Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 1955 March 14, 1995

NAPOLEON R. GONZAGA and RICARDO R. GONZAGA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CRISANTO P. REALUBIN, respondent.

MELO, J.:

This refers to a complaint filed by the Gonzaga brothers, Napoleon and Ricardo, for the
disbarment of Atty. Crisanto P. Realubin on grounds of "malpractice, gross misconduct
and violation of oath of office", allegedly committed as follows:

That respondent Notary Public testified during the deposition taking in

connection with the intestate estate of the late Don Julio Gonzaga and
Doa Juliana de la Rama Gonzaga in Manila, that we previously appeared
before him to have the authority of Atty. Eugenio Villanueva to appear as
counsel for the estate of our late parents and the heirs, notarized;

That he likewise presented his notarial register No. 013753 purportedly

showing that our document was duly notarized by him on August 1, 1977;

That this notarial register in the name of respondent Crisanto P. Realubin

was never sold to him but to a certain Pedro Geling. The true name of the
Notary Public in Notarial Register No. 013753 was erased and the name
of respondent Crisanto P. Realubin was written. Likewise the year of the
issuance of the receipt for the purchase of the said notarial register was
likewise tampered instead of 1976 it was made to appear as 1977. Xerox
copies of the certifications issued by the Office of the Solicitor General that
Notarial Register No. 103753 was sold to Pedro Geling and that it was
sold on January 29, 1976 and not January 29, 1977 is hereto attached as
Annexes "A" and "B". Likewise attached as Annex "C" is a xerox copy of
Official Receipt No. 5266027 issued to Pedro Geling on January 29, 1976;

All these erasures and tampering made by the respondent Realubin and
his false testimony during the deposition taking that we appeared before
him to have said authority notarized constitute a violation of his oath of
office, malpractice and gross misconduct. Xerox copy of page 1 of
respondent's Notarial Register No. 013753 is hereto attached as Annex
"D";

That we never appeared before Crisanto P. Realubin on August 1, 1977.

(pp. 4-5, Rollo.)

Following the referral of the complaint to the Solicitor General, a report was submitted
confirming in substance the aforesaid charges and recommending the suspension of
respondent, to wit:

The issue is one of credibility. Complainants claim they never appeared

before respondent for the notarization of their authority to Atty. Villanueva
to handle the criminal case. On the other hand, respondent claims they
appeared before him.
Complainants should be sustained. Napoleon Gonzaga positively testified
that he signed the questioned authority in the San Antonio Church at
Forbes Park in the afternoon of August 1, 1977 (pp. 30-33, tsn., Aug. 24,
1979); that Napoleon never met respondent before August 1, 1977 and it
was only during the instant investigation that he met respondent (p. 84,
tsn., Ibid); that Napoleon Gonzaga did not appear before respondent for
ratification, first because the document did not contain a jurat when he
signed it; second, because it was already 6:30 in the evening of August 1;
that there was no hurry for them to have the document
notarized; third after signing the document, Atty. Villanueva took the same
from them, without giving them a copy; fourth, if they wanted it notarized,
they could have gone to Atty. Arturo Alafriz who offered his help to them
(pp. 30-32, tsn., Oct. 26, 1979; pp. 32-33, tsn., Aug. 24, 1979; pp. 45-50,
tsn., May 31, 1983).

Likewise, Ricardo Gonzaga, who co-signed with his brother Napoleon

(Exhs. E, D, pp. 130, 131, Inv.), positively testified that he never appeared
before respondent for the notarization of said document on August 1,
1977, and it was only during the instant investigation that he met
respondent (pp. 33-36, tsn., Jan. 5, 1980); that Atty. Villanueva did not
give him nor his brother Napoleon, a copy of said document after they
signed the same (p. 36, tsn., Ibid); that they were so busy with their
parents' coffins at the Forbes Park Church, that they were not in a hurry to
notarize said authorization (pp. 37-38, tsn., Ibid).

Dionisio Jakosalem Buencamino also positively testified that Napoleon

Gonzaga was beside him at about 6:00 to 6:20 in the afternoon of August
1, 1977, just before the start of the 6:30 requiem mass at the Sanctuario
de San Antonio for the parents of Napoleon Gonzaga, on the eve of their
departure for the interment in Bacolod the following day; that he noticed
Napoleon stepping aside a few moments before the start of the mass, and
he (Buencamino) saw Napoleon signing a piece of paper, which Napoleon
told him later, was the authority for Atty. Villanueva to file the criminal case
against the killers of Napoleon's parents (pp. 10, 16-23, tsn., March 25,
1983).

As against said three (3) witnesses, namely Napoleon Gonzaga, Ricardo

Gonzaga and Dionisio Jakosalem Buencamino, is the lone testimony of
respondent, claiming that the document was not yet signed when the
Gonzaga brothers presented the same to him for notarization at
respondent's Padre Faura office at about 9:00 o'clock of August 1, 1977
(pp. 6, 9-10, 14, tsn., Aug. 7, 1980); that after examining the residence
certificates of the Gonzagas which tallied with the residence certificates
appearing in the prepared authorization, the Gonzaga brothers affixed
their signatures in respondent's presence (pp. 14-17, tsn., Ibid).

Respondent's lone denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of

said three (3) witnesses. Respondent could have presented his
secretaries who were allegedly present when the alleged notarization took
place to corroborate his testimony (pp. 271-272, Inv.). He chose not to
present any of them. The testimony of Atty. Villanueva could have been
availed of by respondent because complainants claim that their signatures
were procured by Atty. Villanueva (see p. 40-41, tsn., June 26, 1980). Yet
respondent did not present Atty. Villanueva.

Furthermore, the evidence is indisputable that respondent was in the

practice of leaving blank spaces between entries in his Notarial Register
with only the consecutive numbers of the documents listed (Exhs. L-1, M-
1, N-1, N-2, O-1, O-2, P-1, Q-1, R-1, pp. 197-203, Inv.). He did not note on
said spaces why they were left blank. From August 2, 1977 to August 11,
1977, he left no less than eleven (11) spaces blank between entries.
 This is clear violation of Section 246 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which states:

"No blank line shall be left. between entries."

This practice would make easy the ante-dating of documents for the
convenience of the parties and of the Notary Public.

It is clear that the respondent has violated the oath he took as a member
of the Bar that has resulted in extreme delay, inconvenience and damage
to the complainants. There is no justification for this violation and
corresponding penalty is called therefor.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be

suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

(pp. 049-052, Rollo.)

