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Working Paper Series No.

67

Does Power Sharing Approach


Work for Peacebuilding?
Lessons Learnt from Bosnia for
Afrasia
Misa SHOJIYA

Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies


Ryukoku University
Mission of the Afrasian Centre for
Peace and Development Studies
Poverty and other issues associated with development are commonly found in many Asian and
African countries. These problems are interwoven with ethnic, religious and political issues, and
often lead to incessant conflicts with violence. In order to find an appropriate framework for
conflict resolution, we need to develop a perspective which will fully take into account the
wisdom of relevant disciplines such as economics, politics and international relations, as well as
that fostered in area studies. Building on the following expertise and networks that have been
accumulated in Ryukoku University in the past (listed below), the Centre organises research
projects to tackle new and emerging issues in the age of globalisation. We aim to disseminate
the results of our research internationally, through academic publications and engagement in
public discourse.

1. Tradition of Religious and Cultural Studies


2. Expertise of Participatory Research / Inter-civic Relation Studies
3. Expertise in Southwest Asian and African Studies
4. New Approaches to the Understanding of Other Cultures in Japan
5. Domestic and International Networks with Major Research Institutes
Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies

Does Power-Sharing Approach Work for


Peacebuilding?
Lessons Learnt from Bosnia for Afrasia

Misa SHOJIYA

Working Paper Series No.67

2009
2009
Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies
1-5 Yokotani, Seta Oe-cho, Otsu,
Shiga, JAPAN

All rights reserved

ISBN 978 4-903625-43-0

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies.

The publication of the Working Paper Series is supported by the Academic Frontier Centre (AFC)
research project In Search of Societal Mechanisms and Institutions for Conflict Resolution:
Perspectives of Asian and African Studies and Beyond (2005-2009), funded by the Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and Ryukoku University.
Does Power Sharing Approach Work for Peacebuilding?
Lessons Learnt from Bosnia for Afrasia

Misa Shojiya*

INTRODUCTION

What are the problems facing the world in the twenty-first century? Likely candidates
include the global financial crisis, serious environmental degradation, global warming,
terrorism which has inexorably expanded in the wake of the simultaneous attack on the
United States in 2001 and those regional conflicts which form the background of terrorism.
None of these problems are capable of solution only using the power of any single country or
region, and consequently the modern world must unite to face these problems. It is not an
exaggeration to say that, of global problems, regional conflicts represent one of the most
serious problems for the international community in our century. A vicious repetition of
violence underpins the background of regional conflicts, the so-called cycle of violence and
stemming this vicious cycle is a matter of urgency for international politics.1 It has been
noted that a fragmented society is an element of the background common to a cycle of
violence and the international community has experienced considerable difficulty in solving
conflicts rooted in a fragmented society.2

Consociationalism is a theory which has maintained a central role for 40 years in the
debate regarding initiatives for conflict resolution of fragmented societies by the international
community. In the 1980s, this theory had been considered to have lost intellectual vigor and
practical application.3 However power sharing models based on the theory have become the
UN template, that is to say, the current system model for the reconstruction of political
systems for postconflict peacebuilding or peace talks for conflicts. 4 Actually the
characteristic features of a power sharing model are seen in many peace talks brokered by
the United Nations after the cold war.5 For example, Yusuf Bangura has pointed out that
power sharing agreements have been concluded in peace activities in Afrasian countries
*
Misa Shojiya is Research Assistant at Afrasian Research Centre for Peace and Development Studies; Doctoral
Candidate of the Graduate School of Law, Kobe University.
1
Masatsugu Naya, Yobogaikoron no Tenkai to Shatei (Deployment and Range of the Theory of Preventive
Diplomacy) in Kokusai Mondai (International Affairs), No. 477 (December 1999), p. 13. In the context of
preventative diplomacy, severing a cycle of violence is given as a concrete example of international
management.
2
Albrecht Schnabel, Shimane University UN University Seminars (August 2002). With respect to the
connection between violence and a fragmented society, Schnabel mentions the risk of a fragmented society
within the context of peace building to prevent conflict.
3
Shinichiro Murakami, Takyokukyozongata Democracy (Consociational Democracy) in Kazuichi Nishikawa,
ed., Hikakuseiji no Bunsekiwakugumi (Analytical Framework of Comparative Politics) (Minerva Shobo, 1986),
p. 219.
4
Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Polity Press,
1999), p. 204.
5
ibid.

1
including Cambodia, Mozambique, Liberia and Angola.6 It is considered to be significant in
this approach has been observed in other Afrasian countries such as Sri Lanka, as noted by
Pippa Norris in relation to the latent role of a power sharing approach towards peace activities
in Nepal for example.7

The 15-year period after the ceasefire agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) is
an example of a classical consociationalist solution which places principal emphasis on ethnic
coexistence in which a peacebuilding approach is promoted centering on power sharing
institutions hand in glove with the participation of the international community.8 For that
reason, this paper will examine the validity of a power sharing approach introducing Bosnia
as a case. The lessons learnt from the Bosnia experience with respect to power sharing
indicate recommendations for peacebuilding of fragmented societies or conflicts in Afrasia.

1. POWER SHARING THEORY

An understanding of the group of theories regarding a power sharing approach primarily


requires an understanding of the consociational democracy created by Arend Lijphart in the
field of comparative politics in the 1960s.9

In 1967, Lijphart proposed a model termed consociational democracy in response to the


categorization of politically stable democracies into Anglo-American and unstable
continental European suggested by Gabriel A. Almond.10 This was due to the need for a
new model to categorize democracy due to the observation that, notwithstanding the fact that
the Benelux countries, Austria and Switzerland were segmentalized societies, these
countries were politically stable democracies. Furthermore for Lijphart, this model was a
normative model for the promotion of stable democratic systems, that is to say, it was also
a model for conflict resolution in fragmented societies.11

6
Yusuf Bangura, Strategic Policy Failure and State Fragmentation in Ricardo Rene Laremont, ed., The
Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa (Heinemann, 2002), p. 164.
7
Pippa Norris, Driving Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 23.
8
Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton (Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2002), p. 216.
9
Arend Lijphart, Typologies of Democratic Systems, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 1 (1967), pp. 3-44.
Respective researchers use different definitions for consociationalism and power sharing. Although Lijphart uses
consociationalism and power sharing in the same sense, Horowitz draws a distinction. Arend Lijphart,
Prospects for Power-Sharing in the New South Africa, in Andrew Reynolds, ed., Election 94 South Africa
(James Currey, 1994), p. 222. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes,
prepared for delivery at the Kellogg Institute Conference, Constitutional Design 2000: Institutional Design,
Conflict Management, and Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Notre Dame (December
9-11, 1999a), p. 12.
10
Gabriel A. Almond, Comparative Political Systems, Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (August 1956), pp.
391-409.
11
Arend Lijphart, Tagenshakai no Democracy (Democracy in Plural Society) (San-ichi Shobo, 1979), p. 13.
According to Ulrich Schneckener, Consociationalism signifies the existence of both segmental cleavages and
conciliation among elites and not only expresses a way of government, but also is a more comprehensive
manner of expressing a special type of society. Ulrich Schneckener, Making Power-Sharing Work: Lessons

2
According to Lijphart, a consociational democracy has the four characteristics below.

Grand Coalition

A grand coalition indicates a characteristic of a political system in which a coalition of all


political leaders in a segment is formed and those leaders cooperate for the administration of
the country. The important point in the formation of the coalition is the alliance of all the
important leaders in a segment.12 Actual configurations include (1) a coalition within a
federal executive council, (2) a ministry within a parliamentary grand coalition and (3) a great
council.

Mutual Veto

Respective veto rights are available in each segment in a system of a consociational


democracy. What should be emphasized is that Lijphart considers the veto right a means of
protecting minority factions obtained by exercise when the decision has a considerable
effect on an important interest of minorities in the segment.13 Nations can be divided into
those nations which officially systematize veto rights (for example, a clear system such as a
constitution) and those nations which adopt a system which substantially recognizes a veto
right albeit not officially.

Segmental Autonomy

Segmental autonomy indicates a characteristic in which self-determination of minority


factions is recognized in relation to problems other than those which are common to all
segments, that is to say, areas of sole interest to minority factions. However this
characteristic has not been seen in consociational democracies and the smaller countries in
Europe categorized by Lijphart. In other words, this is the only characteristic which is not
extracted on the basis of experience from actual politically stable plural societies. Lijphart
argues with respect to this point that, apart from common problems, discretions and executive
powers could be delegated to respective segments.14

Proportionality

According to Lijphart, a political system for a consociational democracy is a proportional


principle which allocates by proportional assignment to each segment with respect to the
three functions of (1) appointment of government employees, (2) apportionment of
government subsidies and (3) formation of policymaking institutions. He argues that a

from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2002), p.
20.
12
Lijphart (1979), op.cit., p. 43. (emphasis added)
13
ibid., p. 55.
14
ibid., pp. 57-58.

3
proportional representation includes a function which allows distancing from
decision-making processes which may lead to fragmentation and that the most important
point with respect to proportionality is the guarantee of participation of all groups in policy
formation.15

The concept of consociational democracy attracted attention in the field of international


politics from the 1970s, 1980s and particularly around 1975, and received a large amount of
criticism.16 The theory received particularly harsh criticism from Donald L. Horowitz during
the 1980s as a model for conflict resolution. Beginning in Ethnic Groups in Conflct published
in 1985, he voiced opposition to the consociational theory of Lijphart in a series of
publications.17 Horowitz performs an analysis of examples of national conflicts including
many developing countries and uses such a conflict example analysis to state that one
important element in such conflicts is the elites which promote hatred for the supporters of
other nationalities for their own purposes by exploiting the emotions of their supporters.18
For that reason, the greatest doubt for Horowitz surrounding consociational theory is the
point that Consociationalism is premised on national cooperation between elites or leaders.

Horowitz uses these criticisms to develop a unique approach which advances an


incentive approach to suppressing a winner-takes-all situation and which seeks to decrease
national conflict by institution of a government which successfully attempts to build bridges
between national segments.19 The basis of this approach is premised on the difficulties
associated with reaching compromise between groups when groups are opposed in a conflict.
Using this premise, this approach realizes compromise between recalcitrant groups by use of
compromise remuneration to elites and by maximizing the incentives stimulating
cooperation between elites.20 The basis of Horowitzs approach is an election system. His
approach attempts to use elections to give compromise remuneration to elites to thereby
create a condition of compromise by antagonistic groups prior to elections. More specifically,
this approach is developed by (1) pluralization of elections and (2) alternative vote

15
ibid., pp. 57-58.
16
For example, Brian Barry, The Consociational Model and its Dangers, European Journal of Political
Research, Vol. 3 (1975), pp. 393-412. At the same time in Japan, the same comment was made by several
researchers into politics. For example, see, Kazuo Ishikawa, A. Lijphart in Rei Shiratori, ed., Gendaiseiji no
Riron (Theories of Modern Politics) (Waseda University Press, 1985). Shin-ichiro Murakami,
Takyokukyozongata Democracy (Consociational Democracy), in Nishikawa, op.cit., etc. The main criticism
of consociational democracy is doubts surrounding the application of the theory to actual policy and criticism of
the overly fine distinctions in case studies and appropriately of the method of categorizing consociational
democracy by Lijphart in the theory. For example, see Ishikawa, op.cit., p. 251 and 270, Murakawa, op.cit., p.
219.
17
Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of California Press, 1985), pp. 568-576. Donald
Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa (University of California Press, 1991), pp. 137-145. Donald Horowitz,
Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict: A Few Steps toward Synthesis in Boris Pleskovic and Joseph
Stiglitz, eds., Annual World Bank Conference on Development of Economics (World Bank, 1999b), pp. 7-12.
18
ibid.
19
Horowitz (1999b), op.cit., p. 13.
20
ibid.

