02961E00 - Eni Guidelines On Risk-Based Inspections

Eni S.p.A.
Exploration & Production Division
COMPANY STANDARD
GUIDELINES FOR RISK BASED INSPECTIONS
02961.VAR.COR.SDS
Rev. 0
March 2011
0 First issue TEMM TEMM TEMM 03/2011

REV. DESCRIPTION COMPILED VERIFIED APPROVED DATE
ENGINEERING COMPANY STANDARD
Documento riservato di propriet di Eni S.p.A. Divisione Agip. Esso non sar mostrato a Terzi n utilizzato per scopi diversi da quelli per i quali stato inviato.
This document is property of Eni S.p.A. Divisione Agip. It shall neither be shown to Third Parties not used for purposes other than those for which it has been sent.
Eni S.p.A. 02961.VAR.COR.SDS
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PREMISE
Rev. 0 First issue March 2011

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. GENERAL
1.1 Foreword
1.2 Scope
1.3 References
1.3.1 Codes and Standards
1.3.2 Eni Company Standards
1.3.3 Eni E&P Company Documents
1.4 Definitions of terms
1.5 Acronyms and abbreviations
2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 RBI targets and project phases
2.1.1 Base case
2.1.2 Asset integrity of existing facilities
2.2 Limitations and exclusions
2.3 RBI and Asset Integrity Management
2.4 Benefits of RBI
2.5 RBI overview
2.5.1 The RBI process
2.5.2 The RBI flow chart
2.5.3 The RBI team
2.5.4 Supports to RBI
3. RBI TARGETS AND EXTENT. DATABASE
3.1 RBI Targets
3.2 RBI Extent. Item identification
3.3 Database
3.3.1 Data collection and review
3.3.2 Database creation and management
4. DEGRADATION MECHANISMS AND RISK ANALYSIS
4.1 RBI and degradation mechanisms
4.2 Corrosion degradation mechanisms
4.2.1 Corrosion types
4.2.2 Corrosion rate and predictive models
4.2.3 Morphology of the degradation mechanisms
4.3 Other degradation mechanisms
4.3.1 Piping fatigue
4.3.2 Brittle fracture
4.4 Risk Analysis
4.4.1 Corrosion Risk Assessment
4.4.2 Other approaches to Risk Assessment
4.4.3 Corrosion risk matrixes
4.4.4 Confidence
4.4.5 Risk analysis results
5. INSPECTION PLANNING AND EXECUTION
5.1 Inspection Plan
5.2 Type of inspections and NDT methods
5.2.1 Intrusive and non-intrusive inspections
5.2.2 NDT inspection methods
5.2.3 Probability of Detection and inspection effectiveness
5.3 Criteria for selection of NDT inspection methods
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5.3.1 Vessels
5.3.2 Tanks
5.3.3 Heat exchangers
5.3.4 Pipework
5.3.5 Flowlines and Trunklines
5.4 Risk Classes and Inspection Level
5.5 Sampling criteria
5.5.1 Systematic sampling
5.5.2 Application to vessel inspection
5.5.3 Application to pipework inspection
5.5.4 Inspections in correspondence to defects
5.6 Inspections Program
5.6.1 First inspections planning
5.6.2 Inspections intervals
5.7 Requirements for inspection execution
6. RESULTS EVALUATION
6.1 Inspection results analysis
6.2 Statistical analysis
6.2.1 Extreme values analysis
6.2.2 Bayes theorem
6.3 Defects evaluation: acceptance, repair or replacement
6.4 Re-evaluation
APPENDIX A. PRESSURE EQUIPMENT DIRECTIVE (PED)
APPENDIX B. FORM FOR DATA COLLECTION
APPENDIX C. CAUSES OF FAILURE IN OIL AND GAS PROCESS PLANTS
APPENDIX D. NDT INSPECTION METHODS
APPENDIX E. EXTREME VALUE ANALYSIS
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1. GENERAL
1.1 Foreword
Risk Based Inspection (RBI) is presented as a method to optimize the inspection activities performed
in Eni oil and gas production assets. The RBI approach is expected to improve the management of
the assets integrity, reducing the overall costs for inspection and monitoring.
The Document is strictly related to recently issued Company Standard dealing with Corrosion
Integrity Management (Ref. /18/) and with Corrosion Risk Assessment (Ref. /19/).
1.2 Scope
The present Company Standard illustrates the RBI approach for planning and executing inspections
of in-service oil and gas (upstream) production assets. Specifically, the document is focussed on:
gathering and distribution flowlines and trunklines networks;
oil and gas treatment units and utilities, onshore and offshore.
A similar approach is used for the inspection of pipelines, onshore and offshore, as described in the
Company Standards N.11554.PLI.COR.PRG and 20415.SLI.OFF.SDS respectively (see Ref. /25/
and Ref. /29/).
The Document is intended as a Guideline and contents shall be used for preparing Project
Documents, in particular the Inspection Plans and Inspection Programs. In particular, the following
issues are covered:
the RBI process;
corrosion mechanisms and morphologies;
criticality assessment;
inspection techniques;
inspection planning;
inspection results evaluation.
Extensive reference is made to the International Normative (API and DNV), issued in last years on
RBI and inspections.
The Document does not cover:

intelligent pig inspections;
hydrostatic pressure testing.
As far as cathodic protection is concerned, cathodic protection inspections is not covered in this
Document. However, reference is made to applicable Company and International Standards where
external degradation mechanisms are considered.
1.3 References
1.3.1 Codes and Standards
Ref. /1/ API RP 580 Risk-Based Inspection.

Ref. /2/ API RP 581 Risk-Based Inspection Technology.
Ref. /3/ API RP 574 Inspection of Piping System Components.
Ref. /4/ API RP 571 Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining
Industry.
Ref. /5/ API RP 579 Fitness-for-Service.
Ref. /6/ API 510 Pressure Vessel Inspection Code; Maintenance Inspection, rating,
Repair, and Alteration.
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Ref. /7/ API 570 Piping Inspection Code; Maintenance Inspection, rating, Repair, and
Alternation.
Ref. /8/ API 651 Cathodic Protection of Aboveground Petroleum Storage Tanks.
Ref. /9/ API 653 Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction
Ref. /10/ ASME B31G Manual for Determining the Remaining Strength of Corroded
Pipelines.
Ref. /11/ ASTM G16 Practice for Applying Statistics to Analysis of Corrosion Data.
Ref. /12/ DNV-RP-G101 Risk Based Inspection of Offshore Topsides Static Mechanical
Equipment.
Ref. /13/ DNV-RP-G103 Non-Intrusive Inspection.
Ref. /14/ EN 13018 Non-destructive testing. Visual testing. General principles.
Ref. /15/ D.L. 93/00 Attuazione della direttiva 97/23/CE in materia di attrezzature in
pressione.
Ref. /16/ D.M. 329/04 Regolamento Recante Norme per la Messa in Servizio ed
Utilizzazione delle Attrezzature a Pressione e degli Insiemi di cui
all'Articolo 19 del Decreto Legislativo 25 febbraio 2000, N. 93.
Ref. /17/ UNI/TS 11325-1 Messa in Servizio e Utilizzazione delle Attrezzature e degli Insiemi a
Pressione.
1.3.2 Eni Company Standards
Ref. /18/ 20602.VAR.COR.SDS Corrosion Integrity Management.

Ref. /19/ 20557.VAR.COR.SDS Corrosion risk assessment methodology.
Ref. /20/ 06215.DOC.GEN.SDS Facility Functional Units.
Ref. /21/ 02555.VAR.COR.PRG Design Criteria. Internal Corrosion. Corrosion Parameters and
Classification of the Fluid.
Ref. /22/ 20555.VAR.COR.PRG Internal Corrosion Monitoring Specification.
Ref. /23/ 20309.VAR.COR.PRG Cathodic protection of buried structures in plant facilities.
Ref. /24/ 20311.VAR.COR.SDS Cathodic protection underwater inspection.
Ref. /25/ 11554.PLI.COR.PRG Guidelines for drawing up the inspection and maintenance plan (IMP)
for onshore pipelines.
Ref. /26/ 11555.VAR.COR.SDS Guidelines for planning cathodic protection surveys of on-land buried
pipelines.
Ref. /27/ 11557.PLI.COR.STD Cathodic protection measurements and surveys for on-land buried
pipelines.
Ref. /28/ 11559.PLI.COR.FUN Technical Specification for on-shore pipeline external survey.
Ref. /29/ 20415.SLI.OFF.SDS Guideline for sealine and riser inspection and maintenance program.
1.3.3 Eni E&P Company Documents

Ref. /30/ Eni E&P Doc N 1.3.0.08 General Requirements for HSE Asset Integrity Management, Rev. 00,
dated September 2009.
Ref. /31/ SVI.TMS.MA.0001 TMS. Technology Management System Facilities Engineering
Handbook. Rev- A02, 29/10/2004.
Ref. /32/ SVI.OMS.POS. MA.0001 Opportunity and Production Operation System Handbook. Rev- A02,
29/06/2005.
1.4 Definitions of terms
ALARP (As Low As A concept of minimization that postulates that attributes (such as risk) can only be reduced to a certain
Reasonably Practical) minimum under current technology and with reasonable cost (Ref. /1/).
Asset All physical facilities required for operations (Ref. /30/).
Consequence of The consequence of failure through the unintentional release of hazardous fluids, including effects on
failure Health and Safety, of employees as well as of the public, to the environment, to the operability of the
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asset and to the company reputation.
Corrosion allowance The thickness of material which can safely be allowed to corrode having regard for the operating
environment and applied stresses
Corrosion risk An assessment of the susceptibility of the structure under investigation to all in-service degradation
assessment (CRA) mechanisms that may affect it. The CRA is not restricted to simply those degradation mechanisms
related to corrosion (Ref. /13/).
Critical Thickness Profile of the penetration if a defect through the wall thickness of a vessel shell or pipe, assessed
Profile through inspection measurements, for instance by spot UT readings. It shall be determined in the
longitudinal and in circumferential direction..
Criticality A function of the risk associated with the inspected equipment, incorporating likelihood of degradation
occurring and associated consequences (Ref. /13/).
Damage (type) The observed effect on a component of the action of a degradation mechanism. The damage type
gives rise to the failure mechanism of a component. Examples of damage include cracking, uniform
wall thinning, and pitting (Ref. /6/).
Damage model A mathematical and/or heuristic representation of the results of degradation. This may express the
accumulation of damage over time as functions of physical or chemical parameters, and normally
includes the estimation of the conditions that give rise to failure(Ref. /6/).
Damage rate The development of damage over time (Ref. /6/).
Defect A defect is an incompliance with project specifications.
Design life That period during which an item or component is intended to remain fit for service under the specified
design and operating process conditions. See also Remnant life.
Extreme value Statistical method applicable for evaluating inspection results, in particular UT residual thickness
analysis measurements (see also APPENDIX E in this Document).
Failure Termination of the ability of a system, structure, or component to perform its required function of
containment of fluid (i.e. loss of containment). Failure may be unannounced and undetectable until the
next inspection (unannounced failure), or may be announced and detected by any number of methods
at the instance of occurrence (announced failure) (Ref. /1/).
The point at which a component ceases to fulfil its function and the limits placed on it. The failure
condition must be clearly defined in its relationship to the component. Failure can be expressed, for
example, in terms of non-compliance with design codes, or exceedance of a set risk limit, neither of
which necessarily imply leakage (Ref. /6/).
Flaw The physical manifestation of a degradation mechanism, in terms of cracking, pitting or wall loss etc.
HAZOP (Hazard and Qualitative methodology that identifies possible deviations from the correct functioning of the process
Operability Analysis) and of the plant services, analysing moreover the consequences of such anomalies and the actions to
be taken to limit them to the smallest possible area (Ref. /32/).
Inspection An activity carried out periodically and used to assess the progression of damage in a component.
Inspection can be by means of technical instruments (NDT) or as a visual examination (Ref. /6/).
Inspection A description of the ability of the inspection method to detect the damage type inspected (Ref. /6/).
effectiveness
Inspection level The Inspection Level is an attribute given to an item in the inspection planning phase which reflects
the risk class, or criticality, attributed to the item itself, or to a part of it. It is used to define the extent of
the inspection, for instance as spacing of spot measurements or size and number of sample areas to
be inspected.
Inspection methods The means by which inspection can be carried out such as visual, ultrasonic, radiographic (Ref. /6/).
Inspection program A summary of inspection activities mainly used as an overview of inspection activity for several years
into the future.
Internal Visual This is considered as an intrusive close visual examination of all internally accessible plate material
Inspection (IVI) and, where applicable, conventional magnetic particle (MPI) or dye penetrant (DPI) inspection of
welds.
Monitoring An activity carried out over time whereby the amount of damage is not directly measured but is
inferred by measurement of factors that affect that damage. An example would be the monitoring of
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CO2 content in a process stream in relation to CO2 corrosion.
NDT Non-destructive testing. Inspection of components using equipment to reveal the defects, such as
magnetic particles or ultrasonic methods.
Non-Intrusive This refers to any inspection performed from the outside of the vessel without having to break
Inspection (NII) containment and/or not requiring vessel entry. It may be performed on-stream or off-stream. The terms
non-invasive and non-intrusive are often used interchangeably (Ref. /13/).
Remnant life That period during which it is judged that an item or component will remain safe to operate, allowing
for the elapsed service life.
Risk The combination of the probability of an event and its consequences. In some situations risk is the
deviation from the expected. Risk is defined as the product of probability and consequences when
probability and consequence are expressed numerically (Ref. /1/).
Risk Based A decision making technique for inspection planning based on risk comprising the probability of
Inspection (RBI) failure and consequence of failure.
1.5 Acronyms and abbreviations
Symbol or Unit Definition

