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Flight Safety

D I G E S T
SEPTEMBER 2004

Charts Raise Pilot


Awareness of Minimum
Vectoring Altitudes
Flight Safety Foundation
Flight Safety Digest
For Everyone Concerned With the Safety of Flight
Vol. 23 No. 9 September 2004
www.flightsafety.org

OFFICERS AND STAFF

Chairman, Board of Governors


President and CEO
Executive Vice President
Hon. Carl W. Vogt
Stuart Matthews
Robert H. Vandel
In This Issue
Treasurer James S. Waugh Jr.
Charts Raise Pilot Awareness of
ADMINISTRATIVE
Minimum Vectoring Altitudes
Manager, Support Services Linda Crowley Horger
At least 158 paper charts published by 34 civil aviation
FINANCIAL authorities currently provide advisory information about
minimum vectoring altitudes to pilots. Newly released data
Director of Finance
for 374 U.S. MVA charts should encourage development of
and Administration Crystal N. Phillips
electronic versions that will help to prevent controlled flight
Accountant Millicent Wheeler
1 into terrain.
MEMBERSHIP

Director, Membership Approach-and-landing Accident


and Development Ann Hill
Severity Decreases in 2003 for STATS
Membership Services
Coordinator Ahlam Wahdan Large Commercial Jets
Although approach-and-landing accidents (ALAs) continued to
PUBLICATIONS
be the largest accident category for the worldwide commercial jet
Director of Publications
Senior Editor
Roger Rozelle
Mark Lacagnina
fleet, ALAs produced a smaller percentage of total fatalities and a
smaller percentage of total hull-loss accidents than in 2002.
29
Senior Editor Wayne Rosenkrans
Senior Editor Linda Werfelman
Crew Resource Management Is
RY

Associate Editor Rick Darby


Called a Human-tech Success Story
A

Web and Print


R

Production Coordinator Karen K. Ehrlich Advanced technology, says The Human Factor, is often poorly
B

Production Designer Ann L. Mullikin designed for the people who work with it. The author finds
LI

Production Specialist Susan D. Reed that, although aviation has its man vs. machine conflicts, the
Librarian, Jerry Lederer
Aviation Safety Library Patricia Setze
34 industry has made progress in taming them.

Leaking Fuel Tank in Boeing 777


TECHNICAL
39
BRIEFS
Director of Technical Programs James M. Burin Prompts Return to Airport
Technical Programs Specialist Joanne Anderson The report by the U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch said
Managing Director of that the purge door for the center fuel tank was not installed.
Internal Evaluation Programs Louis A. Sorrentino III
Q-Star Program Administrator Robert Feeler
Manager, Data Systems
and Analysis Robert Dodd, Ph.D.
Manager of Aviation
Safety Audits Darol V. Holsman

Founder Jerome Lederer


19022004

Flight Safety Foundation is an international membership organization


dedicated to the continuous improvement of aviation safety. Nonprofit
and independent, the Foundation was launched officially in 1947 in
response to the aviation industrys need for a neutral clearinghouse to
disseminate objective safety information, and for a credible and knowl-
edgeable body that would identify threats to safety, analyze the problems
and recommend practical solutions to them. Since its beginning, the
Foundation has acted in the public interest to produce positive influence
on aviation safety. Today, the Foundation provides leadership to more
than 910 member organizations in more than 142 countries.
Cover photo: Copyright 2004 Matton
VE C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S
Copyright 2004 Getty Images Inc.

Charts Raise Pilot Awareness of


Minimum Vectoring Altitudes
At least 158 paper charts published by 34 civil aviation authorities currently provide
advisory information about minimum vectoring altitudes to pilots. Newly released data
for 374 U.S. MVA charts should encourage development of electronic versions that will
help to prevent controlled flight into terrain.

FSF EDITORIAL STAFF

A
lthough the use of minimum vectoring Radar vectoring is common during IFR opera-
altitudes (MVAs) by air traffic control tions in terminal areas within the vicinity of one
(ATC) facilities has been familiar to or more major airports, and increases as more
pilots for decades, civil aviation au- aircraft are equipped to conduct area-navigation
thorities vary as to whether they publish this infor- (RNAV) operations off the routes published on
mation to enable pilots to anticipate assignment IFR charts. During normal flight operations, pilots
of altitudes below those depicted on instrument may be told by the radar controller or may not
flight rules (IFR) navigation charts. Various terms be told that the MVA has been offered to them
and definitions are used for these predefined alti- during approach or departure.1
tudes. Charts that depict these altitudes also have
been offered as a method for pilots to cross-check During the past 35 years, civil aviation authorities
assigned altitudes during radar vectoring under increasingly have published paper charts in their
IFR in controlled airspace. aeronautical information publications (AIPs)2 so

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 1


V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

that controllers and pilots have the same informa- global positioning system (GPS) and flight man-
tion about MVAs. Some contain procedures to be agement system (FMS), it is now possible to display
used for loss of ATCpilot communication during MVA information in an electronic form on the flight
radar vectoring. deck. The one missing action is for ATC to make this
information available to pilots who want or need
Paper charts depicting MVAs are available to pilots it. The [working group] strongly recommends that
from Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; MVA information be made available for use.3
Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Czech Republic;
Ecuador; Egypt; France; Germany; Greece; India; The working group said that its conclusion and
Indonesia; Iran; Israel; Italy; Jordan; Malaysia; recommendation were based on the following
Mexico; Oman; Panama; Philippines; Poland; reasons: Currently there is a hazardous discon-
Portugal; Russia; Slovenia; Spain; Taiwan, China; nect between the vectoring charts used by the
Tunisia; Turkey; Ukraine; United Kingdom; and air traffic controller and those available in the
Uruguay, according to August 2004 information cockpit. The pilot has minimum-sector-altitude
compiled in a Jeppesen database (Appendix A, (MSA) charts that provide the lowest usable al-
page 23). The three countries with the largest titude in a sector surrounding an airport. These
number of such charts in this database were France charts are centered around radar-antenna sites,
(29 charts), Mexico (nine charts) and the United which in most cases are different from the center
Kingdom (41 charts). point of the MSA charts. As the MSA and MVA
charts are based on different criteria, a pilot can
Since the 1990s, aviation safety specialists, includ- become confused when vectored at an altitude
ing the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Approach- that is below the MSA charted altitude. The pilot
and-landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Task is not sure whether [he/she] is being radar vec-
Force, have said that the most important reason tored at an approved MVA altitude or whether
for shared awareness of MVAs is to help prevent a mistake has been made concerning the MSA.
controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). This is especially critical in high-density traffic
areas where radio congestion may preclude fur-
CFIT occurs when an airworthy aircraft under the ther and immediate clarification with ATC. This
control of the flight crew is flown unintentionally is a classic latent situation or enabling factor in
into terrain, obstacles or water, usually with no the potential error chain.
prior awareness by the crew. This type of accident
can occur during most phases of flight, but CFIT is The risk of CFIT during ATC radar vectoring is
more common during the approach-and-landing minor but not negligible, said Don Bateman, a
phase, which begins when an airworthy aircraft member of the FSF ALAR Task Force and chief
under the control of the flight crew descends below engineer, Flight Safety Avionics, Honeywell
5,000 feet above ground level (AGL) with the in- International. His worldwide CFIT-accident data
tention to conduct an approach for transport category aircraft and reports of terrain
and ends when the landing is warnings help to shed light on the value of MVA
complete or the flight crew flies charts to pilots.4
the aircraft above 5,000 feet AGL
en route to another airport. The probability of an incorrect altitude assign-
ment in a radar vector, an incorrect aircraft posi-
Absence of vertical situation tion or ATC radar-vectoring the wrong airplane
awareness i.e., when pilots do seems very low, but these errors continue to
not know the relationship of the happen close calls occur every year, he said. I
airplane altitude to the surround- would be very surprised to find that an MVA chart
ing terrain, obstacles and intended was wrong, however. (See CHIRP, ASRS Reports
flight path has been identified Suggest Value of MVA Awareness, page 5.)
as a significant causal factor dur-
ing analysis of global CFIT acci- In some reported incidents, pilots have said that
dents. In 1997, one working group they received questionable radar vectors and that
of the FSF ALAR Task Force said, they avoided terrain either on their own or by
With the implementation of the receiving a terrain warning.

2 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


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In one example, an MVA chart would have been better ways for terrain aware-
very helpful to a captain who refused a radar ness. As one part of that research,
vector in Central America after realizing that MVA sectors were depicted on
the controller apparently had reversed aircraft some sample area charts and
call signs and was vectoring the wrong airplane, terrain shading was drawn on
Bateman said. This crew had been monitoring top of other IFR area charts
their enhanced ground-proximity warning system for Denver [Colorado, U.S.], a
[EGPWS] display, and one pilot said, Thats not mountainous terminal area.
right hes got us going right at that terrain
then the captain refused the vector and cor- The company conducted re-
rected the error. (Terrain awareness and warning search with airline pilots in
system [TAWS] is the term used by the European McDonnell Douglas DC-10
Joint Aviation Authorities and FAA to describe flight simulators. An instruc-
equipment meeting ICAO standards and recom- tor-captain conducted test-
mendations for GPWS equipment that provides flight scenarios that included
predictive terrain-hazard warnings; EGPWS and radar vectors around the area
ground collision avoidance system are other terms for approaches.
used to describe TAWS equipment.)
The instructor intentionally gave
Use of MVA charts on the flight deck should be the crew radar vectors that would
seen as another dimension of improving safety, direct the aircraft into terrain, Terpstra said. He
he said. then evaluated the crews ability to visualize whether
or not they were within the depicted MVA sector. We
Current paper MVA charts can add a layer of found that MVA charts printed over area charts were
safety in the cockpit by enabling a pilot to know quite difficult to use and so confusing that they were
what to expect in a given terminal area, which is not of value. Terrain depiction was much more vivid
preferable to the pilot having to blindly follow to a pilot compared with interpreting what was on
the controllers radar vector, he said. If ques- MVA charts. So we added the first colored terrain
tions come up about radar vectors, these MVA shading to our IFR area charts in 1976.
charts certainly can be related to aircraft position
with VOR DME [very high frequency omnidirec- The first terrain was depicted as shaded areas
tional range and distance-measuring equipment], called area minimum altitudes (AMAs), provid-
for example. It can be difficult for pilots to relate ing 1,000 feet of terrain/obstacle clearance for
the aircraft position to a paper MVA chart, how- aircraft operating at or below 6,000 feet mean sea
ever. Electronic MVA charts especially would be level (MSL) and providing 2,000 feet of terrain/
beneficial whenever the pilot is not too sure if the obstacle clearance for aircraft operating at 7,000
altitude assignment is OK. feet MSL or higher.

Air carriers have considered methods of improving Typically, pilots in the test-flight scenarios had dif-
terrain/obstacle awareness for pilots during radar ficulty in determining precisely where they were
vectoring for decades, said James Terpstra, another located during radar vectors to determine the
member of the FSF ALAR Task Force, who retired MVA sector.
in 2004 as senior vice president, flight information
technology and aviation affairs, Jeppesen.5 If crews tried to use VOR DME during radar vec-
tors, determining the MVA sector was almost im-
In the mid-1970s, Jeppesen Sanderson researched possible, Terpstra said. The principal reason was
terrain depiction on IFR charts because a U.S. air- that the center of the DME was not at the center of
line wanted us to put terrain on their charts for the radar-antenna site used to establish the circles,
terrain-challenged airports in Central America arcs and lines of MVA sectors. We never pursued
and South America, Terpstra said. When they this application of paper MVA charts with airlines
made the proposal during one of our airline semi- in the United States. That is one of the reasons why
nars, we began doing research into whether that there have been no paper MVA charts published for
really was the best method or whether there were pilots in the United States.

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V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

The intent in countries where MVA IFR obstacle criteria. It may be lower than PANSATM, Paragraph 8.6.8,
charts are published for pilots is to the public MEA [minimum en route IFR Minimum Levels, says, A radar
provide meaningful information, but I altitude] along an airway or J-route [jet controller shall at all times be in
am not sure how well paper MVA charts route] segment. It may be used for radar possession of full and up-to-date
work. In the United States, I believe that vectoring only upon the controllers de- information regarding established
the main issue was not complexity of termination that an adequate radar return minimum flight altitudes within
MVA charts, but rather the study that is being received from the aircraft being the area of responsibility; the
found that pilots then had great difficulty controlled. Charts depicting [MVAs] are lowest usable flight level or lev-
interpreting their position relative to the normally available only to the control- els ; and established minimum
MVA sectors during flight. ler and not to pilots.7 FAA defines an altitudes applicable to procedures
off-route vector as a vector used by based on tactical radar vectoring.
ATC which takes an aircraft off a previ- Criteria for the determination
ICAO Cites Ambiguity of ously assigned route. Altitudes assigned by of minimum altitudes applicable
Position During Vectoring ATC during such vectors provide required to procedures based on tactical
obstacle clearance. radar vectoring are contained

T he term minimum radar-vectoring


altitude is used by the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to
in Procedures for Air Navigation
ServicesAircraft Operations
(PANSOPS, [Document] 8168),
describe a predetermined altitude used Volume II, Part III, [paragraph
by ATC units for tactical radar vector- 24.2.2.3, Procedures Based on
ing, but the term is not defined in ICAO Tactical Vectoring];
Procedures for Air Navigation Services
Air Traffic Management (PANSATM, PANSATM, Chapter 4, General
Document 4444) or in PANSOperations Provisions for Air Traffic Services
(PANSOPS, Document 8168, Volume [ATS], paragraph 4.10.3,Minimum
II, Part III, Chapter 24, Procedures Cruising Level for IFR Flights, says,
Based on Tactical Vectoring). General Except when specifically authorized
principles for providing radar-vector- by the appropriate authority, cruis-
ing information to pilots were recom- ing levels below the minimum
mended by the ICAO 6th Air Navigation flight altitudes established by the
Commission in 1969 and by the U.K. state shall not be assigned. The
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Terrain objectives of air traffic control
Clearance Working Group in 1976. (Civil service as prescribed in [ICAO]
aviation authorities may use other terms Annex 11 [Air Traffic Services] do
and definitions in regulations that refer to not include the prevention of col-
similar requirements for radar-vectoring Other ICAO documents relevant to lision with terrain. The procedures
IFR aircraft.) discussion of pilot awareness of MVAs described in this document do not
include the following: therefore relieve the pilots of their
For example, in the United Kingdom, responsibility to ensure that any
U.K. CAA defines a radar vectoring PANSATM, Paragraph 8.6.5.2, says, clearance issued by air traffic control
area as a defined area in the vicinity When vectoring an IFR flight, the units is safe in this respect, except
of an aerodrome, in which the minimum radar controller shall issue clearances when an IFR flight is vectored by
safe levels allocated by a radar control- such that the prescribed obstacle clear- radar; and,
ler vectoring IFR flights have been ance shall exist at all times until the air-
predetermined.6 craft reaches the point where the pilot PANSATM, section 8.3, Com-
will resume own navigation. When munications, says, The level of
In the United States, the Federal Aviation necessary, the [MVA] shall include a [ATC] reliability and availability of
Administration (FAA) defines MVA as correction for low-temperature effect. communications systems shall be
The lowest MSL [mean sea level] altitude When an IFR flight is being vectored, such that the possibility of system
at which IFR aircraft will be vectored by a the pilot is often unable to determine failures or significant degradations
radar controller, except as otherwise au- the aircrafts exact position and conse- is very remote. Adequate backup
thorized for radar approaches, departures quently the altitude which provides the facilities shall be provided.
and missed approaches. The altitude meets required obstacle clearance; Continued on page 6

4 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


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CHIRP, ASRS Reports Suggest Value of MVA Awareness

controllermanship sometimes.

T
he following reports describe (CHIRP Report no. 2406, June 5,
circumstances in which pilot 2000) (CHIRP Report no. 2438, July 20,
awareness of minimum vectoring 2000)
altitude (MVA) might be beneficial for Departure [from European airport
safety: omitted by CHIRP] was via SID During flight from San Diego
[standard instrument departure] [California, U.S.] International Airport
The air traffic controller [in a previous from Runway 22L, with stop height to Ontario [California] International
letter published by CHIRP1] asks 4,000 feet. This entails a straight- Airport [in a Boeing 757-200], ATC
why the pilot descended below ahead climb to 4.0 nautical miles [7.4 issued clearance to fly heading 275
MSA [minimum sector altitude] kilometers] from the [identification degrees, radar vector to BONDO
when asked to do so by ATC omitted by CHIRP] VOR DME, intersection, direct HDF, direct
[air traffic control]. [The controller followed by a right turn downwind PETIS NDB [nondirectional beacon],
said,] MSAs are published on the to pick up a northerly track from direct Ontario. Outside PETIS NDB,
approach plates, so why didnt the the VOR to AAA. The MSA within the crew was given clearance to fly
crew query the altitude given? I 25 nautical miles [46 kilometers] to heading 340 degrees for vectors to
have heard this one once too often. the north of the airfield is 8,500 feet; join Localizer Runway 26L approach
Pilots descend below MSA on almost beyond that, minimum IFR levels to Ontario and a descent to 4,200
every flight they make, as a matter of [altitudes] rise to Flight Level (FL) 100 feet. After leveling at 4,200 feet, the
routine, you would not get into alpine [approximately 10,000 feet]. Passing crew received an EGPWS [enhanced
[mountainous] airports any other way. abeam the field on the downwind leg, ground-proximity warning system]
Even in lowland areas like [airport I thought that further climb might be Terrain, Terrain. Pull Up. warning.
omitted by CHIRP], the MSA is 3,500 desirable, as we were heading for this The captain, who was the pilot flying,
[feet] and the usual clearance is to high ground which was partially (say, complied and immediately climbed
1,850 [feet]. Some pilots declare the scattered to broken) cloud covered. to 5,000 feet where the warning
radar-vectoring minima to be a better After a pause, clearance was given stopped. ATC was notified and the
rule to follow, but not only are the to climb to FL 130. Some moments flight proceeded to Ontario with no
jagged edges of these areas [sectors later, ATC requested whether we further [problem]. Upon descent
on U.K. radar-vectoring-area charts] were in visual contact with the into the Ontario area, the crew had
difficult to follow in relation to the ground. We were then passing the EGPWS with terrain [warning]
aircraft position, but many airports FL 80, VMC [visual meteorological activated. The crew saw the terrain
(like Liverpool) regularly descend conditions] on top with intermittent ahead of the aircraft and determined
the aircraft in IMC [instrument ground contact. While under radar that the descent clearance to 4,200
meteorological conditions] below control, it is the pilots responsibility feet was safe and reasonable. The
the radar-vectoring minima (to 1,500 to maintain terrain clearance. With crew believes that terrain was never
feet on Runway 9). I noticed a recent this in mind, I looked at Jeppesens a [safety] factor but had no choice
incident report that blamed the crew radar vectoring area chart. While but to respond to the warning using
for making a descent below MSA. Yet this shows minimum flight levels in proper CFIT[-prevention] recovery
I seem to remember making many various sectors, it does not have technique. Both [I] and the first officer
radar-vectored right-base turns a range/radial graticule, making it do not believe that any other aircraft
onto [Runway] 24 at [airport omitted difficult to use properly. Also, the were placed in jeopardy. (U.S.
by CHIRP] that were well below SID chart does not have minimum National Aeronautics and Space
MSA in IMC simply because the en route heights, nor does it have the Administration [NASA] Aviation
controller wanted to place the aircraft MSA circle found on the approach Safety Reporting System [ASRS]2
on a quick 7.0-mile final [approach plates. Had I not requested the Report no. 614863, April 2004)
segment]. There are no clear rules further climb when I did, I dread
as to whether one should follow the to think of the consequences. At Upon approach to ILS [instrument
clearance below MSA and, while best, a pull up as I approached landing system] Runway 12R with the
making a mental picture of your the hills. At most, CFIT [controlled copilot flying [a Canadair Regional Jet
position in the circuit [traffic pattern] flight into terrain] on a turn away from 200], we were instructed to descend
can assist in making such judgment, my cleared track, perhaps straight from 3,000 feet to 1,800 feet MSL
if there are any distractions going on into the opposing traffic? We hear [mean sea level]. I set 1,800 feet on
at the time, one is very likely to follow a lot about airmanship perhaps the altitude alerter and the copilot
the [ATC radar-vector] instruction. there should be some talk of verified it. We were about to intercept

