi essent visibilia extra: constat quod tunc aspectus eius non terminaretur nec deter-
minate ferretur in aliquod extrinsecum obiectum, et si paulo post omnia exteriora sicut
nunc sunt crearentur, eo ipso primus aspectus oculi determinaretur ad obiecta exteriora.
(Summa II q. 73, 6869.) See also ibid., q. 59, 54344; q. 62, 595. Olivis thought-experiment
186 chapter seven

The powers of the soul have an aspectus generalis when they are directed
somewhere in an indeterminate way and not terminated at any object.
When an object presents itself to the aspectus, the latter becomes termi-
nated at the object, and the power brings about a cognitive act pertain-
ing to that object. Moreover, Quaestio de locutionibus angelorum shows
us that the external senses have this aspectus generalis even when the
common sense does not act in relation to them. Only after the power of
hearing has produced an act which pertains to a loud noise does the com-
mon sense apprehend the hearing and the object thereof.
The idea of the aspectus generalis explains how the souls attention can
function as the basis for subsequent perceptions. An intentional act of
perception becomes possible only if the soul pays attention to the object
which it perceives. At the outset this idea seems problematic because
Olivi does not seem to give any explanation for the initial emergence of
the souls attention towards certain objects instead of others within ones
perceptual field. If I want to see an apple, I have to pay attention to it. But
how am I able to pay attention to an apple in front of me before I perceive
it? The attention by which the soul reaches the apple cannot be based
on yet another attention because that would lead to infinite regress, and
it cannot be caused by the apple because Olivis metaphysical commit-
ments do not allow the soul to be acted upon by corporal objects.41 How-
ever, the souls ability to pay a minimal degree of attention to the external
world without perceiving anything shows that the attention should not be
understood as if it were a kind of act. It is more like a permanent state of
the soul which enables it to focus on anything that happens to be within
the perceptual fieldwe may think of a torch which enlightens surround-
ing space and makes visible every object that happens to enter that space.

resembles to some extent the so called floating man of Avicenna (Shif De an. 1.1, 3637).
Of course, the contexts in which Olivi and Avicenna present their thought-experiments
and the argumentative roles they give to them are very different. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to note that whereas Avicennas flying man does not admit the existence of his body,
Olivis man before creation is well aware of his ability to see even though there is nothing
to be seen. The man is not only created with his eyes open but he: conatu niteretur per
oculos intendere ad videndum. A list of Latin authors, who quote Shif De an. 1.1, can
be found in tienne Gilson, Les Sources grco-arabes de laugustinisme avicennisant,
AHDLMA 4 (1929): 4142. For discussion on the influence of the flying man in Latin phi-
losophy, see Hasse, Avicennas De Anima, 8092.
41This problem has been raised by Dominik Perler, in Thories de lintentionnalit,
7172. I have presented the following solution in Silva & Toivanen, The Active Nature of
the Soul, 27577.
attention and the common sense 187

Similarly, when a vivacious object enters the scope of the souls attention,
it determines the general attention and the soul perceives the object.
Moreover, we can intentionally direct our attention to the external
world without fixing it to a certain object or without having an intention
to perceive one: we can direct our eyes without having an intention to
determinately see those things that are then before our eyes.42 When we
actually remember a certain object and want to see it, we simply open
our eyes, pay attention to our visual field, and hope for the best. We can
pay attention to the external world without fixing our attention on any
definite object, and the objects that happen to be present function as the
end-terms of our attention, thus enabling us to perceive them.
On the basis of the passages that I have quoted above it seems that
a sleeping person and one who is awake but intensely concentrating on
one particular thing are in a similar situation. Both fail to perceive their
surroundings, but still they have an aspectus generalis towards the whole
hemisphere around them. In fact, Olivi fluctuates to some extent in his
view, because on one occasion he explicitly says that slumber takes away
the aspectus generalis altogether.43 This statement goes against his expla-
nation for the fact that loud noises awaken sleeping persons, and there-
fore it is possible that either he has in mind an occasional slumber that
is so deep that the sleeper does not wake up even to the loudest noise,
or he may think that even general attentiveness comes in degrees. It is
one thing to be in total darkness, trying to see and quite another to be
asleep and fail to see because of that. One might think that the strength
of the aspectus generalis varies between these kinds of cases. At least
the strength of our intentional attention admits of various degrees. Olivi
points out that:
When we are asleep, our sensitive powers are retracted from external things
to internal ones in such a way that open ears do not hear actual sounds,
and open eyes do not see lights which are present. When we are awake, we
experience that sometimes we tend (intendere) more intensively through
the eyes or the ears, sometimes more weakly, and sometimes we tend fur-
ther away and sometimes closer, depending on how strongly or how distant
a place our will directs and applies the inferior powers.44

42[...] nos possumus convertere oculos absque hoc quod intenderimus determinate
videre illas res quae tunc obiciuntur coram oculis nostris [...] (Summa II q. 36, 634.)
43Generalis vero et indeterminatus aspectus datur evigilantibus, cum excitantur a
somno, qui et per somnum eis aufertur. (Summa II q. 72, 32.)
44In somno enim sic retrahuntur potentiae sensitivae ab exterioribus ad interiora quod
auribus apertis voces actualiter insonantes non audiuntur aut aperto oculo lux praesens
188 chapter seven

Sometimes we concentrate on things in our visual field and sometimes we


think about other matters. We see in both cases but not with the same
level of intensity. It seems possible that the general and constant atten-
tion of the soul admits of similar kinds of degrees.
We are now in a position to see what kind of role Olivi attributes to the
common sense as a necessary part of the process that brings about acts
of the senses. The distinction between acting and directing the aspectus
explains how the external senses are capable of acting even when the
common sense does not act. There is no contradiction between Olivis
explanation for the fact that sleeping persons may wake up when they
hear a loud noise and his repeated insistence that the external senses
are incapable of acting if the common sense is completely retracted from
them. The common sense does not have to act in relation to the external
senses in order to enable their action; all that is needed is that the com-
mon sense directs its aspectus to them.45
The distinction between the aspectus generalis and the aspectus that is
specified to a certain object accounts for the way in which the common
sense is all the time attentive to the activity of the senses. When I concen-
trate on listening to music, my attention is directed to my ears, to be sure,
but this does not necessarily mean that my attention would be completely
withdrawn from my eyes. Thus, the aspectus of the common sense can be
directed to different directions simultaneously and with varying degrees.
While I am asleep, it is mostly directed at the imagination (and this is why
the common sense has imaginative acts and why I see dream images), but
it also remains attentive to the external senses to a lesser degree (and this
is why I hear noises if they happen to be loud enough).
The presupposition behind this idea is that the aspectus of the powers
of the soul can be directed simultaneously in different directions, and we
can find support for this interpretation from Olivis texts. The aspectus of
the powers of the soul is, according to him, composed of distinct parts
which together form a whole. These parts may be directed to different
objects and in the case of the common sense to different external senses
and their objects:

non videtur. In vigilia etiam experimur nos per oculos vel aures nunc fortius intendere,
nunc debilius, et nunc longius, nunc propinquius, secundum quod voluntas fortius vel ad
longinquius convertit et applicat potentias inferiores. (Summa II q. 59, 559.)
45If this interpretation is correct, we must take it that Olivi formulates his idea some-
what loosely in Quodl. 1.7, where he says that the external senses are capable of acting only
if there is a corresponding act in the common sense (see footnote 6 above).
attention and the common sense 189

For no created power can apprehend a thing unless it actually regards that
thing; but the entire aspectus of one power must have some kind of unity.
[...] In this way we experience in a sensory way that although an eye regards
simultaneously many things, it never does this except under one entire
aspectus. This is why all the things it sees simultaneously must be related to
each other in such a way that they can be observed and apprehended under
one entire aspectus. This kind of unity must be assigned also to the sense of
touchin which case it seems to be the least necessaryaccording to the
uniformity of the continuity of its entire organ.46
The sense of touch is an example of a power that can simultaneously have
many aspects which are directed to different objects. Different aspects
must have some kind of unity, which is provided by the unity of the whole
body (which is the organ of the sense of touch), but still the power can be
simultaneously directed in multiple directions, so to speak. For instance,
I feel the pressure of the keyboard of my computer on my fingertips and
the floor under my feet. The sense of touch has many acts and many
aspects by which I am capable of feeling these things simultaneously,
and the unity they have is due to these feelings existing in the same body.
Olivi goes on to say that the required unity may be due to the fact that
all the different parts of the aspectus belong to one and the same power.47
The different aspects of the common sense are probably united in this
way. The central point is that he does not see any problem in the idea that
one power of the soul can be directed in several directions and objects
simultaneously.
Moreover, Olivi thinks that to produce an act of apprehension in rela-
tion to an object does not require that the whole aspectus be directed to
that object. The higher powers of the soul are able to apprehend objects
by using only part of their capacity and part of their aspectus:

46Cum etiam nulla potentia creata possit aliquid apprehendere, nisi actualiter aspi-
ciat illud, totalis autem aspectus unius potentiae oportet quod habeat aliquam unitatem.
[...] Sic etiam sensibiliter experimur quod quamvis oculus plura simul aspiciat, nunquam
tamen hoc facit nisi sub uno totali aspectu; unde oportet quod omnia quae simul videt
sic se habeant quod sub illo uno totali aspectu possint conspici et apprehendi. Et etiam in
sensu tactus de quo minus videtur oportet hanc unitatem assignare secundum correspon-
dentiam unius continuitatis totius sui organi. (Summa II q. 37, 664.)
47Summa II q. 37, 665. Olivi is discussing two visions which the blessed have in Heaven:
they see God, and they see things in themselves. He points out that there is a unity even
between the aspects of these visions because they belong to one and the same power.
Thus, the required unity may be due to three things: (1) the objects are located near each
other and the aspectus of the power of sight has unity because of the vicinity of its objects;
(2) different aspects are realised in one and the same organ (the case of touch); (3) differ-
ent aspects are realised in one and the same power.
190 chapter seven

In order for a noble power to see some object (even in order to see it per-
fectly) it is not necessary that it direct its entire power and aspectus only to
that object. It suffices that it does this to such a degree that the nature of the
power, the perfection of its act, and the conditions of the object require.48
The common sense does not need to use all its capacity to perceive the
objects of sight, and it does not have to be completely directed towards
the eyes in order to see. This idea is reflected also in the passage that
I cited above: when the aspectus of the common or interior sense is
totally turned away from the objects and acts of vision, then the act of
vision is impeded.49 The power of sight becomes unable to act only if the
aspectus of the common sense is completely retracted from it. Partial or
weak attention towards the eyes is possible even when listening to music,
and aspectus generalis may exist even when I am asleep.50
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, we can arrive at a detailed
description of Olivis view on the psychological process of perception
which takes place when, say, the ringing of my alarm clock draws my
attention, I perceive it, and wake up. The process may be formulated in
the following way:
1. The aspectus generalis of the common sense is directed to all of the exter-
nal senses.
2. This allows the aspects generales of the external senses to be directed
outward.
3. When the alarm goes off, the aspectus of the power of hearing is termi-
nated at it.
4. The power of hearing acts and senses the ringing.
5. The act of the power of hearing becomes the terminus of the aspectus of
the common sense.
6. The common sense acts and perceives the act of hearing.
7. The common sense directs its aspectus to the external world, perceives
the sound, and I wake up.

48Non igitur oportet quod una nobilis potentia pro quocunque obiecto etiam perfecte
videndo totalitatem suae virtutis suique aspectus ad ipsum solum dirigat, sed sufficit quod
sub tanta et tali mensura hoc faciat, quantum exigit natura illius potentiae et perfectio sui
actus et conditio sui obiecti. (Summa II q. 37, 669.)
49Cum aspectus sensus communis seu interioris totaliter avertitur ab obiectis et
actibus ipsius visus, tunc impeditur actus videndi. (Summa II q. 50 app., 54; emphasis
mine.)
50The common sense is capable of bringing about several acts at the same time, and
thus it can apprehend the perceptible qualities of different objects simultaneously. See,
e.g., Summa II q. 37, 66061; ibid., q. 79, 16162.
attention and the common sense 191

The sleeping person who wakes up to a loud noise is an extreme case


which shows clearly what kind of role the souls attention plays in Olivis
theory of perception. When we concentrate on perceiving a certain object,
we pay explicit intentional attention to it and our minds are focussed on
it, but at the same time the soul pays attention to everything around us to
a lesser degree. The idea of the various degrees of attention explains away
some of the problems in Olivis theory. External objects do not have to
act upon the soul in order to catch its attention, because the soul already
pays attention to its surroundings and is thus capable of perceiving every-
thing that happens in its vicinity. When we concentrate on perceiving one
thing, we may also perceive other things in a less intensive manner, and
we do not have to pay attention to a certain object in order to perceive
it because the general attentive state of our souls is sufficient to estab-
lish the connection between the object and the soul. In this way, Olivis
idea of the degrees of attention is crucial for understanding his theory of
perception. It also goes well with his discussion concerning second-order
perception, but that is an issue that will have to wait until we arrive at the
third part of this study.
Chapter eight

Bodily Changes and Perception

Olivis idea of the double aspectus of corporeal cognitive powersthat


is, his insistence that not only the eyes but also the power of sight have
to be directed towards the objects of sightand the emphasis he lays
both on the active character of perception and on attention as a neces-
sary condition for perception reveal an important tension in his thought.
When perception takes place, there are always two distinct yet intermin-
gled aspects at play. On the one hand, the organs of the body play some
kind of role in perception but on the other hand perception is an act of
the spiritual soul. Olivi accentuates the latter thread to the extent that
the role of the body becomes questionable. The organs of the body must
be appropriately directed in order to perceive, but it is not clear that they
have anything else to do with perception. According to Olivi, perception is
a psychological process that takes place in the powers of the soul and it is
not clear how exactly its dependence upon corporeal changes in the body
should be understood. Especially if we take into consideration Olivis con-
ception of the ontological superiority of the soul with respect to the body,
we may ask whether cognitive acts are dependent upon such changes in
the first place.
Approached from this perspective, it may seem that Olivis theory has
a kind of dualistic flavour. The sensitive powers of human beings are pri-
marily forms of the spiritual entity-like soul, and Olivi thinks that percep-
tual acts are realised principally in the soul and only secondarily in the
corporeal organs of the body. They pertain to the soul in a way that makes
them less dependent on the body than true hylomorphism requires. Per-
ception involves bodily changes in the organs, but it cannot be reduced
to these changes.1

1By bodily changes I mean any kind of movement of the corporeal matter out of which
the sense organs are made, including the spiritus animalis in the visual nerves and in the
organs. I prefer using the notion of bodily change (or sometimes physiological change)
instead of material or physical change, because it is not obvious what the notion of
physical would mean in a medieval context, and because according to Olivi, the changes
that take place in the soul are also material, as they are realised in the spiritual matter.
194 chapter eight

If this interpretation of Olivis view is correct, one might accuse him of


eclecticism: he tries to embrace hylomorphism and yet places even the
sensitive powers of the soul on a level that is distinct from the bodily
changes in the organs. But then again, eclecticism is a pejorative term
which serves only to conceal the originality of Olivis close-to-dualistic
anthropology. He thinks that when we perceive, we do not primarily
undergo a certain kind of bodily change but perform an act of the soul
which is in direct relation to the external world. It is our soul that per-
ceives, and even though it is united to our body, the role of the body
remains in the background. The direction of influence is crucial: acts of
the soul are realised as bodily changes but bodily changes are not realised
as acts of the soul. If it turns out that the organs of the body play either
no role at all or at least that their role is accidental for the functioning of
the powers of the soul, we must conclude that Olivis theory is suggestive
of dualism.
Although this problematic applies more clearly to human beings (who
are, in the end, the only bodily creatures who have a spiritual soul, accord-
ing to Olivi), my general impression is that the same tension between
bodily changes and acts of the soul can also be found in non-human ani-
mals. From the point of view of the metaphysics of the soul, human beings
and non-human animals are quite unlike each other. Yet the souls of non-
human animals have all the relevant properties (namely, simplicity and
activity) that cause the disparity between acts of the soul and their bodily
realisation, and this is why the question concerning the role of bodily
changes applies also to them, although with qualifications.
In the present chapter I shall argue that although Olivi wants to
secure the unity of a human being by emphasising the role of the body
in perception, he in fact comes close to a dualistic position. The cogni-
tive acts of the sensitive (part of the) soul are realised as bodily changes
but because they belong principally to the soul and only secondarily to
the body, the bodily changes are only accidental to them. Section one
shows that even though perception involves both bodily and psychologi-
cal aspects, the former are not necessary for perceiving. In section two
I return to Olivis theory of the connection between the soul and the body
(the via colligantiae) and show how he uses this concept to explain how
certain kinds of bodily changes may change the way in which the powers
of the soul function. The central claim of the section will be that even this
kind of connection does not account for perceptual acts. This second part
of the study is brought to an end by section three, in which I shall discuss
bodily changes and perception 195

Olivis conception of the possibility of disembodied perception. He argues


that after the human soul is separated from the body, it retains its ability
to perceive even though it no longer has bodily organs. Moreover, he gives
no plausible explanation for the fact that we need the body in order to
perceive in this life. I shall argue that the bodily changes do not have any
substantial role in the perceptual process, and in this sense Olivis theory
entails functional dualism.

1.Perception as a Psychological Process

In order to obtain a full understanding of Olivis conception of the mutual


roles of the bodily changes and the acts of the soul in perception, it will be
useful to relate his thought to a well-known scholarly dispute over Aris-
totelian philosophy of mind, launched by a seminal paper by Myles Burn-
yeat some twenty-five years ago.2 Burnyeats paper provoked a scholarly
discussion which focuses on the question of whether psychological acts of
the soul are based on physiological changes in the sense organs. Accord-
ing to Burnyeat, Aristotle maintains that when we perceive no material
change takes placeto use the standard example, the eyes do not turn
red when a person sees red colour, nor is there any other kind of physi-
ological change. By contrast, several other scholars (especially Nussbaum,
Putnam, and Sorabji) argue that in Aristotles view, psychological opera-
tions are realised in and by physiological changes.3

2Myles Burnyeat, Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft), in


Essays on Aristotles De anima, ed. M. Nussbaum & A. Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1992), 1526. I am using the 1995 paperback edition, which contains also Burnyeats fur-
ther defence of his view (M. Burnyeat, How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and
Hears Middle C? Remarks on De anima 2. 78, 42134).
3The litterature defending both sides of this dispute is voluminous. One may begin
with the following: Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997);
Martha Nussbaum & Hilary Putnam, Changing Aristotles Mind, in Essays on Aristotles
De anima, ed. Nussbaum & Rorty, 2756; Richard Sorabji, Intentionality and Physiological
Processes: Aristotles Theory of Sense-Perception, ibid., 195225; id., Aristotle on Sensory
Processes and Intentionality: A Reply to Myles Burnyeat, in Ancient and Medieval Theories
of Intentionality, ed. D. Perler, 4961; S. Marc Cohen, Hylomorphism and Functionalism,
in Essays on Aristotles De anima, ed. Nussbaum & Rorty, 5775; T.K. Johansen, Aristotle on
the Sense-Organs, Cambridge Classical Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998); Burnyeat
has further defended his reading of Aristotle in Myles F. Burnyeat, De anima II 5, Phro-
nesis 47:1 (2002): 2890. See also Sarah Broadie, Aristotles Perceptual Realism, in Ancient
Minds, ed. J. Ellis, 13759 (= The Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (1993) suppl.); Robert
Bolton, Perception Naturalized in Aristotles De anima, in Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in
Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji, ed. R. Salles (Oxford: Clarendon
196 chapter eight

The discussion has not concerned only Aristotles thought. From the
beginning, Aquinas has been paraded to support the cases of both sides.
Burnyeat, for instance, claims that when Aquinas depicts seeing as a spiri-
tual change which is not accompanied by a natural (naturalis) change,
his point is not to confine seeing to the sphere of mental (as opposed
to physical) but simply to deny that there is any kind of material change
in the eyes.4 The eye jelly does not become red when I see a red flag, and
there are no other material changes either. In modern parlance, cones and
rod cells would not have to fire and send a neural impulse to the brain.
Following Burnyeats reading of Aquinas, the only thing that happens in
the eyes is that the potency to see is actualised. The form of the eye (the
power of sight) changes from having the potency to see to actually seeing
the red flag. Burnyeat correctly points out that in the cases of touch and
taste there are also material changesfor example, my hand becomes hot
when I feel the heat of firebut these changes are only accidental to the
perception.5 By contrast, Nussbaum and Putnam argue against Burnyeat
that not only Aristotle but also Aquinas think that perception involves
some kind of physiological change in the organs of the senses.6 According
to their functionalist reading of the Aristotelian theory, perception and
other psychological operations are functions of the organs of the senses,
and they are necessarily realised as bodily changes.
It has been well established that Aquinas understood perception as a
process that takes place in the organs of the senses and does not belong
to the soul but to the composite of the sensitive soul and the body.7
Nowadays there is wide agreement that Aquinas understood perception
as a spiritual change which takes place in the sense organ. Precisely what
kind of change Aquinas had in mind is a more complicated issue.8

Press, 2005), 20944; Victor Caston, The Spirit and The Letter: Aristotle on Perception,
ibid., 245320. For further references, see ibid., 246, footnotes 37.
4Myles Burnyeat, Aquinas on Spiritual Change in Perception, in Ancient and Medi-
eval Theories of Intentionality, ed. D. Perler, 12953.
5Burnyeat, Aquinas on Spiritual Change, 13637. For a recent evaluation of Burn-
yeats position, see Yrjnsuuri, The Soul as an Entity, 5992.
6Nussbaum & Putnam, Changing Aristotles Mind, 5155.
7Sheldon Cohen pointed this out very convincinly in his article, which was written as
a reaction against an at the time prevailing interpretation which saw Aquinas as a rather
straightforward dualist. See Sheldon M. Cohen, St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial
Reception of Sensible Forms, The Philosophical Review 91:2 (1982): 193209. For the his-
torical background of Aquinas theory, see Tweedale, Origins of the Medieval Theory,
21531.
8Cohen proposes that it is a reflection of the object seen in the pupil, and Burnyeat
argues in favour of a formal change of the power of vision without a concomitant material
bodily changes and perception 197

Although this controversy does not directly touch Olivis thought, it


helps us to analyse his position concerning the role of the bodily changes
in perceptual process. Olivi seems to think that there is no straightforward
connection between bodily changes and perceptual acts of the soul, even
though it must be admitted at the outset that his view is not easy to com-
prehend. On the one hand, he admits that acts of perception are carried
by the spiritus animalis and thus he is more in line with Avicenna than,
for instance, Aquinas, whose intention seems to have been to challenge
Avicennas theory of perception, which was based on physiology.9 On
the other hand, however, he thinks that the bodily changes in the sense
organs and in the cavities of the brain are not efficient causes of percep-
tion. In the end, it seems that they do not have any role in perception, at
least not a direct one. Bodily changes of the sense organs are not essential
parts of perceptual acts. The overall picture one gets from a careful read-
ing of Olivis texts on the changes in the body and their relation to the
cognitive activity of the soul is that he conceives of perception primarily
as a psychological process that takes place in the spiritual soul. The soul
must act first (logically, if not in the temporal sense) and only then does
a bodily change in the organ take place. This leaves open the option for
bodily changes to be unnecessary in the end; we shall see below that in
the case of a separated soul Olivi draws this conclusion and says that the
body is necessary for perception only in this life. But even in this life its
role seems to be only secondary.
Olivis argumentation against the passive theories of perception is
especially revealing, because it shows that his own position differs from
both interpretations of the Aristotelian theory. There seems to be two
approaches available to passive theories: either external objects cause
bodily changes in the sense organs, and these changes are equal to the cog-
nitive acts of the soul; or external objects cause the cognitive acts directly

change in the eye. It has even been suggested that although Aquinas was certain that the
change takes place in the organ without involving any movement of the organs matter, he
did not develop an elaborate philosophical theory about the exact nature of the spiritual
change. (Cohen, St. Thomas Aquinas, 2069; Burnyeat, Aquinas on Spiritual Change,
149; Yrjnsuuri, The Soul as an Entity, 8081, respectively.) See also John Haldane, Aqui-
nas on Sense-Perception, The Philosophical Review 92:2 (1983): 23339. It needs to be
emphasised that even Burnyeat accepts this. He adheres to Cohens results but proposes
that even though the change takes place in the organ, it is not a material but a formal
change (Burnyeat, Aquinas on Spiritual Change, 130 & 149).
9Yrjnsuuri, The Soul as an Entity, 8081. Also Hasse states that Aquinas is not
interested in physiological aspects of psychology, so characteristic of Avicennas account
(Hasse, Avicennas De anima, 71).
198 chapter eight

in the powers of the soul without bringing about any bodily change. The
latter option is close to Burnyeats reading of Aquinas, and the former
can be interpreted in a functionalist way. We have seen that Olivi denies
the latter possibility, and although he acknowledges that external objects
cause some kinds of changes in our body, he does not concede that they
would be able to cause the kinds of changes in the organs which would
be realisations of cognitive acts of the soul or which would be equal to
cognitive acts in a functionalist way.
Olivis view is that the acts of the sensitive (part of the) soul are realised
as bodily changes. However, they cannot be in the organs unless they are
first in the soul:
Augustine says that the acts are received in the powers of the souls of ani-
mals because the organs are not susceptible to these kinds of simple acts
or species unless they are informed by simple powers for two reasons. The
first reason is: Since the acts are simple [...] the subject which receives them
must have substantial simplicity by which it can be prepared to receive and
to sustain them. This is the simplicity of the soul and its powers and the
simple imposition of the powers to the organs. [...] The other reason is: Pos-
terior forms which have a natural order and succession in relation to prior
forms cannot be received in matter unless the matter is first informed by
the prior forms. Similarly the acts [of the soul] can be received in the organs
[of the body] only insofar as the organs are informed by the powers [of the
soul] because of the natural order and succession which these acts have in
relation to the powers. In human beings the case is different because the
powers have a double matterspiritual and corporeal. Thus, as the pow-
ers exist principally in the spiritual matter and secondarily in the corporeal
matter, so the acts and species exist principally in the spiritual matter and
secondarily in the corporeal matter.10

10Dicuntur tamen ab Augustino recipi in earum potentiis, quia organa non sunt
s usceptiva huiusmodi actuum aut specierum simplicium, nisi prout sunt informata ipsis
potentiis simplicibus. Et hoc duplici ex causa. Quarum una est: Quia cum ipsi actus sint
simplices [...] oportet quod subiectum in quo recipiuntur habeat aliquam simplicitatem
substantialem per quam possit ordinari ad receptionem et sustentationem illarum. Haec
autem est simplicitas ipsius animae et potentiarum eius et simplex informatio organo-
rum ab eis. [...] Alia vero causa est: Quia sicut formae posteriores quae habent naturalem
ordinem et consequentiam ad priores non possunt recipi in materia, nisi prius sit informata
formis prioribus, sic nec actus possunt recipi in organis, nisi prout sunt informata ipsis
potentiis propter naturalem ordinem et consequentiam quam habent ipsi actus ad suas
potentias. In hominibus vero est aliter, quia ipsae potentiae habent duplicem materiam,
spiritualem scilicet et corporalem, et ideo, sicut ipsae principalius existunt in sua mate-
ria spirituali et secundario in materia corporali, sic et ipsi actus et species principalius
existunt in materia spirituali, secundario vero in corporali. (Summa II q. 58, 51213.) The
expression ipsae potentiae refers to the sensitive powers of the soul. This becomes clear
bodily changes and perception 199

The central idea in this passage is that the organs of the body cannot
receive the kinds of changes that are realisations of the cognitive acts of
the soul unless they are informed by the powers of the soul. It is not pos-
sible to cause simple changes in the organs directly without first causing
them in the power of the soul. The case of human beings is different in the
sense that the relation between the bodily changes and the psychological
acts is even more distant. The acts of the sensitive powers of the soul are
principally realised in the spiritual matter of the soul and only second-
arily in the corporeal matter of the bodily organs. Olivi also frequently
claims that the acts take place primarily in the powers and only second-
arily in the organs: For a cognitive act is primarily and immediately in
the power and not in the organ. This is why it cannot be in the organ in
any way unless the organ is informed by the cognitive power by a natural
priority.11
Olivi goes further and grants that the bodily changes are not necessary
for cognitive acts. In a somewhat puzzling passage he takes up a literal
interpretation of the nature of the bodily changes in perception. Accord-
ing to this interpretation the eyes turn red when a red object is seen, and
the tongue becomes sweet when it tastes a sweet flavour. Olivi presents
an argument against this view and says that light and colour change the
power of vision without any movement (absque omni motu). By contrast
to the power of sight, hearing sounds, smelling odours, and tasting fla-
vours involve bodily changes as well. However,
the sense is not changed in any of these four changes by the formal nature
(ratio) of its object in such a way that its organ would receive the name of
the object as if from a form that is produced (educta) in the organ and from
it; for we do not say that a tongue that senses sweetness becomes sweet or
that nostrils become odorous.12

from the context and also from the fact that the intellectual powers are not realised in
corporeal matter at all.
11 Nam actus cognitivus primo et immediatius est in potentia quam in eius organo,
unde nec in organo potest aliquo modo esse, nisi sit informatum per ipsam potentiam
cognitivam et hoc prius naturaliter. (Summa II q. 73, 83.)
12In nulla autem praedictarum quatuor immutationum immutatur sic sensus a for-
mali ratione sui obiecti quod eius organum denominetur ab illa tanquam a forma in se et
ex se materialiter educta; non enim dicimus quod lingua sentiens dulcorem sit facta dulcis
aut nares odoriferae. (Summa II q. 61, 576.)
200 chapter eight

The sense of touch is the only external sense that literally becomes like its
object: a hand becomes hot when it touches a flame.
The passage is puzzling since it is not absolutely clear whether it pres-
ents Olivis own stance or not. It comes from a question in which Olivi
discusses the plurality versus the unity of the sense of touch, and it is sup-
posed to prove that there is only one sense of touch: because all the vari-
ous kinds of objects that can be sensed by the sense of touch change the
organ of touch similarly, they have a common denominator and thus can
be apprehended by one power, and there is no need for several senses of
touch. It seems to me that Olivi accepts the unity of the sense of touch but
denies that this particular argument is capable of proving the unity. Thus,
I take it, the counter-arguments which he presents against the above line
of reasoning are the ones which he favours.13 In one of these counter-
arguments he says that bodily changes in the sense organs are not neces-
sary for the acts of the soul:
It is clear that a cognitive action and a change in the sense of touch are vital
and simple and belong to a different genus than that of any extended form
in this respect it is like an act of seeing and a change of vision. Therefore,
to assume the specific difference of the acts and the powers (to which these
acts belong) from the corporeal changes that are more or less circumstantial
to the act and to the power is to assume a cause from things that are acci-
dental. This is especially clear in the case of those who think that apprehen-
sive and cognitive acts of the senses (both external and internal) are brought
about by these powers themselves with their aspects which are fixed to
their objects in such a way that the objects do not take part in the process
other than by being the end-terms which bring to an end first the aspectus
of the power and then its cognitive act. In this case it is more clearly patent
that no cognitive act requires corporeal change.14
We can see that although Olivi does not present this view as his own, he
thinks that the redundancy of the bodily changes is an outcome of the

13Summa II q. 61, 57678.


14Constat autem quod cognitiva actio et immutatio sensus tactus est viva et sim-
plex et alterius generis ab omni forma extensa, sicut et visiva actio et immutatio visus.
Ergo specificam differentiam earum et suarum potentiarum assumere ex corporalibus
motibus plus vel minus circumstantibus hanc vel illam est assumere causam ex iis quae
sunt per accidens. Quod quidem maxime patet tenentibus apprehensivas et cognitivas
actiones sensuum tam exteriorum quam interiorum effici a potentiis ipsis cum determi-
nato aspectu earum ad sua obiecta, ita quod obiecta nihil ibi cooperantur nisi sub ratione
termini terminantis primo aspectum potentiae et tandem eius cognitivum actum. Tunc
enim clarius patet quod ad nullum actum cognitivum requiritur corporalis motus [...]
(Summa II q. 61, 577.)
bodily changes and perception 201

theory of perception that he defends elsewhere. According to him, the


acts of the sense of touch are vital and simple rather than bodily and
extended, and in this respect they are similar to acts of seeing. The bodily
changes are circumstantial, accidental, and unnecessary for the cognitive
acts of the soul.
This same distinction between psychological acts of the soul and
changes of the body that are concomitant to them applies also to non-
human animals, although the underlying metaphysical ground is differ-
ent. We have already seen that the animal soul is simple, and therefore
it cannot be acted upon by corporeal objects directly.15 Let me repeat a
central text:
A thing that generates the sensitive souls of brute animals can [act upon]
the powers of the soul in a similar way as it can [act upon] the substance
of the soul, namely, by producing (educendo) both of them from the matter.
But from the fact that it can produce both of them from corporeal matter, it
does not follow that it could directly influence either of them once they are
already produced. The reason for this is the following: it produces both of
them by influencing only the corporeal matter, and it influences them by a
corporeal aspectus and inflow. By contrast, it could influence the powers of
the soul (once they are already produced) only by a spiritual aspectus and
inflow. This influence would not be immediately directed and inclined to
corporeal matter. Rather, it would be primarily directed to the simple pow-
ers and to the simple substance of the soul. And the reason why it would be
a greater and higher thing to generate a cognitive act in the soul of a beast
than to produce the soul from corporeal matter is clear on the basis of this
argument.16
Let us pause here to see what Olivi says in this passage. First, he repeats
his idea that external objects may cause changes in the corporeal matter
of the body. In this case the external agent is semen or a celestial body,
and the effect it brings about is educing the soul and its powers from
corporeal matter. Second, he alludes to the distinction between being

15See chapter three above.


16Eo modo quo generans animam sensitivam brutorum potest in eius substantiam
potest et in eius potentiam, utramque scilicet de materia educendo. Sed ex hoc non sequi-
tur quod sicut potest utramque de materia corporali educere, quod sic in utramque iam
eductam possit directe influere. Cuius ratio est: quia utramque educit influendo solum in
materiam corporalem et hoc per aspectum et influxum corporalem, in potentiam vero ani-
mae iam eductam non posset directe influere nisi per aspectum et influxum spiritualem;
qui non esset immediate directus et inclinatus in materiam corporalem, immo prius et
potius in simplicem potentiam et substantiam animae. Et ex hoc ipso patet ratio quare
maius et altius esset generare actum cognitivum in anima brutorum quam sit ipsam edu
cere de materia corporali [...] (Summa II q. 72, 45.)
202 chapter eight

able to bring about changes in the body and doing the same in the pow-
ers of the soul. Even though external objects can influence the body and
its physiological constitution, they cannot act on the soul and therefore
cannot produce cognitive acts. In order to be able to do the latter, exter-
nal objects should exercise spiritual influence, but they are incapable of
doing that. The outcome is that external objects are not capable of caus-
ing changes in the spiritual powers of non-human animals, no more than
they are capable of causing them in the human soul.
Olivi notices a possible further counterclaim which clarifies the picture:
Perhaps it is objected that an act and a disposition (habitus) of a beasts
cognitive power are only in the corporeal matter of the power because the
soul of a beast has only corporeal matter. On the basis of this it seems that a
corporeal power can influence them. To this argument it must be replied
that a cognitive act and its disposition are connected by a natural priority to
the substantial form of the soul and to the cognitive power rather than to its
matter. For they can be received in the matter, especially in the corporeal
matter, only through a preceding and intermediate form of the soul and its
power, and matterespecially corporeal matteris not capable of receiv-
ing them otherwise. This is why a power that brings about this kind of act
and this kind of disposition must have an aspectus that is turned and lifted
directly to the substantial form of the soul and to the cognitive power as to
a primary and immediate subject of its influence.17
Although non-human animals have only corporeal matter of the body in
which the cognitive acts are realised, the central doctrine of Olivis theory
of perception applies also to them: external objects cannot affect the pow-
ers of the soul by causing bodily changes in the sense organs. This is true
irrespective of whether the soul is a form of the spiritual matter or not.
It is difficult to see what Olivi means by the idea of acting on the form
instead of acting on the matter which the form informs (or having an
aspectus directed to the form instead of directing it to the matter which
the form informs). We may assume that in the case of inanimate corporeal

17Sed forte obicietur quod actio potentiae cognitivae brutorum et eius habitus sunt
tantum in corporali materia eius, quia anima brutorum non habet materiam aliam nisi
corporalem; ex quo videtur quod possunt influi a virtute corporali. Sed ad hoc dicen-
dum quod actio cognitiva et eius habitus prius naturaliter cohaerent formae substantiali
animae et potentiae cognitivae quam suae materiae; nam non possunt recipi in materia
et praecipue in corporali nisi per praeviam et intermediam formam animae et suae poten-
tiae, nec materia, et praecipue corporalis, est aliter capax eorum. Et ideo virtus influens
huiusmodi actus et habitus oportet quod habeat aspectum directe conversum et elevatum
super substantialem formam animae et potentiae cognitivae tanquam super primum et
immediatum subiectum sui influxus. (Summa II q. 72, 4546; see also ibid., 83.)
bodily changes and perception 203

things this is impossible: the only way to alter the form of a statue is by
forging its matter. Olivi tells us, however, that animated beings are dif-
ferent from inanimate ones in this respect. The cognitive acts of living
beings can be realised in the corporeal matter of the body only insofar as
the body is informed by the soul. To use a familiar example, if an eye is
not informed by the power of sight, it is incapable of receiving an act of
seeing. From this Olivi concludes that the primary and immediate subject
of the act of seeing is the power of sight and that the act is realised only
secondarily in the corporeal matter of the eye. In order to bring about an
act of seeing, an external object should be able to actualise the potency to
see which is (in) the power of sight. But external objects cannot do this.
They can cause different kinds of changes in the eye but not the kind of
change that is a realisation of an act of seeing. Here we see again how the
direction of influence goes from the soul to the body: the activity of the
soul causes changes in the body and not vice versa.

2.Bodily Changes and colligantia potentiarum

By distancing perception from the bodily changes that take place in the
sense organs, Olivi diverges from a hylomorphist position according to
which acts of the sensitive powers of the soul are equal to bodily changes
in such a way that these two are only different descriptions of the same
phenomenon. However, although he places emphasis on the soul and its
powers, he admits that there is a difference between the corporeal powers,
which are actualisations of the bodily organs, and the intellectual powers,
which use no organs in their operations.18 The sensitive powers of the soul
are forms of their bodily organs, and they use their organs in their acts.
Olivi goes so far as to claim that the organs are necessary for the sensitive
powers.19 In question 58 of his Summa, he presents four different reasons
for their necessity. (1) First, the powers do not have complete existence
(existentia completa) without the organs. (2) Second, the aspectus and the
virtual reaching out of the powers are made proportional to the corporeal
objects by the organs. Olivi expresses this in a peculiar way: insomuch as

18For instance, the reason why he presents the idea of a double aspectus of the sensi-
tive powers is to make a distinction between the intellectual powers and the powers which
use corporeal organs in their operations (Summa II q. 67, 61819).
19Forma enim non potest ad aliud moveri vel applicari nisi per motionem suae mate-
riae, unde visiva non potest dirigi et converti ad visibilia exteriora nisi per motionem
quandam spirituum in quibus fertur et organi sui. (Summa II q. 51, 112.)
204 chapter eight

they are located in corporeal organs, they can have quasi-corporeal and
quasi-located aspects which are, in some way, proportional to material
objects (corporibus).20 He has in mind that the sensitive powers function
as if they were corporeal even though in reality they are spiritual powers.
For instance, I can see only those objects which fall within my visual field,
and this is because the eyes render my power of sight quasi-corporeal.
Olivis idea seems to be not only that the power of sight cannot func-
tion without the eyes but also that the corporeality of the eyes restricts
the scope of the power. If the power of sight were not actualised in the
corporeal eyes, it would be completely spiritual and as such capable of
seeing not only those objects which are within the visual field but also
every other visible object to which it directs its aspectus. The location of
external objects would not affect our ability to see them in any way. Since
the power of sight is actualised in the eyes, the location of visible objects
in relation to the eyes is an important factor in defining what we can and
do see, and the expression quasi-corporeal seems to refer to this: the
act of seeing is not corporeal, but it shares some features of corporeity
because of the physical organs in which it takes place. (3) The third reason
why the organs are necessary is that even though the matter of the organ
is not an efficient principle of the acts of the soul, it takes part (coefficit)
in the production of the acts, thus making the acts of the sensitive powers
perfect. (4) Finally, the fourth reason is that non-human animals do not
have spiritual matter, and therefore the matter of the organs is needed in
order to realise the acts of their powers.21
It is not clear why Olivi thinks that the first three reasons would prove
that the organs are necessary for the sensitive powers and their operations.
The first reason is closely related to an idea which was often repeated in
discussions concerning the resurrection of the body. In order to have a
complete existence, the soul must be reunited with its body, and for this
reason the body must be resurrected. In a similar vein, Olivi claims that
the sensitive powers of the soul need their organs for a complete existence
even though they remain in the soul even when it is separated from the
body. This idea fits well with the theological currents of the time, but it
does not establish philosophically that the organs are necessary.

20[...] pro quanto enim sunt sitae in organis corporeis, pro tanto possunt habere
aspectus quasi corporales et quasi situales et corporibus quodam modo proportionales.
(Summa II q. 58, 512.)
21 Summa II q. 58, 512. See also ibid., q. 72, 3033; q. 74, 11314; q. 111, 27273.
bodily changes and perception 205

The second and third reasons do not seem to be conclusive either if


we take into heed Olivis own idea about the possibility of disembodied
perception, about which I shall speak more below. As long as the soul is
united with the body, and the sensitive powers use their bodily organs in
their operations, they need the organs. When we live in this world and our
souls are united to our bodies, we do perceive in a quasi-corporeal way,
as Olivi puts it, but it seems that the organs are not an absolute neces-
sity after all. As we have seen, Olivis theory of perception may be taken
to entail that the powers of the soul are capable of functioning without
bodily organs. This is what Olivi himself says in another context: the sense
organs are necessary for the perfect functioning of the sense powers, but
the powers can function also without them.22 However, in question 58, in
which the four reasons are presented, he seemsin a circular wayto
take it for granted that our sensitive powers need their organs in order to
function as they do as long as they are actualisations of the organs. The
organs are necessary for the action that takes place in the organs, to be
sure, but that does not prove that they would be necessary for the powers
as such.
Yet, Olivi clearly struggles to account for the role of the organs. His
intention was never to distance the soul from the body to such an extent
that the body would turn out to be an unnecessary or even harmful vessel
and instrument for the soul.23 He is also reluctant to dismiss completely
the Avicennian idea about the spiritus animalis as a material basis for the
sensitive powers of the soul, received in the medical knowledge of the
timequite the contrary. Olivi readily favours that theory and clearly
thinks that the description of the movement of the bodily spirits in the
organs of the senses, in the nerves, and in the cavities of the brain is a
correct way of describing what happens in the body when a living being
perceives.
Hence, from time to time he states that the sensitive functions of the
soul are realised in the corporeal matter of the body. He writes for exam-
ple that:
The acts and the species exist principally in the spiritual matter and sec-
ondarily in the corporeal matter. For they are not in the spiritual matter
absolutely but only insomuch as they are ordered and connected to the cor-
poreal matter. This is why they [viz. the two kinds of matter] have a nature

22See section three below.


23See, e.g., Summa II q. 16, 336; ibid., q. 51, 119; Quodl. 5.11, 325.
206 chapter eight

(ratio) of one complete matter in respect to the substantial form of the soul
and in respect to the acts thereof.24
According to this passage, the acts of the sensitive powers are realised
both in the spiritual matter of the soul and in the corporeal matter of
the organs. In this respect, Olivi differs slightly from Aquinas who grants
that bodily changes (or, to use Aquinas own expression, natural changes)
occur in touch and taste but denies that they take place in the case of
other senses.25 Olivi believes that bodily changes are concomitant to all
sensations.
What Olivi is advancing, it seems to me, is that the order of change
is reversed compared to the Avicennian modelor to the Putnam-Nuss-
baum reading of the Aristotelian modelaccording to which an object
causes bodily changes in the organs of the senses, and these changes are
equal to the acts of perception, or at least the acts of perception are psy-
chological functions that are brought about by (or supervenient on) the
physiological changes.26 The direction of influence is, according to this
functionalist view, such that an external object causes a bodily change in
the sense organ, and the act of perception supervenes on this change. The
emphasis is on the bodily aspect.
Olivi approaches the issue from the opposite direction. For him the
forms are in many ways more important than the matter. The existence
and the operations of the soul are primary to the changes in the body.
The bodily changes should be understood as consequences rather than
causes of perceptual acts: The third reason [why natural heat consumes
radical humour] is that transmutations of the organs of the powers of the
soul follow from and are concomitant to the operations and passions of
the powers.27 The changes in the organs do not cause cognitive acts, and

24Ipsi actus et species principalius existunt in materia spirituali, secundario vero in


corporali; non enim sunt in materia spirituali absolute, sed prout habent ordinem et col-
ligantiam ad materiam corporalem. Unde ambae habent rationem unius materiae com-
pletae tam respectu formae substantialis ipsius animae quam respectu actuum suorum.
(Summa II q. 58, 513.) See also ibid., q. 51, 113; q. 111, 27273.
25ST I.78.3; QDA q. 13.
26For Avicennas medically orientated theory of vision, see Hasse, Avicennas De anima,
11927.
27Tertia ratio [quare calor naturalis consumit humidum radicale] est ex operationibus
et passionibus potentiarum ipsius animae, ad quas sequuntur et concomitantur transmu-
tationes variae organorum suorum. (Summa II q. 53, 215.) Olivi writes also that: Quemad-
modum enim est in praecedenti quaestione [q. 72] probatum, impossibile est quod aliquid
corporale directe influat in potentias animae, ita quod illa influentia primo et immediate
bodily changes and perception 207

cognitive acts cannot be reduced to bodily changes. Cognitive acts cannot


be said to supervene on physiological changes either because that way of
speaking places the causal picture upside down, so to speak. One can say
that even though Olivi grants the bodily realisations of the psychological
acts of the sensitive powers of the soul, he does not think that they are
central in accounting for those acts, since the spiritual basis of the acts of
the soul is already sufficient for that purpose.
However, he acknowledges that there is one way in which bodily
changes can affect the powers of the soul, namely, through the via col-
ligantiae.28 When he discusses the manner in which loud noises, bright
lights and similar objects may wake a sleeper up, he claims that:
These objects can also wake a human being up in another way because they
can cause corporeal impressions in the human body which are so power-
ful and vivacious that they change the body strongly, and these bodily
changes may be followed by a change in the power and its aspectus. For,
these authors readily admit that a bodily change may be followed by some
change in the powers of the soul through a natural connection (per natu-
ralem colligantiam).29
Olivi uses the concept of colligantia to account for the connection between
the soul and the body and the influence that bodily changes sometimes
have upon the powers of the soul. When a very loud noise goes off, it may
cause a bodily change in my ears, and the power of hearing is changed in
some manner as well. This kind of bodily change can indirectly result in
an act of perception because it draws the attention of the soul to external
objects.

recipiatur in ipsa potentia. Ergo si potentiae sensitivae apprehendunt per species ab


obiectis corporalibus influxas: oportebit quod primo et immediate recipiantur in organo
ipsius potentiae. Quod autem per tales non possit hoc fieri probatur multipliciter. (Ibid.,
q. 73, 83.) See also ibid., q. 58, 47980 & 496; q. 73, 46.
28See chapter two, section four above.
29Talia tamen obiecta per alium modum possunt hominem excitare, quoniam pos-
sunt facere corporales impressiones in corpus hominis sic fortes et vivaces quod ipsum
corpus fortiter immutabunt, ad quam immutationem poterit sequi immutatio in potentia
et in aspectu eius. Bene enim concedunt isti quod ad immutationem corporis potest per
naturalem colligantiam sequi aliqua immutatio in ipsis potentiis. (Summa II q. 58, 500.)
The intellect and the will, however, cannot be changed in this way: falsissimum est supe-
riores potentias mentis nostrae sic sequi variationes corporis et impressiones corporum
caelestium et elementarium aut ab eis diversimode immutari sicut inferiores potentiae
immutantur. (Ibid., q. 57, 369.)
208 chapter eight

We need to be careful, however. Olivi very clearly denies that the bodily
changes are tantamount to the acts of the soul. Robert Pasnau presents
Olivis idea neatly:
On his account, a flash of lightning will make a physical impression on our
eyes, and this physical impression can, through the via colligantiae, affect the
spiritual sensory powers. But, crucially, this connection is not what brings
about sensation. We see this flash, as opposed to receiving merely a physical
impression from it, when we direct our spiritual attention towards it.30
Bodily changes may draw our attention to the external objects that are
causing those changes, but they are not equal to perception. If we look
closely at the passages in which Olivi takes up the idea about the influ-
ence that bodily changes have on the soul, we see that he actually never
says that the changes could bring about a cognitive act. Due to the col-
ligantia between the soul and the body, certain kinds of bodily changes
alter the way the powers of the soul function, as, for instance, when the
imaginative power apprehends strange visions:
We can see that these movements [of the spiritual memory species] must
take place in the memory if we think of what happens in sleep, in frenzy,
and in similar states due to the various movements of the spirits in the
brain. When a multitude of vapours rise to the brain, diverse representa-
tions and new compositions of images that we have never seen or thought
of arise by way of the movement of these vapours. As the organic powers
undergo changes by way of the movement of their organs and the spirits in
which they are carried, it is no wonder that the memorative power is moved
and agitated spiritually by way of these movements.31
Dream images and illusions are brought about by the common sense when
it apprehends images that are stored in the memory.32 Even though the
images themselves are spiritual, they can be mixed with each other due to
the movements of the animal spirits in the brain. Importantly, Olivi does
not say that the movements of the spirits cause (let alone are equal to) the

30Pasnau, Theories of Cognition, 178.