abbreviation
ACFM (-) Eddy Current ACFM
AE (-) Acoustic Emission
CHIME (-) Creeping Head Inspection
CR (mm/y) Corrosion rate
CorrRA (-) Corrosion risk assessment
CSCC (-) Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking
CTP (-) Critical Thickness Profile
CUI (-) Corrosion Under Insulation
CVI (-) Close Visual Inspection
D (-) Diameter (vessel or piping)
DL (years) Design life or remnant life
DMS Development Management System
DPI (-) Liquid Penetrant Inspection
EMATs (-) Electromagnetic Acoustic Transmission
EVT (-) Extreme Value Theory
Fc (-) Corrosion factor
FOC (-) Overall consequence factor
HAZOP (-) Hazard and Operability Study
HSE (-) Health, Safety, Environment
GEV (-) Generalized Extreme Value distribution
LDEFECT (-) Length of a defect
LS (-) Recommended profile spacing
LRUT (-) Long Range Ultrasonic
MFD (-) Material Flow Diagram
MFL (-) Magnetic Flux Leakage
MPI (-) Magnetic Particle Inspection
NDT (-) Non Destructive Testing
OPDS (-) Opportunity and Project Development System
OPOS (-) Opportunity and Production Operation System
p (mm) Through wall corrosion penetration
P&ID (-) Process Instrumentation Diagram
PDEFECT (-) Penetration of a defect
PEC (-) Pulsed Eddy Current
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PED (-) Pressure Equipment Directive

PFD (-) Process Flow Diagram
POD (-) Probability of detection
RT (-) Radiography
RTR (-) Real Time Radiography
RVI (-) Remote Visual Inspection
SLFEC (-) Saturated Low Frequency Eddy Current
SSC (-) Sulphide Stress Corrosion Cracking
t (mm) Nominal wall thickness (referred to a pipe or a vessel)
tCA (mm) Corrosion allowance
tCD (mm) Declared design corrosion allowance.
tMIN (mm) Minimum required thickness
TOFD (-) Time of Flight Diffraction
TT (-) Thermography
UI (-) Ultrasonic Imaging
UT (-) Conventional Ultrasonic Testing
k (-) Skip. Is the grid spacing for spot NDT readings
kPC and kPL (-) Circumference and longitudinal spacing for spot NDT readings on pipework
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2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 RBI targets and project phases
RBI applies to in-service facilities and it is a process mainly pertinent to operation phase of a Project.
Actually, RBI can be adopted with different targets and contexts which are reviewed here below.
2.1.1 Base case
The case for adopting the RBI approach is for new assets where, starting from the development
phase, RBI is planned as method to execute periodical inspections (Inspection Programs).
Integrated to the RBI process, Corrosion Risk Assessment is planned and executed from the
development phase, based on design data and documentation (see Figure 2.1). First inspection
campaign is typically executed within the first year of the operating life, with the aim to provide base-
line data as well as to confirm the facility is free from construction defects.
The RBI results are then integrated in the database and used to update the criticality levels of the
evaluated items. Inspection frequency and requirements are then updated based on available
inspection results and the RBI process is periodically re-executed in accordance with the Inspection
Programs.
2.1.2 Asset integrity of existing facilities
This is the case of existing facilities, already operating, where RBI is requested as part of the Asset
Integrity process. Examples of this case are:
evaluation after asset acquisition;
asset re-qualification.
In these contexts, RBI is performed as unplanned activity, focused on a specific target, like asset re-
qualification or acquisition or as preliminary activity for future interventions on the asset.
2.2 Limitations and exclusions
RBI methodology is intended to be applied to all Static Pressure Equipment. Besides, the present
Guideline has been prepared for specific areas of applicability and under a number of limitations, as
reported in Table 2.2.
The following types of inspections are not covered by the present Guideline:
cathodic protection inspections;
intelligent pig inspections;
hydrostatic pressure tests.
The present Guideline does not intend to comply with National Regulations for pressurized systems.
In Italy, for instance, the European Directive for Pressure Equipment (PED) applies; an overview of
the PED methodology is given in APPENDIX A.
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Table 2.1 Applicability and limitations of this Guideline.

Parameters Area of applicability Exclusions and remarks
Facilities Typical facilities covered by RBI are: Wellhead and wells in general.
Oil and gas gathering networks; Pipelines inspections are covered by other
Distribution networks (gas and water Company Standard (see Ref. /25/ and Ref.
injection; water disposal); /25/).
Oil and gas process Units;
Utilities Units;
Storage tanks.
NOTE 1
Location Onshore and Offshore (topside) Not applicable for subsea facilities
Equipment Pressure vessels, tanks, pipework and heat Exclusions:
exchangers structural items including supports, skirts and
saddles;
non-static equipment (pumps, compressors,
etc.);
internal components (covered only in case of
intrusive inspections);
instrumentation.
Seals, gaskets, flanged connections Remark:
at the moment no valid RBI methodologies
are available to evaluate the risk classes.
Therefore the risk class shall be inherited
from the line which they belong, and the
frequency of inspection shall be the highest
between the one suggested by RBI and the
one required by the Maintenance.
Failure mode Degradation mechanism, including: Exclusions:
weight loss corrosion, general and localized; high temperature corrosion (T>500C);
stress corrosion cracking; creep;
erosion corrosion and wear abrasion; defectiveness occurred in construction
NOTE 2
corrosion fatigue; phase;
fatigue; accidental events.
low temperature brittle fracture
follow-up of previously detected defects.
NOTE 1 Inspection of subsea facilities, like subsea wellheads, Pipe Line End Manifold (PLEM), flowlines, risers, require
underwater interventions and are covered by dedicated Company Standard, as for instance Ref. /24/ and Ref.
/29/. RBI procedure, as illustrated in this Document applies but shall be adapted to underwater situations.
NOTE 2 Defects originated in the construction phase is covered by dedicated documents. Construction defects cannot be
correlated to operating conditions of the item and cannot be predicted and risk assessed.
2.3 RBI and Asset Integrity Management
RBI is defined as (see Par. 1.4) a decision making technique for inspection planning based on risk
comprising the probability of failure and consequence of failure.
In this Document RBI is presented as a process of planning the inspection requirements through the
assessment of risk.
RBI is one of the Tasks of Asset Integrity Management and it contributes to prevention of major
accidents and to maintain the safe operability of oil and gas production facilities. The Corrosion
Integrity Management System (Ref. /18/) has been established to adequately handle the corrosion
issues in the engineering phase (OPDS - Opportunity and Project Development System) and during
production (OPOS - Opportunity and Production Operation System) through a number of well-defined
and organised activities, or TASKS.
Figure 2.1illustrates the positioning of the tasks of the Corrosion Integrity Management System with
respect to the project phases. Corrosion Risk Assessment, RBI and Monitoring and Inspections are
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the tasks involved in the RBI process; as shown in same figure, the tasks begin in the development
phase and continue during the whole operation phase.
PROJECT PHASES
Development Operation
TASKS Commissioning,
Evaluation Concept Selection Concept Definition Execution
Start-up, Tests
Handover to First Period Running Product. Preparation to
Operation Production & Improvement Decommissioning
Corrosion control
philosophies
Materials and corrosion
control design
Corrosion monitoring and
inspection design
Laboratory and field testing
Data management
Corrosion management
CORROSION RISK
ASSESSMENT
RISK BASED INSPECTIONS
MONITORING AND
INSPECTIONS
Asset Integrity review
Figure 2.1Corrosion Integrity Management tasks and project phases (simplified from Ref. /18/).
2.4 Benefits of RBI
RBI is intended to provide beneficial effects in the following area:

increased operability through increase in asset availability and reduction of shutdowns;
reduced risks of failure and associated consequences, including safety and environmental impact;
inspection optimization, through optimization of number of items and positions to be monitored
and frequency of inspection;
monitoring optimization, through the identification of most critical positions and parameters to be
monitored.
The reasons for selecting a risk based approach to inspection planning are:
to focus inspection efforts on items where the safety, economic or environmental risks are
identified as being high, whilst similarly reducing the effort applied to low risk systems;
to ensure that the overall installation risk does not exceed the risk acceptance limits, set by the
operator, at any time;
to identify the appropriate inspection or monitoring methods according to the identified
degradation mechanisms.
The RBI approach can lead to a reduction of the inspection costs. However, cost reduction is neither
the target nor the motivation of RBI.
2.5 RBI overview
2.5.1 The RBI process
RBI is a process consisting of independent and correlated steps, or tasks, which are:
definition of RBI extent and targets;
creation of database;
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risk and criticality assessment;

inspection planning;
inspection execution;
inspection results evaluation;
update of database and re-evaluation.
Figure 2.2 shows the main sub-tasks of the RBI process and sequence of their execution. Each step
is analysed in next Section of the Document.
DEFINITION OF
RBI EXTENT AND TARGETS
CREATION OF DATABASE
RISK AND CRITICALITY

ASSESSMENT
UPDATE OF DATABASE INSPECTION PLANNING

AND RE-EVALUATION
INSPECTION EXECUTION
INSPECTION RESULTS
EVALUATION
Figure 2.2 Sub-tasks of the RBI process.
2.5.2 The RBI flow chart
The detailed flowchart of the RBI process is illustrated in Figure 2.3.

