LEE HONG KOK vs.

DAVID

FACTS:

Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which
an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent (*similar to public auction) was made by the Director
of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892.

On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No.
510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City on October 21, 1959.

Land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources have always sustained the public character for having been formed by reclamation (as
opposed to peittioners contention that it is accretion)

The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud - But there was no fraud in this case

ISSUES:

W/N Lee Hong Kok can question the grant. - NO

W/N David has original acquisition of title. - YES

HELD: Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal justification for nullifying the right of David to the disputed lot
arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials)

Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. The
legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. Private parties like the plaintiffs
cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered
owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after
claiming it as their private property.

Well-settled Rule : no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the government
Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an
owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in
addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of
5 years.

Imperium v. Dominium

Imperium - government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept
of sovereignty

Dominium - capacity to own or acquire property. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands
held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use
of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs IAC

FACTS:

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and
Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land

possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan

land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members
of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements

ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government
when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela

donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela

IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of

ISSUES:

W/N the land is already a private land - YES

W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies-
NO

HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc

YES

already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient

it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption

The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent.

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred
by the decree, if not by earlier law

2. NO

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also
be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition

The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

TELECOMMUNICATIONS vs. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an
organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal
standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from
actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had
the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television
broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec
Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of
all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television
stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of
campaign.

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in
newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by
COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
connection with the 1992 presidential electionand 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even
more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of
the radio and television stations is the sale of airtime to advertisers and to require these stations to provide
free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost
P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to
lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time
daily for such.

Issues:

(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal
protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and
without just compensation.

Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is
licensed by the government. Airwavefrequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who
want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and televisionbroadcasting companies, which
are given franchises, do not own theairwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast
signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the
state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against
newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may
provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds
which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for
COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the
requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

Republic vs Imperial

FACTS:
On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 408 (500)
pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of then Court of First Instance of Albay. OCT No. 55173 was subdivided and
further subdivided resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are now the subjects of herein petition
in the name of private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a case with the trial court to
judicially declare the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) issued to herein private respondents null and void
on the ground that the subject land, on which the OCT was based, has the features of a foreshore land
based on an investigation conducted by the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City. Respondents, on the other
hand contend that Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed
from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area."

Within the time for pleading, private respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and Salvador
Alcazar filed their answer with cross-claim, while the rest, namely, Felix S. Imperial, Feliza S. Imperial, Elias
S. Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to dismiss. They contended that the adjudication by the
cadastral court is binding against the whole world including the Republic since the cadastral proceedings
are in rem and the government itself through the Director of Lands instituted the proceedings and was a
direct and active participant therein. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an objection
to the motion to dismiss. After hearing the motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the judgment rendered by the cadastral court in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88 and the Courts resolution
in the petition to quiet title, G.R. 85770, both decreed that the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500)
was not foreshore. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and for failure to file the appellants brief within the extended
period granted to petitioner.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.

HELD: Yes.
At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in question are foreshore lands. Foreshore
land is a part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not
otherwise. It was defined as "that part (of the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the
flux and reflux of the tides." It is also known as "a strip of land that lies between the high and low water
marks and, is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide."

The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government, specifically the
director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau). The decision of the director of lands
when approved by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle behind this ruling is that the
subject has been exhaustively weighed and discussed and must therefore be given credit. This doctrine
finds no application, however, when the decision of the director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict with
that of, the DENR Secretary.

There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, in the
present case. Respondents contend that the Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT
No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area." Petitioner,
on the other hand, claims that subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, disclosed
that the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) from whence the titles were derived "has the features of a
foreshore land." The contradictory views of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City,
on the true nature of the land, which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by the RTC, cannot
be the premise of any conclusive classification of the land involved.

The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner's reversion efforts
are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the
third and fourth motions for extension to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's appeal presents an exceptional
circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given due course.

Petitioner Republic assailed the dismissal of its appeal on purely technical grounds. Petitioner also alleged
that it has raised meritorious grounds which, if not allowed to be laid down before the proper Court, will
result to the prejudice of, and irreparable injury to, public interest, as the Government would lose its
opportunity to recover what it believes to be non-registerable lands of the public domain.

The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court ruled that the question of what constitutes good and
sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court. It has the power to
relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrants
or when the purpose of justice requires it. In the case at bar, the need to determine once and for all whether
the lands subject of petitioners reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause
for relaxing the procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extensions to file appellants
brief. Petitioner Republics appeal presented an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest
which in the Courts discretion must be given due course.

ONG CHING PO vs COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Petitioner and respondent disputed over a parcel of land. Respondent contends that she bought the
said land from a certain Ong Joi Jong, evidenced by a notarized deed of sale; and entrusted the
administration of the same to petitioner, a Chinese citizen and the brother of respondents husband.
Petitioner on the other hand claims that she bought the disputed land from the same vendor and the sale
is evidenced by a photocopy of a deed of sale.

