PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(ATTY.
AMPIL)5thweek|BeduralBlezaCimagalaDelosSantosImperialNoelPlazoSia2D2012|
*The spaces are there so that you can draw the situation to make
the facts clearer (or for you to write your own notes if you dont
need to draw). :P
VIAJAR v. CA
It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens
System does not protect the riparian owner against the
dimunition of the area of his registered land through
gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream or
river.
FACTS
Private respondents Spouses Ladrido are owners of Lot 7511
of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan Iloilo. Petitioners are
owners of the Lot 7340, which they bought from the Te.
Viajar had lot 7340 relocated and found out that the property
was in the possession of Ladrido. She demanded the return
but the latter refused. She instituted a civil action for
recovery of possession and damages. She also impleaded Te
as defedant for the reason that if Ladrido is going to be
favored then the sale was to be annulled and plaintiff must
be reimbursed. During the trial it was proven that during
the cadastral survey in 1926, the two lots were separated by
the Suague River and that a part of the land of Lot 7340 and
the old river bed were in the possession of the defendants
and that the plaintiffs have never been in actual physical
possession.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendants which the CA confirmed.
There was a mention in the case that the issue from which
the decision of the CFI was not the issue appealed in the CA
so the affirmation made by the CA should be void.
ISSUES
1) W/N the change in the course of the Suague River was
gradual or sudden
2) W/N the plaintiffs are protected by the Torrens System
(in relation to the dimunition of the area of their land bec
the plaintiffs are contending that Art 457 must be
interpreted as applicable only to unregistered lands)
RULING
It was established in the trial that for a period of 40 years the
Suague river overflowed its banks yearly and the property of
the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the
effects of the current of the river.
It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens
System does not protect the riparian owner against the
dimunition of the area of his registered land through gradual
changes in the course of an adjoining stream or river.
Accretions which the banks of the river may gradually receive
from the effect of the current become the property of the
owners of the banks.
AGUSTIN V. IAC
FACTS:
Private respondents, Maria Melad and Pablo Binuyag are
among those who are occupying the western bank of the
Cagayan River while on the eastern bank is owned by
petitioner Eulogio Agustin. From 1919 to 1968, the Cagayan
river has eroded the lands on the eastern bank including
Agustins Lot depositing alluvium on the land possessed by
Pablo Binuyag. In 1968, after a typhoon which caused a big
flood, the Cagayan River changed its course and returned it
to its 1919 bed and it cut through the lands of respondents
whose lands were transferred on the eastern side. To
cultivate the lands they had to cross the river. When they
were cultivating said lands, (they were planting corn) Agustin
accompanied by the mayor and some policemen claimed the
land and drove them away. So Melad and Binuyag filed
separate complaints for recovery of their lots and its
accretions. The Trial Court held ordered Agustin et. al to
vacate the lands and return them to respondents. On appeal,
the IAC affirmed in toto the judgment thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: W/N private respondents own the accretion and such
ownership is not affected by the sudden and abrupt change in
the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old
bed
HELD: YES
Art. 457 states that the owner of the lands adjoining river
banks own the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the currents of the waters. Accretion benefits a
riparian owner provided that these elements are present: 1)
deposit be gradual and imperceptible 2) it resulted from the
effects of the current of the water and 3) the land is
adjacent to the river bank. When the River moved from 1919
to 1968, there was alluvium deposited and it was gradual and
imperceptible.
Accretion benefits the riparian owner because these lands are
exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive
force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject
to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only
just that such risks or dangers should in some way be
compensated by the right of accretion.

PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(ATTY.AMPIL)5thweek|BeduralBlezaCimagalaDelosSantosImperialNoelPlazoSia2D2012|
Also, respondents ownership over said lots was not removed
when due to the sudden and abrupt change in the course of
the river; their accretions were transferred to the other side.
Art. 459 states when the current of a river x x x segragates
from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and
transfers it to another estate, the owner of segregated
portion retains ownership provided he removes the same w/in
2 years. And Art. 463 states that whenever the current of a
river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or
part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains
ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated
from the estate by the current.
BINALAY VS. MANALO
A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is not the
alluvial process contemplated in Art. 457. The accumulation
of the soil deposits must be slow and hardly imperceptible in
order for the riparian owner to acquire ownership thereof.
Also, the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent
to the banks of the rivers (or the sea coast).
FACTS
Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by Judge
Taccad from 2 different people (the latters daughter and
from an earlier purchaser). These lots were later
consolidated into Lot 307, a total of 10.45 hectares.