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RBI extent and targets
Define the Asset and Establish the targets

battery limits for RBI of RBI
Item Identification. Data collection. Database
Identify and List the Codify the Items Collect Data and
ITEMS Create the Database
Risk Analysis
Identify the Perform Corrosion Perform Consequence Risk Matrixes Criticality Assessment
corrosion mechanisms Analysis Analysis
Inspection planning
Identify Applicable Establish Sampling For Each Item Define Fix Inspection
Inspection Methods Criteria Inspection Level and Requirements
Coverage
Inspection execution
Perform Inspections Review and Check

Inspection Results
Inspection results evaluation
Evaluate Inspection Perform Statistical Evaluate Defects Perform Re-

Results Analysis evaluation and Re-
Assessment
Fitness-for-service
Fitness for Service Accept, Repair, De-rate

or Replace
Figure 2.3 RBI process flowchart.
2.5.3 The RBI team
The RBI is a complex process which involves several parties, including:

the Owner of the asset;
the Company in charge for operations through its representatives (Operation Manager; HSE
Manager; Corrosion Manager; Maintenance Manager; etc.);
the discipline Specialists.
Typically the team for RBI execution would include the following Functions and responsibilities.
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HSE Manager He contributes to the identification of the consequences in case of failure of

the item covered by the RBI. Based on RBI results, he is responsible that
remedial recommendations are implemented.
Inspection Manager He contributes to all aspects related to inspection execution, including:
compliance of inspection works with inspection plans;
to ensure proper training of inspection personnel;
management of the inspection data results and loading in the database.
Corrosion Manager He contributes to all aspects related to corrosion assessment of the item
under evaluation, including:
construction materials;
identification of expected degradation mechanisms;
fluid treatments with corrosion inhibitors;
corrosion rate prediction;
corrosion monitoring.
Operation Manager He contributes to all aspects related to operability, including:
shut downs;
item redundancy;
impact of production losses.
The above description of Function and responsibilities shall be obviously adapted to each specific
context where the RBI is executed and in case integrated with additional contributions, also
depending on the Parties involved, including Contractors.
2.5.4 Supports to RBI
A number of supports are available and shall be used along the execution of the RBI process; these
include:
Company standards and Procedures;
International standards;
Company software tools;
Data management systems.
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3. RBI TARGETS AND EXTENT. DATABASE
3.1 RBI Targets
Definition of the target of an RBI represents the first step of the RBI process.
RBI target shall be identified and agreed amongst the Parties involved considering all aspects
affecting the RBI process and use of the results. These include, but are not limited to:
phase of the asset within the project life (commissioning; operation; re-qualification;
decommissioning; new asset operated by the Company; etc.)
requirements from the legislation of the country where the asset is located;
type of inspections: if routine Periodical) or extraordinary;
cost related aspects.
3.2 RBI Extent. Item identification
The asset object of the RBI process shall be clearly defined and battery limits established. Once
identified the asset and the battery limits, a list shall be created of the item to be included in the RBI
process. The most significant case is of process Units, like Separation, Stabilization, Gas
Compression and Treatment; Water Treatment, Utilities.
RBI typically covers pressure vessels, tanks, pipework and heat exchangers.
As first choice, it is recommended to include ALL the items of the Units, leaving to corrosion risk
analysis to exclude the less risky items. Application of the RBI procedure is mandatory for pressure
vessels and pressure pipework.
For risk analysis, grouping of items is admitted in principle; however, it has to be verified their
equivalence from all viewpoints, including: material; sizes thickness in particular; exposure
conditions (present and past); operating parameters.
Each selected item shall be univocally identified by a code, or TAG.
Based on the asset under study, the exposure side(s) to be investigated shall be established. These
typically include:
internal;
external atmospheric
external soil;
under thermal insulation.
3.3 Database
3.3.1 Data collection and review
In order to allow the most appropriate corrosion risk analysis, project data shall be collected and
validated. Typical source documents are the following:
design premises and design codes;
design and remnant life;
layout drawings ;
P&IDs;
PFDs;
piping class specifications;
heat and material balances;
corrosion prevention philosophy studies;
materials selection reports;
material flow diagram;
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vessel data-sheets;
flow rate data, past and forecast;
operating data, past and actual:
failure track records and failure analysis reports;
inspection history and reports;
repair interventions history and reports;
painting, coating and insulation specifications;
cathodic protection specification;
cathodic protection inspection reports.
3.3.2 Database creation and management
The documents listed in previous paragraph, together with all useful sources, shall be reviewed and
validated and used to create the RBI database to be used in next steps of the RBI process.
As a minimum, the database shall contain the following categories of data (for each item):
codes and extent (from/to for pipework only);
dimensional data;
materials and grades;
design and operating parameters (actual and past);
fluid chemical analysis and physical parameters (actual and past);
bacterial analysis (for waters);
fluid treatments with chemicals: types; injection points; injection mode; dosages (actual and past);
process treatments;
cathodic protection data (actual and past);
coating and painting;
monitoring, inspection and failures data;
risk matrixes by homogeneous items and Process Units.
criticality level (from risk matrixes);
The creation and update of the database for the asset under evaluation is a key point of the RBI
process (see Ref. /18/).
In APPENDIX B an example is reported of FORM for data collection.

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4. DEGRADATION MECHANISMS AND RISK ANALYSIS
4.1 RBI and degradation mechanisms
The degradation mechanisms are defined as the means by which a component degrades thus
reducing its ability to carry out its function (Ref. /6/).
Several degradation mechanisms are met in oil and gas production facilities, which can be grouped
in accordance to different criteria.1 Main categories are:
internal and external corrosion mechanisms;
stress corrosion (environmental) cracking;
sand erosion;
mechanical and metallurgical mechanisms.
A further category of degradation mechanism is classified as high temperature corrosion, as for

instance oxidation, which occurs only at temperature above 500 C.
Amongst the degradation mechanisms, distinction can be made between time dependant and non-
time dependent mechanisms.
Non-time dependent degradation mechanisms occur as sudden rupture, for instance by fracture, and
inspection criteria based on inspection intervals cannot be applied.
RBI, in its most appropriate and complete interpretation, applies to time-dependent degradation
mechanisms where risk prediction can be performed. However, the RBI approach, at least in part,
can be easily extended and adapted to all expected degradation mechanisms.
In oil and gas production, corrosion mechanisms weight loss, pitting, cracking represent the main
time dependent corrosion mechanism. Examples of failure data in offshore facilities are reported in
APPENDIX C.
4.2 Corrosion degradation mechanisms
4.2.1 Corrosion types
Corrosion mechanisms result by a combination of environment and metallic material. Carbon and low
alloy steel (CS) have a dominant position in the facilities under consideration, but also corrosion
resistant alloys (CRA) can be met (stainless steels, copper alloy, nickel alloys, titanium alloy).
Corrosion mechanisms are classified depending on exposure side, if internal or external, and
morphology (see Table 4.1).
1
A comprehensive description of degradation mechanisms met in industry, in particular in refinery, is covered by API 571
(Ref. /4/).
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Table 4.1
Exposure side Corrosion mechanism Affected materials
Uniform or localized loss of thickness
CO2 corrosion CS
Microbial Induced Corrosion (MIC) CS
H2S corrosion CS
Oxygen corrosion CS
Erosion corrosion CS; CRA
Amine corrosion CS; CRA
Galvanic CS; CRA
Internal
Elemental sulphur corrosion CS; CRA
Localized pitting and crevice corrosion CRA
Sand erosion CS; CRA
Environmental cracking
Sulphide Stress Cracking (SSC) CS; CRA
Hydrogen Induced Cracking CS
Amine cracking CS
Chloride Stress Corrosion Cracking (CSCC) CRA
External Atmospheric CS; CRA
Corrosion under insulation (CUI) CS; CRA
Sea water corrosion CS; CRA
Soil corrosion CS; CRA
Electrical interference (DC and AC) CS; CRA
Carbonate-bicarbonate stress corrosion cracking CS
4.2.2 Corrosion rate and predictive models
Corrosion in general is a time dependent phenomenon. However, depending on the specific

mechanism, different types of dependence of corrosion with time exist. In particular the following
types can be identified:
progressive time dependent mechanisms: for a given corrosion system, which results from the
combination of given metal and environment, the corrosion attack proceeds regularly, typically as
weight loss, at rate which depends on value assumed by the operating and environment
parameters; for some of these mechanisms models are available to predict corrosion rate.
incubation-propagation mechanisms: corrosion occurs after an incubation time, variable to zero
up to infinite, after which the damage occurs at high rate or instantaneously. It is the case of
cracking mechanisms in general and of some localised types of pitting and crevice corrosion.
Progression with time of these mechanisms is difficult to predict, and prediction is often issued in
binary terms (pass no pass) based on compatibility verification.
The propagation modes (through wall penetration, p, vs. time) for typical corrosion forms met in oil
and gas production facilities are illustrated in Figure 4.1. For corrosion mechanism which proceeds in
a time dependent manner, case (a), the failure event, and time-to-failure, depend on which wall
thickness is taken as reference, if the full wall thickness or corrosion allowance. For incubation-
propagation mechanisms, as cracking phenomena, which proceed at a fast or instantaneous rate,
the failure event is at end of incubation time.
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P P P
localized
propagation propagation
uniform
incubation
incubation
time time time
CO2corrosion (Carbon Steel) Pitting Corrosion (Stainless Steels) Cracking

Erosion
Microbial Corrosion
Oxygen corrosion (Carbon Steel)
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.1 Through wall penetration modes for different corrosion mechanisms.
4.2.3 Morphology of the degradation mechanisms
Knowledge and prediction of the morphology of defects produced by a given degradation mechanism
supports the selection of most convenient inspection method.
Depending on the mechanism, the corrosion damage assumes different morphologies. The following
ones are the most typical:
localised weight loss corrosion: localized attacks have a minor impact on pressure/load bearing
capacity; failure can occur as wall perforation or as consumption of the corrosion allowance
(different definitions of the corrosion allowances are possible: see Ref. /19/);
uniform weight loss corrosion: it occurs on a large area and it affects the pressure/load bearing
capacity of the equipment wall. Conservatively, failure shall be referred to the consumption of the
design corrosion allowance;
pitting corrosion: it is typical of stainless steels and corrosion resistant alloys; corrosion occurs at
a very small area and it develops through the wall thickness;
cracking: one or more crack, single or ramified, penetrates through the wall thickness. Failure
occurs as leak before break, giving leak or structural failure respectively.
Both localised and uniform weight loss corrosion produce a wall thickness reduction.
Identification of the expected corrosion morphology is integral part of the risk analysis as inspection
techniques shall be selected based on the type of defect to be looked for. Prediction of corrosion
morphology is intrinsically uncertain; however, general rules are available.
Expected morphology for main weight loss (internal) corrosion forms are reported in Table 4.2.
Morphology is expressed as ranges of probability for the size parameters of the corrosion defect:
LDEFECT is the length of the defect (or the equivalent diameter of the corroded area) and PDEFECT is the
penetration of the defect through the wall thickness. Within the RBI process, the knowledge on
morphology of corrosion defects has to be considered in the phase of NDT selection (see Par. 5.3).
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Table 4.2 Predicted corrosion morphology for main corrosion forms.

Corrosion form Size parameters Probability
CO2 corrosion (Carbon Steel) Uniform (mesa at bottom-of-
LDEFECT/PDEFECT Localised
line)
~1 0.5 0
~10 0.5 0.1
100 0 0.9
Erosion LDEFECT/PDEFECT Uniform (elbows, tees, valves) Localised
~1 0 0
~10 0.1 0
100 0.9 0
Microbial Corrosion LDEFECT/PDEFECT Carbon Steel Stainless Steels
~1 0.2 1.0
~10 0.8 0
100 0 0
Oxygen corrosion (Carbon LDEFECT/PDEFECT Localised Uniform
Steel)
~1 0.2 0
~10 0.8 0.1
100 0 0.9
Pitting Corrosion (Stainless LDEFECT/PDEFECT Localised
Steels)
1 1.0
4.3 Other degradation mechanisms
Although corrosion degradation mechanisms have been identified as the main mechanisms affecting
the durability of the assets considered in this document, other degradation mechanisms exist which
shall be adequately considered within the risk analysis and the inspection tasks. The main ones are:
fatigue (for piping): mechanical-, thermal-, corrosion-;
brittle fracture, caused by low temperature or low toughness.
Fatigue is a time dependent degradation mechanism, purely mechanical or aggravated by corrosion