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 5


V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

the localizer for Runway 12R when this happen and said he would (ASRS) is a confidential incident-
the controller said, Turn to heading take action. None was taken. The reporting system. The ASRS
150 degrees at 2,800 feet to join, area manager was aware that this Program Overview said, Pilots, air
cleared for the ILS Runway 12R happened but wanted to wait and traffic controllers, flight attendants,
approach. We were passing through see what action his supervisor was mechanics, ground personnel
2,800 feet when he [the controller] going to take. Almost two weeks and others involved in aviation
came back and said that he had a after this happened, no one has operations submit reports to the
low altitude alert, climb immediately tried to correct the performance of ASRS when they are involved
[on the minimum safe altitude warning the [controller]. Peer pressure on in, or observe, an incident or
system of the approach radar]. We this controller has not worked, and situation in which aviation safety
complied immediately, leveled at vectors below terrain are still given. was compromised. ASRS de-
2,800 feet and completed the I have to wonder why no action is identifies reports before entering
approach. The copilot had briefed taken. Normal operations for this them into the incident database. All
the approach, and we were aware of situation would have been Leaving personal and organizational names
the 2,800 feet on the ILS approach. 6,000 feet, cleared direct FLAAK, are removed. Dates, times and
The same controller earlier had EPH 6 to Seattle. (NASA ASRS related information, which could be
offered us a visual [approach] on the Report no. 601609, November used to infer an identity, are either
downwind. I told him we could not 2003) generalized or eliminated. ASRS
[conduct a visual approach] because acknowledges that its data have
we would lose sight of the field during Notes certain limitations. ASRS Directline
the approach. When he gave us the (December 1998) said, Reporters
1,800 feet [altitude] assignment, we 1. These reports were selected to ASRS may introduce biases that
thought that he was giving us an for Flight Safety Foundation by result from a greater tendency to
MVA (controller altitude) to get under the CHIRP Charitable Trust, report serious events than minor
the clouds for the visual [approach]. which administers a confidential ones; from organizational and
We never went to 1,800 feet and incident-reporting system in the geographic influences; and from
never broke out of the clouds. No United Kingdom, and are used many other factors. All of these
passengers or crew were affected with permission. The CHIRP potential influences reduce the
by the immediate climb to 2,800 feet. Internet site said, The objective confidence that can be attached to
(NASA ASRS Report no. 606025, of CHIRP is to promote safety in statistical findings based on ASRS
January 2004) the aviation [sector] and maritime data. However, the proportions of
sector for employees and others consistently reported incidents to
The controller next to me gave radar by obtaining, distributing and ASRS, such as altitude deviations,
contact to the aircraft at 3,200 feet analyzing safety-related reports have been remarkably stable over
MSL and cleared the aircraft direct which would not otherwise many years. Therefore, users of
FLAAK for the EPH 6 arrival into be available, while at all times ASRS may presume that incident
Seattle-Tacoma [Washington, keeping the identity of the reporter reports drawn from a time interval
U.S.] International Airport. I told confidential. of several or more years will
the controller that the aircraft was reflect patterns that are broadly
below terrain and the controller took 2. The U.S. National Aeronautics representative of the total universe
no action. MVA in that area [sector] is and Space Administration (NASA) of aviation-safety incidents of that
6,000 feet. The supervisor watched Aviation Safety Reporting System type.

U.K. CAA which began in the early in electronic flight deck applications than for the design, accuracy, currency and
1970s to publish radar vectoring area is possible with paper charts. operational application of their RVAs.
(RVA) charts as advisory information RVA charts are valid for two years but
for pilots and FAA which released may be reviewed and suspended/revised
in June 2004 radar-video-map (RVM) U.K. CAA Charts if the ATS provider becomes aware of any
MVA-chart data files as advisory infor- Originate With safety-critical inaccuracy.
mation for pilots are moving toward Local ATS Providers
similar practices (Figure 1, page 7). Their The purpose of RVAs is defined in terms
of radar controller requirements and pilot
methods of developing RVA charts and
MVA charts, respectively, will enable
these altitudes to be used more effectively
U .K. CAA is responsible for design
authority and policies applicable
to RVAs. ATS providers are responsible
requirements. U.K. CAA said that this is
Continued on page 8

6 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


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Figure 1
FAA Radar Video MapMinimum Vectoring Altitude Chart
Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.

I O N
T
AV IGA
R N
F O
O T
N

T = True north M = Magnetic north FAA = U.S. Federal Aviation Administration

Note: The center point is the antenna site for airport surveillance radar and each sector within the circle shows the minimum vectoring altitude for that
sector in hundreds of feet.
Source: U.S. Federal Aviation Administration

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 7


V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

to relieve the radar controller of Under U.K. CAAs terrain-clearance criteria for
the responsibility for determin- RVAs, the minimum altitude available for radar-
ing the appropriate minimum vectoring arriving flights within the RVA is 1,000
safe levels, in the vicinity of the feet above the highest obstacle within the RVA or
aerodrome, where radar sequenc- RVA sector. Design rules also specify that the
ing and the separation of arriving minimum altitude for any RVA or RVA sector
IFR flights [are] taking place; and, will not be less than 1,500 feet in compliance
to provide pilots with an indica- with the U.K. requirement that aircraft shall be
tion of the minimum altitudes at vectored to join final approach at not less than 5.0
which ATC radar vectoring will nautical miles (8.0 kilometers) from touchdown,
take place on initial approach U.K. CAA said. Additional criteria specify buffer
below the published [MSA]. areas used to factor in obstacles in the vicinity
[RVA charts are promulgated in of the standard-shape RVA and to determine the
the Aerodrome (AD 2) section of minimum altitude for ATC use. Design methods
the U.K. Aeronautical Information require ATC when creating RVA sectors to consider
Publication. They will contain the ability of pilots to determine their position.
suitable information to enable RVAs also must conform to regulations governing
their use by pilots.] low-altitude flight operations.

It is very important to recognize Where operationally desirable, the RVA may be


that the RVA is not the only area sectorized to provide relief from dominant obstacles
within which radar vectoring may that would affect only one runway direction or ra-
take place, U.K. CAA said. When vectoring flights dar circuit, U.K. CAA said. Sectorization should,
outside the RVA, the controller is responsible for whenever practicable, be referenced to navigation
determining and providing the required terrain aids (to provide ease of cross-checking by flight
clearance as specified in CAP 493 Manual of Air crew). When considering sectorization of the RVA,
Traffic Services Part 1. RVAs do not constitute complex sectorizations, which might be difficult for
controlled airspace nor do they attract any special flight crew or controllers to assimilate, should be
airspace attention in their own right. The dimen- avoided. Instrument approach procedure (IAP)
sions of the standard RVA take account of the MSAs shall be shown on RVA charts to indicate the
handling characteristics of modern aircraft and minimum level that should be attained by aircraft
ATC radar-vectoring requirements. intentionally leaving the RVA.

Initial RVA charts are drafted manually and centered In practice, U.K. radar controllers must ensure that
on an airport reference point (Figure 2, page 9), not radar coverage is adequate before issuing instruc-
on the radar-antenna site, and working drawings, tions to descend to RVA altitudes, and they must
final drawings and final accuracy checks are done by apply greater terrain/obstacle clearance require-
terminal-airspace specialists. Standard shapes have ments defined in the Manual of Air Traffic Services
been developed for airports with a single instru- when aircraft are more than 30 nautical miles (48
ment runway and multiple instrument runways. kilometers) from the radar-antenna site on which
the RVA is based. This basically requires the radar
U.K. aeronautical topographical charts (1.0 inch: controller to maintain 1,000 feet vertically above
250,000 feet [1.0 centimeter: 30,000 meter] scale), the highest fixed object in a keyhole-shaped area
which depict obstacles above 300 feet AGL, are around and ahead of the aircraft, said Martyn
used in initial RVA chart development and other Cooper, a representative of U.K. CAA.8
data sources with more detail are used to validate/
refine required obstruction clearances during In the 1960s and 1970s, RVA charts capable of
chart preparation. Published RVAs do not con- ready interpretation were seen as a significant
form to a fixed scale, but depict a 10-nautical-mile contribution to the prevention of CFIT, Cooper
scale bar. U.K. radar-vectoring terrain-clearance said. As a consequence of a terrain-related acci-
requirements also provide a safety margin for dent involving a U.K. public transport aircraft in
unknown obstacles below 300 feet AGL and for 1974, the U.K. Terrain Clearance Working Group
altimeter error. Continued on page 10

8 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


VE C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

Figure 2
Example of U.K. CAA Radar Vectoring Area Chart
Norwich International Airport, Norwich, England, U.K.

UK AIP (25 Dec 03) AD 2-EGSH-5-1

RADAR VECTORING AREA NORWICH


GENERAL INFORMATION
1. All bearings are magnetic. Within the Radar Vectoring Area the minimum initial altitude to be allocated
2. Levels shown are based on QNH. by the radar controller is 1600FT except within 3NM of Talcolneston
3. Only significant obstacles and dominant spot heights are shown. (735FT amsl) where the minimum initial altitude to be allocated is 1800FT.
4. The minimum levels shown within the Radar Vectoring Area Further descent to 1500FT may be given within the Approach Areas shown
ensure terrain clearance in conformity with Rule 29 of the Rules of the when on 40 leg or Final Approach.
Air Regulations in respect of obstacles within the RVA.
5. Minimum Sector Altitudes are based on obstacles and spot heights
within 25NM of the Aerodrome Reference Point.
0 1 2 3 4 5 10NM
Elevation 117FT Transition ALT 3000FT
001
001 00E
00E 001 30E

R
0'- R ID E

T
00 OR
75 OR OPT

'AL
C LIC
25
HE
WEYBOURNE
BURNHAM 345 RAF COLTISHALL
322

L65
LANGHAM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

ILITY AREA OF
304 SFC-FL65

SFC-F
CROMER
00 16
16 0 0 290 16 00

RESP LIA RADAR


GVS/3.5 00
16
LITTLE GUNTON Pk 550 350

ONSIB
SNORING 331
SCULTHORPE 22

ANG
I O
AT
00

258
15

G
COLTISHALL

I
COLTISHALL

285
SWANTON
MORLEY
502
FELTHORPE
NAV LUDHAM
394

WINDFARM

O R NWI 1500 Neatishead/1.6


27

227

F
NORWICH
NH
230
09

OT
205 NORTH
DENES
H
1500
310
282 338
206

N
267 SHIPDHAM
00

571
15

204 450
WATTON H HETHEL
160
180

16 00

04 735 5230N
0
0

SEETHING
00
16
16 0

Tacolneston/3.3
5230N 0
0

D208/2.5
23

OLD LONG
OCNL/7.5 0 BUCKENHAM H STRATTON
HARDWICK
G TIBENHAM
BECCLES
PRIORY Fm

KNETTISHALL 001 00E 001 30E

LOSS OF COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES


Initial Approach
Continue visually or by means of an appropriate final approach aid. If not possible proceed at 2000FT, or last assigned level if higher, to NDB(L) NH.
Intermediate and Final Approach
Continue visually or by means of an appropriate final approach aid. If not possible follow the Missed Approach Procedure to NDB(L) NH.
In all cases where the aircraft returns to the holding facility the procedure to be adopted is the basic Radio Failure Procedure
detailed at ENR 1.1.3.
CHANGE NEW RVA DIMENSIONS. APPROACH AREA. MSA TO SW.
AERO INFO DATE 16 OCT 03

Civil Aviation Authority AMDT AIRAC 13/03

Source: U.K. Civil Aviation Authority

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 9


V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

considered the then-extant RVA param- All U.K. RVA charts are available in radar vectoring of aircraft and creating
eters. The conclusion was that the radar digital format from commercial sources area boundaries from each obstruction of
controllers main responsibility was to with the same content and detail as paper 3.0 nautical miles (for obstacles less than
separate and sequence traffic, and that a RVA charts. They currently can be used 40 nautical miles (74 kilometers) from the
separate method should be employed to in electronic flight bags (EFBs)9 that radar-antenna site) to 5.0 nautical miles
determine and publish the minimal initial are compatible with electronic charts, (9.3 kilometers, for obstacles 40 nautical
altitudes that a controller will allocate. Cooper said. Currently, U.K. CAA does miles or more from the radar-antenna
not publish RVA-chart data as individ- site), and enclosing single prominent ob-
The working group reaffirmed that ual RVA dimensions/sectorizations in structions with buffers (as done for area
minimum (terrain-safe) levels avail- latitude/longitude format, he said. boundaries) to facilitate radar vectoring of
able to controllers should be predeter- aircraft around the obstruction.
mined that is, not left to controllers
to work out for themselves and that FAA MVA Charts The required-obstacle-clearance cri-
this information should be available to Involve Centralized teria from FAA Order 8260.19, Flight
pilots. ICAO PANSOPS, following the Accuracy Checks Procedures and Airspace, then are applied
U.K. lead, introduced procedures based to each RVM MVA-chart sector. The al-
on tactical radar vectoring in the early
1980s. Recently, an enhanced RVA-design
process and a requirement for regular
U nlike U.K. ATS providers, FAA ATC
facilities design their MVA charts
for use by radar controllers with each
titudes normally are not less than MIA
vertical obstacle clearance: 1,000 feet in
nonmountainous areas or 2,000 feet in
design review have been applied to U.K. MVA chart centered on the location of the designated mountainous areas of the
aerodrome operators and to ATS provid- the radar-antenna site. FAA design crite- United States that are defined in Federal
ers. The design responsibility has been ria vary depending on whether the MVA Aviation Regulations (FARs) Part 95, IFR
transferred from a central authority to chart is for terminal-control services and/ Altitudes.
local management of ATS. or approach-control services with airport
surveillance radar (ASR), with ASR plus MVAs are established irrespective of the
U.K. CAA guidance for air carriers air route surveillance radar (ASRS) as flight-checked radar coverage in the sec-
describes the responsibility of air car- a backup radar system or with ASRS. tor concerned, FAA said. They are based
rier pilots for terrain clearance but does MVAs may be drawn to the maximum on obstruction clearance only. It is the re-
not explicitly require that they use RVA ASR radar range or ASRS radar range sponsibility of the controller to determine
charts, Cooper said. (typically 60 nautical miles [97 kilome- that a target return is adequate for radar-
ters]) or drawn to a 40-nautical-mile [64- control purposes. Designers also ensure
CAP 360, Air Operators Certificate kilometer] range from the radar-antenna that MVAs on MVA charts are compatible
Operation of Aircraft, describes the site with MVAs, en route minimum IFR with vectoring altitudes established for ra-
responsibilities of aircraft operators in altitudes (MIAs) or a combination as dar instrument approach procedures.
respect of flight deck documentation, specified by FAA Order 7210.3T, Facility
he said. However, it is stated that when Operation and Administration.10 Current FAA specifications for MVA
under radar control, it is their respon- charts require review at least annually,
sibility [i.e., the responsibility of com- FAA ATC facilities use paper sectional and charts must be revised immediately
manders of aircraft] to ensure adequate aeronautical charts (or computer-generated when changes occur that would affect
terrain clearance. CAP 360 is not law, and substitutes of required accuracy and scale) MVAs. Reviews and approvals of initial
failure to comply with CAP 360 is not an to develop their initial MVA chart design MVA charts and revised MVA charts
offense. Our meaning in the guidance is or revisions. Techniques for depicting are conducted by FAAs National Flight
that commanders have this responsibil- sectors within the RVM MVA chart include Procedures Office, and final charts are
ity, and this means that how they choose the use of magnetic bearings from the produced by FAAs National Aeronautical
to discharge it is up to them. Although antenna site,radials fromVORs/VORTACs/ Charting Office (NACO) as video maps
unsaid, their actions should be in line TACANs [tactical air navigation] or radar- in various NACO ATC-data formats for
with current practice, recommendations display range marks. MVA boundaries radar displays and as RVM MVA chart-
and/or good airmanship. They could, for coincide with, or are compatible with, data files (see Internet Offers Subscribers
example, use RVA charts. RVAs assist the map overlays or RVM data on radar Access to MVA-chart Data, page 16).
aircrews situational awareness, and RVA displays.
charts should trigger a response/reaction The following recent changes affect how
by the aircrew if an abnormal level is as- Principles of MVA design include mak- U.S. RVM MVA charts are developed
signed by a controller. ing sectors large enough to accommodate and used:

10 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


VE C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

In 2004, FAA initiated policy changes About three years ago, however, the Availability of MVA data in the cock-
for the development of MVA charts in NBAA Flight Management System pit might generate unwarranted/
FAA Order 8260.19; initiated changes Subcommittee saw an opportunity to unsafe questioning of ATC radar
in its MVA chart development, review take advantage of existing technology vectors;
and approval process; and released to improve pilots situational awareness
RVM MVA-chart data files to the related to MVAs and MIAs without Uncontrolled distribution of MVA-
public (see Industry Innovations introducing new problems, Lamond chart data would result in unsafe
Expected for MVAs, page 13); said. The subcommittee found a use of the data (unlike the strictly
few documented incidents in which controlled application of MVA data
Comprehensive, updated criteria airplanes came very close to CFIT within ATC);
for the design of MVA charts were as a result of lack of adequate situ-
prepared in 2003 for the pending ational awareness. Some pilots were Distribution could be technically
Change 20 to FAA Order 8260.3, U.S. distracted while operating in clouds complex and/or costly to implement;
Standard for Terminal Instrument and did not realize immediately that
Procedures (TERPS); they were approaching higher terrain. Release of RVM MVA-chart data
Consequently, we began questioning would result in legal liability issues;
Work continued on procurement why U.S. MVA data should not be and,
of an automated tool for use in the available to pilots.
development and approval of MVA Safety risks might be involved in
charts and MIA charts (used by What also occurred sometimes in a busy changing proven methods.
air route traffic control centers in departure environment or in a busy ar-
controlled airspace without radar rival environment was that the controller Robert H. Vandel, FSF executive vice
coverage); intended to issue a timely radar vector president, in December 2003 co-signed
to turn or climb but the instruction was with NBAA and the Air Line Pilots
Internal review of current FAA pol- delayed by radio-frequency congestion or Association, International, a letter
icy and orders that allow reductions, other cause, he said. to FAA. The letter requested the re-
under specific criteria, of MVA- lease of MVA-chart data to qualified
required obstacle clearance from the Crews currently may have no reason original equipment manufacturers that
standard 2,000 feet in designated to question the absence of further ra- request the data for use as advisory
mountainous areas was underway dar vectors while operating at the MVA information.
in 2004; and, they may not realize that they have
gone through a sector into a sector with We are continuing to work with FAA to
FAA radar controllers have been a higher MVA, Lamond said. develop a framework of manufacturer
reminded that pilots typically have standards and operational guidelines by
no immediate knowledge of the During an August 2003 meeting, FAA early 2005, Lamond said. NBAA simply
minimum assignable altitude be- representatives and industry representa- sees MVA charts as one more set of back-
cause ATC may utilize diverse vec- tives discussed the public availability of ground data to help warn pilots before
tor areas, MVAs and other altitudes MVA/MIA charts, the fidelity of charts they fly into harms way. This is critical
authorized by FAA Order 7110.65P, in use, the criteria and policy under information, but using MVA data alone
Air Traffic Control. which charts are developed, and the le- will not be a silver bullet [i.e., a complete
gal requirements for pilots of FARs Part solution] for CFIT prevention.
91.175 and Part 91.177 as they relate to
NBAA Leads Quest for MVA/MIA charts.12,13 Capt. Wally Roberts, an advisor to NBAA
FAA MVA-chart Data and proponent of flight deck applications
Lamond said that NBAA and other or- of MVA-chart data, said that some MVA

U .S. MVA charts evolved for use


exclusively by ATC in part because
no practical methods existed to inte-
ganizations worked with FAA to address
concerns that:
charts used by U.S. ATC facilities in
mountainous areas have become highly
complex for example, showing many
grate MVA information into the flight Pilots/operators might use MVA- small sectors relatively compressed
deck, said Bob Lamond, director of air chart data for purposes other than against steeply rising terrain.14
traffic services and infrastructure, U.S. advisory information (e.g., the files
National Business Aviation Association must not be used as a navigational In mountainous, high-traffic areas such
(NBAA).11 tool); as Reno and Las Vegas, Nevada, and Los

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 11


V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

Angeles, California, some MVA sectors have data files, public availability of the data files also
evolved into complex, convoluted polygons rather might support applications such as the following:
than simple segments at various ranges from the
radar-antenna site, he said. Complex sectors Research on problems in specific airport ap-
have been designed partly to provide versatility proaches and departures; TAWS terrain warn-
in aircraft separation and traffic flow, and ATC ings; and anomalies during radar vectoring;
cannot be faulted for designing orderly transitions
to approach procedures. Creation of MVA-sector overlays on large wall
charts of airport terminal areas for general
They are unlike typical sectors in nonmountain- advisory and educational purposes;
ous areas of the United States or in Europe, where
sectors are based on a five-mile or 10-mile radar Pilot training on MVAs using real airport
range that is very simple to video-map and to MVA charts in place of simulated example
understand. Complex sectors very easily would charts;
become time-consuming not enabling for
pilots. The problem will be not so much that these Airport-familiarization briefings; and,
sectors are complex, but how to provide MVA-
chart data that are readily usable, scalable and Preflight review by pilots for a general aware-
georeferenced to the aircraft position. ness of the MVAs in the terminal area.

San Diego, California, was among MVA charts Looking at an FAA MVA chart, as designed for
reviewed by Roberts that supports his belief that ATC use, enables the pilot to see the lowest and
pilots will require scalable electronic MVA charts highest MVAs, the altitude changes between
as advisory information on the flight deck. adjacent MVA sectors, sectors where an MVA is
significantly higher than the average MVAs and
San Diego, if scaled to the working area of inter- the relative positions of MVA sectors.
est, is very straightforward to read, Roberts said.
If depicted on a paper chart, however, it would When an MVA chart is superimposed correctly
be unreadable to pilots in flight. As designed for on a sectional aeronautical chart (which depicts
FAA ATC showing a circle of 120-nautical-mile terrain and the floors of controlled airspace),
[193-kilometer] diameter paper MVA charts the pilot can see MVA sectors and MVAs rela-
would be useless and inappropriate from a human tive to terrain and relative to navaids, fixes, low-
factors standpoint, causing information overload altitude Victor airways, obstacles and the airports
and confusion. It would take pi- highest nearby terrain. When an MVA chart is
lots too much time to make sense superimposed correctly on an IFR area chart,
out of these MVA charts on paper approach chart, standard terminal arrival pro-
pilots would not use them. cedure or departure procedure, the pilot can
see how MVAs compare with altitudes such as
Nevertheless, technology already MEAs, minimum obstruction-clearance altitudes
used for flight deck display of (MOCAs) and MSAs.
other advisory information
shows promise for capabilities Giving pilots access to MVA-chart data will not
such as dynamic altitude symbol- be a sea change in the traditional pilotcontroller
ogy i.e., keeping the altitude relationship, said Steve Bergner, chairman of
number visible and correctly NBAAs FMS Subcommittee and chief pilot for
oriented for each MVA sector, he Cable Air of White Lake, New York, U.S.15
said. Otherwise, if an electronic
MVA chart scrolls off a pilots I do see MVA cross-checking as a way to bring
display, sector altitudes also dis- situational awareness and operational safety up
appear from the display. several notches during radar-vectored operations
and radar-monitored direct-to RNAV operations,
Based on Roberts experimenta- Bergner said. The controller will have the lead
tion with FAAs RVM MVA-chart during radar vectors and the pilot will not be doing

12 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


VE C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

the navigation per se even though an electronic would have had difficulty recon-
MVA chart will be in the cockpit. ciling aircraft position with MVA
sectors.
With increasing use of RNAV, which inherently
involves random routing, U.S. pilots more often As noted by the FSF ALAR Task
leave the safety of a published IFR route or IFR Force, the introduction of elec-
procedure than in the past, he said. tronic MVA charts with own-ship
position [i.e., the position of the
As we get into more and more random opera- aircraft with this display] would
tions, we are losing some of our anti-CFIT IFR allow the pilot to see the position
safety net the MEAs, MOCAS and published of the airplane relative to the MVA
IFR routes, Bergner said. Availability of elec- sectors and to zoom in to clearly
tronic MVA charts in the cockpit will help to see the depiction of smaller sec-
restore the safety net. tors, Bergner said. Crossing the
finish line on this initiative will be
Published RNAV waypoints on a departure, for ex- up to the avionics manufacturers
ample, may be in an A-B-C-D sequence, but if the and the navigation-database pro-
tactical situation permits, ATC may find it more viders. I believe that when pilots
efficient to clear the airplane direct to downstream have this tool, however, they will
waypoint D from waypoint A, he said. not have to lean quite so heavily on the TAWS as
the safety system of last resort.
Controllers need the tactical flexibility to take air-
planes off a published route to establish a sequence NBAAs two primary concerns in seeking release
or the necessary spacing, Bergner said. We all of MVA-chart data were the fallibility of radar
want the same IFR safety margins irrespective controllers and the fragility of the very-high-
of the phase of flight from MVA charts. Pilots frequency (VHF) communication link, he said.
intuitively want this whenever airplanes are rela-
tively close to the ground during terminal opera- Risks multiply whenever the airplane is being
tions, so the same IFR-charting science ought to radar-vectored close to terrain and is being taken
apply. Whether the airplane is on the black line of off a published route, Bergner said. The sole
a chart or an ATC-assigned heading, the required- source of minimum safe altitude VHF radio
obstacle-clearance values and integrity of obstacle communication becomes subject to weaknesses
clearance should be applied for MVA/MIA charts such as misheard/misread clearances, frequencies
as for airways and feeder routes. blocked and misinterpreted call signs.

In flight, access to MVA data will provide the pilot NBAA would not have an objection to commer-
an additional measure of confidence while being cial publication of paper MVA charts in addition
radar-vectored in unfamiliar areas or at night, and to electronic applications of RVM MVA-chart
will enhance situational awareness when being data, but the best use of MVA-chart data will be
vectored toward areas of higher terrain or toward in the moving-map-display technology, he said.
higher MVAs, he said. Either a paper MVA chart or an electronic MVA
chart, however, can help pilots to know before
Knowing the terrain is easier for pilots in some departure what minimum altitudes ATC may use
places than others, Bergner said. Pilots arriving during radar vectoring and can reduce the pilots
at some U.S. airports typically face the rather un- anxiety during radar vectoring at some locations,
comfortable feeling of leaving an MEA structure Bergner said.
that is higher than 10,000 feet, for example, and
being radar-vectored at low altitudes that are not
published on any cockpit reference. Industry Innovations
Expected for MVAs
In the era of round-dial cockpits when pilots had
only VOR azimuth and DME, the VOR DME typi-
cally was not colocated with the ASR site, so they P ublic release of U.S. RVM MVA-chart data
in 2004 culminates two years of discussion

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 13


V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

through the Government/Industry primarily because of better understanding condition for the airplane. We envision
Aeronautical Charting Forum, said of what users wanted and better under- MVA applications for advisory informa-
Howard Swancy, senior advisor to the standing by users of what FAA would be tion being no different.
deputy administrator, FAA. Our posi- able to do. Moreover, we are constrained
tion has been that RVM MVA-chart in the availability of resources to jump Significant FAA resources have been
data are part of an internal government out in the lead on MVA applications or committed to more effectively adapting
system a radar-controller tool in to provide a total service. Working with databases such as those containing
support of government employees who industry organizations, however, we will satellite imagery from various federal
provide services to the public. The idea put in place something that works. We government sources to improve aviation
of providing MVA data for advisory recognized together that there is further safety.
information only was a breakthrough utility in RVM MVA-chart data, and that
not so much a change in policy as an we need to explore that to understand how In the past several years, there have
evolution of policy on what more can be and if it can be used more efficiently as a been changes in our understanding of
done with the data. The user groups are flight deck resource. how to manage differences in terrain
satisfied, and I would like to keep the data and man-made-obstruction data,
momentum going.16,17 FAAs decision sets the stage for us- Swancy said. To go beyond the appli-
ers of MVA-chart data to investigate cation of RVM MVA-chart data solely
Part of the inertia that worked against as advisory information would require
this change in the status quo was FAA identifying the accuracy requirement for
specialists confidence in the current sys- in-flight use with aircraft and how that
tem, Swancy said. There had not been an accuracy requirement corresponds with
earlier identified need to change proce- the accuracy FAA currently provides for
dures that largely have been deemed as ATC use.
safe by FAA, he said.
FAAs initial MVA-chart development
During discussions of potential MVA- methods and revision methods are be-
chart-data applications on the flight deck, ing reinforced by satellite imagery, sur-
some FAA specialists also saw the absence veys and obstruction-tracking activities.
of policies, procedures or specific aircrew
training as a barrier to MVA-chart-data All aeronautical charting methods, how-
release. How to offer MVA-chart data for ever, involve some degree of error we
something other than directly controlling recognize this and factor into FAA pro-
traffic or for other than mandatory use cesses the errors inherent in charts and
of these data in flight operations was not in-flight systems, Swancy said. The
grasped easily. applications and perhaps to frame a dif- working principle is to err on the side
ferent concept of pilot situational aware- of safety by using wider-based assump-
FAA officials reached their decision ness during radar vectoring. tions for flight operations so that we do
after weighing the advantages and not have a criticality of accuracy down to
disadvantages of MVA-chart improve- We want to ensure that future controller minute numbers. There have to be built-
ments without publicly releasing data procedures and pilot procedures clearly in safety allowances in the development
versus MVA-chart improvements with will identify what the roles and respon- of MVA charts.
collaborative sharing of information that sibilities would be that is going to be
could enhance situational awareness of very critical, he said. In some cases, pilots A separate problem for FAA is identify-
pilots, he said. would have an opportunity, if there were ing errors in the interpretation of MVA
a human error, to provide a second check policy.
We basically concurred with industry and to raise a question with ATC. This
representatives that technology being concept already is in all our flight opera- For example, in mountainous terrain,
developed possibly would make our old tions procedures the pilot being the sole FAA has a basic standard of 2,000 feet of
arguments moot because new factors authority for the operation of the aircraft, required obstacle clearance, but certain
would have to be taken into consider- required to follow ATC instructions but to exceptions are allowed in specific in-
ation, Swancy said. We first had to ask questions and/or to report deviations stances for less than 2,000 feet, he said.
agree to be open to the concept suggested from clearances when he or she assumes We currently are having internal argu-
by the users FAA changed its position that an instruction will cause an unsafe ments and discussions with users and

14 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


VE C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

the U.S. National Transportation Safety subscribers might be going. FAA mean- software that enables printing paper MVA
Board about policy interpretation as to while can validate what we are doing charts and viewing charts on the display
when the exceptions to required obstacle with current MVA-related programs, of a personal computer that does not have
clearance can be used. Some believe that can determine the full scope and scale specialized map-drawing software.)
the FARs stipulate that an exception of releasing MVA/MIA data under this
only should be allowed in association collaborative controllerpilot concept Georeferenced MVA charts [i.e., charts
with the development of an airway. We and can assess related flight systems containing accurate longitude/latitude
expect fairly soon to resolve this policy- and/or ground-based systems. Then we data] will be very useful and will greatly
interpretation issue. could begin the appropriations process enhance safety, Roberts said. FAAs MVA
to get funding dedicated to the MVA charts show precisely the MVA sectors
FAA expects to work with the industry initiative. and corresponding altitudes that radar
to broadly agree on what types of regula- controllers use because they contain the
tions would be in play and how the pilot Swancy said that every subscriber must identical latitude/longitude that NACO
using MVAs in a future-flight-operations read and abide by the disclaimer that FAA uses to produce RVMs for ATC radar
scenario would be held responsible. has included on the files. There are no displays.
restrictions on who can obtain the data,
If you told me that as a pilot I would but FAA set up Internet access with the From initial discussions with industry,
be operating in an environment where FAA understood that current providers of
I have operational use of MVAs yet I in-flight information could use our files
still receive services provided by ATC, either to produce paper MVA charts suit-
and I still have an obligation to follow able for pilots or to adapt them to avion-
clearances, I would want to understand ics systems and EFBs, Swancy said. My
how this affects my reaction to situations expectation is that manufacturers first
based on MVA data, Swancy said. We will be going through the process of
have had to work through similar prob- certification of systems that will provide
lems such as the initial implementa- an airplane spotter [i.e., a delta-shaped
tion of TCAS [traffic alert and collision symbol superimposed on the electronic
avoidance system] where the pilot chart to represent own-ship position in
receives first-hand information that real time] overlaid on electronic MVA
may be contradictory to the controllers charts. We assume that many avionics
information and instructions. But I do vendors and others who develop in-
not think it would be a difficult thing to flight systems will be interested; we also
work though this issue for future MVA assume that organizations responsible for
applications. navigation charts and in-flight databases
will be interested. If demand grows, we
Companies, organizations and individu- expectation that there would be a low will work with NACO if there is a need to
als can obtain the RVM MVA-chart data demand from the public. change the distribution venue.
in the same manner, in an FAA file for-
mat, he said. Roberts, for example, has used commer- If subscribers want to use MVA-chart data
cial off-the-shelf software for drawing for purposes such as commercial sale, as a
Anyone interested may contact us and maps, which directly opens FAAs RVM service or for research and development,
sign up to become a subscriber, he MVA-chart data file as a viewable/ the disclaimer on each file reinforces the
said (see Internet Offers Subscribers printable MVA chart and accurately requirement that the only authorized use
Access to MVA-chart Data, page 16). overlays digital MVA charts onto digital is for advisory information.
Subscribers will be able to manipu- navigational charts with the required
late the data in many different media center point, scale and orientation to Not being aware of how subscribers
and software applications with the true/magnetic north. (FAA provides pa- might make changes to MVA-chart data
opportunity to use it in any way they per MVA charts to some ATC facilities as based on their need, and not being able
see fit. Distributing one file format via Adobe portable document format [PDF] to create standards in advance, the dis-
an Internet site helps to control FAAs documents for nonoperational uses such claimer seemed reasonable, Swancy said.
cost compared with trying to support as controller training. Users other than The disclaimer also is a self-check to
many different software applications FAA personnel can convert RVM MVA- make sure the all users of the data be-
without a clear idea of what direction chart data files to PDF with Adobe fore they provide services understand

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 15


V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

that if they want to change the file was processed and the FAA disclaimer. NACO
data use to anything outside of only updates a file when changes approved by the
advisory-information only, that National Flight Procedures Office are sent from an
they go through the proper pro- ATC facility. All elements of an MVA chart, includ-
cess to make sure that they receive ing numbers and words, are drawn as scalable vector
FAA certification. At some future graphics (i.e., not editable text). NACO does not
date, we probably will have mi- charge subscribers for the RVM MVA-chart data.
crocomputer technology that will
be able to store on the aircraft Each data file contains the following FAA message
every terrain height, obstruction to the user:
and obstacle in the world so that
pilots flying in a truly direct-route MVA charts are not updated on a regularly
environment could go anywhere scheduled cycle. Any person using these files
they want and still have real-time is responsible for checking currency dates on
situational awareness of terrain these individual MVA map files;
and obstacles. MVA-chart data
provide a good compromise for the limitations [FAA NACO] certifies the MVA line GP data
and capabilities that we have today. that is loaded onto the FTP site. Once the files
are retrieved, if they are modified, the certi-
fication of these MVA map files is no longer
Internet Offers Subscribers valid;
Access to MVA-chart Data
These MVA map files are to be used as a