The lot was beside the Cagayan River, which, due to flooding,
would place a portion of the land underwater during the rainy
season (September to December). On sunny days, however,
the land would be dried up for the entire dry season (January
to August). When a survey of the land was conducted on a
rainy month, a portion of the land that Manalo bought was
then underwater and was thus left unsurveyed and excluded
from Lot 307.
The big picture is this: Cagayan River running from south to
north, forks at a certain point to form two braches (western
and eastern) and then unites at the other end, further north,
to form a narrower strip of land. The eastern branch of the
river cuts through Lot 307, and is flooded during the rainy
season. The unsurveyed portion, on the other hand, is the
bed of the eastern branch. Note that the fork exists only
during the rainy season while the island/elongated strip of
land formed in the middle of the forks becomes dry and
perfect for cultivation when the Cagayan river is at its
ordinary depth. [draw it :D]
The strip of land in the middle of the fork totaled 22.7
hectares and was labeled Lot 821-822. Lot 821 is directly
opposite Lot 307 and is separated by the eastern branch of
the rivers fork.
Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of
accretion to the submerged portion of the land to which it is
adjacent. Petitioners (Binalay, et al) who possess the Lot 821,
on the other hand, insist that they own it. They occupy the
other edges of the lot along the river bank (i.e. the fertile
portions on which they plant tobacco and other agricultural
products) and also cultivate the western strip during the
summer.
Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both
dismissed. Later on, he filed a complaint for quieting of title,
possession, and damages against petitioner. The trial court
and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying that Lot 821 and
Lot 307 cannot be considered separate and distinct from each
other. They reasoned that when the land dries up for the
most part of the year, the two are connected.
[Note: The CA applied the ruling in Govt of the Phil Islands
vs. Colegio de San Jose, which was actually inappropriate
because the subject matter in this case was a lake so that the
definition of a bed was different.]
ISSUE: w/n Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion
RULING: No.
The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action of
the heavy rains that cause the highest ordinary level of
waters of the Cagayan River during the rainy season. The
depressed portion is a river bed and is thus considered
property of public domain.
The SC observed the following:
a) The pictures identified by Manalo during his direct
examination depict the depressed portion as a river
bed. The dried up portion had dike-like slopes
(around 8m) on both sides connecting it to Lot 307
and Lot 821 that are vertical and very prominent.
b) The eastern bed already existed even before Manalo
bought the land. It was called Rio Muerte de
Cagayan.
c) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land
because article 420 of the civil code states that
rivers are property of public dominion. The word
river includes the running waters, the bed, and
the banks. [The seller never actually owned that
part of the land since it was public property]
d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of
the land he actually bought. It is difficult to suppose
that such a sizable area could have been brought
about by accretion.
More importantly, the requisites of accretion in article 457
were not satisfied. These are: 1) that the deposition of the
soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; 2) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea);
and 3) the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent
to the banks of the rivers (or the sea coast).
The accretion shouldve been attached to Lot 307 for Manalo
to acquire its ownership. BUT, the claimed accretion lies on
the bank of the river; not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly
opposite it across the river.
Aside from that, the dike-like slopes which were very steep
may only be formed by a sudden and forceful action like

PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(ATTY.AMPIL)5thweek|BeduralBlezaCimagalaDelosSantosImperialNoelPlazoSia2D2012|
flooding. The steep slopes could not have been formed by the
river in a slow and gradual manner.
REPUBLIC VS. CA
Alluvium must be the exclusive work of nature. It has 3
requirements: 1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; 2) through the current of the river; and
3) the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent
to the river bank. Deposits made by human intervention
are excluded.
FACTS
The respondents (Tancincos) were registered owners of a
parcel of land in Bulacan, bordering on the Maycauayan and
Bocaue Rivers. They filed an application for the registration
of three lots adjacent to their fishpond, but because of the
recommendation of the Commissioner, they only pushed for
the registration of two. The RTC and CA granted the petition
despite the opposition of the Bureau of Lands.
The respondents based their claim on accretions to their
fishponds. They presented a lone witness (their overseer).
The Bureau of Lands argue that the lands in dispute are not
accretions. They assert that what actually happened was that
the respondents simply transferred their dikes simply further
down the river bed of the Meycauayan River. Thus, if there
was any accretion to speak of, it was man-made.
Respondents counter that the their evidence shows that
accretion happened without human intervention and that the
transfer of the dikes occurred only after.
