Republic of the Philippines litigation or other matters growing out of or connected therewith for counsel or
SUPREME COURT attorneys fees, but in no case less than P25. It is hereby further agreed that in case of
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8437 November 28, 1956
ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased,
vs.
LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant-appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
Appeal by Luzon Surety Co., Inc., from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, presided by Judge Hermogenes Caluag, dismissing its claim against the Estate
of K. H. Hemady (Special Proceeding No. Q-293) for failure to state a cause of action.
The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different
indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and
by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor) in all of them, in
consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.s of having guaranteed, the various principals
in favor of different creditors. The twenty counterbonds, or indemnity agreements, all
contained the following stipulations:
Premiums. As consideration for this suretyship, the undersigned jointly and
severally, agree to pay the COMPANY the sum of ________________ (P______)
pesos, Philippines Currency, in advance as premium there of for every __________
months or fractions thereof, this ________ or any renewal or substitution thereof is in
effect.
Indemnity. The undersigned, jointly and severally, agree at all times to indemnify
the COMPANY and keep it indemnified and hold and save it harmless from and
against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges, and
expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which the COMPANY shall or may, at any
time sustain or incur in consequence of having become surety upon this bond or any
extension, renewal, substitution or alteration thereof made at the instance of the
undersigned or any of them or any order executed on behalf of the undersigned or any
of them; and to pay, reimburse and make good to the COMPANY, its successors and
assigns, all sums and amount of money which it or its representatives shall pay or
cause to be paid, or become liable to pay, on account of the undersigned or any of
them, of whatsoever kind and nature, including 15% of the amount involved in the
extension or renewal of this ________ we equally bind ourselves for the payment
thereof under the same terms and conditions as above mentioned without the necessity
of executing another indemnity agreement for the purpose and that we hereby equally
waive our right to be notified of any renewal or extension of this ________ which
may be granted under this indemnity agreement.
Interest on amount paid by the Company. Any and all sums of money so paid by the
company shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum which interest, if not paid,
will be accummulated and added to the capital quarterly order to earn the same
interests as the capital and the total sum thereof, the capital and interest, shall be paid
to the COMPANY as soon as the COMPANY shall have become liable therefore,
whether it shall have paid out such sums of money or any part thereof or not.
xxx xxx xxx
Waiver. It is hereby agreed upon by and between the undersigned that any question
which may arise between them by reason of this document and which has to be
submitted for decision to Courts of Justice shall be brought before the Court of
competent jurisdiction in the City of Manila, waiving for this purpose any other venue.
Our right to be notified of the acceptance and approval of this indemnity agreement
is hereby likewise waived.
xxx xxx xxx
Our Liability Hereunder. It shall not be necessary for the COMPANY to bring suit
against the principal upon his default, or to exhaust the property of the principal, but
the liability hereunder of the undersigned indemnitor shall be jointly and severally, a
primary one, the same as that of the principal, and shall be exigible immediately upon
the occurrence of such default. (Rec. App. pp. 98- 102.)
The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of
the twenty bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further
asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the
bonds, with 12 per cent interest thereon.
Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of Hemadys estate,
the lower court, by order of September 23, 1953, dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety
Co., on two grounds: (1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were
not contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of the undertaking of
the guarantor (Hemady), since they were not liabilities incurred after the execution of
the counterbonds; and (2) that whatever losses may occur after Hemadys death, are
not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor.
Taking up the latter point first, since it is the one more far reaching in effects, the
reasoning of the court below ran as follows:
Page 1 of 51
The administratrix further contends that upon the death of Hemady, his liability as a
guarantor terminated, and therefore, in the absence of a showing that a loss or damage
was suffered, the claim cannot be considered contingent. This Court believes that
there is merit in this contention and finds support in Article 2046 of the new Civil
Code. It should be noted that a new requirement has been added for a person to qualify
as a guarantor, that is: integrity. As correctly pointed out by the Administratrix,
integrity is something purely personal and is not transmissible. Upon the death of
Hemady, his integrity was not transmitted to his estate or successors. Whatever loss
therefore, may occur after Hemadys death, are not chargeable to his estate because
upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor.
Another clear and strong indication that the surety company has exclusively relied on
the personality, character, honesty and integrity of the now deceased K. H. Hemady,
was the fact that in the printed form of the indemnity agreement there is a paragraph
entitled Security by way of first mortgage, which was expressly waived and
renounced by the security company. The security company has not demanded from
K. H. Hemady to comply with this requirement of giving security by way of first
mortgage. In the supporting papers of the claim presented by Luzon Surety Company,
no real property was mentioned in the list of properties mortgaged which appears at
the back of the indemnity agreement. (Rec. App., pp. 407-408).
We find this reasoning untenable. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well
as under the Civil Code of 1889 (Article 1257), the rule is that
Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in
the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their
decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the
principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased
but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code (and Articles
659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article
1311 already quoted.
ART. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of
law.
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person which are not extinguished by his death.
In Mojica vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 403, this Supreme Court ruled:
Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are subrogated
to all the rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and can not be regarded
as third parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party, touching
the estate of the deceased (Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil. 44).
xxx xxx xxx
The principle on which these decisions rest is not affected by the provisions of the
new Code of Civil Procedure, and, in accordance with that principle, the heirs of a
deceased person cannot be held to be third persons in relation to any contracts
touching the real estate of their decedent which comes in to their hands by right of
inheritance; they take such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon in
the hands of him from whom they derive their rights.
(See also Galasinao vs. Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. (No. 6) p. 2874 and de Guzman vs.
Salak, 91 Phil., 265)
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by
the provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated
and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89).
The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a
payment by the heirs and distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact
diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a partys contractual rights and
obligations are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the
progressive depersonalization of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by
Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman
concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation
from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative
position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is
contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person
and by no other. The transition is marked by the disappearance of the imprisonment
for debt.
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the surety
or guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are
contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. What did the creditor Luzon
Surety Co. expect of K. H. Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the
counterbonds? Nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that the Luzon Surety
Co. might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the principal debtors. This
reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money, resulting from an obligation to give;
and to the Luzon Surety Co., it was indifferent that the reimbursement should be made
by Hemady himself or by some one else in his behalf, so long as the money was paid
to it.
The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the
parties. Being exceptional and contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility
should not be easily implied, but must be expressly established, or at the very least,
Page 2 of 51
clearly inferable from the provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the
agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that they are non-transferable.
(b) Intransmisibilidad por pacto. Lo general es la transmisibilidad de darechos y
obligaciones; le excepcion, la intransmisibilidad. Mientras nada se diga en contrario
impera el principio de la transmision, como elemento natural a toda relacion juridica,
salvo las personalisimas. Asi, para la no transmision, es menester el pacto expreso,
porque si no, lo convenido entre partes trasciende a sus herederos.
Siendo estos los continuadores de la personalidad del causante, sobre ellos recaen los
efectos de los vinculos juridicos creados por sus antecesores, y para evitarlo, si asi se
quiere, es indespensable convension terminante en tal sentido.
Por su esencia, el derecho y la obligacion tienden a ir ms all de las personas que les
dieron vida, y a ejercer presion sobre los sucesores de esa persona; cuando no se quiera
esto, se impone una estipulacion limitativa expresamente de la transmisibilidad o de
cuyos tirminos claramente se deduzca la concresion del concreto a las mismas
personas que lo otorgon. (Scaevola, Codigo Civil, Tomo XX, p. 541-542) ( emphasis
supplied.)
Because under the law (Article 1311), a person who enters into a contract is deemed
to have contracted for himself and his heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary for him to
expressly stipulate to that effect; hence, his failure to do so is no sign that he intended
his bargain to terminate upon his death. Similarly, that the Luzon Surety Co., did not
require bondsman Hemady to execute a mortgage indicates nothing more than the
companys faith and confidence in the financial stability of the surety, but not that his
obligation was strictly personal.
The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists
when they are not transmissible by operation of law. The provision makes reference
to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished
by death, as is the case in legal support (Article 300), parental authority (Article 327),
usufruct (Article 603), contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726), partnership
(Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By contract, the articles of the Civil Code
that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that
the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.
The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the effect that
one who is obliged to furnish a guarantor must present a person who possesses
integrity, capacity to bind himself, and sufficient property to answer for the obligation
which he guarantees. It will be noted, however, that the law requires these qualities
to be present only at the time of the perfection of the contract of guaranty. It is self-
evident that once the contract has become perfected and binding, the supervening
incapacity of the guarantor would not operate to exonerate him of the eventual liability
he has contracted; and if that be true of his capacity to bind himself, it should also be
true of his integrity, which is a quality mentioned in the article alongside the capacity.
The foregoing concept is confirmed by the next Article 2057, that runs as follows:
ART. 2057. If the guarantor should be convicted in first instance of a crime
involving dishonesty or should become insolvent, the creditor may demand another
who has all the qualifications required in the preceding article. The case is excepted
where the creditor has required and stipulated that a specified person should be
guarantor.
From this article it should be immediately apparent that the supervening dishonesty
of the guarantor (that is to say, the disappearance of his integrity after he has become
bound) does not terminate the contract but merely entitles the creditor to demand a
replacement of the guarantor. But the step remains optional in the creditor: it is his
right, not his duty; he may waive it if he chooses, and hold the guarantor to his bargain.
Hence Article 2057 of the present Civil Code is incompatible with the trial courts
stand that the requirement of integrity in the guarantor or surety makes the latters
undertaking strictly personal, so linked to his individuality that the guaranty
automatically terminates upon his death.
The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety
Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by
the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual
liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts,
therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under section 5,
Rule 87 (2 Moran, 1952 ed., p. 437; Gaskell & Co. vs. Tan Sit, 43 Phil. 810, 814).
The most common example of the contigent claim is that which arises when a person
is bound as surety or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead. Under the
ordinary contract of suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against his principal
until he himself pays something by way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is
secured. When he does this, there instantly arises in favor of the surety the right to
compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety has contributed
something to the payment of the debt, or has performed the secured obligation in
whole or in part, he has no right of action against anybody no claim that could be
reduced to judgment. (May vs. Vann, 15 Pla., 553; Gibson vs. Mithell, 16 Pla., 519;
Maxey vs. Carter, 10 Yarg. [Tenn.], 521 Reeves vs. Pulliam, 7 Baxt. [Tenn.], 119;
Ernst vs. Nou, 63 Wis., 134.)
For defendant administratrix it is averred that the above doctrine refers to a case where
the surety files claims against the estate of the principal debtor; and it is urged that the
rule does not apply to the case before us, where the late Hemady was a surety, not a
principal debtor. The argument evinces a superficial view of the relations between
parties. If under the Gaskell ruling, the Luzon Surety Co., as guarantor, could file a
contingent claim against the estate of the principal debtors if the latter should die,
there is absolutely no reason why it could not file such a claim against the estate of
Hemady, since Hemady is a solidary co-debtor of his principals. What the Luzon
Surety Co. may claim from the estate of a principal debtor it may equally claim from
the estate of Hemady, since, in view of the existing solidarity, the latter does not even
enjoy the benefit of exhaustion of the assets of the principal debtor.
Page 3 of 51
The foregoing ruling is of course without prejudice to the remedies of the
administratrix against the principal debtors under Articles 2071 and 2067 of the New
Civil Code.
Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantors liability is not extinguished by his
death, and that in such event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the
estate a contingent claim for reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to discuss
the estates liability for premiums and stamp taxes, because irrespective of the solution
to this question, the Luzon Suretys claim did state a cause of action, and its dismissal
was erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed in accordance with law.
Costs against the Administratrix- Appellee. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