F AAs complete set of 374 RVM MVA chart-data


files (total as of Sept. 4, 2004) is available to
the public via a 24-hour Internet file-transfer-
visual reference; they are not to be used as a
navigational tool;

protocol (FTP) site. The site displays a directory Air traffic control facilities are responsible
of filenames and enables subscribers to download for the annual review of MVAs; [and,]
any or all files with web-browser software. File sizes
range from about 150 kilobytes to 800 kilobytes. MVA-chart discrepancies should be reported
Prospective users must register as a subscriber to the responsible facility in question.
by sending an e-mail request to Fred Milburn,
fred.milburn@faa.gov to obtain access to these Pilots are to use MVA charts as an information
files, said Terry Laydon, manager of NACO.18 tool only for CFIT prevention and not as a means
Access to the FTP site requires a user name and for selecting altitudes when filing flight plans,
password. File names begin with a three-letter requesting specific altitudes or en route flight,
identifier assigned by FAA. said Tom Schneider, an FAA terminal instru-
ment procedures specialist. No current opera-
The password-controlled FTP site was established tional practices are affected. Material for the FAA
to enable NACO to have a secure site for users to Aeronautical Information Manual and other pilot-
access these files, Laydon said. The data in each education material are to be developed. Possible
ASCII [American Standard Code for Information regulatory amendments to FARs Part 91.177 are
Interchange, a standard used for character-set still to be developed by FAA Flight Standards, FAA
encoding in computers] file are in FAAs line- Air Traffic Services and the FAA Office of General
geographic-position format or line GP one of Counsel to clarify that for pilots, acceptance of a
the standard ATC-data formats created by NACO. radar vector creates an exception to adherence to
the IFR minimum altitudes, he said.19
Basically, commands and data in each file enable
software to draw lines from point to point, with Among proposed changes in TERPS Change 20,
each point defined by latitude/longitude coordi- no criteria are considered for vectors below the
nates. A line command completes each line defined MVA other then the criterion necessary for depar-
by the points. Each data file includes a header that tures, Schneider said. Significant changes include
contains the RVM MVA map number, the date the a mandatory requirement that the MVA must be

16 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


VE C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

at or above the floor of controlled airspace, the respect to terrain is helpful. In general aviation,
consideration of an assumed 200-foot obstacle some avionics equipment for VFR operations
over terrain and criteria for an adverse-terrain already can alert the pilot that the aircraft is near
adjustment when terrain contour lines are the Class B airspace, for example.
controlling obstacle. The primary goal of these
initiatives is to have comprehensive MVA criteria Electronic MVA charts will provide pilots a tool to
in TERPS rather than scattered in several criteria become more aware of terrain by knowing exactly
and policy orders. how the aircraft is being vectored in relation to
MVA sectors, Terpstra said.
U.S. air traffic controllers typically have MVA
charts printed on translucent vellum overlays Preventing the few CFIT accidents where control-
available as a backup if the MVA video map fails lers have mistakenly radar-vectored an aircraft into
on a radar display, he said. terrain will be the greatest benefit enabling the
pilot to have a check-and-balance with controller-
The automated system under development would issued vectoring altitudes, he said. Electronic
enable digital MVA charts to be drafted first within MVA charts as a means of validation will
ATC facilities. The proposed system will use, in addi- be one of the better safety tools that pilots have had
tion to digital sectional aeronautical charts, digitized in a long time. Controllers rarely make operational
terrain-elevation data and the vertical-obstruction errors, but it is wise for pilots to use the philoso-
file maintained by NACO, Schneider said. phy Get a clearance and validate have healthy
skepticism. Pilots should check that information
This system, when completed, should provide in every clearance is correct before accepting it.
much greater accuracy than the current manual- Validation simply is recognition that controllers
search method to identify terrain and obstacles and pilots are human and do make mistakes.
on sectional aeronautical charts, he said. It will
provide automated terrain in greater detail than Jeppesen navigational databases have not been
sectional aeronautical charts and will consider designed specifically to make use of electronic
man-made obstacles less than 200 feet [61 meters] MVA charts. From the perspective of a database
above ground level. Currently, ATC-facility spe- manufacturer, however, MVA displays and related
cialists follow procedures for using more-detailed functions could be added by several possible
maps to gain better resolution when terrain data methods, Terpstra said. Jeppesen is investigating
are questionable. The new tool should eliminate or the ability to deliver MVA data soon to enable
reduce the human-factors errors associated with some avionics manufacturers to display MVA
manual drawing and scanning. charts as advisory information in the near future.
If deemed appropriate, the international standard
for navigation databases (ARINC 424) could be
Adding MVAs to FMS updated in the future.
Might Take Years
General aviation avionics typi-

T erpstra said that within the ACF, discussions


about methods of improving MVA-chart
development gradually have evolved to concep-
cally will accept more readily new
database specifications because
they have different kinds of
tualization of methods to incorporate MVA charts certification requirements than
into current and future avionics. Airbus avionics or Boeing avi-
onics, he said. When air carrier
Once pilots have the abilities to know that they flight decks might incorporate
are inside a particular MVA sector and to know electronic MVA data especially
what the minimum altitude is, MVA data has in the FMS is more difficult to
meaning they have something that will be estimate.
helpful from a pilot perspective, he said. We of-
ten hear that pilots never run into anything they There are a number of methods
can see. Anything we can do to help the pilot to of presenting MVAs to pilots in
become more aware of where he or she is with the cockpit: some of these include

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 17


V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

paper charts, EFB moving maps FMSs, approach procedures, RF legs [radius- spotter on an electronic airport
and navigation displays. around-a-fix approach segments; i.e., diagram. As of September 2004,
curved approaches for RNAV operation Jeppesen had not delivered a service
We may not see any MVA data in the that are similar to DME arcs but do that depicts MVAs with an airplane
FMS of an airliner flight deck for quite not require DME] and RNP [required spotter;
a few years, because of the expense of navigation performance] values in the
FMS-specification changes, he said. I navigation database. Moving-map display in a stand-
doubt that we would see this in the FMS alone GPS navigation system,
of the current generation of glass cockpits Jeppesen provides navigational-database which theoretically could show the
because of the tremendous cost involved updates that conform to ARINC 424 aircraft position on a scalable chart
in modifying the avionics. More likely, we and provides other data in the Jeppesen- and which currently can alert pilots
might see MVAs in EFBs as they are in- standard format to provide a specifica- before the aircraft enters various
stalled as either forward fits or retrofits. tion change, new information, ARINC classes of airspace at specified alti-
424 revisions or internal Jeppesen policy tudes; and,
The Boeing 777, for example, probably changes.
would not be able to have MVA functions Next-generation FMS, a long-term
in its FMS but some of these airplanes solution that theoretically could
such those delivered to KLM20 cur- alert pilots with or without
rently have an EFB with airplane spotter. display of an electronic MVA chart
If airlines do not demand MVAs in the before the aircraft enters an MVA
FMS, avionics manufacturers will not sector below the corresponding
add them. But in the next generation of MVA.
avionics, manufacturers could build their
data models and display technology so The complexity of implementing elec-
that MVAs are there for the crew. tronic MVA charts in these and other
methods is related to the underlying
When MVAs are designed into the FMS, technologies. Current-generation EFBs
there is the potential for more intelligent and chart-display systems are designed
information so warnings could be issued to display precomposed images (i.e., the
to the pilot when the airplane descends digital display exactly reproduces the
below an MVA. The industry only has be- paper chart); FMS, next-generation
gun to look at possible applications for EFBs and stand-alone GPS navigation
MVA data, however, and the process of systems use data-driven information,
testing conversions of RVM MVA-chart Providing electronic MVA charts to pilots dynamically generating graphic ele-
data has just begun in 2004. as in-flight advisory information could ments on the display from in-flight
involve the following methods: computations and stored data. Software
This is all brand new Jeppesen, for that manipulates precomposed images
example, probably would begin to ingest Electronic MVA charts such as can be implemented relatively quickly,
all of FAAs data files, convert them into those produced from the paper but does not provide the required
Jeppesen-standard format and decide MVA charts that non-U.S. civil intelligence to generate automatic
how to provide them to avionics manu- aviation authorities have issued advisories.
facturers, Terpstra said. It will be at least for pilot use currently can be
a year before we announce to avionics displayed for preflight briefings and FMS technology does very well draw-
manufacturers that the MVA data would in-flight advisory information. They ing routes as lines between VORs, way-
be available. Typically, for a change like have the same limitations as paper points, outer markers and various fixes,
this, we would send sample files and the MVA charts, however; but typically not so well drawing pictures
date of data availability to all avionics such as the series of graphic elements
manufacturers in time for them to evalu- Electronic MVA charts with own- that comprise an MVA chart as graphi-
ate future effects on their systems. ship position, which in the near cal elements on a display, Terpstra said.
future would provide functions A substantial effort would be needed to
Airlines currently have higher-priority similar to current Class 3 (perma- modify todays FMSs to display graphi-
issues than this, however, such as nently installed) EFB applications cal elements such as boundaries of MVA
duplicate/multiple identifier codes in that already show the airplane sectors.

18 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


VE C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

All classes of EFBs could have the ability Technology out there right now en- government sources, regardless of their
to integrate electronic MVA charts in the ables display of the airplane spotter revision cycles.
near future. on top of non-U.S. MVA charts that
already are within applications on air- Compared with issuing navigation
EFB applications can draw a graphic craft that are certified to operate with charts, providing updated electronic
such as an electronic chart on the display them, Terpstra said. Certification of MVA charts should be a fairly low-
and put a moving airplane on top of it, all charts and georeferencing allow volume activity, Terpstra said. JeppView
he said. That will be the first method of the use of these precomposed charts contains no charts that depict MIAs.
providing electronic MVA charts to pi- including the non-U.S. MVA charts
lots. If the EFB application uses current with an airplane spotter. About 158
electronic charts, for example, georefer- JeppView/FliteDeck electronic charts MVA-data Applications
encing combined with position data from contain radar-vectoring altitudes May Complement TAWS
a GPS receiver, enables the application to (some are radar-vectored departure
generate an airplane spotter and see the
airplane moving around on the approach
chart or IFR area chart.
procedures), including about 125 that
are freestanding MVA charts; these B ateman said that the ATC facilities
developing MVA charts in the United
States must comply with FAA standards
while ensuring safe, orderly and efficient
EFBs that combine a scalable MVA chart traffic flow which inherently requires
with an airplane spotter would enable keeping as much controlled airspace as
pilots to see immediately where they are possible available around terminals.
with respect to MVA sectors during radar
vectoring, he said. I sympathize if, in some cases, ATC
facilities have difficulty complying with
The pilot then will be able to see altitudes FAA standards for minimum altitudes
and interpret the situation, but there will and radar vectoring because of traffic
have to be mental processing by the pilot growth and where the airport is sited,
to warn about a problem there would for example, he said. Sometimes, if the
be no intelligence in the avionics to gen- ATC facility were to raise an MVA, they
erate alerts, he said. In contrast, with the would lose airspace.
intelligence of data-driven avionics and
the required alphanumeric database, the In the past, avionics engineers had want-
system would provide a visual warning ed to consider MVA data for use in GPWS
and/or aural warning if the aircraft began and for use later in EGPWS, he said.
to go below the MVA.
represent every one known to have Back in the 1970s, I had found that MVA
System intelligence also automatically been published in a state aeronautical charts were not kept current, were not
could turn on or turn off display of the information publication. available in a public document and were
electronic MVA chart based on aircraft not in a usable format for air carrier use,
position, altitude and flight path. Under If operators have FliteDeck or the cur- Bateman said. So technology bypassed
SAE standards approved in August rent release of JeppView [the first genera- the possibility of using MVA data for
2004 for the electronic display of aero- tion of JeppView was delivered without terrain warnings. Looking back, I do not
nautical chart information, avionics the airplane-spotter capability], pilots understand why it has taken 35 years a
manufacturers and chart producers will already are able to see the aircraft posi- period when all MVA data should have
consider three criticality levels: Level 1, in tion on top of any electronic MVA charts been publicly available and the industry
which displayed information cannot be or similar charts in the world. There could have developed new safety tools
deselected/replaced by the pilot; Level 2, probably is not a lot of operator/pilot for FAA to release MVA-chart data. I
in which displayed information appears awareness yet, however, because of the was very skeptical that public release of
but can be deselected/replaced; and Level limited number of systems in use. U.S. MVA data would become a reality
3, in which information normally is not in 2004. When we can get the MVA data,
displayed but can be selected for display. Jeppesen issues updated electronic we will use it.
Electronic MVA charts likely would be navigation charts every 14 days; these
treated as Level 2 information or Level 3 updates incorporate the most current The original GPWS had an incompat-
information, Terpstra said. information that may be issued by ibility between radar vectoring and the

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 19


V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

GPWS system itself, he said. The reason these data are updated once a month, descends to about 900 feet above ground
was that the technical standard order for Bateman said. level, Bateman said. As far as we know,
GPWS required certain performance, despite incompatibility with minimum
while ATC had separate standards for Questions remain about when electronic altitudes used in FAAs air traffic control
radar vectoring. MVA charts should be seen if at all handbook, EGPWS will provide a timely
and when they should be out of the terrain warning if something goes wrong
I wrote letters to FAA beginning in 1975 pilots sight. during radar vectoring. Moreover, if the
but later I gave up, he said. We then flight crew is operating at night or in
designed EGPWS to prevent unwanted I envision applications that normally instrument meteorological conditions,
terrain warnings within certain limits, would not show MVAs because the MVAs one pilot should have the EGPWS display
to be compatible with ATC radar vec- could add visual clutter, he said. If the on and the second display should show
tors and to give pilots more time to con- pilot wants to see MVAs, we could enable radar weather. Most, but not all, airlines
duct an escape maneuver. Only under that. Pilots probably would not want the have implemented this procedure. By es-
certain conditions could we eliminate MVA displayed very often during flight tablishing this procedure, pilots see that
those warnings, however. These in- 99 percent of all ATC clearances are something is wrong on the terrain display
clude when we have very good aircraft- proper and safe. Alternatively, if the before the terrain warning.
position data, integrity of terrain data airplane altitude or projected airplane
and vertical accuracies. We also do not altitude is below MVA, we could begin For terrain warnings during radar vector-
rely only on barometric altimetry; we to show the MVA not necessarily an ing, such as before entering an area of
rely on data from geometric altimetry MVA chart on a moving-map display higher terrain, an up-to-date database is
(incorporating satellite-derived altitude but perhaps on an attitude display. critical, he said.
data, radio-altitude data and high- I would leave the question of any aural
quality terrain data). alert or visual alert to cockpit designers, Free worldwide database updates are
Bateman said. available to all operators, and they vir-
With current software, unwanted ter- tually eliminate the problem of unwanted
rain warnings during radar vectoring Incorporating crew-alerting intelligence terrain warnings during radar vectoring,
virtually have been eliminated, he said. into the FMS also might reduce the crew he said. We recommend that operators
If a terrain warning or other anomaly effort. twice a year download and install the
occurs during radar vectoring, however, current EGPWS database from the
the aircraft operator always should inves- We could make obvious the terrain haz- Internet, typically during an aircraft-
tigate the reason including the remote ard and the required action, perhaps with maintenance A check or during a form
possibility that altitude data used by ATC a change of MVA-sector color and per- of an A check.
were incorrect, said Bateman. haps by flashing twice the altitude num-
ber, Bateman said. With this method, Although no regulatory requirements
If the investigation shows that the the crew would not see the electronic exist for these database updates, if an
problem requires a change in the aircraft MVA chart very often, yet we would not accident occurs, operators can assume
system, so be it; if the problem requires disable a warning when needed. If an EFB that failure to carry the current database
changing the MVA chart, so be it, he were used as the platform, a moving-map will become an issue. Nevertheless, some
said. After 10 years of experience with display could incorporate a projected operators in the United States and other
this technology, we feel good about being flight plan that similarly could flash an countries operate with the database that
independent of ATC radar. If a control- alert if something were wrong with the was installed originally.
ler operational error occurs today during aircraft altitude relative to MVA.
radar vectoring, the risk of CFIT in an To continue improving safety during
EGPWS-equipped aircraft is not as high Accuracy of navigation databases and radar vectoring, every unwanted ter-
as it used to be. terrain/obstacle databases is a constant rain warning in the airplane should
concern, and manufacturers must be be reported. We want to know about
His company envisions various methods extremely careful how they achieve every one, Bateman said. Similarly,
of introducing electronic MVA charts compatibility of terrain-warnings with air traffic controllers should report all
for advisory purposes into navigation radar-vectoring at MVA, he said. unwanted alerts from minimum-safe-
systems such as the FMS or EFB. altitude warning systems (MSAW)21 to
EGPWS, for example, functions with- the appropriate civil aviation authority
The natural place to put MVA data out unwanted terrain warnings dur- for investigation and corrective action,
would be in the FMS database because ing radar vectoring until the aircraft he said.