ISSUE: w/n accretion took place
RULING: No
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There is not
evidence that the addition to said property was made
gradually through the effects of the currents of the two
rivers. The lands in question total almost 4 hectares of land,
which are highly doubtful to have been caused by accretion.
The lone witness testified that she observed an increase in
the area in 1939, but the lots in question were not included
in the survey of their adjacent property conducted in 1940.
They were also not included in the Cadastral Survey of the
entire Municipality of Maycauayan between the years 1958-
1960. If the overseer was indeed telling the truth, the
accretion was sudden, not gradual.
When the respondents transferred their dikes towards the
river beds, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes
and not to protect their property from the destructive force
of the waters of the river. The lots in question were portions
of the bed of the Meycauayan River and are therefore
classified as public property.
Registration denied, decisions appealed are reversed.
Note: The lands sought were not even dry land. The entire
area was under one to two meters of water.
HEIRS OF NAVARRO V IAC
Accretion along an area adjacent to the sea is public domain,
even if the accretion results from rivers emptying into the
sea. It cannot be registered.
FACTS:
Sinforoso Pascual sits in the midst of a land registration case.
The story begins on 1946 upon his desire to register land on
the northern section of his existing property. His current
registered property is bounded on the east by Talisay River,
on the West by Bulacan River and on the North by the Manila
bay. Both rivers flow towards the Manila Bay.
Because of constantly flowing water, extra land of about
17hectares (thats about the size of Disney Park!) formed in
the northern most section of the property. It is this property
he sought to register.
The RTC denied the registration claiming this to be foreshore
land and part of public domain (remember, accretion formed
by the sea is public dominion). His Motion for Reconsideration
likewise burned.
In 1960, he attempted registry again, claiming that the
Talisay and Bulacan rivers deposited more silt resulting on
accretion. He claimed this land as riprarian owner. The
Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Fiscal
opposed
Then a new party surfaced. Mr Emiliano Navarro jumped into
the fray opposing the same application, stating the he leased
part of the property sought to be registered. He sought to
protect his fishpond that rested on the same property.
Sinforoso was not amused and filed ejectment against Mr.
Navarro, claiming that Navarro used stealth force and
strategy to occupy a portion of his land.
Pascual lost the case against Navarro so he appealed. During
the appeal, his original land registration case was
consolidated and tried jointly. (alas Pascual died) The heirs
of Pascual took over the case.
On 1975, the court decided that the property was foreshore
land and therefore part of public domain. The RTC dismissed
the complaint of Pascual for ejectment against Navarro and
also denied his land registration request.
Pascuals heirs appealed and the RTC was reversed by the
IAC. The Apellate court granted petition for registration! The
reason? The accretion was caused by the two rivers, not
3

PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(ATTY.AMPIL)5thweek|BeduralBlezaCimagalaDelosSantosImperialNoelPlazoSia2D2012|
manila bay. Hence it wasnt foreshore land. (BUT the
confusion lies in the fact that the accretion formed adjacent
to Manila Bay which is sea!)
Aggrieved, the Director of Forestry moved for reconsideration
(Government insists it is foreshore and hence, public
domain). The Apellate court denied all motions of the
Director and the Government.
The matter went to the SC.
ISSUE: w/n the accretion taking place on property adjacent
to the sea can be registered under the Torrens system.
HELD:
It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain.
Pascual claimed ownership under Article 457 of the Civil
Code saying that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion
caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers
Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that
the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on
Art 457 is misplaced. If theres any land to be claimed, it
should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan.
The law is clear on this. Accretion of land along the river
bank may be registered. This is not the case of accretion of
land on the property adjacent to Manila Bay.
Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is
foreshore land and the applicable law is not Art 457 but Art 4
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. This law, while old,
holds that accretion along sea shore cannot be registered as
it remains public domain unless abandoned by government for
public use and declared as private property capable of
alienation.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866
provides as follows:
Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits
caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public
domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of
the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility,
or for the establishment of special industries, or for the
coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be
the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto
and as increment thereof.
The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set
aside. Registration cannot be allowed.
REPUBLIC V CA
Land near the sea that is submerged in water because of
rainfall is not considered foreshore land, hence it can be
registered.
FACTS:
Benedicto del Rio purchased from Ms. Pili a lot with size of
17,311 sqm in Laguna, about 20 meters from the shore of
Laguna de Bay. He registered the property and declared it for
tax purposes since 1918 . Actual tax payments began 1948.
