Post-democracy within the EU: Internal security vs.

human rights - unavoidable conflict?

Paper prepared for the CEEISA 4th Convention, Tartu, 25-27 June 2006

Abstract
At the very beginning of the 21st century Europe needs to address terrorist
threats to a larger extent than ever before. Both the EU member states and the
EU institutions adopt whole range of measures to prevent and to fight terrorism.
Nevertheless, some of these measures can endanger human rights and freedoms.
Paradoxically, efforts to enhance security could therefore decrease security of
individuals. I use the concept of securitization to analyze this process. The text
tries to answer the question to what extent the securitization of terrorism takes
place inside the EU nowadays. This is done by the analysis of some counter-
terrorist measures and of their perception by general public. In extreme case, an
intensive securitization could change current liberal democracies into post-
democracies.

Key words
terrorism, post-democracy, home security, individual security, Copenhagen
school, securitization, political discourse, France, Italy, Great Britain, European
Union

Radka Druláková, Ph.D.

University of Economics in Prague
Faculty of International Relations
Czech Republic
drulakr@vse.cz

2
 „Europe is coming to grips with the fact that al-Qaida´s opponent is the West, not just the
United States. The interior ministers of the EU nations have been holding meetings to
coordinate anti-terrorist measures. The outcome of these meetings is likely to determine how
many of their civil liberties Europeans will have to sacrifice.“
Richard Rorty

Introduction1
Terrorism and fight against it are among key challenges in current international
relations. States as well as international organizations increasingly adopt new
anti-terrorist measures. In Westfalian system of nation states security has two
dimensions – internal (inside the state borders) and external (at international
level). Although the political decisions and methods differ at the two levels
(Liberty & Security Challenges2 2005a), they are interrelated. This interrelation
is especially visible when the internal dimension of security is externalized. At
the EU level we can call this process Europeanization of the internal security,
which means that “internal security was now defined as legitimate filed for
European co-optation” (Liberty & Security Challenges 2005a). Europeanization
implies that the measures for strengthening of internal security are adopted not
only by member states themselves but also by the EU as a whole.
Looking at the internal security from the individual point of view, the
relation between state at one side and individual on the other side has two-ways.
Traditionally, the security of individual is derived from the security of state.
However, human and state security can also clash (Waisová 2005: 138).
Strengthening of state security does not necessarily bring about the
strengthening of the human security. Moreover, some measures can even
endanger the security of individual eroding civil liberties and human rights
(right to a fair trial, freedom of association, freedom of expression, no arbitrary
interference with the privacy, family, home or correspondence etc.) including
the core principle of European justice - presumption of innocence.3 In an
extreme case, the individual could be endangered not by the terrorist threat but
by the anti-terrorist measures instead. This article examines some anti-terrorist
measures adopted both by some member states and by the EU itself assesing
their impact on human security and especially on human rights.

1
This draft version is based on the text which will be published in Mezinárodní vztahy 2/2006. Any comments to
the text are welcome.
2
Liberty & Security Challenges is project of 5th Framework Programme for "The Changing Landscape of
European Liberty and Security" (European Liberty and Security, ELISE) presented on the website
http://www.libertysecurity.org. The research is done by a number of European universities and research centres.
3
It is not relevant for the text to distinguish between human rights, civil rights, civil liberties etc. which in other
sense can not be automatically replaced. In this text they mean a block of rights belonging to individual.

3
 Terrorist threat is usually seen as one of the greatest objective threats to
both domestic and international stability. But terrorist threat has its own
dynamics which can not be reduced only to its objective basis, it results from the
process of securitization as analysed by the Copenhagen school (Buzan 1991,
Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998). Securitization is process in which states
declare some issues as matters of state security and for this reason excludes
them from the standard democratic rules. Such issues are therefore excluded
from the public debate and depoliticised. Political representatives convince
public about these steps with a great urgency. Hence the audience accepts the
“necessity” of such provisions to be left to experts only. Text presents case
studies on Great Britain, Italy and France which show that these countries have
reached different stages of securitization of terrorism. France has past
experience with terrorist attacks (remind Algerian attacks in 50´s and 60´s),
Great Britain was attacked in July 2005 and Italy is expecting some kind of
attack in these days because of its support to American policy in the Middle
East. Through the member states the securitization process rejoines at the EU
level as well which is facilitated by the democratic deficit at this level.4
A massive securitization can lead to post-democracy (Rorty 2004). Post-
democracy does not mean non-democracy. In post-democratic regime the public
opinion and influence on public affairs are reduced by the powerful minority of
political elites to minimum. The political elites do not keep in line with the
public opinion and expertise more and more issues. Finally, the public audience
gives up on a possibility to influence the public affairs at all. Even though this is
not the case in any of the countries in Europe today, it remains a negative
scenario which should be avoided.
The article analyses political discourse as the expression of political
power. Some anti-terrorist measures can evoke political controversy. This is
studied at the cases of disputes between the political power and NGO´s (or
interested public). The discourse analyses helps us to determine the level of
securitization in selected countries5; analyses of adopted measures shows the
possible extant of derogation from human rights.
The investigation of the relation between anti-terrorist security measures
and human rights is still quite rare as „much of the debate on the security/liberty
tension is too polemical and/or on a very weak theoretical basis“ (Liberty &
Security Challenges 2005b). The article tries to overcome this shortcoming by
connecting of securitization to post-democracy. By analysing the empirical cases
and political discourse I want to illustrate the clash between individual and state
security as well as a possible future threat of post-democracy. The connected

4
The text analyses anti-terrorist measures adopted at the EU level mostly during 2005.
5
„The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations. …If by means of an
argument about the priority and urgency of and existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free
of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization.“
(Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 25)

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issue of the externalisation of internal security is addressed by the examination
of both three selected countries and the EU as such.