4
(AV).21 When an AV system is introduced to an election, since victory in the election is
affected by votes other than political supporters of ones own nationality, nationalist parties
must exchange votes in advance with other parties. For this reason, moderate strategies with
respect to problems which face opposed ethic parties must be adopted by a party based on a
specific nationality to retain their votes, and in this manner, compromise is promoted between
nationalities.

In addition, Horowitz states that the above approach also creates another effect of
multipolar fluidity, that is to say, it can be expected to play a role in the facilitation of
solutions to national problems by mitigation of claims to superiority by majority factions on
the basis of being the majority as a result of the existence of many groups.22 Furthermore he
asserts an effect of preventing delineation of identities in each group and suppression serious
antipathy between groups.23 He gives Malaysia or Lebanon as examples of success of the
approach and proposes the example of Fiji in 1997 as an example of recent success by
analyzing the promotion of coalitions by vote pooling arrangements prior to elections.24

As shown by the fact that Horowitzs argument is developed by criticizing


consociationalism, consociational democracy represents one key in the debate regarding the
democratization of fragmented societies or conflict resolution, and this theory can be said to
develop power sharing.25 Although Lijphart himself sometimes uses the same definition in
his writings without making a distinction between the theories, most researchers draw a clear
distinction between power sharing and consociational democracy. In time sequence, examples
can be given of post-cold war power sharing models in Cyprus in the 1960s, Belgium, South
Tyrol and Northern Ireland in the 1970s, and South Africa and Bosnia in the 1990s.26 Bosnia
will be used of these examples as the subject of research in this paper and has continued
experimenting with a power sharing model since 1995.

21
Donald Horowitz, Some Realism about Peacemaking, prepared for Center for Development Research:
Facing Ethnic Conflict (December 14-16, 2000), pp. 7-8.
22
Horowitz (1999b), op.cit., p. 15.
23
ibid., pp. 13-16.
24
ibid., pp. 13-17.
25
Schneckener, op.cit. Schneckener places consociationalism in a theory forming a concept of power sharing.
26
Schneckener, op.cit. After distinguishing consociationalism and power sharing, analysis is performed of
examples of power sharing in Belgium, South Tyrol, Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Bosnia Herzegovina.
Lijphart argues that South Africa is an example of consociationalism and Youichi Mine also argues that South
Africa is an example of consociationalism. Yoichi Mine and Sachiko Hatanaka, Zouo kara Wakai he Chiiki
Funso wo Kangaeru (From Antagonism to Reconciliation Thinking about Regional Conflicts) (Kyoto
University Press, 2000).

5
2. POWER SHARING INSTITUTIONS

2-1. Background to the Conflict in Bosnia

The collapse of the cold war which had continued for half a century brought far-reaching
change to the former Yugoslavia which to that time had been a model of multiracial harmony.
In 1990, the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia Herzegovina announced
an end to Communist Party domination. As a result, the former Yugoslavia was placed on a
path to social upheaval. In the following year, a declaration of independence by Slovenia and
Croatia caused the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. In these circumstances, the pros and
cons of succession and independence from the federation posed a large problem for Bosnia
which had a national makeup and residential patterns which were extremely complex even
when compared with the other republics (the composition of the population before the war
was Bosniac 39 percent, Serbian 32 percent, Croatian 18 percent, the residence patterns are
said to have been a mixture of concentration and integration as seen in Figure 1.27 The
Bosnian Parliamentary Assembly fell into disarray over the succession and independence
question against a background of nationalist parties inflaming the public with nationalist
demands. The Serbian Democratic Party boycotted the Parliamentary Assembly and the
Bosnian government held an in absentia referendum without that party. The Serbians who had
boycotted the government referendum proclaimed the Constitution of the Bosnian Serbian
Republic at the end of March 1992. Hostilities commenced immediately thereafter and
extended over the entire Bosnian territory. Bosnia fell into a state of war. Changes to the
relationship between the participants, mainly the ceasefire agreement between the Bosniacs
and the Croatians and the participation of the international community headed by the
intervention of the United States finally saw an end to hostilities by 1995. The massacre of
neighbors by neighbors resulted in the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and left deep
scars including hatred and insecurity between the national groups.28 On December 14, 1995,
a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Accord)
was signed in Paris and brought some degree of certainty that three years of civil war in
Bosnia had ended.29

27
Taro Tsukimura, Bosunia no Naisen mae to Naisen go (Bosnia before and after the Civil War) in Japan
Association for Comparative Politics, ed., Minzoku Kyozon no Joken (Conditions for Ethnic Coexistence)
(Waseda University Press, 2001), p. 162.
28
Zen Chida, Yugo Funso (Yugoslavian Conflict) (Kodansha Gendaishinsho, 1993), p. 17. The casualties of the
Bosnian civil war are estimated to be 200,000 to 300,000 persons.
29
The Office of the High Representatives (OHR) Website, The General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp, accessed November 1, 2002).

6
Figure 1: Ethnic composition before the Bosnian War
Source: The Office of the High Representative Website30

30
The Office of the High Representatives (OHR) Website (http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/maps, accessed
November 1, 2002).

7
2-2. Dayton Accord

The Dayton Accord determined the name of Bosnia Herzegovina (Bosnia) for the
former Yugoslavian republic. Bosnia was recognized to be constituted by two entities being
the Bosnia Herzegovina Federation and the Republic of Srpska. In addition to being a peace
treaty, the Dayton Accord also included the Bosnian Constitution (as Annex 4) which stated
the details of the framework of the political system or procedural system. The attached
constitution was an important element in the peace treaty. The Bosnian Constitution
prioritized problems such as the construction of a political system enabling power sharing
between nationalities and reconstruction of a society of national coexistence. Carl Bildt, the
first High Representative, has stated that power sharing was the essence of the new Bosnian
Constitution and it was actually the constitution which formed the core of the peace
agreement.31 Next, the framework of the Dayton system will be described focusing on the
four points of grand coalition, mutual veto, segmental autonomy and proportionality.

2-3. Dayton Institution

2-3-1. Central Government

Grand Coalition

As shown by Figure 2, the administration of the central Bosnian government under the
Dayton Accord was comprised of a Presidency as a head of state and a Council for Ministers.
The central Bosnian government has adopted a semi-presidential system with a Presidency
being formed from three persons, one each from the Bosniac, Serbian and Croatian groups
which form the major national groups (Annex 4: Article 5 (1)). The members of the Council
for Ministers submit candidates for the Presidency and are approved by the House of
Representatives. The Constitution determines the national makeup of the Council for
Ministers and prohibits ministers belonging to the same nationality from accounting for more
than two thirds of all ministers (Annex 4: Article 5 (4) b).

31
David Chandler, Bosnia Faking Democracy After Dayton (2nd Edition, Pluto Press, 2000)

8
Figure 2: Bosnian Legislative and Executive Bodies
Source: The Office of High representative Website32

32
The Office of High Representatives (OHR) Website (http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/charts, accessed November
1, 2002).

9
Mutual Veto

The Bosnian constitution affords a right of veto to the three principal nationalities. In
addition, systems are provided which function substantially as a right of veto. Firstly, there is
a veto right in Presidency given to the members of the Council from respective nationalities.
Secondly, the Bosnian Assembly adopts a bicameral system with an upper and lower house
with a system which requires the consent of a majority of representatives from each
nationality when allowing bills or using the veto. Thirdly, the makeup of the judges in the
Constitutional Court results in a system which enables prevention of the adoption of a
resolution which would be disadvantageous to a specific nationality.

The veto provided in the Presidency is a right to a declaration by which the


representatives of each nationality can deem that a resolution of the Assembly has an adverse
effect on a vital interest of their national group. A resolution subject to such a declaration is
presented for deliberation by the national representatives of either the Republic Assembly or
the upper house of the Federation with a large national representation of the nationality
making the declaration. When the declaration is supported by at least a two-thirds majority,
the resolution is invalid (Annex 4: Article 5 (2) d).

The Bosnian Assembly includes the right of veto together with various systems enabling a
substantial right of veto. The House of peoples, the upper house, which has 15 members
formed from five representatives of each nationality can make a declaration that a proposal
adversely affects a vital interest of their nationality by a majority of at least three members of
their nationality representatives. Approval of a proposal which is subject to such a declaration
requires approval of a majority of the representatives of each nationality voting in session in
the House of peoples (Annex 4: Article 4 (3) e). In addition, there is a system in which a
quorum of the House of peoples is formed by a total of nine persons being three
representatives from each nationality and this quorum functions substantially as a veto right
(ibid., (1) b). The quorum system enables each nationality to use an absence of a majority of
representatives to hinder deliberations of the House of peoples. Both the upper and the lower
house require a majority of representatives to be in attendance and vote on approval by the
Assembly and the Constitution expressly requires the utmost efforts to be made so that at
least one third of the representatives of each nationality are included in such voting. This
section of the constitution further provides that if approval does not reach one third of the
groups of representatives of each nationality, attempts should be made to achieve approval
within three days by discussion between the Speaker and the Vice-Speaker. In the event of
failure of those discussions, although determination is possible with a majority of
representatives voting in session, there is an additional condition that two thirds or more of
the representatives of each nationality must not oppose the resolution (ibid., (3) d). The above

10
systems are also considered to provide a substantial right of veto for each nationality.33

Since the Constitutional Court is constituted by nine judges, four of whom are provided
by the Federation, two from the republic and the remaining three being outside Bosnia and
surrounding countries, a resolution which is detrimental to a particular nationality can be
prevented. This nationally-based configuration of judges has been indicated to substantially
impart a right of veto to the blocs of judges from each nationality.34

Segmental Autonomy

The characteristic of segmental autonomy in a consociational theory is not merely a


generalization from the systems existing in the smaller European countries, but show an ideal
of the theory. However in the case of Bosnia, broad-based autonomy has been realized. The
extremely broad autonomy delegated to each entity under the Dayton system is symbolic of
the Bosnian political system. Jurisdiction of the Bosnian central government is limited to the
following ten issues under Article 3 (1) of Annex 4. Authority for issues other than the
following are delegated to the entities (ibid., (3)).

(1) Foreign policy, (2) Foreign trade policy, (3) Customs policy, (4) Monetary policy, (5) Finances, (6)
Immigration, refugee, and asylum policy, (7) International and inter-entity criminal law enforcement,
(8) Establishment and operation of common and international communications facilities, (9)
Regulation of inter-entity transportation, (10) Air traffic control

Even though the foreign policy matter above which falls under the jurisdiction of the
central government, each entity entails a right to confirm a special relationship to surrounding
countries (ibid., (2) a). The Constitution explicitly states that the consent of the Bosnian
Assembly enables the conclusion of treaties with other countries or international institutions
(ibid., (2) d). Furthermore each entity is recognized as regulating the rights of citizens (Annex
4: Article 1 (7)).