Page 4 of 51
G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990
JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and
VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO, respondents.
Domingo Lucenario for petitioners.
Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to existing
relevant laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
dated December 11, 1987 which reversed and set aside that of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, Camarines Sur. 2 The challenged decision adjudged
the petitioners liable to the private respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00
and for costs.
The facts are as follows:
In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido
Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines
Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor
and owned and operated by petitioner Jose Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident
Bienvenido and his passenger died 4 and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal
case arising from the incident was ever instituted. 6
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement
of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer Philippine First
Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) Bienvenido Nacario's
widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In consideration of
the amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in
favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all
actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her
husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving.
Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested
her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the
petitioners. 7
On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the
accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of
Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with the
then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. 8 In their complaint, the private
respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners
through their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-
judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the
funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the
purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim.
The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and
settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario
spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them
in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for
the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages,
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages. 9
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the
defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the preferred
heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his
parents, the plaintiffs (herein private respondents), extinguished any claim against
the defendants (petitioners). 10
The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the
trial court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena
Vda. de Nacario did not discharge the liability of the petitioners because the case
was instituted by the private respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs,
representatives, successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly
waived the damages being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not
the one who suffered these damages arising from the death of their son.
Furthermore, the appellate court said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the
testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that they were the ones who bought
the tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden of proof of
such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony . . . 11 Anent the funeral
expenses, "(T)he expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by the
appellants (the private respondents). This was never contradicted by the appellees
(petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were made by the appellants, therefore, the
reimbursement must accrue in their favor. 12
Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the
private respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle, P5,000.00 for
"complete" funeral services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto,
and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. 13 The petitioners moved for
a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision 14 but their motion was
denied. 15 Hence, this petition.
Page 5 of 51
The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding that
the petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate amount of
P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners
and the victim's compulsory heirs.
The petition is meritorious.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment.
Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
(Emphasis ours.)
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising
from the accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is
whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment,
is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom
payment to extinguish an obligation should be made.
Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor
the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest,
or any person authorized to receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the
successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive
payment. The Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants
with respect to their legitimate children and decendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal
fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded
by those in Nos. 1 and 2. Neither do they exclude one another.
(Emphasis ours.)
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of
the deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him,
to the exclusion of collateral relatives.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies
without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs
with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to
Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-
interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore
acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido
and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been
estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the
disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief
and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private
Page 6 of 51
respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and 10 Id., 42-44.
shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but
money claims against the estate of their deceased son. 16 These money claims are not 11 Id., 50.
the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the
agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda.
de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their 12 Id.
child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of
the petitioners. 13 Id., 45-51.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is 14 Id., 52-58.
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents. 15 Id., 61.

SO ORDERED. 16 Rule 87, Section 1, Rules of Court; see also, MORAN, 3

Comments on the Rules of Court, 479-480 (1980).
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Chua, Segundino G., J., ponente, Ejercito, Bienvenido C., and

Lapea, Nicolas P., Jr., JJ., concurring.

2 Judge Conchita Carpio-Rosales, presiding.

3 Rollo, 46.

4 Id.

5 Id., 42.

6 Id., 46.

7 Id., 42.

8 Id., 24.

9 Id., 62-65.

Page 7 of 51
G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO
SANTILLON, CLARO SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO
CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
Clodualdo P. Surio and Claro Santillon (in his own behalf) for petitioner-appellant.
Patricio M. Patajo for oppositors-appellees.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
specifying the respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate
of Pedro Santillon.
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his
residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his
marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province.
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of
administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta
Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following
grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except
three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that
Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided
share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and
Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case
for partition pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the
oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It
appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix
of the estate.
On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a
project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro
Santillon.
On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve
the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the
estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2
from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2
must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the
other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of
the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro
claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled
and ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro
Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF
(1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son,
Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-
owner of the conjugal properties. ... .
From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two questions
of law are involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, is
whether the order of the lower court is appealable. And the second, raised in
appellant's lone assignment of error, is: How shall the estate of a person who dies
intestate be divided when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?
The First Issue: It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore,
appealable to this Court.
Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an order of
the Court of First Instance where such order "determines ... the distributive share of
the estate to which such person is entitled."
The Second Issue: Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art.
892 of the New Civil Code which provides that:
If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the
widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate.
... .
As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand,
cites Art. 996 which provides:
If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of
the children.
Page 8 of 51
Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the
extent that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate
succession, whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.
Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should
control, regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate
succession involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in
statutory construction, the plural word "children" includes the singular "child."
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession;
whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such
being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim
to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse
and Art. 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may
indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a
spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of
shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if
the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e.,
Art. 996.
Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; at
least, his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm the half and half idea of
the Pangasinan court.
This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal
or intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having expressed the
opinion that under this article, when the widow survives with only one legitimate
child, they share the estate in equal parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries
writes as follows:
One child Surviving. If there is only one legitimate child surviving with
the spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the
child and the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law
refers to "children or descendants," the rule in statutory construction that
the plural can be understood to include the singular is applicable in this
case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)
The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions:
(a) Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one
"child"; consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of
judicial construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas
in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would
get 1/2 in intestate.
A. Children. It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include
the singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow
or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share
as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the
ground that "child" is not included in "children," the consequences would be
tremendous, because "children" will not include "child" in the following articles:
ART. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children
and descendants ... .
ART. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists
of one-half of the hereditary estate ... .
ART. 896. Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to one-
fourth of the hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901).
In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be
inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only
legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is
clear, because the only legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks
of "children," not "child." So if "children" in Art. 888 includes "child," the same
meaning should be given to Art. 996.
B. Unfairness of Art. 996. Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate
succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half,
and the widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now,
the child gets one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable,
they insist.
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or
widower "gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half if the testator so
wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament,
whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor).
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that
whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken,
contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow
or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where
the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to
Page 9 of 51
provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to
promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain and this we are not
called upon to discuss but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are
bound to enforce.

The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.

Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Barrera, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1V. Francisco, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. III, p. 931.

282 C.J.S. 675, 676.

Page 10 of 51
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-
appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of
partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second
wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G.
Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for,
his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma
Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied,
the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary
E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released
from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various
motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account
of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted
and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of
Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and
Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of
the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs
of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of
which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the
lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and
approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court
on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of
which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
Page 11 of 51
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31,
1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result
in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines.
In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on
the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national
law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four
items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They
provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law
of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of
the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new.
It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As
further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national
law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that
he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was
the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the
law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16
of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and
the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
Page 12 of 51
Footnotes

1He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this
case as one of the oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of
his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his brief after paying his
proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the printing of the record
on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters but this
Court resolved to deny the motion.

2San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.

3Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil.

500.

Page 13 of 51
 ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, G.R. No. 174489 WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be
impressed with merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30
SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered
ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA
REGALA.
ROSIE M. MATEO, Present:
NENITA A. PACHECO, SO ORDERED.[5]

VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

and RAFAEL TITCO, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution[6] which denied the
Petitioners, BERSAMIN,
Motion for Reconsideration thereto.
DEL CASTILLO, and
- versus - VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Petitioners call us to reverse the CAs assailed Decision and instead affirm the

Promulgated: Decision of the RTC which disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.
LORENZO LAXA,
Respondent. April 11, 2012
x------------------------------------------------------------------- Factual Antecedents
x

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent
was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the
state is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the
manner provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.[1]
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled Tauli
Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala[7] (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September
13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin),
was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at
the end of the said document on page 3[8] and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.[9]

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] of the June 15, 2006 Decision[3] of
Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Wills due
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003
execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause[10] and on the left margin of
Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special
pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,[11] in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin
Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for probate of the
who acted as notary public.
notarial will of Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit:

Page 14 of 51
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:

More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed
xxxx
a petition[14] with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since
the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-
then up to the present by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and
CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all 1186.
my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO
R. LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA and their children, LUNA
LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo
R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an
residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their children,
Order on June 13, 2000[15] allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date,
LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not
of legal age and living with their parents who would decide to bequeath Dra. Limpin testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the execution of the last
since they are the children of the spouses;
will and testament of Paciencia on September 13, 1981.[16] The Will was executed in her fathers
xxxx
(Judge Limpin) home office, in her presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco and
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered Faustino.[17] Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her signatures on all its four
aside from the properties mentioned in this last will and testament, I am
also bequeathing and giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and pages.[18] She likewise positively identified the signature of her father appearing
Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also command them to offer
masses yearly for the repose of my soul and that of D[]a Nicomeda thereon.[19] Questioned by the prosecutor regarding Judge Limpins present mental fitness, Dra.
Regala, Epifania Regala and their spouses and with respect to the
fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery.[20] The
of D[]a Nicomeda Regala in accordance with her testament as stated in judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin
my testament. x x x[12]
stated that her father can no longer testify in court.[21]

The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is

The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed
Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and
an opposition[22] to Lorenzos petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencias
treated Paciencia as his own mother.[13]Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in Sasmuan,
Will belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had
Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the
no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.[23]
execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of America
(USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.