31 Quod autem istos motus oporteat ibi poni videtur per ea quae contingunt in somnio
aut in phrenesi et consimilibus, quia spiritus diversimode commonvetur in cerebro;
sicut fit, quando multitudo fumositatum ascendit ad cerebrum, tunc ad commotionem
huiusmodi spirituum fiunt variae repraesentationes imaginum et novarum compositio-
num quas antea nunquam vidimus vel cogitavimus. Cum enim potentiae organicae ad
motum organorum suorum et spirituum in quibus feruntur per naturalem colligantiam
immutentur: non est mirum, si ad tales motus potentia memorialis moveatur et spirituali-
ter agitetur. (Summa II q. 58, 506.) See also ibid., q. 111, 274.
32See chapter thirteen below.
bodily changes and perception 209

cognitive acts of the soul. Instead, the movements of the spirits change
the images or representations.
Moreover, the bodily changes that lead us to perceive external causes
of these changes must be apprehended by the soul. Otherwise they do not
have an effect on us. But the bodily changes can be apprehended only if
attention is directed to the body and the changes that take place in it:
Note that a passion which is brought about by an impulse or a sound in
the sense cannot be perceived any better, unless the aspectus of the power
is turned towards it by a natural priority.33 The soul is able to apprehend
the changes in the bodyindeed, it is induced to apprehending them by
the via colligantiaebut to apprehend a bodily change is not equal to the
bodily change. I may apprehend the changes an object causes in my eyes,
but this apprehension is an act of the soul and the changes are but an
object for the act. Again, we see that there is a kind of distinction between
bodily changes on the one hand and perception of external objects on the
other. Even though the external objects are capable of indirectly produc-
ing some changes in our cognitive powers, these changes do not explain
our ability to perceive the objects or the bodily changes.

3.Functional Dualism in Perception

On the basis of the interpretation that I have presented above, we may ask
whether Olivis theory of perception involves a kind of functional dualism.
If perception belongs to the spiritual soul, and the bodily changes in the
organs of the senses are but concomitant to the acts of the soul, are we
not in a position to question altogether the role of the body in the process
of perception? As I see it, Olivi struggles to tackle this problem on two
fronts: he argues for the substantial union between the body and the soul
and claims that the acts of the sensitive part of the soul are realised in the
corporeal organs of the body. However, as he downgrades the role of the
body and acknowledges that the soul is capable of perception without
the body (see below), we can say that his theory of perception entails at
least a certain degree of dualism.
Although medieval philosophers were quick to reject flagrantly dual-
istic positions, Olivi is not the only one to espouse ideas which pave the

33Attende quod passio per impulsum vel sonum facta in sensu ita parum posset
sentiri et sentiendo adverti, nisi aspectus potentiae prius naturaliter esset conversus ad
ipsam. (Summa II q. 72, 27.)
210 chapter eight

way for the more radical substance dualism of the Early Modern period.
Especially the discussions concerning the relation between the soul and
the body contain threads that can be seen as anticipating later views. For
instance, some medieval authors, Olivi among them, questioned the inter-
action between the mind and the body in a radical way when they rejected
the possibility of material objects (including the body) to efficiently cause
anything in the spiritual soul. This position entails what can be called the
interaction problem. Another version of the mind-body problem that is an
integral part of medieval philosophy concerns the way in which the soul
and the body are united into one thing, a human being. The idea that the
soul is capable of existing without the body between the death of an indi-
vidual human being and the Day of Judgement was established as a part
of the Catholic faith during the twelfth century, and during the thirteenth
century there were debates concerning the different ways in which this
kind of possibility of a separate existence could be reconciled with the
emerging Aristotelian conceptions of the soul-body relation.34 To be sure,
the soul-body problem is not exactly the same as the mind-body prob-
lem since the medieval concept of anima is not identical to the modern
notion of mind.35 Still, there are important parallels between the modern

34For discussion, see Bazn, The Human Soul, 95126; Dales, The Problem of the Ratio-
nal Soul, passim.
35The medieval concept of mens does not convey the same meaning as the modern
term mind. In medieval philosophy, mens was often employedfollowing Augustinian
usageto denote the intellectual (and incorporeal) part of the human soul and its func-
tions, the intellect and the will (see trin. 14.19.26; De libero arbitrio, ed. W.M. Green, CCSL
29 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970) (hereafter lib. arb.), 1.89; Contra Academicos, ed. W.M. Green,
CCSL 29 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970), 1.2.5. In other words, the scope of the term mens is
stricter than that of mind because it does not include all mental processes, such as per-
ception or emotions. On the other hand, we cannot equate the modern concept of mind
with the medieval concept of anima either, because medievals attributed to anima func-
tions that we do not consider as mental: it accounts for vital functions such as growth,
nutrition, and reproduction. The scope of the term anima is broader than that of mind.
Understood in this way, mens is a part of the animaand mind is not identical with
either one of them. Rather, it crosses the medieval distinction by encompassing the func-
tions of mens and some functions of anima. (The confusion stems partly from Descartes
identification of mens and anima. See, e.g., Ren Descartes, Responsio ad quintas objectiones
(AT VII, 356).) For discussion, see, e.g., Robert Pasnau, The Mind-Soul Problem, in Mind,
Cognition, and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotles De anima, ed.
P. Bakker & J. Thijssen, Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007),
319; Hilary Putnam, How Old Is the Mind? in Words & Life, ed. J. Conant (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard UP, 1995), 37 (originally published in Exploring the Concept of Mind, ed.
R.M. Caplan (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1986)). ODaly, Augustines Philosophy
of Mind, 78; John P. Wright & Paul Potter, Introduction, in Psyche and Soma: Physi-
cians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment, ed.
J.P. Wright & P. Potter (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 9; Mary T. Clark, De Trinitate, in
bodily changes and perception 211

mind-body problem and medieval discussions concerning the soul-body


relationship.36
In addition to these ontological problems, medieval authors sometimes
addressed questions concerning the relation between bodily changes and
acts of the soul. It seems obvious to us post-Cartesians that sensations
(understood as a sort of mental process) and physiological states of the
body are different, whereas their connection is far from obvious. This is
why it seems natural to us that there is some kind of problem to be solved
in the relation between these two aspects of perception. Medieval authors
do not always see this relation as a philosophical problem, and this is why
it may seem that they do not recognise this version of the mind-body
problem. However, I have already argued that at least Olivi conceives of
bodily changes as being accidental to perception. From here it is only a
short step to ask whether the body is needed in psychological operations
at all, and it is easy to see how a position according to which there can be
sensations in the mind without the body verges on a radical separation of
the two and therefore to functional dualism.
Had medieval philosophers strictly followed Aristotelian hylomor-
phism, these problems would not have been difficult to solve; in fact, they
would not have been problems at all because (at least arguably) radical
hylomorphism does not face any of them. If the soul were understood as
being a hylomorphic form of the body and nothing else, the interaction
problem and the unification problem would vanish, since there would not
be two things that would influence, or be united to, each other. Moreover,
the existence of sensations would require the body because the acts of the
soul could not be independent from the bodily changes. However, we must
keep in mind that few (if any) medieval philosophers adhered to such a
radical version of hylomorphism because there was a strong Neoplatonic-
Augustinian undercurrent even in the case of such Aristotelian minds
as Aquinas. Thinkers from the Franciscan order especially were more
favourable towards notions of the soul-body relationship which could be
associated with some of the mind-body problems mentioned above. Even
though none of these problems were as acute to medieval philosophers

The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. E. Stump & N. Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge UP, 2001.), 97; John P. OCallaghan, Aquinass Rejection of Mind, Contra Kenny,
The Thomist 66 (2002): 1559; Henrik Lagerlund, Introduction: The Mind/Body Problem
and Late Medieval Conceptions of the Soul, in Forming the Mind, ed. Lagerlund, 34.
36See Henrik Lagerlund, Introduction, 2; id., John Buridan and the Problems of
Dualism in the Early Fourteenth Century, Journal of the History of Philosophy 42:4 (2004),
36987.
212 chapter eight

as they have been to philosophers in and after the seventeenth century,


it is rather easy to see how the Early Modern problems are deeply rooted
in medieval discussions.
Yet, it has been argued that the third version of the mind-body
problemthe one that problematises the relation between bodily changes
and mental operationsis neither ancient nor medieval. The most con-
vincing line of argumentation draws from the supposition that no pre-
modern thinker conceives of perception as a completely mental process.
Perception is or at least necessarily involves a bodily change. The mere
possibility of questioning the relation between perception and bodily
changes presupposes that perception can be taken to be something that
is completely separable from the body, and this idea did not appear before
the Early Modern period. Even medieval philosophers who acknowledged
that the soul can exist without the body denied the possibility of disem-
bodied perception. If a separated soul were to perceive, then perception
would be a non-bodily mental operation, and we would have a medieval
version of the mind-body problem, but it has been argued that medi-
evals did not open this door. Perception belongs to the compound of the
soul and the body, and it is not possible to have sensations without the
body.37
While it may seem that medieval thinkers were unanimous in their
insistence that the body is necessary for perceiving, it is clear that they

37Peter King, Why Isnt the Mind-Body Problem Medieval? in Forming the Mind, ed.
H. Lagerlund, 187205. King analyses several medieval theories of perception and points
out that none of them attribute perception to the soul by itself. He starts with Ockham,
continues with Scotus and Aquinas, and ends up with Augustine, who is (arguably) the
best candidate for being a medieval thinker whose thought entails the mind-body prob-
lem, given the dualistic flavour of his anthropological view. Ockham seems to recognise
the mind-body problem, but he does not accept the idea of a soul having perceptions
without the body. See William Ockham, Quodlibeta septem 2.10 (OTh IX, 158). See also
William Ockham, Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum (Reportatio) 4.9 (OTh VII,
162). The same basic idea applies also to Scotus (King, Why Isnt, 19396). Aquinas thinks
that a separated soul has its sensitive powers (see, e.g., QDA q. 19), but it cannot use them
without the body (see, e.g., ST I.77.8). Augustine thinks that perception involves bodily
processes and is necessarily realised in the body (an. quant. 23.41; cf. ibid., 48.) As we have
seen, Olivi refers to Augustines expression but thinks that it is not the correct definition
of perception (see chapter five, footnote 52). On the basis of his examples, King concludes
that: There is no room for disembodied sensation, and hence none for a mind-body prob-
lem, even in the Platonist tradition, even in the early Middle Ages. (King, Why Isnt, 203.)
See also Caroline Bynum, Why All the Fuss about the Body? A Medievalists Perspective,
Critical Inquiry 22:1 (Autumn 1995): 1314. With respect to ancient philosophy, see Wal-
lace I. Matson, Why Isnt the Mind-Body Problem Ancient? in Mind, Matter, and Method:
Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl, ed. P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), 92102.
bodily changes and perception 213

had the conceptual tools to raise and discuss the problem concerning the
relation of bodily changes and acts of the soul. Moreover, if my interpreta-
tion of Olivis theory of perception is correct, it represents a clear counter-
example to the claim that all medieval authors conceive of bodily changes
as being essential for acts of perception.38
To boot, Olivi explicitly and repeatedly claims that a separated soul
is capable of perceiving. He believes (and argues philosophically) that
the entire human soul is created by God. It is immortal and incorrupt-
ible, and also its sensitive powers remain when it is in a disembodied
state.39 To be sure, the continuation of the existence of the sensitive pow-
ers after the souls separation from the body does not prove that the soul
would be capable of disembodied perceptionAquinas, for one, thinks
that they remain when the soul is separated from the body, but he denies
that they could be used. Hence, the crucial question is: Does Olivi think
that the sensitive powers are capable of functioning in the absence of the
body? He addresses this problem in his Quodlibeta quinque, in a ques-
tion entitled: Is our intellect capable of seeing exterior sensible things
immediately without a sensitive act?40 It is important to note that he is
not dealing with the Aristotelian doctrine that the intellect has to work
on phantasms which are acquired through perception (the doctrine of
conversio ad phantasmata). Rather, what is at stake here is the intellectual
knowledge of particular objects, and literallyas can be seen from the
wording of the questionthe intellects ability to see (videre) or, more
generally, to perceive particular objects. The question presupposes that
the intellect is capable of apprehending particular perceptible objects,41
and it concentrates on the necessity of the sensitive powers and their
organs in the process.

38See Yrjnsuuri, The Soul as an Entity, 8889.


39See Summa II q. 51, 10135 (especially p. 118); ibid., q. 51 app., 15253; q. 52, 198206;
q. 54, 270.
40Quinto queritur an noster intellectus possit immediate uidere exteriora sensibilia,
absque omni actu sensitiue. (Quodl. 1.5, 1821.)
41 Olivi accepts intellectual cognition of particular objects. See Brub, La Connais
sance de lindividuel, 100106. The question of whether a separated soul can perceive was
discussed to some extent in the latter half of the 13th century. For example, Matthew of
Aquasparta allows the separated soul to receive information about particular objects of
this world, but he thinks that it receives the information directly by its intellect, with-
out the mediation of the sensory powers, because senses cannot function without their
organs. See Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones disputatae de anima separata, Bibliotheca
Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 18 (Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1959), q. 4,
6070.
214 chapter eight

A positive answer to this question would mean that the sensitive pow-
ers are unnecessary for acquiring perceptual information; it would mean
that I could perceive the mug on my desk by my intellect without using
my eyes or my power of sight. In his answer Olivi presents two differ-
ent positions, and even though he does not determine which of them
is correct,42 he accepts what they have in common, namely, the overall
idea that we need sensitive acts to perceive. The intellect is not capable
of seeing external objects without sensitive acts.43 According to the first
opinion:
No created intellect can apprehend anything corporeal without some medi-
ating act of some sensitive power which presents the corporeal object to the
intellect. But those who say this have no other reason than the fact that that
is what we experience in ourselves.44
The other opinion differs from the first one only because it allows angels
to perceive directly by the intellect and without the sensitive powers. It
is important that Olivi gives no explanation for the need of the sensory
powers. It is just an experiential fact.
The same idea applies to souls in a disembodied state as well. The cru-
cial passage goes as follows:
Because as long as the sensitive part [of the soul] is in the body, it is not car-
ried to (fertur) any object without the organs of its powers; this is why nei-
ther it nor the intellect, as long they are in the body, are capable of reaching
a perceived object (posse in obiectum expertum) without the organs of the
body. But when the rational soul together with its sensitive part is separated

42In Summa he seems to adhere to the latter view (see Summa II q. 67, 623).
43Pasnau refers to Quodl. 1.5 and claims that Olivi takes this virtual attention to such
an extreme that he is willing to allow that, theoretically, intellect should be able without
sensory mediation to perceive objects in the external world directly. (Pasnau, Theories of
Cognition, 171.) He can be praised of drawing attention to this important text, but he mis-
interprets it slightly. According to Olivi, the intellect is not able to perceive objects in the
external world directly because it needs the sensory powers of the soul; what it does not
need are the organs of the body. This becomes evident not only from Quodl. but also from
Olivis Summa. For instance, he states that: Manifeste enim et continue sentimus quod
intellectus noster nihil apprehendit de sensibilibus nisi apprehendendo aliquem actum
sensitivae qui tunc est in actu et per consequens obiectum illius actus. (Summa II q. 51,
122.) See also ibid., q. 67, 623.
44Nullus intellectus creatus potest aliquod corporale apprehendere, nisi mediante
aliquo actu alicuius potentie sensitive, per quem obiectum corporale intellectui offeratur.
Sed isti qui hoc dicunt nihil aliud pro se habent, nisi quia ita experiuntur in nobis. (Quodl.
1.5, 1920.)
bodily changes and perception 215

from the body, then it surely is capable of reaching material objects (in cor-
pora siue corpus);45 but it cannot reach them without its sensitive powers.46
It is an experiential fact that in order to perceive external objects in this
life we need not only the sensitive powers but also the bodily organs, Olivi
argues. But the case is slightly different after the soul is separated from
the body. We still need sensitive powers but we can perceive without the
body. The soul is capable of perceiving external objects and their percep-
tual qualities even in the disembodied state.
The same idea is presented also in Summa, in the appendix to ques-
tion 51, which is his response to Vital du Fours critique of Olivis theory
of the relation between the soul and the body. One of the objections that
Vital raises concerns the idea that the vegetative and sensitive forms are
forms of the spiritual matter of the soul. If they were, he claims, their
functions and operations would be realised in the spiritual soul and then
a disembodied soul would be capable of nourishment, growth, and sensa-
tion. Vital takes this to be an insupportable consequence.47
Olivi begins his answer by repeating the idea that the operations of the
sensitive part of the soul are realised both in spiritual and corporeal mat-
ter because the sensitive form informs them both. Moreover, he draws on
the idea that the sensitive powers cannot direct their aspects to corpo-
real objects without the aid of the corporeal organs:
And I give there an example concerning the brain and the organs of the
senses: namely, all active powers must be appropriately brought into con-
tact with their objects by adequate aspects before they can perform their
actions. But our sensitive powers do not have a sufficiently proportional

45It seems to me that the sentence would make more sense if the expression in cor-
pora sive coprus were in corpora sine corpore: the rational soul would be capable of
reaching material objects without the body. This is, after all, what Olivi is arguing for in
the passage. However, reading the passage as it stands does not change the fact that Olivi
clearly states that the soul is capable of apprehending sensible objects without the body
because that is just the presupposition he makes at the beginning of the sentence.
46Quia vero pars sensitiua quamdiu est in corpore ad nullum obiectum fertur absque
organis suarum potentiarum, ideo nec ipsa nec intellectus, quamdiu sunt in corpore, pos-
sunt in aliquod obiectum expertum sine organis corporis. Quando autem rationalis anima
cum sua parte sensitiua est separata a corpore, tunc quidem potest in corpora siue corpus;
non tamen potest sine suis potentiis sensitiuis. (Quodl. 1.5, 20.)
47Olivi paraphrases the argument as follows: Cum enim ista positio velit quod sen-
sitiva et vegetativa hominis sint formae materiae spiritualis, si rationes positionis sunt
bonae, sequitur quod communicabunt suas operationes suae materiae spirituali, et sic
materia spiritualis sentiet et nutrietur et augebitur. (Summa II q. 51 app., 154.) See Vital
du Four, De rerum principio q. 9, 41920; ibid., q. 11, 467.
216 chapter eight

aspectus towards sensible objects that are located in space (situalia) unless
they are virtually directed and brought into contact with them together with
their corporeal organs.48
Olivi undermines Vitals critique by appealing to the necessity of corporeal
matter. Hence, it seems that the soul needs the body in order to perform
the sensitive functions after all. But then comes a surprise, as he contin-
ues: And this is why our sensitive [part of the soul] does not have acts
outside the body as perfect as it would have with the glorious or imper-
ishable body, but it still has some act.49 The sensitive part of the soul has
acts that are more perfect when it informs some kind of body (either a
physical body which we have in this life or an incorruptible body of the
afterlife) than when it is completely without a body. Still, it can act in the
latter state as well. Olivi goes on to say that the functions of nutrition and
growth cease for good in the separation of the soul from the body, but
certain other functions of the vegetative part of the soul continue in the
disembodied state.50

48Et datur de hoc ibi exemplum in cerebro et organis sensuum: omnes enim potentiae
activae praeexigunt per debitos aspectus proportionaliter applicari ad sua obiecta ad hoc
quod possint agere suas actiones. Sensitivae autem potentiae nostrae non habent suffi-
cienter proportionalem aspectum ad obiecta sensibilia et situalia, nisi prout sunt cum suis
corporalibus organis virtualiter directae et applicatae ad illa. (Summa II q. 51 app., 155.)
49Et hinc est quod sensitiva nostra non habet extra corpus ita perfectos actus sicut
haberet cum corpore glorioso vel incorrupto, habet tamen aliquem actum [...] (SummaII
q. 51 app., 155; emphasis mine.) See also ibid., q. 111, 280; Summa IV q. 21, 167 (Maranesi,
q. 9); ibid., q. 24, 18182 (Maranesi, q. 12). The idea that a separated soul can perceive and
suffer pain gets a literary expression in Dante Alighieris La divina commedia. Dante, see-
ing that the souls of the damned suffer in Inferno, asks Vergil whether their suffering is
increased after they receive their bodies on the Day of Judgement:
At which I said: And after the great sentence
o masterwill these torments grow, or else
be less, or will they be just as intense?
And he to me: Remember now your science
which says that when a thing has more perfection
so much the greater is its pain or pleasure.
Though these accursed sinners never shall
attain the true perfection, yet they can
expect to be more perfect then than now.
(Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri, Inferno, trans. A. Mandelbaum
(New York: Bantam Books, 2004), 6.10611.) Vergil refers to a scientific view that the union
with the body makes perception more perfect but importantly it is possible even without
the body as the fates of the damned testify. For a discussion, see Yrjnsuuri, The Soul as
an Entity, 6267.
50Actus autem nutritionis et augmenti non est perpetuus, alias esset in corporibus
beatorum [...] Sed vigorose vigere et vivere est intrinsecus et perpetuus actus vegetati-
vae, et hunc quidem radicalius habet in sua materia spirituali quam in corporali [...]
bodily changes and perception 217

Olivi paraphrases and refutes altogether four of Vitals arguments which


are designed to prove that a disembodied soul cannot perceive.51 The first
argument is based on a supposition that perception involves sensible spe-
cies which are not simple but extended. As a separated soul is simple and
does not have extension, it cannot receive anything extended. From this,
Vital concludes that a disembodied soul cannot receive sensible species
and therefore cannot perceiveunless it is extended, which is impossi-
ble. As we have seen, Olivi rejects many fundamental features of this argu-
ment, but his reply in this connection is not based on his critique against
the sensible species. He simply points out that Vitals argument necessar-
ily involves a total denial of the ability of a separated soul to apprehend
particular objects, and he seems to think that this is insupportable from
the point of view of both his own theory and the species theories. Even if
perception were to take place through sensible species, they would neces-
sarily be simple and unextended and therefore Vitals objection does not
hold.52
In the second argument Vital claims that the sensitive power of the
soul receives a kind of contraction (arctatio) from the body and from vari-
ous organs of the senses. This contraction accounts for the fact that the
soul apprehends different kinds of objects through different senses. For
instance, the eyes render the perceptual power capable of apprehending
visible qualities. When the soul leaves the body, it loses this contraction
which it had received from the body, and it cannot perceive without it.
Olivi objects to this argument by claiming that the soul and its powers
cannot receive any contraction from the body and that the operations of
the soul are not different in kind when the soul is in the body from when
it is outside the body.53
The third argument asserts that human perception would be utterly
different from animal perception if the sensitive part of the human soul
could perceive in a disembodied state. We would not perceive in a similar
way as other animals do, and consequently the sensitive powers of the
human soul would be completely different from those of other animals.

(SummaII q. 51 app., 15556.) In ibid., q. 71, 640, he adds the function of procreation. The
only vegetative function that remains is vivification.
51 Three of the arguments are paraphased in Summa II q. 51 app., 157, and the fourth in
ibid., 196. The arguments do not exactly match with those presented in De rerum principio,
probably because Olivi did not read them directly from Vitals text, as he admits in the
beginning of his answer (ibid., 136).
52Summa II q. 51 app., 15758; Vital du Four, De rerum principio q. 11, 468.
53Summa II q. 51 app., 15759; Vital du Four, De rerum principio q. 11, 477.
218 chapter eight

Human beings and beasts would be called animals only equivocally.54


In other words, there would not be a psychological continuity between
human beings and other animals. Vital thinks that this is a genuine
problem, and this compels us to conclude that a separated soul cannot
perceive. This argument is a reductio ad absurdum, to be sure, but it is
intriguing that Vital and Olivi raise the possibility that human beings
could be conceived of as creatures which are not animals in the same
sense as irrational beasts.
Olivi responds to the third argument with a counter-attack. He points
out that the problematic consequence applies more to Vitals concep-
tion of the human soul than his own. Namely, Vital argues that there is
no metaphysical difference between the sensitive and intellectual parts
of the soul. Given that the intellectual soul is the form of the body and
bestows not only the intellectual but also the sensitive and vegetative
functions, the sensitive powers of a human being are grounded on an
intellectual bedrock. Olivi insists that this makes the disparity between
human beings and other animals far wider than what is implied by his
own theory. After this argument he lays out his own view, which is worth
citing in its entirety:
Moreover, we say that the acts which our sensitive [part of the soul] has
with and without an organ do not differ in species if they are about the
same formal object and from the same power; for, the acts do not receive
their species from the organ but from the power and the object. Moreover,
a human being differs more from every species of brute animal than from
the proximate genus because all the brutes come together in the genus of
irrational animals, but the human being is not in the genus of the irrational.
And perhaps perfect brute animals differ from imperfect animals by another
proximate genus as wellfor instance, from worms and shellfishand per-
haps fish, birds, and quadrupeds differ from each other by some proximate
genus. Therefore, there is no inconsistency if the acts of our sensitive [part
of the soul] are in some way very unlike the acts of brutes; rather, the greater
difficulty is how they converge so much that they seem to be specifically
the same actions in some way. Moreover, the action of a sensitive power
remains specifically the same both when it is separated from and when it

54Quia si sensitiva hominis differt tantum a sensitiva bruti quod una possit sentire
sine organo corporali, reliqua vero non, tunc videtur quod animal non possit de eis uni-
voce praedicari; quia istae actiones, in quantum tales, different genere ac per consequens
et essentiae potentiarum suarum. (Summa II q. 51 app., 157.) Vital du Four, De rerum
principio, q. 9, 420.
bodily changes and perception 219

is connected with [the body] for the same reason that the power remains
specifically the same.55
Olivis strategy is to argue first that the essence of the cognitive acts is not
affected in any way by the organsnot even in the case of non-human
animals. Perceptual acts which take place in the organs are exactly similar
to those which are not realised in an organ, and therefore it is possible that
animals perceive in the same way as we do, even though our perceptual
acts do not necessarily need the sensory organs. Then he continues by say-
ing that human perception may differ essentially from animal perception
because human beings belong to the genus of rational animals whereas
other animals are irrational. He acknowledges that the metaphysical dif-
ference may yield a fracture in the psychological continuity. On the other
hand, he does not think that beasts should be conceived of as a homog-
enous group either. There may be significant differences between differ-
ent species of animals, even to the extent that they should perhaps be
regarded as belonging to different genera. One should not consider it a
problem that the way we perceive differs from the way other animals per-
ceive. Rather, it seems difficult to find a common feature between animals
and human beings in the processes of perception, a feature which would
explain why these two groups are regarded as similar percipients.
Olivi seems to be willing to allow a radical difference between human
beings and other animals if it turns out to be necessary for achieving other
goals. He concedes that animals may perceive differently than we do
because he wants to uphold the metaphysical difference between human
beings and non-human animals. However, as we have seen in chapter three,
he thinks that the animal soul is simple and thus functionally similar to
the human soul. Even though he admits the possibility of a psychological
dissimilarity, his general tendency is to conceive of non-human animals
as having sophisticated psychological capacities which are similar to ours.

55Praeterea, dicimus quod actus quos habet nostra sensitiva cum organo et absque
organo non differunt specie, si sint eiusdem obiecti formalis et eiusdem potentiae; non
enim sumunt speciem suam ab organo, sed a potentia et ab obiecto. Praeterea, homo dif-
fert a qualibet specie bruti plus quam genere proximo, quia omnia bruta conveniunt in
genere animalis irrationalis, homo autem non subest illi generi irrationali, et forte anima-
lia brutorum perfecta differunt adhuc alio genere proximiori ab imperfectis, puta, a vermi-
bus et conchilibus, et forte pisces et aves et quadrupedia differunt ab invicem alio genere
proximiori. Non est ergo inconveniens, si actiones nostrae sensitivae habeant quoad aliqua
maximas differentias ab actionibus brutorum; quin potius maior est difficultas quomodo
tantum conveniunt ut quoad aliqua videantur esse eaedem actiones specie. Praeterea, qua
ratione potentia sensitiva manet eadem specie separata et coniuncta, eadem ratione et
actio sua. (Summa II q. 51 app., 15960.) See also ibid., q. 72, 46.
220 chapter eight

The first argument in the previous passage captures his position well: we
are essentially different from other animals, but that does not mean that
there would be psychological differences. Perception is an active process
which requires the subject to pay attention to the external world. This is
true whether or not the perceiving subject has an incorporeal soul, and
therefore Olivi does not deviate from the principle of psychological con-
tinuity: as regards to perception as a psychological process, differences
between human beings and other animals are not significant, if they exist
at all. He thinks that we resemble other animals to a great degree, at least
as long as we live in this world with our physical bodies.
Finally, the fourth argument that Olivi paraphrases claims that if the
sensitive powers function without the body when the soul is separated
from it, the organs of the body are also unnecessary when the soul is
united to it. Moreover, if the activity of the sensitive powers of the soul
does not require realisation in the corporeal organs of the body, there is
no reason for their lack of freedom and self-reflexivity. The idea behind
this argument is that the intellectual powers of the soul are free and self-
reflexive because they are not limited by the laws of corporeity, and the
sensitive powers are unfree and incapable of self-reflexivity because they
are limited by their corporeal matter. Olivis answer conforms to his other
counterclaims. The body is needed to perfect the sensitive operations,
and the fact that sensitive powers are not capable of reflexivity is princi-
pally due to the essence of those powers themselves and only secondarily
caused by their organs. The soul needs the body in this life, but in prin-
ciple it can perceive without the body.56

56Summa II q. 51 app., 196. Olivi combines two arguments from De rerum principio q. 11,
46768. It is of some importance that he does not consider experiencing pain as an excep-
tion. King argues that medievals understood pain as a product of a damaged or overloaded
sense-organ and, as such, no more mental than any other object of perception (King, Why
Isnt, 2045). Also Bynum claims that medieval thinkers: would not have understood the
question (frequent in modern circles): Is pain in my body or in my mind? (Bynum, Why
All the Fuss about the Body? 14.) I am inclined to think, however, that Olivi would have
understood the question. As we have seen, he thinks that a separated soul is not only
capable of perceiving corporeal fire but also suffering pain caused by the perception of
fire. Pain is not confined to the compound of the soul and the body because it does not
require harmful changes in the body. It does not require the body at all, and thus it is a
mental feeling which accompanies certain kinds of perceptions. (Summa IV q. 19, 14963
(Maranesi, q. 7).) Olivi is in line with the condemnations of 1270 and 1277, which prohibit
asserting: Quod anima post mortem separata non patitur ab igne corporeo and Quod
anima separata nullo modo patitur ab igne (condemned teachings #8 (1270) and #19
(1277), respectively). See Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle & . Chate
lain, vol. 1 (Paris, 1889), 48687, and tienne Tempier, Articuli condempnati a Stephano
bodily changes and perception 221

Olivi provides a clear and explicit counter-example to the claim that


medieval authors rejected the possibility of disembodied perception. He
not only tacitly allows for it by shifting the emphasis of the theory of
perception from the bodily processes to the activity of the soul but also
explicitly argues for it. Perception is a psychological process, and it takes
place in the spiritual soul. The soul is an independent entity which is not
only capable of existing without the body but also of exercising its func-
tions in the absence of the body. Olivi does not appeal to changes in the
body in the process of perception, and even though he thinks that acts of
the sensitive powers of the soul are realised in the physical organs, such as
movements of the spiritus animalis in the sense organs and in the cham-
bers of the brain, perception and other sensitive acts are not dependent
on these changes.
One of the reasons why Olivi defends the view that disembodied per-
ception is possible is his conviction that the soul must be capable of
apprehending particular objects after it has ceased to be united with the
body. This conviction is undoubtedly related to the theological doctrines
of purgatory and hell, where people are supposed to entertain their past
sins. They must be able to apprehend their past actions which are par-
ticular and related to particular objects. However, Olivi also seems to
have philosophical reasons for underlining the possibility of disembodied
perception (after all, being able to remember ones sins would suffice in
purgatory). He was an acute philosopher who undoubtedly understood
his own theories. His theory of perception entails the redundancy of the
body, and when he allows for disembodied perception to take place, he
may just be drawing the necessary implications from his own view.
In this way, Olivi defends a position which questions the relation
between bodily changes and cognitive acts in such a way that his position
may be said to entail functional dualism. It is important to note, however,
that he does not seem to think that there is some kind of mind-body
problem lurking in his theory. He allows the separated soul to perceive,
and does not give any plausible explanation for the necessity of the body
in perception in this life, but he does not consider the relation between

episcopo Parisiensi anno 1277, in La Condamnation Parisienne de 1277, ed. D. Pich, Sic et
non (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 84. To be sure, Olivi is not alone in accepting this view but he seems
to be quite unique in his insistence that the soul is in pain which is in principle just like the
pain we undergo when our corporeal body is damaged. For discussion, see Ren Antoine
Gauthier, Notes sur Siger de Brabant, Revue des sciences philosophiques et thologiques,
67 (1983): 21726; Luca Bianchi, Guglielmo de Baglione, 50320. For Olivis conception of
the perception of pain, see Toivanen, Animal Action, 42032.
222 chapter eight

the powers of the soul and the body in the sensitive functions as a central
philosophical problem that should be addressed and solved. There is a
tension within his thought, but he pays little theoretical attention to it.

Olivis theory of perception is an original attempt to explain how we come


to know external reality. It is ultimately based on an ontological hierar-
chy between the spiritual soul and corporeal objects. Perception is not a
passive process, because external objects cannot play a causal influence
upon the powers of the soul. Rather, it is an active process in which the
soul pays attention to its surroundings and forms in itself an intentional
act that is directed towards an external object. Although Olivis theory
leans heavily to his understanding of the spiritual nature of the soul, the
differences between the perceptual process in non-human animals and
in human beings are minor. The metaphysical difference does not trans-
late into a psychological one, and non-human animals perceive much in
the same way as we dothe only difference is that human beings are
capable of perceiving without the body when the soul is disembodied. On
the other hand, the dualism between the spiritual soul and the extended
corporeal body and the diminished role of the body in perception can be
seen as a step towards a more radical separation of human beings from
the rest of the bodily creatures, a separation that is visible also at the
sensitive level.
Part Three

Internal Senses
Introduction to part three

Human beings are capable of much more complex psychological opera-


tions than simply perceiving the perceptual qualities of external objects.
Even if we leave out intellectual understanding, there are a variety of psy-
chological operations which are not immediately dependent on percep-
tion. For instance, we can imagine and remember all kinds of things even
when they are absent. We also apprehend external objects as frightening
and harmful or as tempting and useful, and our actions are often moti-
vated by such apprehensions.
Medieval authors think that at least the higher animals are capable
of these kinds of psychological operations as well. By observing animals
actions we see that sheep cower from wolves, dogs wave their tails when
they see their masters, birds gather twigs to build nests, cats prey upon
mice, and so forth. Sometimes these actions are accounted for by appeal-
ing to instincts implying that psychological activity might not exist behind
the observed action, but medieval philosophers did not think in this way.
Rather, they took it that there is an affinity between the psychological pro-
cesses which they attributed to human beings and non-human animals.
If human action is accounted for by appealing to psychological processes,
the same approach must be applied to non-human animals. And this was
precisely what they did: not only perception but also the higher cogni-
tive functions were attributed to non-human animals and these functions
were often understood to be identical to those of human beings. Animals
act as they do because they can picture absent objects in their minds and
remember things they have seen before. Pets and domestic animals rec-
ognise their owners and keepers, and they perceive external objects in
a way that causes them to pursue or flee, and this seems to be possible
only if they perceive something in addition to the perceptual qualities:
they apprehend things with respect to their own well-being, and they
regard some things as useful and tempting, while others appear harmful
and repulsive.
In the thirteenth century, the discussions concerning the higher cog-
nitive functions of the soul were conducted by using the technical term
internal senses (sensus interiores). These powers of the soul are not inter-
nal in the sense that they would provide perception of something that is
inside the subject; rather, they account for post-sensory psychological pro-
cesses which enable the subject to be aware of features of external things
226 part three

that go beyond perceptual qualities and to detach from the immediate


perception of things that are present. The seemingly rational action of ani-
mals was accounted for by appealing to the internal senses, which process
further the raw information received from the external senses. They form
a loose hierarchy, in which a higher power processes the information
it receives from a lower power. The hierarchy is not metaphysical but
refers to the order in which different internal senses come into play in the
process of acquiring information from the external world. Another impor-
tant underlying idea in medieval discussions was that for every distinct
function there is a power of the soul which performs that function. When
medievals discussed psychological functions or capacities, they usually
attributed them to distinct powers of the soul.
These ideas were developed over a long period of time, beginning from
the first suggestive remarks made by ancient Greek philosophers and
ranging all the way to medieval Arabic thinkers, especially to Avicenna.
They were transmitted to Latin philosophy through the translations of
Arabic and Greek philosophical and medical texts, and they influenced
Latin discussions especially in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The
historical background of the medieval Latin theories of the internal senses
is dealt with in chapter nine, which summarises general features of the
discussions from before the latter half of the thirteenth century and pro-
vides an overview of the theoretical context in which Olivi developed his
theory of the internal senses.1

1Earlier studies on theories of the internal senses include the following: Harry Austryn
Wolfson, The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophic Texts, in Studies
in the History of Philosophy and Religion, vol.1, ed. I.Twersky & G.H.Williams (Cambridge
Mass.: Harvard UP, 1973), 250314 (Originally published in Harvard Theological Review 28
(1935): 69133); Pierre Michaud-Quantin, La classification des puissances de lme au XIIe s.,
Revue de moyen-ge latin 5 (1949): 1534; George Klubertanz, The Discursive Power: Sources
and Doctrine of the Vis Cogitativa According to St.Thomas Aquinas (St.Louis: Modern
Schoolman, 1952); Pierre Michaud-Quantin, Une division augustinienne des puissances
de lme au moyen ge, Revue des tudes Augustiniennes 3 (1957): 23548; Nicholas Ste-
neck, The Problem of the Internal Senses in the Fourteenth Century (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1970);
id., Albert the Great on the Classification and Localization of the Internal Senses, Isis 65:2
(1974): 193211; Harvey, The Inward Wits, 161; de Libera, Le sens commun, 47596; Janet
Coleman, Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge UP, 1992), 34662; Deborah Black, Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna:
The Logical and Psychological Dimensions, Dialogue 32 (1993): 21958; Simon Kemp &
Garth Fletcher, The Medieval Theory of the Internal Senses, The American Journal of
Psychology 106:4 (1993): 55976; Dorothea Frede, Aquinas on Phantasia, in Ancient and
Medieval Theories of Intentionality, ed. D.Perler, 155183; Richard Taylor, Remarks on
Cogitatio in Averroes Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, in Averroes
and the Aristotelian Tradition, ed. G.Endress & J.A.Aertsen (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 21755;
introduction 227

In chapter ten I shall turn to Olivis view. There are two places in the
second book of Olivis Summa which are explicitly devoted to the internal
senses. The first is a short section in question 58, and the other comprises
questions 6366.2 The former section is short, and its central ideas are
developed more fully in the latter group of questions: both repeat basi-
cally the same arguments, and both deal with the same set of powers.
They are the following:
1. The common sense
2. Imagination
3. Memory
4. The estimative power
5. The cogitative power
There are two characteristic features that emerge from Olivis discus-
sion concerning these powers. First is that he sees almost no difference
between various species of animals with respect to the internal senses:
mice and men are similar to each other. In this respect he differs from,
for example, Avicenna and Aquinas, who think that human beings have
a different set of internal senses than non-human animals. For Olivi, all
animals are the same, and even though simple animals (worms and the
like) may be less capable of using their powers, the powers are essentially

Deborah Black, Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transforma-
tions, Topoi 19 (2000), 5975; Hasse, Avicennas De anima, 12754; Peter Sobol, Sensations,
Intentions, Memories, and Dreams, in The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John
Buridan, ed. J.M.M.H.Thijssen & J.Zupko (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 18398; David Bloch, Aris-
totle on Memory and Recollection: Text, Translation, Interpretation, and Reception in West-
ern Scholasticism, Philosophia Antiqua 110 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 137228; Carla Di Martino,
Memory and Recollection in Ibn Sns and Ibn Rushds Philosophical Texts Translated
into Latin in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries: A Perspective on the Doctrine of the
Internal Senses in Arabic Psychological Science, in Forming the Mind, ed. H.Lagerlund,
1726; Heller-Roazen, The Inner Touch, 31162; Jari Kaukua, Avicenna on Subjectivity: A
Philosophical Study, Jyvskyl Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 301
(Jyvskyl: University of Jyvskyl, 2007), 2630, 3569; Jari Kaukua & Taneli Kukkonen,
Sense-Perception and Self-Awareness: Before and After Avicenna, in Consciousness, ed.
S.Heinmaa et al., 95119; Toivanen, Peter Olivi on Internal Senses, 42754; Rega Wood,
Imagination and Experience in the Sensory Soul and Beyond: Richard Rufus, Roger Bacon
& Their Contemporaries, in Forming the Mind, ed. H.Lagerlund, 2757; Carla Di Mar-
tino, Ratio particularis: Doctrines des sens internes dAvicenne Thomas dAquin, tudes
de philosophie mdivale 94 (Paris: Vrin, 2008); Daniel Heller-Roazen, Common Sense:
Greek, Arabic, Latin, in Rethinking the Medieval Senses: Heritage, Fascinations, Frames, ed.
S.G.Nichols, A.Kablitz & A.Calhoun (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 2008), 3050.
2SummaII q. 58, 50811; ibid., q. 6366 & 596614. According to Piron, question 58
dates from the end of 1270s and questions 6366 from the beginning of 1280s.
228 part three

the same. And in the case of higher animalsdogs, snakes, humans,


and the likeOlivi seems to think that there are no differences at all.
The other characteristic feature of Olivis view is that he argues for the
unity of the internal senses.3 There is only one internal sense, the common
sense, which accounts for all the different psychological functions that
were commonly attributed to distinct powers. However, despite Olivis
willingness to deny the existence of several post-sensory powers in the
sensitive soul, he does not think that the existence of the higher cogni-
tive functions of the sensitive soul should be rejected. The sensitive soul
provides a set of functions which cannot be identified with each other:
perceiving is not the same thing as imagining, and both of these differ
from remembering. These functions differ from each other from a phe-
nomenological and a psychological point of view even though they are
brought about by one and the same power, the common sense.
The phenomenological difference is evident upon short introspection:
an experience of perceiving a mouse differs from an experience of imagin-
ing one. Both of these operations are unlike remembering, and all of them
may or may not be accompanied by an estimation of the mouse either
as desirable or detestable (depending on whether the subject who imag-
ines the mouse happens to be a cat or someone who is afraid of mice).
Moreover, Olivi thinks that all of these functions are realised by different
kinds of acts of the common sense. They result from different psychologi-
cal processes, and although Olivi denies the differentiation of the powers,
he provides a detailed analysis of these processes.
Chapter ten is devoted to Olivis conception of the unity of the internal
senses and to the philosophical reasons for denying their plurality. We
shall see how he regards the traditional criteria which were commonly
used to make distinctions between different cognitive powers of the soul,
and what kind of criteria he applies in his own theory. I shall also present
an interpretation of two main philosophical reasons for Olivi advancing
the thesis about the unity of the internal sensesthe interconnectedness
and the experiential unity between various psychological processes. They
grow out of the fundamental idea behind faculty psychology: powers of
the soul operate with relative independence in relation to each other, and
they perform certain clearly defined functions. Olivi points out that these

3Duns Scotus makes a similar claim (Steneck, The Problem of the Internal Senses,
12023). This may reflect Olivis influence on him.
introduction 229

functions are necessary parts of certain complex psychological processes,


and as such, they have to be connected to each other. He also emphasises
that we do not experience that we perceive by one power and estimate
the perceived thing as harmful by another. Rather, we have an experience
of estimative perception. Various functions are parts of a unitary experi-
ence, and Olivi thinks that this interconnectedness and experiential unity
must be accounted for by attributing all the higher cognitive functions of
the sensitive soul to one single power, the common sense.
The question about the unity of the powers of the soul may appear
idiosyncratic. It seems obvious to us that all our psychological functions
have some kind of unity because they are all understood as operations
of the unitary mind. If we follow this basic Cartesian assumption (as I
believe we do), the whole question of unity becomes pointless: different
kinds of psychological acts are interconnected and experienced as unitary
because they are acts of the same mind. By contrast, the unity versus mul-
tiplicity of the powers of the soul is an important question in the medieval
framework. Medieval authors accepted the idea that different psychologi-
cal functions are actualisations of different powers, and it is not obvious
how they are interconnected and experienced as unitary, as belonging to
one and the same subject. It was a philosophical question that needed to
be addressed.
Chapters eleven to fifteen deal with Olivis conception of the psycho-
logical functions of the internal senses and of the psychological processes
and abilities they represent. Rather than opposing one particular theory,
he argues against pluralist theories in general, and he does this by present-
ing a detailed analysis of all the functions of the internal senses. Chapter
eleven covers the functions which were usually discussed in relation to
the common sense: combining and comparing the information received
from several external senses, perception of the so-called common sensi-
bles, and second-order perception. Chapter twelve deals with imagination,
chapter thirteen with memory, and chapter fourteen with the estimative
power. Finally, in chapter fifteen, I shall take up Olivis short discussion
concerning the power which was referred to as cogitativa in the Middle
Ages, and sum up his idea that the common sense functions as a cognitive
centre of the sensitive soul.
Chapter nine

Historical Background

There is no such thing as the medieval theory of the internal senses.


Rather, medieval philosophers presented a multitude of rivalling theo-
ries which shared some general features but at the same time differed
from each other in the details.1 Since the variety of theories is so large,
the purpose of this chapter is not to present a thorough discussion of the
history of the internal senses but render Olivis thought on this matter
more comprehensible by situating it in a larger context. I shall begin by
giving a very general outline of the development of the central ideas, and
then I shall take a more detailed look at the views of Avicenna, Aquinas,
Augustine, and the medieval medical tradition because they are impor-
tant for understanding Olivis view.
Discussions concerning the higher cognitive capacities of the animal
soulthe ones that were later labelled the internal senseshave a long
history. They can be traced back to antiquity, especially to Aristotle. In
Aristotles tripartite division of the types of soul into the vegetative, the
sensitive, and the rational, the sensitive soul of the higher animals pro-
vides psychological functions which go beyond simple perception. Aris-
totle refers to these functions by using two expressions: koin aisthsis
(although this wording is not very common) and phantasia. Under these
names, he discusses a variety of psychological processes and functions, for
example, the perception of the common sensibles, the capacity to com-
bine sense data from several external senses, and second-order percep-
tion. In Parva naturalia he adds a further post-sensory power, namely,
memory.2 Even though Aristotle did not present a systematic theory of

1For a general overview, see Hasse, The Souls Faculties, 30519.


