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FINAL TOPIC
Article 1763 (Liability of common carrier for willful act/negligence of co-
passenger/stranger)
Common carrier is liable for injuries of its passenger caused by the willful act or
negligence of co-passenger or stranger PROVIDED: The employees of the common
carrier if only have observed diligence of good father of a family (ordinary diligence)
could have prevented or stopped such willful act/negligence
1. Common carrier not liable for the willful act/negligence of co-
passenger/stranger
(a) Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 52159, December 22, 1989 (p. 134)
Facts: Bus (common carrier) was travelling along the highway when a
stranger (bystander along the highway) hurled stone against the bus and
injured the passenger
Issue No. 1: When injury/death caused by a stranger, what degree of
diligence required of the common carrier in preventing/stopping
injury/death to its passengers?
Held: Diligence of a good father of a family (ordinary diligence)
Issue No. 2: The injured passenger alleged that the common carrier should
have installed grills on the windows in order to prevent injuries to its
passengers caused by a stranger who hurled stone rule on this argument
Held: Passenger is not correct. In this case, remember that the only degree
of diligence required for willful/negligent act of stranger is only diligence of
a good father of a family with such mere ordinary diligence required, to
require the common carrier to install grills on windows would be
unreasonable as such demand would put the common carrier as absolute
insurer of the safety of passenger from willful act/negligence of strangers
Issue No. 3:The common carrier by exercising diligence of good father of a
family to prevent injury/death of passenger through willful act/negligence of
co-passenger/stranger, in what way then that the common carrier could
have remiss from such ordinary diligence in order to make it liable to its
injured/deceased passenger?
Held: When the common carrier notwithstanding it has control, knowledge
or capacity to prevent such willful/negligent act of co-passenger/stranger
but did nothing, then the common carrier is liable(Example: When despite
knowledge of the common carrier that in such particular highway, it is
known to be notorious hurling of stone against travelling vehicles it did
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nothing to protect its passengers such as avoiding such highway and take
instead another safe route if there be any, or if no alternative route, by at
least putting curtain on bus windows and advice the passengers to closed
their respective curtains before approaching such highway)
Opinion: If the sudden act of the passenger in stabbing a fellow passenger is
within the context of force majeure (not foreseen by common carrier)
(Bachelor Express Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 85691, July 31, 1990),
then how much more of the willful act of a stranger who is outside the
common carrier hurled stone against the bus provided such force majeure
is not foreseeable or though foreseeable nevertheless inevitable?
2. Common carrier liable for the willful act/negligence of co-passenger/stranger
(a) Fortune Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119756, March 18, 1999
Principle: An event is not unforeseeable since the common carrier has been
previously informed/warned of such event
Facts: Common carrier collided with a jeepney causing injuries to two (2)
Maranaos. The Constabulary conducted investigation and resulted to an
information that certain Maranaos are planning to take revenge against the
common carrier by burning some of its passenger buses. This information
was made known to the management of the common carrier but despite
such information, no security measures were taken by the common carrier.
Later, in view of such lack of security measure, three (3) armed Maranaos
were able to successfully board one of the buses of the common carrier. The
armed Maranaos seized the bus and ultimately led to the killing of a
passenger (Atty. Caorong).
Issue No. 1: Did the common carrier observed of diligence of a good father
of a family in preventing willful act of the Maranaos who became a co-
passengers causing death to passenger Atty. Caorong?
Held: NO. Despite such information and warning about the plan of revenge
by the Maranaos, the common carrier did not impose security measures
(e.g., non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detector) in determining
passengers with deadly weapons before boarding the bus
Issue No. 2: Whether the act of the armed Maranaos (co-passenger) is within
the context of force majeure/fortuitous event?
Held: NO. A force majeure/fortuitous event is when the event causing
injury/death/damage could not be foreseen, or though foreseeable
nevertheless inevitable. In the case at bar, the event is foreseeable because
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of the information given by Constabulary to the management of the

common carrier that certain Maranaos will take revenge against the
common carrier which should have caused the common carrier into
imposing security measures to avoid such incident (Opinion: Had the
common carrier did not receive information about the plan of revenge by
Maranaos, then such incident could have constituted force
majeure[unforeseeable] provided the act of the Maranaos is grave or
irresistible threat, violence or force [Bachelor Express Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 85691, July 31, 1990])
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CHAPTER 4
DAMAGES for Breach of Contract of Common Carriers

Article 1764 (Damages against common carrier)

Damages in cases comprised in this Section (i.e., Article 1764 to 1766) shall be awarded
in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book concerning damages (i.e., Article 2195 to 2235
[damages referring to Moral, Exemplary, Nominal, Temperate, Actual and
Liquidated).Article 2206 shall apply to the "death of a passenger caused by the
breach of contract of carriage by a common carrier
Note: Sources of obligation which common carrier-employer and driver-employee are
liable to passenger/pedestrian in cases of injury (i.e., three culpas culpa contractual
[breach of contract] against common carrier, culpa aquiliana [quasi-delict/tort] against
common carrier or driver, and culpa criminal [delict/crime] against driver-employee)
1. Article 1764 in relation with Article 2206speaks about liability for damages for
death of the passenger - to wit: (a)death indemnity for P50,000, plus (b) loss
of earning capacity, plus (c) support for a person who is not called to inherit
from the deceased passenger but shall not exceed 5 years, plus (d) moral
damages for the heirs of the deceased passenger
(a) Application of Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 (Sulpicio Lines Inc. vs.
Curso, GR 157009, March 17, 2010; Philtranco vs. Court of Appeals, GR No.
161909, April 25, 2012[p. 159])
General rule: Moral damages are not recoverable in actions for breach of
contract(i.e., all contracts under ObliCon) and in fact Article 2219 where it
enumerates right to recover moral damages does not include moral damages for
breach of contract - EXCEPT:
(a) Article 2220 2nd Sentence NCC: There is fraud, or bad faith on the part of the
defendant (or gross negligence[Far East Bank vs. CA, GR 108164, February
23, 1995] applying Article 2220 2nd Paragraph); or
(b) Under Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 (3) i.e., in breach of contract
of carriage that resulted to death of passenger, moral damages is
recoverable even without proof of fraud/bad faith of the common carrier
(but of course, the common carrier must be proven negligent)
Issue: In breach of contract of carriage of passenger, suppose the passenger did
not die (but merely injured), can the spouse, legitimate/illegitimate descendants
and ascendants still recover moral damages?
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Held: NO because Article 1764 in relation with Article 2206 requires that the
passenger must die UNLESS: Pursuant to Article 2220 2nd Sentence, the
common carrier in breaching its contract of carriage of passenger, acted with
fraud/bad faith (gross negligence)
Issue: In breach of contract of carriage of passenger, suppose the passenger
dies, and the plaintiffs are his brothers and sisters can they claim moral
damages against the common carrier?
Held: NO. Article 2206 (3)includes only spouse, ascendants and descendants, so
that it excludes collateral relatives (inclusio unius est exclusio alterius)
2. Remedies of injured passenger, or heirs of deceased passenger
(a) Civil case for breach of contract of carriage of passenger
Against whom filed: Only against the common carrier, but not against the driver
as the passenger has no contractual relation with him
Burden of proof: After the passenger/heirs proved existence of contract of
carriage plus he is injured/died then pursuant to Article 1756, the common
carrier is presumed at fault/negligent thereby the burden of proof is now
shifted to the common carrier
Quantum of evidence: Preponderance of evidence
Common carrier proved due diligence in the S/S of employees (for common
carrier to avoid/limit its civil liability): Common carrier is still liable for damages
(Article 1759), but it is mitigated (partial defense)
(b) Civil case for quasi-delict/tort (i.e., no contract of carriage)
Against whom filed: Only against the driver (there being no pre-existing
contractual relation). Not against the common carrier as the passenger has
contract of carriage with it
EXCEPT: In the case of Air France vs. Carrascoso, GR No. L-21438, September 28,
1966 (p. 143), if the act that breached the contract (e.g., contract of carriage),
would have itself constituted cause of action for quasi-delict/tort had no
contract existed then the contract is said to have been breached by tort/quasi-
delict
Question: Suppose the driver is negligent/wilfully caused injury/death to
passenger (or damage/loss to his goods), is there possibility that the
passenger/heirs can file quasi-delict/tort against the common carrier
despite existence of contract of carriage?
Held: YES, if the common carrier in breaching contract of carriage, also
constitutes tort/quasi-delict (Air France vs. Carrascoso - applying Human
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Relations plus Article 2176 [quasi-delict] in relation to Article 2180