Home security versus individual security

I focus on the impact of internal security measures on the individual security
(individual as a citizen whose rights and duties should be granted by state). The
proportions of these „two sides of the same coin“, that is state security and
individual security, are not always symbiotic but may be contested respectively.
I have used the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen school of security
studies for researching the state/citizen security relationship (Buzan 1991;
Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998).
Contemporary international system is still based on the states as main
actors. Every state acts as independent and sovereign subject of international
relations. The main aim of every state is to ensure its survival and security in
surrounding world (Drulák, Druláková 2000: 13). Its external security efforts
belong largely to the remits of ministries of defence. But the state authorities
behave as sovereign subjects also within the sub-state structures, internal
security is an example of this. Internal security is in remits of law enforcement
agencies which are coordinated largely by ministries of home affairs and
ministries of justice.
The division of state security into internal and external one has never been
rigid but nowadays it is more interconnected than ever before. This shift is
called externalisation of internal security (Liberty & Security Challenges
2005a). The main reason for the shift consists in the more and more intensive
fight with the trans-frontier forms of organized crime including counter-terrorist
actions. At the EU level we can speak of the process of Europeanization (Liberty
& Security Challenges 2005a). This means that some important counter-terrorist
devices are more often adopted at the EU level than before, which corresponds
to the idea of building the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice. As
Buzan stated, government stands at the frontier between internal dynamics of the
state and external dynamics of the international system and tries to balance them
(Buzan 1991: 328-329). States may keep its external sovereignty but at the same
time they must be able to reduce criminal activities coming into/across its
territory. Otherwise their proclaimed sovereignty loses its internal contents
(Nožina 2000: 13).
From the Copenhagen school point of view, the security means to ensure
survival of the reference objects. The reference objects are placed at the three
level of analysis – international system, state and individual – state being the
most important. It is the sovereign state which is primarily obliged to its citizens
to guarantee their safety within its boundaries and uses all its supreme powers to
fulfil this objective. But as state may produce both security and insecurity for the
citizen, their relation is not equivalent. An individual is never so powerful to
destroy a state but a state can endanger an individual (Buzan 1991: 44). The

5
sources of this imperilment coming from a state may have different forms, e.g.
home legislation and law enforcement agencies, administrative or political
actions directed on individuals or groups of individuals, external security policy
etc. Modern bureaucracies have a wide scope of legal powers which can be
imposed on its citizens in the name of common good (Buzan 1991: 44).
Securitizing actor is an entity which practices the securitization that is he
defines the security threat, depoliticizes it and consequently securitizes it. Many
different entities may act as a securitizing actor, e.g. political elites,
governments, interests groups etc. Securitization of terrorism is made especially
by the governments. Any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging
from non-politicized (state does not deal with it and it is not an issue for public
debate and decision) through politicized (state - government - decides on the
issue with the help of communal governance and public debate) to securitized
(Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 23). Securitization is an extreme step which
needs de-politization by which the issue leaves the “rules of the game” and is
shifted exclusively into state security agenda. During the process the
securitization actors declare publicly certain questions as matters of state
security which must be therefore taken out from the standard democratic rules.
A certain question is presented as:
• an existential threat (which need not really exist);
• a matter of absolute priority (requiring emergency measures);
• a matter justifying the need of extraordinary measures (outside the
normal bound for political procedure) (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde
1998: 23 - 4).
To carry a securitization into operation, it is necessary to go through three steps
and no one can be missing: declaration of an issue as an existential threat;
acceptance of such a “constructed reality” by the public; the act of acceptance
allows adopting extraordinary measures without public control. That means that
if an issue is presented by the securitizing actors as an existential threat only, we
can not speak of the full securitization. This phase is called “securitizing move”.
To fulfil the securitization, the acceptance by the audience is necessary. This is a
crucial moment which allows overcoming of standards or norms which would
be otherwise binding for the politicians (securitizing actors). It is the public who
decides the successful securitization, not the securitizing actor itself (Buzan,
Waever, de Wilde 1998: 31). It is the audience who legitimizes the extraordinary
measures by its approval. I try to asses - with the help of opinion polls - whether
a full securitization takes places within the selected countries or whether it is
presumably a securitizing move for the moment.
To study securitization means to analyse political discourse on threats
(Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 25 - 29). In this case the political discourse is a
kind of security rhetoric with specific structure - a speech act. Speech acts
underlying the securitization process are usually framed in terms of emergency.
The political discourse is a performative speech act. Not only does it account for

6
the reality but it also tries to construct a new one. This is done by securitizing
actors using the words as “survival”, “defence”, “utmost urgency”, “the priority
is to act now otherwise is could be late”, “duty to save [our] values“ etc. The
speech acts are performed very emotionally, dramatically and with a great
urgency. We will focus on the use of these words in the empirical part of this
paper as we will study some statements made by politicians having
responsibility for the state security issues (and being the securitizing actors in
the front line) such as prime ministers and home affairs ministers. Connecting it
with some opinion polls on counter-terrorism I can asses the level of
securitization in selected countries and the EU respectively.

Post-democracy
Before speaking of post-democracy I clarify my concept of democracy. Two
perspectives on democracy can be distinguished: procedural and substantive
(Janda et al. 1998: 36 - 39). Procedural point of view focuses on the processes
how the decisions are made and on the procedures which allow people to govern
(public debates, elections etc.). Substantive point of view accents the substance
of government policies (e.g. guarantees of the freedom of expression and human
needs). Both perspectives agree that the public audience provides an efficient
guidance to democratic society. The governments should be therefore sensitive
to the public opinion and from this reason also attempt at strengthening of
human rights and liberties. Empirical studies document the stabilizing and
rationalizing influence of the public audience upon the government policies in
longer term (Everts 1996 in Drulák, Druláková 2000: 103 – 105).
If we look at securitization now, we can sum it up as excluding the public
from the decision-making leaving it with a little influence on the government
decisions. The securitized issues are dealt with by the securitizing actors
themselves with no respect to the public opinion. Moreover, the audience is
persuaded about the necessity to give the influence up to the experts exclusively.
If securitization continues in a longer period without the possibility of de-
securitization,6 it could change the basis of liberal-democratic societies
dramaticaly. Under these conditions the democracy could degenerate into post-
democracy.
Post-democracy is relatively new concept in the field of social sciences
and its interpretations differ from one scholar to another. Some researchers
define post-democracy as weakening of national democratic states “… by acts of
trans-national corporations, global financial speculations and other influences
which limit the possibilities of democratic decisions within the states” (Hrubec
ed. 2005: 7). According to them the main reason of this trend lies in the process
of economic globalization which causes the increasing influence (more or less

6
De-securitization means that a certain security issue is politicized again, i.e. the issue is open to public debates,
it is a matter of choice again (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998: 29).