2DA 2.6, 3.13 & 3.7; Sens. 67; Somn. 2, 455a1222; De memoria et reminiscentia (here-
after Mem.), 449b4453b11. For discussion, see Kahn, Sensation and Consciousness, 529;
Deborah Modrak, Aristotle: The Power of Perception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press
1987), especially pp. 55110; Julia Annas, Aristotle on Memory and the Self, in Essays on
Aristotles De anima, ed. M.Nussbaum & A.Rorty, 297311; Dorothea Frede, The Cognitive
Role of Phantasia in Aristotle, ibid., 27995; Malcolm Schofield, Aristotle on the Imagi-
nation, ibid., 24977; Victor Caston, Aristotle on Consciousness, Mind 111:444 (2002):
751815; Everson, Aristotle on Perception, 13986; Sihvola, The Problem of Consciousness,
4965.
232 chapter nine

these post-sensory capacities, his remarks became very influential and ini-
tiated a long tradition in which these ideas were discussed and developed
further.
As Harry Austryn Wolfson has shown in his seminal article The Internal
Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophical Texts, the discussions
concerning the classification and number of the post-sensory functions of
the sensitive soul continued throughout antiquity. Aristotelian ideas were
systematised, and other ancient traditions, especially Galenism and Sto-
icism, contributed to the discussions. In this quite loose sense, it can be
said that theories of the internal senses were presented already in antiq-
uity, although the term internal sense was not in common use.3
The most important developments, however, were made by Arabic
thinkers who took over the ancient theories and developed them further.
Definitely the most important single figure in the development of the
theory of internal senses is Avicenna. His theory of the internal senses
was a continuation of a long tradition. He was influenced by both Peri-
patetic and Neoplatonic ideas, and he was also knowledgeable about the
Late Ancient and earlier Arabic medical thinking that was related to the
internal senses. Nevertheless, despite his indebtedness to the tradition
and despite the fact that the story about the influence of Avicennas pre-
decessors on his conception of the internal senses remains to be written,
it is rather safe to say that he was an innovative thinker on this topic.
Wolfson goes even so far as to claim that it was Avicenna who completed
the classification of the internal senses and that his theory comprises all
the psychological functions that were thereafter attributed to the internal
senses.4 Even though I do not intend to give a comprehensive summary of
the complexities of Avicennas theory of the internal senses, it is useful to
give an overview of his theory and especially of the way he classifies the
internal senses by using various criteria.5

3Wolfson, The Internal Senses, 25076; DAncona, Degrees of Abstraction in Avi-


cenna, 4771.
4Wolfson, The Internal Senses, 27677. In particular, Wolfson claims that it was Avi-
cenna who introduced the common sense among the internal senses. However, Alain de
Libera points out that the idea is present already in al-Frb (de Libera, Le sens com-
mun, 478).
5My discussion of Avicennas theory is confined to the ideas contained in those works
which were available as Latin translationsi.e., the sixth book of his Shif and his medi-
cal work Canon medicinaebecause my intention is not to provide a detailed picture of
Avicennas own view but to give some necessary background knowledge about the context
in which 13th century authors developed their ideas. Hence, I shall not discuss Avicennas
theory as such but as it appeared to his Latin readers in the 12th and 13th centuries. The
historical background 233

Avicenna distinguishes altogether five internal senses, each of which


accounts for a certain type of psychological function. The internal senses
are distinguished from each other by employing three criteria:6
1. Active powers are different from passive powers.
2. Powers are differentiated by the kinds of objects they pertain to: powers
that pertain to sensible species are different from those which pertain to
the so-called intentions (intentiones).7
3. Receptive powers are different from retentive powers.
By applying these criteria, Avicenna distinguishes a total of five internal
senses. One of them, compositive imagination (which is called a cogita-
tive power when it is controlled by reason), is active, and the other four
are passive. The four passive powers are marked off by the intersection of
criteria (2) and (3), as follows:

Receptive Retentive
Sensible species common sense imagination
Intentions estimative power memory

After the reception of Avicennas works in the Latin west, this classifica-
tion of the internal senses and the criteria behind it became very influ-
ential. They were not universally agreed on, but at least they served as a
basis for further development.
Another important aspect of Avicennas theory is the list of functions
which he accounts for by appealing to the internal senses. According to
him, the task of the common sense is to apprehend the sensible forms
which it receives through the various channels of the external senses
and to combine from them a unified perceptual experience involving all
the sense modalities. It also accounts for the perception of perception
and some other more complex features of the perceptual process. The

following discussion is based mainly on Shif De an. 1.5, 8590 & 4.13, 154. See also
Canon 8, 55474 & 16267. For discussion concerning Avicennas view, see the relevant
studies listed in the introduction to this part.
6Shif De an. 1.5, 85, 88-89; Black, Imagination and Estimation, 59.
7Avicennas arabic term is man, which was translated into Latin as intentio. We
shall see below what these intentiones are, but it is important to keep in mind that the
medieval term should not be confused with the modern term intention. The idea that
different kinds of objects call for distinct powers was presented already by Aristotle (DA
2.4, 415a1622), and it was generally accepted.
234 chapter nine

imagination is responsible for the ability to imagine absent things by retain-


ing the sensible forms. Once apprehended, a sensible form is retained in
the imagination, and it can be brought to mind even when the object that
caused it is no longer present.
Further, the basic function of the estimative power is to apprehend the
intentions (intentio), and memory retains these intentions in a similar
manner to how the imagination retains the sensible species. It is not an
easy task to determine what intentions arenot least because Avicenna
never defines them positively8but for our purposes it suffices to know
that Avicenna postulates them to account for the features of cognitive
activity that go beyond perceiving sensible forms but are not rational,
because non-human animals have them. The best-known example which
Avicenna uses to describe this kind of phenomenon is about a sheep which
flees from a wolf without having had a previous experience of wolves.
The idea in this example is that the sheep must apprehend something
more than the perceptible qualities of the wolf in order to be aware that
the wolf is dangerous. In technical terms, the sheep apprehends an inten-
tion of the wolf in addition to its sensible form, and the apprehension of
the intention accounts for the sheeps action by triggering the passion of
fear which, in turn, triggers the flight. The intention of the wolf enters
the sheeps cognitive system together with the sensible form of the wolf,
but the intention is not perceived by the external senses or by the com-
mon sense. Rather, it directly affects the estimative power. In this way, the
intention is an imperceptible feature of the wolf.
The last of the passive internal senses, memory, has the same relation
to the estimative power as the imagination has to the common sense:
it retains intentions just as the imagination retains sensible forms. It is
a storehouse of intentions, and it does not bring about recollection by
itselfrather, recollection is a function of the estimative power.9 Finally,
the task of the active compositive imagination is to combine the retained
sensible species with each other so as to form new images, such as golden
mountains and chimaeras, which the subject has never actually seen
before.
This description of the functions of the internal senses is by no means
exhaustivethe role of the estimative power in particular is much more
multifaceted and profound than what can be described in this connection.

8Black, Imagination and Estimation, 60.


9Di Martino, Memory and Recollection, 2021.
historical background 235

However, it already shows the basic structure of Avicennas theory of the


internal senses: there are as many separate powers as there are functions
that can be considered as distinct psychological processes. We see that
animals act in certain ways, and on the basis of this observation we are
led to conclude that there must be particular psychological processes
in the animal soul. These processes or functions can be analysed into
smaller units which can be attributed to distinct powers of the soul.10 This
approach was transmitted to Latin philosophy, and even though many
details from the Latin theories diverged from Avicennas view, there was
a considerable amount of similarity between them.
One of the features of Avicennas theory which contributed to its suc-
cess in the Latin circles was undoubtedly its explanatory power at the
philosophical and psychological level. But there was another factor: it was
grounded on the best medical and physiological knowledge available at
the time.11 Avicenna was a philosopher, but he was also a physician, and in
his theory of the internal senses medical and philosophical ideas go hand
in hand. They do not contradict each other but are different viewpoints
of the same phenomenon. To put it shortly, the psychological functions
performed by the internal senses are actualisations of the souls poten-
cies on one hand, but they are also realised on the physiological level
as the movement of the spiritus animalis in the ventricles of the brain.
Avicenna thinks that there are three brain ventricles which are filled with
spiritus animalis. The internal senses are located in these ventricles: the
common sense and imagination are in the foremost ventricle; the com-
positive imagination (or cogitative power) and estimative power are in
the middle ventricle; and the rearmost ventricle is the seat of memory.
Spiritus animalis flows in these ventricles, and its movement is a physi-
ological realisation of the psychological functions of the internal senses.12
This same fine matter also fills the nerves, and its movement accounts for
the connection from the cognitive powers which are located in the brain

10As Hasse states, the four intellects [of Avicennas theory] certainly are not powers
or parts of the soul in the same way as the other human powers, such as the internal
senses. These exist independently of each other, they have their own organ, their own
action and often also their own object. (Hasse, Avicennas De anima, 183.)
11Hasse, Avicennas De anima, 22526.
12See, e.g., Harvey, The Inward Wits, 2130 & 3946. This idea originates in Galen, who
believed that the higher cognitive processes are housed in the cortex of the brain. The
idea that these processes are localisable in the ventricles became common by the end of
the Western Roman Empire. For instance, Augustine and Nemesius of Emesa adhere to
this view. (Kemp & Fletcher, The Medieval Theory of the Internal Senses, 560; Hill, The
Grain and the Spirit in Mediaeval Anatomy, 6373.)
236 chapter nine

to the external senses and the rest of the body. The localisation of the
internal senses into the ventricles of the brain gives an additional crite-
rion by which the internal senses may be distinguished from each other:
a power which is localisable in one of the ventricles differs from a power
that is realised in another ventricle.
Arabic medical knowledge and the idea that corporeal spirit is the
physiological counterpart of psychological operations were transmitted to
the Latin west through translations from Arabic medical works from the
first half of the twelfth century onwards. In addition to Avicennas Canon
medicinae, which is a vast medical work that was translated into Latin by
Gerard of Cremona in the twelfth century, medieval Latin authors were
acquainted with works such as Costa ben Lucas highly influential De dif-
ferentia spiritus et animae (translated by John of Seville in the first third
of the twelfth century); the theoretical part of the medical encyclopae-
dia of Al ibn al-Abbs al-Majs (a.k.a. Haly Abbas), known in Latin as
Pantegni (translated by, and often attributed to, Constantinus Africanus);
and the so-called Isagoge of Johannitius (also translated by Constantinus)
just to mention few important ones.13
Avicennas influence on the Latin discussions concerning the sensitive
souls higher cognitive functions was significant. One might think that it
would have been reduced by the translations of Aristotles worksas hap-
pened with many other philosophical topicsbut this does not seem to be
the case.14 In fact, it seems that the reception of Aristotles works and the
rise of their importance in Latin philosophy did not have a considerable

13For discussion concerning the development of the medical tradition and important
Arabic works, see Luis Garca-Ballester, Artifex factivus sanitatis: Health and Medical
Care in Medieval Latin Galenism, in Knowledge and the Scholarly Medical Traditions, ed.
D.Bates (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995): 12750; Danielle Jacquart, La science mdicale
occidentale entre deux renaissances (XIIe s.XVe s.), Collected Studies Series CS568 (Alder-
shot: Variorum, 1997); Joseph Ziegler, Ut Dicunt Medici: Medical Knowledge and Theo-
logical Debates in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century, Bulletin of the History of
Medicine 73:2 (1999): 20837.
14Hasse has argued that the Avicennian type of psychological writing became very rare
in the latter half of the 13th century (Hasse, Avicennas De anima, 7379). It is true that Avi-
cennas direct influence declined (without becoming extinct, it must be emphasised), but
that does not necessarily mean that his psychological ideas would not have survived. They
did, as Hasse rightly points out (ibid., 7879). The influence of Avicennian psychology does
not end when patently Avicennian kinds of theories and theorising disappear. Rather, Avi-
cenna was used and absorbed into Latin philosophical psychology in the first half of the
13th century, and in the latter half of the century Avicennian ideas had become common:
they had become a natural part of the psychological framework of Latin authors. Thus, it
is possible to extract Avicennian elements from the theories presented in the latter half of
the 13th century even though the theories themselves cannot be labeled Avicennian.
historical background 237

effect on the discussions concerning the internal senses. The Arabic tradi-
tion, together with a few ideas from earlier Latin discussions, defined the
way Aristotle was read and commented on. This is probably due to the
fact that Arabic and Latin developments were considered scientifically
superior to Aristotles fragmentary remarks. A good example of the pro-
pensity of reading Aristotle through the Arabic and Latin tradition is an
anonymous commentary on Aristotles De anima which dates from about
124647 and is a reflection of a university course.15 It is a purely exegeti-
cal work in which the author tries to explain the meaning of Aristotle. As
Carlos Bazn points out:
The master had a fair knowledge of the Aristotelian corpus and of the
Aristotelian tradition: he quotes Averros, Avicenna and Boethius. Except
for the developments concerning the internal senses, where he is indebted
to the Arabic tradition, he maintains a healthy distance vis--vis the com-
mentators, using them as interpretative tools to clarify some passages, but
Aristotles text remains always for him the focus of attention.16
In other words, the author endeavours to expose the true meaning of
Aristotle, and while he uses other commentators, he is capable of disen-
tangling Aristotles ideas from later interpretations. However, he does not
hesitate to interpret Aristotles remarks on the higher cognitive capacities
of the sensitive soul in light of Arabic developments. It seems that espe-
cially with regard to the theory of the internal senses, the reception and
commenting on the Aristotelian corpus did not diminish the influence of
the Arabic tradition, and medieval Latin theories of the internal senses
were successors thereof.
We can see this by looking at one of the most well-known medieval the-
ories of the internal senses, namely, the theory of Aquinas. In fact, Aquinas
did not write much about the internal senses, but as he enjoys general
prominence, his view has received almost a status of the medieval theory
of the internal senseswhich it obviously is not, given the multi-faceted
nature of the medieval discussions.17 Aquinas accepts two of the three
Avicennian criteria for distinguishing different internal senses, namely,

15Anonymous, Sententia super II et III De anima [ca. 12461247], ed. B.C.Bazn, Philoso-
phes mdivaux 37 (Louvain: Peeters, 1998).
16Bazn, 13th Century Commentaries, 137.
17Aquinas discusses internal senses in ST I.78.4; QDA q.13; Sent. De sensu 2, 10910. For
discussion, see, e.g., Di Martino, Ratio particularis, 85101; Black, Imagination and Esti-
mation; Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature; Klubertanz, The Discursive Power,
152264.
238 chapter nine

criteria (2) and (3) of the list above: there is a distinct power for every
different kind of object, and receptive powers are distinct from retentive
ones. By employing these criteria, Aquinas arrives at a fourfold division of
the internal senses:

Receptive Retentive
Sensible species common sense imagination
Intentions estimative/cogitative power memory

Aquinas follows Avicenna closely when it comes to the functions that these
powers provide, although he also incorporates elements from Averros
and Albertus Magnus.18 According to him, the common sense combines
the information from the external senses, and it accounts for second-order
perception. He also discusses perception of the common sensibles (move-
ment, rest, figure, magnitude, number, and unity) but does not think that
they are objects of the common sense. The imagination retains the sen-
sible species and thus enables the subject to picture things in the mind.
The estimative power apprehends intentions, and the memory retains
them. However, there are some notable differences between Avicennas
and Aquinas theories. Most obvious is of course the number of powers:
Aquinas reduces the number of powers to four by explicitly rejecting the
existence of the fifth Avicennian power, the compositive imagination. He
believes that the function of combining sensible species so as to form fan-
tastic images is provided by the imagination.
A distinctive feature of Aquinas conception of the internal senses is
that he sees a clear difference between human beings and non-human
animals. In contrast to Avicennaand, as we shall see, in even sharper
contrast to Olivihe understands human beings and non-human animals
to be unlike each other not only because human beings have intellectual
capacities but also because their intellectual nature allows them to use
their internal senses in more sophisticated ways. Thus, he broadens the
difference between human beings and other animals, and he does this in at
least three ways. First, only human beings can imagine things which they
have never seenthat is, only human beings have an imaginative power
that is capable of preparing new compositions out of sensible species.

18Black, Imagination and Estimation, 66.


historical background 239

Animals are capable of imagining only those things that they have seen
before. Second, memory functions differently in human beings than in
animals. Animal memory, Aquinas holds, is only a kind of storage for
intentions. In addition to this, human beings are capable of recollecting
past events and objects by actively searching for them in their memories,
and they are not limited to instantaneous remembering. The third differ-
ence concerns the estimative power. Aquinas thinks that the estimative
power is more sophisticated in humans than in other animals. Animals
apprehend the intentions only instinctively, whereas humans do this by
means of a certain comparison (per collationem quandam). The estima-
tive power even has a different name in the case of human beings: Aquinas
calls it the cogitative power (cogitatio).
Although Aquinas deviates from Avicennas view in many ways, it is
not difficult to see that Avicennas influence is remarkable. Then again,
despite the unquestionable importance of Avicennas theory in Latin
thought, it is sometimes slightly over-emphasised. For example, Wolfson
seems to think that after Avicenna (and Averros) there were only minor
discussions concerning the details of the theory of the internal senses and
that the pluralistic idea according to which internal senses are distinct
powers was not challenged during the Middle Ages.19 This is an over-
statement. Latin authors did not follow Avicenna (or Averros) blindly,
partly because his theory was not always understood correctly and partly
because Latin philosophers dwelled in their own tradition. Deborah Black

19Wolfson, The Internal Senses, 295310. Wolfson presents only one medieval excep-
tion to pluralistic theories, namely, Moses Maimonides (ibid., 29192), and he dates the
dissolution of the pluralistic model to the 17th century, associating it with names like
Eustachius a Sancto Paulo and Ren Descartes. He is not the only one who dates this
development to around the Early modern period: Simon Kemp and Garth Fletcher argue
that the theory declined in the 16th century because of advances in knowledge of the
physiology of the human brain (Kemp & Fletcher, The Medieval Theory of the Internal
Senses, 56568). This is probably true to the extent that medieval thinkers universally
used the terminology of internal senses in discussing the higher cognitive capacities of the
sensitive soul, but one should be careful in making too general claims about the theory
of internal senses. The pluralistic approach was challenged already in the 13th century,
as we shall see with Olivi, and this shows how important it is to carefully define exactly
what was rejected in the 16th century. It would be beneficial to investigate to what extent
the important psychological considerations of the theories of internal senses were actu-
ally taken over by early modern philosophers and to what extent the decline of faculty
psychology was only terminological. To be sure, there are important ways in which the
Early Modern period diverged away from faculty psychology (especially by rejecting the
physiological part of the theory), but many psychological ideas continued to appear in
the writings of that time, nevertheless.
240 chapter nine

has argued that: it is impossible to isolate any universal features that are
common to all medieval exponents of the philosophical doctrine of inter-
nal senses.20 It seems to me that her point should be taken seriously.
Rather than trying to present a history of the theory of the internal senses,
we should acknowledge that there was a plurality of theories which shared
a common approach and a number of details, but these theories differed
from each other to such an extent that paying attention to the differences
is as important as finding the affinities.
Even the idea of the plurality of the internal senses was not universally
agreed upon. Olivi is one of the philosophers who regarded plurality with
suspicion, but he is not original in this respect. For instance, an anony-
mous exposition-commentary on Aristotles De anima, entitled Lectura in
librum De anima (dating from about 124550) illustrates the discussions
which were taking place around the middle of the thirteenth century.
The author first presents what he calls the distinction of the apprehensive
powers secundum medicos and he employs the threefold distinction based
on the three ventricles of the brain. Then he goes on to present another
approach:
Philosophers distinguish between the apprehensive powers in another way.
According to them, one should say that the powers of sense, phantasy, imag-
ination, estimation, particular opinion, and memory are substantially the
same (secundum substantiam) and that they differ from each other by defi-
nition (secundum rationem). So all these powers are substantially the same
as common sense and have the same organ, but they differ by definition.21
This is an important text because it reveals that already in the first half of
the thirteenth century there were thinkers who considered the pluralist
positionaccording to which the internal senses are distinct powersto
be a mistake. There is only one internal sense, and it is capable of per-
forming different kinds of psychological functions. The functions can be
referred to by different names, and they can be analysed separately, but
in reality they are brought about by the common sense. This approach

20Black, Imagination and Estimation, 68.


21Aliter autem distinguunt philosophi uirtutes apprehensiuas. Et secundum eos dicen-
dum est sic quod iste uirtutes, sensus, fantasia, ymaginatio, estimatio, opinio particularis
et memoria sunt idem secundum substanciam, differunt autem secundum rationem; unde
omnes ille uirtutes sunt idem secundum substanciam cum sensu communi et idem est
organum eorum et sensus communis, differunt autem secundum rationem. (Anonymous,
Anonymi, Magistri Artium (c. 12451250): Lectura in librum De anima a quodam discipulo
reportata, ed. R.A.Gauthier, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 24 (Grottaferrata: Collegium
S. Bonaventurae, 1985), 441.)
historical background 241

converges with Avicennas theory in many ways, but it also diverges from
it by adhering explicitly to the unity of the internal senses.
It seems that the question of plurality versus unity of the internal senses
was an important aspect of the thirteenth century discussions. There were
authors who favoured a pluralistic approach,22 but there were others who
were inspired by certain Augustinian ideas and emphasised the unity of
the internal senses. To be sure, the Augustinian approach was combined
with Avicennian (and, to some extent, Aristotelian) ideas, which shows
that the philosophers of the thirteenth century were innovative also when
it came to the reception of the theories of the internal senses. At the pres-
ent state of research, it is not possible to convey a comprehensive story
about the channels from which different ideas were taken, and how the
different currents were woven together. It seems rather safe to say, how-
ever, that thirteenth century authors used Augustine and the earlier Latin
tradition in addition to Arabic sources.23
What I am advancing is that the typical story of the formation of the
so-called theory of the internal senses is not definite. The main strand
of influence goes, to be sure, in such a way that Platos and Aristotles
remarks initiated a lively Ancient discussion which was later taken over
by Arabic thinkers; the Arabic theories were transmitted to Latin philoso-
phers through the translations, which gave rise to Latin faculty psychol-
ogy. But this channel of influence was not the only one, since there was
an earlier Latin tradition which developed independently during the Early
Middle Ages, and it played a role in the thirteenth century as well. Even
though it was not common for psychological questions to be the centre
of interest before the reception of Aristotle and Arabic philosophical
literatureand when they were, the vantage point was usually theologi-
cal and ethicalthe ideas and approaches of the early Middle Ages were
also employed later. Of the early medieval authors, one may mention John
of Salisbury, Hugh of Saint-Victor, Thierry of Chartres, William of Saint-
Thierry, Aelred of Rievaulx, Isaac of Stella, Alcher of Clairvaux, and William
of Conches who contributed to the classification of the powers of the

22The most well known of the pluralists is Aquinas. See, e.g., Sent. De sensu 2.2, 10910;
ST I.78.4. Wolfson points out that Aquinas once uses the expression internal sense as
if there were only one internal sense (Wolfson, The Internal Senses, 303). The passage
in question is ST II-2.47.3. However, in that context Aquinas is not dealing with internal
senses and he does not need to name the separate powers individually. Thus, the passage
does not challenge the picture of Aquinas as a pluralist with regard to the number and
unity of the internal senses.
23Wood, Imagination and Experience in the Sensory Soul, 2730.
242 chapter nine

soul.24 But thirteenth century authors also invoked Boethius, John Dama-
scene, the pseudo-Augustinian De spiritu et anima, and Augustine himself,
and the ideas of these thinkers contributed directly to later discussions. In
fact, it was Augustine who coined the Latin term internal sense (sensus
interior),25 and from him we find many ideas which influenced thirteenth
century discussionsespecially the idea about the unity of the internal
senses. There is only one higher cognitive power which accounts for all
the different kinds of psychological processes in non-human animals;
there is only one power between the external senses and reason in man.26
Augustines influence in ancient discussions was perhaps not significant,
and he was not known in the Arabic world, but he is an important figure
in the early medieval Latin discussions. He was considered as one of the
most important Church Fathers in the thirteenth century, and therefore
it is no surprise that his conception of the sensus interioris contributed
to the discussions of the time. In this way, the thirteenth century is a
time of prolific combining of different traditions. Among others, questions
concerning the number of the powers, the attribution of different psy-
chological functions to different internal senses, and the relation between
different powers and functions were under discussion.27
Despite the differences that can be found between the various theories
of the internal senses, there are also some shared features. Most impor-
tantly, the existence of the psychological functions or processes of the

24See Boureau, De vagues individus, 1954; Michaud-Quantin, La classification des


puissances de lme, 1534.
25Wolfson, The Internal Senses, 252; Heller-Roazen, Common Sense: Greek, Arabic,
Latin, 37.
26Augustines most detailed account of the power of the soul he calls the internal
sense (sensus interior) can be found from lib. arb. 2.3.86.13. See also Gn. litt. 12.6.1517
& 12.16. For a discussion, see ODaly, Augustines Philosophy of Mind, 88151. Augustine
does not develop any explicit theory about the post-sensory powers of the soul, but his
remarks were taken as authoritative passages of support for the position that there is only
one internal sense. In addition to Olivis explicit references, Aquinas, for example, parades
Augustines idea from Gn. litt. 12 as a quod sic argument against his own pluralist position
(ST I.78.4).
27This fact is well reflected in Nicolas Stenecks dissertation, which begins with a pre-
sentation of a general picture of the theory of the internal senses. Steneck himself warns
that the picture does not fit with any one writer, and at times he painstakingly underlines
that there were different conceptions of certain details of the theory. (Steneck, The Prob-
lem of the Internal Sense, 118.) Understandably, he does not point out all the divergent
issues: there were too many of them, and a general overview would be made futile by pay-
ing too much attention to the differences in details. However, Stenecks discussion shows
that even though it is a useful endeavour to present a kind of overall view of the theory
of the internal senses, it is also a dangerous and, in the end, hopeless task.
historical background 243

internal senses was quite commonly acknowledged. Although Black seems


to be correct in her claim that there are no universally accepted features
in the medieval theories of the internal senses, there is a great deal of
affinity within the alleged psychological processes that these theories
were designed to account for. The list of psychological functions includes
(at least) the following items:28
1. Combining and comparing information provided by the external
senses.
2. Perception of the common sensibles.
3. Second-order perception.
4. Retaining information provided by the external senses.
5. Imagining absent objects.
6. Compositive imagining of unreal objects.
7. Evaluating objects in relation to ones well-being (in Avicennas terms:
apprehending intentions).
8. Retaining intentions.
9. Remembering past events and objects.
10. Combining all the preceding (in the same way as information from dif-
ferent external senses is combined).
(1) refers to the basic function of the common sense which is to compile
perceptual experiences into one integral whole in such a way that when,
say, the shape and colour of a duck are seen, and its quacking is heard,
the two sense modalities are perceived as belonging to one and the same
object: the duck. (2) is based on the idea that there are kinds of objects
that can be perceived by several senses (for instance, movement, num-
ber, and figure), and this is sometimes understood as a function that is
distinct from the perception of the proper sensibles. This function was
often attributed to the external senses. (3) is a function that accounts for
second-order perception, that is, a perception that one perceives. (4) is
simply a prerequisite for being able to imagine, say, the duck when it is no
longer present to the senses, and (5) is the process of imagining the duck.
(6) accounts for the ability to imagine, say, a duck with a donkeys head.
(7) is the function that was usually attributed to the estimative power:
even non-human animals seem to be capable of striving for beneficial
things and avoiding harmful ones, and this means that they evaluate them
in relation to their own well-being. (8) is very often attributed to memory
(as we have seen with Avicenna and Aquinas): somehow the cognitive
system also stores intentions. (9) enables the subject to remember things

28In preparing this list, I have profited from Wolfson, The Internal Senses, 277.
244 chapter nine

that it has seen before and to bring to mind earlier events. The crucial
element of this function is that the things and events are apprehended
as pertaining to the past. And finally (10) is a function which accounts for
the fact that apprehended objects and their intentions are connected to
each other in such a way that when we perceive, say, a wolf as dangerous,
we do not perceive the danger and the wolf as two separate things. In this
way (10) is parallel to function (1). These functions are attributed to differ-
ent powers in different theories, and not all theories include all of them.
We now have some understanding of the context in which Olivi pre-
sented his theory. When we turn to Olivis theory, we face two impor-
tant issues. First, Olivi adheres to the Augustinian view of the unity of
the internal senses. His view, which he presents most fully in questions
6366 of the second book of Summa, is that there is only one internal
sense, the common sense, which is responsible for all the higher cogni-
tive functions of the sensitive soul. Olivi refers to Augustine, especially to
De Genesi ad litteram, in support of his view and takes his basic insight
from him,29 but his theory is also influenced by the Avicennian tradition.
Unlike Augustine, he gives a detailed account of the different psychologi-
cal operations and explains how they take place as different kinds of acts
of the common sense. Second, Olivi accepts the existence of all the afore-
mentioned psychological functions and does not see any major difference
between human and non-human animals with respect to them. He even
seems to bestow animals with one form of function (6), the compositive
imagination of unreal objects, which was traditionally thought to belong
only to human beings. Hence, he departs from the Avicennian tradition
by simplifying the structure of the soul, but he leaves the psychological
functions intact.30
Before going into the details of Olivis theory, one further issues needs
attention. Namely, Olivi does not explicitly adhere to the unity of the
internal senses. Rather, he presents what he takes to be Augustines view
concerning the unity of the common sense and the imagination, and then

29In his discussion concerning the number of the internal senses, Olivi refers several
times to Augustine: in questions 6366 to Gn. litt. 7, 12.20, 12.25, 12.26, 12.33; trin. 11.7.11
usque ad finem libri, 15.3; Musica 6; De bono coniugali; and in question 58 to trin., lib. arb.
2, and mus. 6.
30It is, of course, a good question whether Avicenna meant to postulate a complicated
structure in the soul in the first place. He was interested in the psychological functions
and their relations, and the talk about different powers was perhaps not so much a meta-
physical commitment as it may have seemed to the authors of the latter half of the 13th
century.
historical background 245

he goes on to say that the followers of Augustine claim that the estimative
power, the memory, and the cogitative power are not distinct from the
common sense.31 He uses impersonal expressions, and thus distances him-
self from the view he presents. However, there are good reasons to believe
that he actually favours that view. Firstly, Olivi rather clearly expresses his
own stand when, after presenting his interpretation of Augustines view
concerning the unity of the common sense and imagination, he writes
that: The position of Augustine is more true and more reasonable than
the first opinion [according to which these are two distinct powers], and
at present this is proved by seven arguments (ratio).32 He does not refute
any of these arguments, and even though the other questions do not con-
tain explicit approvals, they do not include criticism towards the Augus-
tinian view either. Rather, all the arguments that go unrefuted support
the Augustinian position. Secondly, Olivi presents the opinion of some
unnamed philosophers (quidam philosophantes) who propose a pluralistic
conception of the internal senses, but he systematically refutes all the
arguments which support their view. Thus, I take it that Olivi accepts the
unity of the internal senses and objects to the pluralistic position.33

31SummaII q.6366, 596614.


32Quod autem haec positio Augustini sit verior et rationabilior priori, septem rationi-
bus probatur ad praesens. (SummaII q.63, 598.)
33Also Bernardus Jansen, the editor of the second book of Summa, thinks that Olivi
approves of the Augustinian view of the unity of the internal senses. See Jansen, Prole-
gomena, in SummaII vol.2, xii.
Chapter ten

Unity of the Internal Senses

Olivi argues that there is only one internal sense, the common sense,
which accounts for all the psychological functions that Avicennian-
Aristotelian faculty psychology attributes to distinct internal senses.
Sectionone shows that in order to defend his view, Olivi rejects some
of the traditional criteria which were commonly used in distinguishing
different powers of the soul from each other; certain other criteria he
accepts in principle, but he denies that they could be applied to the inter-
nal senses. I shall also point out that Olivi adheres to the medical view
that different cognitive processes take place in different ventricles of the
brain but, nevertheless, maintains that the common sense is a kind of a
functional whole which comprises all the higher psychological processes,
even though from a physiological point of view those processes take place
in different places of the body. The functional unity between different
psychological operations was more important than the fact that different
functions are localised in different ventricles of the brain.
Sectiontwo deals with the general reasons for Olivis conception of the
unity of the internal senses. The authority of Augustine supports this view,
but also philosophical reasons, such as the interconnectedness of the vari-
ous psychological functions, the principle of parsimony, and the experien-
tial unity between the different psychological functions play a significant
role and lead Olivi to simplify the structure of the soul.

1.Criteria for Distinguishing the Internal Senses

It is easy to find medieval thinkers who treat the internal senses as dis-
tinct powers. They defend what I call the pluralistic theories of the inter-
nal senses. Proponents of the pluralistic theories usually employ several
criteria by which they make distinctions between the powers of the soul.
From various theories we can gather altogether five such criteria: two of
them are based on physiological considerations, whereas the other three
are more of a philosophical nature.
The first of the physiological criteria is based on the idea that different
powers are realised in different organsor, in the case of internal senses,
248 chapter ten

in different ventricles of the brain. This idea stems originally from Galens
medical observations according to which injuries in different parts of
the brain cause different kinds of cognitive disabilities: an injury in one
area of the brain affects certain psychological processes but leaves others
intact. Galen observed and reported several cases of head injuries and
on this basis proposed a general classification of different psychological
functions and their localisation in different parts of the brain. His reports
contributed not only to medical theories but also to philosophical dis-
cussions concerning the internal senses because they influenced Greek
and later Arabic medicine, and the medical theory of the localisation of
psychological functions found its way also into Avicennas writings. In this
way, the physiological criterion of distinguishing different psychological
powers according to their localisation in the brain served as a background
for philosophical psychology. It was so widely accepted in the thirteenth
century that it can be regarded as commonplace.1 According to medieval
understanding, there are three ventricles in the brain, and thus physiology
gives reason to distinguish between three internal senses.
Philosophers, however, rarely confined themselves to such a coarse
classification of the post-sensory powers. They used philosophical crite-
ria for making further distinctions. Yet the physiological classification of
the internal senses according to their location does not contradict philo-
sophical classifications. Rather, philosophical criteria complete the more
coarse physiological classification in such a way that philosophers could
propose that there are actually many internal senses in one and the same
ventricle.2
Olivi discusses the physiological criterion to some extent. The version
of the physiological theory which he presents as supporting the pluralist
theory goes as follows:
The common sense and the imaginative power are in the foremost part
of the brain, although the common sense is closer to the front and more
to the outside. Behind these is the estimative power around the middle [of
the brain], and the memorative power is behind these, near to the back

1See Harvey, The Inward Wits, 461.


2Avicenna adopts this approach when he presents two different classifications of
the internal senses in his Canon medicinae: philosophers hold that the imagination and the
common sense are distinct powers, whereas physicians think that they are a single power.
Avicenna does not intend to present two conflicting theories but only two different ways
in which the internal senses may be understood, and he does not think that one excludes
the other. See Canon 8.1, 557, 16364; Wolfson, The Internal Senses, 27780.
unity of the internal senses 249

of the head. In the rearmost part is the power which moves the members
[of the body].3
It is interesting that the moving power is situated in the posterior part
of the brain. It is not absolutely clear which kind of power Olivi has in
mind when he speaks about motiva membrorum. Avicenna distinguishes
the sensitive appetitive powerwhich is the subject of emotions and, as
such, the origin of animal movementfrom the power of locomotion
which accounts for the contraction of muscles. The appetitive power of the
sensitive soul was usually located in the heart because Aristotle thought
that the heart is the seat of the emotions, and the power of locomotion
is, at least according to Avicenna, in the limbs themselves.4 Apparently,
whether Olivi refers to one or the other of these two motive powers (or
even if he means to include both of them), his main target is not Avicenna.
One possible source is Costa ben Lucas De differentia spiritus et animae,5
but this version of the localisation of the souls powers may have also been
a common idea in medieval medicine. Another possibility is that Olivi
derives this view from Augustine, who says on one occasion that there is a
ventricle: behind the neck, from which all movement comes.6 Also, Jean
de la Rochelle locates the general locomotive power in the rearmost part
of the brain, although it is infused to the limbs of the body as well.7
Olivi accepts that different psychological functions are localised in dif-
ferent parts of the brain.8 However, he does not think that this requires
a distinction between the internal senses, that is, conceiving of the func-
tions as belonging to separate powers. Instead, he understands the com-
mon sense as a kind of a functional whole which covers all the different
psychological operations of the sensitive soul. They can be localised in

3In anteriori parte cerebri est sensus communis et imaginativa, sensus tamen commu-
nis magis versus frontem et magis ad extra, post haec vero aestimativa quasi circa medium,
post haec vero est memorativa prope occipitium, in postrema autem est motiva membro-
rum. (SummaII q.65, 607.)
4Shif De an. 1.5, 8283. See Knuuttila, Emotions, 21255.
5Costa ben Luca, De differentia spiritus et animae, 161 & 218.
6Gn. litt. 7.18.24; Klubertanz, The Discursive Power, 5253.
7Jean de la Rochelle, Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae 2.12; id.,
Summa de anima, ed. by J.G.Bougerol, Textes philosophiques du Moyen Age 19 (Paris:
Vrin, 1995), 2.4.110.
8Olivi writes, for example, that: Ex morbo igitur vel laesura postremae partis cerebri
impeditur officium quo prompte et expedite nostrum aspectum et cogitatum recolligimus
ad profunda nostri cerebri et ad illa memorialia quae ibi servantur, ex laesura vero partis
anterioris et etiam mediae laeditur officium sensate discernendi et diiudicandi ea quae de
foris nobis occurrunt. (SummaII q.66, 614.)
250 chapter ten

different parts of the brain, but there is a psychological unity between


them, and due to this unity the different kinds of acts belong to one
power. He writes:
As the same soul is simultaneously in all parts of its body [...] so its powers
have a large and wide circumference. This is why they are not only in one
point of the body and, as it were, point-like. Rather, they inform and thus
integrate diverse heterogeneous parts of their whole organs. And surely, he
would be a fool who said that the sense of touch which senses coldness in
the hand is a different power from the sense of touch which senses fire in
the foot; yet the foot is more distant from the hand than the foremost part
of the brain is from the middle or the rearmost part.9
Olivi argues that powers of the sensitive soul are extended throughout
their organs and do not exist in one simple point. Organs of the sensitive
powers are corporeal, they are extended in space, and they are constituted
from several heterogeneous parts. The sensitive powers and their acts are
present in every part of their organs,10 even though as forms they are sim-
ple and unextended.11 Once the idea is established that a sensitive power
may be realised in all the parts of an organ of the body, there seems to
be no reason to contend that the internal senses should be distinguished

9Sicut eadem anima est simul in omnibus partibus corporis sui [...] sic eius potentiae
habent grandem et latum ambitum; unde non sunt in solo puncto corporis quasi punc-
tales, quin potius diversas partes heterogeneas suum completum organum integrantes
informant. Et certe, fatuus esset qui diceret tactum manus sentientis calida esse aliam
potentiam a tactu pedis sentientis ignem; et tamen longe plus distat pes a manu quam
prima pars cerebri a sua media vel postrema. (SummaII q.66, 613.) The idea of the exten-
sion of corporeal powers is most clear in the case of touch: Videmus enim quod sensus
non reperiuntur in organis suis nisi sub certa dimensione, ita quod oportet essentiam
ipsius potentiae esse applicatam illi dimensioni. Tactus enim in diversis partibus corporis
existens secundum aliam applicationem sui est in una quam in alia et in omnibus simul
est quasi secundum unam continuam applicationem correspondentem et proportionalem
continuitati et dimensioni materiae suae; in tantumque est ibi secundum leges dimensio-
nis quod alium actum numero differentem habet, prout est in una parte, et alium, prout
est in alia, etiam in eodem nunc. Et sic, cum nulla alia virtus organica sit in parte punctali
et omnis pars corporis distincta secundum situm habeat suam actionem immediatam et
quasi partialem distinctam ab actione immediata alterius partis: idem forte aliquo modo
erit dare in omnibus potentiis organicis. (Ibid. q.51, 11516.)
10Cum enim omnis actus et habitus potentiae apprehensivae sint recepti in materia
ipsius potentiaealiter enim non possunt esse in ea [...] Impossibile est autem quod
ea quae sunt recepta in corpore sicut in materia vel subiecto sint omnino sequestrata a
modis et conditionibus corporum. Unde in actu visus et aliorum sensuum manifeste pos-
sumus experiri quasdam dilatationes et acuitiones et divaricationes et reberationes iuxta
modum et legem corporalium. (SummaII q.51, 113.) Tertia ratio est ex operationibus et
passionibus potentiarum ipsius animae, ad quas sequuntur et concomitantur transmuta-
tiones variae organorum suorum; et hinc est quod homo ex nimia continuatione actus
cuiuscunque potentiae lassatur. (Ibid., q.53, 215.)
11SummaII q.54, 28283.
unity of the internal senses 251

from each other on the basis of their different locations in the brain. The
crucial idea here is that the organ of the common sense is the whole
brain (and even the heart).12 One power has several functions in differ-
ent parts of its organ, but it remains the same power nevertheless. This
clearly shows how Olivis point of view is psychological and philosophi-
cal. He simplifies the structure of the powers of the sensitive soul not to
reject the received medical view; rather, he interprets the medical theory
in such a way that it becomes possible for him to simplify the structure of
the powers of the soul. This simplification is made for philosophical and
psychological reasons. One might say that Olivi prefers a holistic psycho-
logical approach to the physiological approach in which more attention
is paid to the localisation of the psychological functions, but he does not
reject the localisation either.
Yet, Olivi does not deny that we can draw distinctions between differ-
ent powers on a physiological basis as well. He accepts the idea that pow-
ers of the soul are actualisations of their proper organs, and the diversity
of the external senses can be discovered, for instance, by noticing that
they are realised in different organs. However, he does not think that the
diversity of the organs would explain the distinctness of the powers, since
the diversity of the external senses is due to their particular modes of
acting.13
When applied to the internal senses, however, this idea becomes some-
what problematic given Olivis claim that in higher animals the common
sense is realised both in the brain and in the heart: clearly, the brain and
the heart are not the same organ. Olivi gives no explicit account for the
double organ of the common sense. He only refers to our intimate experi-
ence, according to which even our cognitive acts take place both in the
heart and the brain:
Our inner experience proves that even a numerically same act of sensation
and thinking is simultaneously in the heart and in the brain. And no won-
der, because it is in these organs only insofar as they are under the same
power of the soul and as if one in it.14

12For more details on Olivis view concerning the localisation of the common sense,
see chapter four, footnote 35.
13SummaII q.60, 571; ibid. q.54, 248. See also ibid., q.73, 97, where Olivi argues that
the power of vision is principally located in the node of the visual nerves from both eyes
because otherwise one visual power could not inform two eyes.
14Intima experientia comprobamus actum sensus et cogitatus esse in corde simul et
cerebro, etiam eundem actum numero; nec mirum, quia non est in eis, nisi prout subsunt
eidem potentiae animae et prout sunt quasi unum in illa. (SummaII q.66, 613.) Secundo
probat hoc [scil. quod cor sit prior radix sensui communi] intima experientia sensus qua
252 chapter ten

He seems to think that somehow the common sense is a functional whole


which transcends the distinction that one might be tempted to make
because of the different organs in which it is realised.15 This idea stands
out as unusual because even though it was often said that the common
sense has a double organ, the idea was that it originates in the heart (from
which the spiritus vitalis flows) but functions in the brain (where the spiri-
tus animalis exists). Olivis idea seems to be far more radical: the common
sense has cognitive acts also in the heart. His stance remains somewhat
obscure and undeveloped, but it is clear that the commonly accepted cri-
terion that powers of the soul are diversified by their organs does not
seem to hold, at least in the case of the common sense.
Another case in which he rejects this criterion is the sense of touch.
The organ of the sense of touch is the whole body, and therefore it also
exists in the other sense organsit hurts if something sticks in the eye.
Olivi explains that the power of touch may inform the other sense organs
without being the ultimate form: another external sense may inform an
organ that is informed by the sense of touch, but nevertheless they remain
two distinct powers.16
The other physiological criterion is closely related to one of the philo-
sophical criteria, as we shall soon see. The central idea in this criterion
is to give support to the distinction between the receptive and retentive
powers of the soul by claiming that there are physiological differences
between the bodily organs, or seats, of these two kinds of powers: the
organs of the receptive powers are moist and therefore easily changed,
whereas the organs of the retentive powers are dry and therefore change-
able only with difficulty.17

sentimus processum motuum animalium imperari in corde et a corde. Sentimus etiam


iudiciarium cogitatum ad cor recolligi, quando aliquid definitive et solide iudicamus et
agendum vel non agendum sententiamus, sentimus etiam radicalem consistentiam seu
radicalem per se existentiam principaliter esse in corde seu in anima, prout ibi existit.
(Ibid., q.62, 59091.)
15One possible interpretation of his position is that the cognitive functions of the com-
mon sense are in the brain and that the heart is the seat of the sensitive appetite. In this
case, the allusions to the double root of the common sense should be understood in such a
way that Olivi refers to both of these powers and considers them as a kind of a whole. This
reading is possible, if not plausible, because he thinks that Augustine includes the sensitive
appetite under the common sense (SummaII q.58, 508.) However, the idea that we feel
our cognitive acts simultaneously in the brain and in the heart is not easily adapted to this
interpretation. Rather, these passages seem to attest to Olivi really locating the common
sense as a cognitive power in two organs.
16SummaII q.60, 570 & 573; ibid., q.61, 578.
17Thus Aquinas claims that: Recipere autem et retinere reducuntur in corporalibus ad
diversa principia: nam humida bene recipiunt, et male retinent; e contrario autem est de
unity of the internal senses 253

Olivi ridicules this idea of a physiological difference between the recep-


tive and retentive powers:
To the first argument (ratio) of the other [philosophers] it must be said
that it is utterly ridiculous. First, because it reduces the spiritual formation
and conservation of vital and intentional species solely to the powers of the
elementary qualities of moistness and dryness.18
At the basis of this criticism is the idea that species (that is, the cognitive
acts of the soul) require spirituality and therefore cannot be reduced to
the qualities of elements. It is not evident what Olivi means by spiritual-
ity in this context, but it is possible that he draws on the physiological
theory of the spiritus animalis and thinks that the higher cognitive capaci-
ties of the sensitive soul are realised as the movement of this peculiar
kind of matter, and thus the functions of the soul cannot be reduced to
the four elements and their qualities. In other words, there is no differ-
ence between the receptive and retentive powers in terms of elemen-
tary qualities because they all are realised as a movement of the spiritus
animalis. Then again, he may just mean that these operations are acts
of the spiritual soul and, as such, irreducible to the qualities of matter.
Whichever way we interpret his criticism, the basic idea remains the
same: one cannot distinguish psychological powers from each other by
appealing to corporeal qualities.
Let us now turn to the philosophical criteria which medieval phi-
losophers employed to make further distinctions between the internal
senses. We can distinguish three such criteria which come originally from
Avicenna:
1. Active powers differ from passive powers.
2. Powers that pertain to sensible species differ from powers that pertain to
intentions.
3. Receptive powers differ from retentive powers.
The third criteria is, in fact, the same as the second physiological cri-
terion, only it is considered from a different perspective. From a philo-
sophical point of view, the underlying idea is a distinction between two
kinds of psychological processes. Some psychological processes, such as

siccis. Unde, cum potentia sensitiva sit actus organi corporalis, oportet esse aliam poten-
tiam quae recipiat species sensibilium, et quae conservet. (ST I.78.4 resp.)
18Ad primam igitur rationem aliorum dicendum quod valde est ridiculosa; tum quia
spirituales formationes et conservationes specierum vitalium et intentionalium reducit ad
solas potentias qualitatum elementarium humidi et sicci. (SummaII q.63, 601.) See also
ibid. q.58, 508.
254 chapter ten

perception, are related to things which are present to the subject; other
processes, such as imagining, pertain to things that are absent. According
to one line of reasoning, the soul must provide principles which account
for the reception of external influences and principles which account for
the preservation of information in such a way that it can be later brought
to mind. This distinction of psychological operations calls for a distinction
of the receptive powers from the retentive ones.
Latin philosophers did not systematically employ all these criteria, and
especially the first one was sometimes omitted. Olivi, on the other hand,
does not accept any of them in the case of the internal senses. He rejects
criterion(3) on the basis that if the power that receives the sensible spe-
cies were distinct from the one that retains it, a species that is numerically
one would inform two distinct powers at the same time, which is impos-
sible: The reception and conservation of species belong to the same sub-
ject and power because it is impossible for a species that is numerically
one to have two subjects or to inform two powers at the same time.19 On
the face of it, Olivis critical remark does not seem to be well grounded.
At least according to some versions of the species theory of perception,
the external object actualises the passive powers of perception by sensible
species, which are multiplied already in the medium between, say, the
eyes and the seen object. There seems to be no reason why such theories
should claim that a species which informs the common sense is numeri-
cally the same as the one which informs the imagination. Moreover, since
pluralistic theories of internal senses can be understood as a kinds of
information-processing models,20 it is possible that in a manner of speak-
ing the common sense hands over the sensible species from the external
senses to the imagination.
Olivis argument must be understood in light of his own theory of per-
ception. As we have seen, he rejects the species theory of perception and
argues that perception is an act of the common sense; it is actively pro-
duced by the common sense in such a way that the external object is not
an efficient cause of the act. The act of perception generates a so-called
memory species (species memorialis) which is retained and thus enables
imaginative and memorative processes, but Olivi claims that there is no

19Quia eiusdem subiecti et potentiae est speciem recipere et eandem conservare;


impossibile est enim quod species eadem numero habeat duo subiecta aut quod duas
potentias simul informet. (SummaII q.63, 599.)
20Kemp & Fletcher, The Medieval Theory of the Internal Senses, 568.
unity of the internal senses 255

need for a different power to account for the retentive function. As he


puts it:
But the species which are immediately generated by an act of the common
sense can be brought about by the common sense only in the subject of
that act [...] Therefore, the memorative or imaginative species which are
brought about by the common sense are retained only in the power of the
common sense or in its organ insofar as it is its organ.21
It is natural to think that if a species is understood as a cognitive act, it
cannot inform several powers of the soul simultaneously.
Olivi is not as explicit in his stance towards the second criterion, accord-
ing to which powers can be distinguished by the different kinds of objects
with which they interact. We have already seen, in chapter four, that he
accepts this criterion in the case of the external senses, even though he
thinks that it is not a sufficient proof for the distinctness of the senses.
The same approach is visible in a context where Olivi discusses the dif-
ference between the intellectual and the sensitive powers: The diversity
of objects does not sufficiently prove the diversity of powers unless a dis-
tinct mode of apprehending is addedthis can be seen very clearly in
ourselves.22 Human beings have distinct powers for intellectual and sen-
sory cognition, Olivi claims, but also in their case the difference cannot be
inferred solely on the basis of objects. Moreover, the unity of two powers
cannot be inferred from the fact that they apprehend specifically the same
object. Olivi argues that:
The unity of the specific object does not suffice for the specific unity of
the powers because [if it did] then the common sense, the intellect, and the
external senses would all be one power as both the common sense and the
intellect apprehend the formal and specific objects of the external senses.
Therefore, the specific diversity of the powers is apprehended not only from
the diversity of the objects but also from diverse modes of apprehending

21Sed species quae immediate gignitur ab actu sensus communis non potest per eum
fieri nisi in subiecto ipsius actus [...] Ergo species memorialis seu imaginaria per ipsum
facta conservatur in sola potentia sensus communis aut in eius organo, in quantum est
eius. (SummaII q.63, 599.) [...] dicendum quod ex omnibus supradictis satis patet quod
receptivum et retentivum non oportet esse duas potentias animae. (Ibid., q.66, 613.)
22Diversitas obiectorum non est sufficiens ratio ad probandum diversitatem potentia-
rum, nisi cum additur modus apprehendendi diversus, sicut in nobis maxime reperitur.
(SummaII q.54, 275.) Licet virtus superior extendat se ad omnia obiecta ad quae infe-
rior, non tamen ad eosdem actus producendos; unde intellectus non potest elicere istum
actum qui est sentire vel vegetare. (Ibid., q.50, 4041.) See Brub, La Connaissance de
lindividuel, 100106.
256 chapter ten

which are essential for the powers and from diverse modes of informing and
being which are essential for them.23
Again, the crucial idea is that two powers may apprehend one and the
same object, but if they do it in distinct modes of apprehension, they
are distinct powers. By considering only the side of the object we cannot
judge whether two powers are separate in reality.
From this perspective it is understandable that Olivi denies the applica-
tion of criterion(2) to the internal senses, but there is also a more funda-
mental reason for his rejection of it: intentions do not constitute a distinct
type of object. I shall not go into the details herethey are dealt with in
chapterfourteenbut Olivis idea is that all the psychological processes
that seem to require intentions can be accounted for without them. Thus,
even though he were to accept that there are as many distinct cognitive
powers in the soul as there are kinds of objects to be apprehended, he
would not be not obliged to posit several internal senses.
Finally, Olivi does not mention criterion(1) by which the active powers
are distinguished from the passive ones. This is not surprising because it
seems to appear less in Latin discussions, and especially because all the
powers of the soul are active in Olivis eyes. Even the distinction between
the compositive imagination, which enables us to imagine things that
we have never seen, and the imagination as a function which enables
us to imagine things that we have perceived before is not based on the
idea that the former would be an active and the latter a passive process.
The common sense is active in all of its operations. Thus, although Olivi
acknowledges the existence of various kinds of imaginative acts, he does
not require criterion(1).
A further way to judge whether two powers are different from each
other was based on the possibility of the powers separate existence. Since
plants have vegetative powers but not sensitive ones, the latter must be
distinct from the former. Similarly, since some animals have the sense
of touch but not vision, they must be distinct powers. Olivi accepts this
principle. He writes: The difference between sensitive, intellectual, and
vegetative powers is clear [...] because sometimes sensitive powers are

23Non enim ad unitatem potentiae specificam sufficit unitas obiecti specifica; quia
cum sensus communis et intellectus apprehendant formalia obiecta et specifica sensuum
particularium, tunc omnes essent una potentia. Diversitas igitur specifica potentiarum
apprehenditur non solum ex diversitate obiectorum, sed etiam ex diverso modo appre-
hendendi essentiali ipsis potentiis et ex diverso modo informandi et essendi eis essentiali.
(SummaII q.51, 129.)
unity of the internal senses 257

found without intellectual ones, as in beasts, and vegetative powers are


found without sensitive ones, as in plants.24 However, when this idea
is applied to the difference between the internal senses by arguing that
there are animals that seem to lack some of them,25 Olivi draws upon a
different explanation. According to him, different species of animals are
endowed with different dispositions which make the operations of the
common sense more or less subtle. Also, the number of external senses
affects the way the common sense functions.26 Thus, he does not accept
that some species of animals would have more internal senses than others.
All animals have the common sense. It just functions more perfectly in
higher animals and less so in simple ones.
By drawing from our earlier discussion of Olivis conception of the diver-
sity of the external senses (chapterfour) and from the present discussion,
we can infer altogether four criteria which Olivi uses to distinguish the
powers of the soul from each other:
1. Powers which inform diverse organs differ from each other. (There are
exceptions to this rule.)
2. Powers which pertain to different genera of objects (which do not have a
common denominator) differ from each other.
3. Powers are different if their acts belong to different genera.
4. Incorporeal powers differ from corporeal ones.
None of these apply to the internal senses: the different psychological
functions of the internal senses are actualised in the same organ (or, if
Olivis remarks about the heart are taken seriously, this criterion fails in
the case of the internal senses); they can be accounted for without appeal-
ing to different kinds of objects; they are not realised by acts of different
genera; and all the functions belong to a corporeal power. Instead, accord-
ing to Olivi there are several reasons to claim that the psychological func-
tions which are often attributed to the internal senses belong in fact to
one and the same power. Let us now see what these reasons are.

