THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185202

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,*
CARPIO,**
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Acting Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
PERALTA, JJ.

FRANCISCO TARUC @ Promulgated:

TARUC,
Accused-Appellant. February 18, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court, as amended, assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 27
February 2008 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01638 entitled, People of the Philippines v.
Francisco Taruc @ Taruc, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated 29
June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan, Branch 3, in Criminal Case
No. 8010 for murder.
 Accused-appellant Francisco Taruc was charged in Criminal Case No. 8010
before the RTC of Bataan, Branch 3, with the crime of murder in connection with
the death of Emelito Sualog.

The Information reads:

That on or about November 8, 1998 at Brgy. Puting Buhangin, Orion,

Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack , assault and use personal
violence upon Emelito Sualog @ Elmer, by then and there shooting him with a
Celiber (sic) 45 on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, thereafter,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.[2]

Upon arraignment on 25 April 2005, accused, duly assisted by a lawyer from the
Public Attorneys Office (PAO),[3] pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

After trial on the merits, the RTC on 29 June 2005 rendered a Decision[4] convicting
the accused, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused FRANCISCO TARUC is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the crime of MURDER,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and with the
attending aggravating circumstance of treachery, is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH.

Accused Francisco Taruc is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Emelito
Saulog the amounts of P49,225.00 in actual damages, P50,000.00 in civil
indemnity and P30,000.00 in moral damages.

Issue warrant of arrest against accused Francisco Taruc that he may serve the
sentence imposed against him.[5]

The case was brought to the Court of Appeals for automatic review pursuant to A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC[6] where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 01638.

On 13 January 2006, accused-appellant, through the PAO, filed a Motion for

Extension of Time to File Appellants Brief.[7]
 Considering that the Notice to File Brief addressed to accused-appellant was
returned to the appellate court with postal notation moved out, the Court of Appeals
directed accused-appellants counsel to furnish it with the present and complete
address of his client within five days from notice.

In compliance, the PAO lawyer concerned informed[8] the Court of Appeals

that accused-appellant escaped from prison on 23 August 2002. Said PAO lawyer
claimed that he had no means of knowing the current whereabouts of the accused-
appellant. Thereupon, the PAO lawyer asked the Court of Appeals to direct the
Warden of the Provincial Jail in Balanga, Bataan, to file a certification as to the
accused-appellants escape.

On 20 February 2006, the Court of Appeals required[9] the Warden of the

Bataan Provincial Jail to comment on the afore-stated information relayed by the
PAO lawyer.

On 6 March 2006, Ropadolfo Fabros Torcuato, Sr., Officer-in-Charge (OIC),

Warden of the Bataan Provincial Jail, conveyed[10] to the appellate court that
accused-appellant was indeed committed to said jail on 10 November 2000 but
escaped at about 11:00 p.m. on 23 August 2002.

On 23 March 2006, notwithstanding the escape of accused-appellant from

prison, the Court of Appeals granted PAOs Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appellants Brief, in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in People v.
Flores,[11] making the review of death penalty cases mandatory. The period of
extension granted had lapsed without the accused-appellant filing his brief; thus, the
Court of Appeals required the PAO to show cause why the latter should not be held
in contempt for failing to file the same.[12]
 The Court of Appeals found the explanation valid, and accepted the briefs of
both the appellant and the appellee, and considered the case submitted for decision.
On 27 February 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming
with modification the Decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, City

of Balanga, Bataan in Criminal Case No. 8010 is AFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. The accused-appellant Francisco Taruc, is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery, defined in Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. In view of R.A.
No. 9346, the modification of the penalty imposed by the trial court from death
to reclusion perpetua is ordered.

The accused-appellant Francisco Taruc is likewise ordered to pay the heirs

of the victim, Emelito Sualog, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity ex delicto; Forty-Nine Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Five (P49,255.00)
as actual damages; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and
Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages. Costs against
the accused-appellant.

On 13 March 2008, accused-appellant, still represented by the PAO, filed a

Notice of Appeal[13] stating that he was appealing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court on questions of law and fact. And on 29 April 2008,
the Court of Appeals gave due course to accused-appellants appeal and directed its
Records Division to forward the rollo and records of the case to the Supreme
Court.[14]

Hence, this Petition.