Page 15 of 51
 Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners
Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra.

Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental Limpin was recalled for cross-examination by the petitioners. She testified as to the age of her

Opposition[24] contending that Paciencias Will was null and void because ownership of the father at the time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia

properties had not been transferred and/or titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article at the time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place. [31]

1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.[25] Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of

Administration in Lorenzos favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the

he being a citizen and resident of the USA.[26] Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration witness stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his fathers condition. According to him his

be instead issued in favor of Antonio.[27] father can no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate was

presented to the court to support this allegation. [32]

Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition[28] asking

the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias Will on the following grounds: the Will was not For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April

executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia

mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the went to the USA and lived with him and his family until her death in January 1996; the

Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured relationship between him and Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took
by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his care of him since birth and took him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without

benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencias death, she did not suffer from

genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the

document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencias death through Faustino;

Recommendation[29] reiterating their opposition to the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator and he was already residing in the USA when the Will was executed.[33] Lorenzo positively

of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead. identified the signature of Paciencia in three different documents and in the Will itself and stated

that he was familiar with Paciencias signature because he accompanied her in her

On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[30] denying the requests of both transactions.[34] Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used force, intimidation, violence,

Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed administrator since the former is a citizen and resident of coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the Philippines when
the USA while the latters claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will has not yet the same was executed.[35] On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed him

been established.

Page 16 of 51
about the Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after
her death.[36]
As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May
21, 2000.
For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first
cousins.[37] She claimed to have helped in the household chores in the house of Paciencia thereby
allowing her to stay therein from morning until evening and that during the period of her service
in the said household, Lorenzos wife and his children were staying in the same house.[38] She
served in the said household from 1980 until Paciencias departure for the USAon September 19,
1981.[39]
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring something for
Paciencia to sign at the latters house.[40] Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see what that
something was as same was placed inside an envelope.[41] However, she remembered Paciencia
instructing Faustino to first look for money before she signs them.[42] A few days after or on
September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of Antonios mother and brought with her the
said envelope.[43] Upon going home, however, the envelope was no longer with
Paciencia.[44] Rosie further testified that Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful
because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments
later.[45] On cross examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a
psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was magulyanwas based on her personal
assessment,[46] and that it was Antonio who requested her to testify in court.[47]
In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt.[48] He identified
the Will and testified that he had seen the said document before because Paciencia brought the
same to his mothers house and showed it to him along with another document on September 16,
1981.[49] Antonio alleged that when the documents were shown to him, the same were still
unsigned.[50] According to him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of one
of her rice lands,[51] and it was he who explained that the documents were actually a special
power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for the
USA, and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her
death.[52] Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: Why will I never
[return], why will I sell all my properties? Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have
other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why should I die
already?[53] Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not
want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, I know nothing about those, throw them away or
it is up to you. The more I will not sign them.[54] After which, Paciencia left the documents with
Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.[55]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision[56] denying the petition thus:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated
April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows the notarized will dated September 13,
1981 of Paciencia Regala.
SO ORDERED.[57]
Page 17 of 51
 The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength
MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
of mind to have testamentary capacity.[58] EVIDENCE ON RECORD;

III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
Ruling of the Court of Appeals RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT
PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE
WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED[63]
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of

Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTCs conclusion that Paciencia was of
The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was
unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that the state of being magulyan does
sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate.
not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a

Will.[59] Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings were not able to overcome the
Our Ruling
presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or events

were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.[60]
We deny the petition.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration[61] but the motion was denied by the CA in its

Resolution[62] dated August 31, 2006. Faithful compliance with

the formalities
laid down by law is
Hence, this petition. apparent from the face of
the Will.

Issues
Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a

Will in probate proceedings.[64] This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules
Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review
of Court, which states:
on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the following errors:

Rule 75
I. PRODUCTION OF WILL. ALLOWANCE OF WILL
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED NECESSARY.
WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIAS WILL
DESPITE RESPONDENTS UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to
SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT; execution. No will shall pass either real or personal estate

Page 18 of 51
 unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court. Subject to
the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to
conclusive as to its due execution.
the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded

that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question her state of
Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
The burden to prove that
law.[65] These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Paciencia was of unsound
mind at the time of the
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be execution of the will lies on
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's the shoulders of the
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express petitioners.
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of one another.
Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was magulyan or
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name
and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise
each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part claimed in their Motion for Reconsideration[66]filed with the CA that Paciencia was not
of each page.
only magulyan but was actually suffering from paranoia.[67]
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and
every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under We are not convinced.
his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and
that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be Will.[68] Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the
required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office of the
Clerk of Court. New Civil Code states:

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the

Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind
be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or
the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental other cause.
witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation

clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses

Page 19 of 51
 It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of
making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencias forgetfulness,
there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of
unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy
of credence Dra. Limpins testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter
went to Judge Limpins house and voluntarily executed the Will. The testimony of subscribing
witnesses to a Will concerning the testators mental condition is entitled to great weight where
they are truthful and intelligent.[69] More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind
at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the
oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound
mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at
the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the
probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making
his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the
validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid
interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one
month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia
was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned,
no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CAs
finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden.
Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly
pointed out by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of
the nature of the document she executed. She specially requested that the
customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of
how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is
bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2)
children. A third child was born after the execution of the will and was
not included therein as devisee.[70]
Bare allegations of duress
or influence of fear or
threats, undue and
improper influence and
pressure, fraud and trickery
cannot be used as basis to
deny the probate of a will.
An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or
testatrix to execute the document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her
death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence
of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; and that assuming
Paciencias signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery. These are grounded
on the alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein the
former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.
We are not persuaded.
Page 20 of 51
 We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated
Lorenzo as her own son and that love even extended to Lorenzos wife and children. This kind
of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters
to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a
prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many family discords between those
favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator and those who stand to benefit in case of
intestacy.
In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencias relationship with
Lorenzo and his family is different from her relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she
cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was
already married and already has children, highlights the special bond between them. This
unquestioned relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity
of the said document as against petitioners allegations of duress, influence of fear or threats,
undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in
nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth
stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial
evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold said allegations.[71] Furthermore, a
purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very
institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been
duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would have to depend largely on the
attitude of those interested in [the estate of the deceased].[72]
Court should be convinced
by the evidence presented
before it that the Will was
duly executed.
Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencias Will on the ground that Section 11
of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not complied with. It provides:
RULE 76
ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for
where will contested. If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses,
and the notary in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced
and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be
satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are
present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been
filed, their deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against
the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or
are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be
allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and
from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in
the manner required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if
at least three (3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator
explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of
the testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court
deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis
supplied.)
They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been
presented in court since all but one witness, Francisco, are still living.
We cannot agree with petitioners.
We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before
the court was satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son,
Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself
Page 21 of 51
due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its
certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in allowance for probate.

1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and

could not even remember his daughters name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and

condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979

opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor are AFFIRMED.

challenged the same on cross examination. We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, SO ORDERED.
Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
witness and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencias Will Associate Justice
may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpins testimony proving her sanity and the due execution
WE CONCUR:
of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that [a] testament
RENATO C. CORONA
may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; Chief Justice
Chairperson
neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in

favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not

necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not
duly executed in the manner required by law.[73]
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Moreover, it bears stressing that [i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties

as regards the authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the

law that it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that is MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
controlling.[74] The very existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed

[testatrix] has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is CERTIFICATION

incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
the attitude of the parties affected thereby.[75] This, coupled with Lorenzos established of the opinion of the Courts Division.
relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as

opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving

Page 22 of 51
 [34]
RENATO C. CORONA Id. at 9-15.
[35]
Chief Justice Id. at 16-17.
[36]
Id. at 24-25.
[37] TSN dated November 27, 2002, p. 4.
[38] Id. at 5.
[1] [39] TSN dated December 4, 2002, p. 8
Gonzales Vda. de Precilla v. Narciso, 150-B Phil. 437, 473 (1972).
[2] [40] Id. pp. 2-3.
Rollo, pp. 9-31.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 177-192; penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and [41] Id. at 4.
[42] Id.
concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Vicente Q. Roxas.
[4] Records, pp. 220-246; penned by Judge Jonel S. Mercado. [43] Id. at 7.
[5] CA rollo, p. 192. [44] Id. at 8.
[6] Id. at 212. [45] Id. at 9.
[7] Exhibit G, Folder of Exhibits, pp. 36-39. [46] Id. at 10.
[8] Exhibit G-11, id. at 38. [47] Id. at 11.
[9] Exhibits G-9, G-10, and G-11, id. at 36, 37 and 39. [48] TSN dated January 7, 2003, p. 3.
[10] Exhibit G-6, id at 38. [49] Id. at 6-8.
[11] Exhibits G-4, G-5, and G-7, id. at 36, 37 and 39. [50] Id. at 12.
[12] English Translation of the Last Will and Testament of Miss Paciencia Regala, [51] Id. at 11.
[52] Id. at 16.
Exhibits H-1 and H-2, id. at 41-42.
[13] TSN dated April 18, 2001, pp. 2-6. [53] Id. at 17.
[14] Records, pp. 1-3. [54] Id.
[15] Id. at 13-14. [55] Id at 18-19.
[16] TSN dated June 22, 2000, p. 2. [56] Records, pp. 220-246.
[17] Id. at 5. [57] Id. at 246.
[18] Id. at 2-4. [58] Id. at 245-246.
[19] Id. at 3. [59] CA rollo, p. 185.
[20] Id. at 2. [60] Id. at 188.
[21] Id. at 6. [61] Id. at 193-199.
[22] Motion with Leave of Court to Admit Instant Opposition to Petition of Lorenzo [62] Id. at 212.
[63] Rollo, p. 18.
Laxa; records, pp. 17-18.
[23] Id. at 17. [64] Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 207 Phil. 758, 766. (1983).
[24] Id. at 25-28. [65] Id.
[25] Article 1049. Acceptance may be express or tacit. [66] CA rollo, pp. 193-199.
[67] Id. at 194-195.
xxxx
[68] Torres and Lopez de Bueno v. Lopez, 48 Phil. 772, 810 (1926); Sancho v. Abella,
Acts of mere preservation or provisional administration do not imply
an acceptance of the inheritance if, through such acts, the title or capacity 58 Phil.728, 732-733 (1933).
[69] Id. at 811.
of an heir has not been assumed.
[26] Records, p. 26. [70] CA rollo, pp. 185-186.
[27] Id. at 27. [71] Gonzales Vda. de Precilla v. Narciso, supra note 1 at 445.
[28] Id. at 42-43. [72] Id. at 474.
[29] Id. at 44-45. [73] Id. at 452.
[30] Id. at 52. [74] Id. at 453.
[31] TSN dated January 18, 2001, pp. 2-4. [75] Id. at 473.
[32] Id. at 5-6.
[33] TSN dated April 18, 2001, pp. 1- 28.

Page 23 of 51
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this
case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the
inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving
the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the
deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration
that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone
the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to
Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish
laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the
laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation
or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the
intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature
of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are
not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any
evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of
evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
(Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on
this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred
the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony
requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into
consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce
competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this
particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question
which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein
appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in
will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part
of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen,
this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by
free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in
acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my
will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in
this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this
request.
Page 24 of 51
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to
comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has
not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his
legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article
792 of the civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be

considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in
any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such
national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which
shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void,
being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are
perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the
testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the
distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted
by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any
pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.

Page 25 of 51
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon.
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated
September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the executor,
directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600
paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime,
and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs.
Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the
testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951
and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No.
665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN,
now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any
way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who,
from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the
said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as
well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter,
the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney),
now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of
my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final
account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it
denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of
the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that
the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the
internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign
elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were
decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that
the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged
that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child
of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights
and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his
property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176
P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record
Page 26 of 51
on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various
motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY,
IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL
LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE
LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE
OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO
THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-
HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question
that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the
following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29,
1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines,
as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S.
Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San
Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines
until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and
stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he
resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year
1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United
States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years
later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese
Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation,
in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines
in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp.
Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-
l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now in question
herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5,
1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30,
1953. (pp. 2-3)
Page 27 of 51
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we
are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and
resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned
to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in
that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines
and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it
is used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich
on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never
lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States
(not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared
that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in
accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of
Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the
same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown,
has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place
where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no
domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time,
certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business
which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might
properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a
resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing
only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home,"
he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of
choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used
with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the
most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the
only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law
of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the
meaning of the term "national law"is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in
the United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its
citizens only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply
to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the
State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the
executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of
his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the
provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by
the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied.
We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the
other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness.
(Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that
as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law
thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the determination
of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
Page 28 of 51
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith
and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule
of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the
reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to
the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to
accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois
which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having
determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of
references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers. The
opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of
Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal
law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution
avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted
the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the
second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the
opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to
internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their
respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to
achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the
two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to
whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the
doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum.
In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,
judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been
brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment
would be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts
would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts
accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title
to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is
challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the
land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the
forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a
person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every
court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid
everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving
movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question
arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the
rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for
an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by
hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would
show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this
property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open
to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to
intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply
the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is
what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it
will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-
of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule
of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This
is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process
is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to
as governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the
rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be
resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the
courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion
by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been
descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
Page 29 of 51
 "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative
answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the
foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S.
872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced.
The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in
determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law
of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then
apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other
jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of
the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2
Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its
application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law
Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are
quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict
of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or
internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of
laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the
whole of its law.
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International
Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the
application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court
shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to
bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and
desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law
of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in
question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent,
which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the
same system of law.
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal
estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance
with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of
Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with
the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality that is the English
law he must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule,
while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly,
each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman
should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of
its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid
down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with
foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law
that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the
person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and
leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law
of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked
to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the
law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical
that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in
case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity
of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is
not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary
state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general
convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point:
'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal
application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of
the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse
and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary
lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than
ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Page 30 of 51
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine
as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents internal law of California..
therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that
We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law
we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California
in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply
the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
domiciled abroad. Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in
the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code
refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the
contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of
the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in
the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our
Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article
946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the
testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the
law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed
back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent
was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its
own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4)
and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged
forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40
Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock,
52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support
the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e.,
the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States
but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there
exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with
Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of