24Quantum autem ad differentiam potentiarum sensitivarum ab intellectivis et


vegetativarum a sensitivis [...] valet, quoniam inveniuntur aliquando sensitivae sine
intellectivis, ut in brutis, et vegetativae sine sensitivis, ut in plantis [...] (SummaII q.54,
248.)
25Videtur autem quod in pluribus eorum [scil. animalium] non sit aestimativa, immo,
ut videtur, sunt omnis prudentiae inexpertia; ergo aestimativa in tantum differt a praedic-
tis [potentiis animae] quod est separabilis et aliquando exclusa ab eis. (SummaII q.64,
603.)
26SummaII q.64, 6067.
258 chapter ten

2.Interconnectedness and Experiential Unity

Almost all the arguments that Olivi presents in favour of his view that
the common sense is the only internal sense are based on one fundamen-
tal idea: there must be a governing power in the soul. One power of the
soul must be able to apprehend and judge the acts and objects of other
powers, to compare them to each other, and also to control the other
powers.27 The necessity of a governing power is due to two interrelated
problems which pluralist theories must face:
1. How are the cognitive functions which are traditionally attributed to var-
ious internal senses interconnected (for example, when someone appre-
hends an external object and its harmfulness)?
2. How can the experiential unity between different kinds of cognitive acts
be accounted for? (By experiential unity, I mean the fact that all the psy-
chological acts, however different they may be, appear as belonging to
the same subject.)
Let us begin with the first problem. Many psychological processes require
the co-operation of several functions which were traditionally attributed
to different internal senses. For example, when a being apprehends an
external object and estimates it as harmful, two functions are employed:
one accounts for the perception of the sensible qualities and the other
for estimationitems (1) and (7) in the list presented above (at the end
of chapter nine). Olivi takes it that if these functions belong to two dif-
ferent internal senses, there must be an explanation for the fact that
they are interconnected in the single psychological process of estimative
apprehension.
It is easy to understand the need for the different functions to connect
when taking into consideration one of the essential features of the medi-
eval theories of perception. The external senses pertain to the different

27One notable exception is the sixth argument in favour of the unity of the common
sense and imagination, which draws on Olivis conception of the relation between the
appetitive and cognitive powers. He argues that the appetitive power, by which we and
other animals desire the objects we perceive, is the same as the one by which we desire
the objects we imagine. However, since one appetitive power cannot be immediately con-
nected to two cognitive powers, the common sense and imagination must be one and the
same power in reality: Quia essentialis ordo appetitivae ad cognitivam clamat quod una
potentia appetitiva non est immediate connexa potentiis pluribus cognitivis, sed soli uni.
Sed appetitiva sequens sensum communem ponitur ab omnibus esse eadem cum appeti-
tiva sequente imaginationem. Quod et ratione probatur: quia eiusdem potentiae est amare
et desiderare absentia et amare eadem praesentia et gaudere de eorum fruibili praesentia.
(SummaII q.63, 600.)
unity of the internal senses 259

perceptible qualities of external objects: the power of sight sees the shape
and colour of an object, and the power of hearing hears the sound that
the object makes. These qualities are, however, apprehended as belonging
to one and the same external objectgiven that they are qualities of one
object, of courseonly if there is a power which unites the information
from the various senses.28 This unifying function was attributed to the
common sense, which combines the perceptible qualities from the exter-
nal senses so as to provide a unitary apprehension of individual external
objects.
Similarly, Olivi thinks, the interconnectedness of the acts of different
internal senses must be explained. There must be a way of accounting for
the interconnection between, for instance, the apprehension of an inten-
tion and the object to which the intention belongs (to use the common
medieval example, a wolf and its harmfulness). He argues that the inter-
connectedness of various psychological functions presupposes that there
is a governing power which is able to combine them.
The crucial point here is Olivis interpretation of the pluralist theories
of the internal senses. He thinks that if the internal senses were sepa-
rate powers, they would be able to process only the information proper
to each of them: for example, the common sense would apprehend only
the sensible qualities of an external object and not its harmfulness,
whereas the power of estimation would apprehend only the harmfulness
and not the sensible qualities. This interpretation seems well grounded,
given that the often repeated reason to conceive of these as separate
powers was that they pertain to different kinds of objects. Now, Olivi
points out that the perceived object and its harmfulness are combined
in the psychological process by which the subject estimates the object as
harmful. The harmfulness is apprehended as a feature of the perceived
object similarly to how, say, a squeaking sound is apprehended as a qual-
ity of a mouse which is seen through the power of sight.29
Olivi thinks that the only possible explanation for the fact that the psy-
chological functions of the internal senses are at least sometimes inter-
connected is that one power is able to grasp all the relevant information
and to operate with it in such a way that various aspects of one object

28The idea comes from Aristotle. See, e.g., DA 3.2, 426b922; Somn. 2, 455a1222; Sens.
7, 448b89.
29SummaII q.63, 599600; ibid., q.64, 6034; q.66, 60911 & 613. I shall discuss Olivis
arguments in detail below, in chapters twelve to fifteen.
260 chapter ten

can be combined and compared to each other.30 In other words, there


must be a governing power in the soul. In the case of human beings, the
ultimate governing power is the intellect, but there must be a cognitive
centre in the sensitive soul as well because also non-human animals are
capable of combining different kinds of information so as to constitute a
complex apprehension of many aspects of one object.31
The second problem is related to the experiential unity in cognitive
operations. The idea becomes clear by considering what Olivi says about
the experiential unity in the case of human beings. According to him, it is
an experiential fact that the higher psychological functions of the sensi-
tive soul are performed by a single power:
Certainly, when we do this [viz. execute different psychological functions],
we do not perceive ourselves as operating now with one power and then
with another. Rather, we perceive that the act and the aspectus of one and
the same power varies in many ways.32
When we use our external senses, we feel that we are using separate
powers,33 but in the case of the internal senses there is no such experi-
ence; rather, we have the contrary experience of a single power. In this
way, Olivi lays much weight on phenomenal experience and thinks that it
supports his theory of the unity of the internal senses.
Moreover, there is a more fundamental manner in which Olivi empha-
sises experiential unity. On several occasions he claims that human beings
experience all of their psychological acts (including the acts of the external

30The idea that comparing and combining cannot take place between two powers but
have to be done by a single power is very central for Olivi. He uses it in many connections.
For example, it proves the existence of the common sense: Prima est, quia [sensus com-
munis] obiecta diversorum sensuum in simul apprehendit et diiudicat [...] Si vero dicas
hoc posse per duas potentias fieri: contra hoc est, quia comparare unum alteri aut eorum
mutuam differentiam et comparationem sentire est unus actus ad duo extrema relatus et
utriusque mutuam comparationem habens pro uno obiecto; idem autem actus oportet
quod sit ab una potentia. (SummaII q.62, 587.) It is also one of the reasons there is only
one intellectual power in the human soul: we are able to combine and compare particulars
and universals, contingent and necessary things, created and uncreated things, etc., and
this is possible only if it is done by one intellectual power which apprehends both things
(ibid., q.55, 28788).
31SummaII q.63, 600.
32Et certe, quando hoc facimus, non sentimus nos nunc operari cum una potentia
et nunc cum alia, sed potius eiusdem potentiae actus et aspectus multiformiter variare.
(SummaII q.66, 614.)
33Although perceptual awareness of the objects of perception is provided by the com-
mon sense, the external senses are used in perception, and this seems to suffice for our
experience of the distinctness thereof.
unity of the internal senses 261

senses) as belonging to and originating in themselves. To use Olivis


expression, when we understand, see, and eat, we experience that: The
I who understands, also sees or eats.34 The emphasis is on the personal
pronoun, and in other contexts Olivi explains that the soul contains one
cognitive power which accounts for this experience:
I concede that there is one power by which we say within ourselves that:
the same I who understands, also wills and sees, namely, the intellectual
power. It can say this as it apprehends its own subject (suppositum) and its
own acts, as well as the acts of other powers.35
Olivi points out that it must be the highest power of the soul because
lower powers cannot apprehend the acts of the higher ones. Hence, in
the case of human beings, the intellect accounts for experiential unity by
apprehending all the acts of the soul in such a way that they appear as
acts of the same subject.
Thus, we have the experience of being unitary subjects. But we are
more than that: we are also capable of having a reflexive relation to our-
selves, and we can direct our lives by our free decisions.36 These abili-
ties make us persons, and our personhood (personalitas) distinguishes
us from other animals who lack the ability to distance themselves from
their own actions. However, even though personhood is a characteristic of
rational beings only, Olivis conception of the common sense as the uni-
fying power within the sensitive soul can be related to the idea that one
has an experience of oneself as a unitary subject. Olivi does not explicitly
say that non-human animals also have a cognitive centre which brings
forth this experienceat least not as explicitly as he argues for the role
of the intellect as such a cognitive centrebut many of his ideas sug-
gest that the role of the common sense in non-human animals is similar
to the role of the intellect in human beings. We have already seen that
the common sense functions as the cognitive centre in sense perception,
and when Olivi discusses the internal senses, he argues that there has to
be one sensitive power which accounts for the interconnectedness of the
various sensory as well as post-sensory functionsthat is, of the various

34[...] ego qui intelligo video vel comedo. (SummaII q.51, 122.)
35Concedo unam esse potentiam per quam intra nos dicimus ego idem qui intelligo
volo et video, scilicet, potentian intellectivam quae hoc dicere potest apprehendendo sup-
positum suum et actus tam suos quam aliarum potentiarum. (SummaII q.54, 280.) See
also ibid., q.37, 659; q.54, 241; q.58, 464; q.59, 540; q.74, 126.
36SummaII q.54, 24950; ibid., 251; q.74, 126. See Piron, LExprience subjective,
4554.
262 chapter ten

sense modalities (like seeing and hearing) and the various functions of
the internal senses (like apprehending an object and the harmfulness
thereof). His idea is that if the internal senses were distinct powers, the
overall experience of the subject would be somehow fragmentary, and
there would be no unifying factor which could make the different kinds
of experiences appear to the same subject. The common sense provides
an explanation for the alleged unity between different kinds of the acts of
the soul. In this way, also the animal soul has a unifying centre.
In principle, there are three possible explanations for the interconnec
tedness of the psychological processes and the experiential unity. The first
of them is to claim that the acts of different powers are experienced as
belonging to the same subject because they belong to one and the same
soul.37 Understood in this way, the powers of the soul may be distinct from
each other since the soul itself is the unifying factor which accounts for
the experiential unity and the interconnectedness. The second explana-
tion is that either the intellect or one of the internal senses functions as a
governing power which not only combines the information from the other
internals senses but also accounts for the experiential unity (function (10)
in the list at the end of chapter nine). This explanation was used by many
authors who favoured a pluralistic theory of the internal senses. In differ-
ent theories the governing power varies but the overall idea remains the
same.38 Finally, one can argue that there is only one internal sense. It is
the subject of all the acts which are responsible for the higher cognitive
functions of the sensitive soul. Because these acts belong to one and the
same power, there is no need for a further explanation for the intercon-
nectedness and the experiential unity.
The main reason for Olivi to reject the first of these positions is his
conception of the metaphysics of the soul. The soul is nothing besides its
powers, and therefore it cannot function as the unifying principle. From

37We can find this position from Avicenna, who claims that the soul explains the
experiential unity. See Avicenna, Avicennas Psychology: An English Translation of Kitb
al-najt, Book II, Chapter VI with Historico-philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements
on the Cairo Edition, trans. F.Rahman (London: Oxford UP, 1952), 15, 6566; See also Shif
De an. 5.7, 15860; Jari Kaukua, Avicenna on Subjectivity, 8285. It must be noted, however,
that Avicennas stance is ambiguous because sometimes he attributes the unifying func-
tion to one of the powers of the soul, namely, to the estimative power (Shif De an. 4.1, 11;
ibid., 4.3, 35.) See Black, Imagination and Estimation, 6061.
38For instance, Albertus Magnus seems to think that the governing power is phantasy,
and Avicenna sometimes attributes the unifying function to the estimative power (Black,
Imagination and Estimation, 6064; Albertus Magnus, De anima 2.4.7).
unity of the internal senses 263

this point of view, it is only natural that Olivi so forcefully endeavours to


point out that there must be a governing power:
When many forms come together in the same matter, there must be a supe-
rior one which presides over all the others, reigns over them, and connects
them together; otherwise they would not come together in a proper order
and with a stable unity. But [...] the formal essences of the souls powers are
formal parts of the soul. Therefore, there must be one power in the sensitive
soul of animals which presides and reigns over all the others.39
Thus, his discussion concerning the unity of the internal senses concen-
trates on the second and the third view. I shall discuss his reasons for
rejecting the second view and accepting the third one in the following
chapters, but generally speaking, his view is based on the unifying role he
attributes to the common sense. It is the governing power of the sensitive
soul and the seat of all the post-sensory cognitive acts which the pluralis-
tic theories attribute to various internal senses.40
It is important to note that Olivi does not actually prove that there can-
not be more than one internal sense. His arguments purport to prove the
necessity of a governing power, but they do not force us to conclude that
there is only one internal sensethey do not prove that the third posi-
tion is better than the second. In many arguments, Olivis main concern
is to point out that the governing power of the sensitive soul must be the
common sense:
Moreover, if there [viz. in the soul] were a power which is higher than the
common sense, it could consider (iudicare) the acts of the common sense
like the common sense can consider the acts of the external senses. But there
are none except reason which considers the acts of the common sense.41
Olivi argues that the sensitive soul contains no power that could appre-
hend the acts of the common sense and make judgements about them.
However, one could accept this claim and still hold that the other internal

39Quando plures formae in eadem materia concurrunt, oportet dare unam omnibus
superiorem et omnibus praesidentem omnesque regentem et connectentem; alias non
concurrerent sub debito ordine et sub stabili unitate. Sed [...] formales essentiae poten-
tiarum animae sunt partes formales ipsius. Ergo in sensitiva anima animalium oportet
dare unam potentiam omnibus aliis praesidentem omnesque regentem [...] (SummaII
q.62, 589.)
40SummaII q.66, 613.
41Praeterea, si est ibi [scil. in anima] aliqua potentia superior sensui communi, illa
poterit iudicare de actibus eius, sicut et ipse potest de actibus sensuum particularium. Sed
nullam est dare praeter rationem quae iudicet de actibus sensus communis. (SummaII
q.58, 509.)
264 chapter ten

senses exist as independent powers: the common sense just happens to be


capable of apprehending the acts of the other powers and to make judge-
ments about them, just like it does with respect to the external senses.
Even Olivi does not think that all the powers of the soul are one and
the same, and as he explains the unity and interconnectedness between
sensitive and intellectual powers by appealing to the second explanation,
it seems that he could have also invoked it in the case of the internal
senses.
But there is more to it than this. Olivi points out that the necessity
of a governing power means that there must be a power that is capable
of apprehending all of the souls acts and the objects of those acts. The
common sense can combine the information from the external senses
because it is capable of apprehending everything they apprehend. Simi-
larly, the governing power of the soul must be capable of apprehending
all the information that is brought about by the activity of the other inter-
nal senses. That is, there must be a power which is capable of apprehend-
ing external objects, imagined objects, intentions, and so on. It is possible
that Olivi thinks that the principle of parsimony should be applied here.
The existence of such a power would make other internal senses unnec-
essary: they could do nothing that the governing power was not already
capable of.42
On the surface, this argument seems unconvincing, given that the com-
mon sense is (according to Olivi) capable of apprehending all the objects
of the external senses, but still the external senses are both necessary in
the process of perception and distinct from the common sense. To be
sure, Olivis willingness to deny the need for separate internal senses
stems from his conception of the psychological functions that they are
supposed to perform. As we shall see, he accounts for these functions
without postulating several powers, and therefore he is liable to give up
the pluralist conception in the case of the internal senses. By contrast, he
cannot see how the functions of the external senses could be accounted
for by appealing to one perceptual powerand he sees even less sense
in the idea that the intellect and the sensitive powers could somehow be

42Olivi mentions the principle of parsimony: Regula generalis est apud philosophos
quod non debet fieri per plura quod potest fieri per unum. He acknowledges the valid-
ity of this principle but specifies it further: [...] maior suae rationis non est vera nisi
quando aeque perfecte potest fieri per unum sicut per plura. (SummaII q.51 app., 19091.)
According to another formulation: [...] superfluum autem est ponere duo vel plura ubi
sufficit unum. (Ibid., q.29, 499.)
unity of the internal senses 265

the same.43 Thus, it is precisely in the case of the internal senses that the
principle of parsimony may be applied.
Olivis idea seems to be that because we are led (by his argumentation)
to admit that there must be one power which is capable of apprehend-
ing the acts and objects of all the other powers, we are at least entitled
to deny the existence of the other internal senses. And because of the
principle of parsimony we should do so. Even though positing a govern-
ing power would be enough to account for the interconnectedness of the
functions and the experiential unity, Olivi understands the acts that rea-
lise the different functions in such a way that they can be attributed to
the common sense.

43SummaII q.67, 61524.


Chapter eleven

The Common Sense

Ever since Aristotle wrote his De anima, philosophers interested in psy-


chological questions have taken seriously the idea that there must be a
kind of unifying centre in the sensitive soul. In the later tradition this
centre came to be classified among the internal senses, and in the Latin
West it was named the common sense (sensus communis). In medieval
discussions the common sense was often thought to account for three dif-
ferent psychological operations: combining and comparing the informa-
tion received through the external senses, apprehension of the common
sensibles, and second-order perception.
The first of these operations serves as an explanation for the unity
of perceptual experience. Even though we perceive different perceptual
qualities by different external sensescolours by sight, sounds by hearing,
odours by the sense of smell, and so forthwe perceive them in conjunc-
tion with each other in such a way that we perceive an external object
which is of a particular colour, produces a particular sound, and smells a
particular way. In a similar fashion, we are capable of distinguishing per-
ceptible qualities from each other and telling that the colour we perceive
is different from the sound we hear. External senses cannot combine or
compare different kinds of perceptual qualities because they can perceive
only their own objects, and therefore there has to be a power, the com-
mon sense, which functions as a unifying centre.
The second operation which was traditionally discussed in relation to
the common sense is the apprehension of the common sensibles. Medi-
eval philosophers received from Aristotle (through a long tradition, to be
sure) the idea that in addition to the proper sensibles of each of the exter-
nal senses, we are capable of perceiving common sensibles, such as move-
ment and number. These qualities are called common because they can
be perceived by several external senses: for instance, we can see and hear
movement. Medieval authors discussed whether the common sensibles
are apprehended by the external senses or by the common sense, and
they also made additions to Aristotles list of the common sensibles. Aris-
totelian framework was not accepted as such, but all of its details were
under discussion in the thirteenth century.
268 chapter eleven

Finally, the ability of having second-order perception was widely dis-


cussed in the Middle Ages. The idea that beings who are capable of per-
ception are also capable of perceiving that they perceive was inherited
from the tradition stretching down from antiquity: Aristotle argued that
perception involves not only an awareness of a perceived object but also
of an act of perception itself.1 In medieval discussions, one of the most
pervasive questions was whether this second-order perception is pro-
vided by the same act by which the external object is perceived, or does
it require a distinct act which somehow has the direct act as its object.2
Whether or not medieval authors thought that the reflexive acts are sepa-
rate from the direct acts, they usually attributed second-order perception
to the common sense.3
I shall begin, in section one, by pointing out that Olivi thinks, in a typi-
cal medieval fashion, that the common sense accounts for combining and
comparing the information received from the various external senses. In
sectiontwo I shall shortly look at Olivis remarks on the question concern-
ing the common sensibles. He breaks little ground with respect to these
two functions but follows the lines of earlier discussions, taking sides with
some authors and opposing others. By contrast, his understanding of sec-
ond-order perception, which is the topic of sectionthree, contains philo-
sophically interesting ideas. He thinks that second-order perception is a
form of self-cognition. Moreover, his works contain also other ideas which
are related to bodily self-awareness. They are discussed in sectionfour,
where I shall show that the common sense provides, together with the
sense of touch, various types of self-cognition.

1DA 3.2, 425b1225; Somn. 2, 455a1221; Sens. 2, 437a2728. For discussion, see, e.g.,
Everson, Aristotle on Perception, 14148; Caston, Aristotle on Consciousness, 751815.
2For medieval positions, see, e.g., trin. 15.12.2122; Albertus Magnus, De anima, 2.4.7;
QDV 10.10; ST I.78.4 & 87.3; SummaII q.79, 15869; Ockham, Quodlibeta septem 1.14 & 2.12
(OTh IX, 7882 & 16567); Anonymous (tentatively attributed to John Buridan), Quaes-
tiones De anima, de prima lectura, in Le Trait de lme de Jean Buridan, ed. B.Patar, Phi-
losophes Mdivaux 29 (Louvain-la-Neuve/Longueuil: ditions de lI.S.P./Les ditions du
Prambule, 1991), 3.11, 46165; Francisco Surez, Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in
libros Aristotelis De anima, vol.2, ed. S.Castellote (Madrid: Editorial Labor, 1981), disp.6,
q.4. For discussion, see Mikko Yrjnsuuri, The Structure of Self-Consciousness: A Four-
teenth-Century Debate, in Consciousness, ed. S.Heinmaa et al., 14152.
3Aristotle discusses this ability especially in Sens. 2. However, it must be noted that
he probably did not think that direct acts and the reflexive acts are different, since the
perceptual capacity is essentially one (see chapter five above).
the common sense 269

1.Combining and Comparing the Proper Sensibles

The common sense enables beings to perceive different perceptual quali-


ties of one and the same external object in a way that renders perception
unified. When I am in the same room with a dog, I see the colour of its
fur, I perhaps smell it, I hear its barking, and if I pet it, I feel the softness
of its fur. My perception of the dog includes the proper sensibles of several
external senses, if not all, and I perceive them as being qualities of one
and the same external object, the dog. The unity in my perception is not
(at least arguably) inferred from the fact that different aspects of a per-
ceptual experience seem to be related to the same object. I do not judge
that all these different qualities must belong to one and the same object,
rather, the unity is somehow present in my perception from the outset.
The information from the various external senses is combined so as
to provide an experience of an object with all of its perceptual qualities,
and this combining cannot be accomplished by any of the external senses
because sounds cannot be seen any more than odours can be heard or
colours smelled. In a similar fashion, we are capable of distinguishing
different perceptible qualities from each other. We are able to tell that
black is not white by sight, but in addition to this intrasensory discrimina-
tion, we are capable of making intersensory distinctions by distinguishing
between, say, white from sweet.4 These functions must be attributed to
the common sense, which is the unifying centre for the external senses.
Olivi accepts this argument. He thinks that the external senses are dis-
tinct from each other, and therefore they cannot account for the unity that
is present in our experience when we perceive the same object by several
senses simultaneously. Also, none of the external senses can apprehend
the difference between the proper sensibles of several senses because they
can apprehend only their own proper objects: We see that the power
which is in the eye cannot perceive sounds, odours, or flavours, and hear-
ing cannot perceive light or colours but only hearable things.5 Hence,
Olivi thinks that the experiential unity and the comparison of different
proper sensibles belongs to the common sense, which:

4These examples and the argument for the existence of a unifying centre of perception
are presented already by Aristotle. They were extremely popular in medieval thought.
5Videmus enim quod potentia quae est in oculo non potest percipere sonos nec odores
nec sapores, nec auditus lucem et colores, sed sola audibilia. (SummaII q.60, 571.)
270 chapter eleven

apprehends and discerns objects of the diverse external senses simultane-


ously. No external sense can do this [...] If you say that this can be done
by two powers, [I answer] against your claim that to compare one thing to
another, or to perceive their mutual difference and comparison, is one act
which is related to two extremes and has the mutual comparison of both
extremes as one object. And one act must come from one power.6
Olivis idea is that two separate powers (such as sight and hearing) cannot
account for the mutual comparison between the objects of those powers.
There must be a common unifying centre which enables the comparison,
and this centre is the common sense. He accepts the common medieval
understanding that one of the functions of the common sense is to com-
bine and compare the objects of the external senses.
In order to be able to compare objects of different sense modalities and
distinguish them from each other, the common sense has to perceive the
objects of the external senses. It is not sufficient that the external senses
apprehend them:
We can find also a third [genus of the combination of the souls acts, namely]
the combination of several acts of different natures (ratio), to wit, when
the common sense judges that an act of hearing and a sound that is heard
differ from a vision of light. For this act is composed of three acts. Two of
them are as if material in respect to the third. Namely, the common sense
must apprehend the objects and acts of both sight and hearing. Namely, the
apprehension of one is different from and belongs to other species than the
apprehension of the other. In addition to this, there is an apprehension or
discernment of the distinction which is between them. And as there cannot
be a union or composition of extremes without these extremes (although
union and composition is really different from them), so there cannot be
an apprehension of a diversity or concurrence of many objects without
the aforementioned double apprehension of them. And as these two acts
are connected under the third act, they constitute one complete act of full
judgement with the third act.7

6[sensus communis] obiecta diversorum sensuum in simul apprehendit et diiudicat,


quod nullus exteriorum sensuum potest [...] Si vero dicas hoc posse per duas potentias
fieri: contra hoc est, quia comparare unum alteri aut eorum mutuam differentiam et com-
parationem sentire est unus actus ad duo extrema relatus et utriusque mutuam compa-
rationem habens pro uno obiecto; idem autem actus oportet quod sit ab una potentia.
(SummaII q.62, 587.)
7Invenitur etiam tertio ibi compositio ex pluribus actibus diversarum rationum, ut,
cum sensus communis iudicat actum auditionis et sonum auditum differre a visione lucis.
Actus enim iste ex tribus actibus est conflatus. Quorum duo sunt quasi materiales respectu
tertii; nam oportet quod sensus communis apprehendat utraque obiecta, visus scilicet et
auditus, et actus eorum. Apprehensio autem unius est alia et alterius speciei ab apprehen-
sione alterius. Et praeter hoc est ibi apprehensio seu diiudicatio diversitatis quae est inter
the common sense 271

The unifying of different cognitive acts necessarily belongs to one power.


The mutual comparison of two cognitive acts presupposes that those acts
somehow take place in one and the same power. Even the common sense
is incapable of uniting and comparing the objects of the external senses
unless it perceives them by its own acts: it cannot judge that sound is not
light if sound and light are apprehended only by the external senses. Thus,
the common sense is the subject of perceiving not only the acts of hearing
and seeing but also their objects. It is capable of having several cogni-
tive acts simultaneously, and it combines the information that it receives
through the external senses by forming an act that has the perceptual acts
and the contents thereof as its object.
This idea is important because it is one of the main reasons why Olivi
thinks that the internal senses cannot be separate powers (as was seen in
chapter ten). His strategy in the questions which are devoted to the unity
of the internal senses is to point out that the functions of the internal
senses necessarily include an act of the common sense by means of which
a subject becomes aware of an object. The apprehension of an object is
an essential feature of all the other functions which were traditionally
attributed to other internal senses, and the activity of the common sense
is, therefore, an essential part of these functions.
Given Olivis conviction that two cognitive acts can be brought together
or related to each other only if one and the same power somehow appre-
hends both, either there must be a superior power that apprehends the
acts of the common sense and combines them with the information which
is provided by the other internal senses, or the common sense apprehends
also the information which was typically attributed to the other internal
senses. In this way, he extends the application of the idea that unifying
and making a comparison between two different types of objects must
belong to one power: it applies not only to the proper objects of the exter-
nal senses but also to the higher psychological functions. The common
sense must be the subject of all these functions.

ea. Et sicut unio vel compositio extremorum non potest esse sine eis, quamvis realiter
differat ab eis: sic nec apprehensio diversitatis aut convenientiae plurium obiectorum
potest esse sine praefata duplici apprehensione ipsorum. Et hinc est quod illi duo actus, ut
sunt sub tertio connexi, faciunt cum tertio unum totalem actum pleni iudicii. (SummaII
q.79, 162.)
272 chapter eleven

2.Perception of the Common Sensibles

Aristotles criterion for distinguishing the proper from the common sensi-
bles is simple: proper sensibles are those qualities which can be perceived
by only one external sense, and common sensibles are the features which
can be perceived by at least two senses. According to him, the common
sensibles are movement, rest, figure, magnitude, number, and unity.8 Later
authors usually thought (probably in line with Aristotles intention) that
the common sensibles are not perceptible in themselves. They are per-
ceived along with the proper sensibles which the external senses appre-
hend. Thus, Avicenna argues that there cannot be a separate sense for
perceiving the common sensibles because they cannot be apprehended
without apprehending some of the proper sensibles, and Aquinas makes
substantially the same claim.9 Their idea is that because colourless things
cannot be seen, one can perceive, say, the size of a wall only by seeing
its colour. The perception of the size of a wall is subordinate to seeing
its colour. This is why the perception of a proper sensible is necessary for
perceiving a common sensible.
Then again, it has been pointed out that Albertus Magnus attributes (in
his early works) the perception of the common sensibles to the common
sense, not to the external senses, and the same goes for Roger Bacon.10
According to them, size and other common sensibles are not actually
seen, rather they are perceived only by the common sense. Whether or
not there is a genuine disagreement between the view presented by Avi-
cenna and Aquinas on the one hand and the one adhered to by Albertus
and Bacon on the other cannot be addressed here. What is clear is that
one of the major questions that was addressed in discussions concerning
the common sense in the middle of the thirteenth century was whether
the common sensibles are perceived by the common sense or by the exter-
nal senses.11 Sometimes medieval authors made additions to Aristotles list
of the common sensibles. For instance, Roger Bacon added the follow-
ing: distance, orientation, corporeity, continuity, separation, roughness,

8DA 2.6, 418a1820 & 3.1, 425a1420; Sens. 1, 437a89.


9Shif De an. 3.8, 28183; ST I.78.3; de Libera, Le sens commun, 482; Robert Pasnau,
Sensible Qualities: The Case of Sound, Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.1 (2000):
2731.
10Steneck, The Problem of the Internal Senses, 58 & 6768; Wood, Imagination and
Experience, 3536; Di Martino, Ratio particularis, 6984.
11 De Libera, Le sens commun, 48384 & 49092.
the common sense 273

smoothness, density, rarity or transparency, shadow, obscurity, beauty,


and ugliness.12
The comments that Olivi makes in relation to the common sensibles
and the apprehension thereof are scarce: I have found only one passage
which is directly related to the idea. Olivis near silence on this matter
may reflect a wider development, namely, a decline of importance of
the questions concerning the common sensibles. Judging on the basis of
Olivis work and that of another important figure of the latter half of the
thirteenth century, John Duns Scotus, who does not discuss the common
sensibles either,13 one gets the impression that at that time perception of
the common sensibles was not a significant topic for philosophical inves-
tigation, at least not in Franciscan circles. To be sure, it is too hasty to
reach a final judgement based on such scant evidence, but at least it is
clear that Olivi does not consider the issue as an important one.
However, as I already mentioned, he is not completely silent about
the common sensibles. When dealing with the external senses and their
distinctness from each other, he presents a counter-argument according
to which the external senses do not differ from each other because they
apprehend: the place, magnitude, unity or plurality, and continuity or
discontinuity of their objects.14 The list does not correspond perfectly to
Aristotles set of common sensibles. In comparison to the one in DA 3.1,
Olivis list lacks movement, rest, and figure, and adds location. Moreover,
it seems that Olivi divides number and unity into two opposites (number
into unity and plurality; unity into continuity and discontinuity). How-
ever, it is clear that the items of the list are portrayed as common sen-
sibles, and the objection draws on the idea that the common sensibles can
be apprehended by several external senses rather than just by one, and
therefore the senses cannot be understood as essentially distinct powers
but as one perceptual capacity.
Now, as we have seen, Olivi does not accept the unity of the external
senses, and thus he refutes this argument:
The same power apprehends its proper object as well as the circumstances
under which the proper object is presented to the power and the circum-
stances according to which the aspectus of the power reaches them. It does
not apprehend two objects but one object under certain circumstances

12Wood, Imagination and Experience, 35.


13Steneck, The Problem of the Internal Senses, 110.
14[...] situm sui obiecti et magnitudinem et unitatem vel pluritatem et continuitatem
vel discontinuitatem. (SummaII q.60, 570.)
274 chapter eleven

(unum circumstantiatum). In this way, all the senses apprehend the place
and quantity of their proper objects not as if these were objects in them-
selves (habeant per se rationem obiecti) but only insomuch as they are cir-
cumstances of the proper object of the sense in question.15
The common sensibles that appear in this passage are site, quantity, and
figure. It is a scant list which lacks not only many Aristotelian items but
also some of the items presented in the above-mentioned objection to
which this passage is a response. This proves, to my mind, that Olivis
intention here is not to present an exhaustive list of the common sen-
sibles but only some illustrative examples. We cannot know, therefore, on
the basis of this passage what the common sensibles are according to him.
Olivi points out that the common sensibles are not in fact common to
several external senses because we do not perceive the same common
sensibles by different senses. Both the eyes and the ears can sense the
quantities of their proper objectsthe eyes see the size of a coloured
surface, and the ears hear the volume of a certain voicebut they do
not apprehend numerically the same quantities. The eyes do not see the
quantity of a voice, and it is impossible for the ears to hear quantities of
visible objects. Therefore the sameness of the common sensible is just
an impression.16 Olivi seems to depart from the idea that the perception
of the common sensibles is something over and above the perception of
the proper sensibles. He accounts for the perception of the common sen-
sibles by arguing that they are not objects of perception but conditions
under which the external objects are perceived. The proper sensibles are
conditioned in many waysthey are located, they may have a figure, they
may be in movement, and so forthand they are always perceived under
these conditions.
Olivi therefore not only accepts the idea that the common sensibles
cannot be perceived without perceiving some proper sensible; he also
denies the common sensibles the status of objects, pretty much in a simi-
lar vein as he denies the reality of universals. For instance, location cannot
be seen without seeing a coloured object because location is not an object

15Eiusdem potentiae est apprehendere suum proprium obiectum et illas circumstan-


tias eius sub quibus sibi offertur et secundum quas ab aspectu potentiae attingitur, nec hoc
est apprehendere duo obiecta, sed suum unum circumstantiatum. Et hoc modo quilibet
sensus apprehendit situm vel quantitatem sui proprii obiecti, non quasi habeant per se
rationem obiecti, sed solum prout sunt circumstantiae proprii obiecti huius sensus vel
illius. (SummaII q.60, 57273.)
16SummaII q.60, 573. Note, however, that Olivi does not explicitly adhere to this
view.
the common sense 275

that can be perceived. The same goes for the other common sensibles,
which are nothing other than conditions of the proper sensibles. Pre-
sumably, Olivi also thinks that the proper sensibles cannot be perceived
without apprehending at least some of the common sensibles, since he
claims that the proper sensibles are presented to the senses under these
conditions. That is, an external object cannot be seen without seeing it in
a specific location, with a certain figure, and so on. Proper sensibles are
the objects of perception, but they are necessarily conditioned by what
are known as common sensibles. This also means that because the com-
mon sensibles as such are not objects of perception, their apprehension
is not something that the common sense would add to the sensation of a
proper sensible. The perceiving of the common sensibles is not a function
of the common sense. Rather, this function is carried out by the external
senses themselvesalthough as far as Olivi thinks that the functioning of
the external senses and perceptual process require the activity of the com-
mon sense, this distinction cannot be applied without qualifications.

3.Second-Order Perception

Olivis most extensive treatment of second-order cognitive acts concerns


only the acts of the intellectual part of the soul, that is, the acts of know-
ing and loving,17 but occasionally he discusses the same phenomena also
on the sensitive level, and thus we are able to draw a reliable picture of
his conception of second-order perception. According to him, the percep-
tion of perception belongs to the common sense and not to the external
senses: Likewise, by the common sense we intimately perceive all the
acts of the particular senses, their changes, and their appropriate or inap-
propriate dispositions,18 and the reason for this is that the external senses
are incapable of reflexively turning upon their own activity.19 Moreover,

17SummaII q.78 & 79, 15770. See Christopher J.Martin, Self-Knowledge and Cog-
nitive Ascent: Thomas Aquinas and Peter Olivi on the KK-Thesis, in Forming the Mind:
Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical
Enlightenment, ed. H.Lagerlund, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 5 (Dor-
drecht: Springer, 2007), 93108.
18Item, nos per sensum communem intime sentimus omnes actus sensuum particu-
larium et immutationes eorum et debitam vel malam dispositionem ipsorum. (SummaII
q.49, 12.) See also ibid., q.51, 123; q.59, 538; q.79, 162. Note, however, that Olivi seems to
think that the common sense needs the acts of the sense of touch to apprehend the state
of the organs (see ibid., q.62, 59495).
19See, e.g., SummaII q.58, 495; ibid., q.61, 58283.
276 chapter eleven

he believes that the second-order acts of the common sense are different
from the direct acts of the external senses because the common sense
is distinct from the senses, and also because he is inclined to think that
reflexive acts are different from direct acts even at the intellectual level.20
The common sense apprehends the acts of the external senses by produc-
ing acts that are different from the acts of the external senses. However,
there is no need for two different acts in the common sense, one of which
would apprehend the external object (with the aid of the act of the exter-
nal senses) and the other the acts of the external senses. Rather, Olivis
idea is that the common sense apprehends the act of the external sense
and the external objects by one and the same act.21
Although Olivi argues that the common sense, being a corporeal power,
can apprehend the acts of the senses only insofar as they are realised in
their bodily organs,22 he thinks that the second-order acts of the common
sense pertain primarily to the spiritual aspect of the acts of perception.
For instance, when he tries to prove that the process of perception does
not involve corporeal species, he argues that:
Moreover, the act of pain which a human being has in the external senses
when the organs of the sense are badly damaged is a simple and spiritual act
because pain does not seem to be extended or corporeal. The same seems
to apply to pleasure which is in the external senses. But the common sense
apprehends these acts and also all the acts of the external senses which like-
wise seem to be simple and spiritual. Therefore, it seems that that by which
the common sense apprehends them is simple and spiritual.23

20In his discussion concerning the sameness of the direct act and the reflexive second-
order act at the intellectual level, Olivi presents arguments in favour of both positions but
does not strongly adhere to either of them. Although he slightly prefers the view that the
acts are distinct, it seems that the main reason for this preference is Augustines author-
ity: there are no compelling philosophical arguments for either direction. (SummaII q.79,
15870.) Olivi reads Augustines stance from trin. 15.12.2122.
21SummaII q.62, 594.
22[...] nulla virtus corpori impressa potest habere aspectum nisi ad ea quae ipsi cor-
pori modo quodam corporali sunt praesentia, unde licet sensus communis apprehendat
actus sensuum particularium, hoc tamen non fit, nisi prout ipsi existentes in suis organis
fiunt praesentes aliquo modo organo sensus communis [...] (SummaII q.59, 538.)
23Praeterea, actus doloris quem homo habet in sensibus particularibus, quando forti-
ter laeduntur organa eorum, est actus simplex et spiritualis, dolor enim non videtur dicere
aliquid extensum aut corporale; et idem videtur de delectatione quae est in ipsis sensibus.
Sed isti actus apprehenduntur ab ipso sensu communi et etiam omnes alii actus sensuum
particularium qui consimiliter videntur esse simplices et spirituales. Ergo videtur quod
illud per quod apprehenduntur a sensu communi est simplex et spirituale. (SummaII
q.58, 503.)
the common sense 277

The subject apprehends the harmful changes of the sense organs as being
painful by the second-order acts of the common sense. Olivis idea seems
to be that the common sense provides awareness of the psychological
aspect of perceptual acts and makes the subject aware of the contents of
the acts of the external senses.
The reason he thinks that it is necessary to posit the capability to per-
ceive ones perceptions can be found from his discussion of the distinc-
tion between the common sense and the external senses. He endeavours
to prove that the sensitive soul must provide a common unifying centre
in which the external senses converge. After presenting two arguments in
favour of this view, he invokes Augustines authority and cites approvingly
from the second book of De libero arbitrio. The citation is worth repeating
here in its entirety:
It is obvious that the interior sense perceives not only the objects of the five
senses but also the external senses themselves. An animal would not move
itself to pursue or flee from something unless it perceived its own perceiv-
ing, for example, in seeing. The animal could never open its eyes and look
around to find what it wanted to see unless it perceived that it did not see
that thing with its eyes closed or stationary. But if it perceives that it does
not see when it is not seeing, it must also perceive that it does see when it
is seeing because it is not the same appetite that moves the eyes when it is
seeing as when it is not seeing. This shows that it perceives both.24

24Manifestum esse per sensum interiorem non tantum sentiri obiecta quinque sen-
suum, sed etiam ipsos. Non enim bestia aliter moveret se appetendo aliquid vel fugiendo,
nisi se sentire sentiret, verbi gratia, in visu. Nam aperire oculum et movere aspiciendo ad
id quod videre appetit nullo modo posset, nisi oculo clauso vel non ita moto se illud non
videre sentiret. Si autem sentit se non videre, dum non videt, necesse est quod etiam sen-
tiat se videre, dum videt, quia videns non movet oculum cum eo appetitu cum quo movet,
quando non videt et per hoc iudicat se utrumque sentire. (SummaII q.62, 58889.) Olivis
citation is not verbatim, but it conveys well the meaning of the text that it draws on,
namely, Augustines lib. arb. 2.4.10. Augustines text goes as follows: Arbitror etiam illud
esse manifestum, sensum illum interiorem non ea tantum sentire quae accepit a quinque
sensibus corporis, sed etiam ipsos ab eo sentiri. Non enim aliter bestia moueret se uel
adpetendo aliquid uel fugiendo, nisi se sentire sentiret, non ad sciendum, nam hoc rationis
est, sed tantum ad mouendum, quod non utique aliquo illorum quinque sentit. Quod si
adhuc obscurum est, elucescet, si animaduertas quod exempli gratia sat est in uno aliquo
sensu, uelut in uisu. Namque aperire oculum et mouere aspiciendo ad id quod uidere
adpetit nullo modo posset, nisi oculo clauso uel non ita moto se id non uidere sentiret. Si
autem sentit se non uidere dum non uidet, necesse est etiam sentiat se uidere dum uidet,
quia, cum eo adpetitu non mouet oculum uidens, quo mouet non uidens, et indicat se
utrumque sentire.
278 chapter eleven

The crucial idea in this argument is that intentional action would not be
possible without perceiving ones perceptions or lack thereof (by inten-
tional action I mean an action that has a certain purpose, for example,
satisfying some desire or preserving ones life and well-being). According
to the above example, when an animal desires to see something but its
eyes are either closed or directed in such a way that it does not see the
desired object, it opens its eyes and keeps turning its head and eyes until
the object is in view. Augustines idea is that the animal must be able to
perceive that it does not see because otherwise it would not know that it
has to open its eyes in order to satisfy its desire to see. And because ani-
mals are capable of perceiving that they do not see when they actually are
not seeing, they must be able to perceive that they see when they do so.
The heart of Olivis argument, which Augustine is supposed to support,
is very close to its inspiration:
There must be some power in the sensitive soul (in sensu) of even brute ani-
mals which apprehends the acts of the external senseswhich they [viz. the
senses] cannot do themselves [...] For, there must be an appetitive power
which controls the movements of animals and moves them by command-
ing them in one direction one moment and in the opposite direction the
next moment; it could not do this unless it were accompanied by a power
which tells it all its commands and the mode of commanding. Therefore,
as it is necessary that the appetitive power controls all the bodily members
and senses and that it leads them to their acts or detaches from them, it
is likewise necessary that it is assisted by a judging [power] which makes
judgements in relation to all their acts [viz. the bodily members and senses],
notices their pleasures and pains, and prefers or shows the preference of one
over the other.25
Animal action is governed and ultimately caused by the sensitive appe-
tite, which is the appetitive power of the sensitive soul and the seat of
emotions and desires.26 However, since the sensitive appetite is not a

25Oportet in sensu, etiam brutorum, aliquam potentiam dare apprehendentem actus


particularium sensuum, quod ipsi facere non possunt, saltem sic plene, sicut oportet per
aliquam potentiam fieri. Oportet enim dare aliquam potentiam appetitivam, imperantem
motum animalium et imperando moventem nunc ad hoc nunc ad oppositum; quod facere
non potest, nisi habeat secum aliquam potentiam sibi dictantem omnia quae imperat et
imperandi modum. Ergo sicut illam appetitivam oportet dominari omnibus membris et
sensibus quos ad suos actus applicat vel ab eis retrahit: sic oportet unam iudicativam sibi
assistere quae de omnibus actibus eorum iudicet et eorum delectationes vel dolores adver-
tat et alteram alteri praeferat vel praeferendam ostendat. (SummaII q.62, 58788.)
26For an extensive study of medieval conceptions of emotions, see Knuuttila, Emotions,
177286.
the common sense 279

cognitive power, it cannot have the necessary information for directing a


subjects actions by itself. It needs the common sense to provide the infor-
mation on the basis of which it does this directing. The common sense
is the cognitive power that makes the subject aware of the things that it
desires. But as the previous passage tells us, Olivi thinks that in addition to
providing information of external objects, the common sense must bring
about an awareness of the activity of the senses. Otherwise animals could
not apply their senses to different objects according to their desires. In
this way, Olivis argument is similar to that of Augustine, even though it
remains something of a stub: a desire to see a certain kind of object in
the external world results in the eyes moving because the subject is aware
that it does not see that kind of object at that moment. Intentional action
presupposes perception of ones perceptions.
It is still not easy to see what Augustine and Olivi have in mind when
they argue for the necessity of the perception of perception for intentional
action. What does to perceive ones sensations actually mean? In the case
of human beings, we could perhaps say that second-order perception is
tantamount to having propositional knowledge of ones acts of sensation
in such a way that whenever I form a second-order act, the object of which
is the direct act of sensing, I direct my attention to my perception itself
and deliberately think about what is going on in my mind when I perceive
external objects. Olivi thinks that this kind of reflexion is possible, but it
seems to me that it is not what he has in mind when he discusses second-
order perception. First, this kind of reflexion of ones acts of perception
requires the intellect, and as such it is not perception proper. Second,
Augustines original text makes it clear that the idea is not to attribute
knowledge or even the perception of a first-order act as an object to ani-
mals. There is no reason to suppose that Olivis idea would have departed
from Augustines even though Olivi is less explicit on the matter. On one
occasion he writes that:
Although no sensitive power turns reflexively towards its own act com-
pletely [...], nevertheless sensitive powers are by nature reflexively turned
towards their acts sensibly and incompletely, but they do not turn towards
their acts as objects which are separated from the objects of the acts.27

27[...] licet nulla potentia sensitiva plene reflectatur super suum actum [...], nichilo-
minus est naturaliter reflexa super illum sensualiter et semiplene, non quidem tamquam
super obiectum ab obiecto sui actus segregatum [...] (SummaIV q.13, 112 (Maranesi,
q.1).)
280 chapter eleven

Hence, the first-order act of sensation is not something an animal appre-


hends as an object. When an animal sees an external object, an awareness
of the act of seeing is a part of the perception, but the first-order act is
not present to the animal in a similar way as is the perceived object. Olivi
seems to account for two things by appealing to second-order perception.
First, if my analysis of the role of the common sense in the perceptual
process (presented in chapter seven) is correct, second-order percep-
tion enriches the perceptual content in many ways and makes the sub-
ject aware of the object of the first-order act of sensationit causes her
to wake up to the sound of an alarm clock, for instance. The common
sense directs its attention to the senses and their acts and produces acts
of perception which somehow simultaneously pertain to the first-order
acts of the senses and through them to the external objects.28
The other feature that a second-order act brings about is related to
the mode of sensing. Second-order perception provides awareness of the
psychological process by which the subject cognises external objects.
Perception involves not only an awareness of an external object but also
an awareness of the way in which the external object is apprehended.
For instance, Olivi explains that the reason why a sleeping person fails
to notice that the dream images are not real is that the common sense
does not notice that the senses are not functioning. In a waking state
the common sense enables us to notice whether the images in our mind
are brought about by the senses or by the imagination, and it seems that
this information comes from a second-order perception of the activity or
inactivity of the senses.29
Let me illustrate this interpretation with an example. Suppose a dog
desires a bone but sees nothing because its eyes are shut. As it has an
actual desire of a bone, it must be imagining oneit was commonly
thought in medieval times that desire necessarily entails an object. How-
ever, the mere imagined image of the bone does not explain why the dog
opens its eyes, at least if Augustine and Olivi are correct. The crux of their

28See, e.g., SummaII 62, 59496.