20 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


VE C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

Notes radar facilities may vector aircraft below director professional of the U.K. Guild
the MVA/MIA within those areas and of Air Traffic Control Officers.
1. For example, the U.S. Federal Aviation along those routes described in facility
9. FAA has defined electronic flight bag
Administration (FAA) Aeronautical directives.
(EFB) as follows in Advisory Circular
Information Manual (AIM), 5-2-6C2, said
2. The International Civil Aviation 120-76A, Guidelines for the Certification,
in part, ATC may assume responsibility
Organization (ICAO) defines an aero- Airworthiness and Operational Approval of
for obstacle clearance by vectoring the
nautical information publication (AIP) as Electronic Flight Bag Computing Devices:
[departing] aircraft prior to minimum
issued by or with the authority of a state [An EFB is] an electronic display system
vectoring altitude [MVA] by using a
and containing aeronautical informa- intended primarily for cockpit/flight deck
diverse vector area (DVA). The DVA has
tion of a lasting character essential to air [use] or cabin use. EFB devices can dis-
been assessed for departures that do not
navigation. play a variety of aviation data or perform
follow a specific ground track. ATC may
basic calculations (e.g., performance
also vector an aircraft off a previously 3. Vandel, Robert H. Flight Safety data, fuel calculations, etc.). In the past,
assigned DP [departure procedure]. In Foundation Approach-and-landing some of these functions were tradition-
all cases, the 200-feet-per-nautical-mile Accident Reduction Task Force: Air ally accomplished using paper references
climb gradient is assumed and obstacle Traffic Control Training and Procedures/ or were based on data provided to the
clearance is not provided by ATC until Airport Facilities Working Group: Final flight crew by an airlines flight dispatch
the controller begins to provide navi- Report (Version 1.2). 1997. In Killers function. The scope of the EFB system
gational guidance in the form of radar in Aviation: FSF Task Force Presents functionality may also include various
vectors. U.K. Civil Aviation Authority Facts About Approach-and-landing and other hosted databases and applications.
Civil Aeronautical Publication (CAP) Controlled-flight-into-terrain Accidents. Physical EFB displays may use various
493, Manual of Air Traffic Services Part 1, Flight Safety Digest Volume 17 and Volume technologies, formats and forms of com-
similarly restricts radar controllers from 18 (November 1998February 1999). munication. These devices sometimes
instructing aircraft to descend below
are referred to as auxiliary performance
altitudes depicted on a radar-vectoring 4. Bateman, Don. Telephone interview
computers (APC) or laptop auxiliary
chart before the aircraft has intercepted by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria,
performance computers (LAPC).
the final approach track of a published Virginia, U.S. Aug. 16, 2004. Flight Safety
instrument approach, except under a Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. The AC also said, Type A EFB software
site-specific approval and for limited applications include precomposed, fixed
purposes. FAA Order 7110.65P, Air Traffic 5. Terpstra, James. Telephone interview presentations of data currently presented
Control, Section 5-6-3, Vectors Below by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, in paper format. [Precomposed informa-
Minimum Altitude, Aug. 5, 2004, said, Virginia, U.S. Aug. 27, 2004. Flight tion (is) previously composed into a static
Except in en route automated environ- Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, composed state (non-interactive). The
ments in areas where more than 3.0 miles U.S. Jeppesen is a subsidiary of Boeing composed displays have consistent, de-
[4.8 kilometers] separation minima is Commercial Aviation Services, a unit of fined and verifiable content, and formats
required, you may vector a departing Boeing Commercial Airplanes. that are fixed in composition.] Type
IFR aircraft, or one executing a missed B EFB [software] applications include
6. Directorate of Airspace Policy, U.K. Civil
approach, within 40 nautical miles [64 dynamic, interactive applications that
Aviation Authority (CAA). Radar Vectoring
kilometers] of the antenna and before it can manipulate data and presentation.
Areas in U.K. Airspace: Policy and Design
reaches the minimum altitude for IFR Pending [FAA Aircraft Evaluation Group
Criteria. Civil Aeronautical Publication
operations if separation from prominent (AEG)] human factors evaluation, pan-
(CAP) 709, June 18, 2004.
obstructions shown on the radar scope is ning, scrolling, zooming, rotating or other
applied in accordance with the following: 7. U.S. Federal Aviation Administration active manipulation is permissible for
a. If the flight path is 3.0 miles or more (FAA). PilotController Glossary, Type B applications. Electronic navigation
from the obstruction and the aircraft is Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM). charts should provide a level of informa-
climbing to an altitude at least 1,000 feet Feb. 19, 2004. tion integrity equivalent to paper charts.
above the obstruction, vector the aircraft If an EFB is being used to display flight
to maintain at least 3.0 miles separation 8. Cooper, Martyn. E-mail commu- critical information such as navigation,
from the obstruction until the aircraft nication with Rosenkrans, Wayne. terrain and obstacle warnings that require
reports leaving an altitude above the ob- Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Aug. 19, 2004. immediate action, takeoff and landing
struction. b. If the flight path is less than Flight Safety Foundation, Alexandria, V-speeds, or for functions other than situ-
3.0 miles from the obstruction, and the Virginia, U.S. Cooper is a London ational awareness, then such information
aircraft is climbing to an altitude at least airport operational controller on loan needs to be in the pilots primary field of
1,000 feet above the obstruction, vector as a desk officer from U.K. National Air view. In addition, consideration should
the aircraft to increase lateral separation Traffic Services to the Directorate of be given to the potential for confusion that
from the obstruction until the 3.0-mile Airspace Policy Terminal Airspace of could result from presentation of relative
minimum is achieved or until the aircraft the U.K. CAA. He also has been execu- directions (e.g., positions of other aircraft
reports leaving an altitude above the tive vice president professional of the on traffic displays) when the EFB is posi-
obstruction. c. At those locations where International Federation of Air Traffic tioned in an orientation inconsistent with
[DVAs] have been established, terminal Controller Associations (IFATCA) and that information.

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 21


V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

10. FAA. Order 7210.3T, Facility Operation chapter; or (2) If no applicable minimum Washington, D.C. Aug. 31, 2004. Flight
and Administration. Feb. 19, 2004. altitude is prescribed in those parts (i) Safety Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia,
In the case of operations over an area des- U.S. Hammett is a senior operations stan-
11. Lamond, Robert. Telephone interview ignated as a mountainous area in Part 95, dards specialist for Innovative Solutions
by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, an altitude of 2,000 feet above the highest International (a contractor for FAA), and
Virginia, U.S. Aug. 16, 2004. Flight Safety obstacle within a horizontal distance of 4.0 recording secretary of ACF. Schneider is
Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. nautical miles [7.4 kilometers] from the an FAA terminal instrument procedures
course to be flown; or (ii) In any other case, specialist, co-chairman of ACF and chair-
12. U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs)
an altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest man of the ACF Instrument Procedures
Part 91.175, Takeoff and Landing
obstacle within a horizontal distance of 4.0 Group.
Under IFR, says in part, Operations on
nautical miles from the course to be flown.
unpublished routes and use of radar in 20. Kleiboer, Edwin. Telephone interview by
instrument approach procedures. When 14. Roberts, Wally. Telephone interview Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia,
radar is approved at certain locations for by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, U.S. Aug. 31, 2004. Kleiboer is project
ATC purposes, it may be used not only Virginia, U.S. Aug. 26, 2004. Flight Safety manager, electronic flight bag (EFB), for
for surveillance [radar approaches] and Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines. He said that
precision radar approaches, as applicable, Roberts is a retired TWA captain, an KLM received airworthiness certifica-
but also may be used in conjunction with aviation writer and a volunteer consultant tion of a taxiing application on Boeing
instrument approach procedures predi- to the U.S. National Business Aviation Jeppesen Class 3 EFBs to be installed on
cated on other types of radio navigational Association (NBAA). He is a former chair- 10 new Boeing 777-200ER airplanes from
aids. Radar vectors may be authorized to man of the committee on terminal proce- FAA and the European Joint Aviation
provide course guidance through the seg- dures for the Air Line Pilots Association, Authorities (JAA) in September 2003.
ments of an approach to the final course International. KLM took delivery of the first aircraft
or fix. When operating on an unpublished in October 2003. Three primary EFB soft-
route or while being radar vectored, the 15. Bergner, Steve. Telephone interview ware applications a moving-map dis-
pilot, when an approach clearance is by Rosenkrans, Wayne. Alexandria, play of aircraft position (airplane spotter)
received, shall, in addition to complying Virginia, U.S. Aug. 18, 2004. Flight Safety on electronic airport diagrams, electronic
with Section 91.177, maintain the last Foundation, Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. airplane-performance computation and
altitude assigned to that pilot until the digital video surveillance of the cabin
16. Swancy, Howard. Interview by Rosenkrans,
aircraft is established on a segment of a were the first to be used in line opera-
Wayne. Washington, D.C., U.S. Sept.
published route or instrument approach tions, Kleiboer said. The EFB will enable
9, 2004. Flight Safety Foundation,
procedure unless a different altitude is use of electronic charts for approach and
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.
assigned by ATC. After the aircraft is so departure, but we have not decided yet
established, published procedures apply 17. The U.S. Government/Industry Charting whether to implement KLM electronic
to descent within each succeeding route Forum (ACF) is a biannual public meet- charts or third-party electronic charts in
or approach segment unless a different ing to discuss informational content and the short term, he said. We currently
altitude is assigned by ATC. Upon reach- design of aeronautical charts and related use our own paper navigation charts.
ing the final approach course or fix, the products, as well as instrument flight The EFB can display MVA sectors. No
pilot may either complete the instrument procedures policy and criteria. The forum additional certification will be required
approach in accordance with a procedure comprises the ACF Instrument Procedures because Type A EFB applications [such
approved for the facility or continue a Group and the ACF Charting Group. as chart display] and Type B applications
surveillance [radar approach] or precision [such as interactive moving maps] can
radar approach to a landing. 18. Laydon, Terry. Interview by Rosenkrans, be added by obtaining operational
Wayne. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Aug. approval from the national civil aviation
13. FARs Part 91.177, Minimum Altitudes 30, 2004. Flight Safety Foundation, authority.
for IFR Operations, says in part, (a) Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. Requests for
Operation of aircraft at minimum alti- these data are processed by Fred Milburn, 21. The FAA AIM defines a minimum safe-
tudes. Except when necessary for takeoff master staff cartographer, program and altitude warning (MSAW) as a function of
or landing, no person may operate an production management staff, FAA the ARTS III computer that aids the con-
aircraft under IFR below (1) The ap- National Aeronautical Charting Office. troller by alerting him/her when a tracked
plicable minimum altitudes prescribed in mode-C-equipped aircraft is below or is
Parts 95 [IFR Altitudes] and 97 [Standard 19. Hammett, Bill; Schneider, Tom. E-mail predicted by the computer to go below a
Instrument Approach Procedures] of this communication with Rosenkrans, Wayne. predetermined minimum safe altitude.

22 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


VE C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

Appendix A
Examples of Minimum Vectoring Altitude Information Available to Pilots by Country
ICAO
Airport Jeppesen JeppView Revision
Code Airport Name City Country Electronic Chart Type Date
EBLG Bierset Airport Bierset Belgium Minimum Radar Vectoring 7/25/03
Altitudes
EBBR Brussels International Airport Brussels Belgium Radar Vectoring Area 5/21/99
LQSA Sarajevo International Airport Sarajevo Bosnia and Radar Vectoring 3/21/03
Herzegovina
LQTZ Tuzla International Airport Tuzla Bosnia and Radar Vectoring 8/23/02
Herzegovina
FBSK Sir Seretse Khana International Airport Gaborone Botswana Minimum Radar Vectoring 9/23/94
Altitudes
SCFA Cerro Moreno Airport Antofagasta Chile Minimum Vectoring Altitude 6/6/03
Chart
SCDA Diego Aracena Airport Iquique Chile IFR Minimum Vectoring Altitude 12/19/03
Clearance
SCEL Santiago International Arturo Santiago Chile Minimum Vector Altitude 12/19/03
Merino Bentez Airport Clearance
SCTE El Tepual Airport Puerto Montt Chile IFR Minimum Altitude Vector 9/12/03
Clearance
SCCI Carlos Ibaez del Campo Punta Arenas Chile IFR Minimum Vector Altitude 9/12/03
International Airport Clearance
SKBO El Dorado International Airport Santafe de Colombia Minimum Vectoring Altitudes 11/22/02
Bogot
MROC Juan Santamara International Airport San Jos Costa Rica IFR Minimum Vectoring Altitudes 12/5/03
Clearance
LKTB Brno Turany Airport Brno Czech Republic Minimum Radar Vectoring 10/4/02
Altitudes
LKMT Ostrava Airport Mosnov Czech Republic Minimum Radar Vectoring 10/4/02
Altitudes
LKVO Vodochody Airport Prague Czech Republic Minimum Radar Vectoring 10/4/02
Altitudes
LKPR Ruzyne Airport Prague Czech Republic Minimum Radar Vectoring 7/11/03
Altitudes
LKKV Karlovy Airport Vary Czech Republic Minimum Radar Vectoring 10/4/02
Altitudes
SEQU Mariscal Sucre International Airport Quito Ecuador IFR Minimum Vector Altitude 10/10/03
Clearance
HECA Cairo International Airport Cairo Egypt Radar Vectoring 12/20/02
HEGN Hurghada Airport Hurghada Egypt Radar Vectoring 12/20/02
HELX Luxor International Airport Luxor Egypt Radar Vectoring 12/20/02
HESH Sharm el Sheikh Airport Sharm el Sheikh Egypt Radar Vectoring 12/20/02
LFCI Albi Airport Albi France Minimum Radar Vectoring 10/4/02
Altitudes
LFBZ Biarritz Anglet Bayonne Airport Anglet France Radar Vectoring 8/9/02
LFLP Annecy Haute Savoie Airport Annecy France Radar Vectoring Chart 3/12/04
LFMV Caumont Airport Avignon France Radar Vectoring 12/20/02
LFOA Avord Airport Avord France Radar Vectoring 12/20/02

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 23


V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

Appendix A
Examples of Minimum Vectoring Altitude Information Available to Pilots by Country (continued)
ICAO
Airport Jeppesen JeppView Revision
Code Airport Name City Country Electronic Chart Type Date
LFKB Bastia Airport Bastia France Radar Vectoring 8/9/02
LFBE Bergerac Airport Bergerac France Radar Vectoring 8/9/02
LFAC Calais Dunkerque Airport Calais France Radar Vectoring 8/16/02
LFQT Merville Airport Calonne France Radar Vectoring 8/16/02
LFMD Cannes Airport Cannes France Radar Vectoring 4/18/03
LFMK Carcassonne Salvaza Airport Carcassonne France Minimum Radar Vectoring 10/4/02
Altitudes
LFRK Caen Airport Carpiquet France Minimum Radar Vectoring 10/4/02
Altitudes
LFCK Mazamet Airport Castres France Minimum Radar Vectoring 10/4/02
Altitudes
LFBC Cazaux Airport Cazaux France Radar Vectoring 12/20/02
LFRC Cherbourg Maupertus Airport Cherbourg France Minimum Radar Vectoring 10/4/02
Altitudes
LFBG Cognac Airport Cognac France Radar Vectoring 8/9/02
LFSD Darois Airport Dijon France Minimum Radar Vectoring 10/4/02
Altitudes
LFKF Figari Sud Corse Airport Figari France Radar Vectoring 12/20/02
LFLS Grenoble-St. Geoirs Airport Grenoble France Radar Vectoring 3/12/04
LFTH Toulon Airport Hyeres France Radar Vectoring 8/23/02
LFMI Istres Airport Istres France Radar Vectoring 12/20/02
LFOH Le Havre-Octeville Airport Le Havre France Minimum Radar Vectoring 10/4/02
Altitudes
LFLY Bron Airport Lyon France Radar Vectoring 3/12/04
LFOB Beauvais Airport Paris France Radar Vectoring 12/20/02
LFPT Cormeilles-en-Vexin Airport Pontoise France Radar Vectoring 12/20/02
LFRG Deauville Airport St.-Gatien-des- France Minimum Radar Vectoring 10/4/02
Bois Altitudes
LFOT Val de Loir Airport Tours France Radar Vectoring 12/20/02
LFQB Troyes Airport Troyes France Radar Vectoring Chart 8/2/02
LFLV Vichy Airport Vichy France Radar Vectoring 12/20/02
EDDB Schonefeld Airport Berlin Germany Radar Vectoring Area 2/13/04
EDDI Tempelhof Airport Berlin Germany Radar Vectoring Area 2/13/04
EDDT Tegel Airport Berlin Germany Radar Vectoring Area 2/13/04
EDDF Frankfurt International Airport Frankfurt Germany Minimum Radar Vectoring 2/6/04
Altitudes
LGAV Athens International Airport Athens Greece Radar Vectoring Area 1/31/03
LGKR Kerkira Airport Corfu Greece Radar Vectoring 8/15/03
LGRP Rhodes International Airport Rhodes Greece Radar Vectoring Area 1/31/03
LGTS Makedonia Airport Thessaloniki Greece Radar Vectoring Area 2/7/03

24 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


VE C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

Appendix A
Examples of Minimum Vectoring Altitude Information Available to Pilots by Country (continued)
ICAO
Airport Jeppesen JeppView Revision
Code Airport Name City Country Electronic Chart Type Date
VABB Jawaharlal Nehru International Airport Bombay India Radar Vectoring 8/22/03
WAAA Hasanuddin Airport Mandai-Maros Indonesia Minimum Vector Altitude 8/27/99
Clearance
WIIJ Adisutjipto Airport Yogyakarta Indonesia Minimum Vector Altitude 6/18/99
Clearance
OIII Mehrabad International Airport Tehran Iran Radar Vectoring 12/20/02
LLBG David Ben Gurion Tel Aviv Israel Radar Vector Departure Runways 8/22/03
International Airport 26 and 30
LIMC Malpensa Airport Malpensa Italy Radar Vectoring Area 9/17/99
LIML Linate Airport Milan Italy Radar Vectoring Area 9/17/99
LIRF Fiumicino Airport Rome Italy Radar Vectoring Area 9/17/99
LIMF Turin International Airport Turin Italy Radar Vectoring Area 2/4/00
OJAM Amman-Marka International Airport Amman Jordan Minimum Vectoring Altitudes 10/4/02
WBKK Kota Kinabalu International Airport Kota Kinabalu Malaysia Radar Vectoring Arrival/ 10/10/97
Departure
WMSA Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah Airport Kuala Lumpur Malaysia Minimum Vectoring Altitudes 11/22/02
WBGG Kuching International Airport Kuching Malaysia Radar Vectoring Arrival/ 10/10/97
Departure
WBGR Miri Airport Miri Malaysia Radar Vectoring Area 8/15/03
MMAA Gen. Juan N. Alvarez Acapulco Mexico Minimum Vector Altitude 1/16/04
International Airport Clearance
MMUN Cancn International Airport Cancn Mexico IFR Minimum Vectoring Altitudes 2/27/04
MMCU Gen. Roberto Fierro Villalobos Chihuahua Mexico Minimum Vector Altitudes 11/7/03
International Airport
MMGL Guadalajara Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla Guadalajara Mexico IFR Minimum Vectoring Altitudes 1/30/04
International Airport
MMHO Hermosillo Airport Hermosillo Mexico Minimum Vector Altitude 10/10/03
MMMX Benito Jurez International Airport Mexico City Mexico Minimum Vector Altitudes 1/3/03
MMMY Gen. Mariano Escobedo Monterrey Mexico IFR Minimum Vector Altitude 12/6/02
International Airport Clearance
MMPR Gustavo Daz Ordaz Airport Puerto Vallarta Mexico IFR Minimum Vectoring Altitudes 1/16/04
MMTJ Gen. Abelardo L. Rodrguez Tijuana Mexico IFR Minimum Vector Altitude 12/6/02
International Airport Clearance
OOMS Seeb International Airport Muscat Oman Radar Vectoring Area 1/30/04
MPTO Tocumen Airport Panama City Panama Minimum Vectoring Altitudes 2/14/03
RPVM Mactan International Airport Cebu City Philippines Minimum Vector Altitude Chart 6/20/03
RPLL Ninoy Aquino International Airport Manila Philippines Minimum Vector Altitude 8/1/03
Clearance
RPLB Subic Bay International Airport Subic Bay Philippines Minimum Vector Altitude Chart 2/28/03
EPGD Trojmiasto Airport Gdansk Poland Minimum Radar Vectoring 3/28/03
Altitudes
EPWA Frederic Chopin Airport Warsaw Poland Radar Vectoring 4/4/03
LPBJ Beja Airport Beja Portugal Radar Vectoring 8/23/02