The Court agrees with the foregoing findings. The very first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that a "lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process". Moreover, Rule 138
Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to "obey
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred by this Court. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as
the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer
is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the court will not countenance. In the instant
case, respondent clearly violated the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code,
more particularly Section 246 thereof.

Then too, respondent has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a lawyer that he
shall not do any falsehood. Not only that, he has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court, nor shall be misled or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.

Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it involves public interest in a

substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are
not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and
the court and administrative offices generally (Buensucero vs. Barrera, 216 SCRA 309
[1992] Joson v. Baltazar, 194 SCRA 114 [1991]).

Respondent's act of falsely certifying that complainants Napoleon and Ricardo Gonzaga
personally appeared before him and acknowledged that the document was their free
and voluntary act and deed is reprehensible, constituting as it does, violation of law and
gross misconduct on his part.

However, since only one instance of unauthorized or false notarization is here involved,
the Court considers the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months as adequate and commensurate to the offense.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Crisanto P.

Realubin from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months commencing upon
receipt of this Resolution. Copies of this Resolution shall be distributed to the courts and
to the Bar Confidant and shall be spread on the personal record of respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

BIDIN, J.:

In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National

Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the
Asset Management Group of complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:

A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement

or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.

by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in
which respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.

Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in
arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of
Milagros Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his
subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of
the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action arose out
of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had since left the employ of
complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.

Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed
by complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave
misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later
disqualified by the Civil Service Commission.

Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainants Asset
Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses
Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the
couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda spouses
as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm "Cedo,
Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.

In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel for
Mrs. Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision.
He alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of the case before the trial court.
With respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he never
appeared as counsel for them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer,
Maynigo & Associates" is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually handled
only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer. Respondent averred that he did not enter into a general
partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer nor with the other lawyers named therein. They are
only using the aforesaid name to designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who
although not partners, maintain one office as well as one clerical and supporting staff.
Each one of them handles their own cases independently and individually receives the
revenues therefrom which are not shared among them.

In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.

During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was
previously fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No.
94456 entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping,
where respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy "through the law
firm of Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."

The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully
substantiated. Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda
spouses is not a partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the attestation
of complainant's counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of the Almeda
spouses' case, respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and
although he did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer
what to say and argue before the court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the
application for a writ of injunction in the same case, respondent impliedly admitted being
the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of record that respondent was working in
the same office as Atty. Ferrer.

Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself
a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the clients
secrets and confidential records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and
staff members at all times.

From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to
devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank
since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his former employer, a
convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional service. In sum, the IBP
saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the money he
expected to earn.

The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3
years.

The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994,
submitted to this Court its Report and recommendation in this case, respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation contained in
the said Report with the IBP Board of Governors. On December 12, 1994, respondent
also filed another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for
Reconsideration. In resolving this case, the Court took into consideration the aforesaid
pleadings.

In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to
emphasize the paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting
interests. In the similar case of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95
SCRA 24 [1980]) where a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who
participated in the investigation of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later
on acted as counsel for the said Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court,
citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13 119681) ruled:

The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree

with him, that even if respondent did not use against his client any
information or evidence acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied
that he did become privy to information regarding the ownership of the
parcel of land which was later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was
the dispute over the land that triggered the mauling incident which gave
 rise to the criminal action for physical injuries. This Court's remarks
inHilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:

"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of

litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and
irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the complexity of what is said in
the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the
nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of
other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause."

Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his

former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere
fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him from
appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. In the
case of Hilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further said:

Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of

attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests.
This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner
from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on
principles of public policy, of good taste. As has been said in another
case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as
to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only
to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double dealing. Only thus can litigants. be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.

The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to
respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank,
respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his
former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an
employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
on adverse influence and conflicting interests, to wit:

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express

conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting
interest when, in behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S.

CEDO from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in Metro Manila.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 2125 April 3, 1995

ENRIQUE M. REYES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LEOPOLDO T. MAGLAYA, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

This concerns the administrative complaint filed by Enrique Reyes against Atty.
Leopoldo Maglaya on 28 February 1980. The complaint alleged the following:

1. That on June 8, 1979 complainant endorsed to the respondent, all

pertinent papers regarding the anomalous and fraudulent actuations of
one Angelica Offemaria an alleged president and General Manager of the
Bicol Veterans Handicrafts Enterprises, Inc., in which complainant was
defrauded of P31,863.30, for the purpose of filing the necessary criminal
action against said Angelica Offemaria and for the recovery of the
aforesaid amount. . . .

2. That the respondent agreed to handle the case, and asked for, and was
given the amount of P1,500.00, as his fee therefor.

3. That once having received the documents and the check for P1,500.00,
complainant has heard from respondent, although said complainant has
been calling said respondent almost daily, to inquire as to the status of the
case he has endorsed.

xxx xxx xxx

7. On January 18, 1980, at the request of complainant, another letter was

addressed to the respondent demanding the return of the P1,500.00,
within five (5) days from receipt thereof, but respondent failed to return the
aforesaid amount up to the present, although he received the letter of
demand on January 23, 1980.

xxx xxx xxx

9. That, however, due to respondent's inaction in the case endorsed to

him by the complainant for a period of more than four (4) months; his
failure to return all the documentary evidence entrusted to him, and his
failure to return the amount he received, the case against Offemaria has
not yet been commenced up to the present.

xxx xxx xxx 1

In. his unverified Answer to the complaint, respondent Maglaya averred that at the time
of the endorsement of said case, complainant Reyes merely had xerox copies of his
documents as the originals thereof were in the possession of one Agent Urmatan of the
Criminal Investigation Service ("CIS") of the Philippine Constabulary where complainant
first had his case investigated.2 As the originals were necessary in order to file the
criminal action contemplated, respondent stated that he enlisted the help of Atty.
Abando, Chief of the PC-CIS legal service on the advice of complainant.3 However,
respondent asserted the investigative reports which he received from Atty. Abando were
only those of complainant's relatives and not the record of complainant himself. 4

Respondent Maglaya also stated that the amount of P1,500.00 which he received from
complainant, was not only for his fees but also for expenses incurred in retrieving
complainant's records from the CIS.5 Furthermore, respondent submitted that
"complainant has no cause of action, except the return of P1,500.00 which respondent
agreed to if only to show complainant that respondent cannot profit at the former's
expense despite time and money spent on his case.6

