SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126351. February 18, 2000.]

PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee, vs . RAUL ACOSTA y

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
LAYGO , accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Law Firm of Lapena & Associates for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Appellant Raul Acosta used to be a good friend of Almanzor Montesclaros, the grandson
of private complainant Filomena M. Marigomen. Montesclaros lived in the house of
Marigomen. On February 27, 1996, Montesclaros, in the belief that the appellant and his
wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the house of the appellant
and burned their clothes, furniture and appliances. At about 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of the same date, appellant was seen carrying a stove and a kitchen knife going
to the unoccupied house of Marigomen. He told Mona Aquino that he will burn the house
of Marigomen. When he was inside the house, he poured a kerosene on the bed and lighted
it with a cigarette lighter but the fire was easily put off by appellant's wife who arrived at
the place. On the following day, at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning, Lina Videa was
roused from her sleep by the barking of their dog at the back portion of their house. When
she went out of her house, she saw Marigomen's house burning. She peeped through the
holes of the GI sheets separating her lot from Marigomen's lot and she noticed the
presence of appellant standing alone in front of the burning house. The appellant was
charged with the crime of arson. He interposed the defense of denial. But the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 127, Kalookan City convicted him of the crime charged and imposed
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. ECaTDc

The Court ruled that all the foregoing circumstances were duly established by the evidence
on record. Inseparably with one another, they point to no other conclusion than appellant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While nobody actually saw appellant light the match which
set the house on fire, the facts and circumstances proved made a complete chain strongly
leading to the conclusion that it was the appellant who perpetrated the crime. Further,
appellant interposed the defense of alibi in his bid for acquittal. For the defense of alibi to
prosper, it is axiomatic that the appellant must prove not only that he was at some other
place at the time the crime was committed, but that it was likewise physically impossible
for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime. In this case, appellant
himself testified that the house of his mother where he was staying on that fateful night
was merely five (5) houses away from the locus criminis, hence, considering the distance,
it was not physically impossible for him to have perpetrated the crime and then gone home
to his mother's home, appearing as innocent as a lamb.
The decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED.