(corrosion-fatigue). Brittle fracture, although not time dependent, can occur in high thickness items, in
particular if unexpected low temperatures are experienced, in particular during transitory operations.
The two mechanisms are reviewed in the paragraphs here below.
4.3.1 Piping fatigue
Mechanical fatigue failures can typically occur in installed piping systems connected to reciprocating
pumps and compressors which cause vibrations and cyclic stresses. In these cases, the component
shall be evaluated from view point of its susceptibility to mechanical fatigue damages, i.e. fatigue
cracks.
Main factors for identification of piping mechanical fatigue failures are:

evidences of previous fatigue failures;
audible or visible piping vibrations;
connection to reciprocating equipment, like pumps or compressors, or to high pressure drop
valves.
The norm API RP 581 (Ref. /2/) Part 2, Par. 25, provides guidelines to assess the probability of
piping fatigue failures.
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4.3.2 Brittle fracture
Toughness of metals and alloys decreases with temperature, with limits which depend on the alloy
and its microstructure. Brittle fracture occurs as a sudden failure usually initiated at a crack or defect.
Low temperature conditions can be experienced due to environmental conditions, as for instance in
artic regions, or because operating conditions, in particular during temporary phases, as for instance
upsets.
Main factors affecting brittle facture and to be considered are:

metallic material: type; microstructure; heat treatments; impact test resistance; welding
procedures; post-weld heat treatment;
applied loads and wall thickness;
minimum operating and design temperatures, during both normal operations and upsets.
Procedures for the assessment of brittle fracture occurrence are available in several international
codes and standard. The following are mentioned here:
API RP 581 (Ref. /2/) Part 2, Par. 21;
API RP 653 (Ref. /9/).
4.4 Risk Analysis
Risk analysis is the task within the RBI process whose outputs allow to orient and optimize the
inspection activities. The following results are expected by the risk analysis:
expected degradation mechanisms and corrosion forms;
morphologies of expected damages and defects;
corrosion risk matrixes and results from corrosion and consequence analysis;
criticality level (for individual item);
confidence level.
4.4.1 Corrosion Risk Assessment
The risk associated with (corrosion) failure is defined by multiplying (or, in general, by combining) the
probability of failure occurrence and the entities of the consequence in case of failure. Accordingly,
risk assessment consists in separately determining, for a given item, the probability of failure and the
entity of the consequences; depending on the approach followed to assess probability of failure and
the entity of the consequences, different definitions are given for risk assessment.
Within the body of the Eni Corporate Standard, the requirements for the execution of Corrosion Risk
Assessment (CorrRA) are covered in a dedicated Eni Document: 20557.VAR.COR.SDS (Ref. /19/),
which shall be adopted for the execution of RBI as integral part of this Guideline. In particular, the Eni
Company Standard 20557.VAR.COR.SDS covers the following topics:
corrosion analysis in oil and gas production facilities;
consequence analysis;
risk matrixes and criticality levels.
4.4.2 Other approaches to Risk Assessment
Although the above mentioned Eni Company Standard 20557.VAR.COR.SDS represents the base
and recommended reference for risk assessment, other methods exist for risk analysis which are
based on same approach but executed at different levels. Distinction, in fact, can be made between
qualitative and quantitative risk assessment as limit cases, where:
qualitative risk assessment is intended as performed using a judgment-based approach to the
assessment.
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quantitative risk assessment should use numerical value calculated with units of measurement,
eventually assigning intervals for probability of failure and consequence of failure, and assigning
risk values to risk ranks.
The term semi-quantitative is also used to define combinations of the two approaches, qualitative
and quantitative. The approach illustrated in the Eni 20557 VAR.COR.SDS is typically semi-
quantitative.
In all cases, the difficulty in calculating the probability of corrosion failure, the corrosion rate or the
corrosion morphology are recognized. In DNV-RP-G103 (Ref. /13/) for instance definitions are given
for different types (four) of corrosion risk assessment.
4.4.3 Corrosion risk matrixes
Depending on the corrosion risk assessment performed different types of corrosion risk matrixes can
be produced. The recommended risk matrix (see also Ref. /19/) shall be based on at least 5 levels of
risk, or risk classes, from negligible to very high, as shown in Figure 4.2.
Very high
Probability ( increasing)
Corrosion Severity or
High
Medium
Low
Very low
( increasing)Consequence of Failure RISK CLASSES
Figure 4.2 Corrosion risk matrixes and risk classes.
4.4.4 Confidence
Confidence is a qualitative attribute that expresses the ability of the corrosion analysis to predict
corrosion types and probability of occurrence. Confidence can be expressed through three
categories: high, medium and low. Assignment of confidence is a subjective judgement, based on the
following guidelines:
High confidence. As part of the integrity management activity, a thorough CRA (quantitative or semi-
quantitative) has been executed giving confidence that all relevant mechanisms and their likely
locations have been predicted. CRA shall cover for each item:
the degradation types (all), their locations and rates;
the metallurgy, modification and repair history;
the process fluid composition and operating conditions;
corrosion preventive measures;
track record of past history of the item shall be known and documented using reliable inspection
techniques (high Probability of Detection POD; see Par. 5.2.3);
the results of at least one previous inspection performed on the item.
Medium confidence. Same as above, but with no previous inspection results available.
Low confidence. More than one of above requirements cannot be fulfilled, with no previous
inspection results available.
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The confidence level shall be assigned to the performed corrosion analysis and the criteria adopted
for assignment declared.
4.4.5 Risk analysis results
The corrosion risk analysis allows, for each evaluated item, to position the item in the risk matrix
through the relevant coordinates of failure likelihood and consequence, and then to assign a
corrosion risk class, or criticality level, to the item.
As whole result of the corrosion risk analysis, as part of the RBI process, the following results are
provided:
expected corrosion degradation mechanisms;
expected corrosion morphologies;
localization of the attacks; examples are: bottom-of-line for CO2 corrosion; elbows for erosion
corrosion;
risk class (or criticality) and confidence;
ranking by risk classes for homogeneous items (for instance vessels and pipework for
homogeneous process Units).
Above results are results to the next step of RBI process, i.e. inspection planning.
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5. INSPECTION PLANNING AND EXECUTION
5.1 Inspection Plan
Inspection planning is the key task of RBI process, aimed to establish the requirements for inspection
execution within a cost effective frame.
The Inspection Plan is the project document which defines the requirements for the inspection
execution; it inherits results of the risk analysis and it takes into account the RBI targets and the
specific context; the following issues shall be covered by the Inspection Plan:
definition of inspection extent (items to be inspected) and targets;
ranking of items to be inspected based on risk class;
selection for each type of item (vessels, pipework, etc.) of the inspection methods;
extent and coverage of the inspections;
priorities for the inspection;
general requirements for inspection execution;
time schedule;
inspection drawings (recommended for main vessels);
reporting requirements.
The Inspection Plan can include the Corrosion Risk Assessment as part of it; however, it is
preferable to cover the two tasks, i.e. Corrosion Risk Assessment and Inspection Planning, by
separate documents.
5.2 Type of inspections and NDT methods
5.2.1 Intrusive and non-intrusive inspections
Inspections can be classified as intrusive and non-intrusive,
Intrusive inspection implies the internal access to the item to be inspected. Actually, this can be
acceptable in case of scheduled plant shut down; however, oil and gas production are designed for
continuous operation, and shut down costs, scheduled or not, can be prohibitive because of high
costs associated with loss of production. The advantages of performing non-intrusive inspection
include:
shutting down the plant or system is avoided;
access is avoided into area which can be hazardous;
where necessary, shutdown duration may be reduced.
impact on operations are minimized.
The acceptability and benefits of non-intrusive inspection for a particular item will depend on a
number of factors including:
geometry and presence of non-accessible parts (for instance, in case of vessels the shell surface
in correspondence to supports);
construction materials;
expected degradation mechanisms;
locations and sizes of damages of concern;
process;
historic inspection data;
confidence in inspection capability;
inspection costs.
RBI is mostly based on the non-intrusive approach, in order to avoid impact on operations.
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5.2.2 NDT inspection methods
Inspection methods applicable in oil and gas production industry include a wide number of
techniques, normally referred as Non-Destructive Testing (NDT). APPENDIX D in this Document
provides a brief description of the NDT methods used in oil and gas production considered in this
document with indication on their maturity and Probability of Detection (POD). For same methods, in
Table 5.1 a number of features are collected useful for their selection. In same table productivity data
are also reported to be considered for planning of inspection duration and budgetary costs
assessment.
Table 5.1 NDT inspection methods (adpted fromRef. /13/).
NDT Inspection Sensitivity and
Abb. Defects detected Productivity Remarks and limitations
methods Accuracy
Close Visual Inspection CVI Anything visible - - -
Conventional Ultrasonic UT Wall thickness 15 mm (weld) 20 m/day (weld) Adherent coating up to 1.5 mm allowed.
Testing (shear wave and reduction, local and 0.5 mm (at spot) 1000 readings/day (spot) Access for spot readings limited by item
compression wave) general. Acc.: 0.1/0.5 mm configuration.
Surface and Wall thickness up to 300 mm.
embedded cracks
(shear wave).
Blistering.
Ultrasonic Imaging UI Wall thickness 0.5 mm Greater than manually Color wall thickness map produced.
reduction, local and Acc.: 0.1/0.5 mm performed UT. Quite Wall thickness up to 600 mm
general variable depending on
items to be inspected and
mechanization level of the
tool (robot, crawler, etc.)
Time of Flight Diffraction TOFD Wall thickness Depends on 40 m/day (weld) -
reduction, local and geometry
general Acc.: 0.1/2.0 mm
Phased-Array PA Wall thickness -
reduction, local and
general
Creeping Head Inspection CHIME Wall thickness - Scan speed 1 m/min -
reduction, local and
general.
Long Range UT, or LRUT Wall thickness 510% of pipe wall 1 km/day as typical Piping from 2 up to 48;
Guided Waves (Lamb reduction, local and circumferential area It works better on straight pipes;
Waves) general. Probe ring at least 1 m from nearest
Cracks. girth weld-
Electromagnetic Acoustic EMATs As UT. 0.5 mm (at spot) 1000 readings/day (spot) Lower sensitivity than conventional UT
Transmission Acc.: 0.1/0.5 mm
Eddy Current ACFM ACFM Cracks (also under Crack depth > 1mm; - Suitable for crack detection and
coating) length > 10 mm. measurements
Acc.: 3 mm
Pulsed Eddy Current PEC Wall thickness 5% of wall thickness 1000 readings/day (spot) Detects general corrosion and erosion if
reduction. Accuracy 5% of wall damage area exceeds 500 mm2
thickness.
Repeatability 2% of
wall thickness
Saturated Low Frequency SLFEC Wall thickness 15% of wall thickness 1050 m2/day Fast large area scanning
Eddy Current reduction, local and
general.
Liquid Penetrant DPI Surface cracks. Anything visible 20 m/day Detects surface cracks
Inspection Clean surface needed
Magnetic Particle MPI Surface cracks. Anything visible 20 m/day Detects surface cracks
Inspection Clean surface needed
Applicable to magnetic alloys only
Magnetic Flux Leakage MFL Wall thickness 30% min. of wall 1050 m2/day; more if 410 mm wall thickness
reduction. thickness mechanized scan
Thermography TT Wall thickness -
reduction.
Film Radiography (Ir 192; RT Wall thickness 2% of wall thickness low Radiation safety restrictions
Co 60) reduction.
Embedded flaws.
Real Time Radiography RTR Wall thickness 2% of wall thickness Faster than Film Radiation safety restrictions
reduction. Radiography
Acoustic Emission AE Growing cracks Detects growing Moderate 60C max.
cracks
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5.2.3 Probability of Detection and inspection effectiveness
Probability of Detection (POD) is a measure of the capability of an inspection method to detect a

given type of defect in the area covered by the inspection method.2
The effectiveness of an inspection depends on the POD of the adopted NDT methods and on the
degree of coverage. Effectiveness is expressed qualitatively (high, medium and low).
5.3 Criteria for selection of NDT inspection methods
NDT inspection methods shall be selected considering the results of the corrosion analysis, and in
particular the expected degradation mechanisms, their probability to occur and their morphology.
Each method in fact, is suitable to detect specific corrosion defects, as wall thinning, uniform or
localised, or cracking.
Actually, selection of most convenient method(s) shall be performed considering the following
factors:
type of expected defects and degradation mechanisms;
applicable NDT methods and features;
item to be inspected: vessel, pipework, above ground tank, pipeline, other;
inspection constraints: inspection tool and personnel availability, costs and duration of the
inspection, specific targets of the inspection activities.
Hereinafter base criteria are given for main type of item, distinguishing between recommended (base
case) inspection methods and applicable methods; applicable methods are intended as proven
techniques, often sophisticated, whose application shall be evaluated case by case based on specific
project requirements.
5.3.1 Vessels
Pressure vessels represent the main item in oil and gas treatment plants, including: separators,
desalters, dehydrators, scrubbers, columns, etc.
Basically, non-intrusive inspection shall be performed in order to avoid plant shut-down.
Inspection shall be focussed on shell and nozzles, distinguishing between internal side and external;
thermal insulation, if present, can limit accessibility to surfaces to be inspected. Vessel internals can
be inspected only in case of shut down of the vessel (intrusive inspection).
The most common and critical type of damage met in vessel in oil and gas treatment plant is wall
thinning, also reported as loss of wall thickness, uniform or localised, mainly caused by internal
corrosion.
Ultrasonic methods, conventional or advanced, are the preferred applicable NDT methods. Wall
thickness of vessels (separators, column, etc.) normally are within the UT applicability limits, which
depending on the method are up to 300 mm. Non-intrusive inspection can be performed with probes
contacting the external side of the vessel shell. Access limitations can be caused by saddle plates,
lifting lugs, stiffeners. UT methods can be applied also in presence of paints, organic or metallic
2
The POD is normally expressed as a ratio of a probability of detecting a flaw with a confidence level (e.g. 90/95, 90/90,
90/75 or 90/50) depending on the requirements of the application. The first number in the series denotes the probability
that the flaw will be detected, which is given as a percentage. The second number denotes the confidence level for
detecting the flaw.
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coating (galvanized or flame spray). In presence of thermal insulation or high built passive fire
protection coating, removal shall be considered.
Nozzles welds can be preferential point for defects, like wall thinning or cracking. Nozzles can be set-
on nozzles or set-through nozzles (see Figure 5.1); the type of nozzles shall be considered in
inspection execution.
Set-through Set-on nozzle

nozzle design design
Vessel shell Vessel shell
Figure 5.1 Set-through and se-on design for nozzles.
Recommended and applicable methods for vessel inspection are given in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2. Recommended and applicable methods for vessel inspection.