Lijphart argues that minority autonomy in areas of interest only to a minority should be
granted and discretions and executive rights for problems other than common problems are
delegated to each segment. However, segmental autonomy in the Bosnian central government
clearly exceeds areas of interest only to a minority resulting in the recognition of extremely
broad-based autonomy for each entity.

33
Tsukimura, op.cit., p. 176.
34
ibid.

11
Proportionality

A proportional representation seen in the upper house of the Bosnian Parliamentary


Assembly has been discussed above. In addition, a proportional representation has been
created between the entities rather than the nationalities in which the House of
Representatives is constituted by 28 representatives from the Federation and 14 from the
Republic in a ratio of two-to-one (Annex 4: Article 4 (2)). Furthermore, to avoid prejudice to
a nationality, in addition to the prohibition against prejudice to a nationality in the Council
for Ministers (Annex 4: Article 5 (4)), it was further provided that the Deputy Prime Minister
shall be selected from a nationality which is different from the Prime Minister. In other
respects, the annex introduces a proportional representation in the following institutions.

Governing Board of the Central Bank (Annex 4: Article 7 (2)):


A Governor not being a Bosnian citizen (appointed from the IMF), two representatives from
the Federation (one Bosniac, one Croat, who shall share one vote) and one from the
Republic

Human Rights Chamber (Annex 6: Article 7 (2)):


Eight members (appointed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe) who
shall not be citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, four members from the Federation and two
members from the Republic

Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees (Annex 7: Article 9 (1)):


Three members including the Chairman (appointed by European Court of Human Rights),
four members from the Federation and two members from the Republic

Commission to Preserve National Monuments (Annex 8: Article 2 (1)):


Two members including the Chairman (appointed by UNESCO), two members from the
Federation and one member from the Republic

Commission on Public Corporations (Annex 9: Article 1 (2)):


Two members including the Chairman (appointed by the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development), two members from the Federation and one member from the Republic

The characteristics of the proportional representation observed in the constitution of the


members of the above institutions reflect the intention of the international community via the
appointment of representatives from international institutions and the emphasis placed on
participation by the three nationalities. Furthermore it is provided that the Bosnian budget
other than special imposition of taxes for the Bosnian Parliamentary Assembly shall be borne
in a proportional manner in which the Federation shall provide two thirds and the Republic
shall provide one third (Annex 4: Article 8 (3)).

12
2-3-2. Federation

The broad-based segmental autonomy discussed in the previous section transformed


Bosnia into a social system which may be termed an experiment in delegation of authority.
In Bosnia, the jurisdiction of the central government is extremely circumscribed and each
entity enjoys a high level of autonomy. This characteristic has complicated a single federal
political system formed from two entities. Furthermore the Federation became an
experiment in delegation of authority formed by an extremely complicated multilayer
system due to the fact that the Federation recognizes the segmental autonomy of cantons
which are underlying lower political units, and in addition, of municipalities which are the
subsequently lower political unit.

The reason for the necessity to form the Federation into such a complicated political
configuration lies in the antipathy of the Bosniacs and the Croatians in the Federation. The
establishment of the Dayton system did not witness any diminution in antagonism between
the Bosniacs and the Croatians. According to a 1997 public survey, 84 percent of Croatians
stated that it would be preferably to gain independence from Bosnia and 62 percent voiced
opposition to the notion of Bosnia as a single state. In contrast, 98 percent of Bosniacs replied
in support of Bosnia as a single state.35 The Federation Constitution was concluded in June
1994 prior to the ceasefire negotiations in Dayton. Although the Federation Constitution was
amended pursuant to the Dayton system thereafter, there was no change regarding a
consociational system centering on power sharing between Bosniacs and Croatians.36

As shown by Figure 2 in the previous section, the Federation has adopted a system in
which the President is a member of the Parliamentary Assembly and the government is
formed from 14 ministers including a Prime Minister and a Deputy Prime Minister.
Furthermore the Federation Parliamentary Assembly adopts a bicameral system formed from
the House of peoples, the upper house, containing 80 representatives, the House of
Representatives, the lower house, of 140 representatives and 5 representatives are selected
from the House of peoples for the Senate of the Bosnian central government. The House of
Representatives is elected by the entire federation but the upper house is selected by the
representatives of the canton. Although the cantons are a lower administrative unit in the
Federation, there is a high degree of delegation of authority between the Federation and the
cantons which forms the basis of a federal system ensuring broad-based autonomy.

35
United States Information Agency, Public Opinion in Bosnia Hercegovina, Vol.4: One Year of Peace
(Washington, D.C.: European Branch, Office of Research and Media Reaction, February 1997). In response to
the same question, 91 percent of Serbians replied that independence from Bosnia would be preferable.
36
The investigation of the Federation Constitution uses the Federation Constitution as amended in May 1997.
The Office of High Representatives (OHR) Website, Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(http://www.ohr.int/const/bih-fed/default.asp?content_id=5907, accessed November 1, 2002).

13
Grand Coalition

The Federation President is elected by the Parliamentary Assembly and takes the form of
a Parliamentary Grand Coalition. The presidential election process firstly includes
nomination of one candidate from each of the Bosniac and Croatian parliamentary groups in
the upper house. Approval of the candidates is confirmed by a majority of both the Bosniac
and Croatian parliamentary groups in both the House of peoples and House of
Representatives. The elected president and vice-president exchange the role of president and
vice-president every second year during a four-year term. The president has responsibility for
nominating the federation government. The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, the
President and the Vice-president must be from different nationalities to thereby adopt a grand
coalition between the national groups in the Federation Parliamentary Assembly (Part 4: B:
Article 2).

At federation government level, the constitution includes an article recognizing the vital
interests of a national group in cabinet determinations. However in contrast to the
constitution of the central government, the Federation Constitution is premised on reaching
agreement regarding the vital interests of a national group. In other words, a determination
of the vital interests of a national group requires agreement between the nationalities in
cabinet. In the event of a failure to agree, the Federation Constitution states that the Prime
Minister shall refer to the opinion of the President or Vice-president who must be of a
different nationality to the Prime Minister. In this manner, the federation government places
emphasis on the form of agreement between nationalities (Part 4: B: Article 6).

Mutual Veto

As a rule, the Federation Parliamentary Assembly adopts a simple majority in decision


making. However decisions regarding the vital interests of a national group, that is to say,
the approval of issues falling within the provision of the constitution governing the vital
interests of a national group, require a majority of both the Bosniac and Croatian assembly
groups in the House of peoples (Part 4: A: Article 18). However problems were associated
with the fact that there were no criteria enabling determination of the vital interests of a
national group until the revision of the constitution of both entities in April 2002. In addition,
problems have been indicated regarding the fact that the wording of the section requires a
majority of national groups means that parties encompassing many national groups will in
reality have a right of veto.37

37
Bose (2002), op.cit., p. 83.

14
Segmental Autonomy

In the same manner as the central government, the scope of authority of the federation
government is extremely limited when compared with the scope of authority of the cantons
which is the lower administrative unit. The jurisdictional scope given to the federation
government is as following (Part 3: Article 1).

Defense limited to joint operations


Economic policy and financial regulation limited to federation level
Energy policy
Policy with respect terrorism, crime between cantons, drug smuggling and other organized
crime
Media allocation for elections
Finance policy for performing the above (imposition of taxation and loans)

Authority for other matters is delegated to the cantons and therefore it can be seen that the
cantons enjoy an extremely high level of autonomy.

Although the federation government and the cantons allocate the scope of authority, it is
their common duty under the constitution to enable cooperation for matters including human
rights, public hygiene, environmental policy, infrastructure for communication and shipping,
tourism and social welfare policy (ibid., Article 2). The constitution explicitly recognizes that
these duties may be performed jointly, separately or by the canton under the coordination of
the federation government (ibid., Article 3).

Proportionality

The regulations in the Constitution regarding the proportionality of policymaking


institutions include the two regulations that the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister,
the President and the Vice-president must be from different nationalities and that Croatians
must account for one third of the ministers (Part 4: B: Article 4 and Article 5).

Legislative bodies such as the House of peoples, the upper house, include the proportion
of 30 Bosniacs, 30 Croatians and 20 other nationalities (Part 4: A: Article 6). Although the
upper house is constituted by cantonal representatives, the number of elected representatives
is proportional to the population of each canton and the representatives from each canton
constituting the upper house must be elected with a national proportion which approximates
the national proportion of the canton. However although this type of proportional
representation has been adopted, there is express provision for at least one of the
representatives for each canton to include one person from the two main nationalities (ibid.,
Article 8) and therefore participation of the main nationalities of each canton in policy
making is guaranteed.

15
There is provision for the judiciary to provide equal numbers of Bosniac and Croatian
judges in both federation courts (the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court) and make
suitable representation of judges from other nationalities (Part 4: C: Article 6). However
details regarding other nationalities is not provided and since there is only a duty to provide
equal numbers of Bosniac and Croatian judges, and in the event of a legislative problem
reaching the Constitutional Court, doubts have been expressed regarding whether or not there
is a dispute resolution capability in the federation judiciary.38

Furthermore provision for human rights under the Constitution provides for a Human
Rights Court within the federation judicial system and expressly provides for the judges of
such a court to be one Bosniac and one Croatian member and another member from another
nationality (Part 4: C: 5: Article 18). In Part 2 of the Constitution related to human rights, a
supervisory institution for the protection of human rights shall be an ombudsman constituted
by one Bosniac and one Croatian member and another member from another nationality (Part
2: B: Article 1).

2-3-3. Canton

The three and a half year civil war resulted in the forcible displacement including
massacres for national cleansing and therefore the Bosnian population distribution underwent
far-reaching change (see Figure 1 and Figure 3). As shown by Figure 3, however, Bosnia
continued to have a mosaic of areas of concentration of nationalities. For example, in Mostar
which was split under the domination of Bosniac and Croatia nationalities is a town which
has a high level of national mixture, it was reported that there was little interaction between
areas of national concentration for a long period after the cessation of hostilities.

The broad-based autonomy granted to each canton has been described above. As shown in
Figure 4, there are ten cantons within the federation and each has its own constitution. Five of
the ten cantons are Bosniac cantons (a canton having a majority of Bosniac persons), three
are Croatian cantons and the remainders are cantons with a mixture of Bosniacs and
Croatians (Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva). Furthermore although autonomy is
granted in the municipality which is the administrative unit below the canton, the authority of
the federation government is relatively limited. 39 As shown by the distribution of
nationalities in Figure 4, the majority of both cantonal areas have a mixture of Bosniacs and
Croatians. This characteristic of the distribution of nationalities required the application of a
special system to these two cantons embodied in Federation Constitution Part 5: Article 12.
The special system was applied for the purpose of enabling the coexistence of the
nationalities and, in a similar manner to the federation system, is based on the distribution of
authority.