In his Reply, complainant Reyes insisted that the amount of P1,500.00 was for
respondent's fee in the filing of the criminal action against Angelica Offemaria and not
for expenses in retrieving the records from the CIS. 7 He also pointed out that
respondent was not candid with this Court when he alleged that he did not receive the
record or file of the complainant.8 As a matter of fact, his receipt of the complete file of
complainant against Angelica Offemaria from the PC-CIS is evidenced by a receipt in
respondent's own handwriting as early as 20 July 1979. 9 Thus, considering that
respondent had with him the complete file of complainant obtained by respondent from
the PC-CIS as early as 20 July 1979, and yet had not instituted the desired criminal
action against said Angelica Offemaria more than three (3) months later, complainant
was impelled in a letter dated 24 October 1979 to demand from respondent the return of
the documents and the amount of P1,500.00. Hence, complainant contended that such
inaction was indicative of respondent's negligence in handling the case of his client. 10

This case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

It appears from the records that Solicitor Magdangal de Leon conducted his
investigation in the absence of respondent because, according to a certain Mr. Ildefonso
Bongalan who appeared for the respondent on said date and on previous dates, the
respondent was sick. By reason of respondent's repeated absence every time this case
was set and called for hearing with due notice to him and his repeated failure to submit
a medical certificate to justify his absences, Solicitor de Leon allowed complainant to
testify in support of his complaint in the presence of Mr. Bongalan, subject to the cross-
examination by the respondent.

Subsequently, this case was transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP")
where it was set for hearing several times by the Board of Governors to afford
respondent Maglaya every opportunity to cross-examine the complainant and to adduce
evidence in his own defense. However, despite having duly received notices of
hearings, respondent failed to appear at those hearings.

In an order of the IBP Board of Governors dated 16 October 1992, respondent was
warned that his failure to appear at the next scheduled hearing set on 11 December
1992, would result in this case being submitted for report and recommendation on the
basis of the evidence so far presented by the complainant only.

On 11 December 1992, respondent's wife asked that the hearing be reset to 29 January
1993, because her husband was still sick. The request was granted but respondent
nevertheless failed to appear at the requested date and since then has not taken any
move to present any evidence on his own behalf.

In its Resolution dated 8 May 1993, the IBP Board of Governors held that the
admissions of respondent contained in his Answer are conclusive upon disciplinary
action against him even without considering the unrefuted testimony of the complainant.
These admissions of respondent Maglaya include, in particular, his admission that on
23 January 1980, he had received complainant's letter of 18 January 1980 demanding
return of the P1,500.00 within five (5) days from receipt of that letter. Respondent did
not deny that he has failed to return that sum of money up to the present. Respondent
had also conceded in paragraph 10 of his Answer that "complainant has no cause of
action except the return of P1.500.00 which respondent agreed to. . . ." The IBP
concluded that the admissions of respondent Maglaya coupled with the testimony of
complainant Reyes more than substantially proved the charge against respondent lied
when he agreed to return the P1,500.00 to the complainant, considering that up to the
present he has failed to so return the p1,500.00.

The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent Atty. Maglaya be

suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

This Court is in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the IBP that
respondent by his admissions has sufficiently demonstrated conduct showing his
unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize the attorney-client relationship.
By his unexplained failure to return the amount of P1,500.00 demanded by complainant-
client receipt of which he had acknowledged and which he had agreed to return at the
earliest possible opportunity, he failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. He has in
particular disregarded Canon 16, Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which requires that "a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand . . . . His inexcusable act of withholding money belonging to his client
warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanction.

This Court also finds that respondent has not exercised the diligence required of
lawyers in the handling of their clients' cases. He failed to act upon complainant's case
for a period of more than three (3) months from the time the complete file of
complainant against Angelica Offemaria was endorsed to him by Atty. Abando of the
PC-CIS. To make matters worse, respondent failed to respond to complainant's
inquiries regarding the status of his case, a duty which was incumbent upon him.

Considering the foregoing, the recommendation of the IBP that respondent be

suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (l) year is approved..

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby SUSPENDS ATTY. LEOPOLDO T. MAGLAYA from

the practice of law for a period of one (1) year from notice hereof, with a WARNING that
a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be spread on the personal records of the respondent in the
Bar Confidant's Office; Supreme Court of the Philippines, with copies thereof furnished
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts.

Romero, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 2468 May 12, 1995

NILO L. MIRAFLOR AND PRIMO L. MIRAFLOR, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. JUAN M. HAGAD, ATTY. JOSE Y. AGUIRRE, JR., ATTY. ROLAND V.
EVANGELISTA, INSULAR LUMBER CO. (PHIL)., INC. and MARIANO P.
ALEDRON, respondents.

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a verified complaint of the brothers Nilo and Primo L. Miraflor charging Attys.
Juan M. Hagad, Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., and Roland V. Evangelista as well as Mariano P.
Aledron and Insular Lumber Co., (Phil.) Inc. (ILCOPHIL) with conspiracy to perpetuate
obstruction of justice relative to NLRC Case No. ROVI-404-73 entitled "Nilo L. Miraflor v.
Insular Lumber Co. (Phil.)." Since this is an administrative complaint, we shall only
proceed against respondents who are members of the Bar.

The antecedents: On 9 May 1973 Nilo L. Miraflor assisted by his brother Primo L.
Miraflor; filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against ILCOPHIL with the Ministry (now
Department) of Labor and Employment, Bacolod City. The complaint was initially
dismissed but on appeal to the NLRC the dismissal was reversed. Upon appeal to the
Office of the President the decision of the NLRC was modified by (a) ordering
ILCOPHIL to reinstate Nilo to his original position in the company and to pay him
backwages computed from the time of his dismissal and (b) directing the remand to
NLRC of the claims of complainant for salary differentials and other fringe benefits.

On 29 November 1976 respondent Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre Jr. issued a
writ of execution for the reinstatement of Nilo and for the payment of his backwages in
the sum of P27,260.00. Upon ILCOPHIL's motion filed through respondent Juan M.
Hagad, respondent Aguirre Jr. not only required ILCOPHIL to post a bond of
P10,000.00 to stay the execution pending appeal but also set a hearing to determine
the amount of backwages and other benefits to be paid to Nilo. Thereafter respondent
Aguirre Jr. reduced the amount of backwages to only P14,201.69.