[vicarious liability]).Article 20:Every person (in this case the driver) who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same. Article 2176: Whoever (in this case
the driver) by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict.
Question: But this damage/injury/death under Article 20 and 2176 is
caused only by the driver and not by the common carrier. How then the
common carrier be liable for damages?
Answer: Article 2180 (Doctrine of Vicarious Liability): The obligation
imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions (i.e., operator of common carrier), but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible (i.e., operator of common carrier
responsible for the acts of his driver).
Burden of proof: Against the passenger
Quantum of evidence: Preponderance of evidence
Common carrier proved due diligence in the S/S of employees(for common
carrier to avoid/limit its civil liability): Common carrier is completely exonerated
from liability for damages (complete defense)
(c) Criminal case for delict/crime
Against whom filed: Only against the driver for reckless imprudence resulting to
physical injuries/homicide
Question: Could the operator of common carrier also liable with driver by
way of conspiracy?
Held: NO. Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of
intentionality/dolo on the part of the cohorts(Fernandez v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 281 SCRA 423, Magsuci vs. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. L-101545, January 3, 1995 and Nava vs. National Bureau of
Investigation, G.R. No. 134509, April 12, 2005)
Burden of proof: Always against the prosecution (Reason: Accuseds
presumption of innocence)
Quantum of evidence: Beyond reasonable doubt (moral certainty)
Common carrier proved due diligence in the S/S of employees(for common
carrier to avoid/limit its civil liability): Never a defense by the common carrier,
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either as complete/partial defense for the exoneration/mitigation of civil liability

for defense since its civil liability subsidiary to the driver
Who is liable for civil damages? Driver and not the operator of common carrier
Question: When can be the operator of common carrier liable for civil
damages in the criminal case filed against its driver for reckless
imprudence resulting to physical injuries/homicide?
Answer: The operator is subsidiarily liable in the same criminal action
for the civil damages caused by the driver PROVIDED: The
passenger/heirs proves the following requisites:(1) driver is convicted
with finality, (2) passenger/heirs file Motion[litigated motion, hence
notice of hearing is required to afford due process to common carrier] to
have the operator subsidiarily liable, and (3)it is proven in the Motion
that the Sheriff executed the judgment for civil liability against the
driver, but the driver is insolvent(Pangonorom vs. People, GR No. 143380,
April 11, 2005)
Question: Can the passenger/heirs instead of filing Motion in the same
criminal action against the driver, file a separate civil action against the
common carrier?
Answer: YES. But this remedy is circuitous. Hence, it is a better
procedural remedy to file Motion in the same criminal action to hold the
common carrier subsidiarily liable
(1) Civil action for damages for quasi-delict based on crime Reckless
imprudence resulting to physical injuries/homicide- as independent civil
action
When a criminal action is filed, deemed instituted is the civil aspect for
damages UNLESS (not deemed instituted): (1) the private complainant
waived his right to file civil action against the accused, or (2) (no waiver but)
he reserved his right to file a civil case against the accused in a separate civil
action - which reservation must be made before the prosecution starts
presenting evidence, or (3) the private complainant already instituted the
civil action ahead to the criminal action
Question: Is civil action for damages for quasi-delict against the driver
based on crime Reckless imprudence resulting to physical
injuries/homicide - as independent civil action?
Answer: YES. Rule 111, Section 3 ROCP provides that Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 (quasi-delict) of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be
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brought by the offended party, and shall proceed independently of the

criminal action which requires only a preponderance of evidence
HOWEVER: The offended party cannot recover civil damages twice- one in
the criminal action for reckless imprudence and another in the civil action
for quasi-delict
Question: Suppose in the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to
physical injuries/death, the private complainant did not reserve to file a
separate civil action in the same criminal action before prosecution starts
presenting evidence, can the private complainant still file a separate civil
action for quasi-delict against the action?
Answer: YES. Because Rule 111, Section 3 ROCP provides that action under
Article 2176 (quasi-delict) is an independent civil action. To require
independent civil to be reserved in the criminal action, would frustrate the
true intent of the law that quasi-delicts are independent civil action
Question: Pending the criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting to
physical injuries/homicide, can the subsequent filing of a separate civil
action for quasi-delict suspends the criminal action on ground of prejudicial
question?
Held: NO. First, Article 33 NCC provides that civil actions for quasi-delict is
an independent civil action "and likewise Rule 111, Section 3 ROCP provides
that independent civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only preponderance of evidence(vis--vis proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases). Now, to suspend the criminal
action would thereby run against the provision that civil action/Rules that
independent civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and not to mention also that their respective quantum of evidence are
different(Jose-Consing, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013)
3. Moral damages
(a) Moral damages - defined (Article 2217 NCC)
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission
(b) How much is the moral damages
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Proportionate to the suffering inflicted(Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon, GR No.

160709, February 23, 2005)
(c) Liable for moral damages for gross negligence
(1) Baliwag Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 116110, May 15, 1996 (p.
163)
Facts: The passenger bus driver was driving at an inordinately fast speed
that it failed to notice a cargo truck parked along the shoulder of the
highway with kerosene lamp sufficiently serving as warning device injuring
the bus passengers (i.e., passengers did not die)
Issue: We know that pursuant to Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 (3)
NCC that the heirs of deceased passenger can claim moral damages. But the
question is, supposed the passenger did not die but merely injured, can the
passenger claim for moral damages against the passenger bus?
Held: General rule NO, because as mentioned, moral damages is not
recoverable for breach of contract such as breach of contract of carriage
UNLESS: The common carrier is grossly negligence. In the case at bar, the
driver driving at exceedingly fast speed is gross negligence
Question: What quantum of evidence that the injured passenger must prove
to show that the common carrier breached its contract of carriage by gross
negligence?
Answer: Because goods faith is presumed, the injured passenger must prove
gross negligence against the common carrier by clear and convincing
evidence
Opinion: If the passenger dies, even if common carrier was not proven to be
in gross negligence, still the common carrier is liable for moral damages in
view of Article 1764in relation to Article 2206 (3) providing that in case of
death of passenger, the common carrier is liable for moral damages
EXCEPT: When the passenger is guilty of contributory negligence (Philippine
National Railways vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-55347, October 4, 1985; p.
173)
(2) Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 118126, March
4, 1996 (p. 166)
Held: The passenger vessel by taking its voyage despite its full awareness of
being unseaworthy that only one engine was functioning, is a breach of
contract of carriage by gross negligence (Note: Also made liable for
exemplary damages)
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(3) Singson vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119995, November 18, 1995 (p. 168)
Facts: Passenger bought six (6) open-dated flight tickets from airline
(common carrier) constituting 6-leg flights from Manila to Hongkong, then
to San Francisco, then to Los Angeles - then from Los Angeles back to San
Francisco, then back to Hongkong, then back to Manila such that each flight
leg, the corresponding ticket number shall be removed from the ticket
booklet of the passenger. For negligence of the airlines employee, there was
a mistake in removing the ticket number in their sequential order that made
the passenger delayed in his flight from Los Angeles back all the way to
Manila because the airline refused to board him. The airline ticketing agent
in Hongkong informed the airline ticketing in Los Angeles that there was a
mistake in the sequential removing from the 6 tickets of the passenger yet
the airline refused to board the passenger.
Issue: Is the airline liable for moral damages?
Held: YES. This negligence of the airline employee in not sequentially
removing ticket from the ticket booklet of the passenger, compounded by
refusal of airline to board the passenger despite already informed by its own
ticketing agent in Hongkong admitting fault that it was mistaken in not
removing tickets sequentially, that led to the delay of the passenger in going
back to Manila amount of gross negligence (Note: The airline was also
made liable for exemplary damages)
(d) Liability for moral damages under Article 2219 NCC
(1) Article 2219 NCC: Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries (e.g., reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide/physical injuries)
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries (e.g., pedestrian injured by a
vehicle)
xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and
35
Note: Article 2219 does not include recovery for moral damages for breached
of contract. Now, as mentioned, there are three exceptions where moral
damages is recoverable for breach of contract i.e., in breaching contract
[such as contract of carriage],(1) the defendant committed fraud, or (2) the
defendant committed bad faith/gross negligence, or (3) In case of death of
 P a g e | 11

