1

COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA

Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to
appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed
coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the
charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for
reconsideration. Alleging denial of due process.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied
by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for
provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional
liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men
facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.

The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground
that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC.
Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a
year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at
the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the
denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their
counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were
again asked to submit in writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to
submit counter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to submit
controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory challenge. (Right to challenge validity
of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations
of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise
interfere with the court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions for
habeas corpus and quo warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is
not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The
right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, there
was substantial compliance with therequirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The
AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after
one year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed
coup.
 2

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of
peremptory challenge under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the
petitions are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private
respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
Comia v. Antona, 337 SCRA 656

On 19 January 1998, an information for murder for the death of complainants husband, Numeriano
Comia, was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Fourth judicial Region, and raffled to Branch 4,
Batangas City, presided by respondent Judge. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9309 and entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Fajardo, et al., accused were Dante Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina Fajardo-
Arce, as principals, the latters husband Pio Arce as accomplice.

On 29 January 1998, counsels for accused Fajardo Sr., Filipina Arce and Pio Arce, filed an Urgent
Motion to Defer Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest with Supplemental Petition to Quash, Lift and or
Dissolve Warrant of Arrest if Already Issued. Private Prosecutor Atty. Isabelita Bathan Manigbas with
the conformity of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Leonardo Suyo of Batangas City submitted a
comment/opposition. Taking cognizance that a petition for review against the resolution of the City
Prosecutor had been filed by the accused with the Department of Justice, respondent judge held that
such fact does not in any way preclude the court from acting on the information already filed with the
Court hence denied the urgent motion for lack of merit. Counsel for the accused filed a motion for
reconsideration. On 10 March 1998, respondent Judge granted the motion decreeing that the efficacy
of the said warrants of arrest against all the herein accused dated January 27, 1998 are hereby
suspended until further order of the court.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the Private Prosecutor with the conformity of the 2nd
Assistant City Prosecutor Leonardo Suyo. On 31 March 1998, respondent Judge denied the motion
ruling, inter alia, that:

X X X In any case, a reading of the subsequent orders of the Secretary of Justice merely gave the
justification for the prosecutors to file informations with the Court even if there were appeals and/or
petitions for review of their resolutions seasonably filed. There is, however, nothing in these orders
and/or circulars which in any way affects the discretion of the Court on whether or not warrants of
arrest should be issued and although already issued, the Court may order its recall and as what had
been made in this case, suspend the effectivity of said warrants of arrest.

Moreover, the right of an accused to appeal and/or petition for review resolutions of Prosecutors to
the Secretary of Justice had not been removed but only qualified. It is unfortunate that what
impressed the Private prosecutor was the apparently no longer effective Circular No. 17 of the
Department of Justice. But as can be gleaned from the order of March 10, 1998, the suspension of
the efficacy of warrants of arrest was primarily premised on the sense of fair play of the Court to give
full meaning to the due process that should be accorded every person accused of a criminal offense
and in the interest of substantial justice in the face of the existence of warrants of arrest which
undoubtedly would affect the rights of the accused to ventillate (sic) their arguments and evidence
before the Secretary of Justice.

On 04 November 1998, defenses appeal to the Department of Justice was dismissed.

On 04 December 1998, respondent Judge issued the second warrants of arrest against accused
Fajardo Sr., Filipina and Pio. While still at large, Atty. Reynaldo P. Dimayacyac, Sr. filed an Urgent
Petition for the Grant of Bail to Accused Dante Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina Arce with Supplemental
Motion for Reduction of Bail Recommended for Accused Pio Arce, Jr. dated 14 December 1998.

On 16 December 1998, respondent Judge merely directed that the urgent petition be filed with the
records it appearing the court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all accused who
are still at large.
 3

On 04 January 1999, acting on the manifestation/motion of counsel for the accused, respondent
Judge issued an order setting tentatively the hearing of the petition for bailof Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina
Arce and reduction of bail of Pio Arce, Jr. on 06 January 1999 at 9:30 a.m. In the same order,
respondent judge directed that a copy thereof be furnished the City Prosecutor, and upon request of
the defense counsel, subpoena ad testificandum be issued to three witnesses named in the request.

On 06 January 1999, the scheduled hearing of the petition for bail was held. First to speak was the
private prosecutor who manifested they only learned today of the return of the warrant dated January
6, 1999 showing that the warrant was served by the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,
Camp Crame, Quezon City in the evening on January 5, 1999. Inasmuch as the accused were
present, she continued that a commitment order be issued for their confinement at the City Jail of
Batangas, adding that a representative of the PNP Batangas is present for the purpose.

Defenses counsel retorted the proceedings was for petition for bail and since the court had ruled that
the petition could not be heard without the accused-movants submitting themselves to the jurisdiction
of the court, they surrendered themselves to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group of the
PNP, Camp Crame and were pressing (sic) for a speedy trial.

Respondent Judge then remarked that the matter to be heard as shown in the order setting the
hearing, was subject to the condition that the accused voluntarily surrender themselves which they
did. Regarding the plea of the private counsel that a commitment order for the confinement of the
accused in Batangas City Jail be issued, he said it will be resolved later on but first things first.
Continuing, he observed that the motion here set for hearing is the one for the movants to show their
cause why this motion should be granted and in the matter of granting bail and with respect to the
other accused in the matter of reduction of bail, so first things first.

Private prosecutor then asserted that under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, in application for bail
particularly for capital offense (the burden of) showing (that the evidence of) the guilt of the accused
is strong, lies in the prosecution. It is the prosecution who should present evidence to prove (that the
evidence of) the guilt of accused is strong. Citing Section 8 of Rule 114, she argues that all of the
evidence presented by the prosecution shall [be] automatically form part (of) the trial on the merits of
the case. So, it would be unprocedural (sic) Your Honor, with due respect to the Honorable Court and
to defense counsel that this application for bail be conducted without first submitting the accused to
the proper agency; that they be properly arraigned and the Prosecution then will be given the proper
opportunity to file an opposition to the petition for bail and to give proper opportunity for the
prosecution to present its evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong; the accused here has
not yet been arraigned; they had not been committed to the proper agency where they should had
been properly detained, Your Honor. (Emphasis Ours)

During the course of the bail hearing, the defense further moved to the objection of the
prosecution that the accused be held in custody at the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,
Camp Crame, claiming that accused, Fajardo, Sr., was then scheduled for medical operation as early
as December 14th.[2] Respondent judge granted the motion of defense counsel.
On 12 January 1999, the prosecution filed an Omnibus Motion to (a) reconsider the order of
custody of the accused; (b) declare the proceedings on the bail null and void; (c) inhibit; and, (d) defer
further proceedings.
On 28 January 1999, the prosecution likewise filed a Supplement to the Omnibus Motion dated
December 14, 1998 with Additional Arguments to Support its Motion for Reconsideration Anent the
order of January 6, 1999.
In an order[3] dated 01 February 1999, respondent judge denied the Omnibus Motion to which the
prosecution moved to reconsider said order. On 03 February 1999, respondent judge denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of the prosecution and declared the bail hearings terminated.
Upon arraignment, accused Fajardo Sr. and Filipina Fajardo- Arce pleaded not guilty to the
charge against them.
In an order dated 15 February 1999,[4] respondent judge granted the petition for bail and fixed the
amount thereof at P200,000.00 each for accused Fajardo Sr. and Filipina Fajardo-Arce, and reduced
the amount of bail to P100,000.00 for accused Pio Arce, Jr.
 4

On 25 February 1999, respondent judge inhibited himself from the hearing and trial of Criminal
Case No. 9309.[5]

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE

Acting on the sworn affidavit-complaint filed by herein complainant Luzviminda Comia and
considering the gravity of the charges imputed therein, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended to the High Court that the instant administrative matter be referred to the Court of
Appeals for immediate raffle, investigation, report and recommendation.
In a Resolution dated 06 December 1999, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals
and, upon subsequent raffle, was assigned to Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero for investigation,
report and recommendation.
On 23 February 2000, herein complainant, through counsel, filed a memorandum.[6] For his part,
respondent judge submitted a Manifestation[7] on 06 March 2000, and a Memorandum[8] on 17 March
2000, to which complainant filed a Compliance with Reply-Memorandum[9] dated 28 March 2000.
In a Memorandum dated 12 April 2000, Investigating Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero submitted
to the High Court his findings and recommendations on the administrative matter, to wit:

1. Ignorance of the law: On the basis of the foregoing, respondent Judge may be
held administratively liable and ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 ;

2. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Court: No Fraud, dishonesty or corruption has
been charged much less proven against respondent Judge. Hence, he may be exonerated; and,

3. Deliberately violating existing doctrines and jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court:
There is no evidence that respondent Judge was aware of herein aforecited jurisprudential
doctrines on application for admission to bail in a capital offense. Not one of these casesor any
case for that matter involving petition for bail in a charge for a capital offensewas brought to the
attention of respondent Judge by the prosecution to show that his order was in violation of
existing jurisprudence. Hence, respondent Judge may be exonerated.(Emphasis Ours)

THECOURTS RULINGThe findings and recommendations of the investigating justice are well-taken. A
thorough perusal of the records and evidence adduced by the complainant lend credible
substantiation to the charge of gross ignorance of the law on the part of respondent judge. Verily, the
actuation of respondent judge specifically in the handling, hearing and resolution of the petition for
bail constitutes not only ignorance of fundamental rules relating to bail applications, but demands
stern rebuke from this Court as well.Without doubt, the rules and principles relating to bail
transgressed by respondent judge are to say the least basic that unfamiliarity therewith entails a
finding of administrative liability and necessitates the imposition of the proper penalty.

Section 8 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is explicit:

Sec. 8. Burden of Proof in Bail Application. At the hearing of an application for admission to bail filed
by any person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is
strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearings shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional
examination unless the witness is dead, outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable to testify.
(Emphasis Ours)

Likewise, jurisprudence on the matter is crystalline. Bereft of any ambiguity of language, this
Court, as early as Feliciano vs. Pasicolan,[10] articulated the principle in this jurisdiction that since bail
is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, the same cannot be authorized or
posted before custody of said accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities by his arrest or
voluntary surrender.
 5

It is self evident that a court cannot authorize provisional liberty to one who is then actually in the
enjoyment of his liberty, or as the Court quoted in Feliciano, it would be incongruous to grant bail to
one who is free.[11] Stated differently, the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say
incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.[12]
Thus in Borinaga vs. Tamin,[13] the High Court in categorical terms enunciated:

Where admission to bail is a matter of discretion, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. X X X Admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise
thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal
principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the
very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion
is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion
must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after
evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution.