SYLLABUS

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 1. CRIMINAL LAW; DESTRUCTIVE ARSON; ELUCIDATED. Arson is defined as the
malicious destruction of property by fire. In this case, the alleged crime was committed on
February 28, 1996, after R.A. 7659 already took effect. The trial court found appellant
herein liable under Article 320, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 10
of R.A. No. 7659, which provides as follows: "Art. 320. Destructive Arson. The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn: 1. One (1)
or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or different occasions. . . ."
2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY
CONVICTION; REQUISITES. Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt." In order to justify a conviction upon
circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no
reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused. But no
greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is
direct.
3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES IN ARSON, EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF
MOTIVE AFFECTS CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is
frequently impossible for the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the
commission of the crime charged, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the
existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the
witnesses.
4. ID.; ID.; MOTIVE; ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. It was duly proved that at
around 4:30 in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, private complainant's grandson, Elmer
Montesclaros, stormed the house of appellant and his wife and burned their clothes,
household furniture and appliances, like TV and karaoke. When appellant arrived home at
around 5:00 in the afternoon and was informed of the incident, he got mad, and as his
common-law wife testified, appellant threw a tantrum ("nagdadabog"). Appellant had every
reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate in kind against Montesclaros
and his grandmother. Second, appellant's intent to commit the arson was established by
his previous attempt to set on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house (private
complainant's) which was burned later in the night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino
testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant carrying a
gas stove and knife. When she asked him what he was going to do with the stove, he
answered that he was going to burn the house of private complainant. Later, she heard the
sound of somebody throwing a chair and breaking bottles next door. When she peeped in
the kitchen, she saw that appellant entered the house of private complainant and started
pouring gas on a bed ("papag") and then lighted a fire with a disposable lighter. Appellant's
wife rushed in and extinguished the fire with a broomstick. The two later left the house at
around 6:00 in the evening.
5. ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBILITY; TO PROVE COMMISSION OF SPECIFIC CRIME, TESTIMONY
MAY BE RECEIVED OF OTHER SIMILAR ACTS, COMMITTED ABOUT THE SAME TIME, FOR
PURPOSES OF ESTABLISHING CRIMINAL INTENT OF ACCUSED. While it is true that
"evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time," it may be received "to
prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or
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 usage, and the like." In People v. Dadles, 278 SCRA 393 (1997), we have held that: "In the
early case of United States v. Evangelista, [24 Phil. 453 (1913)] the accused was convicted
of arson after the trial court admitted evidence that he had earlier attempted to set fire to
the same premises. Ruling on the admissibility of the said evidence, we said that: ". . . While
it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not by any means amount to direct
evidence against the accused, it was competent to prove the intent of the accused in
setting the fire which was charged in the information. ". . . 'Where a person is charged with
the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of other similar acts,
committed about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of
the accused."
6. ID.; ID.; APPELLANT'S PRESENCE AT LOCUS CRIMINIS DURING THE HEIGHT OF
FIRE WAS DULY ESTABLISHED. Appellant was not only present at the locus criminis
before the incident, he was seen inside the yard of the burning house during the height of
the fire. At around 1:00 in the morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness Lina
Videa was awakened by the barking of their dog, so she went to the back of their house
to investigate. Through the holes of the GI sheets, she saw appellant standing alone inside
private complainant's yard watching the house burning. Appellant even looked happy with
a canine smile and crazy-looking expression.
7. ID.; ID.; APPELLANT'S IMPLIED ADMISSION SUBSEQUENT TO THE INCIDENT
POINTED TO HIS CULPABILITY. Appellant's actions subsequent to the incident further
point to his culpability. At around 12:00 noon of the same day, private complainant went
with prosecution witness Lina Videa to the place of Kagawad Tecson. They were about to
leave when appellant arrived. Private complainant asked him why he burned her house and
appellant answered, "So what if I burned your house?" Then appellant stared meanly at
private complainant, who got nervous and had to take medications. The following day,
appellant threatened prosecution witness Mona Aquino, saying that if she would testify
against him, he would also burn her house.
8. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; CIRCUMSTANCES INSEPARABLY LINKED
WITH ONE ANOTHER POINT TO NO OTHER CONCLUSION THAN APPELLANT'S GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Inseparably linked with one another, they point to no
other conclusion than appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While nobody actually
saw appellant light the match which set the house on fire, the facts and circumstances
proved make a complete chain strongly leading to the conclusion that it was the appellant
who perpetrated the crime.
9. CRIMINAL LAW; ARSON; PROOF REQUIRED TO WARRANT CONVICTION. In
prosecutions for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence
establishes (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the
identity of the defendants as the ones responsible for the crime. Corpus delicti means the
substance of the crime, it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed. In arson,
the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and
of its having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single
witness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.

10. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; ALIBI; APPELLANT

MUST PROVE THAT IT WAS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE AT LOCUS
CRIMINIS AT TIME OF ALLEGED CRIME. Appellant interposes the defense of alibi in his
bid for acquittal. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is axiomatic that the appellant must
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 prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed, but
that it was likewise physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of
the alleged crime.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. In this case, appellant
himself testified that the house of his mother where he was staying on that fateful night
was merely five (5) houses away from the locus criminis, hence considering the distance, it
was not physically impossible for him to have perpetrated the crime and then gone home
to his mother's home, appearing as innocent as a lamb. DACIHc

12. CRIMINAL LAW; ARSON; NOT MEASURED BY VALUE OF PROPERTY THAT MAY BE
DESTROYED BUT RATHER BY HUMAN LIVES EXPOSED TO DESTRUCTION. Lastly, it
would not be amiss here to point out that "[i]n the crime of arson, the enormity of the
offense is not measured by the value of the property that may be destroyed but rather by
the human lives exposed to destruction." It is indeed a heinous crime that the law wisely
seeks to suppress with the most serious penalty because of its grave anti-social
character.

DECISION

QUISUMBING , J : p

This is an appeal from the decision 1 dated August 25, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City, Branch 127, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Arson, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify private
complainant the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. llcd

Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident of Barrio
Makatipo, Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good friend
of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private complainant, Filomena M.
Marigomen. 2 On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montesclaros, in the belief
that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the
house of appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances. 3 Montesclaros lived
in the house owned by said complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights
Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly set on fire by
appellant.
The pertinent facts in this case, as summarized by the Solicitor General, which we find
supported by the records, are as follows:
"At about 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, the nephew
of prosecution witness Mona Aquino called the latter, simultaneously shouting
that appellant Raul Acosta, their neighbor, was carrying a stove and a kitchen
knife (TSN, May 22, 1996, pp. 3-4, 7). She went out of her house and approached
appellant who, when asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife, replied that
he would burn the house of complainant Filomena M. Marigomen. (Ibid., pp. 3-4)

Complainant's house is situated at Banahaw Street, Mountain Heights

Subdivision, Kalookan City and adjacent to the house of prosecution witness
Aquino. (Ibid., pp. 2, 18). Only a wall fence divides her property from that of the
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 complainant. (Ibid., p. 18).