passenger pursuant to Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 (3) except

when the passenger is guilty of contributory negligence (Philippine National
Railways vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-55347, October 4, 1985; p. 173)
(2) Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 120262, July 17, 1997
(p. 155)
Facts: The passenger boarded the airline from Manila and disembarked in
Cebu City where he was supposed to take connecting flight to Surigao City.
However, while in Cebu City, his connecting flight to Surigao City was
cancelled due to fortuitous event (typhoon). By way goodwill, the airline
gave P100/200 per day to its passengers while in Cebu City, however, the
passenger instead requested from airline that he be billeted
(accommodated) in a hotel at airlines expense as he did not have cash with
him that time, but it was refused by the airline - hence, he was forced seek
the help from his co-passenger where the latter took him as roommate in a
certain hotel. When later the passenger reached Surigao City, he learned
that there were some of his co-passengers were allowed by the airline to
stay in a hotel while in Cebu City at their own expense in the meantime
subject for reimbursement by the airline which accommodation was kept
secret by the airline from the passenger
Issue: Is the airline liable for moral damages to the passenger?
Held: YES. Granting that the passenger have no vested right to such
amenities (billeted hotel accommodations) in case flight cancelled due to
fortuitous event/force majeure NEVERTHELESS: The discriminatory act of
the airline company by accommodating hotel expenses of other passengers
except the passenger violates Article 2219 (10) where moral damages is
recoverable where there is violation of Article 21 (Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall be liable for damages)
ALSO (opinion): There is liability for moral damages when there is fraud. In
the case at bar, the common carrier committed fraud when it kept secret
from the passenger the fact that the common carrier accommodated the
hotel of other passengers while denying the same from the said passenger
Note: The common carrier was also held liable for actual damages for
expenses of passenger while stranded in Cebu City and exemplary damages
(e) Moral damages not recoverable when passenger committed contributory
negligence
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(1) Philippine National Railways vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-55347, October
4, 1985 (p. 173)
Facts: The passenger train (PNR) was overcrowded that made the passenger
sit on the open platforms between the train coaches. The train did not slow
down when it was approaching a bridge under repair that led to the falling
of the passenger and despite the call of other passengers that a certain
passenger fell off, the train did not stop. The passenger died
Issue No1: Can the PNR (GOCC) invoke immunity from suit?
Held: NO. PNR is created under its own charter Republic Act 4156, as
amended where therein provided Generally, to exercise all powers of a
corporation created under the Corporation Law hence, PNR has all the
characteristics and attributes of a private corporation created under the
Corporation Law (viz., PNR is deemed as if a private corporation). The PNR
being deemed as if a private corporation, PNR can therefore sue and be sued
just like any private corporation. Moreover, granting for the sake of
argument that the PNR is not GOCC but as government agency, however,
when the government agency exercising proprietary function (engaged in
business; e.g., collecting passenger fares just like PNR) and not governmental
function, then it enters into commercial business and thereby abandons its
sovereign capacity and is to be treated like a private corporation
Issue No 2:Considering that PNR (GOCC) cannot invoke immunity from suit in
view of its charter (i.e., RA 4156)which provides that it can exercise powers
of corporation created under the Corporation Law the question is, can it
nonetheless invoke non-liability since its funds are public funds (suability is
different from liability)?
Held: NO. PNR being a GOCC engaged in proprietary function akin to
business conducted by private corporations, and that being GOCC having
personality separate and distinct from the Government it cannot therefore
invoke non-liability
Issue No. 3: Is PNR guilty of negligence?
Held: YES. Article 1756 provides that when passenger is injured/died, the
common carrier is presumed at fault/negligent. The PNR was not able to
refute this presumption considering the proven evidence of negligence when
it did not slow down despite approaching slow bridge then under repair, all
the more negligent when it did not stop when other passengers were
shouting that the passenger fell off the train
 P a g e | 13

Issue No. 4: Is the passenger guilty of contributory negligence i.e.,

passenger contributed to the negligence of the PNR?
Held: YES. The passenger is equally guilty of contributory negligence by
opting to sit on the open platform between train coaches, which on that
situation, the passenger should have entertained danger to himself, and
with that, he should have held tightly on the metal bar in order to avoid
falling off(Note: Article 1761: Passenger must observe the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid injury to himself)
Issue No5:Is the PNR liable for moral damages?
Held: NO. While PNR is liable for damages(i.e., death indemnity for
passengers death[Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206], and actual
damages for loss of earning capacity) nevertheless, it is not liable for moral
damages since the passenger is also guilty of contributory negligence
Note: When no moral damages, no exemplary damages
(2) Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon, GR No. 160709, February 23, 2005
Facts: Motorcycle driver after taking one/two bottles of beer, drove his
motorcycle at high speed without wearing helmet and was following closely
the jeepney (tailgating). While travelling, the jeepney driver slightly veered
to his right for him to have space allowance for him to park on the road
shoulder and then the motorcycle veered to the left (to pass the jeepney) but
it was also at that moment when jeepney driver made immediate sharp left
turn to make the final parking that resulted the motorcycle driver bumped
the side of the jeepney that led to his death. The heirs of M/C driver filed
civil action for quasi-delict against the jeepney
Issue No. 1: Is the jeepney negligent?
Held: YES - by suddenly making abrupt sharp left turn without first verifying
his right of way (i.e., without first verifying on its side mirror), makes the
jeepney negligent.
Issue No. 2: Is there contributory negligence on the part of the M/C driver?
Held: YES. Article 2179 reads When the plaintiffs negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants negligence, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but mitigated.Now, in the case at bar, the immediate
and proximate cause of the death of the M/C driver is that of the negligent
of the jeepney. As to findings of contributory negligence of the M/C driver,
 P a g e | 14

consists of (1) driving the motorcycle at a high speed;(2)tailgating closely

the jeepney; (3)consumed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not
wearing a protective helmet
Issue No. 3: If the immediate and proximate cause of the death of M/C is
because of the negligent of the jeepney, how much then is the latter liable
for damages?
Held: Jeepney is liable for damages it actually caused. In contributory
negligence, the defendant is liable only for the damages actually caused by
his negligence hence, the determination of amount of damages varies
depending on the circumstances of each case.
Issue No. 4: Is the jeepney liable for moral damages?
Held: YES. Remember that the case filed by the heirs of M/C driver against
the jeepney is quasi-delict. Now, under Article 2206provides that the
amount of damages for death caused by a crime or QUASI-DELICT shall be
at least P50T, even if there may have been mitigating circumstances. In
addition: Article 2206 (3)provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased
Issue No. 5:How much is the moral damages?
Held: Must be proportionate to the suffering/pain inflicted (upon the heirs
of the deceased M/C driver), the intensity of affection for the deceased M/C
driver - and such amount of moral damages bears no relation whatsoever
with the wealth or means of the offender
(3) Similarities and difference between Philippine National Railways vs. Court
of Appeals (supra ) and Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon (supra) insofar
as the award of moral damages when there is contributory negligence is
concerned
(a) Similarities: In both cases the victim are found to have committed
contributory negligence, and the victims died
Also: In both cases Philippine National Railways vs. Court of Appeals
(supra), death indemnity for passengers death was awarded pursuant
Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206], and also actual damages for loss
of earning capacity WHILE: In Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon
(supra),the jeepney was also made liable for death indemnity pursuant to
Article 2206 for death under quasi-delict - AND ALSO: Pursuant to Article
 P a g e | 15