Issue: WON an alien may acquire lands in the Philippines by virtue of a Deed of Sale.

Held: No. Whether or not said deed of sale is genuine, the Constitution provides that aliens, whether
individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands, hence disqualified also in
acquiring private lands.

Gamboa v. Teves etal., GR No. 176579, October 9, 2012

Facts:

The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost 12 million
shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus,
First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby
increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner contends
that it violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation of public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not
more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in favor of the petitioner, hence this new case,
resolving the motion for reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term capital in its 2011 decision?

Held/Reason: The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy of developing an
economyeffectively controlled by Filipinos. Asserting the ideals that our Constitutions Preamble want to
achieve, that is to conserve and develop our patrimony , hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-
controlled economy. In the 2011 decision, the Court finds no wrong in the construction of the term capital
which refers to the shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership (Art. 12, sec. 10)
which implies that the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with benefits, is tantamount to an
effective control.Therefore, the Courts interpretation of the term capital was not erroneous. Thus, the
motion for reconsideration is denied.

ROY vs HERBOSA

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This is a case of special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 2013 (SEC-MC No. 8)issued by the SEC for allegedly being
in violation of the Court's Decision ("Gamboa Decision") and Resolution ("Gamboa Resolution") in Gamboa
v. Finance Secretary Teves, G.R. No. 176579 which jurisprudentially established the proper interpretation
of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.

On June 28, 2011, the Court issued the Gamboa Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in
the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and non-
voting preferred shares). Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission is
DIRECTED to apply this definition of the term "capital" in determining the extent of allowable foreign
ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.

On May 20, 2013, the SEC, through Chairperson Herbosa, issued SEC-MC No. 8 entitled
"Guidelines on Compliance with the Filipino-Foreign Ownership Requirements Prescribed in the
Constitution and/or Existing Laws by Corporations Engaged in Nationalized and Partly Nationalized
Activities." Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8 provides:

Section 2. All covered corporations shall, at all times, observe the constitutional or statutory ownership
requirement. For purposes of determining compliance therewith, the required percentage of Filipino
ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in
the election of directors; AND (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to
vote in the election of directors.

On June 10, 2013, Roy, as a lawyer and taxpayer, filed the Petition, assailing the validity of SEC-
MC No. 8 for not conforming to the letter and spirit of the Gamboa Decision and Resolution and for having
been issued by the SEC with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner Roy also questions the ruling of the SEC
that respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company ("PLDT") is compliant with the constitutional
rule on foreign ownership. He prays that the Court declare SEC-MC No. 8 unconstitutional and direct the
SEC to issue new guidelines regarding the determination of compliance with Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution in accordance with Gamboa.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance, i.e., he
has a personal and substantial interest in the case that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the act or issuance

RULING:

Petitioners have no legal standing to question the constitutionality of SEC-MC No. 8. The personal
and substantial interest that enables a party to have legal standing is one that is both material, an interest
in issue and to be affected by the government action, as distinguished from mere interest in the issue
involved, or a mere incidental interest, and real, which means a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.

As to injury, the party must show that (1) he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

To establish his standing, petitioner Roy merely claimed that he has standing to question SEC-MC
No. 8 "as a concerned citizen, an officer of the Court and as a taxpayer" as well as "the senior law partner
of his own law firm[, which] x x x is a subscriber of PLDT."
 The Court has previously emphasized that the locus standi requisite is not met by the expedient
invocation of one's citizenship or membership in the bar who has an interest in ensuring that laws and
orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued as these supposed interests are too
general, which are shared by other groups and by the whole citizenry. Per their allegations, the personal
interest invoked by petitioners as citizens and members of the bar in the validity or invalidity of SEC-MC
No. 8 is at best equivocal, and totally insufficient.

Petitioners' status as taxpayers is also of no moment. As often reiterated by the Court, a taxpayer's
suit is allowed only when the petitioner has demonstrated the direct correlation of the act complained of
and the disbursement of public funds in contravention of law or the Constitution, or has shown that the case
involves the exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress. SEC-MC No. 8 does not involve an
additional expenditure of public funds and the taxing or spending power of Congress.

The allegation that petitioner Roy's law firm is a "subscriber of PLDT" is ambiguous. It is unclear
whether his law firm is a "subscriber" of PLDT's shares of stock or of its various telecommunication services.
Petitioner Roy has not identified the specific direct and substantial injury he or his law firm stands to suffer
as "subscriber of PLDT" as a result of the issuance of SEC-MC No. 8 and its enforcement. Moreover, in the
most practical sense, a PLDT subscriber loses or gains nothing in the event that SEC-MC No. 8 is either
sustained or struck down by [the Court].

SECRETARY vs. MAYOR YAP

FACTS:

This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.

On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist
zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified
as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the
Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE:

Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore
making these lands alienable.

HELD:

No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order,
an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or
statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of
state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.