The man died and his son Santos acquired part of the land
after partition amongst the heirs. He filed for registration but
the same was opposed by the Director of Lands and Private
Oppositors.
Director OF Lands alleged that a portion of the land stays
submerged in water for 4 to 5 months, therefore it forms part
of public domain.
Two Private oppositors also blocked registration because they
wanted the land for themselves (they built duckhouses with
the toleration of Santos, but violated the terms of agreement
by also building residences).
ISSUE: w/n the land can be registered
HELD:YES.
The Law of waters govern. According to such law, the natural
bed of lakes, ponds or pools pertains to that covered by
waters at their highest ordinary time of the year for most of
the year. The Laguna Bay is a lake and the part around it
covered with water up to 5 months a year results not from
tidal action but from thunderstorms. The law defines
foreshore land as that area between high and low water
alternately revealed and hidden by the tide. Hence, the
disputed land is not foreshore. It is registrable. The Director
of Lands argues from the wrong premises.
And as to the private oppositors who entered into possession
based on mere PERMISSION and as ungrateful tenants WHO
DID NOT EVEN PAY RENT REGULARLY, their petition had been
denied. Such possession cannot ripen into ownership. Only
possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owners can
serve as the basis for title acquired via prescription.
GRANDE v CA
FACTS:
The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by
inheritance from their deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who
likewise, inherited it from her parents.
In the early 1930s, the Grandes decided to have their land
surveyed for registration purposes. The land was described to
have Cagayan River as the northeastern boundary, as stated
in the title.

PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(ATTY.AMPIL)5thweek|BeduralBlezaCimagalaDelosSantosImperialNoelPlazoSia2D2012|
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of
the current of the river, and an alluvial deposit of almost
20,000 sq.m. was added to the registered area. The Grandes
filed an action for quieting of title against the Calalungs ,
stating that they were in peaceful and continuous possession
of the land created by the alluvial deposit until 1948, when
the Calalungs allegedly trespassed into their property. The
Calalungs, however, stated that they were the rightful
owners since prior to 1933.
The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to
vacate the premises and pay for damages. Upon appeal to the
CA, however, the decision was reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alluvium deposited land
automatically belongs to the riparian owners?
HELD:
Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the
owners of the adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure
become theirs merely believing that said land have become
imprescriptible. The land of the Grandes only specifies a
specific portion, of which the alluvial deposits are not
included, and are thus, subject to acquisition by prescription.
Since the Calalungs proved that they have been in possession
of the land since 1934 via two credible witnesses, as opposed
to the Grandes single witness who claims that the Calalungs
only entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held
to have acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits by
prescription. This is because the possession took place in
1934, when the law to be followed was Act 190, and not the
New Civil Code, which only took effect in 1950.
REYNANTE v CA
FACTS:
More than 50 years ago, Reynante was taken as tenant by the
late Don Cosme Carlos over a fishpond in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Reynante subsequently built a nipa hut where he
and his family lived and took care of the nipa palms which
they planted on lots 1 and 2, which was located between the
fishpond and Liputan River. Reynantes family sold the nipa
palms, and appropriated the fruits as his own, without
interference or complaint from Don Carlos.
Upon Don Carlos death, his heirs convinced Reynante to sign
an affidavit, relinquishing his rights as a caretaker of the
fishpond. Reynante, however, continued to live in the inpa
hut he had built, and he still took care of the nipa palms,
which he continued to sell.
This lead the heirs to file a complaint for forcible entry with
preliminary injunction against Reynante in the MTC. The MTC
found for Reynante, but the heirs appealed to the RTC, where
the decision was reversed. The CA merely affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not accretion automatically becomes
registered land just because the adjoining lot is registered in
the Torrens System?
HELD:
While it is true that alluvial deposits shall belong to the
owner of the lot adjoining such accretion, it does not
automatically bestow an imprescriptibility. If the owners of
said land have not registered this with the proper entity, said
land will be subject to acquisition by prescription, which was
what occurred in this case.
Since the affidavits prove that Reynante has been in
possession of these lands for more than 50 years, the SC
rightly held that the land belongs to him.
RONQUILLO V. COURT OF APPEALS
The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or
artificial accretions 23 nor to accretions to lands that
adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems.
FACTS:
Del Rosario owns a registered land adjacent to Estero
Calubcub which is already dried up due to the dumping of
garbage by the sorrounding neighborhood and not by any
natural causes. Defendant now occupies said dried up land
until Del Rosario, claiming ownership over the same, required
him to vacate on the basis of Article 370 of the Civil Code
which provides that riparian owner owns the dried up river
bed abandoned by natural changes.