2206 (1) for death under quasi-delict, the jeepney was liable for actual
damages particularly loss of earning capacity
(b) Difference: Philippine National Railways vs. Court of Appeals (supra),
the cause of action Breach of Contract of Carriage and moral damages
not awarded because of the contributory negligence of the passenger
WHILE: In Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon (supra), the cause of action
is quasi-delict and moral damages awarded even if the passenger
committed contributory negligence
(f) Summary for liability for MORAL DAMAGES
(1) Moral damages in case of civil action for BREACH OF CONTRACT OF
CARRIAGE
(a) Where passenger DIES under breach of contract of carriage
Moral damages recoverable even without proof of fraud, bad
faith/gross negligence. Reason: Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206
[3])
Except: Passenger is also guilty of contributory negligence(Philippine
National Railways vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-55347, October 4,
1985;p. 173)
(b) Where passenger DID NOT DIE (i.e., merely injured) under breach of
contract of carriage
General rule: Moral damages is not recoverable for breach of contract
(such as contract of carriage) UNLESS: There is fraud or bad faith/gross
negligence (Article 2220 2nd Sentence NCC; Sulpicio Lines Inc. vs. Curso,
GR 157009, March 17, 2010; Philtranco vs. Court of Appeals, GR No.
161909, April 25, 2012[p. 159]) which fraud or bad faith/gross
negligence must be proven by injured passenger by clear and convincing
evidence since good faith is presumed
Please analyze this: When a common carrier is negligent but the
deceased passenger is also guilty of contributory negligence then the
common carrier is not liable for moral damages (Philippine National
Railways vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-55347, October 4, 1985;p. 173)
then all the more, moral damages is not recoverable when the passenger
did not die and also guilty of contributory negligence. But the question is:
Suppose the passenger did not die and guilty of contributory negligence,
however, the common carrier is guilty of fraud, bad faith or gross
 P a g e | 16

negligence, should the common carrier liable for moral damages pursuant
to Article 2220 2nd Sentence NCC?
(c) Damage/loss to property- under breach of contract of carriage
Article 2220 2nd Sentence: Moral damages is recoverable provided the
defendant acted by fraud or bad faith (gross negligence) proven by clear
and convincing evidence since good faith is presumed
(2) Moral damages in case of civil action for QUASI-DELICT (no pre-existing
contractual relation)
(a) Resulting to death under quasi-delict
Moral damages is recoverable. Article 2206:The amount of damages for
death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least P50T, even
though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition
(Article 2206 [3]):The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased (Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray
Castillon, GR No. 160709, February 23, 2005).
Note: In Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon (supra), when the cause of
action is quasi-delict, moral damages recoverable even if the deceased
passenger committed contributory negligence
(b) Resulting to physical injuries (e.g., pedestrian/other driver or person or
passenger) under quasi-delict
Moral damages recoverable (Article 2219 [2]) provided the moral
sufferings is the proximate cause of the act/omission of the defendant
Note: For moral damages under Article 2219, the moral suffering must be
proximate cause of act/omission/negligence of the defendant (Mendoza
vs. Gomez, GR 160110, June18, 2014)
(c) Resulting to damage/loss to property under quasi-delict(e.g., defendant
damaging goods/vehicle of another)
Moral damages is recoverable provided the defendant acted in fraud or
bad faith/gross negligence proven by clear and convincing evidence
since good faith is presumed(Ace Haulers Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, GR
127934, august 23, 2004)
(3) Moral damages in case of civil action based on Human relation particularly
Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35 (Article 2219 [10])
 P a g e | 17

Moral damages recoverable provided the moral suffering is the proximate

cause of the act/omission of the defendant (California Clothing Inc. vs.
Ybaez, GR 175822, October 23, 2013)
Note: For moral damages under Article 2219, the moral suffering must be
proximate cause of act/omission of the defendant (Mendoza vs. Gomez, GR
160110, June 18, 2014)
(4) Moral damages in case of criminal action
(a) Resulting to death (whether intentional crime or criminal negligence [e.g.,
reckless imprudence resulting to physical injuries/homicide])
Moral damages is recoverable. Article 2206:The amount of damages for
death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least P50T, even
though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition
(Article 2206 [3]):In death caused by crime (or quasi-delict), the spouse,
legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased (Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon, GR No. 160709,
February 23, 2005)
Note: Even if the deceased-victim committed contributory negligence,
the accused is still liable for moral damages(Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray
Castillon, GR No. 160709, February 23, 2005)
(b) Resulting to physical injuries (whether intentional or criminal negligence
[e.g., reckless imprudence resulting to physical injuries])
(1) Intentional crime
Moral damages recoverable provided the moral sufferings is the
proximate cause of the act/omission of the defendant(Article 2219
[1])
Note: For moral damages under Article 2219, the moral suffering
must be proximate cause of act/omission of the defendant (Mendoza
vs. Gomez, GR 160110, June 18, 2014)
(2) Criminal negligence
Moral damages recoverable provided the moral sufferings is the
proximate cause of the act/omission of the defendant (Article 2219
[1])
Note: For moral damages under Article 2219, the moral suffering
must be proximate cause of act/omission of the defendant (Mendoza
vs. Gomez, GR 160110, June 18, 2014)
 P a g e | 18

4. Exemplary damages
(a) The amount of exemplary damages need not be alleged in the Complaint
Article 2234: The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, but
exemplary damages cannot be awarded when the plaintiff is not entitled to
moral, actual damages, liquidated or (disjunctive)temperate (MALT)viz., MALT
is a requisite before exemplary damages can be awarded.
HOWEVER: For the award of liquidated damages in addition to exemplary
damages, the plaintiff must also be entitled for moral, actual or temperate
damages (Abobon vs. Abobon, GR 155830, August 15, 2012 citing Article 2234)
NOW: Considering that amount of exemplary damages need not be proven, it
follows that the amount of exemplary damages need not be pleaded in the
complaint because it cannot be predetermined by the court as such amount
depends on the evidence (i.e., amount depends on a case to case basis
depending on the degree of negligence, or the degree of necessity to protect the
public so that the incident/event subject of exemplary damages will no longer
repeated or at least minimize by other wrongdoers in the future; Singson vs.
Aragon, GR L-5164, January 27, 1953)
NOTE: The basis of exemplary damages is to imposed it as one of the damages
for the public good (so that the incident/event subject of exemplary damages
will no longer repeated by other wrongdoers in the future or at least minimize)
(1) While amount of exemplary damages need not be alleged in the
Complaint, should claim for exemplary damages be included in the
Complaint?
Generally, YES. The rule is, any claim not alleged in the Complaint cannot be
granted by the court as this would be violative of due process.
(a) EXCEPTION: But how about general prayer in the Complaint (i.e.,
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed
for)?
A general prayer Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are
likewise prayed for is broad enough "to justify extension of a remedy
different from or together with the specific prayers PROVIDED: The
facts are alleged in the complaint relevant to such remedy (e.g.,
exemplary remedy),and such relevant facts are proven(Gutierrez vs.
Valiente, GR 166802, July 4, 2008)
 P a g e | 19