38
Bose (2002), op.cit., p. 83.
39
ibid., p. 79.

16
Figure 3: Ethnic Composition after the Bosnian War
Source: The Office of the High representative Website40

40
The Office of the High Representatives (OHR) Website (http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/maps, accessed
November 1, 2002).

17
Grand Coalition

In a canton, an assembly which is formed from representatives elected by election, a


governor elected by a voting majority of the assembly and a government of candidates
nominated by the governor and approved by a majority vote of the assembly (refer to Table 1
for administrative and legislative composition of a canton). Central Bosnia and
Herzegovina-Neretva, where there is a mixture of nationalities, implement a governor and
vice-governor system which does not exist in other cantons. Two candidates, one each from
the respective national groups are approved by respective majorities of both national
representative groups and exchange the role of governor and vice-governor every second year.
The election of ministerial candidates by the governor requires the consent of the
vice-governor who belongs to a different nationality to the governor. A two-thirds approval of
the assembly is required for cabinet appointments. Conditions are imposed on the ratio of
nationalities in cabinet such as the number of Bosniacs and Croatians being equal and the
election of the minister and vice-minister from different nationalities (Federation Constitution
Part 5: Article 12).

Mutual Veto

Provisions regarding the vital interests of the nationality are applied to the Assembly in
mixed-nationality cantons. In this manner, approval of resolutions regarding vital interests
of each nationality requires a majority of both the Bosniac and Croatian representative groups.
In the event that a majority cannot be obtained from one of the groups, an opinion is sought
from the joint committee of both national representatives and thereafter is placed in the hands
of the cantonal court (ibid.).

Segmental Autonomy

A wider autonomy is recognized in the canton than in the entity (Federation). Furthermore
in mixed-nationality cantons, authority is delegated to the municipalities which are the level
below the canton for the purpose of recognizing the joint cultural autonomy of each
community. The scope of autonomy recognized for each municipality covers areas such as
education, culture, radio/television, regional commerce and tourism (ibid., Part 6: Article 1).

18
Figure 4: Cantons of the Bosnia Herzegovina Federation
Source: The Office of the High representative Website41

41
The Office of the High Representatives (OHR) Website (http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/maps, accessed
November 1, 2002).

19
Proportionality

Elections for the cantonal assembly adopt a single-vote proportional representation


system. The constitution of the cabinet following the ratio of nationalities in each canton
(Federation Constitution Part 5: Article 8) and the makeup of the judiciary is also determined
in order to reflect the ratio of nationalities (ibid., Article 11). The makeup of the police within
the public service at cantonal level is determined by the Federation Constitution to reflect the
ratio of nationalities of each canton and, at municipality level, reflects the ratio of
nationalities in each municipality (ibid., Article 10). As discussed above in relation to the
grand coalition, managerial positions such as vice-governor complement governor as a
special system in mixed-nationality cantons.

3. DOES POWER SHARING WORK?

Fifteen years have passed since the peace agreement was settled in Bosnia. After the
cessation of hostilities in Bosnia, the reconstruction of infrastructure began in earnest. After
entering the twenty-first century, city life began to return as witnessed by the intercourse
between the entities and between the regions having a specific concentration of a nationality.
Although the reconstruction of economic and social areas of Bosnia has progressed due to
support from the international community, political reconstruction is not yet satisfactory. Of
course, from the point of view of preventing reoccurrence of armed conflict, the power
sharing institutions have perhaps served a purpose. However it must be admitted that doubts
remain regarding the effective function of the Dayton system with respect to rebuilding a
society of coexistence. The validity of the power sharing approach will be explored below by
comparing Bosnia with a series of the other cases. This paper recognizes Belgium and South
Tyrol as successful power sharing cases and Cyprus as a failure case due to the reoccurrence
of conflict. This section focuses on the two points; (1) institutional selection and (2) incentive
approach. The power sharing institutions of the post-Dayton Bosnia are summarized in Table
1

20
Table 1: Power Shearing Institutions of Bosnia
Power Sharing Model Bosnian Government Federation Mixed-nationality cantons
(Central government) (entity) (local)
Grand Coalition All political leaders in a segment form an Presidency System of exchanging President and System of exchanging Governor and
alliance and cooperate to govern the Representatives of 3 nationalities by Vice-president Vice-governor
country. election Election by each nationality representative Election by each nationality representative
Council of Ministers group in Upper House. Requires approval group. Requires approval of majority of
Elected by Presidential Parliamentary of majority of both groups of both groups of representatives.
Assembly and approved by Assembly. No representatives. Government
more than 2/3 of one nationality. Government Election of governor by consent of
Nomination of government by president, vice-governor, approval by Assembly.
approval by Assembly. Ministers according to ratio of nationalities,
President/Vice-president and Prime Minister and Vice-minister of different
Minster/Deputy Prime Minister of different nationalities.
nationalities.
Mutual Veto A veto is granted as a protection mechanism Presidency Federation Assembly Assembly
when a resolution will affect an important Assembly Majority of each nationality group required Resolutions related to vital interests of
interest to a minority in a segment. Constitutional Court for resolutions related to vital interests of nationality require approval of majority of
Substantial right of veto on all resolutions. nationality. each nationality group.
Segment With the exception of common problems, Broad-based delegation of autonomy to Broad-based delegation of autonomy to In comparison with other cantons in the
Autonomy right of determination and executive powers entities. cantons. Federation, more broad-based delegation of
are delegated to segments with respect to Delegation of authority to entities in The scope of federal authority is limited to autonomy to autonomous regions.
areas of interest only to minorities. relation to defense, conclusion of treaties joint operations in defense matters. Also In particular, cultural scope education,
with other countries and regulation of areas of common responsibility between media, etc.
citizen rights. Federation and canton such as human
rights.
Proportional Public servants Proportional system applied to areas of the Proportional system applied to areas of the Proportional system applied to areas of the
System Allocation of government funds public service in addition to executive, executive, legislative and judicial executive, legislative and judicial
Formation of policymaking legislative and judicial institutions. In institutions and human rights monitoring institutions and police.
institutions particular, strict proportional system institutions.
As a rule, principle of proportionality applied to policymaking institutions.
Adoption of strict proportional system
including representatives of international
community in central bank, Human Rights
Chamber and public utility company
committees.
The author prepared the table referring to Footnote 11, 29, 36 and 42.

21
3-1. Institutional Selection

Grand Coalition

In Bosnia, the Presidency is the head of state. Sartori defines that a president has the free
power to appoint to and dismiss from cabinet.42 However, approval of the Assembly is
required for the appointment of a minister in Bosnia. A president of the Federation at entity
level is the head of the entity, but it is different from the Sartoris definition of a president. A
president should be elected via elections according to his definition, but the election of a
president is not held directly in Bosnia.43 The head of mixed-nationality cantons is similar to
that of federation level. Consequently the type of the executive at state central government
level can be said a president system, on the other hand, those of the two lower levels are the
mixtures of the characteristics of a parliamentary system with a direct popular vote.

In the Cypriot government of Greek and Turkish confrontation, the states head was
composed by a Greek president and Turkish vice-president, and a Greek prime minister and a
Turkish deputy prime minister (see Table 2). Schneckener uses a comparison of Belgium or
South Tyrol with Cyprus to reach a conclusion that presidential system is not an appropriate
system for a fragmented society and has emphasized that, for that reason, cooperation within
a cabinet cannot be forced under a presidential system.44

The first Presidency of the Bosnian central government was formed by leaders of various
nationalistic political parties representing the three main nationalities elected by the
presidential assembly election of 1996 which was the first election after the Dayton Accord.
From the inauguration of the Presidency resulting from this election, a lack of consensus
resulted in political turmoil in Bosnia over a long period of time. Political turmoil during
deliberations by the Council for Ministers was caused by the lack of a clearly functioning
Presidency. The legislative and administrative power of the Presidency in the Bosnian central
government was a basic cause of expansion and continuation of political turmoil in Bosnia.

42
Giovanni Sartori, Hikaku Seijigaku (Comparative Politics) (Waseda University Press, 2000), pp. 93-134.
43
Ibid.
44
Schneckener, op.cit., p. 219.

22
Table 2: Comparison of Grand Coalition Types
Belgium (1970) South Tyrol (1972) Cyprus (1960-63)
Definition of Schneckener Parliamentary System of Government Parliamentary System of Government Presidential System
Council of Ministers Landerregierung 2(1). President nominates ministers
1. Parliamentary System of Government (Collegial)
1. Parliamentary System of Government 1. Parliamentary System of Government
(Characteristic of equal distribution of authority in Cabinet) Greek ministers can always decide useful
Cabinet selected from Assembly Official alliance of largest parties in each Official alliance of largest parties in each proposals by majority. In contrast,
segment. segment. confrontation resulting from exercise of veto
2. Presidential System (Direct Popular Vote)
by Turkish Vice-ministers. In contrast to
(Election of representatives from candidates from each
parliamentary system of government, Cabinet
segment)
does not require cooperation.
President controls configuration of government.
(1) President nominates ministers
(2) President proposes ministers to Assembly

Bosnian Government (central government) Federation (entity) Mixed-nationality Canton (local)


Presidential System Mixture of Presidential System and Mixture of Presidential System and
2(2). President proposes ministers to Assembly Parliamentary Government System Parliamentary Government System
1. Parliamentary System of Government 1. Parliamentary System of Government
According to Sartoris definition, in a
2(1). President nominates ministers 2(1). President nominates ministers
Presidential system, the administration cannot
be appointed or dismissed by the Assembly. There is a president, but is not elected directly There is a governor. Characterized as on
The Bosnian central government requires or indirectly by general election as in the below left.
approval of the Assembly for election of the definition of a Presidential System of Sartori.
Council of Ministers, and therefore does not Approval of Assembly required in election of
accord to that degree with the definition of a Cabinet.
Presidential System.
The author prepared the table referring to Footnote 11, 29, 36 and 42.