29SummaII q.49, 9; ibid., q.59, 533 & 55354; q.63, 599600. In q.73, 94 (cited above
in chapter seven, section two) Olivi points out that when we close one of our eyes, the
common sense perceives that the act of seeing that was in that eye ceases from existing,
and the act of seeing in the other eye remains. The common sense provides awareness
not only of the perceived object but also of the acts of sensing, and this awareness is an
essential feature of the process of perception. Otherwise, the phenomenal experience of
perceiving an external object would not change when one eye is closed: after all, we do
still see the object with the other eye. See also ibid., q.62, 59495.
the common sense 281

argument is, I take it, that in order for perception to turn into action,
one must be aware not only of the object of perception but also of the
way in which the perceived object has entered the cognitive system, so
to speak. As Augustine points out, the dog has to be aware that it does
not see. The desire to find the bone turns into the action of opening
the eyes only if the dog is aware that it is imagining the bone and not
seeing it. In other words, the dog has to be aware of the mode in which it
cognises the object, and this awareness is achieved by second-order per-
ception of the first order actbe it an imaginative or a perceptual act.30
However, this does not entail that first-order acts of sensation are taken as
objects in themselves. Perception of perception only figures in the experi-
ence by adding something to the apprehension of an external object.

4.Bodily Self-Awareness and Reflexivity

One of the most refined functions that Olivi attributes to the common
sense is related to bodily self-awareness.31 According to him, non-human
animals are capable of evaluating different parts of their bodies with
respect to their relevance to the well-being of the animal: animals protect
the most important members at the expense of others in order to save
their lives. This ability requires that they are aware of their bodies and
parts thereof, and as this kind of awareness is brought about by the com-
mon sense, we may think that the common sense provides a bodily self-
image, which renders non-human animals capable of self-preservation
that exceeds the simple ability to avoid pain.
This idea appears in a context where Olivi argues that the common
sense must provide awareness of the bodily members and senses. He con-
tinues his argument by presenting an example about a dog or a snake
which sacrifices a less important body part in order to save a vital organ,
such as the head:

30According to Eleonore Stump, Aquinas theory of perception involves some prob-


lems, one of which is that it cannot account for the phenomenal distinction between
imagination and perception. Consciousness of a perceived object takes place in such a
way that the phantasy is actualised by a sensible species; imagining occurs exactly in the
same way. (Stump, The Mechanisms of Cognition, 17078.) I do not want to take a posi-
tion on whether Stump has interpreted Aquinas correctly, but it is important to note that
Olivi seems to account for this problem by the ability of second-order perception to make
the distinction phenomenologically available to the perceiver.
31I have discussed this topic in Juhana Toivanen, Perceptual Self-Awareness in Seneca,
Augustine, and Peter Olivi, Journal of the History of Philosophy (forthcoming 2013).
282 chapter eleven

Therefore, as it is necessary that the appetitive power controls all the bodily
members and senses, which it leads to their acts or detaches from them, it
is likewise necessary that it is assisted by a judging [power] which makes
judgements in relation to all their acts [viz. the bodily members and senses],
notices their pleasures and pains, and prefers or shows the preference of
one over the other. Moreover, when a dog or a snake sacrifices one of its
members in order to save its head or sacrifices some part in order to save
the whole, then it prefers the whole over the part and the head over the
other member. Therefore, these animals must have some common power
which shows simultaneously both extremes, their mutual comparison, and
the preference of one over the otheralthough it does not do this with the
same fullness and altitude of reflexive judgement as does the intellect.32
The two highest powers of the sensitive soul work together and enable the
animal to act as it does. The sensitive appetite provides an impulse to the
bodily members and sensesmoves them to their actsbut this kind
of control and use requires some kind of awareness of the members, the
senses, their functions, and their well-being. This awareness is brought
about by the common sense, which apprehends the pains and pleasures
of the body and provides evaluative information of the relevance of dif-
ferent parts to the survival of the animal.
In this way, animals are capable of evaluating their various parts. The
example of the dog who sacrifices its paw in order to save its head shows
that it is not only aware of its body and the condition thereof when harm-
ful and painful changes occur, but it is also aware of the purpose and func-
tions of the different parts and their relevance to its life before any such
changes occur in the body. When a dog is beaten with a stick, it does not
wait until the stick hits its head. It blocks the blow with its paw before the
stick strikes and before it feels pain from the blow. The action of the dog
is not caused by pain, rather, it is grounded on the awareness of the heads
higher value to the well-being of the animalit is grounded on a bodily
self-image, which contains the body as a whole, the different parts and

32Ergo sicut illam appetitivam oportet dominari omnibus membris et sensibus quos
ad suos actus applicat vel ab eis retrahit: sic oportet unam iudicativam sibi assistere quae
de omnibus actibus eorum iudicet et eorum delectationes vel dolores advertat et alteram
alteri praeferat vel praeferendam ostendat. Praeterea, quando canis vel serpens pro con-
servatione capitis exponit aliud membrum aut pro conservatione totius exponit aliquam
partem, tunc praefert totum parti et caput alteri membro. Ergo oportet in eis esse aliquam
communem potentiam quae in simul ambo extrema et mutuam eorum comparationem et
unius ad alterum praeferentiam ostendat, quamvis non cum illa plenitudine et altitudine
reflexivi iudicii cum qua fit hoc ab intellectu. (SummaII q.62, 58788.)
the common sense 283

organs, and the functions of these parts and organs, and which accounts
for the appropriate use of the bodily members and senses.33
Furthermore, Olivi seems to think that animals are aware of themselves
as living beings, because he writes that an animal may sacrifice a part of
itself in order to save the whole (pro conservatione totius exponit aliquam
partem). The term totus, whole, cannot signify only the bodily whole of
the animal because if a part is taken out, the whole does not survive as
a whole. Olivi must mean the composite of the soul and body. If the dog
sacrifices its paw, it remains alive, and therefore the composition is not
destroyed and the dog remains a whole. If, by contrast, the dog loses its
head, the composite of the soul and body is destroyed as the dog dies and
ceases from being a whole. Of course, being irrational creatures, animals
cannot use conceptual language, and they cannot apprehend a soul and
a body as constitutive parts of a whole. They just are aware of themselves
as living beings, whose life depends on certain parts of the body more
than on others.
This interpretation is attested to by a quotation from Augustines De
libero arbitrio which Olivi uses in his discussion concerning animal self-
preservation. In the immediate context of the quotation, Olivi has just
presented the idea of a dog which knows to sacrifice its paw instead of its
head. He goes on to cite Augustine in his support. In the quoted passages,
Augustine provides some reasons to grant animals second-order percep-
tion, and after presenting these reasons, Olivi goes on to add one more
citation:
And he [viz. Augustinus] adds: But it is not clear whether this life, which
perceives that it perceives material objects, also perceives itselfexcept
that everyone who considers the matter realises that every living thing
avoids death. Since death is contrary to life, it must be the case that life
perceives itself because it avoids its contrary.34

33Yrjnsuuri, Perceiving Ones Own Body, 113.


34Et subdit: Sed utrum haec vita quae sentit se sentire corporalia sentiat etiam se
ipsam, non ita clarum est, nisi quod se quisque interrogans invenit omnem rem viventem
fugere mortem. Quae cum sit vitae contraria, necesse est ut vita etiam se ipsam sentiat
quae contrarium suum fugit. (SummaII q.62, 589.) Olivi cites quite verbatim, for the
original text goes as follows: Sed utrum et se ipsam haec uita sentiat, quae se corporalia
sentire sentit, non ita clarum est, nisi quod se quisque intus interrogans inuenit omnem
rem uiuentem fugere mortem; quae cum sit uitae contraria, necesse est ut uita etiam se
ipsam sentiat, quae contrarium suum fugit. (lib. arb. 2.4.10.)
284 chapter eleven

Augustines ideawhich Olivi seems to accept, judging from his silent


approval of this passageis that the fact that animals strive to preserve
their lives is a proof of their awareness of themselves as living beings. The
mere possibility of self-interested action presupposes both the awareness
of ones own body and the awareness of oneself as a living being.
Self-awareness figures as a necessary condition for self-interested life
also in another context. When Olivi discusses the estimative function of
the common sense, he grants that non-human animals are capable of cog-
nising external objects as being harmful or uselful, and he claims that this
ability requires self-awareness:
When a sheep estimates a wolf as hostile to itself, it is necessary for it to
apprehend the thing that it judges to be hostile; for to apprehend only the
property of hostility (ratio inimicitiae) is not to apprehend that the wolf
is hostile. This is why it is necessary for the animal at the same time to
apprehendbesides the two preceding thingsitself as the end (termi-
num) of that hostile relation (respectus).35
Olivi states that animals have the ability to apprehend things as being
harmful or useful to them. He interprets that these properties are rela-
tions between the perceiving subject and the perceived object. Becoming
aware of a relation requires that one is aware of both of the end-terms of
the relationespecially as Olivi thinks that relation does not add any-
thing real to the end-terms themselves.36 Even though the sheep perceives
the harmfulness as being a feature of the wolf, the harmfulness is actu-
ally a relation between the wolf and the sheep. A bear does not fear the
wolf because the relation between the bear and the wolf is not similar to
the relation between the sheep and the wolf. Thus, the estimative per-
ception and the fear of the sheep presupposes that it is aware of itself.
Self-awareness is a prerequisite for apprehending the harmfulness and
usefulness of other things. Unfortunately, Olivi does not state in detail
what exactly animals are aware of when they are aware of themselves
as being the end of a relation. Nevertheless, it is evident that he intends
to emphasise that self-awareness is a necessary prerequisite for self-
interested life and that it is necessary for self-preservation.

35Quando enim ovis aestimat lupum sibi esse inimicum, oportet quod apprehendat
illam rem quam sibi iudicat inimicam; apprehendere enim solam rationem inimicitiae non
est apprehendere lupum sibi esse inimicum. Unde etiam ultro duo praedicta oportet quod
simul apprehendat se tanquam terminum illius hostilis respectus. (SummaII q.64, 603.)
36Alain Boureau, Le concept de relation chez Pierre de Jean Olivi, in Pierre de Jean
Olivi (12481298), ed. A.Boureau & S.Piron, 4255.
the common sense 285

The Augustinian idea of awareness of oneself as a living being seems


to presuppose that the common sense is capable of reflexively turning
towards itself. Prima facie this idea is problematic because it was a medi-
eval truism that corporeal powers are incapable of self-reflexion, and Olivi
himself adheres to this view on many occasions. He even grounds some
of the basic ideas of his anthropology, such as the plurality of substantial
forms, on the idea that corporeal powers are not self-reflexive.37 Corporeal
matter is unable to turn towards itself,38 but the inability to be reflexive is
not only due to the corporeal nature of the sensitive powers. The nature
and essence of the sensitive soul is itself non-reflexive: Moreover, it is
not only due to the organ that [the sensitive form] is not free and self-
reflexive; rather, it is principally and essentially due to its own essence
and nature.39
We have to be careful, however. A close reading of Olivis textsa
reading that takes into consideration the contexts as wellshows that his
intention is not to deny reflexivity altogether from the sensitive powers
but to deny the similarity between the sensitive powers and the intellec-
tual ones with regard to reflexivity. He wants to clarify that the sensitive
powers are not capable of the same kind of reflexivity which is attributed
to the intellectual part of the soul, but he thinks that certain sensitive
powers of the soul are capable of a lower type of reflexivity.
The most explicit discussion of this lower kind of reflexivity appears in
question 61 of the second book of Summa, which deals with the sense of
touch. In order to understand Olivis idea and its relation to the reflexivity
of the common sense, we need to make a short excursion to his concep-
tion of the sense of touch. His view differs radically from the Aristotelian

37For instance, Olivi maintains that the intellectual soul of a human being must be
spiritual and unextended because an entity can reflexively turn towards itself only if it is
not corporeal or extended in space. See SummaII q.51, 10198.
38Secundum hoc etiam non posset reflectere se super se, quia tunc oporteret quod
materia corporalis posset reflecti super se. Impossibile est autem quod materia corporalis
possit immediate converti nisi ad aliquid quod est extra se non solum secundum essen-
tiam, sed etiam secundum positionem et situm; unde pars corporis non potest converti
immediate ad se ipsam, sed solum ad partem aliam sibi propinquam. (SummaII q.51,
112.)
39Praeterea, [forma sensitiva] non habet ex solo organo quod non sit libera et super
se reflexiva, immo principalius et essentialius habet hoc ex sua propria essentia et natura.
(SummaII q.51 app., 196.) Self-reflexivity is possible only by means of another object that
is external to the power: [...] quia natura est omnis agentis creati, saltem corporalis, quod
dirigat aspectum virtutis suae ad extra, unde communiter non dirigit ad intra nisi per
reflexionem factam ab aliquo extrinseco. (Ibid., q.53, 215.)
286 chapter eleven

teaching, which was popular in the latter half of the thirteenth century.40
In short, Aristotle thinks that the five external senses perceive qualities
that are external to us. Moreover, he claims that a medium is necessary
for the functioning of all the senses. For instance, the sense of sight can
perceive external visible qualities, but it cannot perceive objects that are
in direct contact with the eyes because there is no medium that transmits
the information from the objects to the eyes.41 Aristotle considers sight as
a paradigmatic case of sense perception, and he wants to apply the same
theoretical principle to the other four senses. Especially in the case of
touch, however, there are certain problems. We have to be in direct con-
tact with the objects we feel by the sense of touch, and this requirement
makes the idea of a medium problematic. In De anima, Aristotle solves
the problem by claiming that the organ of the sense of touch is not the
skin or the whole body but the heart, and the flesh of the body functions
as a medium that conveys the information from an external object to the
heart and to the sense of touch.42 In this way, the purpose of the sense of
touch is to sense external objects, and the body of a perceiver has a similar
function as the air or water in the case of seeing. Crucially, the body itself
is not perceived at all by the sense of touch.
Contrary to this Aristotelian model, Olivi thinks that animals are capa-
ble of perceiving a number of phenomena that are not external to them
but take place inside their own bodies. In fact, external objects are per-
ceived only because they cause changes in the body. The sense of touch
is primarily a power of self-perception, and it provides information about
external objects only secondarily. A good starting point for understanding
Olivis conception of the sense of touch is a list of the diverse phenomena
that we can perceive by it:
First, because the sense of touch apprehends many things which differ in
kind ( genere) as much as the objects of other senses differ from each other,
such as heavy and light, hot and cold, moist and dry, hard and soft, dense

40Yrjnsuuri points out that Pietro dAbano presents a view that the sense of touch is
capable of apprehending pain and pleasure not caused by any external object (Yrjnsuuri,
Perceiving Ones Own Body, 1056). See Pietro dAbano, Conciliator, f. 117va118ra.
41DA 2.7, 419a1223.
42DA 2.11 422b34423b27; Sens. 2, 439a14. As Yrjnsuuri points out, in PA 2.1, 647a19
21, and PA 2.8, 653b2430 the flesh is depicted both as the organ and as the medium of
touch (Mikko Yrjnsuuri, Types of Self-Awareness in Medieval Thought, in Mind and
Modality, ed. V. Hirvonen et al., 157, footnote 5). For discussion on Aristotles conception
of the sense of touch, see Cynthia Freeland, Aristotle on the Sense of Touch, in Essays on
Aristotles De anima, ed. M.Nussbaum & A.Rorty, 22748.
the common sense 287

and fine, and also manifold dispositions and disorders of its proper organ
and of the whole body. Namely, we seem to perceive by the sense of touch
the catarrhs in indigestion, in inflation, and in aposteme; the febrile heats;
the emptiness and the needs of the body; the fullness of the body in satiety;
the various itches of the flesh; the agile mobility or the opposite tardity of
the members; the enduring vigour or vague weakness of the members; and
the wounds or integrity of the members and the pains and pleasures that
these cause. All these differ from each other as much as they differ from
colours or sounds.43
The aim of this argument is to show that there must be several different
senses of touch because the things perceived by touch are so dissimilar
to each other that there seems to be no reason to attribute the percep-
tion of all of them to one power. Olivi does not approve of the intended
conclusion of this argument, but he agrees with the list of the things that
are perceptible by the sense of touch.
The list begins with five pairs of contraries: heavy and light, hot and
cold, moist and dry, hard and soft, and dense and fine. These are the stan-
dard objects of the sense of touch in the Aristotelian tradition. In addition
to these qualities of external objects, the list includes a number of internal
sensations in the sense that they take place inside our bodies: we can
perceive that we are hungry, that our backs itch, and various symptoms
of disease, just to mention few illustrative examples. Moreover, some of
the items in this list are reminiscent of the modern concept of propriocep-
tion, and certain other passages reveal that Olivi attributes the perception
of the posture of ones own limbs to the sense of touch.44 Also, the rise
of body temperature caused by running can be perceived in this way.45

43Primo, quia multa per tactum apprehenduntur quae non minus differunt genere
quam obiecta diversorum sensuum, utpote, grave et leve, calidum et frigidum, humidum
et siccum, durum et molle, densum et subtile, et item multiplex dispositio et indispo-
sitio proprii organi et totius corporis; nam gravedines indigestionum et inflationum et
apostemationum et calores febriles et corporis inanitatem et indigentiam et satietatis
plenitudinem et varios pruritus carnis membrorumque agilem mobilitatem vel contrariam
tarditatem eorumque constans robur ac inconstantem debilitatem eorumque scissuram
vel integritatem ac dolores et delectationes ex his causatas videmur sensu tactus sentire,
quae utique non minus ab invicem differunt quam differant a colore vel sono. (SummaII
q.61, 574.) The ultimate source of this idea may be Avicennas Canon, which discusses
various types and causes of pain and makes it evident that pains are caused by harmful
changes in the body, some of which are due to diseases. See Canon 10.18, 92910.19, 960,
pp.24652.
44See, for instance, SummaII q.61, 580; ibid., q.87, 199. For discussion concerning the
differences between Olivis account and the modern concept of proprioception, see Yrjn-
suuri, Perceiving Ones Own Body, 11112.
45Quodl. 2.13, 150.
288 chapter eleven

The apprehension of these diverse phenomena is attributed to the sense


of touch.
Now, one may askas does the objector in the above passage
whether there really is something in common between all these phenom-
ena, something that justifies thinking that they can be apprehended by
one and the same power. This question is the immediate context in which
Olivi discusses the sense of touch. It seems that in the end he commits
himself neither to the position that the sense of touch is one power nor to
the contrary position that it consists of several powers. However, he offers
a theory which explains how one power can apprehend all the aforemen-
tioned things: the proper object of the sense of touch is the body and
its state, and the common denominator behind all the various objects of
touch is that they affect the body. As Olivi puts it: The proper object of
the sense of touch is the intrinsic state of its own organ, and thus all the
things which change or affect the organ intrinsically are objects of the
sense of touch.46 Even external objects are apprehended by perceiving
the changes they cause in the body. The sense of touch perceives primar-
ily the condition of its own organ, that is, almost the whole body of an
animal,47 and only secondarily the things that change its state. As such,
it is a power of bodily self-perception.48
Olivi further specifies that the sense of touch is an evaluative power
because it apprehends only those changes and states of the body which
are relevant to its well-being.49 This evaluative aspect of the sense of touch
is distinctly visible in Olivis discussion of the perception of pain and plea-
sure. His idea is that the sense of touch senses the bodily changes which
are relevant to the well-being of the body and consequently to the subject
as a whole. These changes are then perceived as painful or pleasant:
One power of touch is capable of [sensing] all those objects by the same
capacity (rationem) by which it is essentially ordered to perceiving the inter-
nal state of its own organ and the things that are agreeable or disagreeable
to it. However, they exclude pain and pleasure from the aforementioned

46Proprium obiectum tactus est intrinsecus status sui organi, et ideo omnia illa quae
ipsum intrinsecus variant vel afficiunt sunt obiecta sensus tactus [...] (SummaII q.61,
578.)
47[...] fere totum corpus animalis est organum tactus [...] (SummaII q.61, 581.)
48SummaII q.61, 57879; Yrjnsuuri, Perceiving Ones Own Body, 10812.
49Obiectum tactus est totum illud genus formarum ex quo corporis animalium debita
vel indebita consistentia constitui potest. Et si vis hoc ad tactum humanum specificare,
obiectum tactus humani est totum genus formarum ex quo consistentia corporis humani
perfici vel destitui potest. (SummaII q.61, 585.)
the common sense 289

[objects of touch] because as the sense of touch cannot perceive its own
act except perhaps very incompletely (semiplene), so it cannot perceive the
pains and pleasures that are consequent of and concomitant with its acts.
Rather, this belongs to the common sense.50
Olivi is not consistent about whether pain and pleasure are apprehended
by the common sense or by the external senses: on some occasions he
seems to think that the external senses are capable of apprehending them.
We may suppose that the common sense at least completes the process
by apprehending the acts of pain and pleasure.51 Be that as it may, Olivi
makes a conceptual distinction between a perception of an external
object, a perception of a change in the body that is caused by an external
object, and a perception of the painfulness or pleasantness of this change.
For instance, when someone puts her hand in a burning flame, the flame
heats her hand. The sense of touch senses the rising temperature because
it is relevant for the hands well-being. When the temperature reaches
high enough and the hand starts to be destroyed, the common sense per-
ceives the act of the sense of touch (the sensation of the heat) and the
object of that act (the heat in the hand) as painful.
The idea that emerges from Olivis discussion of the sense of touch is
that it is a power which is necessary for self-preservation. Every being that
is capable of striving for self-preservationat the most basic level, this
is nothing but avoiding pain and pursuing pleasuremust of necessity
have the sense of touch. From this point of view, it is not at all surprising
that Olivi attributes, in good Aristotelian fashion, the sense of touch to all
species of animals. It is the only external sense that all animals have.52 In
addition, every animal has the common sense, even though in some cases
it is not easy to distinguish it from the sense of touch: in the most simple
animals, such as worms, the common sense and the sense of touch exist
in the same material organ (which actually is the whole body) because
worms and the like do not have a central organ that could serve as the seat

50Una potentia tactiva potest in omnia illa obiecta per illam unam suam rationem per
quam est essentialiter ordinata ad sentiendum internum statum sui organi et conformia
vel difformia sibi. Excipiunt tamen a praedictis dolorem et delectationem, quia sicut tactus
non potest sentire suum proprium actum nisi forte valde semiplene, sic non potest sen-
tire dolores vel delectationes consequentes et concomitantes suum actum, sed potius hoc
spectat ad sensum communem. (SummaII q.61, 583.)
51SummaIV q.13, 1078 & 11112 (Maranesi, q.1); SummaII q.58, 503. See chapter seven
above.
52Animal est animal propter sensum tactus. (SummaII q.54, 252.) For Aristotle, see,
e.g., DA 2.2, 413b19; DA 2.3, 414b35. DA 3.12, 434b1024 mentions taste as well, but Aris-
totle thinks that taste is a sort of touch.
290 chapter eleven

of the common sense.53 In this way, Olivi attributes a rudimentary form


of bodily self-awareness to all animals. He does not conceive of bodily
self-awareness as something that requires highly elaborate psychological
abilities. Rather, it is fundamental for every animals existence.
The kind of reflexivity that Olivi attributes to the sense of touch differs
from intellectual reflexivity:
Again, they say that although organic agents cannot turn reflexively towards
themselves in a simple and intellectual waywhich the intellect and the
will are capable ofnonetheless they can do this in a less perfect way.
[...] But insofar as the sense of touch senses more inwardly than the other
senses, it turns its own and its organs virtual aspectus inwardly back to its
own organ. Nevertheless it cannot reflexively turn it to the intrinsic and
spiritual essence of the power or to the intrinsic act of the power, since that
belongs properly to the superior powers.54
Here, Olivi makes a distinction between two types of reflexivity. The intel-
lectual powers are capable of turning reflexively towards themselves in
a simple and intellectual way and the sense of touch in a less perfect
way. His idea is that the sense of touch senses primarily the state of its
own organ, and therefore it must be able to reflexively turn towards its
own organ. However, this kind of reflexivity differs from intellectual reflex-
ivity in one important way. Powers that are genuinely reflexive are able to
turn reflexively towards their own essences and their own acts, whereas
the sense of touch is only able to turn reflexively towards its organ, not
towards its own essence or acts.
The common sense is capable of the same kind of reflexivity as the
sense of touch: it can reflexively turn upon its own organ.55 Moreover,

53SummaII q.31, 569; ibid., q.62, 590.


54Rursus dicunt quod licet agens organicum non possit super se sic simpliciter et
intellectualiter reflecti sicut possunt intellectus et voluntas: nihilominus possunt aliquo
imperfectiori modo. [...] Pro quanto autem tactus intimius sentit quam ceteri sensus, pro
tanto virtualem aspectum suum et sui organi intimius reflectit super suum organum. Non
tamen potest ipsum reflectere super intrinsecam et spiritualem essentiam ipsius poten-
tiae nec super eius intrinsecum actum, quia hoc est proprium potentiarum superiorum.
(SummaII q.61, 58182.) Olivi considers also another possibility, namely, that the sense of
touch, as it exists in one part of the body, perceives the state of the adjacent part of the body
and not the part which is its own seat. However, it seems that he favours the view that the
sense of touch is capable of self-reflexivity. At any rate, he does not consider it to be a par-
ticularly problematic idea to defend. See Yrjnsuuri, Perceiving Ones Own Body, 10612.
55Et hinc est quod licet sensus communis apprehendat spirituales et sensitivos actus
sensuum, non tamen facit hoc nisi cum quodam aspectu corporali organi sui ad organa
sensuum aut etiam ad organum proprium, prout aliquo modo forsitan reflectitur in se
ipsum. (SummaII q.67, 619.)
the common sense 291

Olivi occasionally suggests that the common sense is capable of a reflexiv-


ity which goes beyond the ability to apprehend the state of the organ and
which shares some features of intellectual reflexivity. Take, for instance,
the following passage:
And so, this does not prove that the common sense would apprehend
something that is presentother than the acts and aspectus of the exter-
nal sensesexcept insofar as it perhaps reflexively turns towards its proper
act in a sensory and incomplete way (semiplene). But in that case the act
towards which it turns first had something else as its object.56
The expression semiplene is clearly meant to make a distinction between
intellectual self-reflexivity and the reflexivity of the common sense, but at
the same time it is clear that Olivi considers it a possibility that the com-
mon sense differs from the sense of touch, which is incapable of appre-
hending its own acts.57 Unfortunately, he does not define exactly what
kind of reflexivity he has in mindit is possible that he never worked
out a final view on this matterbut he seems to indicate that there is a
kind of middle level of reflexivity which can be attributed to the common
sense.
A central difference between the reflexivity of the common sense and
the higher intellectual reflexivity is introduced in the last clause. Olivi
insists that the common sense must be actualised by a direct act which is
intentionally directed at some external object (via the acts of the senses),
and only this direct act can be perceived by a reflexive act of the common
sense. It is not completely apparent what this reservation is meant for
because Olivi (once again) does not elaborate upon the issue. However,
his idea seems to be that the common sense cannot reflexively appre-
hend itself unless it is actualised by a direct act, and therefore it cannot
provide awareness about itself as a cognitive power. It is only capable of
apprehending the direct acts that are realised in it, and as such it provides

56Et ideo ex hoc non probatur quod sensus communis apprehendat aliquid praesen-
tiale praeter actus et actuales aspectus particularium sensuum, nisi forte pro quanto super
suum actum proprium sensualiter et semiplene reflectitur. Sed tunc actus ille super quem
reflectitur habuit primo aliquid aliud pro obiecto. (SummaII q.62, 595.) See also ibid.,
58889 (in footnote24 above); q.67, 61516 & 624; q.111, 27071. In q.58, 421, Olivi suggests
that not only the will but also other powers (note the plural) of the soul may be capable
of reflexively turning towards themselves.
57Note, however, that Olivi wavers with respect to this denial, and on some occasions
he seems to think that it is possible to attribute the middle level of reflexivity even to the
external senses (SummaII q.61, 583; SummaIV q.13, 1078 & 112 (Maranesi, q.1)).
292 chapter eleven

awareness of itself as perceiving, imagining, remembering, and so on. In


short, it provides animals with awareness of themselves as living beings.58
Every feature of bodily self-awareness (as Olivi understands it) exists
for the preservation of the being. All animals are aware of their own bod-
ies from the point of view of the well-being of the body and the whole
animal,59 and pain and pleasure guide even the simplest animals to pre-
serve themselves. Further, the evaluative awareness of the functions of dif-
ferent parts and organs of the body is attributed to living beings because
they seem to be capable of sacrificing a non-vital part in order to stay
alive, and the striving for self-preservation is also the reason why Olivi
allows animals to be aware of themselves as living beings. And finally,
every animal can be aware of itself as the end-term of a relation between
itself and an external object so as to avoid dangers and strive for advanta-
geous things. Non-human animals do everything they do for the sake of
self-preservation,60 and self-awareness is a precondition for it.
The above analysis shows that for Olivi, self-awareness appears rather
low in the hierarchy of beings. He does not attribute the rudimentary
forms of self-awareness exclusively to humans, because every living being
who possess a sense of touch, the common sense, and an ability to strive
for self-preservation is aware of its own body. Self-awareness is not a fea-
ture which separates human beings from other animals; it is a feature
which separates animals from plants.

58By contrast, the intellect is capable of apprehending itself directly. See SummaII
q.76, 14648; Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Impugnatio quorundam articulorum Arnaldi Galliardi,
articulus 19, ed. S.Piron, in Pierre de Jean Olivi, ed. C.Knig-Pralong et al., 457. Olivi wrote
Impugnatio at the end of 1282 as a contribution to a controversy between himself and his
old adversary and rival, Arnaud Gaillard. Both of these young Franciscans collected lists of
doctrines of the other which they thought to be susceptible to error and presented them to
the minister general of the order, Bonagratia of St. John in Persiceto. As a result, certain of
Olivis ideas were censured by his own order in 1283. See Boulnois, tre et reprsentation,
167174; Sylvain Piron, Lexprience subjective, 4354; id., Censures et condamnation,
31373; Burr, The Persecution of Peter Olivi, 3544; Juhana Toivanen, Animal Conscious-
ness: Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul (Jyvskyl: University of Jyvs-
kyl, 2009), 31840.
59SummaII q.61, 585.
60Primo, ex praedominio amoris super omnes affectiones animae; nam ipsa est
omnium radix et causa efficiens et finalis, nam ex amore et propter amorem et propter
eius amatum, puta, in animalibus propter amorem sui proprii suppositi suaeque naturae,
facit animal omnia quae facit. (SummaII q.69, 628.)
Chapter twelve

Imagination

The next power Olivi introduces in his discussion about the unity of the
internal senses is the imagination. This power was usually thought to
account for two different psychological processes: the ability to cognise
objects not present to the senses and the ability to form new images by
combining aspects of objects that one has seen before. The former process
was often thought to take place in such a way that the imagination func-
tions as a kind of storage for the species of things that one perceives, and
they can be later brought back to mindthis happens both in dreams
and through a deliberate concentrating on them. The compositive imagi-
nation takes place when the images that are stored in the imagination are
connected with each other.
In sectionone I shall discuss the general framework of Olivis ideas
concerning the imagination and point out that he rejects the idea of the
imagination as a storehouse. He thinks that imaginative acts are similar
to acts of perception with the exception that the former are intention-
ally directed at memory species. Sectiontwo deals with his argumentation
that the imagination is not an independent power but a special function
of the common sense. Sectionthree is devoted to Olivis conception of
dreaming, and sectionfour to the compositive imagination.

1.Imagination and Its Objects

Olivi conceives of the role of the imagination slightly differently than


many philosophers before him, even though there are significant similari-
ties between his ideas and those presented in the earlier tradition. One of
the similarities is the general idea that the imagination accounts for the
ability to apprehend absent objects. For instance, his theory is similar to
the one presented by Aquinas to the extent that he discusses both the
imaginative functionsimagining absent objects and the compositive
imaginationunder one general term and does not even consider the
possibility that they might be two distinct powers.1 He acknowledges that

1In contras to Aquinas who uses the term imaginatio, Olivi prefers imaginativa, often
without connecting it to any noun.
294 chapter twelve

both human and non-human animals are capable of imagining absent


objects and that human beings can also deliberately fantasise about
things which they have never seen. In other words, Olivis conception
of the psychological functions which can be called imaginative follows
the tradition closely. But this is where the similarities end. First, Olivi
thinks that it is unnecessary to postulate a separate power for perform-
ing these functions since both of them belong to the common sense.
Second, he understands the process of imagining an absent object in a
way that differs radically from the traditional idea that the imagining of
absent objects is conducted by the same power that retains the sensible
species. As Olivi discards the sensible species, it is natural that he rejects
also the role of the imagination as their storehouse. Third, he attributes the
ability to imagine unreal objects (or objects that the subject has not seen
before) also to non-human animals. He seems to think that there are two
kinds of fantasising: one is deliberate and possible only for human beings,
whereas the other happens spontaneously, for example, in dreams.2
The originality of Olivis conception of imagination is clear if we look at
the way he depicts the imagining of absent objects. He thinks that even if
the imagination were a separate power from the common sense, it would
not function as Avicenna and Aquinas claim. It is not a storehouse, as it
does not retain anything. Rather, the images or internal representations of
external objects are stored in the memory, and when a subject imagines
an absent object, the common sense forms an imaginative act which is
intentionally directed to the memory species. In this way, imaginative acts
are quite similar to acts of perception. Both are intentional acts which are
produced by the common sense. This affinity does not, however, mean
that there would be no differences between imaginative acts and the per-
ceptual acts of the common sense. These two kinds of acts differ from each
other not only phenomenally (I shall discuss the phenomenal difference
below when I examine Olivis conception of dreaming in sectionthree)
but also essentially. According to Olivi, the cognitive acts of the soul
are structured in the following way: (1) a power which is the subject of
the cognitive act brings about (2) an act that is intentionally directed at
(3) an object. Since both imaginative and perceptual acts belong to the
common sense, the difference must be either in the acts themselves or in

2Olivi may have received the last idea from Avicenna and, as such, it is not a deviation
from traditional understanding, but it is a deviation from Aquinas position.
imagination 295

their objects. As we have seen, Olivi thinks that the acts of the soul are
diversified because they belong to different powers and, to some extent,
because they pertain to different kinds of objects. Thus, in the case of
imagination and perception, the difference must be due to the objects:
Cognitive acts are produced by a power but not only by the powers bare
essence. Rather, an actual aspectus which is actually terminated at an object
is required in every act. [...] Therefore, when an external thing itself is not
the object of an aspectus, it is necessary that some memory species be the
object of the aspectus instead of the thing. The memory species is not a
principle of the cognitive act except in the manner of being a terminative
and representative object.3
Thus, the acts of perception are directed at external objects, and the
imaginative acts are directed at memory species (species memorialis). It is
important to note that memory species are not functionally similar to the
sensible species which figure in the species theories of perception. Olivi
does not think that they are principles which actualise the souls cognitive
powers. Rather, the role of the memory species in the process of imagina-
tion is exactly the same as the role of an external object in perception: it
functions as an object, as a terminus of the cognitive act. The imaginative
acts are not caused by the memory species; they are about the memory
species. As the memory species are representations of external objects,4
the subject imagines an object simply by directing the aspectus of the
common sense to its species in the memory.5
The difference between imaginative acts and perceptual acts of the
common sense is subtle. The only difference is that the former pertain to
mental representations of objects, whereas the latter are about external
objects that are present to the senses. One and the same power concen-
trates on different things, but otherwise the acts are similar.

3[...] actus cognitivi efficiuntur a potentia, non tamen per solam nudam essentiam
eius, immo in omnibus exigitur actualis aspectus super obiectum actualiter terminatus.
[...] Et ideo, quando res exterior per se non obicitur aspectui, oportet quod loco rei obi-
ciatur aspectui aliqua species memorialis, quae non est principium actus cognitivi nisi
solum per modum obiecti terminativi et repraesentativi [...] (SummaII q.74, 113; for
more details, see ibid., 11517); [...] species memoriales in quas tunc aspicit aspectus
imaginantis [...] (ibid., q.58, 504.)
4See, e.g., SummaII q.74, 119 & 12122; Putallaz, La connaissance de soi, 121.
5SummaII q.74, 11516.
296 chapter twelve

2.Imagination as a Function of the Common Sense

Let us now look at Olivis argumentation in favour of his thesis about the
unity of the imagination and the common sense. The underlying rationale
of identifying these powers is twofold: the receptive powers should not be
distinguished from the retentive ones (on the basis of this feature alone),6
and the imagining of absent objects is a psychological process that is so
similar to perception that it is plausible that they are produced by the
same power.
In addition to these general ideas, Olivi presents a host of other argu-
ments. Only two of them are relevant to our inquiry here. The first argu-
ment is based on his idea that there can be only one power in the soul
which can apprehend all the acts of the other powers and the objects of
these acts. He writes:
For, if the imaginative [power] is distinct from the common sense and supe-
rior to it (which it must necessarily be if it is distinct because it is posterior),
then it must control the common sense in its act and judge (iudicet) its act
and the acts of the inferior senses. This is obviously false and ridiculous.7
The point of this argument is that the imagination cannot be different
from the common sense because if it were, it should be able to apprehend
also the acts and objects of the common sense. According to Olivi, it is
more reasonable to think that imaginative acts belong to the common
sense than to attribute the apprehension of the acts of the common sense
to an imaginative power. There must be, even in the sensitive soul, a supe-
rior power that is capable of apprehending all the acts of the other powers
and their objects, and Olivi thinks that this power is the common sense.
The other important argument which Olivi presents is based on the
interconnectedness of the psychological functions. On the one hand,
there are certain psychological functions that were often attributed to a
distinct power of the imagination, like the imagining of an absent object.
On the other hand, there are functions which were unanimously attrib-
uted to the common sense, like the perception of a present object via the

6Ergo species memorialis seu imaginaria per ipsum facta conservatur in sola potentia
sensus communis aut in eius organo, in quantum est eius. Ergo eius subsequens inspectio
et cogitatio est eiusdem potentiae, in quantum est activa. (SummaII q.63, 599.)
7Quia si imaginativa est alia a sensu communi et superior illa, quod utique oportet,
si est alia, quoniam erit posterior: tunc oportet quod ipsa regat sensum communem in
suo actu et quod iudicet de eius actu et de actibus sensuum inferiorum. Quod aperte est
falsum et ridiculosum. (SummaII q.63, 59899.)
imagination 297

external senses. Olivi thinks that if we can find a psychological process in


which these two acts are compared to each other, we have good reason
to think that these two functions belong to one and the same power. And
he is quick to find such a case:
For, the act of discerning that an imaginary species is not an external object
but something else is higher than the mere imagining of the object. But the
discernment is brought about by the common sense because this [viz. the
difference between an imagined and a real object] is discerned only while
awake, and it occurs in such a way that the one who discerns the difference
notices that the image of the absent object is not situated outside the exter-
nal senses or apprehended by them. Therefore, it is necessary that the same
power compares the act of imagining to the acts of the external senses and
perceives and judges that there is a sensible difference between them. How-
ever, it is clear that apprehending the acts of the senses when they occur
and judging them belong only to the common sense. Therefore, apprehend-
ing the acts of the imagination and judging them belong to it as well. This
is, to my mind, the most powerful argument among the aforementioned
because it is proved also by constant internal experience.8
According to this argument, to imagine an object and to discern that an
object is imagined (and not perceived) are two different things. Normally,
when a being imagines something, it is able to tell whether it imagines or
perceives that thing. Olivi claims that this presupposes that it is aware of
the activity or inactivity of its senses: if the object is apprehended by the
external senses, the subject is aware that it is perceiving the object. Simi-
larly, if an object is apprehended by imagining, the subject is able to tell

8Quia actus, quo species imaginaria discernitur non esse ipsa res extra, sed esse aliud
ab ipsa, est altior quam sola imaginatio eius. Sed illa discretio fit per sensum commu-
nem, quia haec non discernitur nisi in vigilia, fitque per hoc quod discernens advertit
illam imaginem rerum absentium non obici extra ipsis particularibus sensibus nec per eos
apprehendi. Ergo oportet quod eadem potentia comparet tunc actum imaginandi ad actus
exteriorum sensuum et quod sensibilem diversitatem sentiat et iudicet inter illos. Constat
autem quod solius sensus communis est apprehendere actus sensuum, dum fiunt, et iudi-
care de eis. Ergo et eius est apprehendere actus imaginationis et iudicare de eis. Et haec
ratio meo iudicio est inter praedictas fortissima, quia et experimento interno et assiduo
comprobatur. (SummaII q.63, 599600.) This is the text that most clearly accounts for
the phenomenal difference between perception and imagination without appealing to an
idea which was later employed by Scotus and Ockham, namely, the differentation of intui-
tive from abstractive cognitionEleonore Stump argues that even though the distinction
was probably not invented in order to account for this problem, in effect it does so (Stump,
The Mechanisms of Cognition, 18188). For discussion, see also Marilyn McCord Adams,
William Ockham, vol.1, Publications in Medieval Studies 26/1 (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1987), 5016. We see that Olivis idea is different and that it is explicitly
associated with the problem of accounting for the difference.
298 chapter twelve

that the object is imagined because it is aware that it does not perceive the
object at that moment. As we have seen, Olivi thinks that second-order
perception accounts for the ability to distinguish imagined objects from
perceived ones. If second-order perception of the activity or inactivity of
the senses were lacking for some reason, the subject could not tell the
difference between perception and imagination.
The awareness of the external senses activity or inactivity belongs to
the common sense. Therefore, the common sense takes part in the dis-
cernment of imagination and perception. Now, if we suppose that the
imagination is a distinct power from the common sense, we must con-
clude that when a being is aware of the objects of its imagination as imag-
ined, it is using both its imagination and its common sense. This is the
point in which Olivi employs his criterion that the comparison between
two cognitive acts and their contents is necessarily carried out by one
power. One power has to apprehend both the imagined object and the
inactivity of the senses. Hence, either there must be a superior power that
apprehends the acts of the common sense as well as the acts of the imagi-
native power, or one of these powers apprehends not only its own acts
and objects but also those of the other. From here it is only a short step to
Olivis first argument, which I presented above: the highest power cannot
be the imagination. The common sense must be capable of apprehending
imagined things, and this makes the imagination an unnecessary postu-
late. The principle of parsimony seems to be at work here.
Olivi takes up still another possible refutation to his argument that the
psychological process of imagining an absent object as absent belongs to
the common sense. What if the common sense and imagination are dis-
tinct powers and the comparison between the act of the common sense
and the act of the imagination is carried out by the intellect? This would
account for our ability to apprehend absent objects as absent without
necessitating us to discard the difference between the common sense and
the imagination: the intellect would be the unifying power in which all
the other acts of the soul converge.
Olivi answers tersely that non-human animals also are capable of dis-
tinguishing absent and present objects:
For when a dog prefers a visible and present bone to a better bone (which
it remembers and also desires) because it sees that the latter is not present;
then it certainly makes a sensory distinction between an absent bone and
a present one. Likewise, when the dog returns to its master and his home,
then it certainly remembers its master and home and perceives well that the
thing which it remembers is not present because otherwise it would stay in
imagination 299

place and would not proceed further to the master as it would to an absent
thing. Therefore, it then clearly perceives that the thing which is presented
in remembrance is not externally present, but absent.9
Olivis reply points out that not only human beings but also non-human
animals are aware that the objects they imagine or remember are not
present to their senses. We can see that this is the case simply by observ-
ing how animals behave. The counter-argument fails because it denies
this ability to non-human animals: the comparison of and the intercon-
necting between various psychological processes cannot be done by the
intellectat least in the case of animals.
The cited passage is important for many reasons. It shows us once
again the degree of psychological sophistication that Olivi attributes to
non-human animals. It also accentuates that he understands the com-
mon sense as being the centre of cognition in the case of non-human
animals: imagining and remembering cannot be brought about by distinct
powers because animals have to be aware of imagined and recollected
thingsotherwise their actions cannot be accounted forand they are
aware of those things because the common sense brings about cognitive
acts with respect to them. The cited passage also supports my reading of
the phenomenal content of the second-order acts of perception, which
I presented in chapter eleven. Olivi makes a clear distinction between
cognising an object and being aware of the way in which the object is cog-
nised. When the dog imagines its home, it is aware that the home is not
present, because otherwise it would not attempt to go there. Yet, the mere
imagining of the home is not sufficient for accounting for the dogs action.
It must also be aware of the way in which it cognises the home. This infor-
mation comes from the common sense, which either perceives that the
senses are not functioning at all or that their activity is not producing
the image of the home. The fourth important aspect of the cited passage

9Quia quando canis praefert os visibile et praesens alteri ossi meliori memorato et
etiam desiderato, quia videt illud sibi non sic adesse: utique tunc sensibiliter discernit
inter absens et praesens. Item, quando redit ad suum dominum et ad domum eius: tunc
utique recordatur de domino et de domo et bene sentit quod illud de quo recordabatur
non est sibi praesens, quia tunc staret in illo et non procederet ultra ad illud tanquam ad
absens. Ergo tunc aperte sentit quod illud quod sibi in recordatione offertur non est sibi
extrinsecus praesens, sed absens. (SummaII q.63, 600.) Olivi uses the example of non-
human animals which are capable of remembering and striving for absent things also in
a different context: see Petrus Ioannis Olivi, Postilla super Isaiam, in Peter of John Olivi
on the Bible: Principia quinque in sacram Scripturam, Postilla in Isaiam et in Ad Corinthios,
ed. D.Flood & G.Gl (New York: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1997) (hereafter Super
Isaiam), Prima pars, 204, 2025.
300 chapter twelve

is that it shows us the phenomenal difference between the imaginative


and perceptual acts of the common sense: when imagining an object, the
subject is aware that it does not perceive the object (or, it is aware of
the object-as-not-perceived), and this is a part of the imaginative process
as a whole. However, sometimes the phenomenal difference between
imagining and perceiving does not exist: during a vivid dream one often
is not aware that the images one sees are not real and present to the
senses.