California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his

Page 31 of 51
G.R. No. L-10907 June 29, 1957
AUREA MATIAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PRIMITIVO L. GONZALEZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
J. Gonzales Orense for petitioner.
Venancio H. Aquino for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Aurea Matias seeks a writ of certiorari to annul certain orders of Hon.
Primitivo L. Gonzales, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, in
connection with Special Proceedings No. 5213 of said court, entitled "Testate Estate
of the Deceased Gabina Raquel."
On May 15, 1952, Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a petition for
the probate of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt,
Gabina Raquel, who died single on May 8, 1952, at the age of 92 years. The heir to
the entire estate of the deceased except the properties bequeathed to her other
niece and nephews, namely, Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud, Policarpio Salud,
Santos Matias and Rafael Matias is, pursuant to said instrument, Aurea Matias,
likewise, appointed therein as executrix thereof, without bond. Basilia Salud, a first
cousin of the deceased, opposed the probate of her alleged will, and, after
appropriate proceedings, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued an
order, dated February 8, 1956, sustaining said opposition and denying the petition
for probate. Subsequently, Aurea Matias brought the matter on appeal to this Court
(G.R. No. L-10751), where it is now pending decision.
Meanwhile, or on February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud moved for the dismissal of
Horacio Rodriguez, as special administrator of the estate of the deceased, and the
appointment, in his stead of Ramon Plata. The motion was set for hearing on
February 23, 1956, on which date the court postponed the hearing to February 27,
1956. Although notified of this order, Rodriguez did not appear on the date last
mentioned. Instead, he filed an urgent motion praying for additional time within
which to answer the charges preferred against him by Basilia Salud and for another
postponement of said hearing. This motion was not granted, and Basilia Salud
introduced evidence in support of said charges, whereupon respondent Judge by an
order, dated February 27, 1956, found Rodriguez guilty of abuse of authority and
gross negligence, and, accordingly, relieved him as special administrator of the
estate of the deceased and appointed Basilia Salud as special administratrix thereof,
to "be assisted and advised by her niece, Miss Victorina Salud," who "shall always
act as aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud." Said order, likewise, provided
that "Basilia Salud shall be helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . . who is hereby appointed
as co-administrator."
On March 8, 1956, Aurea Matins asked that said order of February 27, 1956, be set
aside and that she be appointed special co-administratrix, jointly with Horacio
Rodriguez, upon the ground that Basilia Salud is over eighty (80) years of age,
totally blind and physically incapacitated to perform the duties of said office, and
that said movant is the universal heiress of the deceased and the person appointed by
the latter as executrix of her alleged will. This motion was denied in an order dated
March 10, 1956, which maintained "the appointment of the three above named
persons" Basilia Salud, Ramon Plata and Victorina Salud "for the
management of the estate of the late Gabina Raquel pending final decision on the
probate of the alleged will of said decedent." However, on March 17, 1956, Basilia
Salud tendered her resignation as special administratrix by reason of physical
disability, due to old age, and recommended the appointment, in her place, of
Victorina Salud. Before any action could be taken thereon, or on March 21, 1956,
Aurea Matias sought a reconsideration of said order of March 10, 1956. Moreover,
on March 24, 1956, she expressed her conformity to said resignation, but objected to
the appointment, in lieu of Basilia Salud, of Victorina Salud, on account of her
antagonism to said Aurea Matias she (Victorina Salud) having been the principal
and most interested witness for the opposition to the probate of the alleged will of
the deceased and proposed that the administration of her estate be entrusted to the
Philippine National Bank, the Monte de Piedad, the Bank of the Philippine Islands,
or any other similar institution authorized by law therefor, should the court be
reluctant to appoint the movant as special administratrix of said estate. This motion
for reconsideration was denied on March 26, 1956.
Shortly afterwards, or on June 18, 1956, respondents Ramon Plata and Victorina
Salud requested authority to collect the rents due, or which may be due, to the estate
of the deceased and to collect all the produce of her lands, which was granted on
June 23, 1956. On June 27, 1956, said respondents filed another motion praying for
permission to sell the palay of the deceased then deposited in different rice mills in
the province of Cavite, which respondent judge granted on June 10, 1956. Later on,
or on July 10, 1956, petitioner instituted the present action against Judge Gonzales,
and Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata, for the purpose of annulling the above
mentioned orders of respondent Judge, upon the ground that the same had been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In support of this pretense, it is argued that petitioner should have preference in the
choice of special administratrix of the estate of the decedent, she (petitioner) being
the universal heiress to said estate and, the executrix appointed in the alleged will of
the deceased, that until its final disallowance which has not, as yet, taken place
she has a special interest in said estate, which must be protected by giving
representation thereto in the management of said estate; that, apart from denying her
Page 32 of 51
any such representation, the management was given to persons partial to her main
opponent, namely, Basilia Salud, inasmuch as Victorina Salud is allied to her and
Ramon Plata is a very close friend of one of her (Basilia Salud's) attorneys; that
Basilia Salud was made special administratrix despite her obvious unfitness for said
office, she being over eighty (80) years of age and blind; that said disability is borne
out by the fact that on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud resigned as special
administratrix upon such ground; that the Rules of Court do not permit the
appointment of more than one special administrator; that Horacio Rodriguez was
removed without giving petitioner a chance to be heard in connection therewith; and
that Ramon Plata and Victorina Salud were authorized to collect the rents due to the
deceased and the produce of her lands, as well to sell her palay, without previous
notice to the petitioner herein.
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that respondent Judge acted with the
scope of his jurisdiction and without any abuse of discretion; that petitioner can not
validly claim any special interest in the estate of the deceased, because the probate
of the alleged will and testament of the latter upon which petitioner relies has
been denied; that Horacio Rodriguez was duly notified of the proceedings for his
removal; and that Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata have not done anything that
would warrant their removal.
Upon a review of the record, we find ourselves unable to sanction fully the acts of
respondent Judge, for the following reasons:
1. Although Horacio Rodriguez had notice of the hearing of the motion for his
removal, dated February 17, 1956, the record shows that petitioner herein received
copy of said motion of February 24, 1956, or the date after that set for the hearing
thereof. Again, notice of the order of respondent Judge, dated February 23, 1956,
postponing said hearing to February 27, 1956, was not served on petitioner herein.
2. In her motion of February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud prayed for the dismissal of
Horacio Rodriguez, and the appointment of Ramon Plata, as special administrator of
said estate. Petitioner had, therefore, no notice that her main opponent, Basilia
Salud, and the latter's principal witness, Victorina Salud, would be considered for
the management of said. As a consequence, said petitioner had no opportunity to
object to the appointment of Basilia Salud as special administratrix, and of Victorina
Salud, as her assistant and adviser, and the order of February 27, 1956, to this effect,
denied due process to said petitioner.
3. Said order was issued with evident knowledge of the physical disability of Basilia
Salud. Otherwise respondent Judge would not have directed that she "be assisted and
advised by her niece Victorina Salud," and that the latter "shall always act as aide,
interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud."
4. Thus, respondent Judge, in effect, appointed three (3) special administrators
Basilia Salud, Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata. Indeed, in the order of March 10,
1956, respondent Judge maintained "the appointment of the three (3) above-named
persons for the management of the estate of the late Gabina Raquel."
5. Soon after the institution of said Special Proceedings No. 5213, an issue arose
between Aurea Matias and Basilia Salud regarding the person to be appointed
special administrator of the estate of the deceased. The former proposed Horacio
Rodriguez, whereas the latter urged the appointment of Victorina Salud. By an order
dated August 11, 1952, the Court, then presided over by Hon. Jose Bernabe, Judge,
decided the matter in favor of Horacio Rodriguez and against Victorina Salud, upon
the ground that, unlike the latter, who, as a pharmacist and employee in the Santa
Isabel Hospital, resides In the City of Manila, the former, a practicing lawyer and a
former public prosecutor, and later, mayor of the City of Cavite, is a resident
thereof. In other words, the order of resident thereof. In other words, the order of
respondent Judge of February 27, 1956, removing Rodriguez and appointing
Victorina Salud to the management of the estate, amounted to a reversal of the
aforementioned order of Judge Bernabe of August 11, 1952.
6. Although the probate of the alleged will and testament of Gabina Raquel was
denied by respondent Judge, the order to this effect is not, as yet, final and
executory. It is pending review on appeal taken by Aurea Matias. The probate of
said alleged will being still within realm of legal possibility, Aurea Matias has as
the universal heir and executrix designated in said instrument a special interest to
protect during the pendency of said appeal. Thus, in the case of Roxas vs.
Pecson* (46 Off. Gaz., 2058), this Court held that a widow, designated as executrix
in the alleged will and testament of her deceased husband, the probate of which had
denied in an order pending appeal, "has . . . the same beneficial interest after the
decision of the court disapproving the will, which is now pending appeal, because
the decision is not yet final and may be reversed by the appellate court."
7. The record shows that there are, at least two (2) factions among the heirs of the
deceased, namely, one, represented by the petitioner, and another, to which Basilia
Salud and Victorina Salud belong. Inasmuch as the lower court had deemed it best
to appoint more than one special administrator, justice and equity demands that both
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased.
The rule, laid down in Roxas vs. Pecson (supra), to the effect that "only one special
administrator may be appointed to administrator temporarily" the estate of the
deceased, must be considered in the light of the facts obtaining in said case. The
lower court appointed therein one special administrator for some properties forming
part of said estate, and a special administratrix for other properties thereof. Thus,
there were two (2) separate and independent special administrators. In the case at bar
Page 33 of 51
there is only one (1) special administration, the powers of which shall be exercised
jointly by two special co-administrators. In short, the Roxas case is not squarely in
point. Moreover, there are authorities in support of the power of courts to appoint
several special co-administrators (Lewis vs. Logdan, 87 A. 750; Harrison vs. Clark,
52 A. 514; In re Wilson's Estate, 61 N.Y.S. 2d., 49; Davenport vs. Davenport, 60 A.
379).

Wherefore, the orders complained of are hereby annulled and set aside. The lower
court should re-hear the matter of removal of Horacio Rodriguez and appointment of
special administrators, after due notice to all parties concerned, for action in
conformity with the views expressed herein, with costs against respondents
Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Reyes, J.B.L. and Felix, JJ.,concur.

Page 34 of 51
G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911
BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant.
Valerio Fontanilla and Andres Asprer for appellant.
Anacleto Diaz for appellees.
CARSON, J.:
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the
instrument propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the
subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the
time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures;
or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large room
connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain
which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the
other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.
A majority of the members of the court is of opinion that this subscribing witness
was in the small room with the testator and the other subscribing witnesses at the
time when they attached their signatures to the instrument, and this finding, of
course, disposes of the appeal and necessitates the affirmance of the decree
admitting the document to probate as the last will and testament of the deceased.
The trial judge does not appear to have considered the determination of this question
of fact of vital importance in the determination of this case, as he was of opinion that
under the doctrine laid down in the case of Jaboneta vs. Gustilo (5 Phil. Rep., 541)
the alleged fact that one of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer room when the
testator and the other describing witnesses signed the instrument in the inner room,
had it been proven, would not be sufficient in itself to invalidate the execution of the
will. But we are unanimously of opinion that had this subscribing witness been
proven to have been in the outer room at the time when the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses attached their signatures to the instrument in the inner room, it
would have been invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under
circumstances not being done "in the presence" of the witness in the outer room.
This because the line of vision from this witness to the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses would necessarily have been impeded by the curtain
separating the inner from the outer one "at the moment of inscription of each
signature."
In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:
The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution
of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they
might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so,
considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation
to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each
other at the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they
may see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that
the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the
instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been
able to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions
or existing conditions. The evidence in the case relied upon by the trial judge
discloses that "at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he
was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Jaboneta
that he could see everything that took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper
direction and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so." And the
decision merely laid down the doctrine that the question whether the testator and the
subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each
other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon
the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment
existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by
merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign.
To extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all manner
of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this
particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the execution
of a will.
The decree entered by the court below admitting the instrument propounded therein
to probate as the last will and testament of Pedro Rimando, deceased, is affirmed
with costs of this instance against the appellant.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
Page 35 of 51
G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973
AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I,
Court of First Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.
Paul G. Gorrez for petitioner.
Mario D. Ortiz for respondent Manuel B. Lugay.
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu
allowing the probate of the last will a testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz.
Petitioner-appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the said decease
opposed the allowance of the will (Exhibit "E"), alleging the will was executed
through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said
instrument was execute without the testator having been fully informed of the
content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the
supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law.
Notwithstanding her objection, the Court allowed the probate of the said last will
and testament Hence this appeal by certiorari which was given due course.
The only question presented for determination, on which the decision of the case
hinges, is whether the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit
"E") was executed in accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the
new Civil Code, the first requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and
subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to
acknowledge the will before a notary public.
Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr.
Francisco Paares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at
the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been
acknowledged. Reduced to simpler terms, the question was attested and subscribed
by at least three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other,
considering that the three attesting witnesses must appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the same. As the third witness is the notary public himself, petitioner
argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public to
acknowledge the will. On the other hand, private respondent-appellee, Manuel B.
Lugay, who is the supposed executor of the will, following the reasoning of the trial
court, maintains that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirement of
having at least three attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of
them, bolstering up his stand with 57 American Jurisprudence, p. 227 which, insofar
as pertinent, reads as follows:
It is said that there are, practical reasons for upholding a will as
against the purely technical reason that one of the witnesses
required by law signed as certifying to an acknowledgment of
the testator's signature under oath rather than as attesting the
execution of the instrument.
After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties, We are inclined to
sustain that of the appellant that the last will and testament in question was not
executed in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he
cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge
before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma, 97 Phil. 258, 262; Castro v. Castro,
100 Phil. 239, 247); to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in
front or preceding in space or ahead of. (The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary
of the English Language, p. 72; Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the
English Language, p. 252; Webster's New International Dictionary 2d. p. 245.)
Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to
avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be
done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before
the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such
a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any
illegal or immoral arrangement Balinon v. De Leon, 50 0. G. 583.) That function
would defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses.
For them he would be interested sustaining the validity of the will as it directly
involves him and the validity of his own act. It would place him in inconsistent
position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud
(Report of Code Commission p. 106-107), would be thwarted.
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may, in
addition, act as a witness to the executive of the document he has notarized.
(Mahilum v. Court Appeals, 64 0. G. 4017; 17 SCRA 482; Sawyer v. Cox, 43 Ill.
130). There are others holding that his signing merely as notary in a will nonetheless
makes him a witness thereon (Ferguson v. Ferguson, 47 S. E. 2d. 346; In Re
Douglas Will, N. Y. S. 2d. 641; Ragsdal v. Hill, 269 S. W. 2d. 911, Tyson
Utterback, 122 So. 496; In Re Baybee's Estate 160 N. 900; W. Merill v. Boal, 132
Page 36 of 51
A. 721; See also Trenwith v. Smallwood, 15 So. 1030). But these authorities do not
serve the purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein
because the notaries public and witnesses referred to aforecited cases merely acted
as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses, and not
as acknowledging witnesses. He the notary public acted not only as attesting witness
but also acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805 of the Civil
Code which reads:

ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary

public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall
not be required to retain a copy of the will or file another with
the office of the Clerk of Court. [Emphasis supplied]

To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and
acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting
witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article 80
be requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which
requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before
the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be, as has been said, that
only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose. In the
circumstances, the law would not be duly in observed.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and
the probate of the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") is
declared not valid and hereby set aside.