7
indirect one) of trans-national corporations on matters of exclusively state
powers. This trend is negative in fact as it could erode the state sovereignty.7
Other researchers blame the NGO´s for weakening the democratic
principles as they are not elected authorities and from this stance they should not
have such a big influence on public matters as they have now. As one of them
stated: „Post-democratic challenges to American democratic sovereignty should
be clearly identified and resisted. NGOs that consistently act as if they are
strategic opponents of the democratic sovereignty of the American nation should
be treated as such. They should not be recognized or supported at international
conferences, not permitted to roam battlefields, and not given special briefings
or access to U.S. government officials.“ (Fonte 2004: 125) The opinion of the
Czech president Václav Klaus is very similar to this one – at the Council of
Europe summit (May 2005) he “... warned of what he called the dangerous
influence of non-governmental organizations. President Klaus said that we are
experiencing what he calls a "post-democracy" - a society where democracy is
being put under pressure by different groups which having no mandate from
democratic elections still have an ambition to determine lives of citizens.“
(http://www.radio.cz, 23.5.2005)
According to this group, it is the state which has to be responsible for the
respecting and granting of the human rights and liberties primarily, not the NGO
´s because of the weak regime of the current international law. Both of these two
views see the reasons of the possible installation of post-democracy as external,
coming from the surrounding world. But others see the reasons as internal too,
e.g. coming from the state itself. This view is represented by Richard Rorty and
Colin Crouch (Rorty 2004 a Crouch 2004). This article refers to their view on
post-democracy as to the analytical concept coming from normative discourse.8
According to them, post-democracy is a society ruled by political elites
diminishing the influence of the public opinion.
Rorty defines post-democracy in the context of counter-terrorism: “Yet if
much less severe damage occurred as a result of terrorism, the officials charged
with national security, those who bear the responsibility for preventing further
attacks, will probably think it necessary to end the rule of law, as well as the
responsiveness of governments to public opinion. Politicians and bureaucrats
will strive to outdo one another in proposing outrageous measures.” (Rorty
2004: 10). The outrageous measures can limit human liberties in the end. Some
of the citizens can even give up their rights and liberties on their own. However,
governments often do not ask the citizens if they agree with such restrictions or
not. Moreover, the media would be coerced into leaving protest against
government´s decisions unreported (Rorty 2004: 10). Extremely, whatever
7
Among others this is why the EU is being built as „… defensive reaction on the external globalization
pressures.“ (Hrubec 2005a: 2)
8
The post-democracy in their view is accepted by the most scholars. The web sites „Google Scholar“
(http://www.googlescholar.com) prove it – Rorty and Crouch occupy the first places after the entry „post-
democracy“ having the highest quotation index.

8
criticism of the government fighting terrorism could be punished by other
extraordinary measures as acts aiding terrorists. War on terrorism could be in an
extreme case more dangerous than the terrorist acts itself. 9 It is the public debate
which can prevent aforementioned negative scenario to be put into practice.
According to Rorty, that is why the public audience should be stimulated to
become more interested in the things of “state secrecy” – foreign policy steps,
armament etc. The security acts should be explained to the public and the public
should call for explaining of these acts by its government which is – in the
democratic societies – responsible for its steps just to the public. This is the only
way of avoiding the post-democracy coming into existence.
The concept of post-democracy emerged in the field of political sociology
in recent years too (Crouch 2004). Political sociology defines the post-
democracy similarly to Rorty: political system is ruled by minority which is
more active than the mass of people, e.g. citizens. The citizens being
discouraged from interest in public matters in longer period need not be
consequently interested in public policy any more. In this situation, elections are
not means of the citizens´ rights, the citizens must be forced to take part in them
by the campaigns directed from above (Crouch 2004: 20 - 21). According to
Crouch, the role of citizens in such a system is minimized to the form of passive,
manipulated participants. This is done by political elites which are able to
identify public demands, are able to influence formulation of the demands but
are unable to guarantee common weal. According to Crouch the politicians are a
kind of traffickers finding out the public demands and reacting by wolf soup in
so that to be (re-)elected. Crouch compares the process to parabola: with the
democracy on its top, the curve on its left side represents the phase of pre-
democracy, the curve on its right side the phase of post-democracy then.
Flowing from this, the post-democracy is not non-democracy but the importance
of the top, e.g. the democracy, is reduced (Crouch 2004: 20-21).
According to Rorty the western society stands at the post-democracy´s
door nowadays, Crouch even sees some symptoms of post-democracy in these
days. Crouch identifies the symptoms at different levels, one of them is made of
economic globalization outcomes. He mentions the influence of the terrorist
activities and counter-terrorism too – the situation in the US and Europe after
9/11 reflects the presence of post-democracy by now – states proclaim the right
for state secrecy more than before, they claim the right to supervise their citizens
and interfere their privacy (Crouch 2004: 14). It is evident that …“the trade-offs
and dilemmas (notably in relation to liberty) involved when democracies enter
„high security“ engagements, is far less openly addressed than, for example,
when the US entered the Cold War.“ (Liberty & Security Challenges 2005b)
The main features of post-democracy are: the minority (political elites)
has the decisive role in society with simultaneously declining influence of
9
Rorty even says that he have spent more time worrying about what his government will do than about what the
terrorists will do (Rorty 2004: 10).