As may be gleaned from the records, before the prosecution witness Randy
Espina could be cross-examined,[15] accused-appellant escaped from the Bataan
Provincial Jail on 23 August 2002.Thus, the RTC considered the act of the accused
as a waiver to cross-examine said witness. Thereafter, the trial court promulgated a
judgment of conviction while accused-appellant was at large. He remains at large
even while his counsel continues to file various pleadings on his behalf before the
RTC, the Court of Appeals, and this Court.
Given that the accused-appellant escaped from jail and eluded arrest until the
present, the issue of whether he has lost his right to appeal his conviction inexorably
ensues.

An accused is required to be present before the trial court at the promulgation

of the judgment in a criminal case. If the accused fails to appear before the trial court,
promulgation of judgment shall be made in accordance with Rule 120, Section 6,
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of

judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment
in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or
thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear
was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these
Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.Within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and
file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons
for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was
for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen
(15) days from notice. (Emphasis supplied.)

Consistently, Rule 124, Section 8, paragraph 2 of the same Rules allows the
Court of Appeals, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, to dismiss the appeal
of the accused-appellant who eludes the jurisdiction of the courts over his
person, viz:

SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. The

Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice
to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his
brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is
represented by a counsel de oficio.

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of
the appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)
 In allowing the dismissal of the appeal of the accused-appellant under the
circumstances identified by the foregoing rule, the Court, in People v.
Mapalao,[16] explained that:

[O]nce an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a

foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits
to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief
from the court.

Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it

has been extended to the Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which reads:

SECTION 1. Uniform procedure. - Unless otherwise provided by the

Constitution or by law, the procedure in the Supreme Court in original and in
appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court of Appeals.

It is indisputable that accused-appellant herein, by escaping from jail, was not

present at the promulgation by the RTC of its Decision dated 29 June 2005 in
Criminal Case No. 8010, finding him guilty of the crime of murder. Accused-
appellant failed to surrender and file the required motion within 15 days from the
promulgation of the RTC Decision. This alone already deprived him of any remedy
against said judgment of conviction available under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, including the right to appeal the same.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the escape of the accused-appellant did not

preclude the Court of Appeals from exercising its review jurisdiction, considering
that what was involved was capital punishment. Automatic review being mandatory,
it is not only a power of the court but a duty to review all death penalty cases.[17]
In this case, considering that the penalty imposed by the trial court was death,
the Court of Appeals rightly took cognizance of the case. Upon review by the
appellate court, however, it modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

We now come to the resolution of the case.

By escaping prison, accused-appellant impliedly waived his right to

appeal. In People v. Ang Gioc,[18] the Court enunciated that:
 There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused
himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for
the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive
it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been
submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to
appeal from the judgment rendered against him x x x.

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he voluntarily

submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days from
notice of the judgment against him.[19] While at large, he cannot seek relief from the
court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal.[20] Thus, having escaped from
prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or
submits to its jurisdiction, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from
the court.

By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of
the land, accused-appellant revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a
position to speculate, at his pleasure on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he
kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory
at his option.[21] Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part
of the appellate court.[22]

Accused-appellant, in the case at bar, has remained at large for most of the
proceedings before the RTC, as well as for the entirety of the pendency of his appeal
before the Court of Appeals, and even until now when his appeal is pending before
this Court. He cannot so audaciously hope that his appeal before this Court would
succeed. He only hopes in vain.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Let the records of this case be

remanded to the trial court for the issuance of the mittimus.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

FITNESS BY DESIGN, INC., G.R. No. 177982

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

COMMISSIONER ON Promulgated:
INTERNAL REVENUE, October 17, 2008
Respondent.
x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On March 17, 2004, the Commissioner on Internal Revenue (respondent)
assessed Fitness by Design, Inc. (petitioner) for deficiency income taxes for the tax
year 1995 in the total amount of P10,647,529.69.[1] Petitioner protested the
assessment on the ground that it was issued beyond the three-year prescriptive period
under Section 203 of the Tax Code.[2] Additionally, petitioner claimed that since it
was incorporated only on May 30, 1995, there was no basis to assume that it had
already earned income for the tax year 1995.[3]