23
It can be suggested that the lack of cooperation between political leaders which prevented the
functioning of the Presidency was caused by the fact that the members of the Presidency is
elected by general election in a direct popular vote. Because the assembly members were
elected by the public of their nationality, it was necessary to emphasize to the public that they
were leaders who would strictly enforce the interests of their nationality.45 Thus they were
immediately aware that the acquisition and maintenance of public support precluded simple
compromise with representatives from other nationalities. In other words, the members of the
Presidency were strongly aware of their roles as nationality representatives rather than a role
as the heads of the Bosnian state. In order to reflect public popularity in assembly elections,
fear campaigns were conducted on the basis that national interests may be violated by other
nationalities. In that context, candidates tended to emphasize national solidarity and as a
result, national divisions deepened. In reality, the election of October 2002 was reported to
have involved the use of nationalistic symbols or slogans and music by many parties to
support a nationalistic campaign.46

Furthermore the lack of a requirement for cooperation between the executive and the
assembly in a presidential system may be considered as a cause for the political chaos of the
Bosnian central government. In the Bosnian central government, there was no system in
which the executive and the assembly cooperated in the legislative process. The adverse
effects of a system characterized by not requiring cooperation are conspicuously shown in the
case deliberations regarding bills in the Council of Ministers as discussed above. The higher
level representatives strove for accommodation by agreement in contrast to the confrontation
of nationalities in the Presidency while, at the same time, antagonism between nationalities
was exposed in the legislative assembly resulting in a dysfunctional Council of Ministers
over the long term. The lack of a cooperative system between the Presidency and the
Assembly in the Bosnian central government was often a cause of inefficiency in affairs of
state. Although the resolutions in the Presidency are determined by a simple majority, when
the majority is from a party which does not occupy the majority of seats in the Assembly,
there is a high risk that confrontation with the Assembly will be caused by the content of the
resolution resulting in freezing of political operations. For example, when the election of
Serbian representatives in the 1998 central government elections is examined, although
Radii of the Socialist Party of Republika Srpska was elected as Serbian representative in
the Presidency, the Serbian Democratic Party became the major party of the Serbian parties
by obtaining 9.5 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives of the central
45
Kei-ichi Hashimoto, Hi-Minzokushugi Seiken no Hossoku to Dayton Taisei heno Cyosen (Creation of the
Non-nationalist Government and the Challenge to the Dayton System), Kokusai Kokyo Seisaku Kenkyu
(International Public Policy), Vol. 6, No. 2 (2002), p. 232. The Croatian Democratic Union won a crushing
victory by characterizing the vote as protectors of nationality interests. Furthermore, it is stated that
nationality interests between rights holders were prioritized in the election of the Republic of Srpska and were
determinative in affecting the election result. ibid., p. 235.
46
International Election Observation Mission, General Election 2002 Bosnia and Herzegovina Statement of
Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, p. 5
(http://www.izbori.ba/documents/2002-528-odihr_bih_preliminary_statement.pdf, accessed December 1, 2002).

24
government. This situation is termed divided government by Sartori.47 In other words,
since the president and the assembly are supported by different parties, a division is created
between the president and the assembly and in Bosnia there was no escape mechanism. In the
United States, when the president and the assembly fall into a state of division, a mechanism
of an accommodating party rule by which the two major parties in the United States
avoided cessation of political functions.48

Clearly, a characteristic of the presidential system above is the hindrance of stable and
effective political operation of the Bosnian central government. Furthermore doubts have
been expressed as to the suitability of a presidential system in a fragmented society. For
example, Juan Linz uses cases from Latin America to argue that a presidential system does
not function appropriately in countries having deep divisions and a fragmented political
system.49 In a 1991 paper, Lijphart states the disadvantages of a presidential system for
power sharing institutions.50 There are many residual doubts surrounding the introduction of
a presidential system to the Bosnian government.

Mutual Veto

It has been suggested that the right of veto provided under the Dayton system is the main
cause of political chaos. 51 Much of the chaos in Bosnian politics was triggered by
declarations (direct veto right) with respect to resolutions damaging vital interests of a
nationality as recognized under the Federation Constitution and the central government.
However the veto right is an extremely important right for protecting minority factions and is
thought to be one reason for the application of power sharing in peace-making or
peacebuilding. Is the adverse effect of the Bosnian-style veto nothing more than a necessary
evil? According to Schnekener, a veto in the context of power sharing can be categorized into
a delaying veto, indirect veto and direct veto.52 A delaying veto has the purpose of
urging reconsideration of a resolution and is used as a means of mediation in an assembly or
constitutional court. An indirect veto is a system which adds a condition regarding a double
majority which requires the majority consent of the respective main segments to a resolution
about an important political problem.

Firstly, the members of the Presidency in the Bosnian central government have a direct
veto and the Assembly can use two types of veto: delaying veto, and direct veto.
Furthermore the Assembly also has a system which substantially functions as a veto. In the
Assembly, both the upper and the lower house are provided with a delaying veto

47
Sartori, op.cit., p. 98.
48
ibid., pp. 97-103.
49
Juan Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, Journal of Democracy, I (Winter 1990), pp. 51-69.
50
Arend Lijphart, The Power-Sharing Approach, in Joseph Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in
Multiethnic Societies (Lexington, 1990), pp. 506-507.
51
Kei-ichi Hashimoto, PhD diss., Osaka University (1991), p. 40.
52
Schnekener, op.cit., p. 221.

25
corresponding to the provision that constitutional matters should be determined with the
utmost good faith, and of the majority of representatives sitting and voting in the assembly, at
least one third should be representatives belonging to each nationality. On the other hand,
only the upper house is granted a direct veto which, in the same manner as the Presidency,
signifies a right to declare that a vital interest of a nationality is being adversely affected.
Such a declaration triggers the application of the double majority principle which requires
the assent of a majority the representatives of each nationality for the approval of a bill.
Although the substantial veto corresponds with the upper house quorum, the system really
corresponds to a strong right of veto which stops the passage of a resolution in the upper
house. In contrast to the strong broad-based veto which is given to the central government,
two types of veto: a direct veto and an indirect veto are given to the Federation and the
mixed-nationality cantons. The former is similar to the right given to the Assembly of the
central government. The latter corresponds to a system which requires a majority of the
respective national representatives in the election of a governor and vice-governor in a canton
and a president and vice-president in the Federation.

At the outset of the Dayton system, there was no limitation placed on the scope of
application of the veto in the central government, the Federation or the mixed-nationality
cantons. In contrast to the veto as practiced in Bosnia, how was a veto applied in Belgium
and South Tyrol? As seen in Table 3, Belgium in 1970 included the two veto system of the
Alarm Bell Procedure and Community Majority Law.53 The Alarm Bell Procedure
corresponds to a delaying veto in which resolutions regarding a bill in the assembly can be
stopped by signatures of three quarters of the representatives of each segment. When an alarm
bell procedure is adopted, a compromise in substitution for the bill may be proposed by the
Cabinet within 30 days. The community majority law is a law determining a requirement
for approval by each segment when passing legislation regarding important problems such as
changes to the political system and corresponds to an indirect veto in the categorization
above. In the same manner as Belgium, South Tyrol also had a system of two vetoes in 1972
which included a system in which the Constitutional Court acted as a mediation institution by
use of a delaying veto, and a Budget Guarantee system which amounted to an indirect
veto.54 The former was a system enabling the examination of the merits of a bill in the
Constitutional Court when a bill was passed which is contrary to the intent of two-thirds of
the representatives of each segment. The latter was a system requiring approval of a majority
of each segment in the passing of the annual budget. As shown above, both Belgium and
South Tyrol do not recognize a direct veto of the overall political structure as seen in
Bosnia. On the other hand, the president in Cyprus had a direct veto where the country
relapsed into conflict after about three years after the introduction of power sharing.

53
ibid., p. 221.
54
ibid.

26
Table 3: Comparison of Veto Types
Belgium (1970) South Tyrol (1972) Cyprus (1960-63)
Schneckener Classification Alarm Bell Procedure Constitutional Court Presidential Veto
1. Delaying Veto 1. Delaying Veto 3. Direct Veto
1. Delaying Veto
System promoting reconsideration of resolutions Bill stopped by 3/4 signatures in each segment. If law passed contrary to 2/3 intention of each Greek president, Turkish vice-president both
(many matters depend on mediation in Assembly or New proposal must be introduced by segment, reconsidered by Constitutional Court. have right to prevent any resolution.
mediation in Constitutional Court) compromise in Council of Ministers within 30
days. Budget Guarantee 2. Indirect Veto
2. Indirect Veto 2. Indirect Veto
Common problems or tax/election law requires
Principle of Double Majority Community Majority Law
Approval of each segment required for annual majority of both segments and amendment of
System applying a condition that legislation is not 2 Indirect Veto
budget. constitution requires 2/3 approval.
possible without assent of majority in both segments.
Legal approval of each segment required for
important problems (revision of system etc.).
3. Direct Veto
Bosnian Government Federation Mixed-nationality Canton
Right of direct veto
(central government) (entity) (local)
Parliamentary Assembly-Assembly Veto Vital Interest of Nationality Vital Interest of Nationality
3. Direct Veto 2. Indirect Veto 2. Indirect Veto

Exercise of veto possible to all resolutions Principle of double majority applied to Principle of double majority applied to
without limit to all problems covered by veto. questions related to election of President or vital questions related to election of Governor or
In Parliamentary Assembly, Upper and Lower interests of nationality. vital interests of nationality.
House, substantive veto granted. Since no substantive definition of vital interests Since no substantive definition of vital interests
of nationality, in reality, can asset any problem of nationality, in reality, can asset any problem
as a problem damaging such interests. as a problem damaging such interests.
(Constitutional Amendment in April 2002) (Constitutional Amendment in April 2002)
The author prepared the table referring to Footnote 11, 29, 36 and 42.

27
In Cyprus from 1960 to 1963, a representative of the majority Greeks acted as president
with a representative of the Turkish minority acting as vice-president. In a Cypriot political
system of the time, both the president and the vice-president enjoyed a veto. Moreover the
veto was a strong direct veto which could stop any resolution.55 Cyprus fell into a state in
which the majority Greek cabinet would introduce a resolution by majority and the
vice-president representing the Turkish minority would exercise a right of veto and as a result,
political processes came to a halt. 56 It is indisputable that the experience of Cyprus
demonstrates that the introduction of a veto into a fragmented society is a cause of stagnation
of political processes.

The right of veto was employed from the first stages of the Dayton system in Bosnia.
Indiscriminate use of the veto resulted in continuing failure to even reach agreement
regarding a flag, which could be said to be the first stage of government rule. This problem
did not reach resolution with the result that the High Representatives commenced exercise of
their ultimate authority. In the same manner, vetoes prevented functioning of legislative
processes and, in the three years to 1999 after the establishment of the Dayton system, only
25 bills were passed. By the end of July 2000, the number confirmed by the Assembly and
passing the High Representatives rose to 89.57

Let us summarize the problems regarding vetoes in Bosnia into (1) ease of exercising the
right, (2) no limitation on the scope of the right, and (3) a forcible mechanism of external
institutions for finally dealing with the veto. Firstly with respect to ease of exercising the
right, the original intention was to provide a veto in order to enable a hint of exercising the
veto as a final trump card to promote compromise by a majority faction without actually
using the veto when a minority is relegated to a disadvantageous position due to a resolution
regarding a vital problem.58 For that reason, the system must be one which encourages an
awareness that the exercise of the veto by both parties was disadvantageous, that exercise
must be avoided at all costs, or that exercise must not be encouraged. However in a system in
which the political leaders of each segment are given a direct veto, it is difficult to expect
such a merely suggestive result. Since the exercise of the veto in Belgium or South Tyrol
was limited to budget questions or vital matters to a segment related the political system,
inter-segmental compromise protected interests and inefficiencies in a consociational sense
were minimized.

The second problem regarding no limitation on the scope of the right is exacerbated by

55
Furthermore at the time in Cyprus, a system was in placed acting as an indirect veto requiring the approval
of the majority of each segment for resolutions regarding common problems to each nationality, tax, or electoral
law, in addition to which amendment of the constitution required approval by two thirds of each segment.
56
Schnekener, op.cit., p. 221.
57
International Crisis Group Website, The International Crisis, Is Dayton Falling?
(http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/balkans/bosnia/reports/A400058_28101999.pdf, accessed December 24,
2002).
58
Schnekener, op.cit., p. 222.