9
public, moreover the influence of audience is marginalized by the elites. Hence
the interest in public matters is minimal which seems to be basis for slight
eroding of civil liberties without public protests. Just such kind of manipulations
could be the outcome of the securitization process, some even speak about
unspecified hyper-securitization „… which allows for civil rights violations
without precise links to specific and specified threats.“ (Liberty & Security
Challenges 2005b) The relation between security and democracy is fragile.

Anti-terrorist measures in selected member states of the EU – primary

study

The text chooses three member states of the EU – Italy, Great Britain and
France. The Italy perceives terrorist threats as top actual mainly because of its
support to the US in the Middle-East; Great Britain because of the same reason
and because of its recent terrorist attack and following actions; France as it has
many years´ experience with tackling the terrorist threats (at least since 60´s and
the war on Algerian independency). Except for these reasons, the states´ anti-
terrorist measures are often criticized by NGOs, especially by those watching
the human rights (Human Rights Watch, Statewatch, Privacy International etc.);
independent journalists (United Press International, The Economist etc.) and last
but not least by interested public. But their criticism is usually rejected by
governments. Together with successful securitization these measures may lead
the societies into the ante-chamber of post-democracy. Luckily, it is more or less
negative scenario which can be and should be avoided.
The main aim is to find out weather securitization is present within
selected countries and to establish the level of securitization at same time.
Through the political discourse analysis I try to find out whether the states are in
the phase of securitizing step or in the phase of full securitization already. This
will be done by analysis of the statements of the governments - represented by
members of government responsible for internal security, i.e. prime ministers
and home affairs ministers - concerning the counter-terrorism. I will focus on
speech act they use. The second step will be the analysis of opinion polls
concerning the counter-terrorism performed by their government. It will show us
the level of accepting the securitization of terrorism by general public. At the
end of each case study there will be mentioned some anti-terrorist measures
documenting their extraordinary feature. I do not want to doubt upon an
objective basis of terrorist threats and upon the rationality of adopted measures
en bloc. What I want to show is that it is unnecessary to adopt extraordinary
measures which do not have to be effective, contrary they could endanger
human rights by eroding them slightly. That is why I have chosen only measures
which breach the rule of law.

10
Great Britain
The analysis of the political discourse concerning the terrorism in Great Britain
tells a lot about securitization efforts of the British government. The government
comes to grips with the opponents represented by House of Lords, judges, public
etc. over the necessity of some anti-terrorist measures. The statements of Tony
Blair, Prime Minister, and Charles Clark, Home Secretary, provide evidence of
the securitization of terrorism. Tony Blair had expressedh himself very
emotionally in his statements after the London attacks and he emphasised the
questions of national identity a lot: as “the world has changed” hence “the need
to protect our way of life” is necessary (Statewatch 2005d: 1) and he „thinks that
European human-rights law prevents Britain from dealing with supporters of
terrorism“ (The Economist, August 13th 2005: 29).10
The Terrorism Act (2000) was presented as reaction to extraordinary
circumstances which was also the case with any other counter-terrorism
legislation. When a new legislation after the London attacks was discussed in
the House of Lords (November 2005), some of the MPS were strongly against
increasing of police powers without objective justification.11 Tony Blair blamed
these MPS from “…putting the security of the country at risk” (The Economist,
November 12th 2005: 43) He fought for the higher police competencies by
stressing the urgency: „We need the competences to protect the citizens security
of this country and we can not admit to MPS to trifle with the legislation“
(Právo, March, 11 2005: 9).12 He claimed that „[t]he present law is called for by
the police and security services. Voting it down would mean jeopardising the
country`s security.“ (Paye 2005) There is no doubt that Blair acts as an actor
securitizing terrorism. Charles Clarke, the home secretary, supported Blair with
his emphasis on the necessity of re-evaluation of the balance between human
liberties and security as based by European Convention on Human Rights.
According to him „… this balance is not right for the circumstances which we
now face …“ (Hayes 2005b: 1).
The speech act performed by British government provides evidence of the
securitization of terrorism as it is emotive, with “state of emergency” notions,
convincing about necessity of adopting new and more radical steps to fight
terrorism. In this moment one can ask about the level of securitization - is there
a full securitization or only a securitizing move? According to the poll taken by
Eurobarometer at the end of 2005, “… a 20 point increase has been recorded
(from 14% to 34%)” (Eurobarometer 2005: 8) in the UK for considering
terrorism as one of the most important issues threatening the country. This
number has increased due to London attack but the public is not convinced a lot
10
„According to Mr Blair, the first step in that process is to find a way around the 1998 Human Rights Act“ (The
Economist, August 13th 2005: 29).
11
The police wanted a dramatic increase in the number of days a terrorist suspect can be held without charge,
from 14 to 90. (The Economist, November 12th 2005: 43) The final compromise consists of 28 days suspecting
without charge even Blair insisted that there could be no compromise on the 90 days because it was „the right
thing“ (The Economist, November 12th 2005: 43).
12
Translated from Czech newspaper „Právo“.

