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parties, subjectmatter and cause of action, the judgment on the
VOL. 197, MAY 20, 1991
Smith Bell and Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 56294. May 20, 1991.
SMITH BELL AND COMPANY (PHILIPPINES), INC. and
TOKYO MARINE AND FIRE INSURANCE CO., INC.,
petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLOS
A. GO THONG AND CO., respondents.
Judgments; Res Judicata; The Supreme Court has discretion
to decide whether a minute resolution should be used in lieu of a
fullblown decision in any particular case, and that a minute
resolution of dismissal of a Petition for Review on Certiorari
constitutes an adjudication on the merits of the controversy or
subject matter of the Petition.Private respondents argument
must be rejected. That this Court denied Go Thongs Petition for
Review in a minute Resolution did not in any way diminish the
legal significance of the denial so decreed by this Court. The
Supreme Court is not compelled to adopt a definite and stringent
rule on how its judgment shall be framed. It has long been settled
that this Court has discretion to decide whether a minute
resolution should be used in lieu of a fullblown decision in any
particular case and that a minute Resolution of dismissal of a
Petition for Review on Certiorari constitutes an adjudication on
the merits of the controversy or subject matter of the Petition. It
has been stressed by the Court that the grant of due course to a
Petition for Review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the Courts
denial. For one thing, the facts and law are already mentioned in
the Court of Appeals opinion. A minute Resolution denying a
Petition for Review of a Decision of the Court of Appeals can only
mean that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings
and conclusions of the Court of Appeals, in other words, that the
Decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct.
Same; Same; The principle of res judicata embraces two
concepts i.e. bar by former judgment and conclusiveness of
judgment.In Tingson v. Court of Appeals, the Court
distinguished one from the other the two (2) concepts embraced in
the principle of res judicata, i.e., bar by former judgment and
conclusiveness of judgment: There is no question that where as
between the first case where the judgment is rendered and the
second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of
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merits in the first case constitutes an
________________
* EN BANC.
201
202
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Smith Bell and Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
absolute bar to the subsequent action not only as to every matter
which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or
demand, but also as to any other admissible matter which might
have been offered for that purpose and to all matters that could
have been adjudged in that case. This is designated as bar by
former judgment. But where the second action between the same
parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the
prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in
issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the
finding or judgment was rendered. In fine, the previous judgment
is conclusive in the second case, only as those matters actually
and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters
merely involved therein. This is the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment embodied in subdivision (c) of Section 49 of Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of Court.(Citations omitted) (Emphases
supplied) In Lopez v. Reyes, the Court elaborated further the
distinction between bar by former judgment which bars the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or
cause of action, and conclusiveness of judgment which bars the
relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation
between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action:
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects. The first is the
effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action
upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second
aspect is that it precludes the relitigation of a particular fact or
issues in another action between the same parties on a different
claim or cause of action. The general rule precluding the
relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and
adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters
essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation.
Thus, it extends to questions necessarily involved in an issue, and
necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final
judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in
reference thereto, and although such matters were directly
referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally
presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows
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that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding
the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that
matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a
judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as
conclusive as the judgment itself. Reasons for the rule are that a
judgment is an adjudication on all the matters which are essential
to support it, and that every proposition assumed or decided by the
court leading up to the final conclusion and upon which such
conclusion is based is as effectually passed upon as the ultimate
question which is finally solved. (Citations omitted) (Emphases
supplied)
VOL. 197, MAY 20, 1991
Smith Bell and Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Compromise Agreements; An offer to compromise does not, in
legal contemplation, involve an admission on the part of the
defendant that he is legally liable, nor, on the part of plaintiff that
his claim or demand is groundless or even doubtful.The familiar
rule is that an offer of compromise is not an admission that
anything is due, and is not admissible in evidence against the
person making the offer. A compromise is an agreement between
two (2) or more persons who, in order to forestall or put an end to
a law suit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, an
adjustment which everyone of them prefers to the hope of gaining
more, balanced by the danger of losing more. An offer to
compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve an
admission on the part of a defendant that he is legally liable, nor
on the part of a plaintiff that his claim or demand is groundless or
even doubtful, since the compromise is arrived at precisely with a
view to avoiding further controversy and saving the expenses of
litigation. It is of the very nature of an offer of compromise that it
is made tentatively, hypothetically and in contemplation of
mutual concessions. The above rule on compromises is anchored
on public policy of the most insistent and basic kind; that the
incidence of litigation should be reduced and its duration
shortened to the maximum extent feasible.
Transportation; Admiralty; The failure of the Don Carlos to
have on board, on the night of the collision, a proper lookout
constitutes negligence.The second circumstance constitutive of
negligence on the part of the Don Carlos was its failure to have
on board that night a proper lookout as required by Rule I (B).
Under Rule 29 of the same set of Rules, all consequences arising
from the failure of the Don Carlos to keep a proper lookout
must be borne by the Don Carlos. Judge Cuevas summary of
the evidence said: The evidence on record likewise discloses very
convincingly that Don Carlos did not have a lookout whose sole
and only duty is only to act as such. x x x A proper lookout is
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one who has been trained as such and who is given no other duty
save to act as a lookout and who is stationed where he can see
and hear best and maintain good communication with the officer
in charge of the vessel, and who must, of course, be vigilant.
Judge Cuevas wrote: The lookout should have no other duty to
perform. (Chamberlain v. Ward, 21, N.O.W. 62, U.S. 548, 571). He
has only one duty, that which its name impliesto keep a look
out. So a deckhand who has other duties, is not a proper lookout
(Brooklyn Perry Co. v. U.S., 122, Fed. 696). The navigating officer
is not a sufficient lookout (Larcen B. Myrtle, 44 Fed. 779)
Griffin on Collision, pages 277278). Neither the captain nor the
[helmsman] in the pilothouse can be considered to be a lookout
203 within the meaning of the maritime law. Nor should he be
stationed in the bridge. H e should
203 204
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Smith Bell and Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
be as near as practicable to the surface of the water so as to be
able to see lowlying lights (Griffin on Collision, page 273). On the
strength of the foregoing authorities, which do not appear to be
disputed even by the defendant, it is hardly probable that neither
German or Leo Enriquez may qualify as lookout in the real
sense of the word. (Emphases supplied) In the case at bar, the
failure of the Don Carlos to recognize in a timely manner the
risk of collision with the Yotai Maru coming in from the opposite
direction, was at least in part due to the failure of the Don
Carlos to maintain a proper lookout.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Bito, Misa & Lozada for petitioners.
Rodriguez, Relova & Associates for private
respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
In the early morning of 3 May 1970at exactly 0350 hours,
on the approaches to the port of Manila near Caballo
Island, a collision took place between the M/V Don
Carlos, an interisland vessel owned and operated by
private respondent Carlos A. Go Thong and Company (Go
Thong), and the M/S Yotai Maru, a merchant vessel of
Japanese registry. The Don Carlos was then sailing south
bound leaving the port of Manila for Cebu, while the Yotai
Maru was approaching the port of Manila, coming in from
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