Owing to the fearsome answer of appellant to witness Aquino's query, she

returned immediately to her house (Ibid., p. 7). A few minutes after closing the
door, she heard the sound of broken bottles and the throwing of chair inside the
house of complainant (Ibid., p. 8). When she peeped through her kitchen door, she
saw appellant inside complainant's house, which was unoccupied at that time.
(Ibid., p. 8). Thereafter, appellant poured kerosene on the bed (papag) and lighted
it with cigarette lighter (Ibid., p. 10). The fire was easily put off by appellant's wife
who arrived at the place. (Ibid., p. 10)

At around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness
Lina Videa, likewise a resident of Mountain Heights Subdivision, was roused
from her sleep by the barking of their dogs at the back portion of her house. (TSN,
May 20, 1996, pp. 3-4). When she went out of her house, she saw complainant's
house situated at the adjacent lot near the back portion of her garage burning.
(Ibid., p. 4). When she peeped through the holes of the GI sheets separating her lot
from the adjacent lot, she noticed the presence of appellant standing alone in
front of the burning house. (Ibid., p. 5) Appellant was just watching the blaze and
not doing anything to contain it. (Ibid.)

Witness Videa immediately rushed back to her house and informed her husband
about the fire at the nearby lot. (Ibid., p. 5). They called up the police detachment
and alerted other members of her family to be ready for any contingency. (Ibid., p.
6). The fire truck arrived at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning, when the house
was already razed to the ground. (TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 6; TSN, May 22, 1996, p.
11).

An on-the-spot investigation was conducted by Fire Investigator Raymundo

Savare of the Kalookan Fire Department (TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 2). After the
conduct of the investigation, the investigator did not find any incendiary device;
hence, the cause of fire remained undetermined. (TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 5). In his
Report, the investigator did not rule out the possibility of intentional burning, since
there is no other source of ignition, unless otherwise somebody lighted an
illuminating object and left it unattended. (TSN, May 17, 1996, p. 8). cdll

xxx xxx xxx" 4

On March 11, 1996, appellant was charged with the crime of Arson under the following
Information:
"That on or about the 28th day of February, 1996 in Kal. City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
any justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously
burn the house of one, FILOMENA MONTESCLAROS VDA. DE MARIGOMEN,
located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision., Bo. Makatipo, this city,
said accused knowing the same to be prohibited, by then and there setting fire to
the said house thereby causing the same to be totally burned, to the damage and
prejudice of herein complainant in the estimated amount of P100,000.00.

Contrary to Law." 5

On April 22, 1996, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de officio Atty. Juanito Crisostomo,
was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses (1) Mrs. Lina Videa, (2)
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 Mrs. Mona Aquino, both neighbors of appellant; and (3) Fire Investigator Raymundo
Savare. When the defense agreed to the proposed stipulation that the value of the burned
property was P100,000.00, the State Prosecutor dispensed with the testimony of private
complainant, 6 the owner of the house.
The defense presented the appellant himself, Ernesto Rilloraza and Marieta Acosta as
witnesses. Appellant claimed that at the time of the alleged arson he was sleeping at his
mother's home, some five houses away from the burned house. 7 Ernesto Rilloraza
testified he lived in the house behind the home of appellant's mother; that at around 9:00 in
the evening, he saw appellant and his family transferring their belongings to the house of
appellant's mother; that at around 11:00 in the evening, he saw appellant watching TV; and
that at around 1:00 AM, he was awakened by the sound of fire sirens; and that he and
appellant stood by the roadside and watched the fire. 8 Marieta Acosta, common-law wife
of appellant, corroborated appellant's testimony that they were sleeping in the home of
appellant's mother at the time of the incident. 9
On August 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, 10 disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused with
moral certainty, this Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the offended party the
amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The period of the Accused's preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the

service of his sentence if qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED."