On February 1, 2005, respondent issued a warrant of distraint and/or levy

against petitioner,[4] drawing petitioner to file on March 1, 2005 a Petition for
Review (with Motion to Suspend Collection of Income Tax, Value Added Tax,
Documentary Stamp Tax and Surcharges and Interests subject of this
Petition)[5] before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) before which it reiterated its
defense of prescription. The petition was docketed as CTA Case No. 7160.
In his Answer,[6] respondent alleged:

The right of the respondent to assess petitioner for deficiency

income tax, VAT and Documentary Stamp Tax for the year 1995 has
not prescribed pursuant to Section 222(a) of the 1997 Tax
Code. Petitioners 1995 Income Tax Return (ITR) filed on April 11,
1996 was false and fraudulent for its deliberate failure to declare its true
sales. Petitioner declared in its 1995 Income Tax Return that it was on
its pre-operation stage and has not declared its income. Investigation by
the revenue officers of the respondent, however, disclosed that it has
been operating/doing business and had sales operations for the year
1995 in the total amount of P7,156,336.08 which it failed to report in
its 1995 ITR. Thus, for the year 1995, petitioner filed a fraudulent
annual income return with intent to evade tax. Likewise, petitioner
failed to file Value-Added Tax (VAT) Return and reported the amount
of P7,156,336.08 as its gross sales for the year 1995. Hence, for failure
to file a VAT return and for filing a fraudulent income tax return
for the year 1995, the corresponding taxes may be assessed at any
time within ten (10) years after the discovery of such omission or
fraud pursuant to Section 222(a) of the 1997 Tax Code.

The subject deficiency tax assessments have already become

final, executory and demandable for failure of the petitioner to file a
protest within the reglementary period provided for by law. The alleged
protest allegedly filed on June 25, 2004 at the Legal Division, Revenue
Region No. 8, Makati City is nowhere to be found in the BIR Records
nor reflected in the Record Book of the Legal Division as normally
done by our receiving clerk when she receive[s] any document. The
respondent, therefore, has legal basis to collect the tax liability either
by distraint and levy or civil action.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The aforecited Section 222(a)[8] of the 1997 Tax Code provides:

In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax

or of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in
court for the collection of such tax may be filed without assessment, at
 any time within ten (10) years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud,
or omission: Provided, That in a fraud assessment which has become
final and executory, the fact of fraud shall be judicially taken
cognizance of in the civil or criminal action for the collection
thereof. (Underscoring supplied)

The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in fact filed on March 10, 2005 a
criminal complaint before the Department of Justice against the officers and
accountant of petitioner for violation of the provisions of The National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977, as amended,[9] covering the taxable year 1995. The criminal
complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 2005-203.

On motion of petitioner in CTA Case No. 7160, a preliminary hearing on the

issue of prescription[10] was conducted during which petitioners former bookkeeper
attested that a former colleaguecertified public accountant Leonardo Sablan
(Sablan) illegally took custody of petitioners accounting records, invoices, and
official receipts and turned them over to the BIR.[11]

On petitioners request, a subpoena ad testificandum was issued to Sablan for

the hearing before the CTA scheduled on September 4, 2006 but he failed to
appear.[12]

Petitioner thus requested for the issuance of another subpoena ad

testificandum to Sablan for the hearing scheduled on October 23, 2006,[13] and of
subpoena duces tecum to the chief of the National Investigation Division of the BIR
for the production of the Affidavit of the Informer bearing on the assessment in
question.[14] Petitioners requests were granted.[15]

During the scheduled hearing of the case on October 23, 2006, on respondents
counsels manifestation that he was not furnished a copy of petitioners motion for the
issuance of subpoenaes, the CTA ordered petitioner to file a motion for the issuance
of subpoenas and to furnish respondents counsel a copy thereof.[16] Petitioner
complied with the CTA order.[17]
 In a related move, petitioner submitted written interrogatories addressed to
Sablan and to Henry Sarmiento and Marinella German, revenue officers of the
National Investigation Division of the BIR.[18]

By Resolution[19] of January 15, 2007, the CTA denied petitioners Motion

for Issuance of Subpoenas and disallowed the submission by petitioner of written
interrogatories to Sablan, who is not a party to the case, and the revenue officers,[20] it
finding that the testimony, documents, and admissions sought are not
relevant.[21] Besides, the CTA found that to require Sablan to testify would violate
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2338, as implemented by Section 12 of Finance
Department Order No. 46-66, proscribing the revelation of identities of informers of
violations of internal revenue laws, except when the information is proven to be
malicious or false.[22]