VESSELS
NDT inspection methods
Expected damage Remarks
Recommended Applicable
Internal wall thinning (general or UT and UI RT Internal CVI recommended during
localised) RVI shut downs.
Local removal of thermal insulation, if
MFL
present, is required.
External wall thinning (general or CVI TT In presence of thermal insulation CVI
localised) require insulation removal;
alternatively, Thermography (TT) is
applicable
Cracking ACFM TOFD -
DPI and MPI AE
UT (shear waves)
Wall thinning or cracking at nozzles UT RT UT shear waves type shall be used
welds DPI and MPI for cracks detection; design of the
nozzle, if set-on or -through, shall be
considered.
5.3.2 Tanks
In oil and gas treatment plants above ground tanks exist for storage of liquid hydrocarbon and water
(firewater; sea water; potable; demineralized; etc.). Crude oil storage tanks represent the most
common type. The tank bottom represents the most critical part from durability viewpoint, with
corrosion being possible from the internal side, caused by separated water, or from the lower side in
contact with soil or foundations. In both cases cathodic protection is normally foreseen.
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Inspection of the tank bottom is possible only from the internal side, and this implies the shutdown of
the tank for intrusive inspection.
The recommended methods for tank bottom inspection are Magnetic Flux Leakage and UT; both
methods are applicable using mechanised devices which allow scanning the entire surface, or a
portion of it, with production of maps of the investigated area.
From the external side, non-intrusive inspections can be performed on shell and roof. Close visual
inspection can be integrated with UT inspection, in particular of the lower part of the shell (first and
second shell course from bottom) where internal corrosion can occur caused by separated water.
Table 5.3. Recommended and applicable methods for above ground storage tanks.
ABOVE GROUND STORAGE TANKS
(*)
Tank bottom thinning (general or MFL - CVI applicable to upper side and shell
localised) (*)
UT and UI
(*) internal during shut downs.
CVI
Tank shell and roof thinning UT and UI EMAT CVI applicable to external side.
(general or localised) CVI
(*)
Inspection to be performed during shut downs only and by access into the tank.
For the inspection and control of cathodic protection systems, if present, of lower side of the tank
bottom and of the internal surfaces, reference can be made to applicable Company and International
Standards: API 651(Ref. /8/); Eni 20309.VAR.COR.PRG (Ref. /23/).
5.3.3 Heat exchangers
Inspection of shell and tube heat exchanger has to be referred to the specific components to be
inspected: shell, heads and nozzles; tube-sheets; tube bundle.
For non-intrusive inspection of inspection of shell, heads and nozzles, the same guidelines above
reported for vessels apply (see Par. 5.3.1). Inspection of tube-sheet and tube bundle can be only
performed during shut downs (intrusive inspection). Type of defects and damage of tubes include:
erosion at pipe inlets; cracks at tube-sheet connection; general or localized wall thickness reduction
along the tube (internal or external); vibration induced fatigue cracks at supports.
Recommended methods for tubes are UT and ACFM. UT IRIS - Internal Rotating Inspection System
(ultrasonic) uses a rotating probe for 360 inspection of tubes. Applicable techniques for tube-sheet
and tubes inspections are given in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4. Recommended and applicable methods for heat exchangers.

HEAT EXCHANGER (TUBE BUNDLES)
Components Remarks
Shell. Heads. Nozzles As per vessel (see Table 5.2)
Tube-sheet CVI
DPI and MPI
Inspection feasible only during
Tubes UT-IRIS equipment shut downs.
RVI
ACFM
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5.3.4 Pipework
Pipework in oil and gas process plant can be internally exposed to a wide range of fluids. Piping
conveying hydrocarbon are the most representative in oil and gas process units, like separation,
crude stabilization, gas compression and dehydration, fuel gas, flare system.
Wall thinning by weight loss corrosion, uniform or localized, represents the main damage, with
mechanisms which depend on fluids and operating conditions. In horizontal piping, corrosion
likelihood is greater at bottom-of-pipe, but localization shall be evaluated in the corrosion risk
analysis phase.
Pipework inspection are preferably based on UT methods, conventional or advanced.
With respect to manually operated UT conventional probe, Long Range UT (LRUT) or Guided
Waves, allows to quickly inspect significant lengths of piping, also if partly buried. Limitations are
represented by presence of thick coating or thermal insulation, by flanges along the piping route and
by the moderate POD. The principle of the method is shown in Figure 5.2.
Piping
Regions inspected
Transducer Flange
Figure 5.2 Schematic of application of Long Range UT to piping inspection.
Recommended and applicable methods for inspection of above-ground pipework are given in Table
5.5.
Table 5.5. Recommended and applicable methods for pipework.

PIPEWORK
Internal wall thinning (general or UT and UI RT Local removal of thermal insulation, if
localised) LRUT RVI present, is required.
MFL
External wall thinning (general or CVI TT In presence of thermal insulation CVI
localised) requires insulation removal;
alternatively, Thermography (TT) is
applicable
Cracking ACFM TOFD
DPI AE
MPI UT
In case of buried pipework, access limitation exists and long range UT (guided waves) represents the
most effective inspection method. When underground piping are cathodically protected against
external corrosion, cathodic protection conditions can be verified in accordance with Eni
20309.VAR.COR.PRG (Ref. /23/).
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5.3.5 Flowlines and Trunklines
For inspection of flowlines and trunklines same methods apply recommended for pipework; however,
flowlines and trunklines are normally buried and severe limitations exist for access them. Actually,
inspection is limited to above-ground portions, as for instance in correspondence to manifold and
wellhead area or to valves and chambers if present along the pipe route. Otherwise, local
excavations shall be planned.
Guide wave performed from above ground positions allow inspection of buried parts of the pipe, with
length which depends on pipe sizes, presence of bends, type of coating. Inspected length extends
from a few meters up to 50 m maximum.
Cathodic protection inspection shall be performed in accordance with same Company Standard
available for pipelines (see Ref. /26/ and Ref. /27/).
5.4 Risk Classes and Inspection Level
The results of the corrosion risk analysis (see Par. 4.4.5) are associated to the Inspection Level,
designed by capital letters, as follows:
Risk Class (Criticality) Inspection Level

Severe A
High B
Medium C
Low D
Negligible or Safe E
The Inspection Level reflects the risk class, or criticality, attributed to the item and is used to express
the requirements for inspection execution and the frequency of inspection once the inspection
methods have been chosen; the higher is the item criticality, the greater will be the Inspection Level.
The Inspection Level is used for instance to fix the spacing of positions for spot NDT readings (see
Par. 5.5).
5.5 Sampling criteria
Risk analysis provides a robust basis for optimization of the inspection costs, focussing the
inspection works on most critical items. However, often inspections cannot be carried out on the
entire (surface of the) item, but, to further optimize costs, they shall be limited to previously selected
portions, or samples.
Selection of the portions, or samples, to be inspected shall combine knowledge on the expected
degradation mechanisms with statistics (sampling theory). Results of the corrosion analysis, in fact,
can be further integrated with an approach for sampling of the positions of the items to be inspected
based on statistical techniques. The aim of using a statistical approach to sampling is to optimize the
number of measurements, that is the costs of the non-intrusive inspection works, with respect to the
quality of the information gained from inspection results.
5.5.1 Systematic sampling
Systematic sampling relies on selecting elements at regular intervals. The most common form of
systematic sampling is an equal-probability method, in which every kth element of the ideal frame is
selected. k is the sampling interval, or skip, and it is calculated as k = N / n, where n is the sample
size and N is the population size (for instance surface area expressed in m2). Using this procedure
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each element in the population has a known and equal probability of selection. This makes
systematic sampling functionally similar to simple random sampling.
Systematic sampling can be applied only if the given population is homogeneous, because units are
uniformly distributed over the population. This sampling involves a random start and then proceeds
with the selection of every kth element from then onwards. Dividing the population into distinct and
independent strata (the different zones) allows to draw inferences about specific subgroups (zones)
that may be lost in a more generalized random sample. Moreover, a stratified sampling method can
lead to more efficient statistical estimates; different sampling approaches can be applied to different
strata since each stratum is treated as an independent population.
5.5.2 Application to vessel inspection
Figure 5.3, shows a schematic view of a separator vessel: corrosion analysis allows identifying
portions with different internal corrosion likelihood. In case shown in figure, the area of the vessel
most severe from corrosion viewpoint is the portion of the bottom in contact with separated water
(before weir); less severe conditions are foreseen at bottom, after weir, in contact with emulsified
water in oil and at top of the vessel in contact with wet gas.
top of vessel
wet gas wetted
gas phase
weir
water-oilemulsion
water water-oilemulsion
bottom of vessel
water wetted
bottom of vessel
emulsion wetted
Figure 5.3 Schematic view of a three-phase separator with indication of most critical area.
Different homogeneous zones of the vessel are then identified based on a local corrosion analysis;
for production separator (see Figure 5.4):
bottom before weir: corrosion likelihood = very high;
bottom after weir: corrosion likelihood = high;
top: corrosion likelihood = moderate.
In case of selection of conventional UT methods for measurements of punctual residual thickness,

different sampling scheme can be applied for each homogeneous zone.
N. 2 cross sections (A-A and B-B in figure) are randomly selected to verify the different degree of
internal corrosion (see Figure 5.4): spot measures are taken in a systematic way, for instance every
30 degree, corresponding to k = 30 degree, for a total of N. 12 readings each section. These
readings are mainly intended to confirm the design thickness datum and to be used as reference
actual thickness.
A the top of the vessel, in contact with separated gas, where less severe corrosion is expected, the
thickness readings will be taken on one row, in longitudinal direction; this corresponds to a linear
sampling approach. The spacing between two adjacent readings (the skip k) is fixed for instance of
0.30 m.
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At the bottom of the vessel, in contact with separated formation water, where internal corrosion is
expected to be more severe, bi-dimensional sampling is adopted, with readings taken on an ideal
grid of given spacing. A coverage area for instance of 20 % minimum of the whole area is
recommended3, which is eventually divided in homogenous sub-zone. Within each sub-area some
convenient areas, for instance of 1 m2 each, are randomly selected. The numbers of areas to select
are proportional to the sub-zone extension till to reach the target coverage, in case of 20 %, of the
whole sub-zone. These sampled areas are assumed to be representative of the condition of the
whole sub-area of the vessel being considered.
A B
inspection inspection inspection

sub-area 1 sub-area 2 sub-area 3
A B
SECTION A-A SECTION B-B
Figure 5.4 Identification of zones with different Risks and Inspection Levels in a production separator
(example).
Each examination area of 1 m2 is then split into sub-areas (say 0.10 m 0.10 m squares) via an ideal
grid of intersecting line segments covering the selected area. In general, a grid consists of two sets of
parallel line segments, intersecting at some angle, with grid points at the intersections of the line
segments. Each grid point represents a position for thickness reading. This is a systematic sample
where the spacing (Euclidian distance) between measures is k (see Figure 5.5 here below).
3
The indicated percentage of 20 % shall be intended qualitatively as minimum percentage to obtain a sample of readings
representative from statistical viewpoint of the inspected surface area.
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Figure 5.5 Ideal grid, with skip = k, for spot reading inspection.
The grid spacing varies with the resulting Inspection Level which depends on Risk Class and local
corrosion likelihood. The skip for each sub-area is then in inverse proportion with respect to risk (see
Table 5.6).
When, based on corrosion analysis, localised wall thickness reduction is expected, a complementary
approach consists in taking several readings within a given inspection surface (for instance the
square a in Figure 5.5) and in reporting only the most severe one; using UT this corresponds in
reporting the lower wall thickness value within the considered area. These inspection results can be
reviewed using extreme value statistical analysis (see Par. 6.2.1).
Table 5.6 Inspection Level and UT grid spacing for vessels.