(b) Article 2229 NCC (Exemplary Damages): Exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for the PUBLIC GOOD - IN ADDITION:
To damages for moral, actual (compensatory), liquidated or temperate (MALT)
HOWEVER: For the award of liquidated damages in addition to exemplary
damages, the plaintiff must also be entitled for moral, actual or temperate
damages(Abobon vs. Abobon, GR 155830, August 15, 2012 citing Article 2234)
Note: Under Article 2235: Stipulation/agreement waiving/renouncing exemplary
damages is null and void
(c) Article 2230 NCC: In CRIMINAL ACTION(whether intentional or criminal
negligence [e.g., reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property/physical
injuries/homicide),exemplary damages where civil aspect is instituted with the
criminal action, may be imposed PROVIDED: There is one or more aggravating
circumstances
(1) Exemplary damage under criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting
to homicide (requisite is the existence of 1/more aggravating circumstance)
Facts: A negligent bus driver hit a M/C driver with backrider that led to their
death. The bus driver left the M/C driver sprawled on the highway which is
an aggravating circumstance for failure to lend assistance/help on the
spot(Article 365 Last Paragraph). The bus driver was charged of Reckless
imprudence resulting to double homicide where he was convicted by final
judgment
Held: The accused-bus driver was slapped with exemplary damages due to
existence of the said aggravating circumstance- in addition to moral, actual
and temperate damages(Nueva Espana vs. People, GR 163351, June 21,
2005)
(d) Article 2231 NCC: In civil action for QUASI-DELICT (i.e., no pre-existing
contractual relation; e.g., defendant-driver causing damage to property or
injury/death to pedestrian/other driver/other passenger),exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence
(1) Exemplary damage under civil action for quasi-delict (requisite is gross
negligence)
Driver running at full speed on a rainy day, on a slippery road in complete
disregard of the hazards to life and limb of other people - cannot be said to
be acting on anything less than gross negligence. The frequent incidence of
accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers, indeed, demands corrective
measures(corrective measure/damages is other name for exemplary
 P a g e | 20

damages; so that such incident will not be repeated or at least minimize by

other wrongdoers in the future) - in addition to moral and actual
damages(Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport System, Inc., GR No. 33836,
March 16, 1987)
(2) Exemplary damage under civil action for quasi-delict (requisite is gross
negligence)
This is about an uncovered manhole in the city street where the pedestrian
met accident. Although the Supreme Court awarded exemplary damages
without express finding of gross negligence nevertheless, this finding of
gross negligence is implied in the texts of the decision since under Article
2231, in civil action for quasi-delict, the award of exemplary damages must
be based on the gross negligence of the defendant- in addition to moral and
actual damages(Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, GR No. 61516, March 21,
1989)
(e) Article 2232 NCC: In civil action for BREACH OFCONTRACTS (e.g., contract of
carriage) and quasi-contracts (e.g., solution indebiti, or negotiorum gestio), the
court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a fraudulent or
wanton/reckless/oppressive/malevolent manner (i.e., bad faith [equivalent to
gross negligence])
(1) Exemplary damage under civil action for breach of contract (requisite is
gross negligence)
Driver of common carrier driving at high speed at night, caused injury to his
passengers is gross negligence damages liable for exemplary damages -in
addition to actual damages(Marchan vs. Mendoza, GR No. L-24471, January
31, 1969)
(2) Exemplary damage under civil action for breach of contract (requisite is
gross negligence)
The passenger vessel by taking its voyage despite its full awareness of being
unseaworthy as only engine was running is in bad faith(gross negligence)
liable for exemplary damages -in addition to moral damages(i.e., gross
negligence)(Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, GR No.
118126, March 4, 1996 [p. 166])
(f) Exemplary damages is generally cannot be imposed against the employer, but
only against the wrongdoer himself (e.g., wrongdoer is the employee-driver of
common carrier, and the employer is the operator of the common carrier)
 P a g e | 21

(1) Exemplary damages cannot be imposed against his employer because it is

primarily imposed the wrongdoer himself unless, the employer
participated in, previously authorized or subsequently ratified such act of
the employee(Rotes vs. Halili, GR No. L-21203, September 30, 1960;
Munsayac vs. de Lara, GR No. L-21151, June 26, 1968)
FINAL
5. Nominal damages
(a) Article 2221 in relation with Article 2222 NCC: Nominal damages is awarded not
due to plaintiffs damage/loss BUT: Awarded when (1) the right of plaintiff
arising from any source of obligation under Article 1157 (i.e., law, contract,
quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict) is violated by the defendant, or (2) his
property right is violated by defendant (HENCE: Proof of damage/loss is not
required but merely proof that the defendant violated the right of the plaintiff)
(b) Article 2223 NCC: The adjudication for the award of nominal damages is a proof
that the right of the plaintiff has been violated by the defendant SO THAT: Such
violation of right becomes res judicata particularly conclusiveness of judgment
in any future action between same plaintiff and defendant other than the
present action (viz., insofar as future action is concerned involving the same
plaintiff and defendant, there is no longer issue as to the fact that the defendant
violated the right of the plaintiff)
Note: There are two (2) kinds of res judicata i.e., Bar by prior judgment, ([1]
there is identity of parties [direct or indirect (privies)], [2] identity of subject
matter the cases, [3] identity of causes of action, and [4] there is final judgment
on the merits in the previous case by competent court). Conclusiveness of
judgment, ([1] there is identity of parties [direct or indirect (privies)], [2] there is
identity of factual issue[i.e., not identity of causes of action] and [3] there is final
judgment on the merits by competent court)
(c) REMEMBER: Nominal damages is awarded when (1) the plaintiff prayed for
actual/compensatory damages but cannot proved any amount (e.g., no
documents/receipt to substantiate it) but the plaintiff proved that his right been
violated by the defendant, or (2) that the plaintiff did not suffer
actual/compensatory damages but the plaintiff proved that his right been
violated by the defendant, (3) that the plaintiff is not entitled to
actual/compensatory damages but the plaintiff proved that his right been
violated by the defendant
(d) Nominal damages allowed or denied
 P a g e | 22

(1) Instances were nominal damages allowed:

(a) In case of trespass upon real property, there is no material loss/damage
on the part of plaintiff as his property was merely trespassed but he
must be awarded with nominal damages for violation of his right over
the property by defendant
(b) While the passenger is not entitled to claim actual/compensatory
damages brought about by his personal expenses while stranded in
Japan because the delay of transportation was due to fortuitous event
that rendered the NAIA not safe for take-off and landing nevertheless,
while stranded in Japan, the passenger has the right to be accorded with
comfort and convenience, as in the case at bar, the common carrier
should see to it that the stranded passenger will be accommodated for
the first available flight after the NAIA re-opened for after all, the
contract of carriage still exists and subsists. This particular right of the
passenger has been violated by the common carrier when the passenger
was not accommodated to the first available flight because he was
declassifiedfrom transit passenger to new passenger/chance passenger,
which declassification caused the passenger stranded longer in Japan in
violation of the right of the passenger to be accorded with comfort and
convenience thereby making the common carrier liable for nominal
damages (Japan Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 118664, August 7,
1998; p. 110)
(c) While actual/compensatory damages is disallowed by the court because
the plaintiff was not able to prove any amount of the same (e.g., no
documents/receipt to substantiate) - nevertheless, nominal damages was
awarded on reason that it is proven that the right of the plaintiff been
violated by the defendant (Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, GR No.
123404, February 26, 1997)
(2) Instances were nominal damages not allowed:
(a) When actual/compensatory damages is already awarded, the award of
nominal damages is untenable(Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Navidad,
GR 145804, February 6, 2003)
Facts: Navidad paid his token and entered the LRT Station, and then
stood on the designated ground platform near the train tracks where
passengers are ought to be while awaiting for the arrival of the train
here, there is already a contract of carriage, hence Navidad is already a
 P a g e | 23

passenger. While waiting for the arrival of train, the security guard of the
common carrier fought with Navidad that caused Navidad fell off the rail
track that led to his death when it so happened that train was
approaching and ran over Navidad causing his death. The Court of
Appeals awarded heirs of Navidad actual, moral and nominal damages
along with P50T death indemnity
Issue: Is the award of nominal damages proper?
Held: NO. Nominal damages are awarded in order that a right of the
plaintiff violated by the defendant is vindicated/recognized, and not for
the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss/damage suffered
by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist
with actual damages (Reason: The award of the court of the actual
damages is already a recognition that the right of the Navidad been
violated by the common carrier - hence, there is no more purpose of
awarding nominal damages).
(b) The award of actual/compensatory and exemplary damages is by itself
a judicial recognition that the plaintiffs right has been violated
therefore, a further award for nominal damages is unnecessary and
improper (i.e., redundant)(Meding vs. Cresencia, GR No. L-8194, July 11,
1956)
6. Temperate (or moderate) damages (Articles 2224 o 2225)
(a) Article 2224: Temperate damages is more than nominal but less than actual
damages and it is recoverable when it is proven that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered by the plaintiff, however, its amount cannot be proven with
certainty
HOWEVER (Article2225): In every case, temperate damages must be reasonable
depending on the attending circumstances
(b) What is then the difference between nominal damage and temperate damage?
Nominal damage is awarded when the plaintiff not at all able to prove any
amount of actual/compensatory damages that he actually suffered but able to
prove that his right has been violated by the defendant WHILE: Temperate
damage is awarded when the plaintiff was able to prove that he actually
suffered actual damage but he was not able to prove such amount with
certainty
(c) Abella vs. People, GR 198400, October 7, 2013
 P a g e | 24