In any event, the CTA held that there was no need to issue a subpoena duces
tecum to obtain the Affidavit of the Informer as the same formed part of the BIR
records of the case, the production of which had been ordered by it.[23]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[24] of the CTA Resolution of January

15, 2007 was denied,[25] hence, the present Petition for Certiorari[26] which imputes
grave abuse of discretion to the CTA

I.
x x x in holding that the legality of the mode of acquiring the documents
which are the bases of the above discussed deficiency tax assessments,
the subject matter of the Petition for Review now pending in the
Honorable Second Division, is not material and relevant to the issue of
prescription.

II.
x x x in holding that Mr. Leonardo Sablans testimony, if allowed, would
violate RA 2338 which prohibits the BIR to reveal the identity of the
informer since 1) the purpose of the subpoena is to elicit from him the
whereabouts of the original accounting records, documents and receipts
owned by the Petitioner and not to discover if he is the informer since
the identity of the informer is not relevant to the issues raised; 2) RA
2338 cannot legally justify violation of the Petitioners property rights
by a person, whether he is an informer or not, since such RA cannot
allow such invasion of property rights otherwise RA 2338 would run
counter to the constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprive[d]
of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

III.
x x x in holding that the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum would
constitute a violation of the prohibition to reveal the identity of the
informer because compliance with such prohibition has been rendered
moot and academic by the voluntary admissions of the Respondent
himself.

IV.
x x x in holding that the constitutional right of an accused to examine
the witness against him does not exist in this case. The Petitioners
liability for tax deficiency assessment which is the main issue in the
Petition for Review is currently pending at the Honorable Second
Division. Therefore, it is a prejudicial question raised in the criminal
case filed by the herein Respondent against the officers of the Petitioner
with the Department of Justice.

V.
x x x in dismissing the request for subpoena ad testificandum because
the Opposition thereto submitted by the Respondent was not promptly
filed as provided by the Rules of Court thus, it is respectfully submitted
that, Respondent has waived his right to object thereto.

VI.
x x x when the Honorable Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the purpose
of the Petitioner in requesting for written interrogatories is to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the witness because such ruling has no factual
basis since Respondent never alleged nor proved that the witnesses to
whom the interrogatories are addressed will be annoyed, embarrassed
or oppressed; besides the only obvious purpose of the Petitioner is to
know the whereabouts of accounting records and documents which are
in the possession of the witnesses to whom the interrogatories are
directed and to ultimately get possession thereof. Granting without
admitting that there is annoyance, embarrassment or oppression; the
same is not unreasonable.
 VII.
x x x when it failed to rule that the BIR officers and employees are not
covered by the prohibition under RA 2338 and do not have the authority
to withhold from the taxpayer documents owned by such taxpayer.

VIII.
x x x when it required the clear and unequivocal proof of relevance of
the documents as a condition precedent for the issuance of subpoena
duces tecum.

IX.
x x x when it quashed the subpoena duces tecum as the Honorable Court
had issued an outstanding order to the Respondent to certify and
forward to the CTA all the records of the case because up to the date of
this Petition the BIR records have not been submitted yet to the CTA.[27]

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal of duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[28]

The Court finds that the issuance by the CTA of the questioned resolutions was
not tainted by arbitrariness.

The fact that Sablan was not a party to the case aside, the testimonies,
documents, and admissions sought by petitioner are not indeed relevant to the issue
before the CTA. For in requesting the issuance of the subpoenas and the submission
of written interrogatories, petitioner sought to establish that its accounting records
and related documents, invoices, and receipts which were the bases of the assessment
against it were illegally obtained. The only issues, however, which surfaced during
the preliminary hearing before the CTA, were whether respondents issuance of
assessment against petitioner had prescribed and whether petitioners tax return was
false or fraudulent.
 Besides, as the CTA held, the subpoenas and answers to the written
interrogatories would violate Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2338 as implemented by
Section 12 of Finance Department Order No. 46-66.
Petitioner claims, however, that it only intended to elicit information on the
whereabouts of the documents it needs in order to refute the assessment, and not to
disclose the identity of the informer.[29] Petitioners position does not persuade. The
interrogatories addressed to Sablan and the revenue officers show that they were
intended to confirm petitioners belief that Sablan was the informer. Thus the
questions for Sablan read:

1. Under what circumstances do you know petitioner

corporation? Please state in what capacity, the date or period you
obtained said knowledge.
2. Do you know a Ms. Elnora Carpio, who from 1995 to the early
part of 1996 was the book keeper of petitioner? Please state how
you came to know of Ms. Carpio.
3. At the time that Ms. Carpio was book keeper of petitioner did
she consult you or show any accounting documents and records
of petitioner?
4. What documents, if any, did you obtain from petitioner?
5. Were these documents that you obtained from petitioner
submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)? Please
describe said documents and under what circumstances the same
were submitted.
6. Was the consent of the petitioner, its officers or employees
obtained when the documents that you obtained were submitted
to the BIR? Please state when and from whom the consent was
obtained.
7. Did you execute an affidavit as an informer in the assessment
which was issued by the BIR against petitioner for the tax year
1995 and other years?[30] (Underscoring supplied)

while the questions for the revenue officers read:

1. Where did you obtain the documents, particularly the invoices and
official receipts, which [were] used by your office as evidence
and as basis of the assessment for deficiency income tax and
value added tax for the tax year 1995 issued against petitioner?
 2. Do you know Mr. Leonardo Sablan? Please state under what
circumstance you came to know Mr. Sablan?[31] (Underscoring
supplied)

Petitioner impugns the manner in which the documents in question reached the
BIR, Sablan having allegedly submitted them to the BIR without its (petitioners)
consent. Petitioners lack of consent does not, however, imply that the BIR obtained
them illegally or that the information received is false or malicious. Nor does the lack
of consent preclude the BIR from assessing deficiency taxes on petitioner based on
the documents. Thus Section 5 of the Tax Code provides:

In ascertaining the correctness of any return, or in making a

return when none has been made, or in determining the liability of any
person for any internal revenue tax, or in collecting any such liability,
or in evaluating tax compliance, the Commissioner is authorized:

(A) To examine any book, paper, record or other data which

may be relevant or material to such query;
(B) To obtain on a regular basis from any person other
than the person whose internal revenue tax liability is
subject to audit or investigation, or from any office or
officer of the national and local governments, government
agencies and instrumentalities, including the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas and government-owned and
controlled corporations, any information such as, but not
limited to, costs and volume of production, receipts or
sales and gross incomes of taxpayers, and the names,
addresses, and financial statements of corporations,
mutual fund companies, insurance companies, regional
operating headquarters of multinational companies, joint
accounts, associations, joint ventures or consortia and
registered partnerships and their members;
(C) To summon the person liable for tax or required to file a
return, or any officer or employee of such person, or any
person having possession, custody, or care of the books
of accounts and other accounting records containing
entries relating to the business of the person liable for
tax, or any other person, to appear before the
 Commissioner or his duly authorized representatives at a
time and place specified in the summons and to produce
such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give
testimony;
(D) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under
oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(E) To cause revenue officers and employees to make a
canvass from time to time of any revenue district or region
and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who
may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax, and all
persons owning or having the care, management or
possession of any object with respect to which a tax is
imposed.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The law thus allows the BIR access to all relevant or material records and data
in the person of the taxpayer,[32] and the BIR can accept documents which cannot be
admitted in a judicial proceeding where the Rules of Court are strictly
observed.[33] To require the consent of the taxpayer would defeat the intent of the law
to help the BIR assess and collect the correct amount of taxes.

Petitioners invocation of the rights of an accused in a criminal prosecution to

cross examine the witness against him and to have compulsory process issued to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of other evidence in his behalf
does not lie. CTA Case No. 7160 is not a criminal prosecution, and even granting
that it is related to I.S. No. 2005-203, the respondents in the latter proceeding are the
officers and accountant of petitioner-corporation, not petitioner. From the complaint
and supporting affidavits in I.S. No. 2005-203, Sablan does not even appear to be a
witness against the respondents therein.[34]

AT ALL EVENTS, issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the production of

the documents requested by the petitioner which documents petitioner claims to be
crucial to its defense[35] is unnecessary in view of the CTA order for respondent to
certify and forward to it all the records of the case.[36] If the order has not been
complied with, the CTA can enforce it by citing respondent for indirect contempt.[37]
 WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the petition is
DISMISSED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.