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 25


V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

Appendix A
Examples of Minimum Vectoring Altitude Information Available to Pilots by Country (continued)
ICAO
Airport Jeppesen JeppView Revision
Code Airport Name City Country Electronic Chart Type Date
LPLA Lajes Acores Airport Lajes Acores Portugal Minimum Radar Vectoring 7/11/03
Altitudes
LPPR Francisco Sa Carneiro Airport Maia Portugal Radar Vectoring 8/23/02
USCC ChelyabinskBalandino Airport Chelyabinsk Russia Radar Vectoring Arrivals Runway 1/30/04
09
USCC ChelyabinskBalandino Airport Chelyabinsk Russia Radar Vectoring Arrivals Runway 1/30/04
27
URMM Mineralnyye Vody Airport Mineralnyye Vody Russia Radar Vectoring Arrivals Runway 3/12/04
12 From North
URMM Mineralnyye Vody Airport Mineralnyye Vody Russia Radar Vectoring Arrivals Runway 3/12/04
30 From North
URMM Mineralnyye Vody Airport Mineralnyye Vody Russia Radar Vectoring Arrivals Runway 3/12/04
12 From East, South and West
URMM Mineralnyye Vody Airport Mineralnyye Vody Russia Radar Vectoring Arrivals Runway 3/12/04
30 From East, South and West
LJLJ Ljubljana Airport Ljubljana Slovenia Minimum Radar Vectoring 11/1/02
Altitudes
LEAM Almeria Airport Almeria Spain Minimum Radar Vectoring 3/28/03
Altitudes
LEMG Mlaga Airport Mlaga Spain Radar Vectoring 7/19/02
LEVC Valencia Airport Manises Spain Radar Vectoring Area 7/12/02
LEPA Palma de Mallorca Airport Palma de Spain Radar Vectoring Area 7/12/02
Mallorca
LEST Santiago Airport Santiago de Spain Radar Vectoring Area 7/12/02
Compostela
LEBB Bilbao Airport Sondika/Vizcaya Spain Minimum Radar Vectoring 7/11/03
Altitudes
RCYU Hualien Airport Hualien Taiwan, China Minimum Vectoring Altitudes 6/19/98
RCLG Taichung Airport Taichung Taiwan, China Minimum Vectoring Altitudes 10/10/97
DTMB Habib Bourguiba Monastir Tunisia Radar Vectoring 1/24/03
International Airport
DTTA TunisCarthage Tunis Tunisia Radar Vectoring Area 1/24/03
International Airport
LTAC Ankara Esenboga Airport Ankara Turkey Minimum Radar Vectoring 9/10/99
Altitudes
LTAI Antalya International Airport Antalya Turkey Minimum Radar Vectoring 5/17/02
Altitudes
LTFE BodrumMilas Airport Bodrum Turkey Minimum Radar Vectoring 1/30/04
Altitudes
LTBS Dalaman International Airport Mugla Turkey Minimum Radar Vectoring 11/12/99
Altitudes
LTBA Istanbul Ataturk Airport Istanbul Turkey Minimum Radar Vectoring 5/17/02
Altitudes
LTBL IzmirCigli Airport IzmirCigli Turkey Minimum Radar Vectoring 3/10/00
Altitudes

26 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


VE C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

Appendix A
Examples of Minimum Vectoring Altitude Information Available to Pilots by Country (continued)
ICAO
Airport Jeppesen JeppView Revision
Code Airport Name City Country Electronic Chart Type Date
UKLR Rovno Airport Rovno Ukraine Radar Vectoring Arrival 7/25/03
Procedures Runways 12 and 30
EGPD Aberdeen Airport Aberdeen United Radar Vectoring Area 9/19/03
Kingdom
EGNS Isle of Man Airport Ballasalla United Radar Vectoring Area 9/6/02
Kingdom
EGAA Belfast International Airport Belfast United Radar Vectoring Area 5/9/03
Kingdom
EGKB London Biggin Hill Airport Biggin Hill United Radar Vectoring Area 8/1/03
Kingdom
EGBB Birmingham International Airport Birmingham United Radar Vectoring Area 12/8/00
Kingdom
EGNH Blackpool Airport Blackpool United Radar Vectoring Area 9/19/03
Kingdom
EGGD Bristol International Airport Bristol/Bath United Radar Vectoring Area 9/26/03
Kingdom
EGTG Bristol Filton Aerodrome Bristol United Radar Vectoring Area 11/29/02
Kingdom
EGSC Cambridge City Airport Cambridge United Radar Vectoring Area 1/16/04
Kingdom
EGFF Cardiff International Airport Cardiff United Radar Vectoring Area 1/30/04
Kingdom
EGHH Bournemouth Airport Christchurch United Radar Vectoring Area 3/26/04
Kingdom
EGBE Coventry Airport Coventry United Radar Vectoring Area 6/7/02
Kingdom
EGNV Teesside International Airport Darlington United Radar Vectoring Area 1/16/04
Kingdom
EGPH Edinburgh Airport Edinburgh United Radar Vectoring Area 6/8/01
Kingdom
EGTE Exeter International Airport Exeter United Radar Vectoring Area 1/30/04
Kingdom
EGPF Glasgow Airport Glasgow United Radar Vectoring Area 7/25/03
Kingdom
EGPK Glasgow Prestwick Glasgow United Radar Vectoring Area Runways 10/17/03
International Airport Kingdom 13, 21 and 31
EGJB Guernsey Airport Guernsey United Radar Vectoring Area 3/8/02
Kingdom
EGNR Hawarden Airport Hawarden United Radar Vectoring Area 3/19/04
Kingdom
EGJJ Jersey Airport Jersey United Radar Vectoring Area 3/19/99
Kingdom
EGNJ Humberside International Airport Kirmington United Radar Vectoring Area 12/19/03
Kingdom
EGNM Leeds Bradford International Airport Leeds United Radar Vectoring Area 1/16/04
Kingdom

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 27


V E C T O R I N G A LT I T U D E S

Appendix A
Examples of Minimum Vectoring Altitude Information Available to Pilots by Country (continued)
ICAO
Airport Jeppesen JeppView Revision
Code Airport Name City Country Electronic Chart Type Date
EGPB Sumburgh Airport Lerwik United Radar Vectoring Area 10/3/03
Kingdom
EGGP Liverpool John Lennon Airport Liverpool United Radar Vectoring Area 4/11/03
Kingdom
EGLF Farnborough Airport London United Radar Vectoring Area 12/20/02
Kingdom
EGGW London Luton Airport London United Radar Vectoring Area 4/18/03
Kingdom
EGKK London Gatwick Airport London United Radar Vectoring Area 7/19/02
Kingdom
EGLC London City Airport London United Radar Vectoring Chart 2/13/04
Kingdom
EGLL Heathrow Airport London United Radar Vectoring Chart 8/1/03
Kingdom
EGSS London Stansted Airport London United Radar Vectoring Area 3/29/02
Kingdom
EGCC Manchester Airport Manchester United Radar Vectoring Area 7/11/03
Kingdom
EGCD Manchester Woodford Airport Manchester United Radar Vectoring Area 4/4/03
Kingdom
EGMH London Manston Airport Manston United Radar Vectoring Area 11/28/03
Kingdom
EGNT Newcastle International Airport Newcastle United Radar Vectoring Area 8/29/03
upon Tyne Kingdom
EGNX East Midlands Airport Nottingham United Radar Vectoring Area 2/20/04
Kingdom
EGPM Scatsa Airport Shetland Island United Radar Vectoring Area 4/28/00
Kingdom
EGHI Southampton International Airport Southampton United Radar Vectoring Area 6/8/01
Kingdom
EGMC London Southend Airport Southend-on-Sea United Radar Vectoring Area 12/19/03
Kingdom
EGBJ Staverton Airport Staverton United Radar Vectoring Area 10/31/03
Kingdom
EGAC Belfast City Airport Sydenham-By- United Radar Vectoring Area 11/28/03
Pass Kingdom
EGHG Yeovil Airport Yeovil United Radar Vectoring Area 8/23/02
Kingdom
SUMU Carrasco International Airport Montevideo Uruguay IFR Minimum Vector Altitudes 12/5/03
Clearance
ICAO = International Civil Aviation Organization

Note: Paper charts are published by the respective civil aviation authorities and also are available to pilots in paper form and electronic form. The
table comprises various types that provide minimum vectoring altitudes (MVAs, or similarly defined altitudes) in the Jeppesen JeppView library of
electronic charts for flight operations under instrument flight rules. In addition to charts listed, IFR terminal-area charts in some countries also contain
information about altitudes that may be assigned by air traffic controllers.
Source: James Terpstra (with FSF research to identify airport name, city and country)

28 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


AVIATION STATISTICS

Approach-and-landing Accident
Severity Decreases in 2003 for
Large Commercial Jets
Although approach-and-landing accidents (ALAs) continued to be the largest accident
category for the worldwide commercial jet fleet, ALAs produced a smaller percentage
of total fatalities and a smaller percentage of total hull-loss accidents than in 2002.

FSF EDITORIAL STAFF

losses3 in 2003 (58 percent of the 12 hull

W
estern-built, large com-
mercial jet airplanes1 were losses), compared with 10 of the 14 hull
involved in 32 accidents losses (71 percent) in 2002.
worldwide in 2003 (Table
1, page 30), an increase of two compared The data were compiled by The Boeing
A LAs accounted

with 2002. The majority 20 accidents Co. in its annual statistical summary of for smaller
(63 percent) were approach-and-landing accident data.4
accidents (ALAs).2 That was a higher percent- percentages of
age of ALAs than the 57 percent in 2002. The 483 fatalities in 2003 (482 onboard)
total fatalities and
compared with 702 (558 onboard) in
Nevertheless, ALAs accounted for smaller 2002. of total hull losses

percentages of total fatalities and of to-


For the 10-year period 1994 through than in the
tal hull losses than in the previous year.
In 2003, ALAs were responsible for 121 2003, loss of control in flight resulted in previous year.
fatalities, or 25 percent of the years total the greatest number of fatalities (2,238,
483 fatalities, compared with 36 percent including 103 in 2003; Figure 1, page 31).
in 2002. ALAs resulted in seven hull Continued on page 31

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 29


30
Table 1
Airplane Accidents, Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet, 2003
Hull
Date Airline Airplane Type Accident Location Loss Fatalities Phase of Flight Description
Jan. 8, 2003 Turkish Airlines Canadair RJ100 Diyarbakir, Turkey X 75 Final approach CFIT, struck mountain
Jan. 8, 2003 TAN Airlines Fokker F28 Chachapoyas, Peru X 46 Initial approach CFIT, struck mountain
Jan. 17, 2003 TAME Fokker F28 Quito, Ecuador 0 Takeoff Rejected takeoff/runway excursion
Jan. 23, 2003 Star Air Boeing 737-200 Jakarta, Indonesia 0 Landing Runway excursion
Jan. 26, 2003 VASP Airlines Boeing 737-200 Rio Branco, Brazil X 0 Initial approach Struck tree on approach to land
Feb. 15, 2003 Evergreen International Airlines Boeing 747-200 Catania, Italy 0 Landing Runway overrun on landing
March 7, 2003 Air Algerie Boeing 737-200 Tamanrasset, Algeria X 103 Takeoff Struck terrain after takeoff
March 12, 2003 Singapore Airlines Boeing 747-400 Auckland, New Zealand 0 Takeoff Tail strike on takeoff
March 21, 2003 Royal Air Maroc Boeing 737-400 Marrakech, Morocco 0 Landing Landing overrun
March 21, 2003 Transasia Airways Airbus A321 Tainan, Taiwan, China 0 Landing Runway excursion
March 26, 2003 Royal Air Maroc Boeing 737-400 Oujda, Morocco 0 Landing Runway excursion
March 31, 2003 AirTran Airways Boeing 717-200 New York, New York, U.S. 0 Parked Evacuation injuries
April 18, 2003 Wetrafa Airlift McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32 Brazzaville, Congo X 0 Landing Intentional off-runway gear-up landing
S

June 17, 2003 Onur Air McDonnell Douglas MD-88 Groningen, Netherlands 0 Takeoff Rejected takeoff overrun
July 6, 2003 Cielos del Peru McDonnell Douglas DC-10-30 Curitiba, Brazil 0 Landing Landing overrun
July 8, 2003 Sudan Airways Boeing 737-200 Port Sudan, Sudan X 116 Initial climb Struck terrain after takeoff
July 11, 2003 Air Memphis Boeing 707-300C Dacca, Bangladesh X 0 Takeoff Rejected takeoff overrun
Aug. 11, 2003 Garuda Indonesia Fokker F28 Jakarta, Indonesia 0 Landing Left-main landing gear collapse
Aug. 15, 2003 EasyJet Boeing 737-300 Geneva, Switzerland 0 Climb Hail damage in flight
TAT I S T I C S

Sept. 12, 2003 Northwest Airlines McDonnell Douglas DC-9-15 Norfolk, Virginia, U.S. 1 Tow Tractor driver killed
Oct. 1, 2003 Cargo Air Lines Boeing 747-200C Liege, Belgium 0 Landing Landing overrun
Oct. 3, 2003 Garuda Indonesia Boeing 737-500 Semarang, Indonesia 0 Landing Runway departure
Nov. 1, 2003 EgyptAir Airbus A321-230 Moscow, Russia 0 Taxi Skidded off runway
Nov. 6, 2003 TAME Airbus A320 Florianopolis, Brazil 0 Landing Runway offside excursion
Nov. 29, 2003 Hydro Air Boeing 747-258C La Guaira, Venezuela 0 Landing Runway offside excursion
Dec. 7, 2003 East African Safari Air Fokker F28 Lokichokio, Kenya X 0 Landing Runway excursion
Dec. 13, 2003 Aero Continente Boeing 737-200 Lima, Peru 0 Landing Landed with all landing gear retracted
Dec. 18, 2003 FedEx McDonnell Douglas MD-10-10 Memphis, X 0 Landing Right-main landing gear collapse,
Tennessee, U.S. fuselage burned
Dec. 18, 2003 Lneas Areas Suramericanas McDonnell Douglas DC-9-15F Mitu, Colombia X 3 Descent Struck jungle terrain
Dec. 19, 2003 Air Gabon Boeing 737-300 Libreville, Gabon X 0 Landing Landing overrun during heavy rain
Dec. 20, 2003 GOL Transportes Areos Boeing 737-700 Navegantes, Brazil 0 Landing Landing overrun
Dec. 25, 2003 Union Des Transports Africains Boeing 727-200 Cotonou, Benin X 139 Takeoff Struck building on takeoff
32 Total 12 483
CFIT = Controlled flight into terrain

Source: The Boeing Co.

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


STAT I S T I C S

Figure 1
Fatalities by Accident Category,
Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet, 19942003
2,500
103 Total Fatalities = 6,794 (6,483 onboard)
2,238
2003 Fatalities = 483 (482 onboard)
121
1,991
2,000
Number of Fatalities

1,500

1,000

119 580
139
500 420
339 373
231 225 192
121
37 29 13 2
3
0
Loss of Midair Fuel-tank Takeoff Runway Fuel Rejected Unknown
Control Collision Explosion Configuration Incursion Exhaustion Takeoff
in Flight
CFIT In-flight Structure Landing Wind Shear Miscellaneous Turbulence
Fire Fatality
Accident Category
Number
of Fatal
Accidents 32 24 2 2 2 1 2 16 3 1 3 8 1 2 6
(105 Total)

CFIT = Controlled flight into terrain


Note: Accidents involving multiple non-onboard fatalities are included.
Accidents involving single, non-onboard fatalities are excluded.
Fatalities/accidents are placed in one category only.
Source: The Boeing Co.

Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)5


was responsible for the second-greatest Figure 2
number of fatalities (1,991, including Accident Rates by Type of Operation, Hull-loss Accidents and/or
121 in 2003). Fatal Accidents, Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet,
19942003
The 19942003 rate for hull-loss ac-
cidents and/or fatal accidents was 0.96 3.0
10-year Accident Rate

2.64
per million departures for scheduled
million departures)

2.5
passenger operations and 2.64 per mil-
(accidents per

lion departures for all other operations 2.0

(Figure 2). 1.5

1.0
0.96
For the 10-year period, the combined
final approach phase of flight and 0.5
landing phase (beginning at the final 0.0
approach fix) included more than half Scheduled Passenger Operations All Other Operations*
143.8 Million Departures 25.4 Million Departures
(51 percent) of the total accidents and
18 percent of the total fatalities (Figure *Unscheduled passenger and charter, cargo, ferry, test, training and demonstration.
3, page 32). Including accidents during Source: The Boeing Co.
the initial approach (beginning at the

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 31


S TAT I S T I C S

Figure 3
Accidents and Onboard Fatalities by Phase of Flight,
Hull-loss Accidents and/or Fatal Accidents, Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet,
19942003

Percentage of Accidents/Fatalities
17% 51%
Taxi,
Load, Initial Climb Initial Final
Parked Takeoff Climb (Flaps up) Cruise Descent Approach Approach Landing

Accidents 5% 12% 5% 8% 6% 3% 7% 6% 45%


Fatalities 0% 8% 14% 25% 12% 8% 13% 16% 2%

22% 18%
Exposure = Percentage of flight time
based on flight duration of 1.5 hours
Initial Final
approach approach
fix fix
1% 1% 14% 57% 11% 12% 3% 1%

Distribution of Accidents and Fatalities


2,000
1,619
Hull-loss Accidents and/or

100 93
1,500
80
Fatal Accidents

Fatalities
1,066
60 902 865 1,000
788
40 539 541
25 500
20 11 11 17 13 14 13
7 161
3
0 0
Taxi, Takeoff Initial Climb Cruise Descent Initial Final Landing
Load, Climb Approach Approach
Parked

Hull-loss and/or Fatal Accidents On-board Fatalities

Source: The Boeing Co.

initial approach fix) would add 7 per- number of fatalities occurred in accidents sustained when the towbar became
cent to the accidents (i.e., 58 percent during the climb (1,619 fatalities out of a disconnected from the aircraft during
of the accidents were ALAs) and 13 total of 6,484, or 25 percent). pushback, and the tractor struck the
percent to the fatalities (i.e., 31 percent aircraft on Sept. 12, 2003, at Norfolk,
of the fatalities were caused by ALAs). For the 19942003 period, the primary- Virginia, U.S.
The combined takeoff phase and ini- cause category (as determined by inves-
tial climb phase included 17 percent of tigative authorities) cited the flight crew Excluded from the 2003 accident data,
accidents and 22 percent of fatalities in 62 percent of hull-loss accidents with because it resulted from hostile ac-
during this period. known causes (Figure 4, page 33). The tion, was an Airbus A300 cargo aircraft
airplane and weather were primary-cause that was struck by a ground-launched
Landing was the phase of flight in which categories in 14 percent and 12 percent of missile at Baghdad, Iraq, on Nov. 22,
hull-loss accidents and/or fatal accidents hull-loss accidents, respectively. 2003. Although the airplanes hydraulic
occurred most often in 1994 through 2003 systems became inoperable, the flight
(Figure 3), including 93 accidents out of One fatal accident in 2003 involved a crew was able to maneuver and land the
the total of 204 (46 percent). The largest lead agentdriver who died of injuries airplane. There were no injuries.