11
about necessity of some legal devices adopted to fight terrorism. Some of the
critics objected to the new legislation saying that “the executive power
concentrates in its hands all the power, including judicial prerogatives…” (Paye
2005) as the new legislation gives the judicial prerogatives to the secretary of
state for home affairs.13 This change thus “calls into question the notion of
habeas corpus.” (Paye 2005) Neither the House of Lords is satisfied with some
new legislation acts as it could be seen during the scrutiny on the “control
orders”. The control orders allow to put suspected terrorists under house arrest –
the House of Lords sent this highly contentious bill back to the House of
Commons (The Economist, March 5th 2005: 38) as it wanted to strengthen the
burden of proof.14 Even a high court judge branded one of the counter-terrorism
devices as „an affront to justice … and ruled that [it] breached human rights
laws.” (Dodd, Bailey 2006)
Thus given the opponents objections, it can be argued about the level of
securitization in the UK that the country experiences securitizing move
nowadays. The terrorism is securitized by members of government but the
interested public, human rights organizations and some state institutions are not
convinced completely about necessity of some of anti-terrorist measures. Some
critics are also afraid of future development (implicitly in post-democratic way)
indicating that “[f]undamental human rights, such as the right to a fair trial, are
what distinguish democrats from terrorists and dictators. The government´s
policy is in tatters – we hope that this time they are listening.” (Dodd, Bailey
2006)
The UK had passed a law enhancing to fight against terrorism even before
September 2001 because of its long experience with the IRA terrorism. The first
complex framework to counter-terrorism was put in 2000 by Terrorism Act
which is still in force and Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. The attacks of
September 11, 2001, allowed the British government to force the urgent
adoption of a new antiterrorist law, Aniterrorism, Crime and Security Act (Paye
2005) with „sunset clause“ till 2005. But before expiry a new modification was
approved (Prevention of Terrorism Bill, March 2005) strenghtening the
excessive measures which provoked more controversies than ever before.
Already the first law (Terrorism Act) was criticised by human rights
organizations but the situation has not changed with following legislation:
„Various non-judicial organs of the Council of Europe, …, recently scrutinised
and severly criticised the detention conditions of foreign terrorism suspects in
the United Kingdom as well as the country´s new anti-terrorism legislation.“
(Mantouvalou 2005: 1) They were declared by some NGO´s as derogating from
the European Convention on Human Rights.15 But, under the convention,
derogation is permitted only “in time of war or other public emergency
13
This criticism goes for so called control orders which can be imposed by home secretary only on person
suspected from some kind of terrorist involvement especially in the cases with „soft“ evidence. „It is clear that
the home secretary is acting as the judge, jury and prosecutor“. (Dodd, Bailey 2006)
14
However, calling for refinement of proof procedure was not successful.

12
threatening the life of the nation” and then only “to the extents strictly required”
(The Economist, February 19th 2005: 33). None of these conditions seems to be
fulfiled in the UK nowadays.
The Prevention of Terrorism Bill (2005) brought a new pre-emptive anti-
terrorist instrument: control orders. The control orders can for example ban the
person suspected of terrorist activities to use any communication devices, or
leave a certain area, or have any visitor at home or any other limitations of free
movement etc. Thus the suspects are not necessarily taken into custody (for
which an irrefutable evidenceis usually required) but are put under house arrest
(for which the suspicion of home secretary is sufficient). This instrument resists
the basic principle of Western judicial system, e.i. the presumption of innocence,
and can be easily abused (Paye 2005).

France
French government representatives, especially those responsible for home
security, aim at tough counter-terrorism line but the securitization of terrorism
clashes with the objections of the civil rights NGO´s and interested public in
similar way as in the UK. Nicolas Sarkozy, Interior Minister, summed up the
Frech counter-terrorism as “zero tolerance” policy (The Economist, August 13th
2005: 25). Sarkozy indicates the terrorist attack on France and on Paris in
particular as highly possible and counts the tough counter-terrorism as the only
efficient. Sarkozy has argued the new legislation reinforces France´s capacity to
fight terrorism and better protects French citizens against the threat (Bryant
2005: 1). Dominique de Villepin, Prime Minister, has said: „It is essential to be
opposed to [terrorism] together and by all means.“ (Whitlock 2004)
During Senat´s negotiations on the new anti-terror law (November 2005)
Sarkozy put pressure on deputies to ratify the bill arguing that greater powers to
law enforcement agencies are necessary to avoid a catastrophe (BBC News
2005). The new bill was adopted by the easy majority (373 : 33) in the end. But
as United Press International mentioned the counter-terrorism may become a
key issue before 2007 presidential elections. Both Sarkozy and Villepin are
considered to be front presidential candidates and „cracking down on Islamist
extremism is the kind of get-tough policy French voters are likely to support“
(Bryant 2005: 1) Nevertheless, the public support to the extraordinary anti-terror
measures is not very high indeed as indicated by polls.
The terrorist threat was perceived as real by 50% of French population,
but only 11% of them considered it as top actual (Eurobarometer 2003). Sarkozy
had no strong support to his home security policy until the 2005 riots. Tough
measures adopted to stop the riots gained him support (he had got a 70% support

15
The Terrorism Act 2000 allows police to interrogate suspects for up to seven (extended in 2004 to 14 and at
the end of 2005 to 28!) days without charge; it allows premises to be searched without a warrant etc. (Hayes
2005b: 1-2)

13
then) and confirmed him in merits of a firm hold policy.16 Although it could look
like the full securitization of terrorism in France there are expressed many
protests from various human rights organizations, researches etc. The public
debates on the counter-terrorism, home security and individual rights are
common in France. Some of them criticise the extraordinary measures and warn
of the human rights erosion explicitly (Whitlock 2004, Human Rights Watch
2005, Lerougetel 2005, Lefebvre 2002 etc.). Some of them emphasis the anti-
terror legislation in existence since 1986 (which could be better used) instead of
adopting new, more excessive law. On the other hand, such criticism does not
have wide impact: „While other Western countries debate the proper balance
between security and individual rights, France has experienced scant public
dissent over tactics that would be controversial, if not illegal, in the United
States and some other countries.” (Whitlock 2004) The French case study can
not be summed up unambiguously but we can say that France is more or less
standing at the door-step of full securitization of terrorism.
France has experiences with Islamist terror since the Algerian war in 50´s
and 60´s and has developed a preventive system for suppressing extremism.
Current system is based on three pillars: increased surveillance, “offensive
harassment” and a tough criminal-justice system (The Economist, August 13th
2005: 25 - 26). The increased surveillance is applied in France since 1995 when
Paris was attacked by Algerian terrorists and is aimed mainly at Muslim
minority. Nevertheless, France considers itself to be the birthplace of human
rights which is difficult to reconcile with the mass surveillance. Thus the secret
services identified three groups which are under permanent surveillance because
they may serve for terrorist recruitment – converts to Islam; French citizens who
have fought in Iraq and brought back violent ideas, and people who could be
radicalised in prison (French Muslims have 10% in population but majority
among prisoners) (The Economist, August 13th 2005: 25).
Offensive harassment (or active intolerance) means raids on places
suspected of harbouring extremists with the deterrence effects. The raids are
sometimes borderline as they are done under the pretexts as health check, safety
check, a tax audit etc. (The Economist, August 13th 2005: 25).17 Although these
raids can be effective in a short period they may cause serious problems in a
long run. The policy of active intolerance can be evaluated as successful in short
period but in longer period it triggered the riots at the end of 2005 within so
called second generation of immigrants which felt to be discriminated and
treated as „second-class citizens“
Toughness of French counter-terrorism is reflected in criminal-justice
system too. One of the measures makes it possible to held suspected terrorists
for 96 hours without charge. “A 1996 law gives judges free rein to detain
16
On the other hand, during student protests (2006) it was just Sarkozy who opposed a strong line in this
situation and acted like a conciliator.
17
There were made 88 such raids in 2004 which involved 1,173 people. Of these, 185 were taken into custody,
and eight prosecuted. (The Economist, August 13th 2005: 25)