As to the civil liability of the petitioner, the CA was correct in deleting the
payment of the actual damages awarded by the trial court in the absence of
proof thereof. Where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined
(with certainty) because of the absence of supporting receipts - but entitlement
for actual damages is shown by the facts of the case, temperate damages may
be awarded - i.e., Benigno certainly suffered injuries, was actually hospitalized
and underwent medical treatment. x x x award temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00, in lieu of actual damages.
7. Actual or compensatory damages (Articles 2199 to 2215)
(a) Compensatory or actual damages consists of the following: (1) actual
loss/damage, including unrealized profits, (2) interests, (3) consequential
damages [e.g., medical and hospitalization expenses], (4) death indemnity for at
least P50T, (5) loss of earning capacity, (6) Attorneys fee
Now, in order that actual damages is awarded, there are two (2) requisites
(1)the plaintiff able to prove the amount of actual damages with certainty, and
(2) there must be in the body of the Decision/Judgment the factual basis on the
amount of actual damages
(b) Article 2199 NCC (compensatory damages): Except as provided by law or by
stipulation (agreement), compensatory damages is awarded only for such
incurred/suffered pecuniary loss duly proven in court. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
(1) On actual/compensatory damages, it is required to present the best
evidence (e.g., original receipts) - and if there be no best evidence, other
best reliable (secondary) evidence (e.g., photocopy of receipts; Baliwag
Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 116110, May 15, 1996)
Facts: To prove actual damages, the passenger presented hospital and
medical receipts amounting to P5,017.74. To show other medical expenses,
it was by the testimony alone of the passenger without corroboration by
presenting receipts or testimony of other witness(es). After trial, the lower
court awarded P25,000, all in all, i.e., those actual damages where medical
receipts were presented and those other actual damages where no medical
receipts presented but through testimony of the plaintiff alone
uncorroborated by testimony of other witness(es).
Issue: Was the award o P25,000 for actual damages proper?
Held: NO. The award for actual damages insofar as in excess of P5,017.74
(i.e., medical receipts) is concerned, is not supported by reliable evidence. To
 P a g e | 25

prove actual damages, the best evidence available to the injured party must
be presented (in this case medical receipts). The court cannot rely on bare
testimony uncorroborated by other evidence where the truth of the
testimony of witness(es) is suspected but rather, must depend upon
competent reliable proof that damages have been actually suffered. Thus,
the actual damages is reduced to (receipted) medical and hospitalization
expenses to P5,017.74
Note: Rule 130 Section 3 ROC. - Best evidence: General rule: When
contents of document is to be proven in court, no evidence shall be
admissible except the original document. HOWEVER: When original
document cannot be presented, then secondary evidence can be
presented (e.g., photocopy of the original document, testimony of witness
who personally saw the execution of the document, etc.) PROVIDED: It is
proven any of the four (4) exceptions (such as the original document is loss
without fault of the offeror; or the original document is in the custody of the
adverse-party and the latter refused to produce the original document
despite reasonable notice from the offeror, etc.)
(c) Interests
In the case of Abella vs. Abella, GR 195166, July 8, 2015:
(1) Article 1956: No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated
in writing (but legal interest will be awarded to begin from
extrajudicial/judicial demand until finality of the decision and until its
execution)
Note: Same rule applies when obligation consists of loan with stipulated
written interest but such interest is not specified
(Note: Since July 1, 2013, the legal interest shifted from 12% per annum t 6%
per annum)
(2) When obligation consists of loan with stipulated written specific interest
and such stipulated specific interest continue until obligation is judicially
demanded (i.e., filing of civil action in court) and after such judicial
demand, legal interest (6% per annum) shall begin to run until the case is
decided in its final and executory stage and until obligation it is
fulfilled/executed
Note: 5% monthly interest, whether compounded or simple, is unconscionable
(Albos vs. Embisan, GR 210831, November 26, 2014)
(d) Loss of earning capacity
 P a g e | 26

(1) Loss of earning capacity in case of death of passenger under breach of

contract of carriage
Article 1764 (Damages against common carrier): X x x. Article 2206 shall also
apply to the DEATH of a PASSENGER caused by the breach of contract of
carriage by a common carrier. And under Article 2206 (1): For death
indemnity in the amount of at least P50T, and in addition, defendant is liable
for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, x x x; unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death
(a) Formula for the computation of loss of earning capacity in case of
death (People vs. Punzalan, Jr., GR No. 199892, December 10, 2012;
Note: The formula applies even if the deceased is not a passenger)
Loss earning capacity = Life Expectancy x Net income
Life expectancy = 2/3x (80 - age at the time of death)
Net income = Gross Annual Income [GAI] - Living Expenses [50%
GAI](Note: The net earning is ordinarily but not absolute computed at
50% of the gross earnings [GAI];Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon, GR No.
160709, February 23, 2005)
(1) Is the formula also applicable to death under crime or quasi-
delict?
YES
(b) Passenger died while still student under breach of contract of carriage
(Perena vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 157915, August 29, 2012)
Facts: Aaron a passenger of a school bus (common carrier) died due to
negligence of the driver. Aaron died at the age of 15 years.
Issue: Considering that Aaron was still a student (no job) at the time of
his death, how to compute for his loss of earning capacity?
Held: The following were adopted:
(1) Aaron begins to earn income not at the age of 15 years (as he yet
studying that time) but at the age of 21 years (age that Aaron would
have graduated from college and started working for his own
livelihood)
(2) By Table of Mortality: Life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age at the time of
death)
Note: The age at the time of death must be 21 years old (i.e., not 15
years old)
 P a g e | 27

(3) Aarons salary would be the prevailing minimum wage at the time of
death of Aaron (on reason that the nature of his work and his salary
at the time of his death were unknown)
Note (SC ruled for more than minimum wage): People vs. Mayor
Sanchez, GR 121039-45, October 18, 2001: Both Sarmenta
(murdered) and Gomez (murdered) were senior agriculture students
at UPLB, the countrys leading educational institution in agriculture.
As reasonably assumed x x x, both victims would have graduated in
due course (Note: Both would have graduated in year 1993). x x x.
Considering that Sarmenta and Gomez would have graduated in due
time from a reputable university, it would not be unreasonable to
assume that in 1993 they would have earned more than the
minimum wage. X x x, the Court believes that it is fair and reasonable
to fix the monthly income that the two would have earned in 1993
at P8,000.00 per month and their deductible living and other
incidental expenses at P3,000.00 per month
(4) Include 13th month pay as part of gross income (since 13th month pay
is mandated by law)
(c) Pedestrian died while receiving monthly pension under crime [reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide] (Gloria Darrocha de Caliston vs. Court
of Appeals, GR No. L-63135)
Facts: Pedestrian (USVA Pensioner) was ran over by a passenger bus that
led to her death. The bus driver was convicted of reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide
Issue: Is the pedestrian entitled for loss of earning capacity insofar as her
monthly pension is concerned?
Held: YES. Article 2206 (1):The amount of damages for death caused by
a crime or quasi-delict is at least P50,000, even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances. In addition:(1) Defendant is liable for the
loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. Now, the pension of the
decedent-pedestrian being a sure income that was cut short by her
death for which bus driver of the common carrier was responsible, the
surviving heir of the former is entitled to the award of P 10,000.00 which
is just equivalent to the pension the decedent would have received for
one year if she did not die.
 P a g e | 28