32 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


STAT I S T I C S

Figure 4
Accidents by Primary Cause,1
Hull-loss Accidents and/or Fatal Accidents, Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet,
19942003
Percentage of Accidents With Known Causes
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

Flight Crew 84 62%


Airplane 19 14%
Weather 16 12%
Miscellaneous/Other 7 5%
Maintenance 5 4%
Airport/Air Traffic Control 5 4%

Total With Known Causes 136


Unknown or Awaiting Reports 50
Total 186

1 Primary causes are those determined by the investigative authority.

Source: The Boeing Co.

Notes 3. Hull loss was defined as airplane damage 5. Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) occurs
that is substantial and is beyond economic when an airworthy aircraft under the control
1. The data included commercial jet repair. The term also included events in of the flight crew is flown unintentionally
airplanes with maximum gross weights which the airplane was missing or was into terrain, obstacles or water, usually with
of more than 60,000 pounds (27,000 substantially damaged and inaccessible. no prior awareness by the crew. This type of
kilograms). Airplanes manufactured in the accident can occur during most phases of
Soviet Union or the Commonwealth of 4. Boeing has revised the data shown in flight, but CFIT is more common during the
Independent States were excluded because Figure 1 since publication of its sum- approach-and-landing phase, which begins
of inadequate operational data. Commercial mary. This article uses the revised data. when an airworthy aircraft under the control
airplanes in military service were excluded. Sachs, Andrew W., safe data manager, of the flight crew descends below 5,000 feet
in-service safety and airworthiness, The above ground level (AGL) with the intention
2. Approach-and-landing accidents (ALAs) Boeing Co. E-mail communication with to conduct an approach and ends when the
were those that Boeing classified as occur- Darby, Rick. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. landing is complete or the flight crew flies
ring in the initial approach, final approach Sept. 9, 2004. Flight Safety Foundation, the aircraft above 5,000 feet AGL en route to
or landing phases of flight. Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. another airport.

STATS

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 33


PUBLICATIONS
RECEIVED AT FSF JERRY LEDERER
AVIATION SAFETY LIBRARY

Crew Resource Management Is


Called a Human-tech Success Story
Advanced technology, says The Human Factor, is often poorly designed for the people who work
with it. The author finds that, although aviation has its man vs. machine conflicts, the industry
has made progress in taming them.

FSF LIBRARY STAFF

Books Some flight deckautomation design problems are


more subtle than the frequently discussed issues
The Human Factor: Revolutionizing the Way of data entry to the flight-management system
People Live With Technology. Vicente, Kim. and interpretation of glass-cockpit displays.
New York, New York, U.S.: Routledge, 2004. For example, the author says, The problem of
352 pp. Figures, index. crew coordination is actually made more com-
plex in the latest cockpits, with their new array of
controls for computer automation (and not just
M ore and more, were being asked to live
with technology that is technically reli-
able, because it was created to fit our knowledge
because there are now only two crewmembers
instead of three). Old-style cockpits had analog
of the physical world, but that is so complex or meters, knobs, switches and other types of controls
so counterintuitive that its actually unusable by spread out all over the cockpit panels. As a result,
most human beings, says the author, an engi- the physical movements of one crewmember were
neer specializing in human factors. The computer a visible indication of what he was doing: if you
program that generates incomprehensible error saw your fellow crewmember leaning to the right
messages, or audio-video equipment that re- and putting his hand on a certain switch, you knew
quires complicated inputs using tiny buttons on he was probably raising the landing gear, but if
a remote unit, are frustrating but not dangerous. he was looking upward at an analog meter, you
In air carrier operations and corporate aviation, knew he was probably checking on the status of
however, where many flight tasks are automated the electrical systems.
but require human programming, a poor fit
between the way human pilots think and act and The arrival of computer technology in the mod-
the technology they control can have very serious ern cockpit changed all that inadvertently.
consequences. Now, almost all the information is presented on
computer monitors, and thanks to the marvels
The book discusses the problem of designing of automation, pilots can bring up displays for
human-centered technology in many fields checking on the hydraulics, displays for looking
including medical care, nuclear power plants and at the weather, and so on; its all at their fingertips
automobiles and has a number of observations they just have to choose which display to look
about how the interaction between users and avia- at. Because physical movement is curtailed,
tion technology can be smooth or awkward. pilots dont receive as much information from

34 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


R E S O U R C E S

the actions of their partners. Most of the time, Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Florida,
theyre just sitting and staring at the computer U.S., says that he wrote this book because no suit-
screens, regardless of what theyre thinking about able text for his courses existed. It is organized into
or working on. So there isnt as much free infor- five parts: fundamentals of maintenance, techni-
mation as there used to be; each crewmember has cal services, maintenance and materiel support,
to explicitly communicate his or her intent and oversight functions and appendixes.
actions by talking to the other, if theyre to keep
in tune with each other. That takes a lot more ef- We will be looking at the big picture, the author
fort and concentration than a glance out of the says in the introduction. We will be looking at
corner of your eye. maintenance, engineering and management as
an integrated whole. We will examine how these
The author gives the aviation industry much credit disciplines combine and coordinate to accomplish
for solving, or working around, difficulties in hu- the goals and objectives of airline maintenance.
man-technology interaction. He describes crew
resource management (CRM) as a human-tech The book is intended for those who have a back-
success story, and believes that voluntary, non- ground and experience in aviation maintenance
punitive reporting systems have alerted crews and and a wish to move into management positions
technology designers to unintended consequences in an airlines maintenance and engineering op-
of modern flight-management systems. erations. Managers who do not have a technical
background in maintenance also will benefit from
Organizations, as well as misapplied technology, the book, the author says.
can create unintentional problems by ignoring the
human factor, the author says. The Cambridge Aerospace Dictionary.
Gunston, Bill (ed.). Cambridge, England:
Often, corporate priorities are muddy or counter- Cambridge University Press, 2004. 750 pp.
productive people who are meant to be working Appendixes.
together instead may unknowingly pull in differ-
ent directions, or even worse, actively compete
against each other, he says. Also, responsibilities
are not explicit, or if they are, they may contain
F rom A (general symbol for area, aspect ra-
tio, amperes, et al.) to Zytel (trade name for
nylon materials that remain flexible at cryogenic
structural conflicts of interest . And even if all cold temperatures), the book includes technical
of those difficulties are dealt with, the right infor- terminology for the aerospace industry and for
mation still doesnt get to the right people at the specific aircraft.
right time; the communication patterns required
to get the job done effectively havent been built This edition is based on three previous editions
into the team or organization. of Janes Aerospace Dictionary and includes 15,000
new terms, mostly acronyms. The editor says in
Even with the right information, individuals may the introduction, There is little point in saying
not have the required expertise to interpret that again that acronyms are an infectious disease,
information and use it to make effective decisions. especially in the world of aerospace. [While]
Sometimes, people dont know what they dont admitting that the incentive to abbreviate is of-
know, so its up to the system designers of the ten strong, it is self-defeating if the reader has a
corporation to determine what skills are necessary choice of more than 20 interpretations and does
for each job and to ensure that all employees have not know which one to pick. ATDC, for ex-
the requisite skill set. ample, stands for Assisted Target Detection and
Classification, Automatic Target Detection and
Aviation Maintenance Management. Kinnison, Classification, and Automated Target Detection
Harry A. New York, New York, U.S.: McGraw- and Classification.
Hill, 2004. 299 pp. Figures, tables, appendixes,
glossary, index. Teaming Up: Components of Safety Under High
Risk. Dietrich, Rainer; Jochum, Kateri (eds.).

T he author, an instructor in aviation main-


tenance management at Embry-Riddle
Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2004.
135 pp. Figures, index.

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 35


R E S O U R C E S

T he book consists of presentations on the


theme of teamwork as it relates to risk in the
workplace, from the Gottlieb Daimler and Karl
they adopted a plan that would assure safety but
might incur economic [losses] or productivity
losses. On the other hand, if they judged the safety
Benz Foundations colloquium, Interaction in risk to be less serious, they modified their cur-
High Risk Environments. Chapter 6, by Judith rent plan to mitigate threats to flight safety while
Orasanu, Ute Fischer and Jeannie Davison, con- satisfying their companys economic [goals] and
cerns Risk Perception and Risk Management in productivity goals.
Aviation.
These findings attest to the inherent subjectiv-
In this paper, we focus on plan continuations, ity of risk assessment, especially in situations
a pattern common to many aviation accidents, that are characterized by ambiguous [condi-
and discuss how pilots risk assessment and risk tions] and dynamically changing conditions.
management strategies may play a role in this type Moreover, these findings suggest that faulty
of event, the authors say. Plan continuation is a risk assessment rather than inappropriate ac-
term coined by the U.S. National Transportation tion decisions may be a dominant factor in
Safety Board for decision errors in which a flight plan-continuation errors.
crew maintained its original plan, even though
the conditions on which the plan was based had
changed. Reports

Research for the paper addressed the following The Effects of NEXRAD Graphical Data
questions: Resolution and Direct Weather Viewing
on Pilots Judgments of Weather Severity
How do pilots think about flight risk? and Their Willingness to Continue a Flight.
Beringer, D.B.; Ball, J.D. U.S. Federal Aviation
What risks are of greatest concern to them? Administration (FAA) Office of Aerospace
Medicine (OAM). DOT/FAA/AM-04/5. March
How do risk factors influence decision dif- 2004. 14 pp. Figures, color images, appendix,
ficulty? and, references. Available on the Internet at <http:
//www.cami.jccbi.gov > or through NTIS.*
How do pilots typically manage risk?

The authors researched pilots concepts of risk


through a survey of pilots from a major U.S. air
T he difference between making decisions
in visual meteorological conditions and
[making decisions] in instrument meteorologi-
carrier. A second study presented pilots from a cal conditions is not trivial, says the report. With
major U.S. air carrier with hypothetical scenarios regard to weather conditions, decision making is
in which decision making was complicated by influenced by location of storm cells, location of
ambiguous conditions. The pilots were asked to precipitation and convective activity. Pilots use
choose between continuing with an original plan visual observation of weather conditions and
that posed a threat to flight safety, but which if electronic instrumentation that displays data on
successful would entail economic, professional, weather, navigation (terrain, obstacles and routes)
productivity and social gains, and a change of plan and traffic to determine if changes in the flight
that would increase the safety margin but would path are needed and when those changes should
incur economic losses or other losses. occur. One example of weather instrumentation
is the next-generation radar (NEXRAD), which
The authors say, Situations that involve a conflict shows radar displays in graphic form and geo-
between different types of risk, especially those graphic weather locations.
that pit safety against economic considerations,
were reported by pilots to increase the difficulty of Some in the aviation community are concerned
decisions. How they settle these kinds of decision that high-resolution radar images encourage
dilemmas was found to depend on their assess- pilots to use the data for tactical navigation by
ment of the safety risk. If they judged the safety observing the location of precipitation or con-
threat to be close to or beyond their comfort zone, vective activity relative to aircraft position but

36 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


R E S O U R C E S

to ignore the dynamic nature of weather and the


limitations of reflective radar. To test the validity
of this concern, a study was designed to deter-
L ight utility helicopters (LUHs) made up half
the fleet of registered helicopters in Australia,
yet were involved in 72 percent of helicopter ac-
mine how changes in resolutions of displayed cidents between January 1985 and December 2003,
NEXRAD data can affect data interpretation according to a 2003 study of safety trends for the
and pilot decision making. previous 20 years.

This report is based on a study of 32 pilots to During that period, LUHs played an increasing
assess how variations in resolution of displayed role in Australian civil aviation. The number of
NEXRAD graphical data are interpreted when LUH aircraft tripled, the total number of flying
a pilot has a direct (out-the-window) view of hours doubled and the number of LUH aircraft
weather. Four levels of resolution were tested. increased to represent half of the Australian heli-
The lowest display resolution showed a broad copter fleet. These aircraft perform flying activities
field of images, and higher resolution permitted with various risk profiles, such as aerial muster-
imagery of finer detail in a focused area. During ing (controlling the movement of livestock),
the study, observations were made as pilots flight training, agricultural operations, personal
performed simulator flights and responded to transport and business transport.
weather scenarios at various display resolutions.
Assessments of their responses were evaluated This report compares the relative safety of four
by observers and participants using the follow- types of LUHs that were similar in usage and
ing criteria: similar in design including the number of
engines and reciprocating engine or turbine
Visual-performance data (how long pilots engine to determine if any particular model
accessed the data); experienced a higher risk than similar aircraft.
Tables of comparative data by manufacturer and
Flight-performance data (how close they by helicopter model show numbers of accidents
came to the significant weather); (fatal and nonfatal), accident rates per registered
aircraft, accident rates per hours flown, type of
Length of time pilots deferred their decisions operation in which the accident occurred and
about continuing the flights; and, accident outcomes.

Pilots responses to equivalent weather data Some of the reports conclusions are the following:
presented at differing resolutions in the non-
flight environment. The overall safety trend for LUHs in number
of accidents and accident rate per hours flown
Pilots appeared to spend more time looking has improved since 1990;
at higher-resolution images than at lower-
resolution images, thus deferring longer their The number of accidents, the accident rate
decisions. The report says that this reinforces per flying hours, and the accident rate per
the idea that higher-resolution images are likely registered aircraft decreased from 1990 to
to encourage pilots to continue flights with the 2002;
expectation that they can fly around or between
significant weather features. The presence of out- LUH operations with the lowest accident rates
the-window viewable weather phenomena was per hour flown are flight training, charter op-
seen to have a significant effect on how pilots erations and other aerial work;
regarded the NEXRAD data.
Most LUH accidents involved collisions with
Light Utility Helicopter Safety in Australia. terrain or other obstacles, such as trees or
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). power lines; and,
Aviation Research Paper BE04/73. June 2004. 44
pp. Figures, tables, appendix. Available on the Aircraft handling or maintenance, repair,
Internet at <http://www.atsb.gov.au/aviation/ design and construction factors contributed
research/index.cfm> or from ATSB.** to the majority of accidents.

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 37


R E S O U R C E S

Effect of Helicopter Rotors on GPS Reception. Regulatory Materials


U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). CAA
Paper 2003/07. December 2003. 65 pp. Figures, The Avoidance of Fatigue in Aircrews: Guide
tables, appendix, references, glossary. Available to Requirements. U.K. Civil Aviation Authority
on the Internet at <www.caa.co.uk> or from (CAA). Civil Aviation Publication (CAP)
Documedia.*** 371. Fourth edition. January 2004. 105 pp.
Tables, appendixes. Available on the Internet at

S uitable installation locations for global posi-


tioning system (GPS) antennas on helicopters
are limited by the shape of the airframe. It is not
<www.caa.co.uk> or from Documedia.***

always possible to ensure that the line-of-sight


signal path to GPS satellites will be clear of the
I n the 1950s, it was recognized that a contributory
factor in some aircraft accidents may have been
flight crew fatigue, and efforts to regulate hours
regions swept by the helicopters rotor blades. worked by flight crews began. Restrictions placed
The report describes a series of experiments, on the number of hours worked developed over
performed on behalf of the U.K. Civil Aviation time to ensure that crewmembers are sufficiently
Authority (CAA), that investigated the effect of rested prior to commencing a duty period.
turning rotor blades on the reception of GPS
signals. The first edition of CAP 371, issued in April 1975,
established a standard for flight-time limitation
The test aircraft was a Sikorsky S-76C, which was and defined the basic framework for duty hours
operated in a series of ground runs during which of flight crew and cabin crew. It reflected a balance
the rotational speed of the rotors was varied. The among industry practices, aeromedical evidence
effects of the operation on three dissimilar GPS and what was considered best for the common
receivers were monitored. good of people in the United Kingdom.

Among the studys conclusions were the The document contains mandatory requirements
following: for the civil aviation flight time limitation (FTL)
scheme and recommended guidelines. Sections
The helicopter rotors were demonstrated define, in detail, responsibilities of operators and
to introduce a periodic modulation onto responsibilities of crewmembers. Appendixes con-
the [coarse/acquisition] code GPS satellite tain four examples of FTL schemes that companies
signals; operating scheduled services, helicopters, air taxi,
charters and others can adopt if desired. Guidance
Rotor interference was identified with documents provide examples of staff roster prepa-
the GPS antenna mounted in two different ration and a schedule matrix of days off.
positions (adjacent to the tail rotor and un-
derneath the main rotor) . The nature of The document includes Amendment 1, dated May
the modulation was observed to differ in the 12, 2004.
two cases;

The effect of the rotor modulation upon the Sources


carrier-to-noise ratio of the received signals * National Technical Information Service (NTIS)
was estimated to be between 3 dB [decibels] 5285 Port Royal Road
and 8 dB; Springfield, VA 22161 U.S.
Internet: <http://www.ntis.gov>
No evidence was obtained for the rotor inter- ** Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)
ference having affected the range-measurement P.O. Box 967
accuracy of a GPS receiver; [and,] Civic Square, ACT 2608 Australia
Internet: <http://www.atsb.gov.au>
Considerable caution must be applied *** Documedia Solutions
RY

when interpreting signal-level figures gener- 37 Windsor St.


A
R

ated by a GPS receiver in the presence of rotor Cheltenham, Gloucester GL52 2DG U.K.
B
LI

interference. Internet: <http://www.documedia.co.uk>

38 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


ACCIDENT/INCIDENT BRIEFS

Leaking Fuel Tank in Boeing 777


Prompts Return to Airport
The report by the U.K. Air Accidents Investigation Branch said that the
purge door for the center fuel tank was not installed.