14
suspects merely for “association with wrongdoers involved in a terrorist
enterprise.” (The Economist, August 13th 2005: 25) Another measure concerns
radical clerics which are expelled from the country if they encourage extremists.
The new French anti-terrorist legislation is supported by its proponents as
reducing the threat of Islamist extremism but its critics fear that it will curb basic
freedoms with few benefits in return. (Bryant 2005: 1) Human rights NGOs
doubt the necessity to adopt a new legislation by pointing out the already
existing law (dating back to 1986) which supports the relevant authorities
sufficiently. Jean-Pierre Dubois, president of France´s Human Rights League,
has said that: “Every time you have a terrorist attack, you have Western
governments taking the opportunity to harden laws against terrorism. … And
hardening restrictions against civil liberties. People in France are getting used to
being treated like potential suspects.” (Bryant 2005: 1)

Italy
It seems that Italy had moved from the securitizating move to the full
securitization of terrorism. The securitizing steps are accepted by majority of
people as polls indicate. Terrorism is highlighted as imminently threatening the
vital interests of the country. The fighting on terrorism by all means is necessary
which supports Giuseppe Pisanu, Interior Minister, saying that: „… Italy will
stop at nothing to fight terror.” (Celeste 2005)
Silvio Berlusconi, Prime Minister, spoke about “superiority” of western
civilisation (The Economist, July 16th 2005: 27) which must be defended by
West. Berlusconi predicted that “the West will continue to conquer peoples, like
it conquered communism” even if that means confronting the Islamic
civilisation (Standish 2001). Giuseppe Pisanu, Interior Minister, claimed that
„[w]e have before us a grave threat that must be faced with all the means of
prevention and opposition that we have …“ (aljazeera.net). But because the
central-left opposition is afraid of too wide and draconian measures, Pissanu at
another opportunity stated that: “We cannot curb the freedom of the public to
combat the enemies of freedom.” (The Economist, July 16th 2005: 27) The then
opposition led by Romano Prodi preferred targeted measures instead of general
ones and Pissanu had to suppress the evolving emotions. Nevertheless, Pissanu
prefered tougher measures and that is why he appreciated the latest anti-terror
law (2005) by stating that it makes „existing norms sharper and more incisive in
the fight against terrorism“ (Statwatch 2005e). He justified it by state of
emergency – „terrorism is knocking at Italy´s door“ (The Economist, July 16th
2005: 27). In this light he evaluated the adopted measures not as extraordinary
but as helping the counter-terrorism to be more efficient.
Some of the government parties from far-right are more militant (The
Northern League, The National Alliance); they called for a motion declaring
Italy at war with terrorism (The Economist, July 16th 2005: 27) which would
enable using further extraordinary measures. The fighting terrorism was

15
institutionalised by setting up the Strategic Anti-Terrorism Analysis Committee
which is composed of representatives of all law enforcements agencies, secret
services included. The Committee shall identify potential threats – there were
more than 140 of them till September 2005 – and recommend vital measures to
be taken (Ministero dell´Interno: 1).
When we look at polls made on terrorism, it seems that there is a full
securitization of terrorism in Italy. Even in 2003 was the threat of terrorism
perceived as imminent by 62% of population, 17% of them felt it very strongly
(Eurobarometer 2003). Accoring to the poll for the Italian daily news Corriere
della Sera (2005) as much as 80% of Italians see a serious risk of terrorist
attacks while 66% of them think that an attack could be within several months
(The Economist July 16th 2005: 27 - 28). Anti-terrorist measures are mostly
adopted without wide public debates.18 This can be interpreted in the way that
Italians need not to be persuaded about the necessity of adopting extraordinary
measures any more. When the new anti-terrorist law was adopted there was no
major opposition to the law even though “Italy has a healthy protest culture”
(Celeste 2005).
Italy belongs to the main supporters of the US policy in Iraq which is why
Italians are afraid of imminent terrorist attack (The Economist, July 16th 2005:
27-28).19 Italy multiplies existing anti-terrorist measures and makes them
tougher than the other selected states. The new Italian anti-terrorist law is valid
since August, 1st 2005. It broadens the scope of activities being declared as
terrorist and thus must be under special regime surveillance: terrorist recruitment
and/or terrorist training, conducts that have terrorist goals etc. The period during
which suspects can be interrogated without a lawyer being present was increased
form 12 to 24 hours which may – according to Amnesty International – crack
the right to a fair trial (Statewatch 2005e: 3). Some of the measures may sound
reasonable but Italian law has substantial weak point – dispersion of
competencies among law enforcement agencies. This weakeness was not
rectified by the new legislation, moreover the legislation grants powers to search
or detain suspects for anti-terrorist purposes even to the army. It also allows the
prefetto (local police chief) to order the immediate expulsion of foreigners
(Statewatch 2005e: 3 - 5) Hardening of the anti-terrorist legislation without
resolving this weak point could not have desirable effects.
One of the new anti-terror laws imposed the duty to check all the Internet
café clients on communication providers – to store their IDs and track the
websites they visit. The law from July, 2005 ordered these providers to make
passport photocopies of every customer seeking to use the Internet, phone, or
fax (Celeste 2005: 1) All the companies providing communication services had
to apply for the special licence in which they obliged themselves to submit to
police authorities a list of customers and a list of web pages they have visited.
18
But speaking of the Italy´s activities in Iraq, the situation is totally different.
19
Most Italians think that the best counter-terrorism would be withdrawing the Italian troops from Iraq.