Note: Why only one year loss of earning capacity? Probably, the
pedestrian was already ____ years old at the time of her death (i.e., 2/3
[Life expectancy = 80 age at the time of death])
(d) Loss of earning capacity of a deceased self-employed
When the evidence to prove daily/monthly income is purely by
testimony of the heirs of the deceased estimating such income as self-
employed is not enough without corroborating evidence such as
income tax returns or receipts (or other evidence)
(2) Liability for Loss of earning capacity in case of physical injury of plaintiff
under breach of contract of carriage
Article 2205: Damages may be recovered: (1) For loss/impairment of earning
capacity in cases plaintiffs personal injury (temporary/permanent injury);(2)
x x x.
(a) Passenger injured while still student (Cariaga vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus
Co., GR No. L-11037, December 29, 1960)
Facts: The passenger was a UST 4th year medical student at the time of
the accident which accident caused him permanent physical disability
that rendered him to stop from his study.
Issue: Could it be assumed that the passenger would pass his board
examination hence, the passenger is entitled to loss of earning
capacity?
Held: YES. At that time he was already a fourth-year student in medicine
in a reputable university (University of Sto. Tomas). While his scholastic
may not be first rate (Exhibits 4, 4-A to 4-C), it is, nevertheless, sufficient
to justify the assumption that he could have passed the board test in
due time (Note: In this case, the Supreme Court awarded the passenger
P25,000 as loss of earning capacity)
(3) Formulas for the computation of loss of earning capacity in case of
physical injuries (hence, living)
Loss of earning capacity = Duration of earning impairment/loss x gross
income
Question: Why gross income and not net income?
Answer: Considering that the plaintiff is living, he himself takes care of own
living expenses
(a) Baliwag Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 116110, May 15, 1996
 P a g e | 29

Principle: In computing for loss of earning capacity of living injured

plaintiff, the living expenses is not deductible from gross income
Facts: The passenger suffered fracture on her pelvis and right leg, and it
would take her to recover for five (5) years, which recovery period deters
her from continuing on his job. Before the accident, the passenger was
earning P5,000 per month
Issue: How much is the loss of earnings of the passenger?
Held: P5,000 (wage per month) x 5 years (of recovery) =P300,000
(b) Attorneys fee
(1) Article 2208 NCC: In the absence of stipulation/agreement, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered - EXCEPT:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest
(3) X xx
(4) X xx
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim
(6) X xx
(7) X xx
(8) X xx
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime
(10) X xx
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered
HOWEVER: Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable
(2) How to prove attorneys fee
(1) The award attorneys fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and
equitable justification. (Philippine National Construction Corp. vs. APAC
Marketing Corp., GR No. 190957, June 5, 2013)
Attorneys fee under Article 2208 NCC is not automatically awarded every
time a party wins a suit, rather it is the exception rather the general rule -
such that it demands factual, legal, and equitable justification to bring the
award thereof within the exceptions under Article 2208 NCC (e.g., the
defendant unjustifiably refused to comply with his obligation)
(3) How much attorneys fee is to be awarded
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Not necessarily proportionate to the amount actually paid by a litigant to his

lawyer rather, it must be reasonable at all times (Article 2208 NCC)(Philippine
National Construction Corp. vs. APAC Marketing Corp., GR No. 190957, June 5,
2013)
Note: Attorneys fee is not to be awarded to the counsel, but to the client who
already paid his counsel
(4) The contents of the Decision in order that award of attorneys fee is proper
(a) Philippine National Construction Corp. vs. APAC Marketing Corp., GR No.
190957, June 5, 2013
It is imperative that the basis for the award of attorneys fee be clearly and
distinctly set forth in the body Decision and it is not enough to merely
state in the Decision the amount in the dispositive portion of the Decision.
Reason: The award attorneys fees under Article 2208 demands factual,
legal, and equitable justification which must be laid down in the body of the
Decision (Philippine National Construction Corp. vs. APAC Marketing Corp.
[supra]; Buing vs. Santos, GR No. 152544, September 19, 2006)
(5) Article 2208 (2):When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff (a) to litigate with third persons (i.e., his lawyer) to protect his interest,
or (b) to incur expenses to protect his interest
(a) Philippine National Construction Corp. vs. APAC Marketing Corp., GR No.
190957, June 5, 2013
Even when a plaintiff is compelled to litigate with third persons (i.e.,
lawyers) or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorneys fees may
not be awarded- where the plaintiff not able to prove that the defendant
acted in bad faith in refusing to comply with his obligation. Hence, when
such refusal of the defendant was due to honest erroneous belief that he can
validly not comply with his obligation, and the plaintiff sued him and the
plaintiff won, the defendant cannot be liable for attorneys fee
(b) Soberano vs. Manila Railroad Co., GR No. L-19407, November 23, 1966
When the defendants failure/refusal to pay was because of plaintiffs
exorbitant charge (e.g., exorbitant interest), then attorneys fee/cost of suit
is untenable
Similarly, when the defendant refused to enter into amicable settlement
because the plaintiff was asking too much - the defendant has the right to
refuse unjust claim, hence, attorneys fee/cost of suit is untenable
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(6) Article 2208 (5):Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim
(1) Defendants failure to pay his obligation without bad faith does not
warrant attorneys fees (Lasedeco vs. Gaston, GR No. L-8938, October 31,
1956). As a matter of fact, even defendants clearly untenable defenses
would not warrant attorneys fee in the absence of gross and evident bad
faith (Jimenez vs. Bucoy, GR No. L-10221, February 28, 1958)
(2) Defendants refusal to pay because the plaintiff demanded more than what
it should be does not warrant attorneys fee - as the defendant has the right
to refuse unjust claim (Globe Assurance Co. vs. Arcache, GR No. L-12378,
May 28, 1958)
(7) Article 2208 (9): In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a
crime
(1) By deductive reasoning, it seems therefore when the crime is prosecuted by
public prosecutor where civil liability is instituted therewith, no attorneys fee
shall be awarded since the private complainant did not pay anything to the
public prosecutor. However, when the civil aspect is instituted with the
criminal action and the private complainant is represented by a private
prosecutor, then award of attorneys fee is proper since, the private
complainant paid the private prosecutor
(2) Attorneys fee is up to the date of judgment, hence, if the judgment is
appealed, then attorneys fee should perhaps at least be doubled (Bantoto
vs. Bobis, GR No. L-18966, November 22, 1966)
(8) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered
(a) Attorneys fee is warranted the litigation the litigation ended for 13 years
(Batangas Trans Co. vs. Caguimbal, GR No. L-22985, January 24 ,1968)
(b) The low income of the plaintiff is considered under Article 2208 (11), i.e.,
court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered
(9) Pauper litigant-defendant (e.g., PAO client) is not exempted from paying
attorneys fees paid by the plaintiff to his counsel
While pauper is exempted from paying court's legal and other lawful fees he is
not exempted from paying attorneys fee paid by plaintiff to his own lawyer
(Cristobal vs. Employees Compensation Commission, GR No. L-49280, February
26, 1981)
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Article 1765 NCC (Cancelling the certificate of public convenience of common carrier)
The Public Service Commission may, (1) on its own motion or (2) on petition of any
interested party - cancel the certificate of public convenience of common carrier
after due hearing that repeatedly fails to comply its duty to observe extraordinary
diligence
1. The Public Service Commission is already defunct, and insofar as common carriers
concerned, its duty already assumed by Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) insofar as land common carriers are concerned, CAB
insofar as aircraft carriers are concerned, and MARINA insofar as sea common
carriers are concerned