3.Dreaming

When we are dreaming, we oftentimes do not realise that what is happen-


ing to us in our dream is not real. Medieval philosophers usually thought
that dream images are brought about by the same psychological process
which accounts for our ability to form images in our minds and to bring
absent things before our minds while we are awake. Dreaming is imagin-
ing, but it is a sort of imagining in which the subject is not aware that
she is imagining: the phenomenal difference between imagination and
perception does not exist.
Olivis conception of dreaming closely follows this medieval approach.
He thinks that when we dream, we see dream images because our com-
mon senses are active and produce imaginative acts. He also endeavours
to explain how the phenomenal difference between imagining and per-
ceiving disappears while we sleep. His most extensive discussion concern-
ing dreaming appears in a question which considers various explanations
for the alleged fact that human beings are not free when they are asleep,
in a state of madness, or in their childhood. According to Olivi, the intel-
lectual part of the soul can function to some extent also when a person is
dreaming, mad, or a child, but it is not capable of producing free acts. The
reason for this is that in these states the will is incapable of full reflexivity,
and this causes changes in the operations of the intellect as well.10
We need not delve into the details of Olivis view because it is mostly
irrelevant to our present inquiry. Yet, when he addresses the causes which
render freedom impossible for persons who are asleep, he provides us
with a clear picture of his conception of dreaming. This picture helps us

10SummaII q.59, 53054; Quodl. 1.67, 2226; Super Gen., 12526; Boureau, Pierre de
Jean Olivi et le semi-dormeur, 23138.
imagination 301

to see the role of the imaginative acts of the common sense and how they
differ phenomenologically from the acts of perception.11 It needs to be
emphasised that non-human animals also dream, and thus the following
ideas apply to them.12
Dreaming is a state in which the common sense has only imaginative
acts. These acts are directed at memory species, but they are not about the
species as species, that is, as representations. We are not aware that we
are imagining them. Rather, the phenomenal content of an imaginative
act is the object which is represented by the memory species. The object
is not usually apprehended as such, but we have a false impression that
we perceive the things in our dreams. When we imagine or dream colours,
sounds, odours, and so forth, these perceptual qualities appear to us as if
we were seeing, hearing, or smelling them. Olivi thinks that this experi-
ence is caused by the aspectus of the common sense, which is directed to
the external senses in addition to the memory species.13 We can under-
stand this idea if we look at another case in which Olivi accounts for the
content of our perception by claiming that the aspectus is directed at two
things simultaneously: he explains that when we see some object through
stained glass, the object appears as having the colour of the glass because
the aspectus is partly terminated at the glass, but most of it goes virtu-
ally all the way to the object we see.14 Similarily, we apprehend the dream
images as if they were coloured by certain sense modalities.
When one is dreaming without being aware that one is dreaming,
the dream image is not distinguished from a real object: When a thing
is apprehended by the means of its species and in the species, as if by
the means of its image, it is not distinguished from the thing itself, as the
thing is actually in itself or as it is present to the external senses.15 The
subject apprehends dream images as if they were external things and not
just images of those things. But this is not due to the nature of the species
because:

11The important passages are SummaII q.59, 53436, 54950, 55357, 559, and 565.
12SummaII q.58, 506.
13SummaII q.51, 112; ibid., q.63, 600601.
14SummaII q.37, 667; ibid., q.58, 506.
15[...] res, prout est sic per speciem et in specie tanquam per suam imaginem appre-
hensa, non distinguitur a re, prout est quiddam actu in se ipsa aut prout est extrinsecis
sensibus oblata. (SummaII q.59, 535.)
302 chapter twelve

To apprehend a species as a thing (species ut rem) can be understood in two


ways: either the real essence of the species is apprehended, or the species
appears as if it were the external thing, a species of which it is. [...] If in the
second way, it is clear that this [kind of apprehension] can be caused by
the species only in such a way that the species presents itself to the gaze of
the imagination (aciei imaginationis) or the intellect, instead of the external
thing. But the species does this every time a human being cognises some-
thing by it. Therefore, if this [kind of apprehension] were to arise from the
species, human beings would always fall into the aforementioned error.16
The content of an imaginative act does not in itself differ from the con-
tent of a perceptual act. When something is imagined and there are no
other kinds of cognitive acts in the common sensesuch as a second-
order perception of the inactivity of the sensesthe subject does not rea-
lise she is only imagining. The memory species and the act of imagining
alone do not make us realise that the imagined thing is not present. As we
have already seen, we are aware of the imagined thing as imagined only
if the common sense apprehends the activity or inactivity of the external
senses and compares the imagined thing to the information it receives
from them.17 Second-order perception is necessary for being aware that
the imagined thing is imagined.
Olivi acknowledges that sometimes in our dreams we are aware that
we are dreaming. This happens when someone dreams that he dreams.
Instead of having a dream of X, he has a dream of dreaming of X, and this
experience is possible only if his mind has turned reflexively towards the
act of dreaming. In this kind of case the dreamer also has a false impres-
sion of being awake:
And if it is said that a human being sometimes dreams that he dreams, and
that he seems to be awake and free at that time, because this [experience]
does not seem to be possible without apprehending the species as a species
and without reflexively turning himself to the act of dreaming: it must be
said that I do not deny all reflexion upon the act in dreams [...] but only
free and dominative reflexion, and I do not deny all apprehension of the
species as a species but only the apprehension of the species (or the thing

16Apprehendere speciem ut rem potest intelligi dupliciter: aut scilicet, quia apprehen-
dit realem essentiam ipsius speciei, aut quia species videtur esse ipsa res exterior cuius
est species. [...] Si vero secundo modo, constat quod hoc ex parte speciei esse non potest,
nisi solum per hoc quod ipsa exhibet se aciei imaginationis vel intellectus loco ipsius rei
exterioris. Sed hoc facit semper, quandocunque homo per eam aliquid cogitat. Ergo si ex
parte eius hoc esset, semper incideret homo in supradicto errore. (SummaII q.59, 535.)
17Question 59 of Summa proves that in human beings the power that makes the com-
parison is the intellect, and question 63 tells us that the intellect needs the common sense
in order to be able to apprehend the activity of the external senses.
imagination 303

by its species) without any error. In the aforementioned case there is still an
error, because [the dreamer] believes that the act by which he judges that
he dreams or sleeps is an act of a person who is awake. He does not appre-
hend with certainty that he dreams or sleeps, because he cannot apprehend
definitely the state or sleep of his powers; rather, he only conjectures it by
estimating.18
The awareness results from a reflexive act, which, however, is not free
and does not convey certain and correct information of the state of the
sleeper. He cannot apprehend the state of his senses, and he does not
realise that the reflexive act is also part of the dream. Being aware of hav-
ing a dream is a dream in itself, and the dreamer mistakenly judges that
he is partly awake.
We can see that Olivi allows for no phenomenal difference between
perceptual and imaginative acts if they are considered as such. If per
impossibile there were an act of perception without a second-order per-
ception of the act of perception, we could not tell the difference between
a perceived object and an imagined object. The phenomenal content of
our cognition would be the same in both cases: we would cognise the
object and nothing else. It would not appear to us as seen, or as imag-
ined. In this way, the phenomenal difference between the perceptual and
imaginative acts of the common sense pertains to a second-order aware-
ness of the way in which the objects of those acts are present to us. This
second-order awareness is concomitant with the psychological processes
of perceiving and imagining, even though it can be missing from the latter
in exceptional situations, for example, when one is dreaming.

4.Compositive Imagination

Olivi thinks in line with other medieval authors that in addition to being
capable of imagining absent objects which have been previously pre-
ceived, human beings can also imagine things that are not real, such as

18Quodsi dicatur quod homo in somnis aliquando somniat se somniare et ita tunc
videtur esse vigil et liber, quia hoc non videretur posse nisi apprehendendo speciem ut
speciem et reflectendo se super actum somniandi: dicendum quod non negatur in som-
nis vel in tempore huius ligamenti omnis reflexio super actum, sed solum reflexio libera
et dominativa, nec omnis apprehensio speciei, ut est species, sed solum apprehensio
speciei seu rei per speciem sine omni errore. In tali autem adhuc est error, quia actum
illum quo aestimat se somniare et se dormire credit actum esse vigilantis nec etiam tunc
apprehendit certitudinaliter se somniare aut dormire, cum non possit apprehendere certe
statum seu consopitionem potentiarum suarum, sed solum aestimative hoc conicit [...]
(SummaII q.59, 565.)
304 chapter twelve

golden mountains and chimaeras. That said, even human beings cannot
imagine anything completely outside their earlier experiences because
what has not been present in the senses cannot be imagined: people who
are blind from birth are as incapable of imagining the visible qualities of
a normal mountain as they are incapable of imagining the visible qualities
of a golden mountain,19 but from within our previous experiences, we can
imagine just about anything. However, Olivi does not delimit this ability
only to human beings. Non-human animals imagine things which they
have never seen before at least while they are asleep.
Olivi gives two slightly different accounts for this psychological func-
tion. In question 58 of the second book of Summa he writes:
We experience in ourselves that we can put together a species with another
almost infinitely, and thus we can compose and think in ourselves infinite
compositions of images which we have never seen before. This is clear when
we imagine golden mountains or a chimaera and so forth, and when we are
imagining one undivided stone or mountain and suddenly we imagine that
it breaks into many parts in many ways, or when at one time we imagine it
still and at another time intensely moving, as it were, before our eyes. [...]
the formation of these compositions and divisions takes place both in the
memory and in the gaze of the one who is imagining (acie imaginantis).
For the gaze of the imagination (acie imaginationis) which is controlled and
moved by the intellect can be applied to memory species in such diverse
ways that we imagine them differently than they exist.20
The core of Olivis view becomes clear from the first line: take a mem-
ory species of a mountain and conjoin it with a memory species of gold.
Voil! You have just imagined a golden mountain. An imaginative act of
the common sense may be directed to several memory species simultane-
ously, and when it does, we imagine an object in which those species are
combined with each other.

19Olivi points this out in SummaII q.74, 121.


20Experimur enim in nobis quod quasi infinitis modis possumus unam speciem cum
altera componere et sic infinitas compositiones imaginum quas nunquam foris vidimus
intra nos formare et cogitare, sicut patet, quando imaginamur montes aureos vel chimae-
ram et sic de aliis et quando imaginantes unum integrum lapidem vel montem subito
imaginamur eum frangi in multas partes et multis modis aut quando modo imagina-
mur eum stantem modo fortiter currentem quasi coram oculis nostris. [...] formationes
istarum compositionum et fractionum fiunt tam in memoria quam in acie imaginantis.
Acies enim imaginationis per intellectum ducta et mota potest ita diversimode applicari
ad species memoriales quod eam imaginabitur aliter quam sit. (SummaII q.58, 5045.)
Olivis use of the term acies bespeaks Augustines influence and is reminiscent of his con-
cept of acies mentis.
imagination 305

The details of this process are, however, less clear. Olivi says at the end
of the previous passage that the composition of the imagined objects takes
place both in the memory and in the imagination. Given that these two
are actually one and the same power, or rather functions of the common
sense, it is not absolutely clear what this distinction means. However,
by a detailed reading we can try to make sense of Olivis idea. The cen-
tral notions are the acies imaginationisby which Olivi seems to mean
the aspectus of the common senseand the memory understood as a
kind of a storehouse of memory species. Even though the imagination
and the memory are the same power, they denote different functions of
the common sense. When Olivi says that composition takes place both
in the imagination and in the memory, his idea is that the memory spe-
cies are combined in the memory prior to apprehending them and during
the process of imagining them. In this way he gives two slightly different
accounts of the compositive imagination, and he also seems to take both
as sufficient in themselves and as alternatives to each other. Supposing
that the image of a mountain and the image of gold were already merged
in the memory when I direct my attention there, I would then imagine the
golden mountain. And supposing that the images were merged during the
process of imagining, I would then imagine the golden mountain as well.
Both accounts are sufficient for saving the phenomenon.
Let us see the details of these two ways of imagining. The following text
is a good starting point:
Compositions and divisions of this kind are and take place first in the act
of cognition, which regards simultaneously several memory species and
brings them together. This kind of act generates then a species by which
we remember it. Or perhaps, as the will moves the gaze of cognition (acies
cogitantis) to look at various memory species, it simultaneously moves the
sinus (sinum) of the memory and the species thereof; and according to the
manifold movements, new compositions and divisions of the species in
the memory are brought about, for in dreams the species seem to be moved
and made available by a natural priority before they are seen by the dreamer.
However, I do not care about this difficulty because it does not have rel-
evance to the question at hand whether these compositions and divisions
are brought about by the changing movement of the aspectus which looks
at the species, by the movement of the virtual parts of the memory and the
species which inform them, or by both of the movements occurring simul-
taneously.21

21Huiusmodi autem compositiones vel divisiones primo sunt et fiunt in actu cogi-
tantis et varias species memoriae simul aspicientis et conferentis, ac deinde ex tali actu
306 chapter twelve

Here we clearly see the two explanations. The first of them is that the
aspectus of the common sense is directed simultaneously to the memory
species of two different objects, a mountain and gold, and the subject
cognises the combination of the two by one act that has two objects.
Afterwards the memory contains a new species of a golden mountain,
and subsequent imaginative acts may use this species.22 The other option
is that the two memory species become merged before they are looked
at. The species of a mountain and the species of gold are merged to each
other in the memory before we imagine the combination. Understood in
this way, the memory contains a species of a golden mountain before we
take it as an object of our apprehension. Olivi provides dreaming as an
example of a case in which this explanation seems better suited, and this
gives us reason to think that the difference between the two accounts can
be described in such a way that merging the species during the process
of imagining is deliberate, whereas merging them in the memory prior to
imagining happens unintentionally. Olivi thinks that both processes may
be applicable. Sometimes imagining happens in one way and sometimes
in another.23
It seems that the memory species are merged in the common sense
during their cognition when a human being deliberately decides to imag-
ine some unreal object. The intellect is capable of directing the common
sense in such a way that it can be directed to several memory species
simultaneously (or in such a way that there is an imperceptible interval),
and when this happens, the common sense forms a cognitive act that per-
tains to both of these species:

gignitur species per quam de ipsa recordamur. Vel forte, sicut voluntas movet aciem cogi-
tantis ad varias species memoriae contuendas: sic simul cum hoc movet sinum memoriae
cum suis speciebus; et secundum quod diversimode movet, fiunt novae compositiones
aut divisiones specierum in memoria, nam et in somnis prius naturaliter videntur moveri
species et offerri, antequam a somniante videantur. Sed de hac difficultate non curo, quia
ad propositam quaestionem non refert an fiant huiusmodi compositiones et divisiones per
variam motionem aspectus super species contuendas, aut per motum virtualium partium
memoriae cum speciebus quibus informantur, aut per utrumque motum simul factum.
(SummaII q.74, 12122.)
22SummaII q.58, 505.
23This interpretation goes against another that I have argued for elsewhere (Toivanen,
Peter Olivi on Internal Senses, 44142). I concentrated too much on Olivis understand-
ing of this process as it applies to human beings who deliberately imagine unreal objects
and failed to notice that the other option (the movement that takes place in the memory)
applies to other animals as well as to human beings who are either asleep or mad.
imagination 307

This is why it seems to a human being that in these kinds of compositions


the aspectus or the gaze of cognition takes one species or one thing and
puts it on anotheralthough sometimes this happens so quickly that there
does not seem to be any preceding movement, and the composition or the
image that is thus composed seems to appear suddenly before the cognitive
regard.24
Then again, sometimes the species are merged to each other prior to their
being cognised, and involuntarily:
It is not inconvenient that the memory can have a kind of virtual move-
ment in itself [...] For, perhaps the memory (as informed by one species)
can be brought into contact with itself (as it exists under another species)
by a kind of a virtual movement in such a way that one species is seen as
if it were placed over anotherlike a parchment were placed over another
parchment.25
Further in the text, Olivi tells us why he thinks that the latter option must
be accepted. When we are asleep or if we are insane, we do not fanta-
sise about unreal things on purpose. Rather, the spiritus animalis flows in
our brain in an uncontrolled manner, and this flow forms new kinds of
compositions of the memory species, which are retained in the memory.
When our attention is directed to the memory, we suddenly see things
that we have never seen before.
Olivi makes thus a distinction between two different kinds of com-
positive imagination. One is controlled by reason; the other is involun-
tary, can be attributed also to irrational animals, and is based on a rather
coarse physiological basis. Olivi does not always make a clear distinction
between these two processes, but the following excerpt confirms that they
differ from each other:
And, according to Augustine, new visions and new dreams may appear to
animals in this way [viz. in such a way that the combining of the species
takes place in the memory]. He proves this [by pointing out] that this is the

24Unde et in huiusmodi compositionibus videtur homini quod aspectus seu acies


cogitantis accipiat unam speciem seu unam rem et ponat eam super alteram, quamvis
aliquando hoc ita subito fiat quod nullus motus videtur ibi praecessisse, sed ipsa com-
positio seu imago sic composita subito videtur ante conspectum cogitantis apparuisse.
(SummaII q.58, 507.) For more details, see ibid., 5057.
25Non est inconveniens, si ipsa memoria potest habere in se quasdam virtuales
motiones. [...] Forte enim ipsa memoria ut tali specie informata potest per quendam
modum virtualem applicari ad se ipsam ut sub altera specie existentem, quod videbitur
una species quasi super altera posita, acsi pellis super pellem poneretur. (SummaII q.58,
5056.)
308 chapter twelve

reason why sleeping [dogs] suddenly bark: something which excites them to
bark appears to them. In human beings, the combining occurs in addition to
this because the imagination is controlled by the intellect or will.26
Olivi says that compositive imagination takes place in two ways in the
case of human beings: by the physiological changes that bring about new
combinations of memory species and by the guidance of the intellect. He
also says that the former process takes place in non-human animals when
they are asleep and dreaming. Interestingly, he appeals to Augustine and
not to Avicenna to support the idea that some kind of compositive imagi-
nation can be attributed to non-human animals. After all, Avicenna could
also be the origin of the distinction between the deliberate and the invol-
untary uses of the compositive imagination. Regardless of the source of
Olivis idea, the fact that he attributes the compositive imagination to non-
human animals reveals that he conceives of them as being more elaborate
creatures than, say, Aquinas doesespecially because there seems to be
no necessary reason for Olivi to attribute this ability to beasts. The ability
to compose new images out of those which the subject has previously per-
ceived does not account for any observed animal behaviour, save perhaps
the barking of a sleeping dog. But then again, this kind of behaviour could
be accounted for without appealing to the compositive imagination. The
attribution of the compositive imagination to non-human animals shows
how deep the similarity of human and non-human animals is in Olivis
eyes. If there is no reason to deny the similarity, it must be accepted.

26Et secundum hanc viam possunt secundum Augustinum aliquando apparere nova
visa et nova somnia animalibus, probans hoc quod hac de causa aliquando, dum dormi-
unt, subito latrant, quia aliquid apparet eis quod eos commovet ad latrandum. In homine
autem ultra hoc contingit istud, pro eo quod imaginatio ducitur ab intellectu seu a volun-
tate [...] (SummaII q.58, 506; emphasis mine.)
Chapter thirteen

Memory

Unlike Avicenna, Aquinas, and many other medieval philosophers who


conceive of memory as a kind of a storehouse where the intentions (inten
tiones) are preserved, Olivi does not appeal to the concept of intention in
his discussion concerning memory.1 In this respect he diverges from the
Avicennian framework. The functions that he analyses under the heading
of memory are:
1. Retaining memory species.
2. Remembering absent objects from the past.
3. Recognising a present object as being previously apprehended.
Olivi explicitly distinguishes functions (1) and (2),2 and although he does
not treat (3) as an independent functionit is a special case of (2)it is
useful to consider them separately.
As one might expect, Olivi argues that these functions should not be
considered as belonging to a distinct power. They can be attributed to the
common sense if they are understood correctly. Functions (2) and (3) are
brought about by acts of the common sense that pertain to past things
and events, and the difference between them is that in the latter case
the memory is connected to an object that is perceived, whereas the for-
mer does not presuppose simultaneous perception of an external object.
Remembering takes place when we turn our attention to the memory spe-
cies which are stored in the memory (although the memory as a store-
house is not actually distinct from the common sense). Sectionsone to
three are devoted to each of the three memorative functions, and I shall
deal with Olivis argumentation for the unity between the memory and
the common sense while I analyse them.

1It should be noted that Olivi accepts that human beings also have an intellectual
memory. See SummaII q.44, 73441; ibid., q.54, 281; q.58, 48586; q.59, 52223 & 561;
q.74, 11417. Cf. ibid., q.66, 61213. I shall not discuss his conception of it here.
2Quod autem memorativa ab ipso non differat probant, et primo, prout memora-
tiva dicitur illa quae elicit actionem recordandi. [...] Secundo probant hoc specialiter de
memoria specierum retentiva. De qua quidem planum est quod ad eam non spectat nisi
solum speciem memorialem recipere et retinere; unde nulla actio sentiendi vel intelligendi
est ab ea, in quantum tali, nisi solum pro quanto fuit de obiecto, id est, de specie quae
tenet locum obiecti. (SummaII q.66, 60911.)
310 chapter thirteen

As remembering is an intentional act of cognition which is about mem-


ories and not external objects, it is structurally similar to the imagina-
tive acts of the common sense. I shall discuss the differences between the
memory and imaginative functions of the common sense in sectionfour.

1.Retention of Memory Species

As we have already seen, the function of retaining the memory species


(species memoriales) is central for Olivis interpretation of the imagina-
tive function of the common sense.3 Memory species should not be
understood as being similar to the sensible species which figure in many
medieval theories of perception. The Olivian memory species are images,
similitudes, or representations of external objects. They are not formal
or efficient causes of cognitive acts. Rather, they serve as the objects of
intentional cognitive acts: Memory species, by contrast, serve only as
objects in which the act and aspectus of the power terminate and which
represent the absent object to them.4 Their role in the cognitive process
of imagining and remembering is similar to the role of external objects in
perceptual acts. Cognitive acts which are produced by the common sense
can pertain either to external objects or to memory species.
In discussing memory species, Olivi employs the familiar imagery of
a piece of wax and a signet ring.5 His idea is that a cognitive act leaves
traces in the memory in a similar way as a signet ring leaves its image on

3Occasionally Olivi seems to accept that memory can serve as a storehouse of inten-
tions. He says, for instance, that: Nullaque est ratio quare intentio praeteriti non possit
occurrere somnianti sicut et ceterae intentiones quae in memoria continentur. (SummaII
q.59, 556.) However, this text and others of the same kind must be understood as impre-
cise formulations because his conception of intentions is such that they cannot be stored
anywhere, as we shall see. The citation comes from Olivis argument that memory func-
tions also while the subject is asleep. He is not analysing the details of the memorative acts
of the common sense, and therefore he simply dismisses the details of his developed view.
Moreover, according to Pirons dating, question 59 of Summa was written before questions
65 & 66, which means that Olivi may have developed his views in the meantime.
4Species vero memoriales serviunt tantum de obiecto terminante actum et aspectum
potentiae et repraesentante eis obiectum absens [...] (SummaII q.74, 119; see also ibid.,
q.58, 46970.) Memory species are similitudes, images, or representations (ibid., q.36, 653;
q.59, 53436; q.72, 26; q.74, 12223; q.75, 142). Even though the imagery Olivi uses per-
tains mostly to vision and visible qualities, memory species can represent all aspects of
perceptual cognition (see, e.g., Super Isaiam, Prima pars, 214, 2035.) See also Putallaz, La
connaissance de soi, 121.
5The imagery of a seal and wax was employed already in antiquity. See Mem. 1, 450a30
35; Plato, Theaetetus 191c92a. To be sure, Platos work was not available to medievals.
memory 311

wax when imprinted: Every memory species is generated by some actual


cognition of an object, as the figure of a signet ring is generated in wax by
an actual imprinting of wax into the ring or ring into the wax.6 He speci-
fies further that memory species are caused by the acts of the common
sense: Species which are retained in the sensitive memory are generated
in it by an act of the common sense,7 and the memory is completely
passive in this process.8 Also imaginative acts of the common sense may
generate a species in the memory.9
Memory species represent the individual objects whose apprehension
generated the species in the first place:
Again, it must be known that because a cognitive act pertaining to an indi-
vidual object is terminated at that object, as it is that individual and not
another, the essence of the act is to be a proper similitude of that indi-
vidual (as that individual). It is not a similitude of other individuals of the
same species insofar as they differ from that individual in their individuality
(individualiter). The act represents the individual nature (ratio) and proper-
ties of its object [...] because it is terminated at an individual object as an
individual in the aforementioned way. The memory species which has been
left by the act has this [ability to represent an individual object] due to the
act which has caused the memory species and which the memory species
represents insofar as the act is or was terminated at such an object.10

6Omnis species memorialis generatur per aliquam actualem cognitionem obiecti,


sicut sigillaris figura cerae fuit genita per actualem impressionem cerae in sigillo vel sigilli
in cera. (SummaII q.74, 116.)
7Praeterea, species retentae in memoria sensuali generantur in ea per actum sensus
communis. (SummaII q.58, 509; ibid., q.63, 599.)
8Dicunt enim quod sicut ad primas impressiones agentium educuntur aliqua in
materia patientis de potentia eius quae remanent post absentiam impressionis, sicut in
cera remanent figurae post actualem impressionem sigilli: sic ad actum sensus communis
educuntur in memoria species quasi de potentia eius [...] et ideo possunt remanere in
ea post absentiam actuum sensus communis. Unde isti memoriam nullo modo ponunt
activam respectu huiusmodi specierum, sed solum passivam, sicut nec cera est respectu
figurarum quas retinet. (SummaII q.58, 5078.) See also ibid., 486; q.66, 611. It becomes
clear from the context that despite the impersonal expression this is Olivis view.
9SummaII q.58, 505.
10Rursus sciendum quod quia actus cognitivus obiecti individualis est terminatus in
ipsum, in quantum est hoc individuum et non aliud: ideo de essentia talis actus est quod
sit propria similitudo huius individui, in quantum huius, et quod non sit similitudo alio-
rum individuorum eiusdem speciei, pro quanto individualiter differunt ab isto. Quod igitur
actus iste repraesentet individualem rationem et proprietatem sui obiecti [...] [habet]
ex hoc quod terminatur ad obiectum individuale, in quantum individuale, et hoc sub
modo praedicto. Species vero memorialis ex tali actu relicta habet hoc ex ipso actu a quo
est causata et quem exprimit, prout ipse actus est vel fuit in tale obiectum terminatus.
(SummaII q.72, 37.)
312 chapter thirteen

Olivis idea is that every perceptual act pertains to an individual object


with its individual properties. The act generates a memory species which
is a representation of the individual object and not of any other object of
even the same species.
Repeated cognitive acts help to make the memory species stronger, and
a lack of cognitive acts pertaining to a certain object leads to oblivion:
We strengthen the memory of a certain object by frequently gazing at and
seeing it. Likewise, we progressively forget that object by extended and com-
plete cessation from gazing at and seeing it and by constantly applying our
mind and memory to something else.11
The memory species wears off if it is not renewed either by perceiving
the object anew or by bringing it back to mind every now and then. The
reason for this is that when the memory species is caused by a cogni-
tive act, it has a certain predetermined duration, and when time passes,
it gets ever weaker and finally disappears. Also the memory itself is apt to
return to its earlier stage, the addition of new memory species sometimes
abolishes the old ones, and memory species may mix with each other.12
Moreover, sometimes we cannot remember even though the memory spe-
cies are intact, because we are unable to bring them to mind for some
reason.13
Olivis way of discussing the function of retaining the memory species
draws heavily on an apparent distinction between the common sense and
memory. He repeatedly says things like: An act of the common sense
generates a memory species in the memory, as if these two were separate
powers. However, even though the function of retaining memory species
is perhaps the best candidate for not belonging to the common sense, Olivi
is explicit in this regard: these two powers are the same. Memory species
are conserved in the common sense. His conviction is partly based on his
rejection of the distinction between receptive and retentive powers,14 but
he also takes it that there is no reason to suppose that a separate power
would be needed in order to account for function (1) of the list above:

11Sicut nos per frequentes aspectus et visiones alicuius obiecti illud in memoria magis
ac magis firmamus: sic per longam et totalem cessationem ab istis et per assiduas appli-
cationes mentis et memoriae ad alia magis ac magis illius obliviscimur. (SummaII q.44,
73637.) See also ibid., q.66, 612.
12SummaII q.44, 73940.
13SummaII q.44, 737.
14SummaII q.66, 613.
memory 313

The power which receives an act of perceiving or understandingand


which receives a disposition (habitus) that the act leaves and causesis
not absolutely (simpliciter) different from the power which produces the
act, except that it acts by its formal [principle] and receives by its material
[principle] [...] In the same way, the power which receives and retains the
species (which the aforementioned act leaves) is the same as the one that
produces the act, and the former differs from the latter only in the afore-
mentioned way.15
The power that forms a cognitive act is the same as that which retains the
memory species caused by this act: This is why an act of the interior sense
generates a species in its sensitive memory, that is, in the retentive and
material sinus of the same power to which the act belonged.16 The idea
that the memory species are retained in the material sinus of the power
is quite interesting. We should, however, be careful here: in another con-
text Olivi uses much effort to prove that memory species must be simple
and unextended. They cannot be bodily changes in the brain because as
such they could not be objects of imaginative acts (which are simple and
spiritual), represent things in the way they do, or be so numerous.17 It
seems that we have to appeal to spiritual matter and, in the case of non-
human animals, to the spiritus animalis which provide the sinus materialis
where the memory species are retained. The simplicity of the memory
species enables Olivi also to claim that when a human being dies, the
memory species do not cease to exist: they are preserved in the spiritual
matter of the soul.18 The damned are capable of remembering the things
that they have experienced in this life, and separate souls can entertain
their past sins in Purgatory because their memories remain after death.
A final point which should be noted is that Olivi does not consider
memory species as dispositions (habitus).19 Dispositions take part in the

15[...] potentia receptiva actus sentiendi vel intelligendi et habitus ex illo actu relictus
et causatus non est simpliciter alia a potentia effectiva ipsius actus, nisi solum quod per
suum formale agit et per suum materiale recipit [...] sic potentia receptiva et retentiva
specierum relictarum ex actu praedicto est eadem cum potentia effectiva illius actus, dif-
ferens solum ab illa modo praedicto. (SummaII q.66, 611.)
16Unde per actum sensus interioris generatur species in sua memoria sensuali, hoc
est, in capaci et materiali sinu eiusdemmet potentiae cuius fuit ipse actus [...] (SummaII
q.74, 116.)
17SummaII q.58, 500504.
18SummaII q.58, 513.
19For instance, Ockham came to think in one of his explanations for memorative cog-
nition that remembering is due to a habitus. See Allan Wolter & Marilyn McCord Adams,
Memory and Intuition: A Focal Debate in Fourteenth Century Cognitive Psychology,
Franciscan Studies 53 (1993): 18289.
314 chapter thirteen

production of acts and modify the powers in such a way that it is easier
to bring about the acts that correspond with the dispositions. Dispositions
are, Olivi claims, efficient principles of cognitive acts, whereas memory
species are nothing but objects of the acts of the soul. They do not facili-
tate bringing about cognitive acts, and, importantly, they do not deter-
mine what kind of acts pertain to them. The same memory species may be
the object of different kinds of acts. For instance, a cat may find a mouse
that is represented by a memory species agreeable whereas someone who
is afraid of mice may remember exactly the same mouse as detestable.
The memory species are similar in both cases and they do not account
for the differences in reactions; the differences in the attitudes are due
to the different kinds of dispositions of the cat and of the person who is
afraid of mice.20
In this way, Olivi denies that there is a real distinction between the
common sense and the memory as a storage house of memories or mem-
ory species. There is no need to attribute a distinct power to fulfil this
function because it can be accounted for by appealing to the common
sense.

2.Remembering Past Objects

The second function on the list presented aboveremembering absent


objects from the pastis also a function of the common sense according
to Olivi. We are capable of remembering past objects, and so are many
other animals, but this capability does not require a separate power.
When a dog remembers a bone that it has seen before, it cognises a bone
that is no longer present to its senses. This way of understanding the pro-
cess of remembering renders it quite similar to imagining, since in both
processes the subject cognises an absent object. We have already seen
how Olivi argues that cognising an absent object is brought about by an
act of the common sense which is directed and terminated at a memory
species which functions as a representation of an object. The psychologi-
cal process of remembering takes place in this way, and Olivi attributes it
to the common sense.

20See SummaII q.74, 11819; ibid., q.66, 61213.


memory 315

One may pose a counter-argument to Olivis conception of remember-


ing. When we remember a particular object or event, we remember that
it took place at a certain point of time in the past. Even if we do not
necessarily remember the exact time and place where we encountered
the remembered object, we still remember it as something that we have
experienced in the past. Following this lead, one way of understanding
the workings of memory is to consider that its proper function is to appre-
hend pastnessor perhaps past and future as distinct from the present,
in which case the memory serves as the power which provides us with
the awareness of time. Olivi takes up this interpretation as a quod non
argument and duly refutes it.21 His argumentation is of particular interest
because it helps us to understand in detail what kind of psychological
process remembering is and why it must be a function of the common
sense.
Olivi acknowledges that remembering pertains to past things. However,
he points out that it is impossible to apprehend pastness as such: Past-
ness is not a property (ratio) which can be apprehended without the thing
to which it is attributed.22 Even though it is possible to understand time
and therefore also to understand pastness intellectually, this is not what
is at stake in Olivis discussion. Remembering a past thing is something
that does not require intellectual capacities, and even animals are aware
of time in a certain way. They do not understand the future or the past
as such, but their actions prove that they can think about things that will
happen in the future or that have happened in the past. However, they can
do this only with respect to things that are somehow present to them:
Moreover, the animal soul cannot desire eternity, because it cannot cognise
it. Although animals aim at some things in the future and, by consequence,
also think about themfor instance, having chicks from eggs or nourish-
ment from foodthey cannot think about the future as the whole eternal
future. On the contrary, animals can think about future things only as they
correspond and are connected to things that the animals sense and do at the
present time. The same applies to remembering past things. The pastness
and the future cannot be fully apprehended without knowing clearly that
they are not actual and without discerning them fully from the present, as
an actual being is discerned from actual non-being. Brute animals cannot

21SummaII q.65, 607.


22[...] praeteritio enim non est ratio apprehensibilis absque re ipsa cui attribuitur.
(SummaII q.66, 613.)
316 chapter thirteen

apprehend the past or the future, because animals apprehend them only
as they, as it were, appear to them in the present in a species and an act of
imagination.23
Olivi continues his argument against the possibility of apprehending past-
ness as such by pointing out that even though human beings are capable
of thinking about the past as such, remembering necessarily requires that
an object or an event is apprehended in addition to the pastness:
Likewise, it is impossible to comprehend something as being present or from
the past without thereby apprehending the thing to which the presence or
the pastness is attributed. Therefore, the power which recollects that some
thing is from the past and that it has seen the thing before apprehends two
things simultaneously, namely, the thing and the pastness of that thing. But
to apprehend a thing as absent belongs to the imaginative power, and to
apprehend it as present belongs to the common sense with some external
sense connected to it. Therefore, etc.24
The argument for the common sense and the memory being the same is
once again based on the idea that a unity at the level of the psychologi-
cal operations is indicative of a unity at the level of the powers. When I
remember what I ate yesterday, I necessarily imagine at least some of the
perceptual qualities of my meal. In general, when one remembers some-
thing, one necessarily imagines the thing that one remembers. This proves,
according to Olivi, that the process of remembering necessarily involves
an act of the common sense, as he has already argued that imagination is
a function of the common sense.
Olivi does not bother to repeat the continuation of his argument, but
it may be useful to expound the ergo etc. The structure of the argument
is similar to the one that he uses to show that the imagination and the

23Praeterea, anima bruti non potest appetere aeternitatem, quia nec potest ipsam
cognoscere. Licet enim aliqua futura intendant ac per consequens et praecogitent, puta,
pullos habere de ovis vel refectionem ex cibo: non tamen possunt futura praecogitare sub
plena ratione futurae aeternitatis, immo nec nisi prout futura sunt quasi praesentialiter
correlata et connexa iis quae praesentialiter sentiunt et agunt. Et idem est de recorda-
tione praeteritorum. Non enim potest praeteritio et futuritio plene apprehendi, nisi plene
sciantur non esse actu et plene discernantur a praesenti, sicut non ens actu ab ente actu.
Bruta autem hoc non possunt, quia nec apprehendunt illa, nisi prout quasi praesentialiter
se offerunt in specie et actu imaginationis. (SummaII q.115, 322.)
24Item, impossibile est aliquid accipi ut praesens vel praeteritum, quin eo ipso appre-
hendat id cui attribuit praesentiam vel praeteritionem. Ergo potentia quae recolit hoc vel
illud esse praeteritum et se illud hactenus vidisse apprehendit simul duo, scilicet, ipsam
rem et suam praeteritionem. Sed ipsam rem ut absentem apprehendere est potentiae
imaginativae, ipsam vero ut praesentem apprehendere est sensus communis cum aliquo
sensu particulari sibi connexo. Ergo et cetera. (SummaII q.66, 610.)
memory 317

common sense are the same: if we can find a psychological operation


that involves two different kinds of psychological acts, either they are
produced by two distinct powers, in which case there must be a superior
power which apprehends and combines the contents of both of the acts;
or the acts belong to one and the same power. This argument applies also
to the memory. Remembering something involves the apprehension of an
object (either by perceiving or by imagining) and knowing that the object
has been perceived before. There are two possible explanations. Either
(1) the common sense cognises an object, the memory apprehends its
pastness, and these two are then combined so as to bring about a cogni-
tion of a past object; or (2) the common sense apprehends both the object
and its pastness.
Olivi rejects the first explanation, and he does not consider it as a
problem that the common sense is capable of apprehending the past-
ness. Remembering is a psychological process that can be attributed to
the common sense: Likewise, the property of pastness (ratio praeteriti)
is nothing other than to have once been present. Therefore, the same
power apprehends the properties of presence (ratio praesentis) and
pastness.25 Elapsed time does not change the mechanism of cognising
a certain object. An act of the common sense accounts for a cognition
of an object when it is present to the senses; likewise, when the object
is no longer present, the common sense accounts for a cognition of it as
it was present to the senses. This is remembering. In other words, Olivi
diminishes the independent status of pastness because he denies that
it is something separable from objects. It does not add anything to the
objects, and it is not an object that could be apprehended in itself.26

3.Recognising Familiar Objects

In addition to retaining memory species and remembering past things,


Olivi discusses to some extent a third memorative function, namely, rec-
ognising a perceived object. Some of his arguments for the unity between
the common sense and memory are based on the process of recognition
rather than on remembering. He does not explicitly treat recognition as

25Item, ratio praeteriti non est aliud quam aliquando fuisse praesens. Ergo eiusdem
potentiae est apprehendere rationem praesentis et rationem praeteriti. (SummaII q.66,
610.)
26For further details, see section four below.
318 chapter thirteen

a distinct function. Rather, he seems to consider it as a special case of


remembering in which the same object is simultaneously perceived and
remembered: when a dog recognises its master, it perceives and remem-
bers him at the same time. As Olivi puts it:
They prove that the memory does not differ from the common sense, first,
insomuch as the memory means that which elicits the act of remembering.
For when a dog recognises its master, it compares the master seen at that
moment to the master it has seen before. The same applies to whatever road
it follows as being previously known and familiar to it, dismissing the other
roads. Therefore the power which compares these to each other apprehends
them both simultaneously. But the power which actually apprehends that it
sees the master at that moment is the common sense. Therefore, the same
power apprehends that it has seen the master before, and this is the same
as to remember.27
Olivis intention is to argue that remembering belongs to the common
sense, and he does this by pointing out that in the process of recogni-
tion one and the same power perceives an external object and remembers
that the object has been perceived also earlier. Recognition is a complex
process in which an object is perceived by a perceptual act of the com-
mon sense and remembered by an act of the common sense which is
directed at a memory species that represents the object. These two can
be related to each other because they are acts of one and the same power,
the common sense.28 It seems, however, that the process should not be
understood in such a way that the dog first sees its master, then begins
searching in the memory for an image that fits the master, and only after
finding a match recognises him. Olivi probably thinks that there is no
temporal sequence or active searching in the memory. When recognition
takes place, the common sense somehow evokes an image of an object in

27Quod autem memorativa ab ipso non differat probant, et primo, prout memora-
tiva dicitur illa quae elicit actionem recordandi: Quia quando canis recognoscit dominum
suum, tunc confert ipsum ut nunc visum ad eundem ut prius visum, et idem est de qua-
cunque via quam reliquis dimissis sequitur tanquam sibi prius notam et assuetam. Ergo
potentia conferens ad invicem illa apprehendit simul utrumque. Sed illa quae actualiter
apprehendit se tunc dominum suum videre est potentia sensus communis. Ergo illa eadem
apprehendit se prius vidisse illum, hoc autem est idem quod memorari. (SummaII q.66,
60910.)
28It seems that the comparison is made by yet another act of the common sense. See
SummaII q.79, 162, where Olivi argues that the act that compares two other acts is distinct
from both of them.
memory 319

the memory and compares it to the external object. All this takes place
simultaneously with perception.29
We can now see that memory is nothing but the common sense itself
according to Olivi. His conviction is that none of the memorative func-
tions can be separated from the psychological operations which provide
cognition of different kinds of things. Moreover, memories are preserved
by the same power which was initially responsible for the apprehension
of the things that the memories are about. In this way, Olivi attributes all
memorative functions to the common sense.

