Aircraft hijacking is the unlawful seizure of an aircraft by an individual or a group.

In most cases, the pilot is forced to fly according to the orders of the
hijackers. Occasionally, however, the hijackers have flown the aircraft themselves, such as the September 9 attack of 2001. Skyjacking is not usually
committed for robbery or theft. Most aircraft hijackers intend to use the passengers as hostages, either for monetary ransom or for some political or
administrative concession by authorities. Motives vary from demanding the release of certain inmates, to highlighting the grievances of a particular
community. Hijackers also have used aircraft as a weapon to target particular locations, notably during the 9/11 attacks.

According to Alone E. Evans, aircraft hijacking is a contemporary addition to the roster of international and national crimes and the necessity for its
control at international and national level is only beginning to be recognized by the States.

The increase in the number of incidents of hijacking and increase in the dangers against the safety of the flights of aircrafts presents grave problems
before the international community and particularly before the International Civil Aviation Organization. In order to solve this problem and punish the
hijackers several Conventions have been adopted.

The Tokyo Convention, 1963

The Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft was signed at Tokyo in a diplomatic conference on September 14,
1963. It came into force on December 4, 1969.

Provisions
Scope
The Tokyo Convention as stipulated under Article 1 Clause (1) covers:

Offences against penal law;

Acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize good order and discipline on board.[i]

Applicability
The applicability of the Convention has been elaborated in Article 1 Clause (2) which provides that:

The Convention shall apply in respect of offences committed or acts done by a person on board any aircraft registered in a Contracting State, while
that aircraft is in flight or on the surface of the high seas or of any other areas outside the territory of any State.[ii]

Exemption
Article 1 Clause (4) exempts the application of the Convention to aircraft in military, customs or police services.[iii]

Consequences
The Convention forbids forceful seizure of civil aircraft in flight and as in Article 11, charges the Contracting States with the duty of restoring such
aircraft and cargo to the rightful owners and facilitating resumption of the interrupted flight.[iv]

Deficiencies[v]
The Tokyo Convention suffers from a number of deficiencies.

1. The convention neither defines the term hijacking nor makes an effort to deal with an offence itself presumably because the act of hijacking
was not regarded as a crime. It simply lays down what would be the consequences if hijacking takes place.

2. The Convention does not extend to domestic airlines (except when the airlines pass over the high seas but linking cities of the State of
registration).

3. There is an absence of the provision regarding clearly formulated principle of inescapable punishment. There is no prescription of adequate
punitive measures. The main emphasis is on restoration of property and resumption of flight. The offender may be taken into custody by the
 Contracting State which may initiate criminal proceeding or extradite the offender, but neither action is mandatory. Article 16 makes it clear
that it does not create an obligation to grant extradition.

4. Exclusive rights given to flight commanders for protecting the aircraft and imposing restraints on the offenders are to some extent
unjustifiable.

The Hague Convention, 1970

Increase in the number of incidents relating to hijacking and the shortcomings of the Tokyo Convention compelled the States to think and take some
effective measures to solve the problem and to give deterrent punishment to hijackers. This process started in September 1968 when the International
Civil Aviation Organization Council was asked to study the problem of hijacking, leading to the adoption of the Hague Convention, 1970, i.e., the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. After having been ratified by the prescribed number of States, The Hague Convention
came into force on October 17, 1971.