In the first place, respondent judge did not have the authority to set the petition for bail for hearing in
view of the fact that he had not even acquired jurisdiction over the criminal case

Under the present circumstances, respondent Judge Antona-- fully cognizant that the court had
not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused considering that the latter were at large--
still entertained the application for bail by setting a date of hearing therefor, albeit tentatively, and
conditioned upon the voluntary surrender of the accused. In doing so, respondent judge indubitably
violated settled jurisprudential doctrines regarding the purpose of bail which is to secure the
temporary liberty of persons under the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of freedom.
It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on the same
date tentatively scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. To our mind, such supervening
event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve respondent judge from administrative
liability considering that he should not have accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on
behalf of persons, who at that point, were devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief
from the court.
The records reveal that at the time the application for bail was filed, the accused were, in fact, in
the enjoyment of their liberty, having evaded the long arm of the law despite the existence of standing
warrants for their arrest issued by no less than respondent Judge Antona himself.
Similarly, respondent judge is guilty of a procedural lapse in the hearing of the petition for bail
inasmuch as the order and manner of presentation of evidence in the bail hearings were flawed and
highly irregular. In the case before us, the defense adduced and presented its evidence even ahead
of the prosecution despite the unequivocal provision of the Rules to the effect that in bail petitions, the
burden of proving that the evidence of guilt is strong lies within the fence of the prosecution. The clear
import of the foregoing pronouncements is that the prosecution should be accorded all the opportunity
to adduce, submit and present proof to bolster its stand that the evidence of guilt is indeed strong so
as to warrant the denial of the petition for bail addressed to the court. Moreover, as gleaned from the
order[14] dated 04 January 1999, only the defense witnesses were issued subpoenas Ad
Testificandum to the exclusion of prosecution witnesses.
Likewise, respondent judge transgressed the Rules in view of the fact that his order dated 15
February 1999, granting the petition for bail in favor of the accused Dante Fajardo, Sr. and Filipina
Fajardo-Arce, and reducing the bail in favor of Pio Arce, Jr., failed to recite a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution. The records show that said order merely made mention and invoked as
its basis the evidence presented by the defense. Notably, respondent judges actuation is dissident to
settled doctrine on this matter that the courts order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution, otherwise the order may be invalidated because the summary of
the evidence for the prosecution, which contains the judges evaluation of the evidence, may be
considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both prosecution and the defense. [15]
To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be
consulted or heard. It is equally entitled, as the accused, to due process. [16] The concept of fairness
must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. This norm is of
 6

the very essence of due process, as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given
the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt.[17]
In the instant administrative matter, proof is extant that in the bail hearings the prosecution was
not afforded adequate opportunity within a reasonable time to present evidence within its grasp to
substantiate the degree and gravity of guilt of the accused, for purposes of resolving the bail petition.
As gleaned from the order dated 15 February 1999, respondent judge relied solely on, and made
strict mention of the evidence adduced by the defense without incorporating in said order a recital of
the evidence for the prosecution. Respondent judge ruled and concluded, albeit erroneously, that the
prosecution waived its right to adduce evidence; in effect, the prosecution was denied the opportunity
to submit all the evidence it desired to present.
Evidently, respondent judge was remiss in performing the specific duty of reciting in the subject
order the summary of evidence for the prosecution. For where the grant of bail is discretionary, as in
the instant case, the issue of whether or not an accused should be admitted to bail lies on the
strength of the prosecutions evidence as to their guilt,[18] without prejudice, however, to the right of the
defense to cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence in its own rebuttal.[19]
Worth stressing too, is that no reasonable notice was given to the prosecution regarding the
hearing of the petition for bail. As shown by the records, the order setting the 06 January 1999 bail
hearing was received by the City Prosecutor and private prosecutor on 04 January 1999 and 05
January 1999, respectively. In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion,
reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be
asked for his recommendation.[20]
Thus, in Depamaylo vs. Brotarlo,[21] the disregard by respondent judge of the mandatory three-
day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court was deemed by the High Court to
constitute undue haste:

The undue haste with which respondent judge granted bail also accounts for her disregard of the
mandatory requirement in Rule 15, Section 4 that notice of a motion must be served on all parties at
least three days in advance of the hearing.

In the same vein, despite lack of proper substantiation and presentation of documentary evidence
by the defense and over the vigorous objection of the prosecution, respondent judge allowed that
custody of the accused be transferred from the Batangas City Jail to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group, specifically under Senior Inspector Eduardo S. Villena, Chief of Prosecution
Department, on the ground of health and security reasons.
As to the charge, however, of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the court, we adopt the
findings of the Investigating Justice that no fraud, dishonesty or corruption was imputed, nor proved
by complainant; hence, respondent judge is not liable therefor.
On the same score, this Court finds no compelling evidence on record to substantiate the charge
that respondent judge deliberately violated existing doctrines and jurisprudence enunciated by the
High Court. To our mind, the procedural lapses and irregularities in the bail hearings were not
consciously, purposely, and intentionally perpetrated by respondent judge so as to render him liable
for said charge. At the most, respondent judges actuation were borne by an ignorance of the pertinent
rules and applicable jurisprudence and were not, in our considered view, products of a grand design
to deliberately perpetrate injustice.
All told, this Court once again seizes the moment to remind judges to keep abreast of the rules
and recent pronouncements of this Court, so they may evolve into more effective dispensers of
justice magistrates of the law in the truest sense of the word.
Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas

The instant administrative case for gross ignorance of the law and incompetence against
respondent judge stemmed from a murder case filed against accused Celso Docil and Juan Docil for
the death of Lucio Docena. In her sworn complaint, complainant alleged that on September 3, 1993,
Judge Gorgonio T. Alvarez of the Municipal Trial Court of Taft, Eastern Samar, conducted a
preliminary investigation on the said murder case, and thereafter issued the corresponding warrants
of arrest. No bail was recommended for the two (2) accused who were at large since the commission
of the offense on August 29, 1993.
 7

Complainant further stated that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch II, then presided by Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. The latter
allegedly granted a P60,000.00 bailbond each to both accused without conducting a hearing, and
while the two were at large. Meanwhile, accused Celso Docil was apprehended on June 4, 2000.
Subsequently, Provincial Prosecutor Vicente Catudio filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch II, now presided by respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, a motion
praying that an alias warrant of arrest be issued for the other accused, Juan Docil; and that both
accused be denied bail. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge. Thereafter, accused
Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration praying that he be allowed to post bail on the grounds
that (1) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right because he is charged with murder allegedly
committed at the time when the imposition of the death penalty was suspended by the Constitution;
and that (2) both the investigating Judge and the First Assistant Prosecutor recommended
P60,000.00 bail for his temporary liberty.
On August 11, 2000, the respondent Judge denied said motion.[4] He explained that
notwithstanding the suspension of the imposition of the death penalty at the time the accused
committed the offense, bail for the crime of murder remains to be a matter of discretion. He cited
Section 13, Article III, of the Constitution which explicitly provides that (a)ll persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The respondent Judge added that contrary to the accuseds claim, there is nothing in the records
which show that bail was recommended for his temporary liberty.
Accused Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating his previous contentions. Then,
he filed a manifestation pointing out that on page 49 of the records is an order granting him and his
co-accused the recommended bail of P60,000.00. The court gave the prosecution five (5) days within
which to file a comment to the accuseds motion for reconsideration but the former failed to do so.
On January 15, 2001, the respondent Judge issued a Resolution granting the said motion for
reconsideration on the basis of a previous order granting bail to the accused.[5]He ratiocinated that on
page 49 of the records, there indeed appears a final and executory order dated July 22, 1994 issued
by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez granting bail of P60,000.00 to the accused, hence, the
inevitable recourse is to grant bail to accused Celso Docil.
On August 16, 2001, the complainant filed the instant administrative case against the respondent
Judge for granting bail to accused Celso Docil without conducting a bail hearing.
In his Comment,[6] the respondent insisted that he committed no gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence. He contended that the prosecution is estopped from objecting to the grant of bail to
accused Celso Docil because it questioned the said order issued by his predecessor Judge only on
February 4, 2000, or after six (6) years from the issuance thereof on July 22, 1994. He added that
despite the five-day period given to the prosecution, it failed to file a comment to the motion for
reconsideration of the accused, warranting the presumption that it has no objection to the accuseds
petition for bail.
On the basis of its evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the instant
case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent Judge be fined in an
amount equivalent to one (1) month salary, with a warning that the commission of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.[7]
In a Resolution dated February 6, 2002, the Court required the parties to manifest whether they
are submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. [8]On April 24, 2002, the
respondent Judge manifested his conformity to the said Resolution.[9] The complainants
manifestation, on the other hand, was dispensed with by the Court.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail especially in cases involving offenses punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion.[10] Under the
present rules, a hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. [11] It
must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion
hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong, and the
determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains
with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a
hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.[12]
 8

In Santos v. Ofilada,[13] it was held that the failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the
part of the prosecution in an application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a bail
hearing. Thus

Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection to the granting of bail to the
accused will not justify such grant without hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the motion for bail, it is
still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from
which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused. Where the
prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court
may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the States evidence or
judge the adequacy of the amount of the bail. Irrespective of respondent judges opinion that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand that a
hearing be conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at
all justified.

Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the
accused, the respondent judge therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing
and diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was not in fact contesting the bail
application. In addition, a hearing was also necessary for the court to take into consideration the
guidelines set forth in the then Section 6, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
fixing of the amount of the bail. Only after respondent judge had satisfied himself that these
requirements have been met could he then proceed to rule on whether or not to grant bail.