In the meantime, Nilo was reinstated. On 29 April 1981 respondent Aguirre Jr. rendered
judgment awarding the sum of P26,768.28 as salary differentials bonuses and other
fringe benefits. ILCOPHIL filed a motion for reconsideration.

Complainants accuse respondents of thwarting the execution of the decision of the

Office of the President with regard to Nilo's reinstatement and monetary award. They
charged that: (a) respondent Aguirre Jr., upon ILCOPHIL's motion, altered the amount
of backwages due Nilo from P27,260.00 to only P14,201.69, and allowed ILCOPHIL to
reinstate Nilo to an allegedly different and lower position in the company, and that again
upon ILCOPHIL's appeal or motion for reconsideration he allowed ILCOPHIL to evade
its obligations to pay Nilo the sum of P26,768.28 as salary differentials, bonuses and
other fringe benefits instead of defending his decision; (b) respondent Hagad as counsel
for ILCOPHIL employed "unashamedly legal contortions and illegalism . . . to satisfy the
unlawful obsession, whims and caprices of a merciless client like ILCOPHIL;" and, (c)
respondent Evangelista as Personnel Manager of ILCOPHIL, through his silence, chose
to be a "spineless minion of ILCOPHIL and Atty. Juan M. Hagad" whose actions run
counter to the decision favorable to Nilo. 1

In his comment, respondent Aguirre Jr. maintains that he merely complied with due
process by granting ILCOPHIL the opportunity to present evidence relative to its claim
that Nilo had gainful employment during the time he was dismissed from his job. 2

For his part, respondent Hagad claims that the question of the amount of salary
differentials and fringe benefits due Nilo has remained open because of ILCOPHIL's
timely appeal or reconsideration; that he could not be faulted for resorting to remedies
available to his client for the protection of its interests otherwise he would have been
remiss in his professional obligation; that complainant Nilo should blame himself for the
slow progress of the case since he has persisted in being represented by his co-
complainant, his brother who is a non-lawyer, who chose to "become personal instead
of concentrating on pursuing his action so that early decision could be obtained in this
case;" and, that despite this circumstance, respondent did not resort to underhanded
means to defeat complainants' rights.3

On the other hand, respondent Evangelista asserts that he was not yet connected with
ILCOPHIL when Nilo was dismissed from employment and that it was absurd for him to
conspire with respondents Aguirre Jr. and Hagad because he knew nothing of the case
nor had he even met with respondent Aguirre Jr. or complainant Primo L. Miraflor.4

Acting on the pleadings of the parties, we referred the case to the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation.5

On 1 March 1995 the Office of the Bar Confidant submitted a report on its findings with
the following recommendation that this administrative complaint be dismissed 6 as

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . There is nothing in the records of the case which will show that
respondents acted in such a way as may constitute malpractice, gross
misconduct nor violation of the lawyer's oath.

Nilo Miraflor's complaint arose out of his frustration to get his salary
differentials and other monetary benefits from his employer ILCOPHIL
which he attributes to respondents' illegal maneuverings which, to his
mind, constitute "conspiracy to perpetuate obstruction of justice." He
zeroed in on the motion for reconsideration of June 9, 1981 filed by
respondent Atty. Hagad which prevented the execution of the Labor
Arbiter's decision of April 29, 1981 awarding to the former salary
differentials, bonuses and other fringe benefits in the amount of
P26,768.28. (R)espondent Atty. Hagad can never be faulted for having
filed said motion for reconsideration. As counsel for ILCOPHIL, he has the
duty to pursue with zeal and dedication the best interests of his client and
the filing of the motion for reconsideration was well within the scope of his
authority and prerogatives as such counsel. Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence." It should be remembered that the
moment a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exert all
effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to
exercise due diligence or abandons his client's cause makes him unworthy
of the trust reposed an him by the client (Legarda vs. Court of Appeals,
209 SCRA 722). Thus, for making use of the legal remedies available to
his client, a lawyer can not be accused of obstruction of justice; otherwise,
a responsible lawyer will have a convenient excuse for not diligently and
competently pursuing their clients' cause.

With respect to respondent Atty. Aguirre, Jr., his explanation is reasonable

and satisfactory. Complainants, except for their unsubstantiated
allegations, never offered any satisfactory evidence to warrant the
 conclusion that Atty. Aguirre, Jr. acted maliciously in allowing ILCOPHIL to
file the questioned motion for reconsideration. His explanation that he
"merely complied with due process by granting the respondent company
ILCOPHIL an opportunity to present evidence relative to its claim that
complainant (Nilo Miraflor) had gainful employment during the time he was
dismissed" is well taken. As a matter of fact, in allowing said motion for
reconsideration, Atty. Aguirre was merely complying with the presidential
directive to have a further adjudication on Nilo's salary differentials and
other benefits due him.

As for Atty. Evangelista, there is not an iota of evidence showing that he

actively participated in the prosecution of ILCOPHIL's cause against Nilo
Miraflor. Complainants' accusation against him is, therefore, baseless and
unfounded.

Moreover, taking into consideration complainants' lack of interest in

pursuing their charges, what with the considerable lapse of time (almost
twelve years) since the last responsive pleading was filed without them
pressing their charges, which has created doubt as to the merit of their
complaint, this case must be dismissed.

We fully agree with the recommendation that the case should be dismissed. We find no
evidence of malice or improper motive in the actuations of respondents who merely
discharged their respective functions to the best of their professional abilities within the
confines of law and jurisprudence. Evidently, complainants cast the bigger blame upon
respondent Hagad whom they accuse of instigating the whole scheme of defeating
Nilo's rights to the monetary award. Such accusation has no basis. A lawyer's devotion
to his client's cause not only requires but also entitles him to employ every honorable
means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every defense
provided by law to enable the latter's cause to succeed.7

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolves to DISMISS the complaint for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., is on leave.