Appellant seasonably interposed the present appeal assigning the following errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BASED MERELY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE OF

DENIAL AND ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED.

Appellant centers his appeal on the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence against
him. He maintains that the fact that Montesclaros lived in the house which was razed to
the ground was not duly proved by the Prosecutor, and that even the Fire Investigator
could not determine the true cause of the fire. Appellant further assails the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses Mona Aquino and Lina Videa since their respective
testimonies as to his presence in the locus criminis before and after the incident remain
uncorroborated, and therefore, wholly unreliable and insufficient to sustain his conviction.
For the State, the Solicitor General rebutted the factual submissions of appellant. First,
appellant himself testified that he knew that Elmer Montesclaros lived in the house of
private complainant. 11 Second, the testimony of prosecution witness Mona Aquino
though uncorroborated does not impair her credibility since no ill-motive was ascribed to
her to testify falsely against appellant. Third, any inconsistency in Lina Videa's testimony
that she did not see appellant at the locus criminis could be explained by a reading of her
entire testimony. She saw appellant inside the yard of the burning house during the fire, not
after the fire. Further, the Solicitor General stressed that the determination of credibility of
witnesses remains within the province of the trial court, whose finding is accorded due
respect on appeal, absent any substantial circumstance which could have been overlooked
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 in the decision. cdll

Arson is defined as the malicious destruction of property by fire. 1 2 In this case, the alleged
crime was committed on February 28, 1996, after R.A. 7659 already took effect. The trial
court found appellant herein liable under Article 320, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 10 of R.A. No. 7659, which provides as follows:
"ARTICLE 320. Destructive Arson. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of

burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, or committed on several or
different occasions.

xxx xxx xxx"

Appellant's conviction rests on circumstantial evidence. Pertinently, Section 4 of Rule 133

of the Rules of Court provides:
"SECTION 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a

conviction beyond reasonable doubt."

In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of

circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal
responsibility of the accused. 1 3 But no greater degree of certainty is required when the
evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. 1 4
In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances taken
together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical conclusion,
that accused started the fire which gutted the house of private complainant. Although
there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the trial court in
holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and on
record:
First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is
frequently impossible for the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the
commission of the crime charged, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the
existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the
witnesses. 1 5 It was duly proved that at around 4:30 in the afternoon of February 27, 1996,
private complainant's grandson, Elmer Montesclaros, stormed the house of appellant and
his wife and burned their clothes, household furniture and appliances, like TV and karaoke.
1 6 When appellant arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon and was informed of the
incident, he got mad, and as his common-law wife testified, appellant threw a tantrum
("nagdadabog"). 1 7 Appellant had every reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to
retaliate in kind against Montesclaros and his grandmother.
Second, appellant's intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to
set on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house (private complainant's) which was
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 burned later in the night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in
the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife. When she
asked him what he was going to do with the stove, he answered that he was going to burn
the house of private complainant. 1 8 Later, she heard the sound of somebody throwing a
chair and breaking bottles next door. When she peeped in the kitchen, she saw that
appellant entered the house of private complainant and started pouring gas on a bed
("papag") and then lighted a fire with a disposable lighter. Appellant's wife rushed in and
extinguished the fire with a broomstick. The two later left the house at around 6:00 in the
evening. 1 9
While it is true that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time," it
may be received "to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like." In People v. Dadles, 278 SCRA 393 (1997), we held
that: LLpr

"In the early case of United States v. Evangelista, [24 Phil. 453 (1913)] the
accused was convicted of arson after the trial court admitted evidence that he
had earlier attempted to set fire to the same premises. Ruling on the admissibility
of the said evidence, we said that:

". . . While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not by any
means amount to direct evidence against the accused, it was competent to prove
the intent of the accused in setting the fire which was charged in the information.

"xxx xxx xxx

". . . 'Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific crime,

testimony may be received of other similar acts, committed about the same time,
for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the accused.'"