Clearly therefore, the respondent Judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged belated objection of
the prosecution to the order dated July 22, 1994 issued by his predecessor, Judge Paterno T.
Alvarez; nor on the prosecutions failure to file a comment to the accuseds motion for reconsideration
of the August 11, 2000 order denying the application for bail.
It is certainly erroneous for the respondent to rely on the order of Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. As a
responsible judge, he should have looked into the real and hard facts of the case before him and
ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong.[14] To make things worse, respondent
Judge relied on the said July 22, 1994 order despite the fact that the same appears to have been
issued by his predecessor Judge also without a hearing and while the accused was at large. In
addition to the requirement of a mandatory bail hearing, respondent judge should have known the
basic rule that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition
for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. [15]
In Basco v. Rapatalo,[16] the Court laid down the following rules which outlined the duties of a
judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose
of enabling the court to exercise its discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. [17] A summary is
defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement. Based on the
summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong
enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.[18]
In the instant case, it appears that when the respondent judge initially granted the prosecutions
motion praying that the accused be denied bail, no hearing was conducted.Irrespective of his opinion
on the strength or weakness of evidence of the accuseds guilt, he should have conducted a hearing
 9

and thereafter made a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing
and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due
process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of
bail.[19]
The indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail has always been ardently and
indefatigably stressed by the Court. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to the
law and maintain professional competence. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic
legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence
exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the
Rule of Law.[20]
In Dericto v. Bautista,[21] the Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the respondent Judge for
granting bail without conducting a bail hearing. We explained therein that although the Rules of Court
authorize the investigating judge to determine the amount of bail, such authority does not include the
outright granting of bail without a preliminary hearing on the matter, more so in cases where the crime
charged is punishable with death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. And while it may be true
that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion,
this discretion lies not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the
appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the prosecutions evidence of guilt against the accused.
In Goodman v. De La Victoria,[22] the erring Judge was found guilty of serious misconduct in office
and ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for failing to conduct a bail hearing in the manner required by
law. It was held that the brief inquiry conducted by the said Judge before granting bail did not
constitute the hearing mandated by law, for such proceeding did not elicit evidence from the
prosecution to guide respondent in the proper determination of the petition.
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores,[23] the Court sustained the recommendation of the OCA to impose
the penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 on the erring judge for granting bail without hearing to
the accused in a rape case.
In Cabatingan, Sr. v. Arcueno,[24] the Court imposed the penalty of fine of 15,000.00 on the
investigating Judge for denying bail on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In said case, the accused
was arrested in the municipality presided by the respondent judge. The Court ruled that the latter had
the authority to grant bail and to order the release of the accused, even if the records of the case had
been transmitted for review to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The Court further noted therein
that the respondent Judge was previously found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and ordered to
pay a fine of P5,000.00, when without a hearing, he granted bail to an accused charged with a capital
offense.
In the following cases, the Court imposed a P20,000.00 fine on the Judges found to be grossly
ignorant of the rules and procedures in granting or denying bail, to wit:

(1) Manonggiring v. Ibrahim,[25] where the respondent Judge, in violation of Rule 114, Section 17(b),
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, granted bail to the accused in a criminal case which was
then pending with another branch involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death;

(2) Panganiban v. Cupin-Tesorero,[26] where the erring Municipal Trial Court Judge who conducted
the preliminary investigation granted bail to the accused (a) without jurisdiction and in violation of
Rule 114, Section 17a, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the corresponding Information
against the accused being pending with the Regional Trial Court; (b) without notice to the prosecutor
of the request to approve the bail bond in violation of Rule 114, Section 18; and (c) without
conducting a bail hearing;

(3) Tabao v. Barataman,[27] and Comia v. Antona,[28] where the Judges concerned entertained an
application for bail even though the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.

(4) Layola v. Gabo, Jr.,[29] where a Regional Trial Court Judge granted bail in a murder case without
the requisite bail hearing.
 10

The record shows that this is not the first administrative case of the respondent Judge. In a
decision promulgated on April 17, 2001, in RTJ-01-1627, he was found guilty of gross inefficiency for
failure to resolve a civil case within the three-month reglementary period and consequently ordered to
pay a fine of P5,000.00. For this second infraction, respondent Judge deserves a heavier penalty.
Enrile v. Salazar,
In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime Salazar. Said crime
arose from the failed coup attempts against then president Corazon Aquino. There was no bail set for
Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime charged against him. Enrile was then brought to Camp
Karingal. Enrile later filed a petition for habeas corpus questioning his detention and alleging that the
crime being charged against him is nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People
vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot be complexed with common crimes such as
murder; as such, the proper crime that should have been charged against him is simple rebellion
which is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. He claimed
that it only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the case to him) to
issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that such period is so short that it was impossible for the judge to
have been able to examine the voluminous record of the case from the prosecutions office that
being, the constitutional provision that a judge may only issue a warrant of arrest after personally
determining the existence of probable cause has not been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandezruling should be abandoned and
that it should be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes like murder.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned.
2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case at bar.
HELD:
1. No, the said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was actually a
previous law (P.D. 942) which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law provided that
graver crimes may not be complexed with rebellion. However, President Corazon Aquino repealed
said law (by virtue of the power granted to her by the 1986 Freedom Constitution). That being, the
Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law under the Revised Penal Code, still stands. The
courts cannot change this because courts can only interpret laws. Only Congress can change the
rebellion law (which the SC suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it stands,
Enrile is correct, there is no such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are
absorbed. He can only be charged with rebellion which is bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour and twenty minutes
to issue the warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite the fact that the prosecution
transmitted quite a voluminous record from the preliminary investigation it conducted. It is sufficient
that the judge follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some might consider
only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he
had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the
legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

Enrile v. Sandiganbayan,

Primary objective of bail The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective
of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987
Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
 11

FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on
the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam.
Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On
July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary
surrender.Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of
his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would
only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and
physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable
byreclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be
punishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

HELD:
1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of innocence.

Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional
right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail
should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than
what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:

Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong.Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the
court.

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

 12

Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application
for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided
it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial
court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty
during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional
Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion

perpetuasubject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: [S]uch
discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the
accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with
notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

2. YES.

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

 13

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community arising
from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and for
detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting
fromGovernment of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These
remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused
during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced
age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to
Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676

FACTS:
Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious
illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum penalty of death in both cases by the Regional
Trial Court.
The private complainant Mia Taha allegedly said that her teacher Danny Godoy(Appellant) by means
of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, have carnal Knowledge with
her and kidnap or detained her, for a period of five (5).
The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.
His defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote by the complainant (Mia
Taha) to the accused and the same was corroborated by the testimonies of the defense witnesses.

ISSUES:
Can Godoy be convicted of rape and kidnapping with illegal detention?

RULING:
No. They were in fact lovers.
This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the
nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt
as to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the
prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt and the accused must be acquitted.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence
presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are: (1)while rape is a most detestable crime,
and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation
easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though
innocent;(2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) that the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
 14

In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate and ineluctably convince
this Court that there was no rape committed on the alleged date and place, and that the charge of
rape was the contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual
wrong.
The challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court below made no serious effort
to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the prosecution in spite of the
teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must not be
accepted with precipitate credulity. In finding that the crime of rape was committed, the lower court
took into account only that portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the incident and
conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to believe that she was indeed
raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her testimony concerning the events which
transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or declined to
appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed.
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. In the present charge for that crime, such
intent has not at all been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact that the Taha
spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted, several grave and
irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on
the guilt of appellant.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are
strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their
reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character
humiliates their entire families. It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save face in
the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's
indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the
scenario of this rape drama.

People v. Villaran, 269 SCRA 630

ERLINDA VILLARAN y FERNANDEZ was found guilty of murder and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. She was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00.[1]
The Information charged that in the evening of 10 October 1990 in Olongapo City the accused,
with intent to kill, feloniously induced one Danilo C. Ong, her live-in partner, to eat pan de
sal containing sodium cyanide, a poisonous substance, which caused his death.[2]
There was no eyewitness, nay, not a scintilla of proof, to the alleged inducement of Danilo by
Erlinda to eat the "poisoned" bread. The prosecution relied mainly on circumstantial evidence to
establish her guilt.
Through the testimonies of Francisco Ong, Richard Patilano and Felicisima Francisco the
prosecution tried to establish that on 10 October 1990, at about nine-thirty in the evening, Pat.
Francisco Ong, younger brother of Danilo, was relaxing in his house when the accused Erlinda
Villaran appeared and informed him that his brother was ill. Erlinda narrated to him that she was
awakened when Danilo arrived from work that evening. Since it was rather late she simply advised
him to lie down and sleep. Shortly thereafter she was surprised to see Danilo frothing,
shivering. Francisco asked why she did not rush Danilo to the hospital and she replied that she could
not carry him. When Francisco further asked why she did not seek help from her neighbors instead of
going all the way to his house, which was rather far, she answered that her neighbors were reluctant
and uncooperative.
Francisco then accompanied Erlinda back to her house where Danilo was. He checked the pulse
of Danilo. There was hardly any pulsebeat. With the help of Alfredo Lugto, a neighbor, they brought
Danilo to the hospital.
While in the emergency room a doctor asked Erlinda whether Danilo ate or took anything. She
replied that she did not see him take anything. As first aid was being administered to Danilo his
dentures were removed by Francisco upon request of one of the doctors. Franciso claimed that he
 15

smelled a strong and distinct odor from the dentures and recalled smelling something strikingly similar
back at the house of Danilo and Erlinda.
Francisco claimed that Erlinda acted strangely at the hospital. According to him, it was odd for
Erlinda to remain outside the hospital all the while that Danilo was in the emergency room, seemingly
unaffected by the seriousness of his condition. Moreover, when Danilo died some thirty (30) minutes
after, she initially refused to keep watch over his body so that Francisco could leave and notify his
other brothers and sisters of Danilo's demise, although she relented upon Francisco's insistence.
On their way home to get clothes for Danilo, Francisco asked Erlinda whether his brother had
eaten or taken anything before going to sleep that evening, as he believed that Danilo could not have
died without having taken something toxic. Erlinda told him later that she saw a big bag of pan de
sal on top of their table.
Upon reaching the house of the live-in partners, Francisco immediately proceeded to the sink
where he saw the bag of bread mentioned by Erlinda. He sniffed the bread and, according to him,
he noted the same pungent odor he sensed when he removed the dentures of Danilo. Francisco then
brought the pan de sal to Dr. Richard Patilano, medico-legal officer of the Olongapo City General
Hospital, who advised him to have the bread examined by the NBI. The following day, forensic
chemist Felicisima Francisco of the NBI conducted a laboratory examination of the pan de sal. The
examination revealed traces of sodium cyanide.[3]
Meanwhile, the cadaver of Danilo was autopsied by Dr. Richard Patilano. Samples of the pan de
sal were taken to the NBI which found that they contained sodium cyanide. [4] From the
particles of the pan de sal recovered from the victim's body, Dr. Patilano ascertained the cause of
death to be chemical poisoning.[5] The results of both tests confirmed the conclusion of Dr. Patilano.[6]
Pat. Francisco Ong also testified that the last time he talked to Danilo was in the morning of the
day he died. On that occasion Danilo confided to him that he had several quarrels with Erlinda
because of her forthcoming tryst with her negro boyfriend who was supposed to arrive shortly.
Testifying in her defense Erlinda, without detracting much from the facts presented by the
prosecution, gave a more detailed account of what happened that night. She said she was asleep
when she was awakened by some noise coming from the lavatory. She sat on her bed and waited for
a while. A few minutes later, Danilo came out from the lavatory. He asked her where Jimmy Ong
was. She told Danilo that she had in fact fallen asleep waiting for Jimmy but he did not arrive. Jimmy
is a nephew of Danilo who was living with them. Then Danilo told her that he would just lie down
where Jimmy usually slept, which was not far from where Erlinda was.
After some five (5) minutes, Erlinda heard moans emanating from the direction of Danilo. She did
not mind the moaning at first. But he continued. It was only then that she moved closer to Danilo. She
found the latter already unconscious. She tried to revive him. She switched on the light. She saw
Danilo soaking wet and perspiring profusely. She ran out of the house to seek help but no one
responded including their landlord. When she noticed the tricycle of Alfredo Lugto parked in front of
his house she knocked at the door, opened it and went straight inside. But her plea for assistance
was met with a blank stare, an unconcerned attitude from the Lugto household. She returned home
and found Danilo momentarily regaining consciousness. She repeated her appeal to Lugto, even just
to call Danilo's brother Francisco, but sensing Alfredo's reluctance she decided to go directly to
Francisco.
At Francisco's residence, Erlinda explained to Francisco the condition of his brother. Hurriedly,
Erlinda returned to her house together with Francisco. Shocked to see Danilo almost lifeless,
Francisco started shouting, "shit, shit," as Erlinda went straight to the lavatory to urinate. They then
brought Danilo to the Olongapo City General Hospital.Erlinda stayed outside the emergency room
and prayed. She was uneasy; her knees were trembling. Then Francisco told her that Danilo was
dead.
Erlinda denied that there was any feud between her and Danilo and that she was slapped by
Danilo during a supposed pot session, as claimed by Francisco. She asserted that everything was
fine with her and Danilo and so was her relationship with his brothers and sisters.
The crux of the controversy is whether the evidence of the prosecution - which was mainly
circumstantial - was sufficient to support the conviction of accused-appellant. She contends that the
trial court erred in convicting her of murder on the basis merely of circumstantial evidence since the
prosecution failed to satisfy all the requisites for conviction based thereon.[7]
 16