 JUNE

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. MTJ-94-894 June 2, 1995

ATTY. FELIXBERTO N. BOQUIREN, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE EMPERATRIZ DEL ROSARIO-CRUZ; CLERK OF COURT MELINDA D.
GATDULA; and ATTY. SATURNINO V. BACTAD, respondents.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

This administrative complaint stemmed from Civil Case No. 111 entitled Alex Boquiren,
et. al. vs. Mariano Gutierrez, for ejectment and damages, where complainant Atty.
Felixberto N. Boquiren was the plaintiff's counsel. Atty. Saturnino V. Bactad, the
defendant's counsel and the incumbent vice-governor of the province, and Judge
Emperatriz del Rosario-Cruz and Atty. Melinda D. Gatdula, the judge and clerk of court
respectively of the Municipal Trial Court, San Antonio, Zambales where the
aforementioned civil case was docketed. Judge Cruz dismissed the ejectment suit due
to plaintiff's lack of cause of action which complainant, Atty. Boquiren, seasonably
appealed to the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Iba, Zambales. On July 5, 1993 Atty.
Boquiren filed an administrative complaint against Judge Cruz and Atty. Gatdula for
misconduct, partiality, serious nonfeasance, culpable dereliction of duty and ignorance
of the law relative to the disposition of civil case no. 111.

On the other hand, Atty. Bactad, the defendant's counsel, was charged by the
complainant with false representation and employing scheme to defeat the application
of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure the latter alleging Atty. Bactad's claim and
false representation that a motion to dismiss is an allowable pleading under the Revised
Rule on Summary Proceedings.

On January 26, 1994 the Court "DISMISSED the case without prejudice to the refiling of
an administrative case at the proper time, it appearing that the case is on appeal with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Iba, Zambales where relief is available". On
February 18, 1994 complainant Atty. Boquiren filed a motion for its reconsideration.

On March 2, 1994 the Court dismissed the complaint for not having been verified and
for its failure to show prima facie case against respondent Atty. Gatdula. In reaction
thereto, complainant Atty. Boquiren filed a motion for reconsideration dated March 26,
1994.

We find these two motions for reconsideration devoid of merit.

Civil Case No. 111 from which the subject administrative complaint stemmed has
distinct facts from the latter but the subject administrative complaint can hardly be taken
into isolation. We deemed it proper, as we had properly resolved in our January 26,
1994 Resolution, to dismiss the subject administrative complaint without prejudice since
Civil Case No. 111 is now on appeal with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Iba,
Zambales. Necessarily, the appeal of Civil Case No. 111 includes all incidents that
occurred from the initial filing of the complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer on June 5,
1992 up to the MTC Decision dated February 26, 1993 dismissing said complaint. In
fact, a cursory reading of Atty. Boquiren's appeal before the Regional Trial Court shows
that he devoted at least twenty pages in his twenty-six page appeal statement detailing
the incidents, perceived improper conduct, orders, proceedings, misrepresentation,
misapprehension of facts, ignorance of the law and rules of procedure allegedly all
evidencing the culpability of the Judge, the Clerk of Court and the defendant's counsel
for administrative offenses. We note that these are the same grounds that now
constitute the bases of the subject administrative complaint. The issues and matters
raised therein were purely judicial in nature which an appeal can adequately and
properly address. The alleged errors committed by Judge Cruz relative to the
disposition of a case are at best errors of judgment and can be amply remedied by any
aggrieved party without recourse to the subject administrative complaint. Besides, it is a
matter of public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of
a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such
acts are erroneous (Revita v. Rimando, 98 SCRA 619 [1980]). More important, any
finding that this Court would make relative to the administrative complaint would
undoubtedly influence and affect the outcome of Atty. Boquiren's appeal. Needless to
say, this would constitute an unwarranted judicial interference and sway the Regional
Trial Court's dispensation of the appeal which we cannot allow to happen.

The Court strongly notes the excessive prose employed by complainant Atty. Boquiren
in his Motions for Reconsideration describing the Court's Resolutions as: "highly
questionable"; "based on insufficient or incorrect reasons"; "a classic arbituarily
concluded resolution", "a glaring violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics"; "pregnant
with aptness to mislead, deceptive or delusive quality"; "patently erroneous"; "a
BRAZEN LIE and MOCKERY OF JUSTICE" "classic carelessness, inefficiency, if not
lack of industry on the part of Special Asst. to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the 3rd
Div. and/or to the adjudication officer/office"; "mirror[ing] the Adjudicating Tribunal's
and/or its staff's BRAZEN MOCKERY OF JUSTICE with their gross violation of the
PUBLIC INTEREST POLICY of the State" [Emphasis in the original]

It appears prima facie that the foregoing words are aimed at seriously undermining the
integrity of this Court. Complainant seems to have forgotten his duty, as a lawyer and as
an officer of the court, to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial
officers (Canon 11, Code of Professional Responsibility).

ACCORDINGLY, finding the motions for reconsideration without merit the same are
hereby DISMISSED. Complainant Atty. Felixberto N. Boquiren, however, is hereby
ordered to explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why he should not
be cited for contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action.

SO ORDERED.
JULY

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 2747 July 6, 1995

GODOFREDO A. VILLALON, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JIMENEZ B. BUENDIA, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed against respondent, charging him with

committing falsehood in the complaint for the sum of money filed by him in Civil Case
No. 84-28455 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila.

On January 20, 1970, complainant prepared and notarized a deed of sale involving a
half portion of the lot described in TCT No. 147977 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City in favor of the spouses Andres Zeta and Felicidad Catada.

In 1972, complainant, together with the vendees of the lot covered by TCT No. 147977
and the witnesses to the deed of sale, was charged with the crime of falsification
(Criminal Case No. 12631) with the Court of First Instance of Manila.

On September 29, 1972, a complaint was filed by Felicidad de Guzman-Sarmiento, the

wife of Severino Sarmiento, against the vendees and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-16942) for
annulment of the deed of sale, repossession of property and damages. The plaintiff was
assisted by Atty. Melquiades Paredes.

On November 23, 1973, Felicidad de Guzman-Sarmiento, assisted by respondent, filed

an administrative complaint for disbarment (Adm. Case No. 1263) against complainant
for having prepared and notarized the deed of sale wherein it was made to appear that
she personally appeared and signed the deed before him when in fact she did not.

On January 30, 1982, this Court found complainant guilty of misconduct, both as a
member of the bar and as a notary public. Hence, he was suspended for three months
with a warning that further misbehavior on his part will merit a more drastic punishment.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision asking for
its modification to include the declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale. This Court, in
a resolution dated July 30, 1982, resolved to deny the motion on the ground that an
administrative case is not the proper forum for such relief.

Thereafter, respondent filed Civil Case No. 36273 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City for annulment of the deed of sale, repossession of property and damages. The
case was dismissed on the ground that it was a mere reproduction of Civil Case No. Q-
16942 previously filed by Atty. Paredes in behalf of Felicidad de Guzman-Sarmiento.

