Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
46
THE Trump administration is about to complete its much-awaited comprehensive review of US policies on Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. There is widespread
speculation that the new policy will involve intensified US military operations in Afghanistan, including the addition of several thousand troops, a tougher posture
Questions still abound about Americas strategic objectives in Afghanistan. US generals, who appear to run Afghan policy in the Trump administration so far, have
repeated the usual mantra about eliminating terrorism and militancy. But their strategic objectives, even if not yet endorsed by the US president, now appear to be
much broader than the pacification of Afghanistan and an early exit from there.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the primary aim of the US establishment in Afghanistan is to prop up its client regime in Kabul, neutralise the rival influence
of China, Russia, Iran or Pakistan in Afghanistan and, if needed, to use it as a base to project power in the entire region. As the commanding US general in
While the US and Kabul continue to declare that they favour a negotiated settlement with the Afghan Taliban, they insist on terms that are obviously unacceptable
to the latter, ensuring a continuation of the Afghan conflict. Indeed, the persistence of conflict within Afghanistan and the region creates conditions to promote
what may well be the new strategic objective of the US and India: to disrupt the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and prevent Chinas direct access to the
US demands on Pakistan are no longer limited to the Afghan Taliban or the Haqqanis.
The reported presence of some Afghan Taliban leaders in Quetta, or a few fighters in the scattered hideouts in the forests of Fata, is not critical to the military
outcome in Afghanistan. The insurgency now operates from the vast areas the Taliban and other groups, like the militant Islamic State (IS), control within
Afghanistan.
But Washington blames Pakistan for the military stalemate in Afghanistan for several reasons: one, to explain the US militarys failure; two, to justify escalated US
air and ground operations; three, to pressure Pakistan to take military action against the Afghan Taliban, especially the Haqqanis, and ease the US fight against
them; and four, perhaps to condone the (Indo-Kabul) intervention from Afghan territory to destabilise Pakistan and disrupt the CPEC venture.
Moreover, American demands on Pakistan are no longer limited to the Afghan Taliban or the Haqqanis. Apart from ignoring the achievements of Pakistans several
past and ongoing military operations against various militant groups, the US now also demands Pakistani action against Kashmiri groups to accommodate its
Indian (anti-China) ally. While Indian repression is under way in occupied Kashmir, Pakistan will be loath to act against the Kashmiris. Americas accommodation
of Indias objectives makes it impossible for Islamabad to evolve a strategic agreement with the US on regional peace and security, including Afghanistan.
Numerous reports in the American media have asserted that the US will henceforth rely on sticks rather than incentives to secure Pakistans cooperation against
The actions to punish Pakistan proposed in the US media, think tanks and Congress include:
a) a cut-off of Coalition Support Funds. The US defence secretary has blocked $50 million from the 2016 reimbursement and Congress has enlarged the onerous
conditions (cooperation against the Afghan Taliban, Haqqanis and Kashmiri groups) to release the 2017 CSF allocation which Pakistan will be unable to meet. It
b) cancellation of non-Nato ally status. Since Pakistan is unlikely to buy any advanced US weapons, the impact of this measure would be mostly symbolic.
c) intensified US drone strikes on Pakistan territory. Pakistan reportedly shot down a wayward Iranian drone. Will it shoot down a US drone? Or, conduct
Pakistani drone/air strikes against the TTP and Jamaatul Ahrar (JuA) safe havens in Afghanistan?
d) cross-border operation by US/Afghan forces. This would be a gross violation of Pakistans sovereignty and a dangerous precedent likely to be emulated by India.
e) visa and financial restrictions on designated officials. This will have no meaningful impact. Pakistan could respond with equivalent measures.
f) sanctions against designated entities/agencies. Again, these would mostly have symbolic effect.
g) designation of Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism. This will be a strategic development. It would put Pakistan in the company of Americas enemies: Iran,
North Korea, Sudan and Syria. It could propel Islamabad into open support for the Afghan Taliban and the Kashmiri freedom struggle.
h) US financial restrictions, including on US dollar transactions by Pakistani banks. Pakistan will be obliged to rely on China to avoid an economic collapse.
Apart from reacting to US sanctions, Pakistan could take other calibrated and graduated measures to retaliate against the US sticks.
These could include: a halt or drastic slowdown in the transport of US-Nato supplies to Afghanistan across Pakistan territory; suspension of all/most Afghan
transit trade; ban on over-flights of US, Nato, Afghan and Indian military-related flights to and from Afghanistan; accelerated expulsion of Afghan refugees;
expulsion of identified/suspected US-Nato and Afghan intelligence personnel; withdrawal of recognition from the Kabul regime and formation of an Afghan
government in exile (including the Afghan Taliban and disaffected leaders like Dostum).
India will, without doubt, attempt to take advantage of Pakistan-US tensions. Terrorist attacks by the TTP, JuA and IS against Pakistan could intensify. New Delhi
may feel sufficiently emboldened to actually conduct the vaunted surgical strikes across the LoC. This could ignite a war with Pakistan which will not remain
Pakistans current domestic crisis has restricted its ability to influence the policies of the Trump administration. Yet, the stakes are high. Even at this late stage,
Pakistan should engage the White House and responsible US leaders to clarify positions and explore avenues to avoid a mutually damaging confrontation.
Simultaneously, Islamabad should open urgent consultations with China and other friendly powers to develop a collective response to emerging US policies in