We agree with Erlinda; hence, we acquit her. Circumstantial evidence to warrant conviction must
constitute an unbroken chain of events that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime,[8] i.e., the circumstances proved
must be congruent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused, and at the
same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. [9] Logically it is here - where the
evidence is purely inferential - that there should be an even greater need than usual to apply with
vigor the rules that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the defense and that any
conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty on the guilt of the accused. [10] Likewise, it
is also in the absence of direct evidence indubitably showing that accused-appellant was the
perpetrator of the killing that motive becomes important.[11]
Significantly, a key element in the web of circumstantial evidence is motive, which the prosecution
vainly tried to establish.[12] The trial court merely relied on the testimony of Francisco Ong in deducing
that the reason for the killing of Danilo was that he stood in the way of the relationship of accused-
appellant and her boyfriend. But whatever testimony given in open court by Francisco Ong regarding
the quarrels between accused-appellant and Danilo could only be hearsay hence inadmissible in
evidence -
Apparently, the alleged altercation between appellant and the deceased that was intended to provide
the motive was at best secondhand evidence, hence worthless. What was proved was the colloquy
between Francisco and the deceased, not the fact that an argument took place between the latter and
the accused. When evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without
any evidentiary weight being patently hearsay.[14]
In reaching its verdict, the trial court considered various circumstantial evidence culled almost
entirely from the testimony of the deceased's brother Francisco Ong, and from which the motive
behind the crime was apparently inferred. These circumstances, reiterated by the prosecution in its
Appellee's Brief, are (a) that Danilo died of poisoning as a result of having eaten pan de
sal containing sodium cyanide which was found on the table in the kitchen of appellant and the victim;
(b) that at the time the poisoning occurred only appellant and the deceased were in the house; (c)
that the victim was a tricycle driver who had no quarrel with his fellow tricycle drivers nor with his
neighbors, thereby ruling out any motive to kill him on the part of any third party; (d) that prior to the
poisoning, appellant and the victim had been quarrelling very often because of the supposedarrival of
her negro boyfriend; (e) that when the victim's mouth was already frothing appellant did nothing to
take him immediately to the hospital but resorted to delaying medical attendance by first proceeding
to the house of the victim's brother located at a far distance; (f) that appellant's excuse that she could
not take Danilo to the hospital because she could not carry him was too shallow to justify her
"strange" demeanor; (g) that while the victim was being given first aid treatment at the hospital
appellant seemed unperturbed; (h) that appellant showed lack of concern for the victim when she
displayed her reluctance to watch over his remains and enable his brother to notify the other
members of their family; and, (i) that appellant did not attend the wake for a day because her
boyfriend supposedly arrived and was seen with her, and that later she had much money in her
wallet.
We have carefully examined the records to determine, in the absence of direct evidence, if the
circumstances singled out by the court a quo indeed support its inference that Erlinda killed
Danilo. But, without much polemics, we conclude that the circumstances which the prosecution
capitalized on to establish the criminal liability of the accused are miserably inadequate in weight and
value required by the Rules.
This is especially true when the veracity of such circumstances is open to question, [15] which is so
in this case. The circumstances that the victim had no quarrel with his fellow tricycle drivers as well as
with his neighbors, and that prior to the poisoning the appellant and the victim had been quarrelling
over the expected arrival of appellant's boyfriend are plainly hearsay and consequently cannot be
admitted. Moreover, we are not at all convinced in the reasoning of the trial court that -

x x x x The victim and the accused were living alone in the said house at No. 77, 14th St., New
Kalalake, Olongapo City until two weeks before the victim's death and they were joined by the victim's
nephew Jimmy Ong. Strangely, however, on the evening of the incident, Jimmy Ong was not in the
house.

Immediately after the accused found the victim moaning and suffering and was seen with his mouth
frothing with saliva and convulsing, the accused instead of taking the victim to the hospital and asking
 17

the neighbor's help for that purpose did not do anything of that sort claiming that the caretaker of the
house was not around and that the neighbor Alfredo Lugto or anybody else in the immediate vicinity
were not willing to help. Significantly, however, that it was the same Alfredo Lugto who took her on
board of his tricycle to the residence of Francisco Ong, a place which is quite far from the place of the
incident. And that must have been the reason why Francisco Ong was asking the questions why he
did not bring Danilo Ong to the hospital, why he did not ask for the neighbors' help and why he did not
insist that the neighbors help her in bringing Danilo Ong to the hospital. The accused gave the lame
excuse that he cannot (sic) bring Danilo Ong to thehospital because she is (sic) only a woman and
that the neighbors whose help she has (sic) asked all refused to give help. But Alfredo Lugtu whom
the accused claims was not willing to help was the same person who took her in his tricycle in going
to the house of Francisco Ong.

The actuations of the accused while in the hospital indicate her culpability and involvement in the
poisoning of Danilo Ong. While Danilo Ong was being treated in the emergency room of the
Olongapo City General hospital, the accused made herself scarce by staying outside of the premises
and was seen merely talking to the people outside. After Danilo Ong died, when she was asked by
Francisco Ong to watch over the deceased in the hospital so that Francisco Ong can fetch his
brothers and sisters, the accused refused to be near the deceased claiming that she was afraid. And
then again, during the wake of the deceased she was for one whole day nowhere to be found. And
when she came back on the day of the burial she has been seen with so much money in her wallet. In
the evening of the day of the wake she was according to the NBI report having conversation in
English with an unidentified man x x x x[16]

There is nothing unusual about the fact that no one else was present in the house that fateful
evening except the deceased and appellant, and that Danilo's nephew Jimmy Ong who was a
member of the household was not around. Anyone could have entered the premises since the door of
the house was always left open. Even if it were true that the deceased had no known friction with his
fellow tricycle drivers - although this was not sufficiently and competently established - it cannot be
discounted that Danilo may have unknown enemies who with some evil design enticed him to eat pan
de sal that was adulterated with sodium cyanide. In other words, the victim himself could have
brought the poisoned bread from outside, or even ate part of it on the way home, which was not
remote.
In attempting to pin down Erlinda, the prosecution would point out that she tarried in bringing the
deceased to the hospital; that she claimed that no one was willing to help her when in fact it was
the same neighbor Alfredo Lugto who took her to Francisco's house and that she behaved
indifferently and insensitively while Danilo was in the emergency room. In this regard, we can only
say that the workings of a human mind when under stress are unpredictable; [17] different people react
differently to different situations, and there is no standard norm of human response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.[18] Some people may have the presence of
mind and immediately think of bringing the victim to the hospital, while others may feel helpless and
do nothing or be dependent on others. At that time, Erlinda's concern was to find out what was wrong
with the deceased. She believed that Pat. Francisco Ong being a police officer was in a better
position to know what to do under the circumstances.
The NBI report[19] showing that Erlinda was nowhere in sight for one whole day during the wake,
and that she was seen with so much cash and having a conversation in English with an unidentified
man should likewise be struck down for being hearsay as it could not be tested by cross-
examination.[20] The NBI agent who conducted the investigation should have been presented in open
court to testify on the report,[21] otherwise, the admission of the report would be a violation of the
constitutional right of the accused to confront the witness against her and to cross-examine him.[22]
Indeed the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are too inadequate for conviction having
miserably failed to meet the criteria herein set forth. The presumption of innocence must be overcome
by the prosecution with proof beyond reasonable doubt, and every circumstance favoring her
innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against her must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that
on the defendant can be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did she
perpetrate the act but that the act also amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty.[23]
 18

The only piece of evidence that would otherwise link the accused directly to the death of Danilo
was that which could prove that she killed him so that she could carry on a relationship with her negro
friend. But such was not proved at the trial and, as we have aptly held, where the weakest link in the
chain of evidence is at the same time the most vital circumstance, there can be no alternative but to
acquit the accused.[24]
We can only speculate at this stage on how Danilo Ong met his death for there is absolutely
nothing on record that can provide us with anything better than what has heretofore been surmised.
Nonetheless, we cannot write finis to this ponencia without addressing an appeal to law enforcement
agencies for the exercise of utmost diligence, extreme care and professionalism in their investigatory
work; to the prosecution, in the preparation, presentation and submission of evidence; and, to the trial
court, in its evaluation of the case before it. The lukewarm stance and miniscule circumspection
exhibited in this case hardly speak well of the manner in which this case has been handled, starting
from the initial phase of the investigation and even up to the court proceedings stage. [
People v. Urzais, G.R. No. 207662,

Frank Karim Langaman and his girlfriend Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes were at Meyland Village,
Meycauayan, Bulacan, in the evening of February 18, 2007, aboard Frank's motorcycle, a green
Honda Wave 125 with Plate No. NQ 8724, registered under the name of Jacqueline Corpuz
Langaman. When they were about to leave the place, two (2) men, both wearing jackets and bonnets
suddenly approached them, followed by a third man who was earlier standing at a post. One of the
three men held Frank by the neck and shot Frank causing the latter to fall down. The same man
pointed his gun at Kathlyn and demanded that she give him her cellphone. After Kathlyn gave her
cellphone, the same man hit her on the back. Thereafter, Kathlyn pretended to be unconscious and
saw that the men searched the body of Frank for any valuables. While the incident was taking place,
the second man took Frank's motorcycle, while the third man, herein appellant, just stood to guard
them and acted as the look-out. Afterwards, the three men left together riding Frank's motorcycle. It
was then that Kathlyn was able to seek help and Frank was taken to the hospital.