Grid spacing for spot
Item type Inspection Level
NDT readings
A 0.1 m
B 0.2 m
Vessels C 0.3 m
D 0.4 m
E 0.5 m
For vessels, it is recommended to issue inspection drawings, with detailed indications of the zones to
be covered by the inspections and of the Inspection Level to be used.
5.5.3 Application to pipework inspection
NDT spot readings are taken on piping in two modes: on pipe ideal circumferences and
longitudinally; the spacing for the two modes are kPC and kPL.
NDT spot inspections of pipework are performed taking spot readings (see Figure 5.6):
on ideal pipe circumferences;
longitudinally, typically at bottom-of-line (for horizontal piping).
Number of readings on pipe circumference will depend on nominal pipe diameter; readings on pipe
circumference are repeated with spacing kPC. Longitudinal readings at bottom of line are taken with
spacing kPL. The spacing parameters kPC and kPL are correlated to the calculated Inspection Level as
indicated in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.7 Inspection Level and UT spacing for piping.

Item type Inspection Level spacing for spot NDT readings
circumferential, kPC longitudinal, kPL
A 1m 0.1 m
B 2m 0.2 m
Pipework C 5m 0.3 m
D 8m 0.4 m
E 10 m 0.5 m
DN < 12 DN 12
Detail A Detail B
spacing, kPC
A A
A A
See Details A or B Spacing, KPL See Details A or B
Detail C
Figure 5.6 Spot inspection of pipework. Spacing parameters.
The coverage of each piping item is performed randomly selecting a piping inspection length as
percentage of the total pipework length (for instance, as above, equal to 20%).
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5.5.4 Inspections in correspondence to defects
In case of significant internal corrosion attacks, not visually accessible, detected by spot inspections
methods, as for instance UT, an accurate mapping shall be performed of the defect sizes.4
In case of localized corrosion attacks or pitting or grooves (mesa corrosion) the critical thickness
profiles (CTP), longitudinal and circumferential, shall be determined by spot thickness
measurements. To determine the CTP, readings of the wall thickness in correspondence to the
defect shall be taken at regular intervals along the inspection plane longitudinal and circumferential
(see Figure 5.7). The spacing distance for spot readings along each inspection plane can be
determined by the following formula (Ref. /4/):
LS = MIN [0.36(DtMIN); 2tNOM]
where:
LS recommended profile spacing (mm);
D inside vessel or pipe diameter (mm);
tNOM nominal wall thickness (mm);
tMIN minimum required thickness (mm).
The spacing of the readings, LS, can be modified based on the actual sizes of the flaw.
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
M5
M4
M3
M2
M1
Line M: path of minimum Line C: path of minimum

thickness readings in thickness readings in
longitudinal direction circumferential direction
Figure 5.7 Method for determining the Critical Thickness Profiles in correspondence to a defect (adapted from
Ref. /4/).
5.6 Inspections Program
The Inspection Program is defined (DNV G101) as a summary of inspection activities mainly used as
an overview of inspection activity for several years into the future.
In accordance with the RBI approach, planning of the inspection along the operating life of an asset
is a dynamic process, where the results of each inspection are used within an iterative loop (see
Figure 2.3) leading to new and updated requirements for future inspections.
4
This is the case for instance of defects found exceeding the acceptance limit (see Par. 4.2.4).
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First inspection however cannot benefit of previous inspection results. In case of new assets, the
inspections performed after erection should be available. However, these inspection results do not
address for defects caused by degradation mechanisms active during operations. Similar situation
can be met of existing assets where for any reasons previous inspection have not been performed or
whose results are not available.
5.6.1 First inspections planning
Frequency of inspection for each item shall be defined based on risk analysis results and in particular
on the risk class attributed to the item. In case of first inspection, however, the confidence on risk
analysis results is low being the analysis based on theoretical models only; a high confidence, in fact,
can be attributed to the results risk analysis only if previous inspection data are available (see Par.
4.4.4).
When previous inspection data were not available, a more conservative approach is convenient; the
recommended inspection intervals are given hereinafter:
Time for inspection

Risk Class (Criticality) Inspection Level
(months)
Severe A 6
High B 12
Medium C 24
Low, Negligible or Safe D and E 36
Accordingly for items identified as belonging to the risk class severe or high, inspection shall be
performed urgently and in any case no later than one year. Independently from the Risk Class, an
inspection shall be programmed within first 3 years (36 months) since start-up.
5.6.2 Inspections intervals
Once previous inspection results are available, planning of the next inspection shall be the result of
the RBI process. For inspection management purposes, however, a long term inspections program
shall be issued, with tentative intervals to be further confirmed based on the results of each
inspection.
Inspection intervals depend on several factors, most of which should be incorporated in the risk
analysis and in the resulting Risk Class. The Risk Class, however, is the combination of the
likelihood of occurrence of the degradation mechanisms and consequences in case of failure, the
latter combining several aspects like environmental issues, safety issues, repairing costs, production
losses, etc.
Inspection intervals can be also affected by the aspects of the involved degradation mechanisms
which not always can be conveniently addressed by the risk analysis. Examples are:
the confidence attributed to the risk analysis;
uncertainties in predicting the rate of deterioration or the effectiveness of the preventive
measures;
uncertainties on construction material properties: it is the case for instance of old plants with poor
project documentation available;
uncertainties in future operating parameters, like: water cut; presence of contaminants; flow rates.
Standing the above outlined factors, guidelines are given in Table 5.8 in this paragraph to be
followed for long term inspection planning. A base case is defined, with inspection interval ranging
from 24 months up to 60 months depending on the risk class the item belongs.
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With respect the base case, two scenarios are defined for inspection intervals, defined reduced and
relaxed. The base case intervals can be modified by considering a number of influencing factors
which, based on the features of the case under evaluation, can lead to reduced or relaxed inspection
intervals.
The table applies in particular for inspection of pressure vessels and pipework performed using non-
intrusive methods and without interrupting the operations.
The case of above ground storage tanks shall be evaluated separately; in fact, severity of the
degradation mechanisms are expected to be moderate to low, and inspection, in particular of the
tank bottom, can be performed only with the tank not in service. Accordingly, inspection intervals
shall be conveniently planned based on the maintenance schedule.
Table 5.8 Inspection intervals and influencing factors.
Risk Class Reduced Relaxed

Influencing factors () Base case Influencing factors ()
(Criticality) intervals intervals
Facilities located in high Facilities located in desert or low
Severe 12 population density area. 24 population density area. 36
Facilities located in close On-land facilities.
proximity to environmental Facilities handling H2S or lethal
sensitive or protected area. fluids.
High 24 Offshore facilities. 30 Facilities with high redundancy.
42
Unmanned facilities. High confidence risk analysis.
Facilities handling H2S or lethal Low cost impact of shut downs.
Medium 30 fluids. 36 Low corrosivity conditions with 48
Facilities handling explosive high predictability of propagation
fluids. rates.
Facilities with low redundancy.
Low 42 48 60
Low confidence risk analysis.
High cost impact of shut downs.
Low POD of applied NDT
Negligible or Safe 48 methods. 60 84
The given intervals DO NOT apply for cathodic protection inspections and controls, which are usually
performed on more frequent basis (see Ref. /26/).
5.7 Requirements for inspection execution
The Inspection Plan shall cover the requirements for the execution of the inspections. In case of
inspections works performed through Contractors, the following issues shall be dealt with:
applications to appropriate Authorities and permits;
safety rules to be adopted in the operating area;
HSE;
Instrumentation;
personnel qualification;
Quality;
Works reporting and deliverables: Safety. Inspection Procedures. Daily reports. Preliminary and
Final reports.
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6. RESULTS EVALUATION
6.1 Inspection results analysis
Results of RBI inspection shall be adequately validated and compliance with inspection plans
verified. In case of deviations, for instance due to impossibility to perform inspections in some zones
(presence of obstacles; inaccessibility; etc.) this shall be recorded and motivated.
Inspection results shall be available in convenient format, depending on type of NDT methods.
Spot readings, typically UT inspection results, shall be preferably reported in spread sheets.
Complete and univocal indications shall be reported of: item, inspection positions; time;
instrumentation employed; NDT operator; any other useful information.
Inspection results shall be analysed and compared with results of the corrosion analysis. In
particular, for each item, predicted corrosion forms and severity of the corrosion damages shall be
confirmed through inspection results.
6.2 Statistical analysis
Statistics can be effectively used, in particular in case of large set of inspection result data.
Practice for applying statistics to corrosion data is covered by ASTM G16 (Ref. /11/). Type of
elaboration and parameters adopted for representing set of data, as for instance average or standard
deviation, shall be evaluated case by case.
When corrosion defects are expected and detected originated by localised corrosion mechanisms, a
powerful statistical approach is the extreme values analysis (see also APPENDIX E).
6.2.1 Extreme values analysis
Extreme values analysis allows investigating the extreme values of a set of data, in case under study
inspection results; assuming that the whole inspection data fit a normal distribution, the extreme
value technique consists in analysing the tail of the normal distribution. Method for gathering
inspection data suitable for extreme value analysis was given in Par. 5.5.2.
Example on how to process data is given in DNV-RP-G103, Appendix B, (Ref. /13/). Main steps of
the analysis are listed here below.
1. Take extreme value reading, for instance using UT.
2. Create the frequency distribution histogram, i.e. depth of corrosion vs. Frequency.
3. Verify if the extreme value data set fits a Gumbel distribution function. Using a spreadsheet, from
frequency data calculate values for probability density function and the cumulative distribution
function.
4. Plot the function Y = -ln[-ln(F1(x))] where F1(x) is the double exponential, or Gumbel, distribution:
5. From the plot of Y vs. Depth of corrosion, calculate (slope) and (intercept at Y=0).
6. Plot the Gumbel function using calculated and , comparing it with the cumulative data
distribution.
7. Use the Gumbel function to calculate the probability of having given defect size (depth).
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6.2.2 Bayes theorem
Bayes' theorem is a useful tool to update the probability of an event A (critical defect), given that a
correlated event B has been observed (defects measured in a past survey). Bayes' theorem
expresses the conditional probability, or posterior probability, of an event A given that observed an
event B, in terms of the prior probability of B, and the conditional probability of B given A. Bayes'
theorem commonly applied in science and engineering. The key idea is that the probability of an
event A given an event B (e.g., the probability of corrosion given that I measured corrosion in a past
survey) depends not only on the relationship between events A and B but also on the (marginal)
probability of occurrence of each event.
Based on Bayes theorem, the conditional and marginal probabilities of events A and B, provided that
the probability of B does not equal zero, is:
where
p(A) is the prior probability or marginal probability of A. It is prior in the sense that it does not take
into account any information about B.
p(A|B) is the conditional probability of A, given B. It is also called the posterior probability because
it is derived from or depends upon the specified value of B.
p(B|A) is the conditional probability of B given A. It is also called the likelihood.
p(B) is the prior or marginal probability of B, and acts as a normalizing constant.
An interesting application to inspections is to calculate confidence on presence of defects, based on