The three major international drug control treaties, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of
1961 (as amended in 1972), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and the United
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,
are mutually supportive and complementary.
An important purpose of the first two treaties is to codify internationally applicable control
measures in order to ensure the availability of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for
medical and scientific purposes, and to prevent their diversion into illicit channels. They also
include general provisions on illicit drug trafficking and drug abuse.
The 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances extends the control regime to precursors, and focuses on establishing measures to
combat illicit drug trafficking and related money-laundering, as well as strengthening the
framework of international cooperation in criminal matters, including extradition and mutual legal
assistance.
The three conventions attribute important functions to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and to
the International Narcotics Control Board:
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, composed of 53 Member States elected by the
Economic and Social Council for a four-year term, is the central policy-making body
with regard to drug-related matters, including the monitoring of the global trends of
illicit drug trafficking and abuse. This functional commission of the Economic and
Social Council adopts and recommends for adoption by the Council or to the
General Assembly through the Council, resolutions on new concerted measures or
agreed policies to better address the drug phenomenon. It decides whether new
substances should be included in one of the schedules of the conventions and if
changes or deletions in the schedules are required.
The International Narcotics Control Board is a permanent and independent body,
consisting of 13 members, who are elected for a five-year term by the Economic
and Social Council on the basis of their competence and serve in their personal
capacity. The Board monitors the implementation of the conventions and, where
appropriate, makes recommendations to States. It also administers the statistical
control of drugs on the basis of data supplied by Governments and assesses world
requirements of licit drugs with a view to the adaptation of production to those
requirements. It gathers information on illicit trafficking, and submits an annual
report on developments in the world situation to the Commission on Narcotic Drugs
and to the Economic and Social Council.
UNODC has an important role in assisting these bodies in performing their treaty-based
functions, and in assisting States Parties in the implementation of their obligations under the
international drug control treaties.
A crime against peace, in international law, is "planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of wars of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing". [1] This definition of crimes against peace was first incorporated into
the Nuremberg Principles and later included in the United Nations Charter. This definition would play a part in defining aggression as a crime against peace. It can also refer to
the core international crimes set out in Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression) which
adopted crimes negotiated previously in the Draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind.

An important exception to the foregoing are defensive military actions taken under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Such defensive actions are subject to immediate Security
Council review, but do not require UN permission to be legal within international law. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." (UN Charter, Article 51) The Security Council will determine if the action is legally the "right of
individual or collective self-defence", or it may appoint another UN organ to do this.

No legal authority exists for the definition of the terms "territorial integrity", "political independence" and "sovereignty". However, their face value would seem to disclose the
following:

The "territorial integrity" rule means that it is a crime of aggression to use armed force with intent permanently to deprive a state of any part or parts of its territory, not
excluding territories for the foreign affairs of which it is responsible;

The "political independence" rule means that it is a crime of aggression to use armed force with intent to deprive a state of the entirety of one or more of the prerequisites
of statehood, namely: defined territory, permanent population, constitutionally independent government and the means of conducting relati ons with other States;

The "sovereignty" rule means that it is a crime of aggression to use armed force with intent to overthrow the government of a state or to impede its freedom to act
unhindered, as it sees fit, throughout its jurisdiction.

This definition of the crime of aggression belongs to jus cogens, which is supreme in the hierarchy of international law and, therefore, it cannot be modified by, or give way to,
any rule of international law but one of the same rank. An arguable example is any rule imposing a conflicting obligation to prevent, interdict or vindicate crimes which also
belong to jus cogens, namely aggression itself, crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, slavery, torture and piracy, so that a war waged consistent with the aim of
repressing any of these crimes might not be illegal where the crime comes within the limit of proportionality relative to war and its characteristic effects.

Examples[edit]
Examples of the crime against peace include two secretly negotiated treaties between Stalin and Hitler on the partition of Poland and annexation of Baltic States, Soviet attack
against Finland in 1939, and the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950.[1]

Kellogg-Briand Pact[edit]
In 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, known as the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, said:

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and
renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

If a nation does not register with the UN as recognizing the Kellogg-Briand Pact, even if the nation had signed it, the UN cannot hold a claimed violation of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact to be a violation of international law (according to its own Charter, Article 102). The interpretation of Article 102 is reserved to the Security Council, so it is possible that a
"crime against peace" might be found by the Security Council, regardless.

Nuremberg Principles[edit]
In 1945, the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal defined three categories of crimes, including crimes against peace. This definition was first used in Finland to
prosecute the political leadership in the War-responsibility trials in Finland. The principles were later known as the Nuremberg Principles.

In 1950, the Nuremberg Tribunal defined Crimes against Peace (in Principle VI.a, submitted to the United Nations General Assembly) as

(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; (ii) Participation in a common plan
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).