According to Dr. Gene Patrick De Leon, Frank sustained a gunshot injury traversing the neck area
which necessitated surgery. Eventually, Frank died on the 27th post-operative day or on March 30,
2007. The cause of Frank's death was "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to the spinal cord injury
with retained metallic foreign body secondary conjunction injury status post the surgery done which is
laminectomy infusion with rods and screws," as shown in the Post-Mortem Certificate.

Thus, an Information was filed against appellant, Richard Lalata and a certain John Doe charging
them of violation of R.A. No. 6539, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of February, 2007, in the City of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
gun, by means of violence and intimidation, with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away with them one Honda Wave 125 motorcycle with Plate No. NQ
8724 valued at 59,000.00 belonging to Jacqueline Corpuz [Langaman], to her damage and
prejudice in the aforesaid amount of 59,000.00, and by reason or on the occasion of the commission
of the said carnapping act, the said accused in furtherance of their conspiracy and with intent to kill
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Frank Karim
Langaman with the gun they were then provided, hitting the latter on his neck which caused his
death.

Appellant pleaded "not guilty" during his arraignment and after the pre-trial ended, the trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jacqueline Langaman, Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes,
Dr. Gene Patrick De Leon and SPO 1 Hernan Roble Berciles, Jr.

Appellant, on the other hand, testified in his defense and denied the charges against him claiming
that on February 18, 2007, he fetched his cousin Richard Lalata before proceeding to his father
Eming Macaranas' house at Brgy. Lawa, where they usually eat and sleep. According to him, they left
early in the morning of the following day' and just slept the whole day at their house in Brgy.
Daungan. Thereafter, sometime in June, 2007, barangay officials arrested him and claimed that they
 19

beat and mauled him in order to admit that he killed Frank, and under coercion, he pointed to his
cousin Richard Lalata as the perpetrator.

The RTC, in its decision, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and
disposed the case, as follows:

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch79, Malolos, Bulacan, dated 22 August 2012 is
hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:

Appellant insists that the trial court and the CA committed an error in giving full credence to the
testimony of the lone witness and in rejecting his defense of denial and alibi.

R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as the taking,
with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using force upon things. 5 By the amendment
in Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:

SEC. 14. Penally for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be
punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation
of persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four
months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof (Emphasis supplied)

Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act: (1) the
penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the
change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of thecommissionof the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof" This thirdamendment clarifies the law's intent to make the
offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal
Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of
Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of
carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the
original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on theoccasion thereof" Consequently, where the
elements of carnapping are notproved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be
applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal
Code.6

"There is no arguing that the anti-camapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery
and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law
with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit:
unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the
latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of
motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with
intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of
force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall
within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment of said
statute."7

So, essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle and it becomes qualified or
aggravated when, in the course of the commission or on the occasion of the carnapping, the owner,
driver or occupant is killed or raped. 8 As we have ruled in People v. Mejia: 9
 20

The killing or the rape merely qualifies the crime of carnapping x x x and no distinction must be made
between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other which is committed "in the course of
carnapping or on the occasion thereof' makes no difference insofar as the penalty is concerned.

It is similar to the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and in People v. Bariquit, 10 it was
ruled that:

In the present case, the accused-appellants were charged with, tried, and convicted for the crime of
robbery with homicide. In our jurisdiction, this special complex crime is primarily classified as a crime
against property and not against persons, homicide being a mere incident of the robbery with the
latter being the main purpose and object of the criminal.

Under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons.
Accordingly, inasmuch as robbery with homicide is a crime against property and not against persons,
cannot treachery be validly considered in the present case.

Thus, the elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under R.A. No. 6539, as amended are
the following:

1) That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2) That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;

3) That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and

4) That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. 11

Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. No. 6539, as amended, the prosecution has to prove
the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more
importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the
killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof." 12 In other words, to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there
must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 13

In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution show that there were two (2) men both wearing jackets and bonnets, together with the
appellant who approached the victim and the witness Kathlyn and employed force and intimidation
upon them and thereafter forcibly took the victim's motorcycle and then shot the victim on the neck
causing his death.

Appellant argues that the RTC, as well as the CA, erred in appreciating the testimony of the lone
witness of the prosecution because of its inconsistencies and the improbability of her imputations.

This Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witness[es],
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. 14 From
its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of
witness[es]. 15 The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even
more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the
findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute grave abuse of discretion. 16

Anent appellant's defense of denial and alibi, this Court has consistently ruled that denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence, which
deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimonies of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters22 and that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime 23during its
 21

commission.24 In correctly ruling that the defense of denial and alibi of appellant is inconsequential,
the CA stated the following:

In the face of the serious accusation, accused-appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and
alibi to prove his innocence.1wphi1 Time and again, this Court held that denial is an inherently weak
defense and has always been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it
can be concocted. Inherently weak, denial as a defense crumbles in the in the light of positive
identification of the accused-appellant, as in this case. The defense of denial assumes significance
only when the prosecution's evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
which is not the case here. Verily, mere denial, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative self-serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of
the prosecution witness who testified on affirmative matters. The Court finds inadequate the accused-
appellant's defense of alibi absent any credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, to
exculpate him of the crime charged. 25

As to the imposable penalty under Section 14 of RA No. 6539, as amended, it is provided that:

Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished
by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen
years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons,
or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not
more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall
be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

Thus, the RTC did not commit an error in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua considering that
there was no alleged and provenaggravating circumstance. In line, however, with the recent
jurisprudence,26 in cases of special complex crimes like carnapping with homicide, among others,
where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua,the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages,
and exemplary damages are pegged at 75,000.00 each. The appellant is also ordered to pay
50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the award of 25,000.00 as actual damages to the
private complainant.27 All the other dispositions of the CA stays.

People v. Navarrete

Sotero Navarrete was charged on September 5, 1972 before the Court of First Instance of Manila, for
having raped his own daughter, Elizabeth Navarrete, allegedly committed as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That sometime in the third week of August, 1972, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there pulling the arms of Elizabeth Navarrete y
de Guia, taking off her clothes and panty, forcibly laying her on bed and touching and kissing her
private parts, threatening to kill her with a sharp pointed instrument should she resist, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said Elizabeth Navarrete y de
Guia, against her will and consent.

"Contrary to law" (Exh. C, p. 1, Folder of Exhibits).

Upon arraignment on September 15, 1972, the accused entered a plea of "not guilty."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The Trial court, presided then by Honorable Juan L. Bocar, after due trial, rendered its judgment on
February 13, 1973, the dispositive portion of which is worded thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape and
sentences him to suffer imprisonment of not less than twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum
and twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P10,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs" (p.
 22

13, rec.).

From this judgment, the accused Sotero Navarrete interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. On
May 3,1976, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which reads in part as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We find that the guilt of the appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

"Article 335 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for rape. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Act,
this Court has no jurisdiction to impose this penalty.

"WHEREFORE, let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for final
determination. The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to certify the case immediately to the Supreme
Court" (p. 113, rec.).

In accordance with the aforequoted decision of the Court of Appeals, the case was certified to this
Court and the same was submitted for decision on May 26, 1976.

It must be noted at the outset that in the case of People v. Daniel (L-40330, 86 SCRA 511, November
20, 1978), the Supreme Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, declared
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Henceforth, should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion
perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed in any criminal case appealed to it where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion perpetua the said Court, with a comprehensive written
analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved, render judgment expressly and explicitly
imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances warrant, refrain from
entering judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to this court for
review" (Emphasis supplied).chanrobles law library

In that case, the trial court imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal on the accused for the crime of
rape. The Court of Appeals, however, recommended that the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed and certified the case to this Court. The accused was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua by this Court.

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals in its decision dated May 3, 1976, affirmed the decision of
the trial court finding the accused guilty of the crime charged but certified the case to this Court with
the recommendation that the penalty of reclusion perpetua be imposed . The case was submitted for
decision on May 26, 1976.

While the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in consonance with the procedural ruling of this
Tribunal in People v. Daniel, nevertheless We assume jurisdiction rather than remand the case to the
Court of Appeals because the case was decided and certified to this Court on May 3, 1976, before
the ruling in the case of People v. Daniel was made interpreting Section 34 of the Judiciary Act.
Besides, this would avoid the unnecessary and time-wasting shuttling of the case between the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals especially so if the right of the accused to speedy trial is to
be considered.

The ruling in People v. Daniel should therefore be given prospective effect so that beginning
November 20, 1978, should the Court of Appeals in criminal cases pending before it be of the opinion
that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua should be imposed where the penalty meted by the
trial court is less than reclusion perpetua it should follow the directive of this Court in the Daniel case
as aforequoted. On the other hand, those certified criminal cases already pending decision before this
Court, like the present case, at the time People v. Daniel was decided on November 20, 1978, should
be outrightly decided, rather than remanded to the Court of Appeals.

(Note: However, in People v. Traya [89 SCRA 274 (1979)], a certified criminal case, decided on
March 30, 1979, per Justice Guerrero, this Court [1st Division, invoking the directive in People v.
 23

Daniel, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for rendition of the proper judgment. In that case,
the trial court imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, believing
that the penalty should be reclusion perpetua refrained from rendering judgment and certified the
case to this Court. As per records, the case was certified by the Court of Appeals on April 3, 1978 and
submitted for decision on April 12, 1978; hence before the directive in the Daniel case).