28
the weakness of inefficiencies preparation of power sharing. If a veto can be exercised in any
situation, there will necessarily be a corresponding reduction in the efficiency of the system.
On April 18, 2002 in Bosnia, the Constitution was amended to limit the scope of exercise of a
veto limited to the entities. The amendment was evaluated as promoting the multinational
nature of the entities by the public relations department of the Office of the High
Representative.59 It was in this context that the concept of vital interests to a nationality
found an initial definition.

Many studies have already considered the final problem regarding the effect of forcible
intervention by the international community. Power sharing is based on determination of
resolutions by agreement rather than by majority. For this reason, a right of veto, as a rule,
cannot be used as a means to engender compromise creating agreement across each segment.
Consequently as in Belgium, there is a need for a mediation mechanism after use of the veto
such as a condition in which a compromise bill must be proposed subsequent to use of the
veto. Since such a mediation mechanism did not exist in the system in Bosnia, the High
Representatives handed down resolutions forcibly using the power given by the international
community in order to resolve the stagnation of administration and legislation. Unfortunately,
in Bosnia, there was not a voluntary attempt to construct a mechanism of reaching agreement.

As described above, the severe adverse effect of the veto in Bosnia constituted a main
cause of administrative and legislative stagnation. However this should be viewed as a
problem in the configuration of the veto system.

Segmental Autonomy

Schneckener categorizes autonomy into autonomy imparted by a regional dimension or


autonomy imparted by personality.60 The characterization of autonomy in Bosnia adopts
territorial autonomy.61 In particular, the cantons expressly adopted this system. The ten
cantons which makeup the Federation are categorized into Bosniac cantons, Croatian cantons
on the basis of the majority nationality among residents and have been granted broad-based
autonomy. In the mixed-nationality cantons where there is rivalry between the residents of
each nationality, delegation of autonomy in relation to education and culture devolves to the
municipalities which are the next lower administrative unit. In contrast, the jurisdictional
scope of the authority of the central Bosnian government is extremely limited in comparison
to other states adopting a federal system. The broad-based delegation of authority to such a
high level to the lower administrative unit is one of the greatest characteristics of the political
system in Bosnia.

59
The Office of High Representatives (OHR) Website, Editorial for Jutarnje Novine by Alexandra Stiglmayer,
Head of the OHR Constitutional Reform in BiH (http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=7397, accessed November
1, 2002).
60
Schneckener, op.cit., p. 222.
61
ibid.

29
The degree of delegation of authority in the central Bosnian government occasionally had
a negative effect on the relations between the central government and the entities. The most
conspicuous example is the political turmoil surrounding the Law on Property. This law was
initially a national policy. However due to the restricted scope of the political jurisdiction of
the central government, the High Representatives strove to persuade both entities. However
the deep-rooted resistance of both entities resulted in the High Representatives spending
several years in negotiations. The problem can also be viewed as resulting from the fact that
both entities even have the authority to conclude agreements or treaties with other countries
or international institutions. This problem came to the surface when the republic which is one
of the Bosnian entities formed a special relationship with the new Yugoslavia. Although in the
final analysis, this agreement was struck down by the High Representative in 1997, the
situation demonstrated the possibility of unilateral conclusion of a treaty or agreement which
is not desirable for an entity but requiring the approval of the central government assembly. A
system as in Bosnia which permits delegation of authority to lower administrative units will
cause endless subdivision of the political system as long as there is a mixed demographic
pattern of nationalities. As shown by the polarization of the political situation in Mostar, the
process of subdivision does not engender promotion of coexistence in the political process.

Belgium and South Tyrol adopted regional autonomy in basically the same manner as
Bosnia (refer to Table 4). In the other hand, Cyprus had a system of autonomy by
membership, or more specifically, a system of recognizing autonomy to elected autonomous
community committees. This system resulted in a gradual increase in the authority of
autonomous community committees due to the dysfunction of the political process of the
central government and resulted in confrontation between the jurisdiction of the central
government and the committees. On the other hand, both Belgium and Cyprus granted
autonomy in relation to cultural matters on the basis of membership. In Belgium, jurisdiction
was granted to cultural communities with respect to matters of language and culture in
addition to education. In South Tyrol, autonomy was recognized with respect to schools of
groups respectively speaking German or Italian. When considering a consociational system
from the point of view of autonomy of segments, suitable granting of regional autonomy
and autonomy by membership to related regions is important for the formation of
coexistence.

30
Table 4: Comparison of Segment Autonomy Types
Belgium (1970) South Tyrol (1972) Cyprus (1960-63)
Schneckener Categorization Federal System Intra-regional Autonomy Community Committees
1. Territoriality (Mixture of 1 and 2) 1. Territoriality (Mixture of 1 and 2) 2. Membership
1. Territoriality
Federal System Intra-regional Autonomy of cultural communities recognized in Groups speaking Italian or German have certain level Autonomy recognized of community committees
autonomy addition to federation. of autonomy regarding schools. elected by election.
For example, cultural community has own
2. Membership (personality)
institutions, and has jurisdiction over linguistic,
Community committees
cultural and educational areas.
Private institutions
Bosnian Government (central government) Federation (entity) Mixed-nationality Canton (local)
Federal System Cantonal System Municipality
1. Territoriality 1. Territoriality 2. Membership

Foreign policy, Foreign trade policy, Customs policy, Defense limited to joint operations, Federal Cultural autonomy recognized communities in
Monetary policy, Finance policy, Immigration, economic and financial regulation, Energy policy, municipalities.
refugee, and asylum policy, International and Policy with respect terrorism, crime between
Inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, Establishment cantons, drug smuggling and other organized crime,
and operation of common and international Media allocation for elections, Finance policy for
communications facilities, Regulation of inter-Entity imposition of taxation and loans.
transportation, Air traffic control Jurisdiction only for above matters.
Jurisdiction only for above matters.
The author prepared the table referring to Footnote 11, 29, 36 and 42.

31
This paper thinks of coexistence as the status that living together with the members of
different communities without destructing or harming the other groups.62 If it is appropriate,
the institutional design of the post- Dayton Bosnia regarding segmental autonomy must be
questioned its validity. In Bosnia even the lower administrative units are granted the
autonomy including the issues having a high possibility of damage to vital segment interests
such as foreign policy or defense. Since the greatest challenge for the continuation of Bosnia
as a state is the guarantee of the rights of the three nationalities, the implementation of a
system of autonomy extending broadly across jurisdictions may have been necessary.
However a system in which each political group pursues its own interest even at the expense
of other groups will promote mutual suspicion and undeniably entails the possibility of
hindering the construction of a society based on coexistence. In reality, Croatians in the
Federation who considered amendment to the electoral system as disadvantaging their
interests attempted to destroy the Dayton system. As shown by Mostar, many regions
continue to exist in Bosnia formed from a mosaic of national concentrations. Such regions
demonstrate the limitations of the effectiveness of regional autonomy and have resulted in the
necessary delegation of autonomy from the canton and municipality to lower unit of the
community. Does the Bosnian experience validate autonomy by membership?

Proportionality

According to Schnekener, the participation of each segment in policymaking can be


categorized into proportional representation in which positions of authority are apportioned
using a principle of proportionality, and over-representation in which a right of representation
is given to minorities in relation to specific positions without reference to a principle of
proportionality.63 According to this categorization, a principle of over-representation has
been in the administrative and judicial areas in Bosnia. For example, although the
demographic ratio of the three main national groups before the civil war is said to have been
Bosniac 39 percent, Serbian 32 percent and Croatian 18 percent,64 it is clear that, at central
government level, Croatian representation in the Parliamentary Assembly, Council of
Ministers, Assembly and Constitutional Court exceeded their minority population ratio.
Although this characteristic is the same as minorities in the Federation, in the cantons in
which comparatively discrete residential distributions are observed, a proportional
representation depending on population ratio has been introduced into the areas of
administration, legislation and the judiciary.

In Belgium and South Tyrol, the two participation systems described above are mixed as
seen in Table 5. For example, in South Tyrol, a proportional representation was applied to
administration in accordance with national proportions so that the allocation of government

62
Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence (Lexington Books, 2001), p. 48.
63
Schnekener, op.cit., p. 220.
64
Tsukimura, op.cit., p. 162.

32
positions was determined in proportion to the number of representatives of a segment or the
number of representatives elected from a political party. In addition to proportional
representation, over-representation can be introduced by a system of fixed allocation which is
applied to the number of public servants and governmental positions. Belgium adopted a
similar mixture of the two systems. In the Cabinet, a relatively mitigated form of
over-representation has been adopted in relation to public servants. The latter is a flexible
proportional representation termed an asymmetric appointment model formed within a long
history of segment confrontation.65 In Belgium, although there is no fixed allocation, a tacit
understanding results in a good balance of representative from both segments in positions or
status, and even though there is a traditional over-representation of persons from one segment
in specific public institutions, many representatives from the other segment obtain work in
other institutions. In contrast to the flexible system in Belgium, in Cyprus, an extremely strict
fixed allocation was adopted, 66 and has been indicated to represent one cause of the
segmental confrontation during the short period of application of a consociational system in
Cyprus. Naturally this confrontation was the result of a collision between the dissatisfaction
of a majority with a system which was extremely advantageous to minorities and minorities
holding onto those rights.

The dissatisfaction with a proportional representation in Bosnia caused serious political


turmoil. The confrontation between segments was clearly shown in problems associated with
the Council of Ministers as discussed above. The proportions of nationalities in the Council
of Ministers generated bitter national confrontation in the Parliamentary Assembly and the
Assembly and as discussed above, has a serious adverse effect on administrative and
legislative processes. In addition, the same type of confrontation of nationalities continued in
the Working Group for the reform of the Council of Ministers commenced in 1998. The
confrontation has been described as Serbians and Croatians attempting to stop strengthening
of the rights of the central government (expansion of the Council of Ministers) and Bosniacs
opposed to the equal allocations of positions to minority Croatians.67 As seen in Cyprus,
resolutions regarding the participation of each segment were important problems which shook
the foundations of the power sharing institutions and confrontation between minorities and
majorities with respect to over-representation is a necessary consequence. Mitigation of such
confrontation is thought to require the long-term formation of a balanced-participation
guarantee such as seen in the moderate proportional representation in Belgium without fixing
a strict proportional representation.

65
Schnekener, op.cit., p. 221.
66
Lijphart (1979) op.cit., p. 78. Although the population ratio in Cyprus at the time was Turkish 18 percent and
Greek 78 percent (four percent other minorities), the fixed allocation of seats in the Assembly was extremely
advantageous to minorities with Turkish 30 percent and Greek 70 percent.
67
Kei-ichi Hashimoto, Bosnia Herzegovina niokeru Minsyusyugi no Seijukudo, Gaimusyo Geppo, No. 2
(1999), pp. 52-53.