Article 1766 NCC (Provisions of Civil Code on common carriers prevail over other laws)
In all matters not regulated by this New Civil Code, the rights and obligations of
common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws
1. Civil Code provisions on common carrier
Articles 1732 to 1766 NCC. This Civil Code provisions prevail over other statute -
hence, rights and obligations of common carrier can be governed by other laws only
when Civil Code does not specifically provide
2. Warsaw Convention
Refers to international carriage by AIR that regulates liability for international
carriage of persons and goods performed by aircraft
3. Court jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention (i.e., Warsaw Convention only
applies when the cause of action is based on Breach of Contract on International
Carriage [i.e., not contract of carriage within the Philippines])
(a) Lhuillier vs. British Airways, GR No. 171092, March 15, 2010
Philippine is a signatory of the Warsaw Convention and thus has the force and
effect of law in the Philippines.
In the case at bench, petitioners place of departure was United Kingdom while
place of destination was Italy and both United Kingdom and Italy are
signatories of the Warsaw Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is
deemed to be an "international carriage" within the contemplation of the
Warsaw Convention hence, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action is governed by Warsaw Convention.
Under Article 28(1) Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for
damages based on breach of contract of carriage before:
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(1) Court where carrier is domiciled; or

(2) Court where carrier has its principal place of business; or
(3) Court where the carrier has establishment which the contract of carriage
perfected (e.g., where ticket was issued); or
(4) Court of the place of destination
In this case, the common carrier is a British corporation domiciled in London UK,
also in London that it has its principal place of business. Hence, under the first
and second jurisdictional rules, the passenger (Filipino) may bring her case
(breach of contract of carriage) before the courts of London UK. It appears also
that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy, hence, under the third jurisdictional
rule, the passenger also has the option to bring the action (breach of contract of
carriage) before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, the place of destination is
Rome, Italy, accordingly, passenger may bring her action (breach of contract of
carriage) before the courts of Rome, Italy. X xx.
X xx.
Issue: Can the passenger bring the action for damages (breach of contract of
carriage) in the court of the Philippines?
Held: NO. In all of the four (4) points of jurisdiction under the Warsaw
Convention where Philippines is also a signatory thereto, the Philippines is not
one of them. Considering that the passenger brought the action in the
Philippines, it is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction
4. Under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention, provides that the action based ion
breached of contract of carriage must be filed in the country of jurisdiction within
two (2) years(otherwise action is already prescribed) AND: The running of the
prescriptive period is absolutely cannot be tolled by extrajudicial/judicial demand
(a) When the cause of action is based not on breach of contract of carriage on
international carriage but breach on other sources of obligation under Civil
Code (i.e., Article 1157 NCC [i.e., law, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict]), then
the Warsaw Convention does not apply (United Airlines vs. Uy, GR 127768,
November 19, 1999; p. 184)
Facts: Airline passenger filed complaint with RTC-Philippines with two (2) causes
of action: (a) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from airline
employees at the San Francisco Airport (destination is Philippines) which caused
him extreme embarrassment and social humiliation (i.e., tort); and, (b) the loss
of his personal effects amounting to US $5,310.00 (i.e., breach of contract of
carriage)
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Issue No. 1: Can the passenger bring either of the said two (2) causes of action in
the court of the Philippines?
Held: YES. On the first action (tort), yes, because under Article 1157 NCC
provides liability for quasi-delict/tort. On the second action (breach of contract
of carriage), yes also, because under the four-point jurisdiction of the Warsaw
Convention, an action based on breach of contract of carriage can be brought in
the place of destination, and Philippines is the place of destination
Issue No. 2: If the action filed by the passenger is based on tort, does the two-
year prescriptive period under the Warsaw Convention applies?
Held: NO. Because Warsaw Convention applies only to action based on
international contract of carriage
Issue No. 2-A: If the Warsaw Convention does not apply to action based
on tort, then what is the prescriptive period?
Held: Four year i.e., Article 1146 NCC: Action for quasi-delict (tort) must
be brought within four (4) years.
Issue No. 3: If the action filed by the passenger is based on breach of contract of
carriage, does the two-year prescriptive period under the Warsaw Convention
applies?
Held: YES. Warsaw Convention applies only to action based on international
contract of carriage
Issue No. 3-A: If the action brought is based on breach of contract of
carriage, hence the two-year prescriptive period under the Warsaw
Convention applies the question is, can the two-year prescriptive
period be tolled by extrajudicial/judicial demand?
Held: NO. Because in the travaux preparatoire of the Warsaw
Convention, provides that the two-year prescriptive period is absolutely
cannot be tolled
5. Tort explained (Air France vs. Carrascoso, GR L-21438, September 28, 1996)
Facts: The passenger (Filipino) was issued a first class ticket. When the airline
(common carrier) had stopover in Thailand, the airline manager requested the
passenger to vacate the first class seat because a white man will occupy the same
and the passenger replied over my dead body. The airline manager resisted and
a commotion ensured inside the airline that many Filipino passengers in the tourist
class got nervous, went to the passenger and pacified him which the passenger
acceded and consequently, reluctantly surrendered his first class seat to the white
man and instead accepted to tourist class seat.
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Issue No.1: How many civil liabilities that the airline committed?
Held: Breach of contract of carriage, and quasi-delict/tort (BUT: The passenger must
choose which cause of action to file - so that if he choose breach of contract of
carriage then WARSAW Convention applies as it is an international flight, but when
he choose quasi-delict/tort then NCC applies)
Issue No.2: How is it that the airline breached contract of carriage and at the same
time also committed quasi-delict/tort?
Held: Although the relation of passenger and airline is "contractual both in origin
and nature - nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort", viz.,
had there been no contract of carriage, a quasi-delict/tort would nevertheless can
be filed against the tortfeasor. Examples: (1) where the common carrier accepted a
passenger's check as payment for fare, it is both breach of contract and a tort
/quasi-delict to falsely notify the passenger that the check was worthless and
demand payment under threat of ejection, and so also (2) when the conductor
came to collect the fare of the passenger, the latter told the conductor to pay only
when he reached his destination, here, there was nothing in the conduct of the
passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by
calling him a lunatic." Now, in the case at bar, while it is true that the act of the
airline manager is forcing the passenger to take a second class seat is a clear
breached of contract of carriage (i.e., the passenger bought first class ticket),
nevertheless, the airline also committed tort/quasi-delict when the airline manager
did not mind his duty to treat its passengers with courteous conduct (i.e., treated
with kindness and respect - protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses). In other words, the act of the airline manager that
breaks the contract is also a tort, such that had there been no contract of carriage, a
quasi-delict/tort would nevertheless can be filed by the passenger against the
airline.
Issue No. 3: If the airline manager committed tort/quasi-delict against the
passenger, then why is it then that the airline be made liable for such personal act of
its employee-airline manager?
Held: Applicable is the Doctrine of Vicarious Liability.
Article 2180 (Doctrine of Vicarious Liability): The obligation imposed by Article 2176
is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions (i.e., airline), but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible (i.e., airline responsible to its
employees [airline manager]).
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Issue No. 3-A: What is it that the airline manager committed tort/quasi-delict
against the passenger - which rendered the airline vicariously liable thereto?
Held: Article 2176: Whoever by act/omission through fault/negligence, causes
damage to another, is liable for damages and if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation, this is called quasi-delict/tort. Also, Article 21 NCC (Human
Relations): Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
Issue No. 4:What damages therefore the airline liable for?
Held: They are the following: (1) actual damages P383 representing the difference
for fare between first class and tourist class ticket, (2) moral damages (Article 2219
[10] NCC: Moral damages for act under Human Relations particularly Articles 21), (3)
exemplary damages for the act of airline manager that is wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner constituting the ejectment of passenger
from first class tourist class, and (4) attorneys fee as the grant of exemplary
damages justifies grant also for attorneys' fees