II

The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of Elizabeth Navarrete the rape
victim, Caridad de Guia, the mother of the victim, Pat. Vifedio Guillen, and Dr. Abelardo V. Lucero,
the Medico-Legal Officer, and Exhibits "A", the crime report; "A-1", the-booking sheet and arrest
report; "A-2", the sworn statement of Elizabeth Navarrete; "B", medical certificate issued by Dr.
Abelardo Lucero; "C", complaint signed by Elizabeth Navarrete; "C-1", the signature of Elizabeth
Navarrete appearing on the complaint; "C-2", the signature of Fiscal Leonardo L. Arguelles before
whom the complaint was sworn by the victim; "D", the Medico Legal report of Dr. Abelardo Lucero;
"E", the marriage contract of Sotero Navarrete and Caridad de Guia; and "E-1", the marriage license.
The evidence for the defense rested mainly on the testimony of the accused, Sotero
Navarrete.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

From the evidence, it appears that Elizabeth Navarrete is the daughter of the accused, Sotero
Navarrete and his wife, Caridad de Guia. Elizabeth, who was a first year high school student, was
only 15 years old when she became the victim of the crime alleged in the complaint. At the time of her
birth, her parents were merely living together in common-law relationship although they subsequently
got married on November 20, 1957 (Exh. "E", p. 36, Folder of Exhibits). Sometime in 1959, two years
after their marriage, Elizabeths parents separated. Her mother was then pregnant and later gave
birth to her other sister, Emma Navarette. Thereafter, Elizabeth and her sister lived with their mother
at 310 Antipolo Street, Sampaloc, Manila, while their father, the accused, lived somewhere in Balic-
Balic, Sampaloc, sometimes with his friends and sometimes with his parents. (pp. 9-11, 13 t.s.n.,
Nov. 3, 1972; p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 10, 1972). It appears also that the accused was convicted for
homicide sometime in 1959, for which he was imprisoned for eleven (11) years [pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Dec. 8,
1972; p. 3, t.s.n., Jan. 29, 1973]. When he was released from prison in 1970 (p. 8, t.s.n., Dec. 8,
1972), he discovered that his wife was living with another man (p. 4. 4, t.s.n., Jan. 29, 1973), but this
notwithstanding, he occasionally visited his two daughters, Elizabeth and Emma (pp. 11, 113, t.s.n.,
Nov. 3, 1972).

The evidence further revealed that in one of his visits which took place on or about the third week of
August, 1972, the accused invited his daughter Elizabeth to a birthday party somewhere in Loreto
Street; Sampaloc, Elizabeth gladly accepted the invitation and willingly went with her father,
unmindful of his evil designs. They rode in a passenger jeepney but they did not go down in Loreto
Street and instead proceeded to Quiapo. Upon reaching their destination, they got off the jeepney
and the accused brought his daughter to the New Star Hotel in Quiapo. When asked why they were
entering that Hotel, the accused told his daughter that he was going to fetch a friend who is waiting
for him and who will also attend the party. Believing her father, Elizabeth followed him in going up the
stairs inside the hotel. Then the accused paid a Chinese woman after which he entered a room and
asked his daughter to come inside. Once inside, Elizabeth asked her father why they were there. She
also asked him about his friend whom he was going to fetch. Her father did not say anything but
simply laughed. After closing the door, the accused started to remove his clothes. At this point,
Elizabeth became apprehensive already. When the accused had removed his clothes, he approached
Elizabeth and told her to undress but she refused to do so. The accused became angry and
threatened to kill her, her sister and mother if she did not do as she was told. Then the accused held
her arms and pulled her towards the bed and removed her dress. Elizabeth cried and she lost her
strength and composure. The accused fondled her body and kissed her cheek, neck, breast and her
private parts. She struggled and resisted her fathers advances but she could not do anything
 24

because he was holding her hands. Elizabeth just kept on crying. He succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with his daughter and she felt pain in her private parts. Soon thereafter, he withdrew his
private part from hers when she continued to cry. Then both of them dressed up without talking to
each other and the accused brought his daughter back home. Elizabeth narrated the harrowing
incident to her aunt, Estrella Navarrete, the next day. Her aunt, who is a half-sister of her father and
only 16 years old, could only shake her head. Elizabeth asked for advice but her aunt was also afraid
because the same thing might happen to her (pp. 13-17, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1972; pp. 3-6, t.s.n., Dec. 4,
1972).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

The accused visited Elizabeth on August 28, 1972 at about 6:00 oclock in the evening to ask if she
had informed anybody about the incident at the hotel and she answered in the negative. The accused
came again the next day at about 5:30 in the afternoon to inform Elizabeth that he was going to rent a
room so that he will not pay anymore for a hotel room. In the afternoon of the following day, the
accused came back to tell his daughter that he had rented a place near the Balic-Balic church and
invited her. He threatened his daughter that something drastic will happen to her if she will not come
to his place. That same afternoon, Elizabeth and her sister, Emma, went to the aforesaid place
accompanied by the accused. Arriving at the place, the accused and his two daughters cleaned the
surroundings. Afterwards, he brought them home and asked them to come again on the 31st of
August (pp. 18-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1972).

At about 10:30 in the evening of August 31, 1972, the accused fetched his two daughters and brought
them to his place. When the two were already asleep, Elizabeth was awakened by her father as he
was getting up and later she felt that he was inserting his hand inside her T-shirt. She stood up and
her father told her that he was again feeling the sex urge. The accused held her by the arm and
pulled her to a wooden bed. He undressed himself and Elizabeth started to cry knowing what her
father would do to her again. Then the accused removed the T-shirt and underwear of his daughter.
Thereafter, he held her hands and placed himself on top of her and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse. Elizabeth tried to resist by closing her legs but the accused was able to open her legs by
means of his legs also. Moreover, she could not do anything because she was afraid of the knife that
was shown to her by the accused and placed on top of the table. Elizabeth just kept on crying
throughout her ordeal. After satisfying his lust, the accused fell asleep and Elizabeth dressed up and
waited for morning. That following morning, Elizabeth and her sister were able to go home (pp. 20-23,
t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1972).

The accused invited Elizabeth again to his place and succeeded in abusing her in the afternoon of
September 1, 1972. As in the previous occasion, she went to his place because she was told that
something drastic would happen to her if she did not come. Subsequently, on September 3, 1972 at
about 6:00 oclock in the evening, the accused came and asked his daughter to go to his place but
she refused. He became mad and left. At about 1:00 oclock in the early morning of September 4,
1972, he returned drunk and with a companion. The accused asked Elizabeth why she did not like to
sleep anymore in his place. She told him that she was already having difficulty or moral conflict
because of what he was doing to her. But he told his daughter that he would come and drag her to his
place if she did not come at about 8:30 in the evening of that day. Then Elizabeth started crying. Her
mother noticed her but did not talk to her at that moment. When morning came, her mother asked her
why she was crying and she finally narrated what her father did to her. Upon learning what happened,
her mother became sad and declared that if it were not only a sin she would kill the accused. In the
afternoon of that day, September 4, 1972, Elizabeth and her mother went to Police Precinct No. 3 to
file a complaint. Elizabeth gave her statement in writing (pp. 23-26, t.s.n., November 3, 1972). She
was later physically examined by Dr. Abelardo Lucero, Medico Legal Officer, who submitted his
findings, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2. Newly healed laceration in the hymen at 6:00 oclock position. The edges are thin and reversible.
 25

"3. Introitus vagina admits one adult finger easily but could hardly admit 2 fingers" (Exhs. "B", "D", pp.
35, 20, Folder of Exhibits).

The appellant, in his brief filed by his counsel de officio, Atty. Virgilio S. Castro, alleged that the trial
court committed an error in finding him guilty of the crime of rape.

There is no question that the appellant had carnal knowledge with his daughter, Elizabeth Navarrete;
but in avoidance, he claims that there was no force or intimidation employed and therefore he is not
guilty of the crime charged.

The contention of the appellant does not find support in the evidence on record. There is sufficient
evidence to establish the fact that the accused employed force in having sexual intercourse with his
daughter. The offended daughter testified in direct examination as to the manner the sexual
intercourse was consummated and the pertinent portions of her testimony are quoted below

From the foregoing testimony, it can be gleaned that there was an appreciable degree of force
employed by the appellant upon his daughter. It appears that the appellant did not rebut in the court
below the testimony of his daughter because he denied having committed the act imputed to him. He
did not, therefore, deem it necessary to present at the trial any evidence at all to show that the act of
sexual intercourse was voluntary on the part of his daughter. On appeal, however, the appellant
apparently has abandoned the defense of denial interposed by him in the court below, and now
impliedly admits having had sexual intercourse with his own daughter; but he contends that the
prosecution has not shown satisfactorily that the same was done through force or intimidation. Not
having presented any evidence that the act of sexual intercourse was voluntary, the unrebutted and
uncontradicted testimony of the offended daughter now assumes more weight and importance and to
which We give full credence. This sudden change of attitude on the part of the appellant militates
against his claim of innocence.

Moreover, the fact of sexual intercourse was substantially corroborated by the medical report and
testimony of Dr. Abelardo Lucero who examined the offended party and found a newly healed
lacerated hymen. He opined that the offended party could have had sexual intercourse with a man
sometime during the month of August up to September 1, 1972 as alleged by her (pp. 29-31, t.s.n.,
Nov. 3, 1972).

It must be emphasized also that considering the relationship between father and daughter, the degree
of force or intimidation need not be the same as in other cases of rape where the parties involved
have no relationship at all with each other; because the father exercises strong moral and physical
control over his daughter. As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals in its May 3, 1976 decision
certifying the case to Us, indeed the kind of force and intimidation as between father and daughter
need not be of such nature and degree as would be required in cases where the parties have no
family relationship at all" (p. 5, C.A. decision; p. 111, rec.). And appellant admitted that "the
relationship between the complainant and the appellant herein has ample importance to show that
there was some kind of moral pressure on the complainant" (p. 21, Appellants Brief; p. 72, rec.).
Likewise, this Court has ruled that: "The force or violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative
term, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other" (People
v. Daniel, L-40330, 86 SCRA 511, 529, Nov. 20, 1978; People v. Sarile, 71 SCRA 593, 598 [1976];
People v. Savellano, 57 SCRA 320, 328 [1974], citing 75 C.J.S. 475; Emphasis supplied).chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

The claim of the appellant that his daughter practically submitted herself to him is hard to believe, for
no daughter in her right mind would voluntarily submit herself to her own father unless there was
force or intimidation, as a sexual act between father and daughter is so revolting. It must be noted
 26

that appellant himself admitted that consent was not previously given by the offended party to the
sexual intercourse (p. 17, Appellants Brief; p. 68, rec.).

While it may be true that the resistance established in evidence by the prosecution may be wanting in
comparison with the resistance offered by victims in other rape cases that have reached this Court,
the fact is, there was resistance, and such, for purposes of this case, is sufficient to qualify the sexual
act as rape, considering that the offender is her own father, whose ruthless assertion of parental
authority accompanied by threats subjugated her will to resist. As aptly observed by the Solicitor
General: "In the present case, Elizabeth was not only afraid of her father. She must have also been
shocked into submission by an experience that was unnatural and uncommon and certainly not
normally supposed to happen to persons so clearly related" (p. 9, Brief for the Appellee; p. 100, rec.).