Cost against the appellee.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur

Page 37 of 51
G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX
BALANAY, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B.
LANABAN, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioner.
Jose B. Guyo for private respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his
mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding and ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors
(Special Case No. 1808). The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in
Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix
Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina
B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia
B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for
the probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in
English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the
"southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of
two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was
her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her
properties (Par. IV).
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was
eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands
(which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the
manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal
lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one
half share of the conjugal assets. *
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the
grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband
and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that
Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the
testatrix.
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of
Felix Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the
probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same
date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of
Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of
respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her
estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the
agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal
properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
"conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June
18, 1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It
gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated
August 28, 1973 it appointed its branch clerk of court as special administrator of the
decedent's estate.
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18,
1973 on the grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of
the southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal
estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr.,
through his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court
denied it in its order of October 15, 1973.
In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaa, Sr.,
claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was
Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to
withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to
proceed by intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaa claimed to be the
lawyer not only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo,
Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Montaa in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the
conjugal assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed
Page 38 of 51
that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into
an intestate proceeding. In another motion of the same date he asked that the
corresponding notice to creditors be issued.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their
comments dated October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for
the issuance of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for
being contrary to law and that an intestacy be declared.
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaa, assumed that the issuance
of a notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It
adopted the view of Attys. Montaa and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order
of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate
proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors
and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court
did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to
creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the
Davao Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be
held in abeyance.
Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion
dated April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of
February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaa had no authority to withdraw
the petition for the allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a
letter dated March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty. Montaa and signed by Felix
Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon,
wherein they terminated Montaa's services and informed him that his withdrawal of
the petition for the probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to
their repeated reminder to him that their mother's will was "very sacred" to them.
Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration.
The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it
declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its
provisions and not because of Atty. Montaa's arguments.
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in
declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which
are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for
probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's
authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic
validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will
might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs.
Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-
23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30,
1965, 13 SCRA 693).1wph1.t
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the
will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding
notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the
surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary
rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does
not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that
the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid
disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the
provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they
can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or
interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the
beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands
is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was
inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty
and Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration does not nullify the
entire will. It may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the
legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which
reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory
heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any
agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may
avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering
Page 39 of 51
 that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is
not assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six
children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal
share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in
article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On
the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years.
So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime
would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless
there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil
Code).
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share
of the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said
renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in
the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations
prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should
be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his
legitime should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is
intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not
prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would
become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net
income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his
wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share
became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of
validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course,
to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a
will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will,
should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention". Under article 930
of the Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is
void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the
thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will,
afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to
partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is
true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170,
Civil Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has
become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix
instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void
because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil
Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the
preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and
there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil
Code).1wph1.t
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did
not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and
renounced his hereditary rights. .
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as
contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case
where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass
first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is
mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil.
249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament
is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate
should be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the
state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of
the parties affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200,
August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565).
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal
law in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33
SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will
render a testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that
will nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will
evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole
estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the
Page 40 of 51
wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be
varied for the purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27,
1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762).
As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed
and the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs.
Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).
The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will
because any disposition therein is better than that which the law can make (Castro
vs. Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).
Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to
creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The
record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in
order if only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, in providing that "immediately after granting letters of testamentary
or of administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having
money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said
court" clearly contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular administrator
and not that of a special administrator.
It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims
against the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and
sec. 1, Rule 88, Rules of Court).
We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its
branch clerk of court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice
because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court
are in cahoots in milking the decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court
commit any abuse or devastavit in the course of his administration, the probate
Judge might find it difficult to hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee
should devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline
the administration of a decedent's estate.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set
aside and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is
affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case
No. 1808 in consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* The pertinent provisions of the will are as follows:
"II. That I am the absolute owner of the southern half of the
following conjugal properties which I acquired during my
married life with my husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., namely: (Here
follows an enumeration of nine lots).1wph1.t
"III. I am the absolute owner of the following paraphernal
properties which I inherited from my deceased father, Cecilio
Julian, namely: (Here follows a description of two lots).
"IV. It is my desire and I direct that in the interest of my family,
my properties shall not be divided among my heirs during the
lifetime of my husband, Felix Balanay, Sr. but should be kept
intact. The respective legitimes of my husband and my children
should be paid in cash out of the proceeds of sale of the produce
and rents derived from said properties.
"V. After the death of my husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., my
properties shall be divided and distributed in the manner as
follows:" (Here follows a partition of the nine conjugal lots and
the two paraphernal lots. The testatrix divided among her six
children not only her two paraphernal lots, one of which she
devised to Emilia Pabaonon and the other lot to Felix Balanay,
Jr., but also the nine conjugal lots. She did not restrict the
partition to her one-half conjugal share but included her
husband's one-half share.).
Page 41 of 51
G.R. No. 141882 March 11, 2005
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L.
TEVES, Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Once again, the Court is faced with the perennial conflict of property claims
between two sets of heirs, a conflict ironically made grievous by the fact that the
decedent in this case had resorted to great lengths to allocate which properties
should go to which set of heirs.
This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the Decision1 dated 30 September 1999 of the
Court of Appeals which reversed the Decision2 dated 7 May 1993 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, of Bais City, Negros Oriental.
The factual antecedents follow.
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia
Baena (Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio).
Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa Teves Escao (Josefa)
and Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio,
namely: Maria Evelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio Teves
(Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves (Milagros Reyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves
(Pedro).3
The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred and fifty-
four (954) square meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was
originally registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and
Antonia under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of Deeds
of Bais City. When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an
action for partition and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 entitled "Josefa
Teves Escao v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al." 4 Milagros Donio, the second
wife of Don Julian, participated as an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case
entered into a Compromise Agreement5 which embodied the partition of all the
properties of Don Julian.
On the basis of the compromise agreement and approving the same, the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District, rendered
a Decision6 dated 31 January 1964. The CFI decision declared a tract of land known
as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian and
his two (2) children of the first marriage. The property was to remain undivided
during the lifetime of Don Julian.7 Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other
properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the "movie property," the commercial
areas, and the house where Don Julian was living. The remainder of the properties
was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.
Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the present dispute, lays
down the effect of the eventual death of Don Julian vis--vis his heirs:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties hereinafter
adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the
properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its
accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their
one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the
legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of
the other half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves. In other
words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves
(not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall
exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L.
Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two
acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes
Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and
Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis supplied)
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of
Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities8 in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc.
(petitioner). Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an
instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the
Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental Deed)9 dated 31 July 1973. This instrument
which constitutes a supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred
ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties, in favor of petitioner. 10 On 14
April 1974, Don Julian died intestate.
On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner sought the
registration of the subject lot in its name. A court, so it appeared, issued an
order11 cancelling OCT No. 5203 in the name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia on
12 November 1979, and on the same date TCT No. T-375 was issued in the name of
petitioner.12 Since then, petitioner has been paying taxes assessed on the subject
lot.13
Page 42 of 51
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession
over the subject lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they
entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria
Cadayday, respondents herein.14 On Lot No. 63, respondents temporarily established
their home and constructed a lumber yard. Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her
children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate15 dated 18 March
1980. In the deed of partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros Donio and her
two (2) children, Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the subject lot was
already registered in the name of petitioner in 1979, respondents bought Lot No. 63
from Milagros Donio as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Estate16 dated 9 November 1983.
At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale,
respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner.
Thus, they failed to register the deed.17
Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a complaint before the RTC Branch 45
of Bais City, seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-375 in
the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in their names, plus
damages.18
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by respondents. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, this
Court finds judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff,
and thus hereby orders:
(1) That complaint be dismissed;
(2) That plaintiffs vacate the subject land, particularly identified
as Lot No. 63 registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-375;
(3) That plaintiffs pay costs.
Finding no basis on the counterclaim by defendant, the same is hereby
ordered dismissed.19
The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on the
interpretation of paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement.20 It added that the
direct adjudication of the properties listed in the Compromise Agreement was only in
favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage, Josefa and
Emilio.21Paragraph 13 served only as an amplification of the terms of the
adjudication in favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage.
According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor of Josefa and Emilio
comprised their shares in the estate of their deceased mother Antonia, as well as
their potential share in the estate of Don Julian upon the latters death. Thus, upon
Don Julians death, Josefa and Emilio could not claim any share in his estate, except
their proper share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa which was adjudicated in
favor of Don Julian in the Compromise Agreement. As such, the properties
adjudicated in favor of Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa, were free
from the forced legitimary rights of Josefa and Emilio, and Don Julian was under no
impediment to allocate the subject lot, among his other properties, to Milagros
Donio and her four (4) children.22
The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words "shall be," the
adjudication in favor of Milagros Donio and her four (4) children was not final and
operative, as the lot was still subject to future disposition by Don Julian during his
lifetime.23 It cited paragraph 1424 of the Compromise Agreement in support of his
conclusion.25 With Lot No. 63 being the conjugal property of Don Julian and
Antonia, the trial court also declared that Milagros Donio and her children had no
hereditary rights thereto except as to the conjugal share of Don Julian, which they
could claim only upon the death of the latter.26
The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julians death on 14 April 1974, Lot No.
63 was no longer a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on
31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a proper subject of extrajudicial