"The legal basis for the jurisdiction of the court was that defined by the Instrument of Surrender of Germany, political authority for Germany had been transferred to the Allied
Control Council, which having sovereign power over Germany could choose to punish violations of international law and the laws of war. Because the court was limited to
violations of the laws of war, it did not have jurisdiction over crimes that took place before the outbreak of war on September 1, 1939"

For committing this crime, the Nuremberg Tribunal sentenced a number of persons responsible for starting World War II. One consequence of this is that nations who are
starting an armed conflict must now argue that they are either exercising the right of self-defense, the right of collective defense, or - it seems - the enforcement of the criminal
law of jus cogens. It has made formal declaration of war uncommon after 1945.
During the trial, the chief American prosecutor, Robert H. Jackson, stated:

To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself
the accumulated evil of the whole.

Associate Supreme Court Justice William Douglas charged that the Allies were guilty of "substituting power for principle" at Nuremberg. "I thought at the time and still think that
the Nuremberg trials were unprincipled.", he wrote. "Law was created ex post facto to suit the passion and clamor of the time." [2]

Crimes against peace, as described by the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1946, are the supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the
accumulated evil of the whole.
Also known as the crime of aggression, crimes against peace formed the first charge against the Nazis in the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The charter
defined them as planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy [to do so]. Crimes against peace are not war crimes per se, which involve unlawful conduct during war.
The idea of charging the Nazis with the crime of starting World War II was controversial at the time and has remained so ever since. For the Americans, crimes against peace were the chief
offense of the Nazis, and the criminality of aggressive war needed to be enshrined in international law. But starting a war had not been regarded as criminal up to that time. The Kellogg-Briand
Pact of 1928, which outlawed war (not too successfully, to say the least), only rendered aggression an illegal act for States, not a criminal act for which individuals could be tried. The French
resisted the concept for this reason; the Soviets, for their part, were concerned about criminalizing aggressive war given their invasions of Finland and annexation of parts of Poland. The
American view prevailedthough the tribunals jurisdiction was limited to Axis aggressionleading to the conviction of leading Nazis for crimes against peace. Afterward, a fierce debate raged
in legal circles as to whether the Allies had applied criminal law retroactively.
Although UN bodies have restated the importance of crimes against peace since World War II, the UNs membersespecially Western Stateshave noted serious obstacles to actually
prosecuting individuals. First, a definition of aggression specific enough for prosecutions of governmental officials remains elusive. Second, since wars are typically planned by many people in
State bureaucracies, drawing a line of guilt might prove difficult. Third, criminal cases could encompass complex, politically laden factual inquiries ill-suited for courts. While some cases of
aggression are as stark as Iraqs invasion of Kuwait, other incidents demand more careful scrutiny.
One clear manifestation of these concerns was the Security Councils unwillingness to give the UNs Yugoslavia Tribunal jurisdiction over this crime. Another was the decision by the States
drafting the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to give the ICC jurisdiction over crimes against peace only if States formally amend that statute to add a definition of the
crime and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. States thus seem to say that aggression is a crime in the abstract, but are reluctant to prosecute it. The concept of crimes against peace still
has some effect on international law, as States want to recognize the illegality of aggression in the strongest wayby proclaiming that leaders can be held accountable for it. But the dim
prospects of actually prosecuting anyone make impunity the norm and crimes against peace somewhat of a dead letter.
Contraband, in international law, such goods as are prohibited to be imported or exported, bought or sold, either by the laws of a particular state or by special treaties; also a term applied
to designate that class of commodities which neutrals are not allowed to carry during war to a belligerent power. It is a recognised general principle of the law of nations
that ships may sail to and trade with all kingdoms, countries, and states in peace with the countries whose flags they bear, and that they are not to be molested by the ships
of any other power at war with the country with which they are trading unless they engage in the conveyance of contraband goods. The question whether certain goods
(other than munitions of war as to which there is no question) are or are not contraband is often a very difficult one. Generally speaking, it depends partly on the practice of
each nation and partly on stipulations in treaties.

A blockade is an effort to cut off supplies, war material or communications from a particular area by force, either in part or totally. A blockade should not be confused with
an embargo or sanctions, which are legal barriers to trade. It is also distinct from a siege in that a blockade is usually directed at an entire country or region, rather than a
fortress or city. While most blockades historically took place at sea, blockade is still used on land to prevent someone coming into a certain area.

A blockading power can seek to cut off all maritime transport from and to the blockaded country; although stopping all land transport to and from an area may also be
considered a blockade. Blockades restrict the trading rights of neutrals, who must submit for inspection for contraband, which the blockading power may define narrowly or
broadly, sometimes including food and medicine. In the 20th century air power has also been used to enhance the effectiveness of the blockade by halting air traffic within the
blockaded airspace.