Shortly thereafter, at around 9:00 in the evening, defense witness Ernesto Rilloraza who
lived behind the house of appellant's mother, saw appellant and his family transferring their
belongings to said house of appellant's mother. 2 0
Third, appellant was not only present at the locus criminis before the incident, he was seen
inside the yard of the burning house during the height of the fire. At around 1:00 in the
morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness Lina Videa was awakened by the
barking of their dog, so she went to the back of their house to investigate. 2 1 Through the
holes of the GI sheets, she saw appellant standing alone inside private complainant's yard
watching the house burning. 2 2 Appellant even looked happy with a canine smile and crazy-
looking expression. ("Siya para bang ang mukha niya ay natutuwa na hindi naman
humahalakhak, . . . para bang ngiting aso at mukhang nakakaluko, your honor"). 2 3
Fourth, appellant's actions subsequent to the incident further point to his culpability. At
around 12:00 noon of the same day, private complainant went with prosecution witness
Lina Videa to the place of Kagawad Tecson. They were about to leave when appellant
arrived. Private complainant asked him why he burned her house and appellant answered,
"So what if I burned your house?" Then appellant stared meanly at private complainant, who
got nervous and had to take medications. 24 The following day, appellant threatened
prosecution witness Mona Aquino, saying that if she would testify against him, he would
also burn her house. 25
All the foregoing circumstances were duly established by the evidence on record.
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 Inseparably linked with one another, they point to no other conclusion than appellant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. While nobody actually saw appellant light the match which set
the house on fire, the facts and circumstances proved make a complete chain strongly
leading to the conclusion that it was the appellant who perpetrated the crime. 26
In prosecutions for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence
establishes (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the
identity of the defendants as the one responsible for the crime. 2 7 Corpus delicti means the
substance of the crime, it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed. In arson,
the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and
of its having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single
witness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.
28

Appellant interposes the defense of alibi in his bid for acquittal. For the defense of alibi to
prosper, it is axiomatic that the appellant must prove not only that he was at some other
place at the time the crime was committed, but that it was likewise physically impossible
for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime. 29 In this case, appellant
himself testified that the house of his mother where he was staying on that fateful night
was merely five (5) houses away from the locus criminis, hence considering the distance, it
was not physically impossible for him to have perpetrated the crime and then gone home
to his mother's home, appearing as innocent as a lamb.
Lastly, it would not be amiss here to point out that "[i]n the crime of arson, the enormity of
the offense is not measured by the value of the property that may be destroyed but rather
by the human lives exposed to destruction." 3 0 It is indeed a heinous crime that the law
wisely seeks to suppress with the most serious penalty because of its grave anti-social
character.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify private complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen, in the amount of
P100,000.00 as actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment, is AFFIRMED. Costs
against appellant. LLpr

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., is on official leave.
Footnotes

1. Penned by Judge Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.

2. TSN, May 28, 1996, p. 4.

3. TSN, May 28, 1996, p. 6; TSN, June 4, 1996, p. 4.

4. Rollo, pp. 68-72.

5. Records, p. 1.

6. Order dated May 20, 1996, Records, p. 13; TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 22.

7. TSN, May 28, 1996, p. 4.

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 8. TSN, June 3, 1996, p. 8.

9. TSN, June 4, 1996, p. 8.

10. Records, pp. 53-60.

11. TSN, May 28, 1996, p. 6.

12. Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, 1993 ed., p. 736. See also P.D. No. 1613, which
was amended by Section 10 of R.A. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law.

13. U.S. v. Rosal, 12 Phil. 135, 140 (1909).

14. People v. Ferras, 289 SCRA 94, 103-104 (1998).
15. People v. Pulmones, 61 Phil. 680, 684 (1935).
16. TSN, June 4, 1996, pp. 3, 6-7.

17. TSN, June 4, 1996, p. 6.

18. TSN, May 22, 1996, p. 4.

19. TSN, May 22, 1996, pp. 8-11.

20. TSN, June 3, 1996, p. 4; TSN, June 4, 1996, p. 7.

21. TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 3.

22. TSN, May 20, 1996, pp. 4-5, 10.

23. TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 16.

24. TSN, May 22, 1996, p. 14.

25. TSN, May 22, 1996, p. 26.

26. People v. Lomuntad, 65 Phil. 605, 607 (1938).
27. People v. Hidalgo and Gotengco, 102 Phil. 719, 731 (1957), citing Curtis, the Law of
Arson, p. 526, Section 486.

28. People v. Gutierrez, 258 SCRA 70, 75-76 (1996), citing other authorities.
29. People v. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213, 227-228 (1998).
30. U.S. v. Zabala, 6 Phil. 431 (1906).

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