33
Table 5: Comparison of Proportional Representation Types
Belgium (1970) South Tyrol (1972) Cyprus (1960-63)
Schneckener Categorization Equality Principle Proportional System Fixed Allocation System
2. Preferential Treatment of Minorities Fixed Allocation System 2. Preferential Treatment of Minorities
1. Configuration Ratio
1. Configuration Ratio
(proportional representation) Even though a fixed allocation has not been Fixed allocation granted posts to minorities exceeding
2. Preferential Treatment of Minorities
determined over a long period of time, public population ratio, resulting in confrontation between
2. Preferential Treatment of Minorities
positions are filled by members of both segments and nationalities.
(over-representation)
there is a balance in posts in various public
Equality principle
institutions.
Fixed allocation system
Bosnian Government Federation Mixed-nationality Canton
(central government) (entity) (local)
Equality Principle Equality Principle Equality Principle
2. Preferential Treatment of Minorities 2. Preferential Treatment of Minorities 2. Preferential Treatment of Minorities

Broad-based guarantee of participation in public Broad-based guarantee of participation in public Broad-based guarantee of participation in public
administration by three main nationalities. administration by two main nationalities. administration by two main nationalities.
(Review of proportional system in both entities by (Review of proportional system in both entities by
constitutional amendments of 2002.) constitutional amendments of 2002.)
The author prepared the table referring to Footnote 11, 29, 36 and 42.

34
Bosnia implemented far-reaching reform of the Constitution in 2002. With respect to
participation in policymaking, the Constitutional Court in 2000 ruled that the current state of
inequality of the three nationalities was unconstitutional under the Bosnian Constitution, and
as a result, it was decided to introduce a new system by constitutional revision of the of the
Federation and Republic in April 2002.68 The constitutional reforms introduced a system of
over-representation at national level in order to guarantee participation of the three principal
nationalities in administration, legislation and the judiciary of both entities and, at the same
time, determined an allocation of positions to prevent a simple majority of a specific
nationality. With respect to administrative institutions, an allocation positions for the three
nationalities was determined based on the population ratios of the 1991 national census
before the civil war from municipal up to entity level. The effect of the reforms was
particularly conspicuous in the republic having a Serbian majority and can be expected to
promote the multi-nationality of the republic over the long term.

In this manner, various institutions are shown to exist in Bosnia against a background in
which the post-Dayton Bosnian political system did not function effectively and the political
state fell into turmoil and demonstrates that the importance of selection of a suitable system
for the effective functioning of power sharing. In addition, the institution can be shown to
contain elements leading to paralysis of national political operation and resulting in
destruction of the political system itself. However the type of political turmoil seen in Bosnia
is not always directly connected to a negation of power sharing. The differences seen in the
institutions at each level of the Bosnian administration and the differences arising from
comparison with cases from other institutions illustrate the risks associated with each
institution and at the same time demonstrate the possibility of effective application of a power
sharing model by suitable selection of institutions. In other words, the primary condition for
the application of power sharing as a model for peacebuilding and its effective functioning
requires selection of institutions in a form which are useful for the maintenance of a power
sharing system and suitable with reference to the background of the political society in
question.

3-2. Incentive Approach

When the Dayton Accord was established, it has been suggested that the international
community had misunderstood the Bosnian civil war. The misunderstanding was that the
principal cause of the Bosnian civil was incitement of the public by nationalist political
parties and, for that reason, it was the view of the international community that the Dayton
system should reduce support for nationalism which had drawn the war-weary population

68
For the details of the constitutional amendments, refer to The Office of High Representatives (OHR) Website,
Agreement on the Implementation of the Constituent Peoples Decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal/const/default.asp?content_id=7273, accessed November 1,
2002).

35
into civil war.69 However in reality, the nationalist elites did not disappear from the political
spectrum. To the contrary, support by the public for nationalist political parties was
strengthened by every confrontation with serious issues in relation to national interests and
such parties continued to perform at the ballot box contrary to the expectation of the
international community. On this point, there is a divergence of opinion in research on the
causes of national conflict. In a national conflict, since the public encounters threats to safety
and security, or is conscious of protecting interests, there is tendency for nationalist parties to
turn toward extreme nationalism.70 The same tendency has been noted in the Bosnian civil
war and the Dayton system had no effect on those relationships.

As a result, the international community introduced the incentive approach advocated


by Horowitz as a means of building reconciliation with the Bosnian elite. This approach
denies the premise of voluntary elite reconciliation in the sense of consociationalism, stands
on a premise of the difficulties associated with confrontational groups reaching a compromise
and therefore attempts to encourage conciliation by giving compromise remuneration to the
elites creating compromise between segments.71 OSCE applied this approach in Bosnia by
introduction into Bosnia of an election system termed PVS. However for several years, the
expected results were not achieved. The SNSD which had demonstrated concessions on the
road to compromise with the international community was supported. In spite of the view in
the international community that the introduction of PVS should be advantageous to the
SNSD, the SNSD was defeated.72 Analysis has demonstrated that the principal cause of the
victory nationalistic political parties was actually a reaction of the public to the intentions of
the international community.73 This view argues that many Serbs in the republic saw through
the intentions of the international community in supporting the SNSD by involvement in the
PVS system and reacted against this form of intervention by the international community
with the result that even Serbs who did not support the SDS voted for the SDS. However in
the Republic elections held at the same time, the SDS only obtained 44 percent support.74
These results demonstrate the residual doubts regarding the effectiveness of a strategy

69
Susan Woodward, Bosnia and Herzegovina in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars,
Insecurity, and Intervention (Columbia Press, 1999), p. 93. The premise in the international community that the
cause of the Bosnian civil war was the nationalist politicians and leaders who agitated the public created the
optimistic outlook that the Dayton system would enable the construction of a peaceful society of coexistence.
70
Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (Columbia Press, 1999), pp.
1-14.
71
ibid.
72
Bose (2002), op.cit., pp. 230-231.
73
ibid., pp. 231-232.
74
ibid. In addition to the reaction of the Serbs to the international community, the electoral behavior of the
Bosniacs has been implicated as a cause of the victory of the Serbian Democratic Party. In other words, the
number BOSS voters which are considered to be Bosniac supporters electing Serbian parties as second
preference candidates was only 288 of 8927. (Moreover only 70 percent of BOSS voters chose a second
preference party). Of the 288 persons who elected a Serbian party, although the SNSD which had a moderate
platform with respect to nationality questions was elected, this amounted to only three percent of BOSS voters.

36
promoting conciliation between elites using an election system as advocated by Horowitz.75

Actually there is a paper pointing out the many unresolved points in the results of AV
advocated by Horowitz. For example, Bangura argues with respect to AV that there are
difficulties in proving at the present time the effectiveness of a coexistent framework using a
means which operates via an election system, or so-called election engineering.76 More
specifically, let us examine the tendency already seen in multiparty system in regions or
nations conducting elections or the mixture of nationalities in the electoral zone. When AV
was introduced as PVS, as shown by the results of the election, the Republic had already
developed a multiparty system. However the Republic was in a state in which human rights
were violated including reports of harassment of non-Serbs after the civil war and the effect
of ethnic cleansing during the civil war and approximately five sixths of voters were Serbian.
Moreover many non-Serbian voters were still encountering difficulties returning to the
Republic and were forced to vote while not living in the Republic. In view of this situation,
NGOs such as the International Crisis Group advocated multiple elections conducted
throughout Bosnia and expressed doubts regarding the effectiveness of AV.77

The emergence of democracy by power sharing requires free and fair elections. For that
reason, conditions must be added to power sharing so that the public is receptive to
coexistence and selects political elites via the election process which is receptive to
compromise with other segments. As clearly shown by the results for PVS above, even when
a means for reaching conciliation among the powerful elites is introduced by the international
community, the public will reject coexistence and it can be concluded that power sharing will
not function as long as nationalist political parties which reject compromise with other
segments are supported.

CONCLUSION

As shown in the Bosnian case, it is a challenge for the international community to support
building coexistent societies by introducing power sharing model in divided societies.
However, some cases indicate the power sharing approach was an only possible choice left in
a long process of peacemaking or peacebuilding because the power sharing resolution could
make all the confronting parties reach the peace settlement.78 For example, the North Ireland
failed in its conflict resolution of power sharing approach in the 1970s, however, they agreed
to introduce power sharing model again for its peace settlement in 1998. Therefore, there is a

75
ibid. However the results of the introduction of AV in Bosnia also suggest the contrary analysis that AV
promoted nationalist solidarity. As advocated by Horowitz, election behavior which exceeds national boundaries
such as voting for parties of other nationalities is required in order for an electoral system to promote
conciliation among the elites.
76
Bangura, op.cit., p. 162.
77
Bose (2002), op.cit., p. 222.
78
Mine, op.cit., p. 124.

37
possibility that the introduction of power sharing approach is effective for peacemaking and
peacebuilding in cases in Afrasia. So what can we learn from the Bosnian case?

This paper identifies the three problems of power sharing approach for peacebuilding.
First, there are various institutional options with power sharing characteristics but the power
sharing system with inappropriate institutional selection does not work for stable political
reconstruction. Second, the power sharing approach has not proposed an effective mechanism
for promoting political elite cooperation yet. Third, power sharing has not presented a clear
approach for developing peoples support for coexistent societies. This paper presents below
some lessons for functional introduction of power sharing approach in divided society
focusing on the above three problems.

As for the issue of institutional selection, the first problem of power sharing approach
mentioned above, the lessons learnt from Bosnia can be said the appropriate process of
institutional design is a crucial condition for functional system. For that, the persons with
decision making authority must have or be provided the knowledge about institutional
options. In addition, Horowitz recommends the situation that a limited number of the central
players with decision making power participate in the negotiation processes is preferable for a
better outcome.79 He also mentions that the parties of conflict should hold the rights to reject
or revise the constitutional design proposed by outsiders when it is not preferable for the
parties or not appropriate for the local situation in the case that the parties of conflict can not
participate in the processes.80 In addition, it is argued that a constitution should be revised
with flexibility based on the outcomes of various institution implementations. In the case of
Bosnia each representative of the main three nations signed the peace settlement, however,
did not get involved in drafting the constitution. Moreover, two of the representatives were
non-Bosnian citizens, who were Slobodan Milosevic (the former president of Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia) and Franjo Tudman (the former president of Croatia), except Alija
Izetbegovic (the former leader of Bosnian Muslim party), a Bosnian representative. That is to
say, the Dayton Accord as well as the new constitution was settled without the consensus of
one state among the Bosnian citizens. Sumantra Bose mentions the Dayton settlement ran
the risk of satisfying none of the three Bosnian peoples because the survey indicates that all
three nations do not accept the solution of a multiethnic state.81 However, the constitution
prohibited to revise its framework in post-Dayton Bosnia. Even though a specific rule of the
constitution brought about troubles to the parliamentary procedures and became an
obstruction for democratization processes, it could not be revised and this worsened the
political paralysis in Bosnia.

The issues of elite cooperation and peoples support for coexistence, the second and third

79
Horowitz (2000), op.cit., p. 19.
80
ibid.
81
Sumantra Bose, The Bosnian State a Decade after Dayton, International Peace Keeping (Autumn 2005), p.
4.

38
problem of power sharing approach are interrelated as the Bosnian case indicates. The
political function was paralyzed in the post-Dayton Bosnia due to the clash antagonisms
between the political elites of each three nation. It was the result of interrelation between the
political elites and people as the political elites clarified their national identity which harm a
coexistence society and exited their hostilities or inspired fears toward the other nations, and
therefore, people supported the nationalistic political elites. The Bosnian case shows us that
peoples support for a coexistent society is an inevitable condition to make political elites
cooperate each other. In sum, the approach to develop peoples support for a coexistent
society is necessary for a functional power sharing system. The approach includes various
activities such as economical and social assistances to improve peoples lives in the local
community promoting coexistence by international and regional institutions as well as non
governmental organizations. Therefore, this paper concludes the power sharing approach
becomes more effective with the approach focusing on local communities.