16
These data will be stored until September 31, 2007 at least. Italian Associazione
per la liberta nella comunicazione elettronica interattiva criticises the law
saying that it represses civil rights with the pretext of terrorism and it does not
distinguish prevention from repression (ALCEI 2005: 2).

Conclusion
The three case studies made on the UK, France and Italy show slightly different
levels of securitization of terrorism. Only Italy seems to be in the full
securitization of terrorism - the government´s political discourses provides
evidence of the securitizing move, i.e. its speech act is aimed at presenting
terrorist threat as state of emergency. Moreover, public is convinced of an
imminent terrorist threat and accepts the government´s explanations. For the
government it is therefore easier to remove the counter-terrorism from public
debates and adopt new and sometimes extraordinary measures without a
significant opposition.
On the other hand, France and the UK still seem to be in the phase of
securitizing move. The governments of both states try to securitize terrorism but
public does not consider adopting new legislation as an urgent need. There are
many debates about the anti-terrorist policy in newspaper, on TV, on Internet,
among the institutional structures of the state (House of Lords, Senate House,
National Assembly), among human rights organisations, among many specialists
at public sessions, conferences etc. Some of them draw attention to the question
of democracy asking wether adopted laws can in some way endanger the system
of democracy within Western countries. Some of human rights and judicial
pillars may be affected by the anti-terrorist measures, e.g. right to privacy, right
to a fair trial, freedom of expression, presumption of innocence etc. Hence the
concept of post-democracy is to some extent relevant, nevertheless it is not a
real scenario in the three countries nowadays.

Counter-terrorism within the EU

It is not necessary to analyse the political discourse within the EU because it is

performed by the same politicians and the proceedings at the EU level are close
to those at the member states level. Domestic experience and legislation of the
member states are decisive for the EU counter-terrorism. Following the July
2005 bombings in London, Jacques Barroso, Commission President, said: “In
response to this threat against our common values, the European Union will
stand together ever closer and intensify our mutual support and assistance.”
(EurActive.com 2005) Hence the counter-terrorism within the members is
replicated at the EU level as well. This part of the text will address some of the
measures which could be labelled as extraordinary and diminish the scope of
human rights within Europe.

17
 Ad hoc co-operation in the field of home affairs and terrorism particularly
goes back to the end of the 1960s. More organized coooperation although
outside law and institutional framework of the then European Community was
set up in 1975 by the TREVI groupe (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme et
Violence Internationale) (Druláková 2005: 18-20). Maastricht Treaty introduced
a more coordinated framework but still at the intergovernmental level which was
modified a bit by Amsterdam Treaty. Since Amsterdam Treaty the EU is built as
an area of freedom, security and justice, all three issues being balanced because
“…”European public order” … shall respond to the desire of citizens for
security and reflect the values of freedom and justice to which the Union is
committed.” (Wallace 2005: 458). Such an optimum is desirable but “… calls
for liberty have been overridden by the security rationale. Security has invaded
the dimensions of Freedom and Justice. In a word, the balance has been missed.”
(Balzaq, Carrera 2005)20 Others interpret this statement in a very similar way –
“there is no “balance” between security and civil liberties – just less of each”.
(Hayes 2005) These affirmations can be backed up by some Union anti-terrorist
measures (innovation of Schengen Information System (SIS II), so called
Schengen III and foremost Data Retention Directive) all of them vulnerable to a
potential abuse detrimental to civic freedoms. Our attention will be focused
foremost on the last mentioned legislation which is the most controversial, that
is Data Retention Directive.21

Data Retention
The EU discussions on the Data Retention as a new tool for fighting terrorism
had taken place since 2004 and resulted into two proposals, each of them with
its own connotations and procedures – one was concluded within the third pillar
as a framework decision and the second within the first pillar as a directive.22
Both of them included retention of telecommunications data to investigate
terrorist acts and serious crimes. The adoption of the proposal (in the form of
Directive at the end)23in the aftermath of London bombings may be an example
of „… the current momentum to effectively and comprehensively implement
more widely as soon as possible cooperation on a highly contested set of
technical security measures…“ (Bigo, Carrera 2005). The proposal was
submitted to the European Parliament during 2005. However the Parliament
refused it at first pointing to the „… incompatibility with Art. 8 of the European
20
Quoted from ELISE research (European Liberty and Security).
21
SIS II proposal contains also some equivocal elements, for example the term of „violent troublemakers“ or
„suspected terrorists“ which will be probably included into the SIS II but the definition of these categories is not
clear at all. The criminal law needs maximum exactness in wording otherwise it can cause serious problems. So
called Schengen III Treaty (the ratification process is still not over) seems to fulfil the „trend of proliferation of
databases“ as it includes setting up of the DNA database, database of persons meaning threat to security and
public order in relation to large events with cross-border significance (Art. 3 of the Treaty) etc. But in databases
alone cannot be found salvation against terrorism.
22
Framework decision is a tool of third pillar which has to be adopted by unanimity but with limited powers of
European Parliament and European Court of Justice. Democratic deficit is called into question in similar cases.
23
COM(2005) 438 final

