1. The RTC of Sindangan appointed X as guardian of minor Y, in a special proceeding. Y is allegedly the son of a U.S. Veteran.

X received
the arrears of beneficiary Y. Later on, the U.S. Veterans Administration filed a case in Washington D.C. for the refund of the benefits
received by Y, on the ground of wrong payment since it was found that the U.S. Veteran was a fake. Question: Does the court in
Washington D.C. have jurisdiction concerning the case of refund? Explain.

ANSWER: No, the point of contact here is the Philippines. (see p. 316) It was ruled: The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the
appellant, make the decisions of the U.S. Veteran Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims properly submitted to him for resolution;
but they are not applicable to the present case, where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference between
actions against the Administrator (which must be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including
the exclusive review by United States courts), and those actions where the veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to
their jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would make the findings of the Veterans'
Administrator, in actions where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That in effect, would deprive our tribunals or judicial discretion and render
them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the veterans' Administrator.

2.Can Philippine courts recognize a foreign decree of adoption? Explain your answer.

ANSWER: Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of
adoption, created by the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to
the status of adoption when created by its own law.4It is quite obvious then that the status of adoption, once created under the proper foreign law,
will be recognized in this country, except where public policy or the interests of its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and demand the substitution
of the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in Article 15 of our Civil Code just quoted, is that the exercise of incidents to foreign adoption "remains subject to
local law."

3.Ching Leng , a Chinese man was granted Philippine citizenship upon his marriage to a Filipina in 1950. His wife filed an adoption to
Ching's five illegitimate minor childen. The adoption was granted. Ching then filed a petition to cancel the alien certificates of registration
of said minors on the theory that they have become Filipino citizens by virtue of the adoption. Is Ching Leng correct? Explain.

ANSWER: Cheng Leng is wrong. The Alien certificates of registration will not be cancelled because the adopted children have not
become Filipinos (see p. 312). Minor children refer to legitimate children only and not the illegitimates.

4.Alvin, a natural born U.S. citizen and his wife Evelyn, a natural born filipina who in 1988 became a naturalized citizen, jointly filed in
1990 a petition for adoption of Solomon, Evelyn's 12 year old brother. Are Alvin and Evelyn qualified to adopt? Explain.

ANSWER: NO, an alien who may adopt a Filipino is one who is a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt a relative by consanguinity,
or one seeking to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse, or one who is married to a Filipino seeking to adopt jointly with his or
her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. None of these requisites are present in the case at bar. (p. 308)

5.In State X, all children whether born inside or outside wedlock are considered legitimate. In State Y, all children born outside wedlock
are illegitimate. Now then, a child is born outside wedlock of a father, who is a citizen of State Y, and a mother, who is a citizen of State X.
Questions: (a) Should the Philippine courts consider the child legitimate or illegitimate? (b) What country's law shall govern the
relationship of parents and child?

ANSWER: The child shall be considered illegitimate since that is the characterization under the fathers law. Inasmuch as the child is
illegitimate, the relationship shall be governed by the mothers law.

6.Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to
the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced
in April 1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.Petitioner contends that said marriage was
bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. Does petitioner have the personality to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy? Why?

ANSWER: A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. Petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of
the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. We note that it was
the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree.
It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence Hence, a remand of the case to the trial
court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the
foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not
allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.

7. Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents.
Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julias parent as averred by Leouel.
The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julias parents.
In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised

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to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During
his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed a case to nullify
their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate
with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Question: As judge will you grant the nullity of their marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity? Explain.

ANSWER: Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term psychological incapacity, which is
adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision adopted with less
specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge
to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.

Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the
factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.

8. IN 1948, Pastor and Vicenta were married before the catholic church in Cebu City. On Oct. 22, 1950 Vicenta obtained an absolute
divorce in Nevada U.S.A., after which she married John Nichols, an American.They resided in Nevada since then, when she finally acquired
her American citizenship in 1958. Meanwhile, Pastor filed legal separation proceedings in the Philippines plus damages. Will the petition
for legal separation and the claim for damages prosper? State the "doctrines" laid in this case.

ANSWER: The petition for legal separation will not prosper. There was a valid marriage between Vicenta and Tenchaves: With regard
to jurisdiction over Escano, the court states that when against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance,
an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction
over the matter , and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The point is the personal status
of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines. Divorce, although successfully obtained in another country, cannot be applied in the Philippines since
it is contrary to public policy. The principle is well-established, in private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized
if they contravene public policy. Furthermore, Vicentas refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of
husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to damages (2176). When, however, the action against
the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, ...,
Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the res, and in that event their jurisdiction over the
person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The res is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines, 45,000 damages
awarded to parents deemed excessive: filing of suit nay have wounded their feelings and caused anxiety but this has not seriously injured their
reputation or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society.

9. Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The marriage produced four children.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus,
on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal,
Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States and both lived as husband and
wife until October 2001. Their union produced one offspring. During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued
by the court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines
and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City. Does Perez have a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a
would-be-intervenor in Tristans petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife? Why?

ANSWER: No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to
Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic
that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect
to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was
married here or abroad initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an
absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce. Petitioners claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their
marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is
based.

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10. October 1986, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived
in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave
birth to their child. On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married in Bacoor, Cavite. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned
to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent
learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
(1) Is the abandonment by the husband of his family and his insensitivity to them automatically constitute psychological incapacity?
(2) Do the requirements of psychological incapacity apply to mixed marriages? Explain.

ANSWER:
1. No. the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. In Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts
(d) clearly explained in the decision.

2. The husband being a Japanese national is immaterial in proving psychological incapacity, no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino
spouse. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

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