In addition, in a crime of rape, it is not necessary that the force used by the accused upon the victim
be irresistible. What is important is that through force, the accused is able to accomplish his evil
design. In the instant case, the appellant succeeded in the consummation of the sexual act against
the will of the victim and in spite of her resistance. As We have repeatedly
declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the existence of the crime of
rape it is not necessary that the force employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character
as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force used by the guilty party be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which he had in view" (People v. Daniel, supra People v. Sarile, supra;
People v. Savellano, supra, citing United States v. Villarosa, 4 Phil. 434 [1905]).

Along the same line, this Court has held that: "When force is an element of the crime of rape, it need
not be irresistible; it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all
consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point" (People v. Daniel, supra,
People v. Sarile, supra, citing People v. Momo, 56 Phil. 86, 87 [1931]).

It must also be noted that the offended party was intimidated by the threat of the appellant to kill her,
her mother and sister and created a real fear in her mind considering that the offender was an ex-
convict and she was just an immature teen-ager, let alone the fact that the offender is her own father.
This fear weakened whatever resistance she could muster at the time of the assault. It has been held
that: "Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits
herself against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety" (People v. Daniel, supra,
People v. Garrines, 57 SCRA 653 [1974]). And it is an accepted rule that: Force or violence
threatened for the purpose of preventing or overcoming resistance, if of such character as to create
real apprehension of dangerous consequences or serious bodily harm or such as in any manner to
overpower the mind of the victim so that she does not reside, is in all respects equivalent to physical
force actually exerted for the same purpose" (People v. Gan, 46 SCRA 667, 677 [1904]).

Furthermore, women may have different reactions when confronted with such heinous act. Some
would probably fight, while others may assume a silent and fearful attitude because not all women are
of the same mettle [People v. Olden, 47 SCRA 45, 52 [1972]).

The appellant attempted to exculpate himself by showing that his daughter Elizabeth might have
denounced him as the perpetrator of a very serious crime committed upon her person because he
told her that he would take her and her sister Emma away from their mother (p. 6, t.s.n., Jan. 29,
1972). The motive alleged is not strong enough to make a fifteen-year-old girl with a fair degree of
education, like Elizabeth who is a high school student, invent a charge that would only bring shame to
humiliation upon her and her family and make her an object of gossip among her classmates and
friends. It cannot be denied that she commenced the present case, impelled by the enormity of the
crime and solely for the purpose of stating the truth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
 27

Counsel for the appellant also presents a starting allegation in his brief, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . ., the acts of the herein appellant and his daughter, complainant herein, can be ascribed to the
permissive character of the times and the circumstances which surround their own society. It must be
noted that appellant had spent already the substantial portion of his life in jail for a previous crime. His
moral education was molded by an abnormal atmosphere. His hunger of the loins is stronger than his
moral self-control if he has any. While the complainant herein, in submitting herself freely to the will of
appellant as one is want to believe, can be best explained by her own parents morality wherefrom
she derives her own and which she has been subjected. It cannot be expected therefore that the
moral standard to which a free society imposed on its members can be applicable to appellant and
his daughter" (pp. 23-24, Appellants Brief; pp. 74-75, rec.).

Such an allegation is unwarranted under the circumstances and it is a disgrace to the Bar and an
affront to this Court. A lawyers language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession. He should therefore be warned for making such cavalier statements.

The records further disclose that the information charges only one crime of rape committed sometime
in the third week of August. However, the evidence presented by the prosecution established two
other separate sexual intercourses on two subsequent dates.

An accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged or included in the information because the
Constitution guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused . . . shall enjoy the right . . . to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him . . ." (Section 19, Art. IV, Bill of
Rights, 1973 Constitution). Likewise,." . . it matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence
of guilt may be, an accused person cannot be convicted in the courts of these Islands of any offense,
unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or necessarily included
therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged before
he is put on trial . . ." (Matilde, Jr. v. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456, 461 [1975], citing U.S. v. Campo, 23 Phil.
396 [1912]). Consequently, the appellant herein may only be convicted of one crime of rape. In the
case at bar, the offended girl is a daughter of the appellant, and because of the nature of the crime,
this relationship is an aggravating circumstance in accordance with Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code.

People v. Rodolfo dela Cruz, 279 SCRA 245

In the early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless bodies of Teodorico M. Laroya, Jr. and his
children, 12-year old Karen Verona D. Laroya and 10-year old John Lester D. Laroya, were
discovered in their residence at 13 Emerald Street, Greenpark Village, Cainta, Rizal by their horrified
neighbors. The star-crossed trio were all bloodied consequent to numerous stab wounds, and each of
them had a knife still embedded in and protruding from their bodies when found. Karen Verona also
bore external signs of sexual assault.[3]
None of their neighbors, however, witnessed the gruesome murders. Two of them later testified in
court, namely, Harold Jim F. Balocating and Anita F. Pangan. The former merely recounted how,
while playing table tennis in front of the Laroya residence, he and his friends stumbled upon the dead
bodies of the victims. Anita Pangan, on the other hand, recalled that at around 9:00 P.M. of June 23,
1992, appellant, who was a brother-in-law of Teodorico Laroya, Jr., purchased some candies at her
store which is located inside the village.[4]
Both Balocating and Pangan had previously executed sworn statements just three days after the
incident, the assertions in which were of the same import as their respective testimonies in
court.[5] On June 27, 1992, the police authorities apprehended appellant at the house of his brother in
Fort Bonifacio. SPO1 Carlos R. Atanacio, Jr., a member of the Cainta Police Station in Cainta, Rizal
interrogated appellant regarding the crimes on the same day that he was arrested.
 28

This police officer declared in the trial court that before he questioned appellant as to his
participation in said crimes, all steps were undertaken to completely inform the latter of his rights and
this he did in the presence of appellants supposed counsel, one Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-
Villanueva. Appellant then signed, likewise in the presence of said counsel, an extrajudicial
confession wherein he narrated in detail how he allegedly snuffed out the lives of the victims. [6]
When presented as the lone witness for himself, appellant was observed by the trial court to be
afflicted with a problem in expressing himself and an impediment in his speech (ngo-ngo). By
appellants own account, he only reached the fourth grade of elementary schooling and, although
conversant with Tagalog, he is unable to read and write, although he can sign his name. He bluntly
repudiated the version of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. and insisted that he was never assisted by any counsel
of his choice, much less met said Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, when he was interrogated at
the police headquarters in Cainta, Rizal and signed his supposed extrajudicial
confession.Parenthetically, his answers to the questions appearing therein are in surprisingly fluent,
flawless and expressive Tagalog,[7] which could not have been done by him because of his defect in
speech and articulation.
He further claims that he was instead tortured by the police authorities into signing the same, and
not that he did so voluntarily. While he admits having been at the residence of the victims on the night
that they were murdered, he flatly denied having killed them as he left the trio well and alive that
same night when he proceeded to his brothers place in Fort Bonifacio. [8]
1. In unambiguous and explicit terms, Section 12, paragraph 1, of Article III of the Constitution
requires that [a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Corollary thereto, paragraph
3 thereof declares that any confession or admission obtained in violation of the same shall be
inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.
An accused person must be informed of the rights set out in said paragraph of Section 12
upon being held as a suspect and made to undergo custodial investigation by the police
authorities.[9] As explained by this Court in People vs. Marra,[10] custodial investigation involves any
questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as
soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is then
aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then
direct interrogatory question which tend to elicit incriminating statements.
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the
investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must
correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A
mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.
The defendant in the dock must be made to understand comprehensively, in the language or
dialect that he knows, the full extent of the same. A confession made in an atmosphere characterized
by deficiencies in informing the accused of all the rights to which he is entitled would be rendered
valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is by non-compliance with the procedural and
substantive safeguards to which an accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now further
implemented and ramified by statutory law.[11]
2. In the present case, SPO1 Atanacio, Jr., admitted in his testimony before the lower court that
the investigation of appellant in connection with the murders actually commenced at around 9:00 A.M.
on June 27, 1992 at the police headquarters in Cainta, Rizal, at the time when appellant was still
without counsel.[12] The sworn statement containing appellants extrajudicial confession itself shows
that it was taken at around 11:00 A.M.[13] Further, while SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. informed appellant in
Tagalog of his right to remain silent, that any statement he made could be used for or against him in
any court, and that he could have counsel preferably of his own choice, he nonetheless failed to tell
appellant that if the latter could not afford the services of counsel, he could be provided with one.[14]
The foregoing lapses on the part of the police authorities are all fatal to the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession supposedly executed by appellant before SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. Jurisprudence
along these lines have all been too consistent - an accused under custodial interrogation must
 29

continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. Indeed, Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution, could not be any clearer.
To reiterate, prior to the commencement of the investigation, the accused must perforce be
informed, on top of all his other rights enumerated therein, that where he lacks a counsel of his choice
because of indigence or other incapacitating cause, he shall be provided with one. Without this further
safeguard, the cautionary right to counsel would merely impress upon the accused, more so upon an
impecunious person like appellant who is hardly educated, that his right thereto would mean simply
that he can consult a lawyer if he has one or has the financial capacity to obtain legal services, and
nothing more.
Curiously, the record is completely bereft of any indication as to how appellant was able to
engage the services of Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, the counsel who was allegedly present
when appellant executed his confession and who was not even subpoenaed to testify thereon. This
significant circumstance lends credence to the latters denial that he ever met in person, much less
executed the confession in the presence of, said counsel. What emerges from a perusal of the record
is that this counsel was merely picked out and provided by the law enforcers themselves, thus putting
into serious doubt her independence and competence in assisting appellant during the
investigation[15] as to affect its admissibility.
Moreover, had she been equal to her responsibility in the face of such serious charge involved in
the cases, the failure of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. to fully apprise appellant of all his rights, particularly the
requirement that if he could not afford the services of a lawyer he shall be provided with one would
have been rectified by said counsel at that very stage of the investigation. Indeed, from our earliest
jurisprudence, the law vouchsafes to the accused the right to an effective counsel, one who can be
made to act in protection of his rights,[16] and not by merely going through the motions of providing
him with anyone who possesses a law degree.
Again, about the only matter that bears out the presence of such counsel at that stage of
custodial interrogation are the signatures which she affixed on the affidavit. Withal, a cursory reading
of the confession itself and SPO1 Atanacios version of the manner in which he conducted the
interrogation, yields no evidence or indication pointing to her having explained to the appellant his
rights under the Constitution.
In People vs. Ayson, etc., et al.,[17] this Court aptly emphasized these constitutional safeguards in
this wise:

In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in
police custody, in-custody interrogation being regarded as the commencement of an adversary
proceeding against the suspect.