4.Difference between Memory and Imagination

At this point we must address a question concerning the difference


between memory and imagination. Inasmuch as memory is the label for
the function of retaining memory species, the division of labour is clear:
imaginative acts enable the subject to apprehend absent objects, repre-
sentations of which are stored in the memory. But if we compare the acts
of remembering and imagining, the case is less clear. Both of them are
cognitive acts which are directed at memory species, and the memory
species that function as objects for these acts are generated by previous
experiences (leaving aside the special case of compositive imagination).
Does not this structural similarity mean that imagination and remember-
ing are one and the same psychological process?
Even though Olivi argues that memory and imagination are not distinct
powers, it is clear that he sees them as two different kinds of psychological
processes. Imaginative acts are not memories. But what exactly is their
difference? Olivi does not explicitly address this question anywhere, but
once again he provides many clues which enable us to arrive at a plausible
interpretation of his view. There are at least two features which can be
interpreted as constituting the difference between imagining and remem-
bering. The first of them was already hinted at above: imagined objects
appear as timeless, whereas remembered objects appear as pertaining to

29However, Olivi does not, to the best of my knowledge, address this issue anywhere.
The reason why it seems to me that active searching from the memory is not what Olivi
has in mind in this argument is that it was customary to think that active searching from
memory requires intellectuality. The distincion between active recollection and passive
remembrance as well as the attribution of the former only to intellectual beings was
received from Aristotles De memoria et reminiscentia.
320 chapter thirteen

the past. The property of pastness (ratio praeteriti, or praeteritus) is some-


how present when we remember but not when we imagine. The other
difference is related to Olivis way of understanding the acts of remember-
ing as pertaining not only to the remembered objects but also (and even
primarily) to the cognitive acts by which they were cognised.
Let us begin with the first difference. As we have seen, dream images
which occur to us when we are asleep are brought about by imaginative
acts of the common sense. Now, Olivi asks whether we are able to remem-
ber anything while we sleep. His answer is positive, but he points out
that some philosophers have found a contrary view from Aristotles De
memoria et reminiscentia. These philosophers have interpreted Aristotle
as stating that to remember is to apprehend a species as a species, that
is, to apprehend an image of an object as an image and thus to be aware
that a remembered object is not really present.30 In dreams we often take
the images we see as real objects, and so, according to this definition of
remembering, we cannot remember anything when we are dreaming.
Olivi does not accept this conception of remembering, and he claims that
it is a misinterpretation of Aristotles text. We are able to remember while
we sleep:
And it is certain that we dream of many past things, and we dream of them
also as being from the past [...] We are disposed towards familiar and unfa-
miliar things differently in dreams. We cannot take familiar things as being
familiar (for example a friend as a friend or a familiar place as [our] own)
unless we firmly remember by memory that we have frequently associated
with them. Moreover, we would not perceive unfamiliar things as being
strange to us unless we experienced in our memory that we have not seen
or experienced those things before. And we often remember lectures as if
deliberately in our dreams. But to that argument which is brought forward
as the explanation for thisnamely that we must apprehend a species as
being a species in order to remember[it must be said that] Aristotle does
not say this. Rather, he says that the species must be apprehended as being a
species of a past thingthat is to say, that we apprehend the thing as being
from the past by the species. [...] Therefore, in dreams I can well remember
a thing by the means of a species, since it is apprehended as being absent
(and thus not in front of the external senses) via an intention of pastness
that is, by apprehending it as being from the past.31

30SummaII q.59, 524. The passage Olivi refers to is probably Mem. 1, 451a1516.
31Certumque est quod nos multa somniamus de praeteritis et ut praeterita sunt [...]
In somnis etiam aliter afficimur ad assueta, aliter ad insolita. Assueta autem non pos-
sumus tunc assumere ut assueta, sicut verbi gratia amicum tanquam amicum et locum
assuetum tanquam proprium, nisi per memoriam tunc firmiter teneremus frequenter nos
memory 321

It is a phenomenological fact that even in dreams I am able to remember


my friends and to imagine persons who are unknown to me. The differ-
ence between these two acts is the property of pastness which belongs
to the image of my friend but which does not accompany the image of a
stranger. Pastness marks a difference between imagination and recollec-
tion, since it accompanies only the latter. Yet, it does not actually signify
any real entity. There is no thing attached to the memory species or to
the act of remembering. The property of pastness is, as Olivi defines it,
nothing but apprehending a past thing as being from the past. Thus it
seems to me that when Olivi writes about the property of pastness, he is
not making a metaphysical claim but a phenomenological one. Pastness is
a phenomenological feeling which is present in memories, and memories
differ from imagined things because it feels different to remember than
to imagine. Undeniably this marks a genuine difference, but then again it
merely describes the difference and does not give an explanation for it.
One can still ask why the property of pastness is present in some imagi-
native acts and not in others. Thus, even though the property of pastness
clearly contributes to the difference between imaginative and memorative
acts, it is not very helpful in our effort of understanding the difference.32
What about the other possibility of accounting for the difference
between imaginative and memorative acts, namely, the idea that mem-
ories pertain primarily to past cognitive acts? Olivi presents some very
interesting remarks with respect to this idea, and it is worthwhile looking
at them in a detail. I emphasise that he does not present the passages I
draw from as explanations for the difference between memory and imagi-
nation; they serve other purposes. Still, they contain valuable information
about Olivis conception of remembering.

conversatos fuisse cum istis. Insolita etiam non sentiremus tunc nobis esse extranea, nisi
in memoria nostra experiremur talia a nobis non fuisse visa vel experta. In somnis etiam
saepe recordamur quasi ex proposito lectiones auditas. Quod autem ad hoc pro ratione
affertur quod ad hoc quod memoremur oportet apprehendi speciem ut speciem: non hoc
ita dicit Aristoteles, sed potius quod oportet ut species apprehendatur ut species rei prae-
teritae, hoc est dictu, ut per eam apprehendamus rem ut praeteritam. [...] In somnis igitur
bene possum memorari rem per speciem, quia per intentionem praeteritionis, per hoc sci-
licet quod apprehenditur praeterita, apprehenditur ut non praesens et sic ut non exterius
sensibus obiecta. (SummaII q.59, 556.)
32It is obvious that in this context Olivi does not care about the difference between
imagination and recollection, because he defines recollection in such a way that it is, in
fact, indistinguishable from imagination in a waking state: Et hoc sufficit ad actum memo-
randi quod species non credatur esse ipsa res quasi praesens exterius actu. (SummaII
q.59, 556.)
322 chapter thirteen

Let us begin with Olivis definition of remembrance, which he gives


in passing: Therefore, the same power apprehends that it has seen that
thing before, and this is the same as to remember.33 Now, if we look
closely at this definition, we see that it includes an element of self-
cognitionindeed, we see that self-cognition is the core of remembering.
When an animal remembers a thing that it has previously seen, it actually
apprehends that it has seen the thing before (apprehendit se prius vidisse
illum). This is due to the generation of memory species which is caused
by acts of the common sense:
It is evident that the aforementioned [memory] species are generated by
the acts of the common sensenot only because they remain after these
acts are carried out, and they are not brought about without these acts, but
also because they represent primarily these acts and only subsequently their
objects by means of these acts. This is obvious when we remember that
we have seen or heard something. For, as an act of the common sense is
included in these acts [...] so a memory of the act of the common sense is
included in the memory of these acts.34
When the dog remembers something, it remembers primarily the past
cognitive act by which it cognised the object of its memory in the first
place. Suppose that the dog perceives an object O by a cognitive act A at
time T. Act A generates a memory species which represents primarily A
and only secondarily O. When the dog remembers O anew at time T1, it
becomes primarily aware of A and remembers O only through A. To put
it more simply, when the dog saw its master for the first time, the act of
perception generated a memory species which represents primarily the
act of seeing the master and the master only through the act. When the
dog recognises its master, it actually remembers itself seeing him earlier.
Understood in this way, memory pertains more to events or psycho-
logical processes than to external objects, and remembering turns out to
be a type of self-awareness. We can imagine things that we have encoun-
tered in the past, but if we want to perform a proper act of remembering,
we have to remember ourselves seeing those things in the past. If this

33Ergo illa eadem apprehendit se prius vidisse illum, hoc autem est idem quod memo-
rari. (SummaII q.66, 610.)
34Quod autem praedictae species generentur per huiusmodi actus patet non solum
ex hoc quod post actus huiusmodi relinquuntur nec absque huiusmodi actibus fiunt, sed
etiam ex hoc quod primo repraesentant huiusmodi actus ac deinde quod per ipsos eorum
obiecta, sicut patet, cum recordamur nos vidisse vel audisse hoc vel illud. Sicut enim in his
actibus includitur actus sensus communis [...] sic in memoria istorum actuum includitur
memoria actus sensus communis. (SummaII q.74, 11617.)
memory 323

element is isolated from the images of the things that we have in mind,
we are not remembering but imagining them.
It has been argued that to understand memory as a process that pri-
marily pertains to ones previous cognitive acts is a distinctive move made
by John Duns Scotus.35 It is true that Scotus argues explicitly that this is
how memory functions, but on the basis of Olivis remarks it seems that
he was not the first to propose such a theory. In fact, it seems that even
Olivi cannot be praised (or blamed) for being the first; rather, it appears
to have been a common idea to include ones own cognitive acts as being
partial objects of memorative acts ever since Aristotle.36 Then again, it
seems that Olivi emphasises in a novel way that ones cognitive acts are
the primary objects of remembrance. In this respect his suggestion may
be taken as an original contribution.
Thus, the difference between memorative and imaginative acts is that
the imagination makes one aware of an object whereas remembering
pertains also to an earlier act by which the remembered object was first
apprehended. This difference can be seen, for instance, when Olivi refers
in an approving manner to Aristotle and writes:
That is why he would think that it is not remembrance when I think (cogi
tem) of a donkey generally speaking (aboslute)[which means that] I do
not think of a donkey as being from the past, and I do not think of it with
respect to some past apprehension of mine (namely, by thinking that I have
seen it before).37
It may seem that Olivi is here dealing with the intellectual level as he
uses the verb cogito. Yet the context shows with certainty that he has
sensitive cognition in mind, and therefore the absolute manner of cognis-
ing refers to an imaginative act. An imagined donkey is not a universal
donkey, because it does not represent the universal essence of a donkey,

35Wolter & Adams, Memory and Intuition, 175. For Scotus view, see John Duns Sco-
tus, Ordinatio IV.45.3, ed. & trans. in A.B.Wolter & M.M.Adams, Memory and Intuition,
193230. Also David Bloch sees novelty in Scotus view of two objects (the object and the
experience) of memory (Bloch, Aristotle on Memory and Recollection, 22025).
36Aristotle suggests that memories at least may involve not only a remembered object
but also the cognitive activity by which it was apprehended in the past (Mem. 1, 449b18
24). However, there is no consensus on how this passage should be understood. For discus-
sion and references, see Bloch, Aristotle on Memory and Recollection, 8384. Aquinas also
says that an animal remembers simultaneously that it has perceived in the past and that
it has perceived some sensible object (ST I.79.6).
37Unde secundum eum non est memorari, si cogitem de asino absolute, non de asino,
ut est praeteritus, seu de eo per respectum ad aliquam apprehensionem meam iam prae
teritam, cogitando scilicet me eum aliquando vidisse. (SummaII q.59, 556.)
324 chapter thirteen

its donkeyness.38 However, it does not represent this or that individual


donkey either. It represents, as it were, a generic donkey which stands
for any individual, and to imagine a general donkey is not to remember
one. In order to remember a donkey, I have to consider my own previous
experience of seeing it.
When one imagines a donkey she does not have any particular donkey
in mind but a kind of a generic donkey:
When we intend [to see something] or think [about seeing something]
beforehand, we never think about this thing by a species by which things
can be seen, but only by the memory species by which we can imagine or
remember absent things or by which we can think about them beforehand.
So it is not necessary for a vision of a thing to precede a vision of a thing
since sometimes we intend to see only in a general or universal way; like
when I want to see a donkey or to get some wine, I do not have to think
about this or that particular donkey or this or that wineit suffices that
I think about them generally.39
When we intend to see a donkey, our mental activity is not the same as
cognising an individual donkey. In order to direct our attention to our
environment with an intention to see a donkey, it suffices that we have
a general intention. The possibility of imagining a general donkey shows
that according to Olivi it is possible to imagine an object that does not
represent any particular individual.
It seems rather safe to say that Olivi has an idea about the difference
between the imagination and memory. Although he does not explicitly
address the issue, he occasionally takes up ideas which are related to it
and thus allow us to see that there is a clear distinction between these two
psychological processes: memories pertain to a subjects earlier cognitive
acts, whereas imagined things are not about the past and do not pertain to
a certain individual object. The details of the processes which cause this

38Olivi explicitly states that memory species cannot be universal, i.e., they cannot
represent universal quiddities (SummaII q.74, 116). In other words, he points out that
although we are capable of imagining donkeys in general, we cannot imagine the essence
of donkeyness. Generality and universality are different things.
39[...] quando hoc intendimus vel praecogitamus, nunquam hoc praecogitamus
per species per quas res videri possunt, sed solum per species memoriales per quas res
absentes possumus imaginari vel rememorari vel recogitare. Et ita non oportet quod visio
rei praecedat visionem rei, quia aliquando hoc non intendimus nisi in generali seu in uni-
versali; utpote volens videre asinum vel emere vinum non oportet quod praecogitem in
particulari hunc vel illum asinum vel hoc vel illud vinum, sed sufficit quod in generali.
(SummaII q.36, 634.)
memory 325

difference remain somewhat obscure, but it seems that Olivi has all the
material needed for accounting for the difference, even though he never
actually considers it as an issue worth dealing with. For him the more
important question is the unity of the common sense and memory. And,
as we have seen, he is quite clear about that.
Chapter fourteen

Estimation

The estimative power is often considered as the most interesting of all


the internal senses because many features of sensory cognition that relate
to it are found philosophically interesting even today. Being one of the
most refined cognitive functions of the sensitive soul, estimation was
understood as a power that is between pure sensation and reason, and it
played an important role in accounting for cognition both in human and
non-human animals. It was thought to account for an animals ability to
perceive things in its surroundings in a way that reveals the relevance of
these things to the well-being of the animal, and thus it figured promi-
nently in medieval theories of action. In addition, many authorsmost
notably Avicennaassigned a multitude of other cognitive functions to
estimation: accidental perception, the governing of the animal soul, and
even certain types of self-awareness. Deborah Black has argued, however,
that Latin philosophers usually simplified the role of the estimative power
and ignored some of the key ideas that were present in Avicennas theory
of estimation.1 Even so, the estimative power remains a central part of the
medieval theories of the sensitive souls higher cognitive functions.
Due to the elusive role that the estimative power plays in medieval
psychological theories, it is not easy to provide a concise description of
it and of the functions that were attributed to it. Medieval authors dis-
agreed on the role of estimation: they attributed to it various functions
and conceived of its relation to the souls other powers in different ways.
Yet, the Avicennian example of the sheep and the wolf was widely used
and continually repeated during the thirteenth century. It played an
important role when scholastics conceptualised the role of estimation. In
many cases, the ability to perceive harmfulness and usefulness remained
a central explanandum for the estimative power.
Olivi employs the example of the sheep and the wolf in his discussion
concerning the estimative function as well, and he understands estimation

1Black, Imagination and Estimation, 59. Then again, Hasse praises medieval scholas-
tics for understanding the notion of intentio much better than most modern philosophers
and historians of philosophy (Hasse, Avicennas De anima, 128).
328 chapter fourteen

as a psychological operation that makes human beings and non-human


animals capable of perceiving external objects in terms of their usefulness
or harmfulness. However, he denies the existence of a separate estimative
power and attributes the estimative function to the common sense. He
thinks that estimation can be explained by a special kind of apprehen-
sion of external objects. When a sheep perceives a wolf, its common sense
produces an act of perception which is about the wolf. This act, however,
is a special kind of perceptual act because it provides awareness not only
of the perceptual qualities of the wolf but also of the harmfulness thereof.
This kind of act we can call an estimative act of the common sense. In the
following two sections I shall analyse in detail how this type of act occurs,
what kind of act Olivi takes it to be, and how he justifies the attribution
of it to the common sense.2

1.Estimative Dispositions of the Common Sense

Olivi thinks that estimative acts are ultimately based on pleasure and
pain apprehended by the common sense. The common sense apprehends
external objects and the acts of the external senses, but it apprehends also
pleasure, pain, and the overall well-being of the body: The apprehension
of that which is pleasurable or painful to the senses and the apprehension
of the perfection or destruction of the body belong only to the common
sense with the five external senses that are connected to it.3 This idea
is based on Olivis conception of the sense of touch as a power which
senses primarily the state of the body of the subject and only secondarily
the external objects that cause changes in this state. The common sense,
together with the sense of touch, provides the subject with awareness
of the state of the body and its pains and pleasures.
Olivi claims that we do not have to attribute an estimative power to the
sensitive soul, because the avoiding and pursuing of external objects can
be accounted for by appealing to the ability to perceive pain and pleasure.
Olivis explanation is based on the reasonable observation that pain and
pleasure cause action:

2Some of the ideas that I discuss below are also presented in Toivanen Animal Action,
42023; and id., Peter Olivi on Internal Senses, 44245.
3Sed solius sensus communis cum quinque sensibus sibi connexis est apprehendere
delectabile sensui vel poenale et perfectionem sui corporis vel consumptionem. (SummaII
q.64, 604.) See also ibid., q.58, 5023.
estimation 329

Moreover, when the common sense perceives pain in the handa pain
which is caused by the burning of the handdoes it not say to the appetite
that the fire should be fled as it is painful and destructive? And does not
the appetite straightaway follow its dictate, order a flight, and flee? And
conversely, when a dog perceives by the common sense that it enjoys some
food greatly and is refreshed by it, does it [viz. the common sense] not then
say and judge that the food should be eaten? And does not the appetite
straightaway order this and move the mouth to the food?4
Olivi thinks that estimation is fundamentally nothing but the ability to
apprehend the painfulness or pleasurability of an object. When the com-
mon sense apprehends an external object and the pain or pleasure it
causes, it is capable of estimating whether that object should be avoided
or striven for. The common sense makes a judgement and the sensitive
appetite moves the animal on the basis of it. Olivis argument is that
because the common sense is capable of apprehending pain and plea-
sure, it is unnecessary to attribute a separate power of estimation to per-
form the estimative function. An object that causes pain is estimated to be
harmful, and one that causes pleasure is estimated to be useful.
So far so good. However, it does not require much ingenuity to find a
counter-argument which could rebuff Olivis idea: the sheep does not suf-
fer pain from the vision of the wolfat least it does not seem intuitively
correct to suppose that it does. The whole point of the example of the
sheep and the wolf is that it differs somehow from situations in which an
object causes pain and is avoided because of the perceived painfulness.
The sheep estimates that the wolf is dangerous and should be avoided
even though the vision of the wolf does not harm the sheep. Olivis way of
conceiving of the relation between the perception of pain and the estima-
tive function does not seem to account for the fundamental problem that
the estimative power was postulated to solve in the first place.

4Praeterea, quando sensus communis sentit dolorem in manu ex eius adustione


causatum: nunquid tunc dictat appetitui illum ignem esse sibi fugiendum tanquam poe-
nalem et consumptivum? nunquid etiam ad eius dictamen appetitus mox imperat fugam
et fugit? Et e contra, quando canis per sensum communem sentit se valde delectari et
refici ex tali cibo: nunquid tunc dictat et iudicat illum esse comedendum? nunquid etiam
mox appetitus hoc imperat et movet os ad cibum? (SummaII q.64, 6045); Praeterea,
aestimativa non videtur differre ab ipsa [scil. sensu communi], quia cum omnes potentiae
apprehensivae possint apprehendere convenientiam vel disconvenientiam suorum obiec-
torum, aestimativae autem non attribuatur aliud nisi apprehendere intentionem conve-
nientis et disconvenientis seu utilis et nocivi, sensus autem communis apprehendendo
offensas et complacentias sensuum particularium sufficienter hoc possit. Ergo et cetera.
(Ibid., q.58, 50910.)
330 chapter fourteen

Olivi is aware of the possibility of this kind of criticism. In order to see


how he manages to avoid it, we need to look at two issues. First, we must
understand what kind of act the estimative act of the common sense is.
Even though estimative perception is ultimately based on perception of
pain and pleasure, Olivi does not require that the subject always suffer
from, or take pleasure in, the perception of an object in order to estimate
that it is harmful or useful. Second, we must take into consideration how
he accounts for those estimative perceptions which are innate and which
can therefore be understood as being instinctive.
The example dealing with the burning hand which Olivi mentions in
the passage cited above is illustrative. It shows clearly how estimation is
ultimately based on the perception of pain and pleasure. Still, it is clear
that we do not have to burn our hand every time we see fire in order
to estimate that it is dangerous and harmful to our well-being. In order
to see how this experiential fact can be consistent with Olivis theory, I
shall expand upon his own example. Let us suppose that a child sees a lit
candle for the first time in her life. She advances towards the candle and,
being curious, tries to grasp the flame with unfortunate consequences.
An Olivian interpretation of this case goes as follows: The child perceives
the flame, its heat, and her burning hand by her sense of touch and the
common sense. The common sense apprehends that fire is harmful to the
hand and to the well-being of the childs body. Then the common sense
provides this information to the sensitive appetite which, in turn, moves
the hand away from the fire. The child hopefully learns that one should
not play with fire, and it is precisely this learning that is important for
understanding how estimative acts function. Only those who have learnt
that fire causes pain are capable of estimating that it would be painful to
touch a flame without really touching it.
From a metaphysical point of view, learning that fire is harmful takes
place in such a way that the simultaneous perception of fire and the pain
it causes generates a disposition (habitus) in the common sense. The dis-
position affects subsequent apprehensions of fire, and when the child sees
fire anew, she perceives it as harmful and painful. The estimative aspect
of the perception of fire is caused by the disposition which was formed
in the first unfortunate encounter with fire. Olivi duly acknowledges that
this kind of learning is possible also for non-human animals.5

5Quando etiam canis per doctrinam et assuessionem acquirit aliquos habitus in suo
sensu communi et appetitu, ita quod habitualiter amat et aestimat multa quae prius non
estimation 331

Olivis manner of conceiving the function of estimation has certain


strengths. We tend to see things in light of our previous experiences, and
we estimate them to be useful or harmful on the basis of our past experi-
ences. It is true that the example of the sheep and wolf was raised exactly
to show that sometimes estimation takes place without previous experi-
ence. Sheep were noticed to flee from wolves even when they had never
seen them before, and thus some estimative acts seem to be instinctive.
But Olivi thinks that he is also capable of accounting for instinctive action
by his conception of estimative acts. He simply claims that some estima-
tive dispositions of the common sense are innate: There are many habit-
ual estimations generated and bestowed by both experience and nature
in human beings and in brute animals.6 The disposition of the sheep to
estimate that wolves are harmful is bestowed by nature, and therefore
sheep do not have to learn it.
After making these moves, Olivi is in a position to argue that estimation
is nothing but an apprehension that is affected by a disposition: Because
the estimative power adds nothing to the common sense or to the imagi-
nation except for certain habitual estimations or some dispositions which
determine or incline it to estimate in one way or another.7 In other words,
estimation is a habitual way of apprehending external objects in relation
to ones own well-being. The psychological process is similar both for the
child who has learnt to see fire as harmful and for the sheep who avoids
the wolf. They both perceive an external object as being harmful due
to the dispositions they have in relation to them, and the only difference
is the origin of the disposition. Moreover, all animals have both innate
and acquired dispositions, and although different species may have differ-
ent kinds of innate dispositions, there is no discontinuity between human
beings and non-human animals in this respect.

amabat vel odiebat nec noverat: tunc utique habitualis amicitia et prudentia eius potentiis
et organis acquiritur differens a suis actibus qui cito recipiuntur et transeunt. (SummaII
q.63, 601.) See also ibid., q.66, 610. On this point Olivi contradicts Aquinas and agrees
with, e.g., Avicenna and Jean de la Rochelle. See Shif De an. 4.3, 3740, and Summa de
anima 2.4.101; Knuuttila, Emotions, 220 & 248; Black, Imagination and Estimation, 69.
6Quod dico, quia tam in homine quam in brutis sunt multae habituales aestimationes
tam a consuetudine quam a natura genitae et inditae. (SummaII q.64, 603.)
7[...] quia aestimativa nihil addit supra sensum communem et imaginativam nisi
solum quasdam habituales aestimationes vel quasdam dispositiones determinantes aut
inclinantes ad sic vel sic aestimandum. (SummaII q.64, 604.)
332 chapter fourteen

2.Estimative Perception

Olivi locates the estimative function in the sensitive soul and thinks that
all animals are endowed with it. It is a perceptual process which takes
place similarly in human and non-human animals. It is not an intellectual
operation even in the case of human beings. Particularly, it should not
be understood as a kind of practical reasoning. When I am careful of not
putting my hand in fire, I do not necessarily have to reason that if I did so,
my hand would burn, and that would be painful. I immediately perceive
fire as something that should be avoided, and the harmfulness of fire is an
integral part of my perception.
When an animal has an estimative perception of an object, it appre-
hends something that is not immediately present to the external senses.
It cannot see the ability to cause pain in fire, but somehow the potential
painfulness is a part of the perception nevertheless. In order to under-
stand how estimation figures phenomenologically in perception, it is
useful to look at Olivis discussion of other kinds of perceptual processes
which enable the percipient to be aware of something over and above
perceptual qualities. Take the following passage in which Olivi argues that
there may be dispositions within the common sense:
You may object to some of the aforementioned [arguments] by saying that
the common sense is not susceptible to any inclination or habitual dispo-
sition (habitus vel habitualis dispositionis). In the first place, Augustine is
against this objection. He says and proves by experiments (in Musica VI)
that some people become more skilful in judging with ease the good or bad
quality of wines and their superiority and inferiority. Likewise, he says that
an affection for discerning the harmonies of voices and a capacity for doing
it quickly and easily is generated and increased by the practice of singing
and listening to various songs and that this capacity is not only in the com-
mon sense but also in the sense of hearing.8

8Si vero contra quaedam praedictorum obicias quod sensus communis non est sus-
ceptivus alicuius habitus vel habitualis dispositionis: contra hoc est primo Augustinus, VI
Musicae, dicens et experimentis probans quod aliqui ex frequenti usu probandi et gustandi
vina acquirunt maiorem peritiam faciliter iudicandi bonitatem vel malitiam vinorum ac
melioritatem et peioritatem eorum. Et consimiliter dicit quod ex usu cantandi et can-
tus varios audiendi non solum in sensu communi sed etiam in sensu auditus gignitur et
augetur aliqua affectio et discretio ad concordantias vocum subtilius et facilius discernen-
das. (SummaII q.64, 605.) See also SummaIV q.19, 159 (Maranesi, q.7). Olivi is not com-
pletely consistent when it comes to the seat of the dispositions which allow us to, say,
better judge the quality of wines. In q.70, 632 he says that such dispositions belong to the
sense of taste.
estimation 333

Olivis intention is not to present the tasting of wine and the hearing of
harmony as instances of estimative perception. He argues that dispositions
may exist within the common sense (and even in the external senses) in
order to justify his idea that estimation is based on dispositions. Estima-
tion is a special case of perception that is affected by a disposition of the
common sense. Tasting the quality of wines and hearing harmonies in
music are other instances of perceiving something over and above the
perceptual qualities of external objects.
When we taste wines, we do not reason whether they are of a good
quality. We taste the quality. The sensation of the goodness or shoddi-
ness of wine is not something that comes after the sensation of taste but
an intrinsic part of it. Similarly, a musician distinguishes dissonance bet-
ter than a layman and this ability is a consequence of the cultivation of
the power of hearing that the musician has undergone during the long
years of his training. This example reveals quite well what Olivi is after
in his argument in the above passage: the perception of the concordance
of tones is not something that comes in addition to the perception of the
tones, nor is it something about which a musician reasons on the basis
of the perception of the tones. The perception of the concordance is sim-
ply the perception of the tones. A musician perceives sounds in a differ-
ent way than a layman, and the difference exists precisely at the level of
perception.
Olivi elaborates this idea yet in another passage, which illustrates his
manner of understanding the role of the dispositions of the common
sense in perception. It is important to note that it is taken from his argu-
mentation of proving that the common sense is capable of acquiring dis-
positions, because it deals with the process of learning to read. As human
beings are the only animals that are capable of reading, it may appear that
Olivi is discussing an intellectual operation. However, this is not the case.
The context and the argumentative role of this idea show that he refers
to a sensory process that is necessary for the ability to read, namely, the
perception of letters as letters and words as words:
Moreover, is not the subtlety of sensory judgement for judging its objects
more subtly and easily improved by frequent exercise? Surely when children
have learned the letters, learned to compose syllables and words from the
letters, and learned to read hymns, they have a sensory disposition (habitus)
to quickly judge and discern everything they readin such a way that we
call some of them slow and dull and others sharp and prompt. Also, the
sight of many people is made sharper by a frequent reading of fine letters,
and by contrast the sight of many people is made thicker by a continuous
334 chapter fourteen

reading of gross letters in such a way that it is rendered inept in discerning


and reading fine letters quickly.9
This passage sheds light on Olivis way of understanding the role of the
dispositions of the common sense in perception. They influence the con-
tent of perception. Learning to distinguish letters from each othereither
when trying to learn how to read in ones childhood or when trying to
make sense of a certain handwritinggenerates dispositions in the com-
mon sense. These dispositions affect the subsequent perceptions by help-
ing the process of recognising different letters and words. Thus, where
an illiterate child sees only a meaningless set of lines when he sees the
sign A, a child who has already learned the letters is quick to see this
constellation of lines as being the letter A, and a literate adult is actually
incapable of perceiving in the constellation anything but the letter A. The
perceptual qualities of A contain nothing but a black colour which has
certain shape, but our perceptual experience of it is richer because we
see the black shape as the letter A. In this way the perception of the sign
A as the letter A has become a part of our perception when we learned
to read. In addition to this, Olivi points out, some people are habituated
to read very small letters, and this is also due to a disposition that affects
their perceptions. Even though understanding a text requires intellect, a
good palaeographer has acquired the ability to perceptually distinguish
the letters and words in a manuscript.
As Olivi thinks that estimation is a perception which is affected by
a disposition, it is a similar kind of process to the one which allows us
to perceive letters.10 This conception of the estimative function as an

9Praeterea, nunquid acumen sensualis iudicii in suis obiectis acutius et facilius iudi-
candis iuvatur per frequens exercitium? Certe pueri, quando didicerunt litteras et ex lit-
teris syllabas et dictiones componere et legere psalmos, habent sensualem habitum cito
diiudicandi et discernendi quaeque legenda, ita quod quosdam dicimus in hoc tardos et
duros, quosdam vero acutos et promptos. Multis etiam per frequentem lecturam subti-
lis litterae acuitur visus et e contra pluribus ingrossatur per continuam lecturam litterae
grossae, ita quod ex hoc redduntur inepti ad subtilem litteram celeriter discernendam et
perlegendam. (SummaII q.64, 605.)
10Further evidence for the claim that dispositions account for perceiving something
over and above the perceptual qualities can be found from a passage in which Olivi dis-
cusses the difference between memory species and dispositions. He points out that dispo-
sitions affect the way we consider the objects of our thoughts. Thus, a Jew and a Christian
both may think of Jesus, but only the latter thinks him as Christ. The differece is due
to the disposition of Christian faith which is present in the latter but not in the former.
(SummaII q.74, 11819.) This example, I take it, shows that dispositions change the way
objects are conceived, and it is only a short step to adapt this same principle to the sensi-
tive level.
estimation 335

integral part of perception can be applied to the cases of the child who
sees fire as harmful and of the sheep which becomes frightened by the
sight of the wolf. They both see something more than the sensible quali-
ties of the fire and the wolf. They perceive them as a musician hears tones
or a literate person sees a text. The only difference between these cases
is that seeing something as a letter or as a word, and hearing tunes as
forming a harmony do not count as estimative perceptions, because they
are not related to the well-being of the percipient. To the best of my
knowledge, Olivi does not present a comprehensive list of features whose
apprehension is accounted for by the estimative dispositions of the com-
mon sense. However, on the basis of his examples we can see that at least
the apprehension of usefulness (utilitas), harmfulness (nocivitas), useless-
ness (inutilitas), hostility (inimicitia), and friendliness (amicitia) count as
estimative perceptions.11
Considering the foregoing analysis, it is not surprising that Olivi denies
the existence of a separate estimative power. The estimative function is
a part of perception, and it enriches the content of perception in many
ways. As such, it presumes an act of perception: it is impossible to per-
ceive any object as being harmful or useful without perceiving the object.
Olivi points out, in a text that I have partly analysed above, that:
The intentions of usefulness, uselessness and the like cannot be apprehended
by any power unless it at the same time apprehends the sensible or imagi-
nary forms to which these intentions belong [...] For, when a sheep esti-
mates a wolf as hostile to itself, it is necessary for it to apprehend the thing
that it judges to be hostile; for to apprehend only the property of hostility
(ratio inimicitiae) is not to apprehend that the wolf is hostile. [...] Therefore,
when the wolf is absent and [the sheep] actually estimates that the wolf is
hostile, then the act and the power that elicits the act must apprehend the
absent wolf in an imaginative way. Then again, when the wolf is seen or
heard as being present and the sheep estimates and judges that the wolf is
hostile, the act and the power that elicits the act apprehend the form of the
wolf as the subject of the hostility by way of the common sense. This makes
it clear that the [estimative] power is one and the same as the imagination
and the common sense.12

11SummaII q.64, 6025.


12Intentiones utilis et inutilis et consimilium non possunt ab aliqua potentia appre-
hendi, nisi in simul apprehendat formas sensibiles vel imaginarias quarum sunt huius-
modi intentiones [...] Quando enim ovis aestimat lupum sibi esse inimicum, oportet
quod apprehendat illam rem quam sibi iudicat inimicam; apprehendere enim solam
rationem inimicitiae non est apprehendere lupum sibi esse inimicum. [...] Ergo quando
lupo absente hoc actu aestimat, tunc oportet quod ille actus et eius potentia per modum
336 chapter fourteen

An object can be apprehended as being useful or harmful only if the


object itself is perceived, imagined, or (presumably) remembered,13 and
usefulness or harmfulness cannot be apprehended as such, without appre-
hending any object to which they belong.
Thus, the basic idea behind Olivis argumentation in favour of the attri-
bution of the estimative function to the common sense is the same which
we have already encountered in our preceding discussions of the imagina-
tive and memorative functions: estimation must belong to the common
sense because in our experience the estimative content (harmfulness and
usefulness) and the perceptual content (the object) are conjoined. Olivi
thinks that the interconnectedness between these two psychological func-
tions can be accounted for if the acts of perception and the estimative dis-
positions are attributed to one and the same power, the common sense.
Olivis way of conceptualising the estimative function is different from
certain other well-known theories, such as those put forward by Avicenna
and Aquinas, who think that intentions are formal objects of the estima-
tive power and imperceptible properties that inhere in the objects of
perception.14 He thinks that intentions are not special kinds of objects of
apprehension; rather, they can be conceived of as relations:
Second, the properties (ratio) of usefulness and friendliness and their oppo-
sites are comprehended with regard to what is pleasant or painful to the
senses and with regard to the perfection or destruction of the subject. For,
useful for us means that which can contribute to our pleasure or perfec-
tion; useless means that which cannot do this; harmful means that which
can do the contrary, and we call hostile that which has a manifest effect
(promptum affectum) for what is bad for us. In contrast, we perceive as our
friend that which we perceive to be favourable for our good and sociable.
Therefore, these [properties] cannot be apprehended by any power unless

imaginativae apprehendant ipsum absentem. Quando vero ipso praesentialiter viso vel
audito ipsum esse sibi inimicum aestimat et iudicat, tunc per modum sensus communis
ille actus et eius potentia apprehendunt formam lupi ut subiectum illius inimicitiae. Ex
quo patet quod illa potentia est una et eadem cum imaginativa et cum sensu communi.
(SummaII q.64, 6034.)
13Olivi mentions the function of imagining an absent object in this context because he
thinks that estimation does not concern only perceived objects: it is also possible to esti-
mate an imagined and absent object to be useful or harmful. He does not say whether it
is possible that remembering involves an estimative element, but I cannot see any reason
why he would deny it.
14Olivi explicitly takes up and rejects the view that intentions are formal objects of
the estimative power. Even though he does not indicate his source, it is possible that he is
opposing either Avicenna or Aquinas.
estimation 337

with respect to the preceding [features]for example, something is appre-


hended as useful for this or that pleasure, for evading this or that punish-
ment, or as useful for the perfection of oneself, of ones relatives (suorum), or
of ones friends. But only the common sense (together with the five external
senses that are connected to it) apprehends that which is pleasant or painful
to the senses and the perfection and destruction of ones body. Therefore,
the common sense apprehends the relations (respectus) of the preceding
intentions.15
An intention is not an independent property of an object but a relation
that makes the object relevant to the well-being of the subject. An object
is harmful to the subject if it can cause pain or destruction, and it is use-
ful if it can cause pleasure and perfect the subject. A wolf is a carnivorous
beast with sharp teeth and a strong jaw, and the intention of harmfulness
is these properties as they are apprehended by a subject who either has
learnt to apprehend them as painful and destructive or innately appre-
hends them as such. Since nothing is harmful as such but only in relation
to something, to apprehend the harmfulness of an object requires not
only the apprehension of the harmful object but also the apprehension
of that to which the object is harmful.16 The intention of harmfulness is
unintelligible without some kind of recourse to the subject pole of the
harmful relation between the subject and the object, and thus the percep-
tion of an intention of harmfulness is to perceive an object and, by the

15Secundo, quia rationes utilis et amicabilis suorumque contrariorum accipiuntur ex


respectu ad delectabile sensui vel poenale et ex respectu ad perfectionem proprii subjecti
vel consumptionem. Utile enim nobis dicitur quod ad aliquam nostram complacentiam
vel perfectionem cooperari potest, inutile vero quod hoc non potest, nocivum vero quod
ad contraria potest, inimicum vero nobis dicimus quod ad nostrum malum habet promp-
tum affectum, per contrarium vero sentimus illud nobis esse amicum quod nostro bono
sentimus esse benevolum et sociale. Ergo haec non possunt ab aliqua potentia apprehendi
nisi in respectu ad praedicta, puta, quia apprehenditur ut utile ad delectationem hanc vel
illam vel ad vitandam hanc poenam vel illam vel utile ad perfectionem sui vel suorum vel
amicorum. Sed solius sensus communis cum quinque sensibus sibi connexis est apprehen-
dere delectabile sensui vel poenale et perfectionem sui corporis vel consumptionem. Ergo
eius est apprehendere respectus praedictarum intentionum. (SummaII q.64, 604.) Olivi
employs the term ratio instead of intentio. We should not be confused by this terminologi-
cal inconsistency, however. It is clear that ratio stands here for features such as usefulness
and harmfulness, and thus it is a synonym for intentio. The intention in question here is
not the same concept as the one Olivi uses when he writes of the directing of the common
sense. He uses the term intentio (at least) in two different senses: it may mean the atten-
tion of the common sense (as, for example, in ibid., q.59, 555; see chapter seven, footnote
7 above), or it may refer to the affective properties, such as harmfulness or usefulness.
16See chapter eleven, section four above.
338 chapter fourteen

same token, to become aware of its ability to cause pain to the percipient.
Olivi writes, that:
Since the intentions of useful, useless, and the like cannot be apprehended
by any power unless it at the same time apprehends the sensible or imagi-
nary forms to which these intentions belong; that is because [intentions]
mean only some relational states (respectivas habitudines) of those forms.17
The estimative function can be accounted for without appealing to a spe-
cial type of object, and the intentions of usefulness, harmfulness, and the
like are relations between the percipient and the object perceived.18
It is rather easy to see how Olivis understanding of the essence of esti-
mative acts turns them into kinds of accidental perceptions.19 When an
estimative perception of an object takes place, the subject apprehends the
perceptual qualities of the object and in addition some other properties
which it does not perceive at that moment. For instance, when an animal
sees fire from a distance, it perceives only the visible qualities, and it does

17Intentiones utilis et inutilis et consimilium non possunt ab aliqua potentia appre-


hendi, nisi in simul apprehendat formas sensibiles vel imaginarias quarum sunt huiusmodi
intentiones; quia dicunt solum quasdam respectivas habitudines illarum formarum [...]
(SummaII q.64, 603.) Also, the following texts are relevant: [...] huiusmodi relativae
intentiones non sunt altiores suo ultimo fine, ex cuius respectu et ordine habent ipsis ani-
malibus rationem utilis vel nocivi, amici. Praeterea, ipse amor ovis ad agnum, quem sentit
agnus eius per sensibilia signa, quae sentit in ove, non est minor aut ignobilior respectu
in ipso fundato, immo et forte idem est sentire unum quod et reliquum. (Ibid., 606);
Memorari intentionum aestimabilium illasque memoriter retinere non potest fieri sine
retentione et memoratione illarum rerum vel formarum quibus huiusmodi intentiones
attribuuntur et quarum sunt respectus [...] (Ibid., q.66, 611.)
18In Quodl. 3.2, 17175, Olivi argues that a relation does not add anything real to a
substance. For discussion, see Alain Boureau, Le concept de relation chez Pierre de Jean
Olivi, 4155. Olivis conception of intentions and the estimative function is similar to John
Duns Scotus position. Simo Knuuttila has pointed out that Scotus view was a deviation
from the received view. (Knuuttila, Emotions, 26667.) It seems possible that Scotus was
influenced by Olivieither already when he was lecturing at Oxford, or when he was
revising the lectures during his stay in Paris. The passage to which Knuuttila refers is Sco-
tus Ordinatio 3.15, q.un., 3437 (Ioannes Duns Scotus, B.Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia
IX. Ordinatio. Liber tertius, dist. 117, ed. Commissio Scotistica (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Vati-
canis, 2006)), and it is probable that Scotus prepared the revision of the third book while
he was in Paris in the beginning of the 14th century (Thomas Williams, Introduction: The
Life and Works of John Duns the Scot, in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed.
T.Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), 9). To be sure, it is extremely difficult to
demonstrate the influence because avowing ones indebtedness to Olivi was not consid-
ered desirable at the timeOlivis own order had demanded confiscation and incinera-
tion of his works in 1299 (Burr, The Persecution of Peter Olivi, 74).
19This thread had been present in theories concerning the estimative power ever since
Avicenna. See Di Martino, Ratio particularis, 11121; Black, Imagination and Estimation,
6168.
estimation 339

not feel the heat. However, it becomes aware of the heat by a kind of
accidental perception because it has an innate disposition, which affects
its perception of fire. Something is perceived (the visible qualities of fire),
and something else (the harmfulness of fire) is apprehended through the
perceived qualitiesnot directly, but accidentally. Similarily, the sheep
perceives the wolf, and even though it does not feel pain from the vision, it
apprehends the wolf as able to cause painit apprehends the wolf as pain-
ful, so to speak. Olivi thinks that estimation is this kind of apprehension.
Chapter fifteen

Cogitative Power

Olivis discussion of the cogitative power (cogitativa) is remarkably short.


He briefly takes up and refutes a view that the cogitative power accounts
for the interconnectedness of all the functions of the internal senses (that
is, function(10) in the list presented at the end of chapter nine). The cen-
tral idea in this view is, as we have already seen, that various psychological
processes are often interconnected: for instance, the perceptual qualities
and the harmfulness of an object are combined in an estimative percep-
tion. One of the possible ways of explaining how these processes are inter-
connected is to claim that the soul contains one power which is capable
of combining all the information from other powers of the soul. Olivi
describes the position that he is about to refute in the following way:
Does the cogitative power which combines and compares all the acts and
objects of the aforementioned [powers differ from them]? It is the opinion
of some of those mentioned earlier that it differs from the aforementioned
powers. They say that to bring everything together belongs to a power which
is superior to other powers and common to all of them. Some call it logical
(logistica), that is, rational, because it participates in the order of reason
more than the other powers. And they say that it exists in the middle part
of the brain, as a mediator, conferrer, and collator of everything. Some of
them say that estimation suffices for this operation in beasts, whereas in
human beings reason is sufficient with the other powers which it moves
and governs completely.1
Olivi does not identify the sources of these two pluralistic positions, and
therefore it is difficult to know with certainty against whom he is argu-
ing. Bernardus Jansen, the editor of the second book of Olivis Summa,

1Quantum etiam ad septimum, an scilicet cogitativa quae omnium praedictarum actus


et obiecta componit et confert. Est quorundam praedictorum opinio quod differat a prae-
dictis. Quia, ut dicunt, conferre omnia est potentiae superioris et communis ad omnes;
unde et a quibusdam logistica, id est, rationalis vocatur tanquam prae ceteris participans
ordinem rationis. Dicuntque quod est in medio cerebri tanquam omnium mediatrix et
collatrix seu comparatrix. Quidam vero ex eis dicunt ad hoc in brutis sufficere aestimati-
vam, in homine vero cum his sufficit ratio istas altius movens et regens. (SummaII q.66,
609.)
342 chapter fifteen

takes it (for granted) that Olivi reacts against Aquinas theory.2 Although
the objections Olivi deals with are mostly compatible with Aquinas the-
ory, it is clear that his discussion of the internal senses is not directed
against any particular theory but against the general idea that there are
several internal senses. He presents two versions of the same general view.
According to the first version, the cogitative power combines the informa-
tion from the other internal senses. Thus, there are five different internal
senses in each creature: the common sense, the imagination, the estima-
tive power, memory, and the cogitative power. The other version distin-
guishes between human beings and non-human animals: the estimative
power is the cognitive centre in non-human animals, and the intellect
performs the same function in human beings. The cogitative power is not
an independent power, and thus there are only four internal senses: the
common sense, the imagination, the estimative power, and memory. The
intellect also modifies the functions of the internal sensesfor instance,
it controls the power of memory in such a way that memory gains a new
name: recollection (reminiscentia).
On the face of it, both of these theories differ from Aquinas view. In
contrast to the latter, Aquinas does not attribute function(10) to the intel-
lect, and he thinks that the cogitative power is the human counterpart of
the estimative power of animals. It must be admitted that Olivis descrip-
tion of the latter position is very short and sketchy, and it is possible that
the idea is not to attribute function(10) to the intellect but to say that the
intellect directs the estimative power of human beings to the extent that
it receives a new name, the cogitative power. Be that as it may, the for-
mer theory is clearly not Aquinas because it posits five internal senses,
whereas Aquinas accepts the existence of only four. It does not seem to be
Avicennas either because Avicenna does not attribute function(10) to the
cogitative poweras we have seen, the cogitative power is just another
name for the compositive imagination of human beings.3
The central idea in these two versions, however, is the same: one of the
powers of the soul brings together all the separate psychological processes
that are necessary for accounting for more complicated forms of cogni-
tive activity. Olivi does not spend much time in refuting this view since

2Jansen, Prolegomena, xii.


3Sylvain Piron has suggested that the philosophantes against whom Olivi argues in the
questions concerning the internal senses (written during 128182 in Montpellier) may have
been from the Montpellier medical school (Sylvain Piron, Olivi et les averrostes, 259,
footnote 26).
cogitative power 343

his discussion of the unity of the common sense and the other internal
senses has already undermined it. According to him, there is no need for
a distinct combining power because all the higher psychological functions
belong to the common sense. Moreover, the function cannot be confined
to reason alone because in that case animals would not be capable of
psychological operations that require the combining of various functions,
and experience proves that they are:
Indeed, experience proclaims this somehow, as we see these sensitive pow-
ers in brute animals who lack the intellect, and we also see that infants and
insane people have the acts of these powers without any intellectual act.4
Even if the functions of apprehending, operating, and governing the acts
of different powers could be attributed to reason in human beings, the
very same functions must be attributed to some power of the sensitive
soul so that the action of irrational animals can be explained. And the
centralising power of the sensitive soul cannot be estimation because
there is no such power.
Olivi concludes his exposition on the unity of all the internal senses by
highlighting one salient idea which runs through the whole discussion:
It becomes clear from the foregoing that if some sensitive power combines
and compares all the objects of the aforementioned [powers] to each other,
it is the common sense. Certainly, it is necessary that the power which com-
bines and compares everything also apprehends and controls everything,
and it is as capable of doing this when we actually perceive sensible things
as when we imagine them as absent.5
The common sense is able to apprehend all the things which were tra-
ditionally attributed to several different internal senses. It functions as a
cognitive centre which apprehends everything there is to apprehend in
the sensible realm: the acts of the external senses, the sensible qualities

4Et quidem hoc aliqualiter clamat experientia qua in brutis intellectu carentibus vide-
mus huiusmodi potentias sensitivas et etiam in infantibus et amentibus quod sunt actus
earum absque actu intellectus. (SummaII q.67, 616.) The passage is not directly related to
Olivis discussion of the cogitative power, but it nevertheless shows that he does not hesi-
tate to attribute all cognitive functions except intellectual understanding to non human
animals. See also ibid., q.63, 600.
5Ex praedictis autem patet quod si aliqua potentia sensitiva omnia obiecta prae-
dictarum ad invicem componit et confert, quod illa est sensus communis. Et certe, oportet
quod illa, quae omnia componit et confert, omnia apprehendat et regat, nec minus hoc
poterit, dum res sensibiles sentimus actu quam dum eas imaginamur absentes. (SummaII
q.66, 613.) Ergo in sensitiva anima animalium oportet dare unam potentiam omnibus aliis
praesidentem omnesque regentem [...] (Ibid., q.62, 589.) See also ibid., 587.
344 chapter fifteen

of external objects, the images of absent objects, the pastness of foregone


events, the harmfulness or usefulness of present and absent objects, the
state of the body and the external senses, and even its own activity. It is
also able to combine the information it receives through the various psy-
chological acts. In short, the common sense provides non-human animals
with awareness of everything which is needed in order to account for their
behaviour.

