NGO SIN SING v.

LI SENG GIAP & SONS and CONTECH CONSTRUCTION

Petitioner spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo owned a lot Binondo. They decided to
construct a 5-storey concrete building thereon, the NSS Building, and for this project, they
contracted the services of Contech as Contractor.

Adjacent to their lot is a semi-concrete building known as the Li Seng Giap Building (LSG
Building), owned by Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. (respondent). During the construction of the NSS
Building, the respondent, through its general manager, received complaints from their tenants
about defects in the building. There were cracks appearing on the floors, the steel door was bent,
and concrete slabs of the walls were falling apart. An inspection of the premises revealed that the
excavation made by Contech on petitioners' land was close to the common boundary, exposing
the foundation of the LSG Building. As a gesture of goodwill, the petitioners assured that repairs
would be undertaken by their contractor.

Contech announced that it had completed repairs on the LSG Building. Notwithstanding
this assurance, more defects in the LSG Building appeared. The respondent was forced to consult
engineers to investigate the cause. It was immediately noticed that the LSG Building underwent
differential settlement. They concluded that the structural failure of the LSG Building resulted
from the differential settlement caused by the excavation during the construction of the NSS
Building and recommended the complete demolition and reconstruction estimated to cost
P8,021,687.00. The respondents demanded that the petitioners rebuild the LSG Building or pay
the cost of the same, which the petitioners refused. Thus, a complaint for sum of money was filed
against Ngo Sin Sing, Ticia Dy Ngo and Contech before the RTC Manila.

The spouses moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that: (1) the respondent's building
had been structurally unstable and deficient from the beginning; and (2) the structural defects
and failure were traceable not necessarily due to soil erosion but to a number of external forces
constantly working upon the building including earthquakes and improper maintenance.

Petitioners filed a cross-claim against Contech averring that pursuant to their construction
contract, all claims of third parties should be answered by said corporation.

The trial court noted that the LSG Building was originally a 2-storey building and the
plaintiff added two more floors without providing the necessary foundation.

The trial court held that it was but fair for the plaintiff to assume its share of the faults and
defects of its property in this case. Dissatisfied with the trial court's ruling, Li Seng Giap & Sons,
Inc. and the spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo filed their respective appeals. The respondent
disagreed with the trial court's finding that it was guilty of contributory negligence and that it
must share in the cost of the reconstruction of the LSG Building.
 The CA affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court ruled that the respondent
had a proven cause of action against the petitioners; that respondent's right to property was
invaded or disturbed when excavation was done without sufficient lateral or subjacent support.
As such, the petitioners' liability as project owner should be shared with the contractor, applying
the provisions of Article 2194 of the Civil Code which states that "the responsibility of two or
more persons for a quasi-delict is solidary."

ISSUE:

Whether the CA committed grave error in rendering the decision which ignored clear evidence
on record that respondents own negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to its
building, or at least, amounted to contributory negligence warranting reduction of the award.

RULING:

Yes, the CA committed error. The Court ruled that the foundation of the LSG Building
which was good to support only two floors remained the same and could not support the weight
of the present 4-storey building. This only goes to show that the additional two floors put up on
the LSG Building could have overburdened the foundation's load-bearing capacity and
contributed to the sagging of the building.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to
conform for his own protection.

In this case, considering that respondent's negligence must have necessarily contributed
to the sagging of the LSG Building, a reduction of the award is warranted. Therefore, the SC
agrees with the trial court that respondent should likewise share in the cost of the restructuring
of its building. This is more in keeping with justice and equity. To put all the blame and
responsibility for the defects, cracks and tilting or sagging of the building on the shoulders of the
defendants is not proper. Plaintiff must realize his share of the faults and defects of his property
in the situation. Builders should be shouldered by the plaintiff alone.

Defendant Contech shall reimburse defendants Spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo
for whatever amount the latter will pay to the plaintiff. The negligence of Contech caused the
damages sustained by the building, which did not discharge its duty of excavating eight (8) inches
away from the boundary line from the lot of plaintiff with insufficient lateral and subjacent
support.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides, whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict.
1. there must be an act or omission;
2. such act or omission causes damage to another;
3. such act or omission is caused by fault or negligence; and
4. there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
 CAEDO v YU KHE THAI and BERNARDO

Caedo and family were traveling Highway 54 on the way to the airport. Private
respondents were traveling on the opposite direction. Bernardo was the personal river of
Yu. Both vehicles were running at moderate speeds when a carritela was traveling the
same direction as Bernardos. The latter overtook the caritella and took the lane Caedos
were traveling and caused multiple injuries and damage to the Caedos. Bernardo was
held liable.

ISSUE:

Whether the owner of the vehicle, who was riding with the driver at the time of
the accident, be held solidarily liable.

RULING:

The court ruled that if the causative factor was the drivers negligence, the owner
of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the
mishap by the existence of due diligence. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is
not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that
ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely
correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent
injury or damage.
 AFIALDA v HISOLE
Assumption of Risk

Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos owned by Basilio Hisole. In March
1947, without any fault from Afialda or any force majeure, one of the carabaos gored him
thereby causing his death. Afialdas sister, Margarita Afialda, sued Hisole arguing that
under the Civil Code, The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable
for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise fromforce majeure or from
the fault of the person who may have suffered it.

ISSUE:
Whether Hisole is liable as owner of the carabao which killed Afialda.

HELD:

No.

The law uses the term possessor and user of the animal. Afialda was the
caretaker of the animal and he was tasked and paid to tend for the carabaos. He, at the
time of the goring, is the possessor and the user of the carabao and therefore he is the one
who had custody and control of the animal and was in a position to prevent the animal
from causing damage.

It would have been different had Afialda been a stranger. Obviously, it was the
caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to
anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances
was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which
he must take the consequences.
 COCA-COLA v COURT OF APPEALS

Private respondent Lydia Geronimo was the proprietress of Kindergarten

Wonderland Canteen. Some parents of the students complained to her that the softdrinks
she sold contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances.

She brought the said bottles for examination to the DOH and it was found out that
the softdrinks are adulterated. As a result, her per day sales of softdrinks severely
plummeted that she had to close her shop for losses.

She demanded damages from Coca-cola before the RTC which dismissed the same
on motion by petitioner based on the ground of Prescription.

On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.

HELD:

Coca-cola was liable for breach of contract and quasi-delict. The vendor could
likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action
based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing
contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on
quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts
which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict.

The SC agrees with the CAs conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is found
on quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years and not on breach of
warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations in the complaint
which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items
intended to be sold for public consumption."
 AIR FRANCE v CARRASCOSO

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to
Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first-class round-trip ticket by Air France. But during
a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat
because a white man allegedly has a better right than him. Carrascoso protested but when
things got heated and upon advice of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and
was transferred to the planes tourist class.

After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France
for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified,
among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the planes pantry
where he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he noted in the planes journal the
following:

First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene

The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance
of a first-class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because
allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties.

Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the note
made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.

ISSUE 1: Whether Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.

ISSUE 2: Whether the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was not presented in court
is admissible in evidence.
 HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and on
culpa aquiliana.

Culpa Contractual

There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a
contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached
when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was
bad faith when Air Frances employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth after he was already, seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by
reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing
him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral
damages.

The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of a first-
Class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first-class seat. Such claim
is simply incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana

Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract
merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is,
that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one
attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos action is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France a case of quasi-delict. Damages
are proper.

HELD: 2:

Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae. The subject of
inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue
between Carrascoso and the purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still
fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this
environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his
entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident.
Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms
part of the res gestae.