In addition, it is crucial to increase communications between groups to solve the third


problem mentioned above because it is significant to develop a support for the political
parties which crossover the segmental boarders as Horowitz highlights the significance in his
incentive approach. Coexistence between segmentations means people accept to live with
their enemy at the point in postconflict regions. The cultural approach also argues the
significance of communication between confronting groups. For example, John Paul
Lederach highlights the importance of reconciliation among people and focuses on the role
of middle hierarchy influencing people in the communities such as the persons in religious
positions or elders in traditional communities.82 He expects that the middle hierarchy can
make a progress of the peacebuilding processes by promoting reconciliation between
segmentations. In Afrasian region, where these traditional roles still have a meaning, the
approach seems to be significant. Moreover, it should be important to foster the overarching
loyalties as one state to compensate the third problem of power sharing approach.83

At last, a question is raised whether the power sharing model which has been developed
in western countries for decades work in non-western countries. Some scholars highlight that
Asian states have not gone through the same historical processes of political development as
western countries.84 The Bosnian case provides the answer that at least it is necessary to
pursuit a new model which is appropriate for each situation though the knowledge and
experiences of the existing institutions are useful and significant as Horowitz mentions.85
That is to say, the tailor-mades institutional model is required, which Reilly also advocates
82
John Paul Lederach, Building Peace (United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).
83
Lijphart (1979), op.cit., p. 105. For example, one of the High Representatives mentions that possibly the
Bosnian peoples fears to the foreign countries might foster the overarching identity of Bosnia as one state.
Furthermore, overarching loyalties might be influenced by the existence of powerful political parties beyond
the segmentations, as Bose writes that it is crucial whether a divided society can develop several political parties
beyond the national or ethnic boarders as the political drive of a state. Bose (2002), op.cit., p. 209.
84
Ikuo Iwasaki, Asia Seiji toha Nanika (What is Asian Politics?) (Chuo Sosyo, 2009), p. 1.
85
Horowitz (1999b), op.cit., pp. 2-3.

39
a hybrid between various existing models suitable for the conditions of relevant states.86 As
the case of post-Dayton Bosnia indicates, the international community needs the art to
transfer from war-torn states to coexistence states, however, it has not learnt it yet.87 The
international community must learn it gradually by progressive strategy. As Dahl mentions
the possibility of the progressive strategy, human beings can pursue not perfect but
satisfactory resolutions by improving previous problems with continues steps of revisions.88

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Yoshio Kawamura and Zhan Jin, WTO/FTA and the Issues of Regional Disparity
No.5 (2006)
Shinichi Takeuchi, Political Liberalization or Armed Conflicts? Political Changes in
Post-Cold War Africa
No.6 (2006)
Daniel C. Bach, Regional Governance and State Reconstruction in Africa
No.7 (2006)
Eghosa E. Osaghae, Ethnicity and the State in Africa
No.8 (2006)
Kazuo Takahashi, The Kurdish Situation in Iraq
No.9 (2006)
Kaoru Sugihara, East Asia, Middle East and the World Economy: Further Notes on the Oil
Triangle
No.10 (2006)
Kosuke Shimizu, Discourses of Leadership and Japanese Political Economy: Three
Phallus-centrists
No.11 (2006)
Nao Sato, The Composition and Job Structure of Female-Headed Households: A Case Study of
a Rural Village in Siemreap Province, Cambodia
No.12 (2006)
Takuya Misu, The United States and the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
No.13 (2006)
Om Prakash, Asia and the Rise of the Early Modern World Economy
No.14 (2006)
Takehiko Ochiai, Regional Security in Africa
No.15 (2006)
Masahisa Kawabata, An Overview of the Debate on the African State
No.16 (2006)
Kazuo Takahashi, The Middle East, the Middle Kingdom and Japan
No.17 (2006)
Tomoya Suzuki, Macroeconomic Impacts of Terrorism: Evidence from Indonesia in the
Post-Suharto Era
No.18 (2007)
Kenichi Matsui, International Energy Regime: Role of Knowledge and Energy and Climate
Change Issues
No.19 (2007)
Kazuo Takahashi, Not the Most Popular Decision: Japans Ground Self Defense Force Goes to
Iraq
No.20 (forthcoming)
Shinya Ishizaka, Leader-Follower Relations in the Foot Marches in Gandhian Environmental
Movements in India
No.21 (2007)
Yoshio Kawamura, Participatory Community Development and a Role of Social Statistical
Analysis: Case of the JICA-Indonesia ProjectTakalar Model
No.22 (2007)
Takashi Inoguchi, The Place of the United States in the Triangle of Japan, China and India
No.23 (forthcoming)
Kosuke Shimizu, Asian Regionalism and Japans Unforgettable Past
No.24 (2007)
Kosuke Shimizu, Human Security, Universality, and National Interest: A Critical Inquiry
No.25 (2007)
Franois Debrix, The Hegemony of Tabloid Geopolitics: How America and the West Cannot
Think International Relations beyond Conflict, Identity, and Cultural Imposition
No.26 (2007)
Naomi Hosoda, The Social Process of Migration from the Eastern Visayas to Manila
No.27 (2007)
Chizuko Sato, Forced Removals, Land Struggles and Restoration of Land in South Africa: A
Case of Roosboom
No.28 (2007)
Michael Furmanovsky, Reconciliation, Restitution and Healing: The Role of Vietnam Veterans
in Facilitating a New Era in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, 1985-2005
No.29 (2007)
Hiroyuki Torigoe, Land Ownership for the Preservation of Environment and Livelihood
No.30 (2007)
Kokki Goto (Edited, Annotated, and with an Introduction by Motoko Shimagami), Iriai
Forests Have Sustained the Livelihood and Autonomy of Villagers: Experience of Commons in
Ishimushiro Hamlet in Northeastern Japan
No.31 (2007)
Kazuo Kobayashi, The Invention of Tradition in Java under the Japanese Occupation: The
Tonarigumi System and Gotong Royong
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Benedict Anderson, Useful or Useless Relics: Todays Strange Monarchies

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Pauline Kent, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: The Use of Radical Comparisons to
Enhance Mutual Understanding
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Naomi Hosoda, Towards a Cultural Interpretation of Migration in the Philippines: Focusing
on Value-Rationality and Capitalism
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Anan Ganjanapan, Multiplicity of Community Forestry as Knowledge Space in the Northern
Thai Highlands
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Shinji Suzuki, The Increasing Enclosure of Mangrove Wetlands: Towards Resource
Management in Development Frontiers
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Akiko Watanabe, Migration and Mosques: The Evolution and Transformation of Muslim
Communities in Manila, the Philippines
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Acharawan Isarangkura Na Ayuthaya and Senjo Nakai, The Emergence and Development of
Interfaith Cooperation: A Case Study of the Theravada Buddhist Advocacy for People Living
with HIV/AIDS (PWA) in Upper Northern Thailand
No.39 (2009)
Jeremy Rappleye, Decline of the Tokyo Technocrats in Educational Policy Formation?
Exploring the Loss of Ministry Autonomy and Recent Policy Trends with Reference to
Globalisation and Educational Transfer
No.40 (2009)
Robert Aspinall, The New Three Rs of Education in Japan: Rights, Risk, and Responsibility
No.41 (2009)
Takehiko Ochiai, Personal Rule in Nigeria
No.42 (2009)
Toru Sagawa, Why Do People Renounce War? The War Experience of the Daasanach of the
Conflict-ridden Region of Northeast Africa
No.43 (2009)
Aysun Uyar, Political Configuration of Thailands Free Trade Agreements within the
Framework of Southeast Asian Regional Economic Cooperation
No.44 (2009)
Kosuke Shimizu, Nishida Kitaro and Japans Interwar Foreign Policy: War Involvement and
Culturalist Political Discourse
No.45 (2009)
Julian Chapple, Increasing Migration and Diversity in Japan: The Need for Dialogue and
Collaboration in Education, Language and Identity Policies
No.46 (2009)
Motoko Shimagami, An Iriai Interchange Linking Japan and Indonesia: An Experiment in Practical
Collaborative Research leading toward Community-Based Forest Management
No.47 (2009)
Nakamura Hisashi, Social Development and Conflict Resolution; as Seen by an Unorthodox Economist
No.48 (2009)
Tomoko Matsui, The Narrative Strategies and Multilayered Realities of Returnee Workers: A Case Study
of Thai Returnee Workers from Japan
No.49 (2009)
Yoshio Kawamura, Framework on Socio-economic Mechanism of Emigration in the Pre-war Japan
No.50 (2009)
Yoshio Kawamura, Socioeconomic Factor Structure of Japanese Emigrant Communities: A Statistical
Case Study at Inukami County, Shiga Prefecture, in the Meiji Era
No.51 (2009)
David Blake Willis, A Nation at Risk, A Nation in Need of Dialogue: Citizenship, Denizenship, and
Beyond in Japanese Education
No.52 (forthcoming)
Shinya Ishizaka, Non-violent Means of Conflict Resolution in the Chipko (Forest Protection) Movement
in India
No.53 (2009)
Shinji Suzuki, Illegal Logging in Southeast Asia
No.54 (2009)
Fuping Li, The Current Issues and Development Process of Poverty in China
No.55 (2009)
Shinichi Takeuchi, Conflict and Land Tenure in Rwanda
No.56 (2009)
Katsumi Ishizuka, The Impact of UN Peace-building Efforts on the Justice System of Timor-Leste:
Western versus Traditional Cultures
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Kazuo Funahashi, Changes in Income among Peasants in Northeast Thailand: Poverty Reduction Seen
Through a Panel Analysis
No.58 (2009)
Kazue Demachi, Japanese Foreign Assistance to Africa: Aid and Trade
No.59 (2009)
Akio Nishiura, Determinants of South African Outward Direct Investment in Africa
No.60 (2009)
Ryosuke Sato, Discontinuity of International Law with the National Reconciliation Process An
analysis of the transitional amnesty mechanism of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South
Africa
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Kazuya Masuda, The Reconstitution of Adat in a Dual Level Land Conflict: A case study of a village
community under forest development schemes in Sumatra, Indonesia
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Kyoko Cross, Harmonizing Local with Global Justice: Emergence of a Hybrid Institutional Mechanism
for Reconciliation in East Timor
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Tomoaki Ueda, Institution and Ideal in Indian Nationalist Thoughts: G. K. Gokhale in Comparison with
M. K. Gandhi
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William Bradley, Educational Policy in 21st Century Japan: Neoliberalism and Beyond?
No.65 (2010)
Kosuke Shimizu, Structural Violence and Human Security
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Misa Shojiya, Democratization in a Divided Society Outcomes and Issues in International Assistance
Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies
Ryukoku University
1-5 Yokotani, Seta, Oe-cho, Otsu,
Shiga, JAPAN
ISBN 978-4-903625-43-0