It should now be clear that Olivi is construing the psychology of the animal
soul in such a way that there is one power which functions as the unifying
centre and allows animals to cognise several kinds of aspects of the exter-
nal world. Various psychological functions are phenomenally, psychologi-
cally, and to some extent also metaphysically different from each other:
imaginative acts differ from perceptual acts because they pertain to differ-
ent objects; estimative perception involves a disposition of the common
sense, and so forth. All these psychological processes belong, however,
to one and the same power of the soul. There is a common foundation
for all of them, and they share an essential unity. This unity is required
because otherwise many psychological operations that are composed of
multiple basic functions would not be possible. At least there should be
one governing power which accounts for the unityand this is superflu-
ous in the eyes of Olivi because he thinks that it is possible to account
for all the psychological functions by appealing only to the activity of the
common sense.
Conclusion

Modern scholarship on medieval philosophy all but neglected Peter of


John Olivi for a long time. During the last couple of decades scholars have
turned their attention to his thought, however, and nowadays it is widely
acknowledged that he was one of the most original philosophers of his
time. Not all of his ideas turned out to be historically influential, to be
sure, but they are nevertheless philosophically interesting. By taking a
close look to his philosophy, we can notice that many characteristically
modern patterns of thought are nascent in his works and that he made
several new openings especially in the field of philosophical psychology.
In order to see Olivis importance, we need not go further than his discus-
sion concerning the freedom of the will, which stands as a milestone in
the development of the modern understanding of human beings as free
individual persons. Olivis original contribution is not limited to the birth
of voluntarism, however. His psychological discussions in general are
innovative, and we have seen in the course of the present study that his
cognitive psychology of the sensitive soul contains many philosophically
original ideas which are reminiscent of later developments.
In this book I have advanced a philosophical reconstruction of Olivis
views concerning the cognitive psychology of the sensitive soul. My aim
has been to further our understanding of Olivis philosophical psychology
by providing a detailed reading of the ideas that can be found across his
philosophical works. I have not tried to take the historical context of his
ideas into account fully, but even a cursory comparison to other central
figures from the late thirteenth century shows how much variety medieval
discussions admit and how original some of Olivis views are. His origi-
nality lies partly in his way of reading earlier authorsin philosophical
questions he relies on reason alone and criticises readily those positions
that are philosophically untenablebut it stems also from his phenom-
enological method. For him, internal experience is a genuine source of
knowledge, and it plays a central role in his philosophical psychology. In
many cases, this methodology leads him to positions and interpretations
that differ from anything presented before him.
The book contains three parts, which together draw a detailed picture
of Olivis way of understanding the psychological processes that are com-
mon to human beings and non-human animals. The first part charts the
346 conclusion

metaphysical basis of Olivis view and situates his theory of the soul in a
larger context. We have seen that Olivi accepts the doctrines of universal
hylomorphism and the plurality of substantial forms because he thinks
that they provide the only philosophically sound way to safeguard both
the immateriality of intellectual operations and the substantial unity of the
soul and the body. The human soul is an independent substance, which
is composed of spiritual matter and several substantial forms (which are
parts or powers of the soul). The essential attributes of the human soul,
spirituality and simplicity, distinguish a special ontological class of
beings, which differ radically from corporeal objects. Human souls and
other spiritual and simple beings are essentially alive, active, and capable
of psychological acts, whereas corporeal objects, such as human bodies,
are passive and extended in space. By making this metaphysical distinc-
tion between the soul and the body, Olivi distances himself from pure
hylomorphism and approaches metaphysical dualism, very much like cer-
tain theories that were presented in the Early Modern period. Yet, he does
not accept the Platonist idea that the human being is nothing but the soul.
He argues that the body is a substantial part of a human being, and it is
substantially united to the soul because the latter informs it by its sensi-
tive part. In other words, we are bodily beings through our animality. The
substantial unity explains also why the body can indirectly bring about
changes in the soul. Olivi argues that when the body undergoes certain
kinds of changes, the soul is changed exactly because it is connected to
the body.
Olivi sees an essential difference between human beings and non-
human animals. In contrast to the human soul, the animal soul is a
hylomorphic form of the body and, as such, not spiritual in the strictest
meaning of the word: it is not composed of spiritual matter. Due to the
lack of spiritual matter, the animal soul is mortal and unable to be genu-
inely self-reflexive. However, the metaphysical difference does not entail a
psychological gap in the lower cognitive processes, because Olivi endows
the animal soul with the properties that are crucial for his cognitive psy-
chology, namely, simplicity and a certain level of spirituality. Thus, human
psychology does not differ radically from animal psychology. Olivi uses
illustrations and arguments from the animal kingdom, especially when
he discusses the internal senses, but also in many other contexts. This
practice underlines his view that animal psychology may illustrate certain
aspects of human psychology and vice versa, human psychology can be
taken to tell us something about animal cognition. Some of the arguments
and illustrations are especially revealing because they show that Olivi is
conclusion 347

willing to attribute certain types of self-reflexivity and self-awareness to


non-human animals. Even in the case of such refined psychological func-
tion, the demarcation line is not between human beings and other ani-
mals, but between animals and plants.
The second part of this study analyses Olivis innovative and original
theory of perception. He criticises earlier theories which saw perception
as a passive reception of external stimuli and defends strongly a theory
in which the soul is active in cognitive processes. The powers of the soul
cannot be directly acted upon by external objects because of the ontologi-
cal superiority of the soul. Rather, the powers are intentionally directed
towards the objects, and this intentional directedness enables them to
bring about cognitive acts by which the subject perceives those objects.
We can say that perception is fundamentally an intentional process which
is based on the ability to pay attention to the external world and to exter-
nal objects. By emphasising the active and intentional character of per-
ception, Olivi comes close to many features that are central in modern
philosophical discussions of cognitive processes.
Olivis theory entails that the perceptual acts of the soul belong first
and foremost to the soul and they are only secondarily realised in the
body as a movement of the spiritus animalis in the organs of the senses
and in the brain. This consequence leads him to the brink of functional
dualism. As we have seen, he argues that the soul, when in a disembodied
state, is capable of perceiving without the body. This kind of perception
does not differ psychologically from normal perception which takes place
in the body. The bodily changes are but concomitant to the cognitive
acts of the soul. This dualistic view reflects the metaphysical dualism that
underlies Olivis cognitive psychology, but (as we have seen) Olivi can-
not be labelled a dualist without qualifications. Not only does he argue
for a substantial unity of the human being, he also underlines that the
bodily changes are necessary for perception as long as the soul is united
to it. He does not suggest a flagrantly dualistic theory, even though his
view contains some dualistic strands in it. Due to this close-to-dualistic
model, one might think that perception would be different in the case
of human beings from the case of non-human animalsgiven that only
the human soul is a spiritual substance. However, Olivi sees only minor
differences between human and non-human animal perception. In both
cases perception is an active and intentional process in which the percipi-
ent pays attention and thus directs the cognitive powers intentionally to
the external world and becomes thereby aware of the things within the
perceptual field.
348 conclusion

A central theme in the second parta theme that runs through the
whole studyis related to Olivis way of understanding the soul as having
a kind of a cognitive centre. The idea stems from the medieval psycho-
logical paradigm according to which the soul has a structure. Olivi thinks
that the soul is constituted by several powers, or formal parts, which are
responsible for different psychological processes. The power of sight is
situated in the eyes, and it accounts for the ability to see; the sense of
touch is in the flesh, and it enables us to perceive tactile qualities, and
so forth. In addition to the external senses, there has to be a centralising
power, the common sense, which is responsible for the unified percep-
tual experience, as it links different perceptual qualities together in an
appropriate manner. Olivi also uses the cognitive centre to explain how
paying attention in perception functions. The common sense is directed
intentionally towards the external senses and, through them, to external
objects. This intentional directedness enables it to act in relation to the
objects that fall within its scope. We may think that a subject pays atten-
tion to different things by directing the highest cognitive power, and the
intentional directedness of this cognitive centre accounts for the contents
of cognitive activity. In a way, the cognitive attention is located in the
highest cognitive power of the soul.
The idea of the cognitive centre becomes even more salient when we
turn our attention to the highest cognitive functions of the sensitive soul,
which are treated in detail in the third part of this study. Olivi thinks in
typical medieval fashion that imagination, memory, estimation and the
like must be accounted for by appealing to the internal senses. Yet Olivi
differs from many other medieval theorists because he argues that there
is only one internal sense, the common sense. His arguments are based on
two fundamental ideas: all the various psychological processes are experi-
enced as belonging to one and the same subject, and they are necessarily
interconnected in such a way that many of them cannot take place without
the others. The interconnectedness of the psychological functions is easy
to explain, as Olivi reduces the number of internal senses to one; the com-
mon sense brings about different kinds of acts which realise the various
functionsthese were analysed in detail in various chapters of the third
part of this study. Because they all take place in one and the same power,
their interconnection is no longer a problem. The experiential unity, in
turn, can be explained by arguing that the highest cognitive power of the
soul apprehends the acts of other powers in such a way that the subject is
aware of all the acts as belonging to herself. In the case of human beings,
conclusion 349

the central power (which brings about a kind of subjectivity) is the intel-
lect, but as we saw above, Olivi seems to think that the common sense
plays a similar role in human beings, even though it does not reach the
same complexity and same level of reflexivity as the intellect.
The similarity between human beings and other animals is apparent
when it comes to these post-sensory cognitive capacities of the sensitive
soul. Olivi admits a possibility of gradation in these powers because he
thinks that different species of animals may have more or less sophisti-
cated abilities, but this is only a matter of degree: there are no clear-cut
disparities between different species. We all have the same basic cogni-
tive powers, and any differences exist not so much between human and
non-human animals but between very simple animals such as worms and
higher animals such as dogs and humans. In fact, Olivi even attributes to
non-human animals cognitive functions which were sometimes denied to
them in medieval philosophical psychology. For instance, he thinks that
animals are capable of one kind of compositive imagination, and their
reactions to external threats and benefits are not merely instinctive but
oftentimes based on experience and learning. Moreover, Olivi argues for
the unity of the internal sensesthat is, he denies the existence of several
post-sensory cognitive powers of the sensitive soul and claims that there
is only one, the common sense, which accounts for various psychological
processes that human and non-human animals are capable of. This idea
shows that Olivi understands the cognitive processes of non-human ani-
mals as similar to those of human beings: in both kinds of creatures there
is a centre of the soul which accounts for their cognitive activity. It also
explains the interconnection of various cognitive operations, such as the
perception of an external object and the harmfulness thereof. Finally, it
accounts for the experiential unity that exists between various kinds of
psychological processes: perception, imagining, and remembering appear
as belonging to one and the same subject. In the case of non-human ani-
mals Olivi appeals to the unifying role of the common sense in order to
account for this phenomenon.
The alleged similarity between human beings and non-human animals
is most striking in the context of self-cognition because it is often consid-
ered as an ability that is exclusive to intellectual beings. We have seen, in
the chapter eleven which is devoted to the basic functions of the common
sense, that Olivi attributes a certain kind of reflexivity and an ability to
apprehend its own acts (in addition to the acts of the external senses) to
the common sense. The idea that any power of the animal soul might be
350 conclusion

able to cognise its own acts is quite radical, since it was commonly thought
that corporeal powers of the soul are incapable of reflexivity. Only the
incorporeal human mind was supposed to be capable of reflexively turn-
ing towards itself. Olivi attributes to the human intellect a special kind of
reflexivity and gives human beings an ability to be directly aware of their
minds in a special way. Yet, he also thinks that the animal soul provides
a certain kind of self-awareness. For instance, animals perceive their own
bodies by the sense of touch, and they are aware of their own bodies as
part of themselves. Animals also have a self-image which enables them to
be aware of the different parts of their bodies and the importance thereof
to their well-being and survival, and they are aware of themselves as living
beings. Self-cognition is a necessary part of the process in which animals
apprehend external objects as being harmful or useful. Finally, animals
are capable of a second-order perception of the acts of the external senses,
and Olivi seems to allow that they are aware of the acts of the common
sense by which they apprehend everything elsethus they can be aware
that they are aware.
By looking at medieval philosophical discussions concerning the psy-
chology of sensitive soul we get a better picture of the medieval under-
standing of humans as beings who occupy the highest peak of a continuum
which extends downward all the way to plants if not to inanimate nature.
Human psychology shares a great deal with lower animals, and the differ-
ences that medieval authors saw between human beings and other ani-
mals come in within a general framework of psychological continuity and
similarity. This conception differs radically from the Early Modern idea of
animals as automataas machines that lack consciousness.
We have seen in the course of this study that Olivi adheres to the idea
of a psychological continuity between human beings and other animals.
Of course, he also saw differences between them. He makes certain impor-
tant moves and puts forth ideas which widen the conceptual disparity
between human beings and non-human animalssuch as his conception
of the freedom of the will, his view of the possibility of intellectual cogni-
tion of particular things, and his explicit commitment to the possibility
that human perception may differ from non-human animal perception.
The radical differences are mostly related to freedom, morality, and the
relation to God. That is, Olivi believes that human beings are different
from other animals not so much because they are capable of more com-
plex cognitive operations (although that holds true to some extent also)
but mainly because humans are free agents who are capable of setting
goals for themselves. The human will is a self-reflexive power which is
conclusion 351

able to freely move itself to will whatever it wills to will, and thus humans
have the ability to decide what kind of life to pursue and what kinds of
things to value.
Yet, with respect to the cognitive functions of the sensitive (part of the)
soul, Olivi sees little difference between human beings and non-human
animals. It is true that the questions concerning psychological continuity
between human beings and non-human animals are more or less implicit
in his works, but a close reading of his theory of perception and his discus-
sion concerning the internal senses reveal many ideas about the alleged
similarity between human and non-human animals. Even though he is
primarily interested in human beings and does not discuss non-human
animal cognition as much as he discusses human cognition, the parallels
between non-human animals and human beings are clear. The cognitive
activity of animals involves intentionality, it is based on selective atten-
tion, it is accompanied by phenomenological awareness and unity, and
animals are also capable of reflexive self-relations to some extent. More-
over, the psychological processes that the sensitive soul provides for non-
human animals are more or less identical to those that the sensitive part
of human beings provides for them.
The freedom of the will stands as the defining feature that sets human
beings apart from other animals. Unlike other animals we are rational, but
for Olivi that does not count for much. Without our freedom we would
be nothing but intellectual beasts. Our cognitive capacities would remain
intact, but we would cease to be what we truly are: persons who are capa-
ble of directing our own lives by our own free decisions. Olivis approach
is important because it is a new opening into the history of human self-
understanding: by emphasising the ability of an individual human being
to lead a personal life in which she may pursue things she values by her
will, it opens up the way for a radically individualist conception of human
beings. As we all know, this trait has become central in our current self-
image. As Olivi construes the difference between human beings and other
animals in terms of freedom, he does not have to emphasise the difference
in any other way. There is no need for him to argue for the distinctive-
ness of human beings with respect to their cognitive capacities because
animals lack the only capability that matters in the end: they are not
free. This point, it seems to me, is the underlying reason Olivi elevates
the psychological capacities of animals in many ways; at the same time
this is the point with which Olivi widens the disparity between human
and non-human animals in a radical way. The central reason why human
beings are special among the whole of creation is not so much because
352 conclusion

they are cognitively superior to other animals. Intellectual understanding


may distinguish us from animals, but the common psychological pow-
ers unite us with them. Continuity is clear, as the common psychological
basis forms an important part of the mental lives of human beings. The
value of human life lays in freedom, but if we are to understand human
psychology properly, we must take into heed the common cognitive pow-
ers as well. And in order to understand humans place in the world, it is
also necessary to understand the manifold ways in which human beings
are similar to non-human animals.
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Index

accident26, 29, 3738, 49, 53, 79, 9193, psychological73, 195, 199, 201, 207,
117, 122, 125, 160, 194, 196, 201, 211, 327, 225, 229, 258, 260, 317, 344, 346
338339 second-order98, 268, 275280, 299,
acies73 n. 89, 146, 302, 3047 303
act2628, 47, 52, 59, 7172, 81, 91, 94, 97, simple34 n. 31, 8182, 86, 119, 120 n. 2,
99100, 105, 110 n. 42, 116, 122, 142146, 198, 200, 276
157159, 161, 173, 175176, 188 n. 45, spiritual119, 173, 193, 205206, 253,
190191, 205, 213214, 222, 228, 244, 276, 290
250251, 254255, 257259, 262265, vital120, 200201
270, 279282, 289290, 296, 309, action2 n. 4, 79, 15, 2223, 32, 38, 59
316317, 322, 335336, 341, 343, 348350 n. 43, 68, 7172, 77, 8283, 9899,
appetitive143, 156, 181 105106, 115, 117, 125129, 135, 139, 141,
apprehensiveSee act, cognitive 143145, 150, 153154, 156 n. 42, 157158,
cognitive1314, 30, 38, 75, 7982, 90, 160 n. 50, 164173, 179 n. 31, 182, 188,
9899, 119120, 124131, 134, 139, 194, 197, 200, 215, 218221, 225226, 234,
142150, 153154, 156, 160161, 163165, 235 n. 10, 261, 264, 271, 275, 278284,
170, 172175, 181, 185186, 189, 193194, 297299, 302, 315, 323 n. 36, 324,
197203, 206209, 219, 221, 234, 327328, 342344, 348351
251253, 255, 258, 263, 271, 275, at a distance122, 157159
294295, 298299, 302, 305306, activity. See action
310314, 319324, 347 actuality14, 26, 2829, 49, 5157, 6364,
direct268269, 276, 279281, 291 6970, 78, 81, 85, 94, 109, 119122,
estimative328331, 338 125126, 139, 142145, 158 n. 47, 203205,
freeSee act of the will 229, 235, 251, 254, 257, 281 n. 30, 291, 295
imaginative120 n. 2, 183 n. 38, 188, Aelred of Rievaulx241
256, 281, 293306, 310313, 316, agent47, 7172, 122, 127128, 156 n. 42,
319321, 323, 344 157, 158 n. 45, 201, 290, 350
intellectual34 n. 31, 57, 7374, 104, Albertus Magnus9 nn. 1516, 10, 27 n. 7,
128, 172, 251, 261, 275276, 343 38 n. 41, 43 n. 1, 87 n. 22, 226 n. 1, 238,
memorative120 n. 2, 178, 183 n. 38, 262 n. 38, 268 n. 2, 272
310 n. 3, 318323 Pseudo-79 n. 7
of the senses13, 74, 78, 100, 104110, Alcher of Clairvaux241
119120, 126131, 137, 143, 150, 160, Alexander of Aphrodisias97, 98 n. 19
166190, 200207, 213214, 251, 260, animal3334, 4950, 53, 62, 8286,
263, 270271, 275282, 289291, 297, 8889, 111, 115, 227, 235, 239, 249,
322, 328, 343, 349350 256257, 262263, 277284, 286290,
of the soul27, 34 n. 31, 70, 7375, 292, 307, 322, 323 n. 36, 329, 331332,
7778, 86, 9091, 98, 119, 125, 128, 137, 338, 343344, 346347, 349352
141, 145148, 151 n. 30, 155, 161, 193213, higher10, 12 n. 30, 88, 106, 109, 115116,
216221, 253, 261262, 264, 270, 295, 225, 228, 231, 251, 257, 349350
298, 314, 347 human23, 514, 23, 30, 40, 77,
of the will59, 72, 126, 144145, 160 115116, 128, 218, 238239, 244, 258
perceptual78, 110, 117126, 128, 131, n. 27, 292, 294, 327328, 332333, 347,
137138, 143, 145146, 151152, 157158, 349352
176, 178, 186, 193197, 206207, 213, imperfect34, 218, 350
219, 254, 268, 271, 277, 279281, irrational115, 218219, 307, 343
294295, 300303, 310312, 318, 322, non-human115, 21, 23, 30, 3335, 37,
328, 335336, 344, 347 40, 4849, 7785, 8990, 115116, 128,
368 index

animal cont. 276 n. 20, 277281, 283285, 304 n. 20,


160 n. 53, 167, 194, 198, 201204, 307308, 332
217222, 225, 227, 234, 238239, Pseudo-242
242244, 258 n. 27, 260261, 278, 281, Averros60, 123, 237239
284, 292, 294, 298299, 301, 304, 306 Averroism40 n. 46, 44, 6062, 116 n. 2
n. 23, 308, 313315, 327328, 330332, Avicenna22, 85 n. 16, 87 n. 22, 98, 100,
342347, 349352 102 n. 28, 106107, 109, 141, 168, 177, 185
perfect34, 88, 91 n. 40, 197, 205206, 226227, 231239,
rational3, 1011, 115, 219, 351 241, 243244, 247249, 253, 262
simple10, 109, 227, 257, 289, 292, 349 nn. 3738, 272, 275 n. 17, 287 n. 43, 294,
anonymous99 n. 21, 237, 240, 268 n. 2 308309, 327, 330 n. 5, 336, 338 n. 19,
anthropology13, 15, 25, 3839, 45, 47, 342
59 n. 43, 117, 194, 212 n. 37, 285 awareness163164, 167, 169170, 173,
appetite78, 156, 160 n. 53, 181, 249, 252 175177, 178179, 185, 225, 234, 260
n. 15, 258 n. 27, 277278, 282, 329330 n. 33, 268, 271, 277, 279285, 290292,
apprehension75, 99, 103, 106, 132, 146, 297303, 315, 320, 322323, 327328, 332,
160, 172, 182, 189, 209, 225, 234, 256, 338339, 344, 347351
258260, 267, 270271, 273, 275, 281,
288, 296, 302, 306, 311, 317, 319, 323, 328, beast2, 3 n. 5, 9 n. 16, 11, 7880, 201202,
330331, 335337, 339 218219, 257, 308, 337, 341, 351
Aristotle2, 5, 7, 9 n. 16, 10, 12, 17, 2122, body6, 11, 1315, 2123, 2526, 28 n. 10,
28, 39, 41, 43 n. 1, 4849, 5354, 60, 62, 3035, 3873, 75, 7791, 9394, 97 n. 17,
64, 70, 83, 85, 87, 89, 9799, 105, 107 102, 109111, 117, 119, 130, 136137, 139,
n. 35, 115116, 119, 121, 123125, 129, 130 142, 155, 163, 170, 173174, 185 n. 40, 189,
n. 30, 135, 149150, 168, 195196, 198, 206, 193199, 201222, 236, 247, 249250, 252,
210211, 213, 231232, 233 n. 7, 236237, 281284, 286289, 290 n. 54, 292, 328,
240241, 247, 249, 259 n. 28, 267268, 330, 337, 344, 346347
269 n. 4, 272274, 285287, 289, 319 Boethius28, 237, 242
n. 29, 320, 323 Bonaventure3 n. 5, 4, 2526, 28, 51,
Arnaud Gaillard4, 292 n. 58 63 n. 55, 93 n. 4, 125
aspectus57 n. 40, 58, 72, 74, 79, 131, 133, brain41, 63, 8586, 98 n. 20, 107109, 171,
146, 151161, 164165, 168173, 176178, 196197, 205, 208, 215, 221, 235236,
181190, 200204, 207, 209, 215216, 239 n. 19, 240, 247252, 307, 313, 341, 347
260, 273, 290291, 295, 301, 305307, ventricles of86, 87 n. 22, 109, 197, 205,
310 221, 235236, 240, 247249
actual110 n. 42, 159, 165, 176, 295 brute11 n. 22, 34 n. 31, 79, 81, 89, 201, 218,
corporeal79, 164165, 201 278, 315, 331, 343
general176, 184188, 190
of the organs156, 164165, 193, 290 capacity6, 8, 11, 15, 91, 97100, 106107,
spiritual79, 164165, 171, 201 115116, 168, 189190, 219, 226, 231232,
virtual154, 160, 177178, 290 237238, 239 n. 19, 253, 268 n. 3, 273,
attention1315, 72, 116117, 153 n. 34, 155, 288, 315, 332, 349, 351
157 n. 43, 163171, 175176, 179191, 193, cause7, 44, 5354, 61, 7172, 74, 7778,
207209, 214 n. 43, 220, 222, 279280, 83, 99, 117, 119130, 133134, 13639,
305, 307, 309, 324, 337 n. 15, 347348 143, 145, 148151, 158159, 168, 185186,
degrees of14, 116, 163, 179191 193194, 197203, 206210, 220, 222,
general117, 163, 184185, 187 225, 234, 248, 278, 280, 282, 286289,
selective14, 175, 351 295, 300302, 311313, 322, 324, 328332,
Augustine5, 15, 22, 28, 32, 3739, 44, 337339
70, 81, 116, 120121, 135139, 141142, 143 efficient70, 7273, 75, 120, 126 n. 16,
n. 7, 148149, 152 n. 31, 155, 164 n. 3, 129, 141143, 145147, 149150, 155
166, 168, 174, 176, 180181, 198, 210 n. 38, 197, 210, 254, 310
n. 35, 211, 212 n. 37, 231, 235 n. 12, final149150
241242, 244245, 247, 249, 252 n. 15, formal150 n. 28, 310
index 369

material150 relation to internal senses240,


terminative74, 141, 145, 149151 244245, 247, 248 n. 2, 258259, 264,
change15, 2627, 54, 94, 117, 164, 168, 185, 293306, 309320, 322, 325, 328337,
252, 275, 277, 300, 346 342344, 348
accidental79 relation to senses91, 97100, 106110,
bodily1314, 45, 54, 7075, 90, 117, 120, 116, 166171, 177190, 264, 270271,
126 n. 16, 130, 136139, 155, 164 n. 3, 275280, 289290, 298, 301302, 328,
173174, 193213, 220 n. 56, 221, 252, 348
277, 282, 286289, 308, 313, 328, 347 simplicity of34, 276
formal82, 196 n. 8 common sensibles229, 231, 238, 243,
spiritual7075, 123, 174, 196200, 207, 267268, 272275
346 condemnation4, 45, 60, 220 n. 56
substantial49, 53 consciousness58, 174175, 281 n. 30, 350
children2, 72, 172, 300, 330331, 333335 Constantinus Africanus236
Christianity21, 38, 334 n. 10 continuity9, 10, 13, 15, 77, 115, 189,
cogitative power227, 229, 233, 235, 218220, 272273, 331, 350352
238239, 245, 341344 corporeality14, 22, 2526, 2834, 3639,
cognition5, 3738, 93, 123 n. 6, 124, 128, 52, 5455, 5759, 6263, 65, 71, 7779,
133134, 153154, 161, 173, 268, 297 n. 8, 8182, 8587, 8990, 119120, 122124,
303, 305307, 310311, 317, 319, 322, 327, 129131, 137, 139, 155, 164166, 173174,
346, 349351 193, 198207, 209, 214216, 220, 222, 236,
centre of13, 15, 116, 163, 170, 172173, 250, 253, 257, 272, 276, 285, 346, 350
178, 179 n. 31, 229, 260261, 299, Costa ben Luca87 n. 22, 236, 249
342343, 348
intellectual8, 124 n. 10, 126 n. 17, Descartes, Ren7 n. 12, 910, 30, 3637,
135 n. 43, 175 n. 25, 213 n. 41, 350 210 n. 35, 239 n. 19
sensory8, 10, 77, 119, 124 n. 10, 128, desire258 n. 27, 278281, 298, 315
135 n. 43, 175 n. 25, 255, 310 n. 4, difference23, 33, 37, 6970, 9697, 105,
313 n. 19, 323, 327 125, 135, 155, 157, 227, 238, 240, 242,
theory of25, 30, 3233, 121, 124 n. 11, 252253, 288 n. 44, 291, 306, 314, 331,
126, 135, 148 n. 20, 153155, 161 333, 335
cognitive centre. See cognition, centre of between acts104105, 110, 135 n. 43,
colligantia4445, 7172, 74, 169, 194, 203, 200, 255, 294300, 303, 309310, 319325
207209 between humans and angels32
colour99101, 103, 122123, 130, 177, 195, between humans and animals13, 6,
199, 243, 259, 267, 269, 272, 274, 287, 301, 912, 15, 7778, 8182, 115, 219220,
334 222, 228, 238, 244, 346347, 349351
common sense13, 15, 73, 84, 116, 157 between objects99, 104, 269270, 295,
n. 43, 190, 208, 227229, 232 n. 4, 297, 303
233235, 238, 254257, 260 nn. 30, 33, between powers92, 106, 109, 200, 203,
265, 291292 218, 252253, 255257, 298
as a cognitive centre110, 116, 163, experiential106, 133, 179, 228, 294,
167179, 182183, 188190, 229, 300, 303
261264, 269271, 277282, 299, metaphysical1415, 23, 38, 70, 7778,
328329, 343344, 348350 8182, 92, 107 n. 37, 218219, 222, 346
dispositions of. See disposition, of the psychological23, 82, 110, 220, 222, 244,
common sense 347
functions of243244, 267272, 275, directedness150151, 155, 157 n. 43, 158,
284285, 293306, 309320, 322, 164, 169, 172, 184, 347348
325, 328337, 343344, 349 disembodiedness. See perception,
organs of107109, 171, 240, 248, disembodied
251252, 289290 disposition7172, 129, 153, 202, 257, 275,
reflexivity of. See reflexivity, of the 287, 313314, 328, 330335, 339, 344
common sense as a species129, 313
370 index

disposition cont. 193, 195196, 199, 203204, 208209, 214,


bodily72, 287 217, 251 n. 13, 252, 254, 269, 274, 277281,
of the common sense328, 330335, 286, 304, 348
339, 344
dream165, 172, 188, 208, 280, 293294, flavour100, 193, 199, 212 n. 37, 269
300303, 305308, 320321 flesh54, 63, 87, 102, 127, 286287, 348
dualism13, 15, 117, 193194, 196 n. 7, foetus53, 79, 172
212 n. 37 form23, 2530, 36, 39, 65, 69, 7374,
functional13, 195, 209, 211, 221, 347 8081, 94, 122123, 150, 193, 196, 198199,
substance22, 25, 3840, 43, 210, 222, 202203, 206, 250, 252, 263, 335
346347 accidental49, 53, 122, 125
complexionis63
ears8384, 105, 138, 165, 169, 171, 180, corporeal2930, 37, 54, 6263, 78,
187188, 207, 274 8485, 89, 148 n. 21, 200
element52 n. 23, 63, 156, 207 n. 29, 253 intellectual25, 44, 4951, 5462,
emotion49, 115, 210 n. 35, 249, 278 6469, 218
entity21, 39, 53, 61, 67, 78, 97, 123124, mixti63
129, 148, 152, 221, 285 n. 37, 321 of a form2728, 5052, 66
spiritual14, 22, 25, 3032, 38, 43, 58, of the body2122, 2526, 33, 35,
70, 78, 110, 185, 193 38 n. 41, 3941, 4445, 4869, 7778,
epistemology120, 124, 128, 131132, 134 8082, 8586, 89, 97 n. 17, 111, 203, 211,
essence7, 9, 9596, 158, 302, 323, 324 n. 38 218, 346
of an act128, 138, 219, 311, 338 organizationis63
of matter2830, 58 partial56, 6869, 84, 91, 94, 97, 263,
of powers69, 107 n. 37, 108, 151152, 348
169, 220, 263, 290, 295 plurality of. See plurality of substantial
of the soul14, 36, 56, 62, 67, 6970, 77, forms
7980, 8283, 85, 9194, 130, 285 sensible233234, 335, 338
simple62, 96 sensitive14, 25, 3435, 44, 4951,
estimation177, 227229, 233235, 6062, 6466, 78, 82, 193, 215, 285
238240, 243, 245, 248, 258259, simple3435, 37, 77, 8084
262 nn. 3738, 284, 303, 327336, spiritual2930, 37, 84
338339, 341344, 348 substantial7 n. 12, 14, 23, 25, 39, 44,
experience5, 13, 16, 93, 103106, 133, 137, 4854, 60, 6266, 6870, 78, 81, 89,
143144, 163, 166167, 170, 173178, 179 94, 110, 202, 206, 285, 346
n. 31, 184, 187, 189, 215, 220 n. 56, total6869, 80, 94
228229, 234, 247, 258, 260262, 265, vegetative61, 64, 78, 215
269, 280 n. 29, 281, 301302, 304, 313, 315, Franciscan order35, 22, 45 n. 3, 51, 211,
319320, 323 n. 35, 324, 330332, 336, 273, 292 n. 58
343, 349 Franciscus of Assisi3 n. 5
internal14, 41, 128, 214, 251, 297, 304, 345 freedom3, 6, 9, 1112, 25, 41, 44, 46,
ownness175 5559, 72, 78, 119120, 126, 144145, 172,
perceptual100, 116, 173, 178179, 228, 220, 261, 285, 300, 302303, 345, 350352
233, 243, 267, 269, 334, 348
unity ofSee unity, experiential Galen86, 107 n. 35, 232, 235 n. 12, 248
extension2931, 3538, 54, 58, 8084, 88, generation7, 79, 149, 210 n. 35, 216 n. 50,
108, 119, 120 n. 2, 129, 131, 142143, 322
146147, 154, 158, 160, 173, 177178, genus27, 3637, 100104, 148150,
200201, 217, 222, 250, 276, 285 n. 37, 160 n. 50, 200, 218219, 257, 270
312313, 346 Gerard of Cremona236
extramission136137, 151152 God3, 2528, 31, 3437, 47, 53, 6062, 80,
eyes72, 8384, 100, 105, 109110, 122123, 92, 9597, 130, 135, 154, 189 n. 47, 213, 350
130, 137138, 148, 151, 164165, 169, Gregory the Great174
171172, 176, 178179, 181183, 185190, growth7, 210 n. 35, 215216
index 371

habitus. See disposition interconnectedness228229, 247,


Haly Abbas236 258259, 261262, 264265, 296, 299,
harmfulness46, 173174, 205, 220 n. 56, 336, 341, 348349
225, 229, 243, 258259, 262, 277, intromission121, 151
282284, 287 n. 43, 327332, 335339, Isaac of Stella241
341, 344, 349350
hearing8, 84, 99100, 104106, 108, 116, Jean Buridan268 n. 2
165166, 168169, 180190, 199, 207, 243, Jean de la Rochelle31 n. 22, 102 n. 28,
259, 262, 267, 269271, 274, 301, 322, 249, 330 n. 5
332333, 335 John Damascene242
heart41, 8283, 8587, 89, 107109, 184, John Duns Scotus56, 51 n. 17, 212 n. 37,
249, 251252, 257, 286 228 n. 3, 273, 297 n. 8, 323, 338 n. 18
Hugh of Saint-Victor241 John of Salisbury241
hylomorphism2223, 2526, 34, 39, John of Seville87 n. 22, 236
40 n. 46, 41, 44, 48, 67, 6970, 73, 78, John Peckham51 n. 19, 121
8283, 89, 193194, 203, 211, 346
knowledge56, 107 n. 35, 138, 205, 213,
image122, 132134, 147 n. 19, 165, 178, 188, 232 n. 5, 235237, 239 n. 19, 279, 345
208209, 234, 238, 280282, 293294,
297, 299301, 304305, 307308, 310, 318, learning330331, 333334, 337, 349
320321, 323, 344, 350351 light100101, 103104, 129130, 147149,
imagination15, 31, 81, 130, 173, 188, 208, 151, 156158, 160, 182, 186187, 199, 207,
227, 229, 233235, 238, 244245, 269271, 286287
248, 254256, 258 n. 27, 280281, love12, 47, 93, 275
293308, 310312, 316, 319324, 335336,
342, 348349 matter23, 2535, 3940, 4852, 5557,
immateriality21, 46, 88, 346 6067, 69, 73, 79, 84, 88, 90, 123, 154,
immortality25, 41, 44, 5557, 59, 7778, 196 n. 8, 198, 201202, 204, 206, 235, 253,
213 263
incorporeality2223, 25, 31, 44, 5455, corporeal26, 2831, 33, 37, 5759, 62,
5859, 62, 67, 77, 210 n. 35, 220, 257, 65, 7882, 86, 87 n. 22, 193 n. 1,
350 198199, 201206, 215216, 220, 285
individual39, 41, 60, 9596, 148 n. 21, 210, essence of. See essence of matter
259, 311312, 324, 345, 351 organic63
individualism12, 351 prime53
insanity72, 172, 208, 300, 307, 343 spiritual22, 25, 2830, 3334, 37, 40,
instinct225, 239, 330331, 349 52, 55, 61, 6465, 68, 7374, 7778,
intellect46, 5761, 65, 7374, 92, 9596, 8182, 8485, 94, 110, 193 n. 1, 198199,
144, 146, 157 n. 43, 163, 172, 179 n. 31, 202, 204206, 215, 313, 346
184, 207 n. 29, 210 n. 35, 213214, 235 Matthew of Aquasparta4, 51, 126, 213
n. 10, 255, 260264, 279, 282, 290, 292 n. 41
n. 58, 298306, 308, 334, 342343, medicine31, 83, 86, 87 n. 22, 89, 107
349350 n. 35, 109, 205, 206 n. 26, 226, 231232,
Gods9597 235236, 240, 247249, 251, 342 n. 3
unity of5962 memory8, 15, 173, 177178, 180181, 208,
intentio152 n. 31, 153154, 159, 166169, 227, 229, 231, 233235, 238240, 244245,
176, 233234, 238239, 243244, 253, 248, 304325, 336, 342, 348
256, 259, 264, 309, 310 n. 3, 320, 324, intellectual309 n. 1
327 n. 1, 329 n. 4, 335338 species81, 120 n. 2, 130, 133, 208,
intentionality13, 15, 57, 116, 123, 129, 137, 254255, 293295, 301302, 304314,
141, 146151, 152 n. 31, 153155, 157161, 317319, 321322, 324, 334 n. 10
163170, 172, 175, 186187, 191, 222, 253, mind7, 11 n. 22, 1314, 39, 46, 59 n. 43,
278279, 291, 293294, 306, 310, 347348, 133, 150, 155, 159, 175, 180, 191, 195,
351 210212, 220 n. 56, 221, 225, 229, 234, 238,
372 index

mind cont. person2, 1113, 31, 4142, 72, 105, 132,


244, 254, 279280, 293, 300, 302, 312, 139, 165, 167, 171172, 175176, 182183,
323324, 350 187188, 191, 195, 261, 280, 300, 303, 314,
body problem210212, 220 n. 56, 221 321, 335, 345, 351
mixture63 perspectivism121122, 129, 135
monopsychism. See intellect, unity of Peter Lombard16
movement238, 243, 249, 267, 272274, phenomenology5, 1314, 46, 100, 133,
277278, 282, 304305, 329330, 341, 351 143, 174175, 178, 228, 260, 280 n. 29,
of air31 281 n. 30, 294, 297 n. 8, 299301, 303, 321,
of matter7374, 156, 193 n. 1, 196 332, 344345, 351
n. 8, 208 physiology83, 85, 98 n. 20, 107109,
of memory species208, 305307 117, 193 n. 1, 195197, 202, 206207, 211,
of spirits176, 193 n. 1, 196 n. 8, 205, 235236, 239 n. 19, 247248, 251253,
208209, 221, 235, 253, 347 307308
Pietro dAbano102 n. 28, 286 n. 40
Nemesius of Emesa141, 235 n. 12 plant10, 21, 34, 3637, 83, 115, 256257,
Neoplatonism22, 32, 38, 70, 116, 121, 135, 292, 347, 350
141, 148, 151, 211, 232 Plato38, 40, 43, 46, 212 n. 37, 241,
nutrition7, 210 n. 35, 215 n. 47, 216 310 n. 5, 346
pleasure173, 216 n. 49, 276, 278, 282,
odour72, 100, 199, 267, 269, 301 286 n. 40, 287289, 292, 328330, 336337
organ5455, 57, 6364, 69, 8086, 89, plurality96, 240, 273
98 n. 20, 100, 102, 107110, 116117, of external senses100, 200
119120, 122123, 125, 126 n. 16, 130, of internal senses228229, 239241,
136138, 156, 158, 164165, 170, 173, 176, 242 n. 26, 245, 247248, 254, 258259,
189, 193200, 202209, 213221, 235 262264, 341
n. 10, 240, 247, 250252, 255, 257, 275 of substantial forms14, 23, 39, 44,
n. 18, 276277, 281, 283, 285292, 347 4854, 60, 62, 64, 67, 70, 78, 89, 94,
vital85, 281, 292 285, 346
Origen46 potentiality14, 21, 2629, 51, 94, 119, 145,
ownness. See experience, ownness 332
practical reasoning10, 332
pain110, 173174, 216 n. 49, 220 n. 56, presence
276278, 281282, 286 n. 40, 287289, essential137, 151152
292, 328330, 332, 336339 virtual137, 141, 151154, 156 n. 42,
passivity116, 119121, 126128, 134136, 158159, 160161, 203, 215216, 301
141144, 164, 167, 197, 222, 233234, proper sensibles243, 267, 269272,
253254, 256, 311, 319 n. 29, 346347 274275
pastness177, 221, 239, 243244, 309, psychology1, 3, 515, 18, 2223, 25, 32,
313317, 320324, 331, 344 35, 73, 77, 82, 89, 90, 98 n. 20, 110, 115,
perception. passim 117, 130, 133, 136, 150, 153, 157, 163, 190,
accidental327, 338339 194197, 199, 201, 206207, 211, 218222,
disembodied195, 205, 212217, 225226, 228229, 231233, 235236, 239
221222, 347 n. 19, 241244, 247251, 253254,
estimative229, 258, 284, 330338, 341, 256260, 262, 264, 267, 272, 277, 280,
344 290, 293294, 296300, 303304, 315317,
modes of97100, 104107, 251, 255256 319, 324, 327, 331, 336, 341352
of perception15, 98, 179 n. 31, 191,
229, 231, 233, 238, 243, 267268, quality106, 115, 122, 132, 145, 151, 168, 171,
275281, 283, 291292, 298299, 190 n. 50, 215, 217, 225226, 234, 253,
302303, 350 258259, 267, 269, 272, 286287, 301,
percipient15, 102, 116, 122, 127128, 132, 304, 310 n. 4, 316, 328, 332334, 338339,
146, 160, 170171, 219220, 271, 281 n. 30, 341, 344, 348
284, 286, 332, 335, 338, 347 quantity3537, 115, 274
index 373

rationes reales9597 sight8, 84, 99101, 103104, 108109, 116,


reason8, 10, 17, 115, 233, 242, 263, 307, 122, 128, 130, 133, 137 n. 49, 148, 151152,
327, 332333, 341, 343, 345 160, 164165, 167168, 176, 178179, 185,
recipient72, 116, 121122, 127128, 143, 189 n. 47, 190, 193, 196, 199, 203204, 214,
152, 154, 156 n. 42, 157160, 167 251 n. 13, 259, 267, 269270, 286, 333,
recognition225, 309, 317318, 322, 334 335, 348
recollection115, 130, 133, 150, 166, 173, signet147, 310311
180, 183 n. 38, 187, 216 n. 49, 221, 225, similitude122, 130, 134135, 147149, 151,
228, 234, 239, 243, 292, 298299, 305, 158, 160, 310311
309310, 312324, 336, 342, 349 simplicity15, 25, 27, 3031, 3338, 77,
reflexivity39, 41, 5859, 78, 110 n. 42, 145, 8084, 90, 96, 108, 119, 169, 194, 198, 201,
173 n. 22, 175, 220, 261, 268, 275276, 313, 346
279, 281282, 285, 290291, 300, 302303, degrees of3334, 88
346347, 349351 of a point36
incomplete279, 285, 289, 291 of God28, 34, 36
intellectual58, 220, 276, 279, 282, spiritual34, 3638, 77, 80, 131 n. 32,
282, 285, 290291, 300, 302303, 346, 276
349350 sin47, 71, 72 n. 82, 221, 313
of the common sense110 n. 42, 282, sleep72, 138139, 144, 165167, 169,
285, 290291, 349350 171172, 181183, 187188, 190191,
of the sense of touch173 n. 22, 285, 207208, 280, 300, 303304, 306 n. 23,
290 307308, 310 n. 3, 320
of the will5859, 145, 300, 302303, sleepwalker166167, 180
350 smell8, 108, 116, 165, 199, 267, 269, 301
rememberingSee recollection sound99100, 103, 105, 183185, 187, 190,
representation124, 129, 131134, 139, 147, 199, 209, 259, 267, 269271, 280, 287,
208209, 294295, 301, 310314, 318319, 301, 333
322324 species2, 10, 29 n. 15, 37, 41, 72, 100,
representationalism110, 120, 124, 127128, 103105, 107 n. 37, 115, 123, 130, 146, 148,
131134, 139 150 n. 28, 198, 205, 208, 218219, 227, 255,
retraction159, 172173, 181183, 187188, 257, 270, 289, 293, 301314, 318322, 324,
190 331, 334 n. 10, 349
Robert Grosseteste119, 122 n. 5 as acts134, 146, 198, 253, 255
Robert Kilwardby51 n. 19, corporeal119120, 123124, 129131, 276
126 n. 16, 147 n. 19 imaginative81, 120 n. 2, 255, 297, 316
Roger Bacon5, 25, 51, 6061, 119, 121125, intentional123, 124 n. 8, 129, 131, 253
272 multiplication of122123, 129130
Roger Marston51 n. 19, 126 sensible81, 119120, 122135, 151153,
161, 164165, 217, 233234, 238,
second-order perceptionSee perception, 253254, 281 n. 30, 294295, 310
of perception -theory120121, 124, 126 n. 20, 129,
self 131135, 152153, 164 n. 3, 217, 254, 295
awareness58, 93, 268, 281292, 322, vital253
327, 347, 349351 spirit3233, 8687, 8990, 98 n. 20, 143
image281282, 350351 n. 8, 174, 176, 205, 208209, 236
preservation281, 283284, 289, 292 spiritus3132, 75 n. 91, 8687, 8687,
reflexivity39, 41, 58, 78, 145, 173 8990, 143 n. 8
n. 22, 220, 285, 290 n. 54, 291, animalis3133, 8283, 8687, 8990,
346347, 350 98 n. 20, 109, 193 n. 1, 197, 205, 221,
sensation8, 54, 115, 122123, 136, 138, 165, 235, 252253, 307, 313, 347
171, 174, 182, 185, 206, 208, 211212, 215, vitalis31, 8687, 89, 252
251, 275, 279281, 287, 289, 327, 333 Stoicism86, 87 n. 22, 232
sheep225, 234, 284, 327329, 331, 335, subject 13, 15, 27, 40, 46, 6566, 68, 72,
339 81, 102, 117, 119, 127, 144, 155, 160, 163, 167,
374 index

subject cont. of the human being13, 21, 44, 49,


169, 171, 173, 178180, 183, 198, 202, 203, 5960, 65, 194, 347
220, 225, 228229, 235, 238, 244, 249, of the intellect. See intellect, unity of
254255, 258259, 261262, 271, 277, of the internal senses228, 241,
279280, 284, 288, 294295, 297298, 244245, 247, 250, 258 n. 27, 260, 263,
300302, 306, 308, 310 n. 3, 315, 319, 324, 271, 293, 296, 309, 317, 325, 343, 349
328, 330, 336338, 347349 of the sense of touch102, 189, 200
substance14, 2122, 26, 3134, 36, 3841, of the soul60, 6466, 8485, 88, 93,
44, 46, 4849, 52 n. 23, 53, 6061, 6466, 97
68, 70, 79, 88, 9294, 97, 201, 210, 338 of the soul and body14, 2223, 25,
n. 18, 346347 28 n. 10, 32, 3940, 4347, 51, 55,
suffering. See pain 5862, 6567, 71, 73, 83, 94, 110, 174,
sun72, 100, 103104, 128, 130, 148149, 151, 194, 205, 209, 216 n. 49, 220221, 346
156158 substantial1314, 2123, 25, 28, 32,
3940, 4346, 51, 59, 6162, 6467, 85,
taste8, 72, 84, 103, 105, 108, 116, 156, 196, 94, 97, 110, 209, 346347
199, 206, 289 n. 52, 332 n. 8, 333 transitional6667
Thierry of Chartres241 usefulness225, 284, 327331, 335338,
Thomas Aquinas5, 9 nn. 1516, 2122, 344, 350
23 n. 3, 26, 3839, 44, 4851, 5355,
6061, 6970, 89 n. 24, 92 n. 1, 99100, vision72, 74, 83, 88, 105, 116 n. 2, 121,
107 n. 35, 121, 123125, 130, 133134, 150 129, 133, 137, 151, 157, 166, 168169,
n. 28, 175 n. 25, 196198, 206, 211, 212 174, 177178, 181, 183, 185, 189 n. 47, 190,
n. 37, 213, 227, 231, 237239, 241 n. 22, 196 n. 8, 199200, 206 n. 26, 208, 251
242 n. 26, 243, 252 n. 17, 272, 281 n. 30, n. 13, 256, 270, 307, 310 n. 4, 324, 329, 339
293294, 308309, 323 n. 36, 330 n. 5, visual152, 158, 178, 193 n. 1, 251 n. 13
336, 342 field15, 164165, 168169, 179, 181,
thought-experiment185 n. 40 187188, 204
touch8, 102103, 106, 109, 116, 152, 156, ray136137
165, 169, 171, 173, 176, 189, 196, 200201, Vital du Four51, 5556, 68, 92 n. 1,
206, 250, 252, 256, 268, 275 n. 18, 215218
285292, 328, 330, 348, 350
transparency100101, 103, 122, 273 will6, 8, 13, 56, 92, 95, 126, 135, 144146,
156, 160 n. 53, 180181, 185, 187, 207 n. 29,
universals10, 5758, 240, 260 n. 30, 274, 210 n. 35, 261, 290, 291 n. 56, 300, 305,
323324 350351
unity92, 104, 189, 228229, 238, 262, 270, freedom of6, 11, 46, 58, 59 n. 43, 72,
272273, 316, 344 119120, 126, 144145, 345, 350351
experiential13, 15, 116, 163, 170, 175, of God9597
179 n. 31, 228229, 233, 247, 258262, William Ockham56, 64 n. 59, 158 n. 47,
265, 267, 269271, 344, 348349, 351 175 n. 25, 212 n. 37, 268 n. 2, 297 n. 8,
formal28, 55, 5860, 62, 65, 67, 73 313 n. 19
of objects101, 255 William of Auvergne92 n. 1, 126
of substantial forms4951, 5354 William of Conches241
of powers9194, 98 n. 19, 100, 102, 109, William of Saint-Thierry241
168, 229, 255, 264, 273, 316 wolf234, 244, 259, 284, 327329, 331, 335,
of the body3334, 65, 80 n. 9, 8485, 337, 339
88, 189 worm8889, 109, 218, 227, 289, 349

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