18
Convention of Human Rights, which guarantees the right of respect for private
life against interference by a public authority.“ (Balzacq-Carrera 2005: 3). But
the Parliament yielded to the UK Presidency24 in the end and accepted the
proposal in first reading.
The Directive contents a duty of telecommunication services providers
(telephone companies and internet providers) to retain data of all connections
realized by every individual. It does not contain the content of any connection
but includes all the identifiers of phone calls (even unsuccessfully established
connection), e-mails and websites´ visits: who was contacted by whom (phone
numbers, e-mail addresses), when and how long. The phone call data would be
kept for one year and Internet communications for six months (EurActive.com
2005), but this is a minimum (maximum depends on every state´s decision). The
cost of the storage shall be met by the telecom companies themselves. This will
certainly raise the price of their services which will be paid by individual user at
the end. Except for the invasion to the right of privacy this system will de facto
force the people to contribute to its own surveillance.Moreover, the efficiency of
this Directive is quite unclear as it has hardly any preventive purpose but can be
called into question until ex post investigation.
The Data Retention Directive cannot sustain a more general criticism
either. The organizations paying attention to the digital data transmission and to
human rights made public their common letter which they sent to Members of
the European Parliament on Data Retention (Privacy International and
European Digital Rights 2005) before the directive was adopted. They warn
against the intrusion upon the privacy right of the individual. They identify the
Directive as invasive, illegal, illusory and illegitimate:
- invasive because it invades the individual privacy beyond reasonable
measure and can “create a map of all of our contacts and relationships” in
detail (Privacy International and European Digital Rights 2005: 1);
- illegal because it “criminalizes” using of telecommunication´s means
because “[t]he indiscriminate collection of traffic data offends a core
principle of the rule of law: that citizens should have notice of the
circumstances in which the State may conduct surveillance, so that they
can regulate their behaviour to avoid unwanted instructions” (Privacy
International and European Digital Rights 2005: 2)25;
- illusory because the identification of suspicious individuals will not per se
ensure the security of the region;
- illegitimate because its approval is an “act of policy loundering: to pass
laws at the EU level [which] failed in Member States” (Privacy
International and European Digital Rights 2005: 5).
24
After London bombings the anti-terrorism became the top priority for the UK Presidency which wanted to
push Data Retention proposal either as Directive or as Framework Decision.
25
The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the recording of traffic data is a violation of Article 8
rights (Article 8 guarantees every individual the right to respect for his or her private life, subject only to narrow
exception where government action is imperative). (Privacy International a European Digital Rights 2005: 2)

19
 Some years ago fierce discussions took place in the EU (lacking
unanimous view) on surveillance of people by means of security cameras which
were installed to watch over the public spaces. Some years on, there are no such
discussions not only because the cameras have proved their raison d´être but
also because of people got used to them. Even though it looks like it might be
the same with the data retention measure (i.e. it is only about getting used to it)
there is one substantial difference – the security cameras are watching over
public space which is not anybody´s private area. Using the phone, websites, fax
machines etc. is a part of everybody´s private “space” and that is the stumbling
block of the measure.

Conclusion
Some measures adopted both at the state and at the EU levels to combat
terrorism share a dangerous feature: by enhancing the security of the state they
consequently endanger individual security by cracking his rights and freedoms:
„… human rights and civil liberties can be endangered and finally lost to the
exceptional security demands.” (Balzacq-Carrera 2005: 1). This paradox is
exemplified by such measures as control orders in the EU, active intolerance in
France, data retention in Italy and in the EU, etc. But it seems that current
Europe subscribes to the view once voiced by the Head of MI5: „ … we value
civil liberties and wish to do nothing to damage these hard-fought for rights. But
the world has changed and there needs to be a debate on whether some erosion
of what we all value may be necessary …“ (Statewatch 2005d: 4).
Securitization is an act which gives a chance to excessive and
extraordinary measures to be adopted. Securitization includes three subsequent
steps: firstly, a security threat must be identified and presented as an urgent issue
by securitizing actors; secondly, these actors must convince public about their
arguments (and necessity to adopt new and extra measures), their success or
failure can be measured by polls on related topics; it seems that the objections of
the public lose their weight, the discussions on the need and substance of the
proposed measures are disappearing during this phase; thirdly, securitization
actors remove the security field out of public decision making process which
allows them to propose and adopt extraordinary measures. The securitization
process is done at this moment. The case studies in this paper have pointed out
the presence of the securitization of terrorism in all three European countries.
However each country is in a different phase – France and the UK at the phase
of securitizing move while Italy is very close to full securitization of terrorism.
It may be argued that anti-terrorist measures are successful. But it is not
evident that using today´s security tools would help to prevent an attack similar
to the one on 09/11. Although the extraordinary measures can be effective in a
short run, in a long run they are likely to cause serious problems. The example
of this is the policy of active intolerance in France, which can be evaluated as
successful in a short run (some people were accused of crimes connected with

20
terrorism). But in a long run they triggered the riots at the end of 2005 among
so-called second generation of immigrants which was frustrated by what they
percieved as „second-class citizenship“ which wasresult of an active intolerance
among others.
Greater danger than terrorism itself “… is that we create a repressive and
defensive society …” (Liberty & Security Challenges 2005c). Extraordinary
measures with limited applicability in time (having so called „sunset clauses“)
often turn into permanent laws. Some of them can intrude human rights and
freedoms which is frequently criticised by some institutions or individuals. But
governments stop listening to the critics mainly because of securitization. This
may be the first step to post-democracy. The second step consists in the intensity
of state reactions to potential terrorist threats: “The objective of most actual
terrorism is usually the overthrow of the state, or at least the status quo. That
being so, it is crucial that a democratic state does not over-react to terrorism or
the threat of terrorism, because to make any of these errors can catapult a state
out of democracy…” (Liberty & Security Challenges 2005c). Extraordinary
measures bring interference with the spontaneous order of society. The only way
out of the ante-chamber of post-democracy lies in the public which should have
a possibility to take an active part in public matters because this is the core
principle of liberal democracies.

21
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