partition by Milagros Donio and her children, and not being the owners they could
not have sold it. Had respondents exercised prudence before buying the subject lot
by investigating the registration of the same with the Registry of Deeds, they would
have discovered that five (5) years earlier, OCT No. 5203 had already been
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner, the trial court
added.27
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial courts decision. The decretal part
of the appellate decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375 registered in the name of J.L.T.
Agro, Inc. as null and void.
Page 43 of 51
 With costs against defendant J.L.T. Agro, Inc. represented by its Manager,
Julian L. Teves.
SO ORDERED.28
Per the appellate court, the Compromise Agreement incorporated in CFI decision
dated 31 January 1964, particularly paragraph 13 thereof, determined, adjudicated
and reserved to Don Julians two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate
except as regards his (Don Julians) share in Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa. 29 The
two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and possession of the properties
respectively adjudicated to them in the CFI decision and Don Julian himself could
no longer dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63. The disposition in the CFI
decision constitutes res judicata.30 Don Julian could have disposed of only his
conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.31
The appellate court likewise emphasized that nobody in his right judgment would
preterit his legal heirs by simply executing a document like the Supplemental
Deed which practically covers all properties which Don Julian had reserved in favor
of his heirs from the second marriage. It also found out that the blanks reserved for
the Book No. and Page No. at the upper right corner of TCT No. T-375, "to identify
the exact location where the said title was registered or transferred," were not filled
up, thereby indicating that the TCT is "spurious and of dubious origin."32
Aggrieved by the appellate courts decision, petitioner elevated it to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari, raising pure questions of law.
Before this Court, petitioner assigns as errors the following rulings of the appellate
court, to wit: (a) that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved
prior to the death of Don Julian; (b) that Don Julian had no right to dispose of or
assign Lot No. 63 to petitioner because he reserved the same for his heirs from the
second marriage pursuant to the Compromise Agreement; (c) that the Supplemental
Deed was tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the second marriage; and (d)
that TCT No. T-375 in the name of petitioner is spurious for not containing entries
on the Book No. and Page No.33
While most of petitioners legal arguments have merit, the application of the
appropriate provisions of law to the facts borne out by the evidence on record
nonetheless warrants the affirmance of the result reached by the Court of Appeals in
favor of respondents.
Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of the Compromise
Agreement has to be quoted again:
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein
adjudicated to Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the
properties comprised as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its
accessories and accessions) shall be understood as including not only their
one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the
legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of
the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.Teves. In other words,
the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not
including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall
exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L.
Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his
two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro
Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio
Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves." (Emphasis supplied)
With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of Appeals ruled that the adjudication
in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage became automatically
operative upon the approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting on them
the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in favor of respondents.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be
determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. The Court
agrees. Our declaration in Blas v. Santos34 is relevant, where we defined future
inheritance as any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at
the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession.
Article 1347 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides:
ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men,
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which
are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy may likewise be the object of a contract.
Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside
the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no
contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to
the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.35
Page 44 of 51
For the inheritance to be considered "future," the succession must not have been
opened at the time of the contract.36 A contract may be classified as a contract upon
future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the
following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened;
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a
right which is purely hereditary in nature.37
The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception
and therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter
vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
....
In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if the
partition is made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the
Article.38 The partition will of course be effective only after death. It does not
necessarily require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is
the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the formalities of a donation be
required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here after
death; since no will has been made it follows that the mode will be succession
(intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is merely the physical
determination of the part to be given to each heir.39
The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article 1056 40 of
the old Civil Code. The only change in the provision is that Article 1080 now
permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by
act inter vivos. This was intended to abrogate the then prevailing doctrine that for a
testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all
the formalities provided by law.41
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to
partition inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this
partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special
character, sui generis, which is revocable at any time by the causante during his
lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. It derives its
binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the will of the owner of the
property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the
forced heirs.42
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid
pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally
operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second
marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was
but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of succession to the property of their
father. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest by its nature was
inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at
the time nonexistent and might never exist.43
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No.
63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since
ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage
at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the
absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by
Milagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated
to them by virtue of the compromise agreement.
Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had validly
transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The lower court ruled
that he had done so through the Supplemental Deed. The appellate court disagreed,
holding that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, containing as it does a prohibited
preterition of Don Julians heirs from the second marriage. Petitioner contends that
the ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention is well-founded.
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not
naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting
him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of
the properties.44 It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from
inheritance.45 It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory
heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not
giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting
him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case.46 But there is no preterition
where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there
was no total omission of a forced heir.47
Page 45 of 51
In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court
approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of
preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal
heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the
second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of
provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julians desire along
this line.48Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julians heirs from the
second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is
unfounded.
Despite the debunking of respondents argument on preterition, still the petition
would ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer effected by Don
Julian to petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was also the president and director of
petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer thereof.
There is of course no legal prohibition against such a transfer to a family
corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such transfer
would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her children
could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title which necessarily must
have emanated from it have to be subjected to incisive and detailed examination.
Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein.49 A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct
statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its
owner.50
To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title establishes, a
sufficient and convincing quantum of evidence on the defect of the title must be
adduced to overcome the predisposition in law in favor of a holder of a Torrens title.
Thus, contrary to the appellate courts ruling, the appearance of a mere thumbmark
of Don Julian instead of his signature in the Supplemental Deed would not affect the
validity of petitioners title for this Court has ruled that a thumbmark is a recognized
mode of signature.51
The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in the name of Julian
by T.C.T. No. T-375 is marred by a grave irregularity which is also an illegality, as
it contravenes the orthodox, conventional and normal process established by law.
And, worse still, the illegality is reflected on the face of both titles. Where, as in this
case, the transferee relies on a voluntary instrument to secure the issuance of a new
title in his name such instrument has to be presented to the Registry of Deeds. This
is evident from Sections 53 and 57 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or
the Property Registration Decree. The sections read, thus:
SEC. 53. Presentation of owners duplicate upon entry of new certificate.
No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds
unless the owners duplicate certificate is presented with such
instrument, except in cases expressly provided for in this Decree or upon
order of the court, for cause shown. (Emphasis supplied)
....
SEC. 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances. An owner desiring to
convey his registered land in fee simple shall execute and register a deed
of conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall
thereafter make out in the registration book a new certificate of title to the
grantee and shall prepare and deliver to him an owners duplicate
certificate. The Register of Deeds shall note upon the original and
duplicate certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of the
registration book in which the new certificate is registered and a reference
by number to the last preceding certificate. The original and the owners
duplicate of the grantors certificate shall be stamped "cancelled." The
deed of conveyance shall be filed and endorsed with the number and
the place of registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed.
(Emphasis supplied)
As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental Deed, it should
have presented it to the Register of Deeds to secure the transfer of the title in its
name. Apparently, it had not done so. There is nothing on OCT No. 5203 or on the
succeeding TCT No. T-375 either which shows that it had presented
the Supplemental Deed. In fact, there is absolutely no mention of a reference to said
document in the original and transfer certificates of title. It is in this regard that the
finding of the Court of Appeals concerning the absence of entries on the blanks
intended for the Book No. and Page No. gains significant relevance. Indeed, this
aspect fortifies the conclusion that the cancellation of OCT No. 5203 and the
consequent issuance of TCT No. T-375 in its place are not predicated on a valid
transaction.
What appears instead on OCT No. 5203 is the following pertinent entry:
Entry No. 1374: Kind: Order: Executed in favor of J.L.T. AGRO, INC.
Page 46 of 51
 CONDITIONS: Lost owners duplicate is hereby cancelled, and
null and void and a new Certificate of Title No. 375 is issued per
Order of the Court of First Instance on file in this office.
Date of Instrument: November 12, 1979
Date of Inscription: Nov. 12, 1979 4:00 P.M.
(SGD) MANUEL C. MONTESA
Acting Deputy Register of Deeds II
(Emphasis supplied)52
What the entry indicates is that the owners duplicate of OCT No. 5203 was lost, a
petition for the reconstitution of the said owners duplicate was filed in court, and
the court issued an order for the reconstitution of the owners duplicate and its
replacement with a new one. But if the entry is to be believed, the court concerned
(CFI, according to the entry) issued an order for the issuance of a new title which is
TCT No. T-375 although the original of OCT No. 5203 on file with the Registry of
Deeds had not been lost.
Going by the legal, accepted and normal process, the reconstitution court may order
the reconstitution and replacement of the lost title only, nothing else. Since what was
lost is the owners copy of OCT No. 5203, only that owners copy could be ordered
replaced. Thus, the Register of Deeds exceeded his authority in issuing not just a
reconstituted owners copy of the original certificate of title but a new transfer
certificate of title in place of the original certificate of title. But if the court order, as
the entry intimates, directed the issuance of a new transfer certificate of titleeven
designating the very number of the new transfer certificate of title itselfthe order
would be patently unlawful. A court cannot legally order the cancellation and
replacement of the original of the O.C.T. which has not been lost,53 as the petition
for reconstitution is premised on the loss merely of the owners duplicate of the
OCT
Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order as a convenient contrivance to
effect the transfer of title to the subject lot in its name, instead of the Supplemental
Deed which should be its proper course of action. It was so constrained to do
because the Supplemental Deed does not constitute a deed of conveyance of the
"registered land in fee simple" "in a form sufficient in law," as required by Section
57 of P.D. No. 1529.
A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the Supplemental Deed discloses that
the assignment is not supported by any consideration. The provision reads:
....
WHEREAS, in the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of
Liabilities executed by Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T.
Escao at Dumaguete City on 16th day of November 1972 and ratified in
the City of Dumaguete before Notary Public Lenin Victoriano, and
entered in the latters notarial register as Doc. No. 367; Page No. 17; Book
No. V; series of 1972, Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T.
Escao, transferred, conveyed and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., all
its assets and liabilities as reflected in the Balance Sheet of the former as
of December 31, 1971.
WHEREAS, on the compromise agreement, as mentioned in the Decision
made in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial
District Branch II, on Dec. 31, 1964 pertaining to Civil Case No. 3443 the
following properties were adjudicated to Don Julian L. Teves. We quote.
From the properties at Bais
Adjudicated to Don Julian L.Teves
....
Lot No. 63, Tax Dec. No. 33, Certificate of Title No. 5203, together with
all improvements. Assessed value - P2,720.00
....
WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is executed by the parties herein in
order to effect the registration of the transfer of the above corporation.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises the
ASSIGNOR hereby transfers, conveys, and assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO,
INC., the above described parcel of land[s] with a fair market value of
EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P84,000.00), Philippine
Currency, and which transfer, conveyance and assignment shall become
absolute upon signing.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Page 47 of 51
The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the dispositive portion of the instrument
does not represent the consideration for the assignment made by Don Julian. Rather,
it is a mere statement of the fair market value of allthe nineteen (19) properties
enumerated in the instrument, of which Lot No. 63 is just one, that were transferred
by Don Julian in favor of petitioner. Consequently, the testimony55 of petitioners
accountant that the assignment is supported by consideration cannot prevail over the
clear provision to the contrary in the Supplemental Deed.
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, apparently considered the 1948 mortgage
which is annotated on the back of the TCT No. T-375 as the consideration for the
assignment.56 However, the said annotation57 shows that the mortgage was actually
executed in favor of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, not of petitioner. 58 Clearly,
said mortgage, executed as it was in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
and there being no showing that petitioner itself paid off the mortgate obligation,
could not have been the consideration for the assignment to petitioner.
Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid contract,
namely: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject
matter of the contract; and (3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause
produce no effect whatsoever. Those contracts lack an essential element and they are
not only voidable but void or inexistent pursuant to Article 1409, paragraph
(2).59 The absence of the usual recital of consideration in a transaction which
normally should be supported by a consideration such as the assignment made by
Don Julian of all nineteen (19) lots he still had at the time, coupled with the fact that
the assignee is a corporation of which Don Julian himself was also the President and
Director, forecloses the application of the presumption of existence of consideration
established by law.60
Neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a donation. Article 749 of
the New Civil Code is clear on the point, thus:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must
be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and
the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate
public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the
lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be
notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments.
In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al.,61 this Court declared that title to immovable
property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation
until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly
notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of
donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made
in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the
formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to
the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance,
the donation is null and void.
In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public
document,62 the absence of acceptance by the donee in the same deed or even in a
separate document is a glaring violation of the requirement.
One final note. From the substantive and procedural standpoints, the cardinal
objectives to write finis to a protracted litigation and avoid multiplicity of suits are
worth pursuing at all times.63 Thus, this Court has ruled that appellate courts have
ample authority to rule on specific matters not assigned as errors or otherwise not
raised in an appeal, if these are indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of
the pleaded issues.64 Specifically, matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which are necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case, or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice.65
In the instant case, the correct characterization of the Supplemental Deed, i.e.,
whether it is valid or void, is unmistakably determinative of the underlying
controversy. In other words, the issue of validity or nullity of the instrument which
is at the core of the controversy is interwoven with the issues adopted by the parties
and the rulings of the trial court and the appellate court.66 Thus, this Court is also
resolute in striking down the alleged deed in this case, especially as it appears on its
face to be a blatant nullity.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30 September
1999 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner J.L.T.
Agro, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
Page 48 of 51
 16
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. Id. at 102; Exh. D.