ISSUE: W/N 370 applies
RULING: No.
The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial
accretions 23 nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or
esteros or artificial drainage systems. 24 Considering our
earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub
was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it
follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and,
hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto
supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be
considered as forming part of the land of the public domain
which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership.
BAES V. COURT OF APPEALS
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for
the damage to or loss of his property due to natural
causes, there is all the more reason to compensate
him when the change in the course of the river is
effected through artificial means.

PROPERTYCASEDIGESTS(ATTY.AMPIL)5thweek|BeduralBlezaCimagalaDelosSantosImperialNoelPlazoSia2D2012|
FACTS:
In 1962, the Government dug up a canal on a private estate in
order to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek (in other
words, there was a mand-made change of river course). Said
private estate was acquired by petitioner Baes, and was
subdivided in to three lots. It was lot 2958-C which was
totally occupied by the canal so the Government in exchange
granted him a lot near but not contiguous to C. The old river
bed was filled up by soil from Lot C. Petitioner now claims
ownership over the old river bed on the basis of Article 461
which says that abandoned river beds belong to the riparian
owners whose land is occupied by the new course of water.
ISSUE: W/M 461 applies
RULING: YES!
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the
damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there
is all the more reason to compensate him when the change in
the course of the river is effected through artificial means.
The loss to the petitioners of the land covered by the canal
was the result of a deliberate act on the part of the
government when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa
de Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated to compensate
the Baeses for their loss.
We find, however, that the petitioners have already been so
compensated. Felix Baes was given Lot 3271-A in exchange
for the affected Lot 2958-B through the Deed of Exchange of
Real Property dated June 20, 1970. This was a fair exchange
because the two lots were of the same area and value and
the agreement was freely entered into by the parties.
JAGUALING V. CA|EDUAVE, 194 SCRA 607
Islands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner
nearest to its margin. However such accretion may be lost
to third parties thru prescription.
FACTS:
Eduave claims that she inherited a parcel of land from her
parents, which later increased in size due to erosion caused
by typhoon Ineng. In 1973 Jagualing asked her permission to
plant corn and bananas provided that they prevent squatters
to come to the area
The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between
Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of Antonio Factura which was the
subject of judgment by compromise in view of the amicable
settlement of the parties. In the amicable settlement the
heirs of Antonio Factura (Jagualing), ceded a portion of the
land with an area of 1,289 square meters more or less to
Eduave.
Later, Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave,
and asserted that they are the real owners of the land in
litigation containing an area of 18,000 square meters more or
less. According to them, they acquired the land by acquisitive
prescription since they have occupied the land since 1969.
They presented tax declarations and photos of actual
occupation to prove claim of prescription.
Eduave filed an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud
over the property in question against Jagualing.
RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave to establish
by preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership over
the land in litigation and that the land is a delta thus is part
of public domain not susceptible of appropriation.
CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of
the river and subsequent thereto the accumulation of alluvial
deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil
Code the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court, declared private respondents as the lawful and true
owners of the land subject of this case and ordered
petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver possession of
the land to private respondents.
ISSUE: W/N Jagualing acquired the island thru prescription?
HELD: No.
From the evidence thus submitted, CA had sufficient basis for
the finding that the property of Eduave actually existed and
was Identified prior to the branching off or division of the
river. The CA, therefore, properly applied Article 463 of the
Civil Code which allows the ownership over a portion of land
separated or isolated by river movement to be retained by
the owner thereof prior to such separation or isolation.
The parcel of land in question is part of an island that formed
in a non-navigable and non-flotable river; from a small mass
of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its
present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation
of alluvial deposits. In this regard the CA also did not err in
applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision,
the island belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer
margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because
the island is longer than the property of private respondents,
they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion
which corresponds to the length of their property along the
margin of the river.
It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the
riparian owner. This preferential right is, under Article 465,
also granted the owners of the land located in the margin
nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in the
best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of
the same. In fact, no specific act of possession over the
accretion is required. If, however, the riparian owner fails to
assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse
possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land
titled under the torrens system must itself still be registered.
However Jagualing failed to prove adverse possession of the
land for the required period and their possession cannot be
considered in good faith since by their admission they have
recognized Eduaves ownership over the land. Thus the land
still belongs to Eduave.
6