On December 19, 1984, respondent filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Manila (Civil Case No. 84-28455) against
complainant with respect to the deed of sale notarized by the latter to the prejudice of
Felicidad de Guzman-Sarmiento, respondent's client.

Alleging that the complaint for the sum of money with damages contained falsehood
and lies, complainant filed this administrative complaint against respondent for violation
of the lawyer's oath, specifically the part which states: "I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same."

This Court in a resolution dated September 16, 1985 referred this case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.

With the effectivity of Rule 139-B on June 1, 1988, this case was forwarded to the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and
recommendation.

On July 24, 1990, the IBP Board of Governors rendered its decision, dismissing the
complaint.

II

The only issue is whether the allegations in the complaint for sum of money with
damages contains falsehood which would constitute a violation of the lawyer's oath.

Section 3, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Court defines a complaint as a concise

statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. "The term
'ultimate facts' as used in Section 3, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, means the
essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot
be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action insufficient . . ."
(Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic, 204 SCRA 428, 437 [1991]).

In the case at bench, the complaint for a sum of money with damages filed by
respondent against complainant sufficiently conforms with the said definition of a
complaint. The allegations therein, which are claimed to be false, are relevant and
material to the respondent's client's cause of action for damages of the respondent's
clients. If complainant thought that the assertions therein were false, then it was a
matter of defense which he could set forth in his answer to the complaint. The veracity
of said allegations can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.

Moreover, it is well to note ". . ., the statements made in the course of judicial
proceeding are absolutely privileged that is, privileged regardless of the defamatory
tenor and of the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to
the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry" (People v. Aquino, 18 SCRA 555, 558
[1966]). What is relevant or pertinent should be liberally considered to favor the writer,
and the words should not be scrutinized with microscopic intensity (Smith Bell & Co. v.
Ellis, 48 Phil. 475 [1925]; United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 [1918]).

We find nothing in the complaint that would constitute a violation by respondent of the
lawyer's oath.

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent is DISMISSED for lack

of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 3283 July 13, 1995

RODOLFO MILLARE, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of

the Revised Rules of Court, this Court resolved to refer it to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On April 15, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors rendered a decision, finding respondent
guilty of malpractice and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law.

Pacifica Millare, the mother of the complainant, obtained a favorable judgment from the
Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra (MTC) which ordered Elsa Dy Co to vacate the
premises subject of the ejectment case (Civil Case No. 844). Co, through respondent as
counsel, appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Bangued, Abra
(RTC). She neither filed a supersedeas bond nor paid the rentals adjudged by the MTC.
The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.

The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for
failure to comply with Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules
and Guidelines (CA-G.R. CV No. 11404). According to the CA, Co should have filed a
petition for review and not an ordinary appeal (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 22).

The judgment of the MTC became final and executory on November 19, 1986.

On January 2, 1987, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by respondent as counsel for
Co in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404, arguing that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC were
null and void for being contrary to law, justice and equity for allowing the lessor to
increase by 300% the rentals for an old house. Respondent, admitting his mistake in
filing an ordinary appeal instead of a petition for review, prayed that he be allowed to file
an action for annulment.

On February 23, 1987, the CA gave due course to respondent's Manifestation and
Motion and let the records remain with it. However, on November 10, 1987, the said
court ordered the records in CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 to be remanded to the court a quo.

On March 9, 1987, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Decisions
and/or Reformation or Novation of Decisions of the MTC and the RTC (CA-G.R. SP No.
11690), insisting that the decisions were not in accordance with existing laws and
policies. On December 17, 1987, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment or
novation explaining that

. . . , aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2,
Rule 38), there is no other means whereby the defeated party may
procure final and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the
renewal of the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is void for want of
 jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by
fraud, . . . . There is no allegation in the present complaint to the effect that
the judgments in the former cases were secured through fraud (Rollo, Vol.
I, p. 35; Emphasis supplied).

On January 15, 1988, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for Oral Arguments of the CA decision. The
CA denied the motion. Again, respondent requested the CA to set his Motion For Oral
Arguments on April 14, 1988.

In a resolution dated February 12, 1988, the CA denied the Motion for Oral Argument
and in a resolution dated October 18, 1988, denied the motion for reconsideration of the
February 12 Resolution.

Respondent then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court (G.R. No.
86084) questioning the decisions of the MTC and the RTC in favor of petitioner's
mother. In a Resolution dated January 4, 1989, we denied the petition for having been
filed and paid late on December 12, 1988 and November 12, 1988, respectively. A
motion for reconsideration from such resolution was likewise denied with finality.

Respondent filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Prohibitory or Restraining Order (dated
July 6, 1988) in CA-G.R. SP No. 11690.

On April 12, 1988, the mother of complainant filed a Motion for Execution of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 844. Respondent filed an Opposition to the Motion for
Execution on the ground that the case was still pending review by the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 11690 and therefore the motion for execution was premature. On August 23,
1988, the MTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration, which was denied. The RTC affirmed the order for the issuance of
the writ of execution. Thus, a writ of execution was issued on October 18, 1988.

On October 26, 1988, respondent filed a special civil action (SP CV No. 624) with the
RTC, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary
injunction against the MTC, Provincial Sheriff and complainant's mother, seeking to
annul the writ of execution issued in MTC Civil Case No. 844 and RTC Civil Case No.
344. Respondent alleged that the order granting the writ of execution was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since a petition to annul the
decisions (CA-G.R. SP No. 11690) was still pending with the CA.

On October 28, 1988, the provincial sheriff, Romulo V. Paredes, deferred the
implementation of the writ of execution until the petition filed in SP CV No. 624
for certiorari was resolved. The CA denied in SP CV No. 624 respondent's Urgent
Motion to Set Aside and Declare Null and Void the Writ of Execution.

From the decision of the RTC, Branch 1, Abra in SP CV No. 624 denying the Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order,
respondent again filed an Appeal and/or Review by Certiorari, Etc. with the CA (CA-
G.R. SP No. 17040).

II

We have no reason to reverse the findings of the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to

represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and
warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule
19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.

Advocacy, within the bounds of the law, permits the attorney to use any arguable
construction of the law or rules which is favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not
allowed to knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing
law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly
groundless actions (Annotated Code of Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]).
Professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary
restrictions and qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 579-582 [1986]).

Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert

every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. Implementing said Canon are the following rules:

Rule 12.02. A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the
same cause.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 12.04. A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.

It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing
of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of
frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment (Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory
Motions Practice: Time for Change, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 1069 [1976]; Overmeyer v.
Fidelista and Deposit Co., 554 F. 2d 539, 543 [2d Cir. 1971]).

The rights of respondent's client in Civil Case No. 844 of the MTC were fully protected
and her defenses were properly ventilated when he filed the appeal from the MTC to the
RTC. But respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay
the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client. The said
decision became executory even pending its appeal with the RTC because of the failure
of Co to file a supersedeas bond and to pay the monthly rentals as they fell due.
Furthermore, his petition for annulment of the decisions of the MTC and RTC which he
filed with the CA (CA-G.R. No. 11690) was defective and dilatory. According to the CA,
there was no allegation therein that the courts had no jurisdiction, that his client was
denied due process, or "that the judgments in the former cases were secured through
fraud."

As ruled in Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 530 (1993):

A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is
void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) that it
has been obtained by fraud. . . . (at p. 534).

Moreover, when the CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded, respondent
knew very well that the decision of the MTC was already ripe for execution.

This Court, in People of Paombong, Bulacan v. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 423
(1993), ruled:

. . . [w]hen the judgment of a superior court is remanded to the trial court

for execution, the function of the trial court is ministerial only; the trial court
is merely obliged with becoming modesty to enforce that judgment and
has no jurisdiction either to modify in any way or to reverse the same. . . .
(at p. 430).

(See also Valenzona v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 306 [1993] and Garbo v. Court of
Appeals, 226 SCRA 250 [1993]).

Respondent filed a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution
of the MTC judgment in Civil Case No. 844, to wit:

(1) Civil Case No. 344 Appeal from the decision rendered in Civil Case
No. 844 of the Municipal Trial Court, Bangued, Abra, with the Regional
Trial Court, Abra;
 (2) CA-G.R. CV No. 11404 Appeal from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Abra;

(3) CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 An Action For the Annulment of Decisions

And/Or Reformation or Novation of Decisions filed with the Court of
Appeals;

(4) G.R. No. 86084 Petition For Review On Certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court;

(5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 Appeal And/Or Review By Certiorari, Etc.

filed also with the Court of Appeals; and,

(6) SP Civil Action No. 624 Petition For Certiorari,

Prohibition, Mandamus with Preliminary Issuance of Prohibitory Order filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, Abra.

Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the
same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping.

In Villanueva v. Adre 172 SCRA 876 (1989), the Court explained that forum shopping
exists when, by reason of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to
another for a more favorable resolution of his case. In the case of Gabriel v. Court of
Appeals, 72 SCRA 272 (1976), this Court explained that:

Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes

and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court.
Needless to add, the lawyer who filed such multiple or repetitious petitions
(which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment)
subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing
any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all
good fidelity to the courts and to maintain only such actions as appear to
him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor (at p. 275).

By having wilfully and knowingly abused his rights of recourse in his efforts to get a
favorable judgment, which efforts were all rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a
member of the Bar to institute actions only which are just and put up such defenses as
he perceives to be truly contestable under the laws (Garcia v. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512
[1993]). As correctly noted by the Committee on Bar Discipline "in filing a number of
pleadings, actions and petitioner, respondent 'has made a mockery of the judicial
processes' and disregarded canons of professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the
rights of a litigant in whose favor a judgment in the case was rendered, thus, 'abused
procedural rules to defeat ends of substantial justice'" (Report and Recommendation,
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, p. 2).

WHEREFORE, respondent is SUSPENDED for one year.

SO ORDERED.
OCTOBER

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 3745 October 2, 1995

CYNTHIA B. ROSACIA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BENJAMIN B. BULALACAO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered

corporation, filed a complaint for disbarment dated October 25, 1991, against herein
respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao. Acting on the complaint, the Court in a
resolution dated February 24, 1992, resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Commissioner Victor
C. Fernandez, the IBP investigating commissioner, found that respondent breached his
oath of office and accordingly recommended respondent's suspension from the practice
of law for three (3) months.1 In a resolution dated July 30, 1994, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve the commissioner's report and
recommendation.2

As found by the IBP, the undisputed facts are as follows:

On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement (Exh. "3-a"),

respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of
a corporation by the name of Tacma Phils., Inc.

On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between the

respondent and Tacma Phils., Inc. was severed as shown by another
agreement of even date (Exh. "3-b").

On July, 1991, or after almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's
retainer agreement with Tacma, Phils., Inc. was terminated, several
employees of the corporation consulted the respondent for the purpose of
filing an action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the
case for the said employees as against Tacma, Phils., Inc. by filing a
complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission, and
appearing in their behalf.3

The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not respondent breached his oath of office
for representing the employees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the
termination of their attorney-client relationship. We agree with the findings of the IBP
that respondent breached his oath of office. Respondent does not now dispute this. In
fact, in his motion for reconsideration, respondent admitted that he "did commit an act
bordering on grave misconduct, if not outright violation of his attorney's oath". 4 However,
respondent is pleading for the Court's compassion and leniency to reduce the IBP
recommended three months suspension to either fine or admonition with the following
proffered grounds: that he is relatively new in the profession having been admitted to
the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990 at the age of 46 when the complained conduct was
committed on August 1991; that he is of humble beginnings and his suspension will
deprive his family of its only source of livelihood he being the sole bread winner in the
family; that he has fully realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense for which he is
fully repentant; that he has severed his attorney-client relationship with the employees
of Tacma, Phils., Inc. by inhibiting himself and withdrawing his appearance as counsel
in the labor case against Tacma, Phils., Inc.; and that he pledges not to commit the
same mistake and to henceforth strictly adhere to the professional standards set forth
by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Court reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in
which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has
terminated as it is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case
other person against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from,
and independent of the former case.5 It behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate
the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 6 The
relation of attorney and client is one of confidence and trust in the highest degree. 7 A
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.8 An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong
points of the case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the
secrets of clients obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists.
Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of the confidence of the people.9

Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent is new in
the profession as he was just admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when the
breach of his oath of office occurred more than a year after. Having just hurdled the bar
examinations which included an examination in legal ethics, surely the precepts of the
Code of Professional Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's trust and confidence
even after the attorney-client relation is terminated 10 must have been still fresh in his
mind. A lawyer starting to establish his stature in the legal profession must start right
and dutifully abide by the norms of conduct of the profession. This will ineluctably
redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of the legal profession as well.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
months. Let this resolution be attached to respondent's record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies thereof furnished to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
NOVEMBER

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 3736 November 16, 1995

CRAIG L. FORD, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ESCOLASTICO DAITOL, respondent.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

Respondent Atty. Escolastico Daitol seeks the reconsideration of IBP Resolution No. XI-
95-255 dated 18 February 1995 recommending his suspension from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) month after he was found to have been remiss in the
performance of his duties as counsel of complainant Craig L. Ford.