Close patrol of hostile ports, in order to prevent naval forces from putting to sea, is also referred to as a blockade. When coastal cities or fortresses were besieged from the
landward side, the besiegers would often blockade the seaward side as well. Most recently, blockades have sometimes included cutting off electronic communications
by jamming radio signals and severing undersea cables.

Close, distant, and loose blockades[edit]

A close blockade entails placing warships within sight of the blockaded coast or port, to ensure the immediate interception of any ship entering or leaving. It is both the most
effective and the most difficult form of blockade to implement. Difficulties arise because the blockading ships must remain continuously at sea, exposed to storms and hardship,
usually far from any support, and vulnerable to sudden attack from the blockaded side, whose ships may stay safe in harbor until they choose to come out.

In a distant blockade, the blockaders stay well away from the blockaded coast and try to intercept any ships going in or out. This may require more ships on station, but they can
usually operate closer to their bases, and are at much less risk from enemy raids. This was almost impossible prior to the 16th century due to the nature of the ships used. [6]

A loose blockade is a close blockade where the blockading ships are withdrawn out of sight from the coast (behind the horizon) but no farther. The object of loose blockade is to
lure the enemy into venturing out but to stay close enough to strike.

British admiral Horatio Nelson applied a loose blockade at Cdiz in 1805. The Franco-Spanish fleet under Pierre-Charles Villeneuve then came out, resulting in the Battle of
Trafalgar.[7]

Pacific blockade[edit]
Until 1827, blockades were always a part of a war. This changed when France, Russia and Britain came to the aid of the Greek rebels against Turkey. They blockaded the
Turkish-occupied coast, which led to the battle of Navarino. War was never declared, however, so it is considered the first pacific i.e. peaceful blockade.[8] The first
truly pacific blockade, involving no shooting at all, was the British blockade of the Republic of New Granada in 1837, established to compel New Granada to release an
imprisoned British consul.[9]

Since 1945, the UN Security Council determines the legal status of blockades and by article 42 of the UN Charter, the Council can also apply blockades.[10] The UN Charter
allows for the right of self-defense but requires that this must be immediately reported to the Security Council to ensure the maintenance of international peace.

According to the not ratified document San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, 12 June 1994, [11] a blockade is a legal method of warfare at
sea but is governed by rules. The manual describes what can never be contraband. The blockading nation is free to select anything else as contraband in a list, which it must
publish.

The blockading nation typically establishes a blockaded area of water, but any ship can be inspected as soon as it is established that it is attempting to break the blockade. This
inspection can occur inside the blockaded area or in international waters, but never inside the territorial waters of a neutral nation. A neutral ship must obey a request to stop for
inspection from the blockading nation. If the situation so demands, the blockading nation can request that the ship divert to a known place or harbour for inspection. If the ship
does not stop, then the ship is subject to capture. If people aboard the ship resist capture, they can be lawfully attacked.
Act of war[edit]
Main article: Casus belli

Whether or not a blockade was seen as lawful depended on the laws of the nations whose trade was influenced by the blockade. The Brazilian blockade of Ro de la Plata in
1826, for instance, was considered lawful according to British law but unlawful according to French and American law. The latter two countries announced they would actively
defend their ships against Brazilian blockaders, while Britain was forced to steer for a peaceful solution between Brazil and Argentina.[12]

Civil disobedience[edit]
There are a number of protest actions with the specific aim of cutting off material, people or communications from a particular area by non-violence, either in part or totally. The
effectiveness of such blockades rely on the principles of nonviolent resistance especially the participation of people and lock-on techniques.

A sit-down strike is a form of civil disobedience in which an organized group of workers, usually employed at a factory or other centralized location, take possession of the
workplace by "sitting down" at their stations, effectively preventing their employers from replacing them with strikebreakers. A non-violent picket is another example; it also
illustrates the specificity of the blockade, non-violent pickets may demand the blocking of some traffic while allowing other traffic; e.g. workers but not the customers, or
customers but not workers.