17 Rollo, pp. 81-82.

18 Supra note 12.

Footnotes
19 Rollo, p. 89.
1Rollo, pp. 9-24. Decision penned by Justice B. Adefuin-De la Cruz and
concurred in by Justices Fermin Martin, Jr. and Presbitero Velasco, Jr. 20 Id. at 85.
2 Id. at 81-89. Decision penned by Judge Ismael Baldado. 21 Id. at 87.
3Id. at 82. Maria Evelyn and Jose Catalino are the legitimated children of 22Id. at 87.
Don Julian and Milagros Donio while Milagros Reyes and Pedro are their
acknowledged natural children.[3] 23 Id. at 87-88.
4 Id. at 82. 2414. That, however, in the event Julian L. Teves or his heirs above-
5
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph would sell any of the
Id. at 82-83. properties adjudicated to the said Julian L. Teves in this agreement, his
two children of the first marriage, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa Teves
6 Rollo, pp. 69-75. Escao, shall be given the first option and preference to buy said
properties at a price to be agreed upon by the parties only in case, when
7 Ibid. the latter two shall refuse to buy may Julian L. Teves or his heirs already
mentioned sell the same to other third persons. (Emphasis added)
8 Rollo, p. 83. 25 Id. at 88.
9 Records, pp. 77-79. 26 Ibid.
10 Rollo, p. 84. 27 Id. at 89.
11 RTC Records, p. 108. 28 Id. at 24.
12 Id. at 109 and 162; Rollo, p. 84. 29 Id. at 19.
13 Id. at 14. 30 Id. at 22.
14 Balansag died on 16 January 1997. 31 Id. at 23.
15 Records, p. 98; Exh. B.

Page 49 of 51
32 46
Id. at 24. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 187 (1992).

33 47
Id. at 33. Reyes-Barreto v. Barretto-Datu, 125 Phil. 501 (1967).

34 48
111 Phi. 503 (1961). Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement provides in part:

35Perillo, et al v. Perillo, et al., (CA) 48 O.G. 4444, cited in Padilla, Civil . . . . In other words, the properties now selected and
Law, Vol. IV-A, 221 (1988). adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to
36 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 522 (1991). the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four
minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves, his two
37
acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro
Ibid. Reyes Teves and his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn
Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves. (Emphasis
38 Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, 556 (12th ed., 1989). supplied)

39 Paragraph 7 thereof reads:

Ibid.

40
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
41Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon, 144 Phil. 558 (1970); See also Zaragoza v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 106401, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 309, 315-
316. A contrary opinion, however, is advanced by Tolentino and Reyes
and Puno.
42Albela and Aebuya v. Albela and Allones, (CA) G.R. No. 5583-R, June
20, 1951.
43
Johnson v. Breeding, 136 Tenn 528, 190 SW 545.
44
Aznar v. Duncan, 123 Phil. 1450 (1966).
45
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious.
....
7. That the parties shall not demand the partition of the said
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa which shall remain undivided
during the lifetime of Julian L. Teves and shall be under the
joint administration of Julian L. Teves, Josefa T. Escao and
Emilio B. Teves. Monthly reports of the affairs and management
of the hacienda shall be prepared and approved by all. In the
event of death of Julian L. Teves, the Hacienda Medalla
Milagrosa may then be partitioned and the one-half undivided
share which in this agreement pertains to Julian L. Teves may be
divided between his heirs, namely, Emilio B. Teves, Josefa
Teves Escao, the wife in second marriage of Julian L.
Teves, Milagrosa Donio Teves and his four minor children,
the two acknowledged natural, Milagros Reyes Teves and
Pedro Reyes Teves and the other two legitimated children
Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Teves, in the
proportion established by law. (Emphasis supplied)
49
Noblejas and Noblejas, Registration of Land and Titles and Deeds, p.
178 (1986 ed.).
50
Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 326 Phil. 982 (1996).
51Solar v. Diancin, 55 Phil. 479 (1930); De Gala v. Gonzales, 51 Phil. 480
(1928).

Page 50 of 51
52 Records, p. 108. Import and Export Co., Inc. v. Philippine International Surety Co., Inc., 8
SCRA 143; Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 760, October 30, 1969;
53A certified copy of the original OCT No. 5203 is part of the RTC Sociedad Europea de Financion, S.A. v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 105,
Records. See p. 107. January 21, 1991; Larobis v. Court of Appeals, 220 SCRA 639, March 30,
1993; Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196 citing 4 C.J.S. 1734 and 3 C.J.S.
54
1341; Barons Marketing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 96, 108;
Records, pp. 167-168. Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114061, August
3, 1994, 234 SCRA 717, 725; Vda. de Javellana v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
55 No. L-60129, July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 799, 805; Catholic Bishop of
Rollo, pp. 14-16.
Balanga v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 206 (1996) citingSection 16(b),
56 Id. at 22. Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

65
57 Records, p. 108. Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, supra note 63.

66
58
Id. at 162. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation later became Sumipat v. Banga, supra note 60 at 16
Development Bank of the Philippines.

59Padilla, Civil Law, Vol. IV-A, 247-248 (1988). Ocejo, Perez and Co. v.
Flores and Bas, 40 Phil. 921, Escutin v. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922.

Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from
the beginning:

....

(2)Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

....

60Art. 1354. Although the cause is not stated in the contract, it is

presumed that it exists and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary.

61 G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004.

62 Records, p. 169.

63 Sumipat, et al. v. Banga, et al, supra note 60.

64Villegas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129977, February 1, 2001, 351

SCRA 69, 74; Logronio v. Taleseo, 370 Phil. 452 (1999), citing Saura

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