Some time in 1987, complainant Ford engaged the legal services of respondent Daitol
in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-5552 filed by the former against the Philippine
Commercial International Bank ("PCIB") in the Regional Trial COurt ("RTC"), Branch XV
of Cebu City. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of complainant. PCIB
thereupon appealed said judgment to the Court of Appeals ("CA"). After PCIB had filed
its appellant's brief, the CA directed complainant to file his appellee's brief. Despite
several inquiries by complainant about the status of the brief and reminders from him to
file the same, respondent never filed the appellee's brief with the CA.

On 29 April 1991, complainant learned from respondent that the CA had issued a
resolution dated 4 March 1991 stating that the case had been submitted for decision
without the appellee's brief. Aggrieved by respondent's omission and apprehensive that
such failure might prejudice his case, complainant lodged a complaint dated 6 May
1991 against respondent before the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines ("IBP"). Respondent did not file an answer to the complaint. The IBP-Cebu
City Chapter forwarded the case to the IBP office in Manila.

Complainant also filed a letter-complaint in the Court praying that disciplinary action be
taken against respondent. In his answer, respondent admitted that he was the counsel
of complainant in Civil Case No. CEB-5552 and that he had also entered his
appearance as such in the CA.. However, before he could finish the draft of the
appellee's brief, complainant allegedly terminated his services due to "various difficulties
and misunderstanding" between them. Complainant denied this allegation stating that
he had already advanced an amount of P600.00 as attorney's fees to respondent who
had assured him that he was preparing the appellee's brief.

In a Resolution dated 28 September 1992, the Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.

During the hearings conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,
respondent did not show up and did not submit any explanation for his failure to file the
appellee's brief. Twice respondent moved to postpone the scheduled hearings
claiming, inter alia, lack of money for his trip to Manila. He moved to transfer the venue
of the hearings to Cebu City but the Commission denied the motion in its Order dated
22 September 1993 holding that there were no compelling reasons therefor and not all
the parties agreed to such transfer. In lieu of his personal appearance before the
Commission, respondent was directed to submit by mail his affidavit and to attach
thereto his evidence to rebut the charge of complainant. Respondent did not submit any
such evidence. The Commission then considered him to have waived his right to
present evidence on his behalf.

The Commission found respondent to have been remiss in the performance of his
duties as counsel of complainant. Respondent was particularly faulted for his failure to
secure a written discharge from complainant before considering himself relieved of his
duty to file the appellee's brief. Accordingly, the Commission recommended to Board of
Governors of the IBP respondent's suspension from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) month. In its Resolution No. XI-95-255 dated 18 February 1995, the Board of
Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commission.

The above resolution of the IBP as well as respondent's motion for reconsideration
thereof were forwarded to the Court for its final action pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court, the recommended penalty being suspension from the
practice of law.

In his motion for reconsideration, respondent claims that the Report of the Investigating
Commissioner, which was made the basis of the IBP Resolution, was rendered ex-
parte and that he was not allowed to present evidence on his behalf. Respondent claims
that he has evidence to show that complainant had discharged him as counsel.

Respondent has no cause to complain since the Commission had given him ample
opportunity to submit his affidavit and supporting documents. The Order of the
Commission dated 22 September 1993 denying respondent's motion to change venue
stated that:

. . . It could be in the best interest of justice that IBP main office hold a
marathon hearing in Manila for one day for complainant and respondent to
present their witnesses and evidence, making it worthwhile for both parties
as to one trip. No postponements would be allowed. Any absence would
be deemed a waiver of right to present evidence. If any of the parties
cannot appear, they are directed to mail their affidavits, evidence and
certified true copies which will be included as evidence.

On 23 February 1994, the Commission issued another Order stating that:

In order to give respondent an opportunity to present evidence, the

Commission hereby directs respondent within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this order to mail directly to the Commission any documentary
evidence to disprove the complaint with respect to the following matters:
a) that respondent, despite the fact that he agreed, failed to file appellee's
brief on behalf of Craig Ford with the Court of Appeals; and b) respondent
received money in the amount of P600.00 for preparation of said brief.

The last opportunity for respondent to present evidence in his own behalf
whether personally, by deposition or by mailing certified true copies of
documentary exhibits shall be set for April 13, 1994 at 10:00 a.m. Should
the respondent fail to appear, the case shall be considered submitted for
resolution.

Since respondent still failed to submit his evidence, if any, despite said Orders,
the Commission declared that he had waived his right to present evidence on his
behalf and regarded the case as submitted for resolution on the basis of
evidence already of record.

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the court finds that the suspension
of respondent from the practice of law is proper. The Court agrees with the IBP that
respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel for
complainant. A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of
protecting the latter's interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellee's brief
on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set
forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts
every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also states that:

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

In In re: Santiago F. Marcos,1 the Court considered a lawyer's failure to file brief for his
client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held:

An attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his ability
and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA
159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable
negligence on his part (People vs. Villar 46 SCRA 107) The respondent
has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed him to his client as
well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy
administration of justice. (People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs.
Estocada, 43 SCRA 515) (Emphasis supplied)

It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred
or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion.2

Having in mind the circumstances of this case and the existing case law of the Court,
we consider that the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) month is not commensurate with the respondent's breach of duty and must be
adjusted upward.3 In previous cases, the Court has imposed for a lawyer's failure to file
a brief or other pleading before an appellate court, suspension from the practice of law
for three (3) months;4 six (6) months;5 and even disbarment in aggravated cases.6

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Escolastico Daitol

from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with a WARNING that
repetition of the same or similar offense will be more severely dealt with. Respondent is
also DIRECTED to return to complainant the amount of P600.00 which he had received
as attorney's fees.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of
respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

Romero, Melo, Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.