FSF EDITORIAL STAFF

T
he following information provides an Aircraft rescue and fire fighting personnel in-
awareness of problems through which spected the airplane after the landing and said
such occurrences may be prevented in that there were no apparent fuel leaks but that
the future. Accident/incident briefs are vapor was emanating from the left-main landing-
based on preliminary information from govern- gear assembly. The engine was shut down and the
ment agencies, aviation organizations, press infor- airplane was taxied to the gate (stand) where pas-
mation and other sources. This information may sengers disembarked normally.
not be entirely accurate.
An inspection of the left-main landing-gear bay
AIR CARRIER

revealed that the center fuel tanks purge door was


Another Crew Saw Smoke, not installed but was instead hanging on a lanyard
inside the fuel tank, the preliminary report said.
Smelled Fuel Vapor From
A plastic bag was attached to the purge-door
Incident Airplane opening. The bag contained fuel, and it also con-
Boeing 777. No damage. No injuries. tained the screws that would normally hold the
purge door in place.

I mmediately after takeoff from an airport in


England for a flight to Zimbabwe, the flight
crew was told that the crew of an airplane at the
Before startup, the airplanes center fuel tank,
which has a capacity of 98,800 liters (26,103 U.S.
runway holding point had observed smoke trailing gallons) or 80,000 kilograms (176,368 pounds) of
the incident airplane and had smelled fuel. The fuel, was slightly more than half full the fuel
flight crew observed no abnormal indications on level was slightly below the purge-door opening
flight instruments and decided that their airplanes but high enough that the airplanes pitch attitude
center fuel tank probably was leaking. during climb-out would have allowed fuel to flow
through the opening.
The crew dumped fuel to reduce the airplanes
weight to maximum landing weight and returned Records showed that a 2C maintenance check
to the departure airport. requiring work on the center fuel tank was

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 39


A C C I D E N T S /I N C I D E N T S

performed between May 2 and May 4, 2004; there runway end a distance of approximately 2,500
was no record of any subsequent work that would feet [763 meters] further on. At approximately 70
have required access to the center fuel tank or remov- knots, reverse thrust was canceled, brakes were ap-
al of the purge door. After the 2C check, the airplane plied and [were] released. Nearing the turnoff,
was flown on 53 sectors before the incident flight; the captain reapplied the brakes and, in her
the most fuel in the center fuel tank on any of those words, they never reapplied.
sectors was 28,000 kilograms (61,729 pounds).
Repeated application of the wheel brakes and
During the 2C check, leak checks were performed heavy pressure on the brake pedals produced no
on all fuel-tank doors that had been removed for braking effect. At 60 knots, the captain turned the
routine jobs; a leak check was not performed on airplane onto the exit using only the nosewheel
the purge door. Some maintenance personnel told tiller. The nosewheel and part of the right-main
incident investigators that they were unaware of landing-gear wheel assembly rolled off the taxiway
the purge door; the incident report said that the onto the grassy threshold area, where the crew shut
aircraft maintenance manuals information on the down both engines. Passengers disembarked nor-
required minimum fuel quantities to check fuel- mally and were transported by bus to the terminal.
tank access doors for leaks did not mention the The airplane was towed to the apron (ramp).
purge door. The manuals information on removal
and reinstallation of the purge door said that the The report said that the manufacturers recom-
subsequent leak check should be conducted with mended manual braking technique smoothly
a minimum of 32,000 kilograms (70,547 pounds) applying constant brake-pedal pressure was not
of fuel in the tank. The report said, however, that used and that several attempts at reducing the
32,000 kilograms of fuel was insufficient to reach speed by modulating the brakes were unsuccessful,
the purge-door opening. (After the incident, the as the brake-pedal pressure was being released and
manufacturer revised the requirement to 52,163 efficiency [was being] lost.
kilograms [114,999 pounds] of fuel.)
The report cited the following as the cause of the
Investigation of the incident also revealed that a accident: The late use of an inappropriate braking
rear spar inspection had been performed improp- technique that failed to achieve a safe taxi speed
erly, the report said. [and] led to the uncontrolled departure of the
aircraft from the taxiway onto the grassy area.
Investigation of the purge-door incident is
continuing.
Cowling Separates From
Airplane During Takeoff
Pilots Braking Technique
Airbus A320. Minor damage. No injuries.
Cited in Runway Excursion
Boeing 737. Minor damage. No injuries.
V isual meteorological conditions prevailed for
the departure from an airport in the United

T he airplane had been flown from Ireland to


Belgium on the crews third flight of the day.
States. Immediately after takeoff, a flight attendant
told the captain that a passenger had reported ob-
serving a cover come off the left engine.
The runway was wet from light drizzle. The report
said that after touchdown, the speed brake was Flight instruments did not indicate a problem, and
deployed, as usual, and the first officer (the pilot the captain asked the flight attendant to look out
flying) selected reserve thrust. The crew said later the window; the flight attendant confirmed that
that deceleration was normal. The captain took part of the left engine cowling was missing. At the
the controls before the airplane reached the run- same time, the captain felt the airplane vibrate and
way exit, when the airplane was traveling about told air traffic control that he planned to return
80 knots. the airplane to the departure airport. The no. 1
engine oil quantity indicator illuminated, and the
The report said, As the runway surface was wet, captain declared an emergency. The crew landed
she [the captain] elected to continue towards the the airplane without further incident.

40 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


AC C I D E N T S /I N C I D E N T S

A preliminary inspection revealed that both sides After the incident, the U.K. Air Accidents Investigation
of the left engine cowling had separated from the Branch (AAIB) recommended that CAA re-
airplane, that the left engine pylon had been bent examine airspace categorization, procedures and
and that the left wing slat outboard of the engine services available for civil transport aircraft operating
nacelle was dented and punctured. Authorities in unregulated airspace; that the Ministry of Defence
recovered the missing sections of the cowling, review military aircraft operations in the same areas;
and the investigation was continuing. and that both the CAA and the Ministry of Defence
review the concurrent use of the unregulated air-
space with the aim of eliminating airproxes and
AIR TAXI/COMMUTER

potential collisions, with likely large-scale loss of life,


AIRPROX Incident Prompts
between civil air transport and military aircraft.
Recommendations on Use of
Airspace
Pilot Swerves Airplane to
Bombardier DHC-8 Dash 8. No damage.
No injuries. Avoid Striking Vehicle During
Emergency Landing

T he airplane was being flown through clouds


in uncontrolled airspace over the North Sea
when the flight crew was told by air traffic control
Cessna 208. Destroyed. Five serious
injuries, one minor injury.

(ATC) that two aircraft were approaching at high


speed. The crew also received a resolution advisory T he airplane was being flown on an early morn-
ing visual flight rules flight in Tanzania. The
pilot said that the takeoff roll was normal, but
(RA) from the airplanes traffic-alert and collision
avoidance system (TCAS); the crew complied with when he began a left turn soon after the airplane
the RA to climb. The TCAS message indicated that became airborne, he heard a buff sound from the
vertical separation between the aircraft was 100 engine. Engine oil splashed onto the windshield,
feet.The pilot later reported the incident as an and the engine stopped.
AIRPROX (aircraft proximity) incident. (The U.K.
Civil Aviation Authority defines an AIRPROX as After use of the emergency power lever (which
a situation in which, in the opinion of a pilot or a controls fuel supply to the engine after a pneu-
controller, the distance between aircraft, as well as matic system failure) did not restore power, the
their relative positions and speed, have been such pilot feathered the propeller, conducted a passen-
that the safety of the aircraft involved was, or may ger briefing and decided to land the airplane on a
have been, compromised.) paved road. As he was preparing for touchdown,
the pilot observed a slow-moving vehicle near
his intended touchdown point and turned the
An investigation revealed that the other aircraft
airplane left to avoid a collision, causing airspeed
involved in the incident were two BAE Systems
to decrease. The airplane landed hard on the left
Sea Harriers from a Royal Navy vessel in the North
side of the road and struck piles of stones.
Sea. The Sea Harriers were being flown on an air
defense exercise, and the pilots had been told to
A preliminary investigation did not determine the
visually identify a radar target.
reason for the engine failure.

The incident report said, Once the Sea Harrier


pilots identified this [target] as a Dash 8 aircraft, Improper Fuel Management
they broke off the intercept to the southwest. The Cited in Accident During
minimum separation recollected by the crews on Emergency Landing
the intercepting aircraft radar was 1.8 nautical
Piper PA-23-250 Aztec. Destroyed.
miles [3.3 kilometers]. Six serious injuries.

A review of radar data from one radar facility in-


dicated that the minimum separation distance had
been 3,700 feet (1,129 meters); data from a second
T he airplane was being flown on a night charter
flight in India when, about 30 minutes after
takeoff, both engines stopped. The pilot attempted
radar facility showed that the minimum separation to conduct an emergency landing, but the airplane
distance had been 3,450 feet (1,052 meters). struck terrain.

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 41


A C C I D E N T S /I N C I D E N T S

The accident report said that the probable cause track 3.83 degrees left of the direct track. One
was depletion of fuel in the inboard fuel tanks on day earlier, the pilot had flown the same airplane
account of improper fuel management, as fuel along the same route with no indication of track-
was available in outboard tanks and the pilot for- ing anomalies.
got to change over the fuel selection from inboard
tanks to outboard tanks in time. The report said
Airplane Strikes Terrain
that the pilot forgot to switch fuel tanks because
of task-saturation in a time-critical situation.
During Night IMC
The report also cited distraction, fatigue [and] Piper PA-32R-301T Turbo Saratoga.
lack of currency on type of aircraft. Destroyed. Five fatalities.

A factor contributing to the accident was the


pilots non-adherence to the recommended and
N ight instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC) prevailed and an instrument flight
rules flight plan had been filed for the business
approved procedures of the aircraft flight manual,
flight in the United States.
the report said.
The pilot and a pilot-rated passenger who was
serving as a safety pilot had begun an instrument
CORPORATE/BUSINESS

Airplane Strikes Trees During landing system (ILS) approach and had received
GPS Approach in Instrument instructions from air traffic control (ATC) that the
Conditions airplane was six [nautical] miles [11 kilometers]
from the marker, turn heading 050, maintain 3,000
Piper PA-31T Cheyenne. Destroyed. Six until established, cleared ILS 3 approach. One of
fatalities.
the pilots replied cleared for the approach, and
seconds later, ATC said that radar services were ter-
I nstrument meteorological conditions prevailed
and an instrument flight rules flight plan had
been filed for the late morning business flight in
minated and that the pilots should use the airport
advisory frequency; the pilots acknowledged the
instructions, but no further transmissions from
Australia. The pilot had received air traffic control
the airplane were heard.
(ATC) clearance to fly the airplane direct to a glob-
al positioning system (GPS) initial approach fix for The wreckage was found in a wooded area at 1,079
a GPS approach to the destination airport. feet, about 0.5 nautical mile (0.9 kilometer) west
of Runway 03, approximately abeam the 500-foot
The pilot told ATC at 1045 that he was beginning [153-meter] markers painted on the runway sur-
the approach, and soon afterward, he broadcast on face, a report said. The wreckage was oriented on
the airports common traffic advisory frequency a 280-degree heading, and the main fuselage was
that he was conducting the approach. At 1103, the on a 230-degree heading.
pilot had not reported landing the airplane at the
airport; ATC declared a distress phase, and a search The altimeter reading was 2,340 feet, the altimeter
began. The wreckage was found later in the day setting was 29.88 inches of mercury, the vertical
on a tree-covered ridge about 34 kilometers (18 speed indicator showed a 500-feet-per-minute rate
nautical miles) southeast of the airport. of climb, and the horizontal situational indicator
was aligned to 275 degrees. The heading bug was
Witnesses who had heard an airplane in the area just set to 030 degrees.
before the accident said that the engine sounds were
normal and that the airplane sounded as though it Airport weather five minutes before the accident
was very low. A preliminary investigation found included winds from 310 degrees at three knots,
that both engines had been producing power when visibility of 2.5 statute miles (4.0 kilometers)
the airplane struck trees, that the landing gear and in mist, a few clouds at 200 feet above ground
flaps had been extended and that the airplane was level (AGL) and an overcast layer at 1,800 AGL,
in a wings-level, climbing attitude. a temperature of 64 degrees Fahrenheit (F; 18
degrees Celsius [C]), dew point of 62 degrees F
Recorded radar data showed that the airplane was (17 degrees C), and an altimeter setting of 29.86
being flown toward the initial approach fix on a inches of mercury.

42 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


AC C I D E N T S /I N C I D E N T S

Three minutes after the accident, visibility was 0.75 applying pesticide, the engine blower malfunc-
statute mile (1.2 kilometers) in mist, with scattered tioned, causing a partial reduction of power. As
clouds at 200 feet AGL and 500 feet AGL and an a result, he decided to fly the airplane to a nearby
overcast layer at 1,800 feet AGL. airport for landing.

Minimums for the straight-in approach were 0.75 As the pilot began to turn the airplane toward
statute mile visibility, with a minimum descent the airport, the airplane struck a power line. The
altitude of 1,421 feet (250 feet AGL). airplane was equipped with a wire cutter, which
cut the 0.5-inch (1.3-centimeter) power line. The
The missed approach procedure called for a climb pilot continued the flight to the nearby airport,
to 3,000 feet and flight direct to a very-high- where he conducted a landing.
frequency omnidirectional radio 6.7 nautical miles
(12.4 kilometers) northeast of the airport.
Airplane Strikes Wires
During Approach to Field
Flap Separates From
Socata Rallye 100ST. Minor damage.
Airplane During Approach No injuries.
Lockheed 1329-23E Jetstar. Minor
damage. No injuries.
T he pilot conducted a departure from an
airport in Ireland, intending to show his

V isual meteorological conditions prevailed


and an instrument flight rules flight plan
had been filed for the midday business flight in
passenger an aerial view of their neighborhood
and to land in a field nearby. Before the flight, the
landowner gave permission for the landing and
the United States. the pilot walked around the field to evaluate its
suitability for landing. He observed two sets of
On final approach at the destination airport, as the power cables that were suspended from east to
flaps were extended to the full flaps position, the west across the northern end of the field.
airplane decelerated and rolled left.
Later, the pilot conducted a low-altitude flight
The report said, The pilot regained control of over the field from south to north. As he leveled
the airplane by accelerating to 165 [knots] to 170 the airplane about 20 feet to 25 feet above ground
OTHER GENERAL AVIATION

knots and holding right roll control. The landing level, he observed a set of power cables immedi-
touchdown and roll was uneventful. ately ahead of the airplane.

Crewmembers inspected the airplane, which had To avoid the cables, the pilot pitched the air-
13,500 flight hours and 11,500 flight cycles, and craft down, the report said. The cables cleared
observed that the left-inboard flap had separated the propeller and the canopy. However, imme-
from the airplane, with the attach bolts still in the diately after this, the aircraft suddenly pitched
flap-attach brackets. A more detailed inspection nose up, followed by a sudden pitch-down
of the failure point at the inboard-flap attaching movement.
point revealed marks and corrosion pitting on the
castings. Further inspection was planned. The pilot flew the airplane away from the field
without conducting a landing and returned to
the departure airport. An inspection revealed
wire damage to the leading edge of the vertical
Airplane Strikes Power Line tail fin, the elevator and the very-high-frequency
After Partial Engine Failure omnidirectional radio antenna. The pilot said
Rockwell S-2R. Substantial damage. that the accident resulted from his failure to ad-
One minor injury. equately survey the entire landing site on foot; his
difficulty in observing the cables, which were not

V isual meteorological conditions prevailed


for the agricultural aerial application flight
in the United States. The pilot said that, while
visible because of their location within trees; and
the visual impairment caused by the suns position
near the horizon.

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004 43


A C C I D E N T S /I N C I D E N T S

Airplane Flips Over on not notice that there was a branch of a tree over
Downsloping Runway the main rotor.

Luscombe 8A. Substantial damage.


No injuries.
As the pilot initiated a climb, he heard a rattling
sound, felt the helicopter wobble and then ob-
served that the helicopter had struck a tree. He
T he pilot was returning the airplane to Runway
27 at an airport in England after a flight in
the area.
maneuvered the helicopter to the departure site,
where he conducted a landing.

The grass runway is about 680 meters (2,231 Helicopter Strikes Hillside
feet) long, with a downward slope for the last
During Flight in Adverse
200 meters (656 feet). During the landing roll,
the airplane bounced about four feet into the air;
Weather Conditions
the pilot increased power to help control the rate Dauphin SA 365N. Destroyed. Seven
of descent that followed the bounce, and with fatalities.
the added power, the airplane rolled onto the
downsloping section of the runway. When the
pilot applied the brakes, the airplane nosed over
and stopped inverted.
T he helicopter was being flown on the first
segment of a three-segment charter flight
in India. The crew flew the first portion of the
flight at 3,000 feet and then began a climb to
The report said, In a candid report from the pilot, 6,000 feet.
he concluded that the accident had been caused by
applying the brakes [while] going downhill. The accident report said that when the pilots flew
the helicopter between two hills, they were un-
able to maintain visual contact with the terrain
ROTORCRAFT

because of adverse weather conditions. (The


Helicopter Strikes Tree During report contained no other details about the
Chase of Wildlife Poachers weather.) The helicopter struck a hillside.
Bell 206L-3 LongRanger. Substantial
damage. No injuries.
Helicopter Strikes Terrain
After Entanglement With
D ay visual meteorological conditions prevailed
for the game-scouting flight being conducted
in support of anti-poaching activities in a national
Fueling Hose
Robinson R22 Alpha. Destroyed. One
park in Tanzania. After poachers were observed on minor injury.
hills within the park, authorities on the ground be-
gan pursuing them, and the helicopter was landed
in a clearing to allow two other law enforcement
personnel to disembark.
I n preparation for a livestock-mustering flight
in Australia, the pilot hot-refueled the he-
licopter (refueled the aircraft with the engine
operating). Afterward, during the into-wind
The pilot then conducted a takeoff, planning to transition from a hover to forward flight, the
fly the helicopter to its base to board more law helicopter rapidly rolled right and struck the
enforcement personnel for the anti-poaching ground.
activities.
A report said that during departure, the helicopter
The accident report said, In haste to get altitude likely became entangled with the refueling hose
for the return flight to the base, [the pilot] did and pump.

44 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST SEPTEMBER 2004


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To receive agenda and registration information, contact Ahlam Wahdan,
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To sponsor an event, or to exhibit at the seminar, contact Ann Hill,
tel: +1 (703) 739-6700, ext. 105; e-mail: hill@flightsafety.org.

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Want more information about Flight Safety Foundation?


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Copyright 2004 by Flight Safety Foundation Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN 1057-5588
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