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly
and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until
such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as
a result of interrogation can be used against him.

The objective is to prohibit incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated

atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights.

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation
of accused persons. And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is meant
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The situation contemplated has
also been more precisely described by this Court.

x x x After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins, a confrontation arises which at
best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and
there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be
necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and
 30

every person he meets, he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned
in their work. They employ all the methods and means that experience and study have taught them to
extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are
not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence
of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill
of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.

3. Necessarily, even while there is evidence of the corpus delicti in this case, appellants
conviction must be set aside for his extrajudicial confession is obviously inadmissible in evidence
against him. The rule is that an extrajudicial confession, where admissible, must be corroborated by
evidence of the corpus delicti in order to sustain a finding of guilt.[18] Both must co-exist. The
insistence of the Office of the Solicitor General that appellants confession could nonetheless be
treated as an admission which could therefore be admitted in evidence is misplaced, for the Bill of
Rights treats of both confessions and admissions in the same light.[19] In addition, it should be
stressed that in appellants case, no eyewitnesses to the actual killings were ever presented to testify
in court, and the prosecution relied primarily on circumstantial evidence to inculpate appellant in
crimes wherein he was meted three penalties of reclusion perpetua.
It is significant that, with the exception of appellants putative extrajudicial confession, no other
evidence of his alleged guilt has been presented by the People. The proposition that the medical
findings jibe with the narration of appellant as to how he allegedly committed the crimes falls into the
fatal error of figuratively putting the horse before the cart. Precisely, the validity and admissibility of
the supposed extrajudicial confession are in question and the contents thereof are denied and of
serious dubiety, hence the same cannot be used as the basis for such a finding. Otherwise, it would
assume that which has still to be proved, a situation of petitio principii or circulo en probando.
Evidently, herein appellant cannot be made to suffer the extreme penal consequences of the
crimes on account of the shaky and decrepit circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution.
While the defense of alibi advanced by appellant is by nature a weak one by itself, it assumes
commensurate significance and strength where the evidence for the prosecution itself is frail and
effete. For, needless to state, the prosecution must not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the
defense but upon the vigor of its own.[20]In sum, the presumption of innocence enjoyed by appellant
has remained intact and impervious to the prosecutions assault thereon.
People v. Antonio Enrile

The evidence for the prosecution showed that at about half past six in the evening of October 25,
1985, a buy-bust team composed of Pat. Jaime Flores and Pat. Wilson Rances of the Quezon City
Police Anti-Narcotics Unit was dispatched to entrap Rogelio Abugatal at Roosevelt Avenue in San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. The plan was made on the strength of a tip given by Renato
Polines, a police informer, who was himself to pose as the buyer.3

In their separate testimonies,4 both policemen said that on the occasion they saw Polines hand over
to Abugatal the marked money representing payment for the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the
money and returned ten minutes later with a wrapped object which he gave Polines. The two
policemen then approached Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the
wrapped object. Subsequent laboratory examination revealed this to be marijuana with flowering tops
weighing 22 grams.5

The prosecution also showed that, upon providing Abugatal led the policemen to a house at 20 De
Vera Street, also in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City, where he called out for Antonio Enrile.
Enrile came out and met them at the gate. Abugatal pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana,
whereupon the policemen immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the right front pocket
of his trousers the marked money earlier delivered to Abugatal, with Serial No. PJ966425.6

At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn confession affirming the above narration. 7 Enrile
refused to make any statement pending consultation with a lawyer.

In his defense, Enrile testified that the marked money was "planted" on him by the police officers, who
he said simply barged into his house without a warrant and arrested him. He stoutly denied any
knowledge of the marijuana. He claimed that at the time of the alleged incident, he was attending, as
 31

a dental technician, to a patient whom he was fitting for dentures.8 The supposed patient, Alicia
Tiempo, corroborated him.9

Enrile admitted that he had earlier been convicted of selling marijuana and that he had a pending
application for probation. He suggested that this could be the reason the policemen sought to
implicate him in the new charge and thus weaken his application.10

Abugatal contradicted his earlier sworn statement and declared on the stand that he had not sold any
marijuana to Polines. What really happened, he said, was that two male teenagers approached him
that evening and told him to buy marijuana, giving him P50.00 for the purpose. When he said he did
not have any marijuana and did not know where to buy it, they forced him to go to Enrile's house and
to give him the marked money. He did so because they had a knife. Enrile handed him a plastic bag
which was later found to contain dried marijuana fruiting tops.11

Judge Willelmo C. Fortun erred when he gave credence to the sworn statement of Abugatal,
considering that it was made without compliance with the requisites of a custodial investigation,
including the right to the assistance of counsel. The confession was clearly inadmissible. It did not
follow the ruling of this Court in Morales v. Enrile,12promulgated on April 26, 1983, as reiterated
in People v. Galit,13 promulgated on March 20, 1985, where Justice Hermogenes Concepcion laid
down the correct procedure, thus:

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He
shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall
have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall
be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid
down, whether exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The challenged decision of the trial court was promulgated on February 14, 1986, long after the
above-cited decisions had become effective.

Even under the old doctrine, in fact, it is doubtful if Abugatal's confession without the assistance of
counsel could have been sustained. It was not enough then to inform the suspect of his constitutional
rights. The trial court had to ascertain for itself that the accused clearly understood the import and
consequences of his confession and had the intelligence and mental capacity to do so. 14 There is no
showing in the record that this was done, short of the statement in the decision that Abugatal had
been informed of his rights and had validly waived the assistance of counsel.

If the sworn statement of Abugatal was inadmissible against him, much less was it admissible against
Enrile.

The prosecution rejected Abugatal's testimony that he was forced to go to Enrile's house and buy
marijuana from him, insisting instead on the extrajudicial confession. With that confession outlawed
and the testimony disowned by the prosecution itself, there is no evidence at all against Enrile to tie
him with Abugatal.

It was Abugatal who was allegedly caught red-handed by the policemen as he sold the marijuana to
Polines. Enrile was not even at the scene of the entrapment at that time. Abugatal said he did lead
the policemen to Enrile's house where he pointed to Enrile as the source of the marijuana. Even
assuming this to be true, that circumstance alone did not justify Enrile's warrantless arrest and
search.
 32

Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a peace officer or a private person may make a
warrantless arrest only under any of the following circumstances :

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;.

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the
policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge that he was the source
of marijuana.

According to the policemen themselves, what happened was that they asked Abugatal who gave him
the marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house
and immediately arrested him.15

What the policemen should have done was secure a search warrant on the basis of the information
supplied by Abugatal, and then, with such authority, proceeded to search and, if the search was
fruitful, arrest Enrile. They had no right to simply force themselves into his house on the bare (and
subsequently disallowed) allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the police station as if he
had been caught in flagrante delicto.

The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the act of selling
marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone would not
retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure.

The principle has been honored through the ages in all liberty-loving regimes that a man's house is
his castle that not even the mighty monarch, with all its forces, may violate. There were measures
available under the law to enable the authorities to search Enrile's house and to arrest him if he was
found in possession of prohibited articles. The police did not employ these measures.

What they did was simply intrude into Enrile's house and arrest him without the slightest heed to the
injunctions of the Bill of Rights. By so doing, they were using the tactics of the police state, where the
minions of the government place little value on human rights and individual liberties and are
obssessed only with the maintenance of peace and punishment of crime.

These are laudible objectives in any well-ordered society. But it should never be pursued at the cost
of dismantling the intricate apparatus for the protection of the individual from overzealous law-
enforcers who mistakenly believe that suspected criminals have forfeited the safeguards afforded
them by the Constitution. Law-enforcers are not licensed to themselves break the law to apprehend
and punish law-breakers. Such a practice only leads to further defiance of the law by those who have
been denied its protection.

In the light of the proven circumstances of this case, the Court is not convinced that there is enough
evidence to establish Enrile's guilt beyond the shadow of doubt. The paucity of such evidence only
strengthens the suspicion that the marked money was really "planted" on Enrile by the police officers
who were probably worried that their earlier efforts in securing Enrile's conviction as a drug pusher
would be thwarted by his application for probation.

Whatever their motives, the fact is that Abugatal's sworn statement implicating Enrile is inadmissible
against Enrile, and so is the marked money allegedly found on him as a result of the illegal search.
The only remaining evidence against the appellant is Abugatal's testimony, but this has been
questioned and discredited by the prosecution itself. Its case against Enrile is thus left without a leg to
stand on and must therefore be dismissed.
 33

Law-enforcement authorities are admonished that mere enthusiasm in the discharge of their duties is
not enough to build a case against a person charged with a crime. They should build it with
painstaking care, stone by stone of provable fact, and with constant regard for the rights of the
accused, before they can hope to secure a conviction that can be sustained in a court of justice.

People v. Serzo
Rights of the Accused

Facts:
1. Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo
Casabal after the latter rescued minors being held by the former.
2. Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits.
3. The accused alleged that he was denied the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared
without counsel,so the court appointed a counsel de officio. Thereafter, he moved that the
arraignment be reset so he can engage the services of his own counsel however, during the
arraignment, he still appeared without one. The arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by
the counsel de officio.
4. During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-examined for the accused.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied of his right to counsel

HELD: NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages
of the proceedings.The option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory
tactics, trifle with the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the State and the offended party
to speedy and adequate justice.

The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also
a recognition of the accused not having the skill to protect himself before a tribunal which has the
power to take his life or liberty.

The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal.
RA 7438 provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all
times be assisted by counsel.
The right is however not absolute and is waivable; a) the state must balance the private against the
state's and offended party's equally important rightto speedy and adequate justice, and b) the right is
waivable as long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made.

People v. Holgado

Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight
illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and
withoutjustifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for
about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He
pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no
evidence was presented to indict the latter.

Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.

Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be
informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he
desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time
must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution
that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all
accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no
fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.
 34

The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does
not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to
the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the
court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether
the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession.
Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr.
Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was
wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a
qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be
assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the
offense found to be capital by the court.

People v. Ayson

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and
Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines
Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his
willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he
refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said
amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa
was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained
Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken
without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating
that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A
motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admission and statement of accused.

Held: No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial
investigation when his statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel in
administrative proceeding. The right to self incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only
when the accused is subjected to custodial inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police
authorities after a person is taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any way. Because the
statements were obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be
admitted in court.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly
and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until
such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as
 35

a result of interrogation can be used against him.The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado

interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement
without full warnings of constitutional rights."

Conde v. Rivera

Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond
to no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her
witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause
postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the
passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away
from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.

Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons,
has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of
that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by
a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his
liberty, by habeascorpus to obtain his freedom.