The Mau movement was a non-violent movement for Samoan independence from colonial rule during the early 1900s. Amongst other actions, participants formed their own
"police force", picketing stores in Apia to prevent the payment of customs to the authorities. Some other examples are the perimeter blockade by human chain at Greenham
Common Women's Peace Camp, the blockade of the Franklin River dam site, and the Keystone Pipeline.

Universal jurisdiction allows states or international organizations to claim criminal jurisdiction over an accused person regardless of where the alleged crime was committed,
and regardless of the accused's nationality, country of residence, or any other relation with the prosecuting entity. Crimes prosecuted under universal jurisdiction are considered
crimes against all, too serious to tolerate jurisdictional arbitrage.

The concept of universal jurisdiction is therefore closely linked to the idea that some international norms are erga omnes, or owed to the entire world community, as well as the
concept of jus cogens that certain international law obligations are binding on all states. [1]

According to Amnesty International, a proponent of universal jurisdiction, certain crimes pose so serious a threat to the international community as a whole, that states have a
logical and moral duty to prosecute an individual responsible; therefore, no place should be a safe haven for those who have committed genocide,[2] crimes against
humanity, extrajudicial executions, war crimes, torture and forced disappearances.[3]

Opponents, such as Henry Kissinger, who was himself the subject of war crimes charges in Spain, [4] argue that universal jurisdiction is a breach of each state's sovereignty: all
states being equal in sovereignty, as affirmed by the United Nations Charter, "[w]idespread agreement that human rights violations and crimes against humanity must be
prosecuted has hindered active consideration of the proper role of international courts. Universal jurisdiction risks creating universal tyranny that of judges."[5][6] According to
Kissinger, as a practical matter, since any number of states could set up such universal jurisdiction tribunals, the process could quickly degenerate into politically driven show
trials to attempt to place a quasi-judicial stamp on a state's enemies or opponents.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674, adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 28 April 2006, "Reaffirm[ed] the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139
of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" and
commits the Security Council to action to protect civilians in armed conflict.[7][8]

Universal distinct from extraterritorial jurisdiction[edit]

Universal jurisdiction differs from a state's prosecuting crimes under its own laws, whether on its own territory (territorial jurisdiction) or abroad (extraterritorial jurisdiction). As an
example, the US asserts jurisdiction over stateless vessels carrying illicit drugs on international watersbut here the US reaches across national borders to enforce its own law;
rather than invoking universal jurisdiction and trans-national standards of right and wrong.[15]

States attempting to police acts committed by foreign nationals on foreign territory tends to be more controversial, than a state prosecuting its own citizens (wherever they may
be found). Bases on which a state might exercise jurisdiction in this way:

The least controversial basis is that under which a state can exercise jurisdiction over acts that affect the fundamental interests of the state, such as spying, even if the
act was committed by foreign nationals on foreign territory. The Indian Information Technology Act 2000 largely supports the extraterritoriality of the said Act. The law
states that a contravention of the Act that affects any computer or computer network situated in India will be punishable by India irrespective of the culprits location and
nationality.[citation needed]

Also relatively non-controversial is the ability of a state to try its own nationals for crimes committed abroad. France and some other nations will refuse to extradite their
own citizens as a matter of law, but will instead try them on their own territory for crimes committed abroad.

More controversial is the exercise of jurisdiction where the victim of the crime is a national of the state exercising jurisdiction. In the past some states have claimed this
jurisdiction (e.g., Mexico (Cutting Case (1887))), while others have been strongly opposed to it (e.g., the United States, except in cases in which an American citizen is a
victim (US v Yunis (1988)). In more recent years however, a broad global consensus has emerged in permitting its use in the case of torture, "forced disappearances" or
terrorist offences (due in part to it being permitted by the various United Nations conventions on terrorism); but its application in other areas is still highly controversial.
For example, former dictator of Chile Augusto Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998, on Spanish judge Baltazar Garzon's demand, on charges of human rights
abuses, not on the grounds of universal jurisdiction but rather on the grounds that some of the victims of the abuses committed in Chile were Spanish citizens. Spain
then sought his extradition from Britain, again, not on the grounds of universal jurisdiction, but by invoking the law of the European Union regarding extradition; and he
was finally released on grounds of health. Argentinian Alfredo Astiz's sentence is part of this juridical frame.[citation needed]