inspection results (see DNV-RP-G103, Appendix B - Ref. /13/). Assume that there is 80% confidence
that no critical defect is present; this statement could come from an expert analysis or from a
probabilistic corrosion analysis. If the item is then inspected using a NDT procedure with 90%
probability of detecting a critical defect, and no critical defects are reported, a new value for
confidence can be calculated using the Bayes theorem.
Let:
A no critical defects exist; before inspection: p(A)=0.80
A critical defects exist; before inspection: p(A)=0.20
B|A no critical defects detected | no critical defects exist; p(B|A)=1.0
B the probability of not detecting a defect; p(B)=[p(B|A)xp(A)]+[p(B|Axp(A)].
Then, the confidence that no critical defects exist after inspection execution, p(A|B), can be
calculated as:
That is confidence that no critical defects exists has increased from 80% to 97.5%.
6.3 Defects evaluation: acceptance, repair or replacement
Defect evaluation shall be primarily based on the corrosion allowance value of the inspected item;
corrosion allowance, in fact, which shall be available and indicated in the Inspection Plan, represents
the design limit which the defects caused by degradation mechanisms cannot exceed. In case
previous inspection results were available, different (i.e. less restrictive) acceptance limits can be
used.
If defects were found exceeding the corrosion allowance, or an equivalent predefined limit, the
operability of the item shall be considered, at least in principle, compromised as the design
mechanical thickness will be interested, at least locally, by defect penetration.
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In case of defects found exceeding the acceptance limits fixed for the inspection, dedicated
investigations shall be carried out aimed to verify the fitness-for-service of the item containing a
defect with known sizes (maximum depth and Critical Thickness Profiles: see Par. 5.5.4).
Defect analysis shall be carried out using applicable codes, as for instance API-RP-579 (Ref. /4/)
which provides guidance for conducting Fitness-for-Service assessment for in-service pressurized
items containing a flaw or a damage. The analysis can provide the following results;
defect is acceptable at design conditions;
defect is acceptable after de-rating of the item;
defect is NOT acceptable and shall be repaired;
defect is NOT acceptable and the item shall be abandoned and replaced.
6.4 Re-evaluation
Inspection results, together with the actions taken based on inspection results, represent feed
information for future corrosion risk assessment and RBI process.
Accordingly, the database of the asset under evaluation shall be updated with inspection results.
In general, re-assessment based on inspection results will have an impact in several area, as for
instance:
attribution of risk class, or criticality, of the inspected items;
inspection intervals;
planning of next inspection;
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APPENDIX A. PRESSURE EQUIPMENT DIRECTIVE (PED)
The PED directive (Pressure Equipment Directive) is directive applied in European Countries for the
design, the construction and the conformity assessment of pressure equipment with maximum
pressure greater than 0.5 bar.
In Italy the directive has been adopted through the government decree issued under parliamentary
delegation N. 93/00 (D.L. 93/00), in force since May 2000. Following the implementation of the
section N. 19 of the D.L. 93/005, the controls and verifications on pressure equipment and
assemblies in Italy are regulated by the ministerial decree D.M. N. 329/04. (D.M. 329/04):
Regulation carrying rules for the pressure equipment and assemblies putting into service and use in
respect of the section N. 19 of the D.L. 93/00
The fields of application of DM 329/04 are:

pressure equipment and assemblies, including: gas and liquid vessels; steam or superheated
water generators; gas and liquid piping.
th
Pressure equipment and assemblies in-service before the 29 May 2002 and homologated by
ISPESL in accordance with the previous legislation.
th
Liquid vessel and piping in use before the 29 May 2002 and never homologated.
D.M. 329/04 provides, among duties to be abided to the putting into service and use of the pressure
equipment and assemblies, the commissioning attestation (Section N.6): the user shall send to
ISPESL and to the competent ASL, an attestation and a Commissioning Report together with other
operating data and handled fluids. The decree also establishes the following requirements for the
operating life:
mandatory controls at start-up: appropriate installation of pressure equipment and assemblies
shall be verified.
Periodical controls (Section N.8): periodical requalification shall be carried out of pressure
equipment and assemblies; operability is allowed only in case of favourable outcome of each
control.
Periodical requalification (Section N.8): it includes integrity controls (Section N.12) and operating
controls (Section N.13). Controls frequencies are based on D.M. 329/04 requirements,
maintenance manual instructions, outcomes from previous controls.
Integrity controls (Section N.12) include external visual inspections and internal inspection visual,
for accessible items, or through thickness measurements or other adequate inspection methods.
Hydraulic test and the internal visual inspection are not mandatory for piping, and convenient non-
destructive tests can be performed.
For the operating controls (Section N.13), the user shall verify the appropriate operation of safety
devices and that the real working conditions of pressure equipment and assemblies comply with
the commissioning attestation.
Controls and inspections after repairs or modifications (Section N.14).
D.M. 329/04 also points out the requirements for liquid vessels and piping in service before the 29th
May 2002 and not certified in accordance with the D.L. 25/02/2000 N. 93(Section N. 16). Specifically,
the user shall submit to ISPESL a report with the following information:
a shortly description of the vessel or piping (plant description, identification codes, operating
conditions, fluids, sizes, safety devices, etc.),
a classification of the equipment and fluid in accordance with the D.L. 93/10;
an assessment of integrity and efficiency of the equipment.
Accordingly, for non-certified vessels and piping handling liquids in service before 29th May 2002 it is
mandatory to provide first periodical requalification. The liquid vessels and piping can be operated
only with the favourable outcome of the first periodical requalification. The outcome of the
requalification defines also the frequency of future controls for requalification.
5
Disposizioni per la messa in servizio e lutilizzazione delle attrezzature a pressione e degli insiemi.
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The Italian Standard UNI/TS 11325, issued on March 2009, provides the instructions and
requirements for periodical requalification of pressure equipment and assemblies. The following
phases are defined for evaluating the integrity and efficiency conditions:
integrity assessment including the following tasks:
technical study of integrity,
technical verification of integrity;
efficiency assessment, to be performed only in case of favourable outcome of the integrity
assessment; it include the following tasks :
technical study of efficiency,
technical verification of efficiency.
The technical study of integrity includes a study of all known and predictable damage mechanisms
and issue and implementation of an inspection plan. Damage mechanism is defined as any
mechanical, chemical or thermal process that can bring to the structural degradation of the
equipment under study.
During the technical verification of integrity the availability of project data shall be verified and the
inspection results shall be analysed and the stability of the equipment verified. Furthermore, the need
of repair interventions or de-rating shall be assessed.
The technical study of efficiency goes along the technical study of integrity again and it defines the
consequences of the all known and predictable damage mechanisms along the time using practical
and empirical comparison or numeric modelling.
During the technical verification of efficiency (see Figure) the capability of the equipment to respect
and maintain the minimum requirements shall be assessed for the time between two periodical
integrity requalification. In case, shorter intervals shall be considered.
The time intervals between periodical requalification are given in D.M. 329/004 (Tables A and B).
However different time intervals and alternative inspections can be established provided that an
equivalent level of protection was guaranteed. In this respect, the UNI/TS 11325 norm states that the
integrity and efficiency assessment can be carried out through standardized procedures based on
hazard analysis for the risk assessment, as for example the an RBI process or other equivalent
procedures; obviously, the extent of the inspections, the verification of the requirements as well as
the issue of an exhaustive reporting of the performed controls remain mandatory.
Accordingly, the controls of pressure equipment and assemblies can be developed within an RBI
process, thus recognizing the importance of adopting standardized methods in the preparation of the
Inspection Plan as the RBI methodology assures.
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APPENDIX B. FORM FOR DATA COLLECTION
Hereinafter an example of Form is reported with indication of the main data to be collected along the
execution of the RBI procedure and to be loaded in the RBI database. The form complies the
structure of Inspection Manager.
The Inspection data and the inspection results shall be provided by the Inspection Company in
Microsoft Excel or compatible format.
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Asset Database
Name and Plant
TAG Area
FFU Facility Funct. Unit Fluid Code
Fluid Description Fluid Phase
P&ID Name
General and Operational Data
Baseline Thickness Corrosion Allowance
Wall Thickness measurement points
Specification Rating
Materials and Grades Insulation Code
Painting code
Outer coating Inner coating
Insulation Code Insulation thickness
Heath tracing type Tracing temperature
Operating pressure [bar] Design pressure [bar]
Design Temperature [C] Operating Temp. [C]
3
Vessel Volume [m ]
Line diameter [in]
From To
RBI Database
Fluid treatments with chemicals
Type
Injection points
Injection modes
Dosages
Cathodic Protection
Impressed current/ sacrificial anode system
Insulating joints location and type
Monitoring Test Point location
Refer. electrode
Measurements
Corrosion Monitoring
Monitoring Point location
Monitoring Probe type
Corrosion rate results
Bacteria presence [yes/no]
Other water analyses
Risk Analysis Results
Failure\degradation Mechanisms
Corrosion morphologies
Localization of the attacks
RBI Output Data
Damage likelihood
Consequences Factor
Risk level
Confidence Factor
Inspection Plan
Risk Analysis results
Failure\degradation Mechanisms
Notes
RBI output Data
Risk level Confidence Factor
Inspection Plan Data
Inspection Methods
Methods Description
Inspection Priority Insp. Frequency
Last Inspection date Next Inspection
Ref. Inspection Drawing Ref. Insp. Procedure
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APPENDIX C. CAUSES OF FAILURE IN OIL AND GAS PROCESS PLANTS
Amongst the degradation mechanisms which affect the asset integrity, corrosion of metallic
materials, in particular of carbon and low alloy steels which still are the main construction material,
has been recognized as main one.
Table C.1 6 shows, for 800 inventoried mechanical failures, the distribution for causes of the failure
and type of equipment. Except for failures from leaking gaskets, 174 failures and 22% of total, which
represents a well-defined and easily detectable type of failure, corrosion and related phenomena
(erosion and pinhole) represents the first cause of incidents.
Table C.1 Ranking of causes of incidents vs. type of equipment.
pipework or fitting
Flange/Joint Leak
Instrument taping
compressors and
Heat Exchangers
Pipework Failure
Valve Loss of
Fired Heaters
Containment
Vessels and
or Failure
Pumps,
Tanks
Total
fans
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Leaking gasket at gland or O-ring 0 67 59 16 10 10 12 0 174
2 Corrosion, erosion or pinhole leak 123 16 3 10 1 3 7 8 171
3 In service failure no specific cause 30 7 7 26 9 1 4 5 89
4 Loose connection, bolting, plug or gland 1 22 37 20 4 2 2 0 88
5 Incorrect or deficient procedure or specification 9 3 23 13 2 3 0 0 53
6 Poor or deficient maintenance procedure 1 6 13 19 5 0 1 1 46
7 Vibration, fatigue or in-service stress 21 4 2 16 2 0 0 0 45
8 Seal failure 0 7 0 1 29 4 0 0 41
9 Other miscellaneous failure 1 20 0 10 1 2 1 0 35
10 Mechanical failure 0 3 1 1 27 2 0 0 34
11 Poor design or construction or manufacture 0 2 8 12 1 0 1 0 24
Total 186 157 153 144 91 27 28 14 800
% 23% 20% 19% 18% 11% 3% 4% 2% 100%
6
From: R. Patel, Evaluation of Hydrocarbon Leaks due to Corrosion/erosion in Offshore Process Plant, A Safety Practical
Project, Diploma in Occupational Health and Safety Management, Loughbrough University, 1997. Reported in: J. Dawson,
K. Bruceand D. G. John, Corrosion risk assessment and safety management for offshore processing facilities. Capcis.
Offshore Technology Report. 1999/064, 2001.
Eni S.p.A.
APPENDIX D. NDT INSPECTION METHODS
Inspection Technique Abbreviation Description in short Defects detected Method maturity and POD
Close Visual Inspection CVI It is intrusive when referred to internal side of an item, non-intrusive if applied to the external surfaces. -
It can be supported by tools (measuring instrument, lights, etc.) and performed in combination with
other inspection methods, as for instance DPI or MPI. All visible defects
Remote Visual Inspection RVI CVI can be also performed using specific supports tools to extend the access inside piping or vessels and damages. -
or heat exchangers. typical tools optic fibre boroscopes, rigid or flexible, which can be also connected
to video recorder,
Conventional Ultrasonic UT In ultrasonic testing (UT), very short ultrasonic pulse-waves with center frequencies ranging from 0.1- Surface and Consolidated. POD high
Testing (shear wave and 15 MHz and occasionally up to 50 MHz are launched into materials to detect internal flaws or to embedded cracks
compression wave) determine the wall thickness of inspected item. (shear wave).
Wall thickness
reduction:
blistering
(compression
wave).
Ultrasonic Imaging UI Ultrasonic probes are combined with hardware and software suitable to provide imaging of vessel and Wall thickness Consolidated. POD high
pipe walls. Ultrasonic wall thickness mapping allows to produce wall thickness maps where different reduction.
thickness values are associated to different colors. Blistering-
Time of Flight Diffraction TOFD Time of Flight Diffraction (TOFD) method of Ultrasonic inspection is a very sensitive and accurate Surface and Consolidated. POD high
method for non-destructive testing of welds for defects. TOFD is a computerized system that was embedded cracks.
invented in the UK in the 1970s for the nuclear industry by Dr. Maurice Silk. The use of TOFD
enabled crack sizes to be measured more accurately, so that expensive components could be kept in
operation as long as possible with minimal risk of failure.
In a TOFD system, a pair of probes sit on opposite sides of a weld. One of the probes emits an
ultrasonic pulse that is picked up by the probe on the other side. In undamaged pipe, the signals
picked up by the receiver probe are from two waves: one that travels along the surface and one that
reflects off the far wall. When a crack is present, there is a diffraction of the ultrasonic wave from the
tip(s) of the crack. Using the measured time of flight of the pulse, the depth of a crack tip can be
calculated automatically by simple trigonometry. This method is even more reliable than Radiographic
testing of a weld.
Phased-Array PA Phased Array technique is an advanced method of ultrasonic testing. The PA probe consists of small Wall thickness
ultrasonic elements, each pulsed individually. By varying the timing, for instance by pulsing the reduction.
elements one by one in sequence along a row, a pattern of constructive interference is set up that Cracks.
result in a beam at a set angle. The beam is swept electronically like a search-light through the object
being examined, and the data from multiple beams are put together to make a visual image showing
a slice through the object.
Creeping Head Inspection CHIME Creeping Head Inspection method consists in the transmission of ultrasound between two probes Wall thickness POD medium
placed a distance apart, up to 1 m, in parallel walled material, covering the 100% of wall volume
Rev.0 March 2011
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between the probes. In contrast to conventional ultrasonic inspection techniques which require reduction.
movement of the probes to cover large surface areas, the CHIME method is a medium range Cracks.
technique which provides instantaneous coverage of the full volume between the probes.
Long Range UT (Lamb LRUT Long-range ultrasonic methods use so-called guided ultrasonic waves, similar to the Lamb waves Wall thickness POD medium
Wave) which may be generated in plates and in common pipe thicknesses are necessarily of much lower reduction.
frequency than that used for normal ultrasonic tests in order to generate the appropriate wave modes. Cracks.
Typically frequencies around 50kHz are used compared with around 5MHz for conventional thickness
testing. These waves have the property that they can travel many metres with minimal attenuation
and therefore offer the potential of testing large areas from a single point using a pulse-echo
transducer bracelet wrapped around the pipe. Any changes in the thickness of the pipe, either on the
inside or the outside, cause reflections which are detected by the transducer. Hence metal loss
defects from corrosion/erosion inside the pipe or corrosion on the outside of the pipe can be detected.
The detection of additional mode converted signals from defects aids discrimination between pipe
features and metal loss.
Electromagnetic Acoustic EMATs The technique is based on using electromagnetic acoustic transducers (EMATs) to generate and Surface and New. POD low
Transmission receive ultrasound instead of the traditional piezoelectric probes. These transducers do not need embedded cracks
contact nor coupling fluid, and they can be used on rough, scaled or heavily painted surfaces, as well (shear wave).
as on hot surfaces (up to 460 in constant contact). Wall thickness
reduction.
Blistering.
Eddy Current ACFM ACFM The Alternating Current Field Measurement (ACFM) technique is an electromagnetic non-contacting Cracks (also under Consolidated. POD high
technique which has been developed to detect and size surface breaking defects in a range of coating)
different materials and through coatings of varying thickness. The basis of the technique is that an
alternating current flows in a thin skin near to the surface of any conductor. When a uniform current is
introduced into the area under test if the area is defect free the current is undisturbed. With a crack
present, the current would flow around the ends and the faces of the crack. A magnetic field is
present above the surface associated with this uniform current and this will be disturbed if a surface-
breaking crack is present. It was realised that if these disturbances could be measured they should
have some relationship to the defects that had caused them. It is possible to make quantitative
measurements of the magnetic field disturbances and relate them to the size of the defects which
produced them. Special techniques are used to induce these electric currents and the components
used are built into the ACFM probes; small detectors or sensors are also built into the probe, which
measure the magnetic field disturbances. The probe is scanned longitudinally along the weld with the
front of the probe parallel and adjacent to the weld toe. Two components of the magnetic field are
measured, the Bx along the length of the defect which responds to changes in surface current density
and gives an indication of depth when the reduction is the greatest and Bz which gives a negative
and positive response at either end of the defect caused by current generated poles. This gives an
indication of length.
Pulsed Eddy Current PEC Pulsed Eddy Current is an electromagnetic method to determine wall thickness of electrical Wall thickness POD medium
conductors. The PEC instrument probe is placed against the metal weather sheeting of an insulation reduction.
pipe or vessel. A magnetic field is created by an electrical current in the transmitting coil of the probe.
This field penetrates through the weather sheeting and magnetizes the pipe wall. The electrical
current in the transmission coil is then switched off, causing a sudden drop in the magnetic field. As a
Rev.0 March 2011
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result of electromagnetic induction, eddy currents will be generated in the pipe wall. The eddy
currents diffuse inwards and decrease in strength. The decrease of eddy currents is monitored by the
PEC probe and is used to determine the wall thickness. The thicker the wall, the longer it takes for the
eddy currents to decay to zero.
Saturated Low Frequency SLOFEC The SLOFEC inspection technique uses the eddy current principle in combination with amagnetic Wall thickness POD medium
Eddy Current field. By superimposed DC-magnetisation the depth of penetration is increased so that corrosion reduction.
attack (metal loss) even at the subsurface can be detected from the surface side. The technology is
an inspection method for detection of topside and underside corrosion in thin and thick walled plates
and pipes.
Liquid Penetrant Inspection DPI Dye penetrant inspection (DPI), also called liquid penetrant inspection (LPI) or penetrant testing (PT), Surface cracks Consolidated. POD high
is a widely applied and low-cost inspection method used to locate surface-breaking defects in all non-
porous materials (metals, plastics, or ceramics). The penetrant may be applied to all non-ferrous
materials and ferrous materials, but for inspection of ferrous components magnetic-particle inspection
is also preferred for its subsurface detection capability. LPI is used to detect casting, forging and
welding surface defects such as cracks, surface porosities, and leaks in new products, and fatigue
cracks on in-service components.
DPI is based upon capillary action, where low surface tension fluid penetrates into clean and dry
surface-breaking discontinuities. Penetrant may be applied to the test component by dipping,
spraying, or brushing. After adequate penetration time has been allowed, the excess penetrant is
removed, a developer is applied. The developer helps to draw penetrant out of the flaw where a
visible indication becomes visible to the inspector. Inspection is performed under ultraviolet or white
light, depending upon the type of dye used - fluorescent or non-fluorescent (visible).
Magnetic Particle Inspection MPI Magnetic particle inspection (MPI) is a non-destructive testing (NDT) process for detecting surface Surface cracks. Consolidated. POD high
and subsurface discontinuities in ferroelectric materials such as iron, nickel, cobalt, and some of their
alloys. The process puts a magnetic field into the part. The piece can be magnetized by direct or
indirect magnetization. Direct magnetization occurs when the electric current is passed through the
test object and a magnetic field is formed in the material. Indirect magnetization occurs when no
electric current is passed through the test object, but a magnetic field is applied from an outside
source. The magnetic lines of force are perpendicular to the direction of the electric current which
may be either alternating current (AC) or some form of direct current (DC) (rectified AC).
The presence of a surface or subsurface discontinuity in the material allows the magnetic flux to leak.
Ferrous iron particles are applied to the part. The particles may be dry or in a wet suspension. If an
area of flux leakage is present the particles will be attracted to this area. The particles will build up at
the area of leakage and form what is known as an indication. The indication can then be evaluated to
determine what it is, what may have caused it, and what action should be taken if any.
Magnetic Flux Leakage MFL Magnetic flux leakage (MFL) is a magnetic method of non-destructive testing that is used to detect Wall thickness POD high/medium
corrosion and pitting in steel structures, most commonly pipelines and storage tanks. The basic reduction
principle is that a powerful magnet is used to magnetize the steel. At areas where there is corrosion (localized).
or missing metal, the magnetic field "leaks" from the steel. In an MFL tool, a magnetic detector is
placed between the poles of the magnet to detect the leakage field. Analysts interpret the chart
recording of the leakage field to identify damaged areas and hopefully to estimate the depth of metal
loss. This article currently focuses mainly on the pipeline application of MFL, but links to tank floor
Rev.0 March 2011
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examination are provided at the end.
Thermography TT In passive thermography heat distribution on a vessel surface is measured; wall thinning defects, if Wall thickness -
present, cause a variation of local thermal conductivity. The variations in heat emission can be local reduction.
measured with a sensible video camera and hot spots identified. The technique can be conveniently Thermal insulation
used on thermally insulated items, vessels or piping, to detect defects in the wall or in the thermal breakdowns.
insulation.
Film Radiography (Ir 192; Co RT Radiographic inspection uses X-rays, gamma-rays or neutron radiation. Radiography is based on the Wall thickness Consolidated. POD high
60) different absorption of the radiations in presence of variable thickness values, i.e. defects, also if reduction.
embedded (as it typically occurs on welds). Embedded flaws.
Iridium 192 and Cobalt 60 are the most common radiation sources for NDT inspections.
Real Time Radiography RTR Real-time radiography (RTR), or real-time radioscopy, is a NDT method where the image is produced Wall thickness POD medium
electronically, rather than on film, so that very little lag time occurs between the item being exposed to reduction.
radiation and the resulting image. In most instances, the electronic image that is viewed results from
the radiation passing through the object being inspected and interacting with a screen of material that
fluoresces or gives off light when the interaction occurs.
Acoustic Emission AE Acoustic Emission (AE) refers to the generation of transient elastic waves produced by a sudden Propagating POD medium/low
redistribution of stress in a material. When a structure is subjected to an external stimulus (change in cracks
pressure, load, or temperature), localized sources trigger the release of energy, in the form of stress
waves, which propagate to the surface and are recorded by sensors placed on the surface of the
inspected item.
Eni S.p.A.
APPENDIX E. EXTREME VALUE ANALYSIS
Introduction
Analysis of inspection data of items where localised wall thinning mechanisms are expected, is
primarily focussed on detecting the most important defects, namely the most penetrating ones.
The traditional statistical methods tend to ignore extreme events and focus on risk measures on the
whole empirical distribution. For example, it is often assumed that corrosion defects are normally
distributed, and minor attention is paid to the distribution of the extreme corrosion defects, which are
the most critical ones. This type of problem also arises in other engineering areas such as ocean
engineering (wave height), hydraulics engineering (floods), structural engineering (earthquakes),
meteorology (temperatures, rainfall), fatigue strength (workloads), etc.
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) is a specialist branch of statistics that applies to the tails of a
distribution, providing information on this part of a distribution of data, as inspection measurements
are.
Model formulation
Suppose is a sequence of independent random variables having a common distribution

function . In practice, variables represent values of the corrosion process measured on a
regular time-scale or space-scale. One simple way of characterizing the behaviour of extremes is by
considering the behaviour of the maximum order statistics . Then is the
maximum of the observed corrosion process over n space units.
The distribution function of verifies:
Thus, a way to study is to estimate F from the whole available data and then to substitute this
estimation in the previous formula to estimate . The problem of this approach is that small
deviances in the estimation of F lead to large discrepancies for . One alternative approach is to
estimate directly from the extreme data. Following this way it is necessary to study the
behaviour of as tends to infinity.
A linear normalization of is used, where and are sequences of

constants with . If converges in distribution to a non-degenerate variable , then
automatically has a distribution belonging to the generalized extreme value distribution (GEV):
Defined an such that and with parameter of location defined in ( ),

parameter of scale positive and parameter of shape defined in ( ).
Different values of the parameter of shape define three classes of distributions named the
extreme value distributions. In particular:
The type I (Gumbel distribution) is obtained by letting

The type II (Frchet) distribution is obtained when
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The type III (Weibull) distribution is obtained when
The uncertainty in the estimation of the parameter measures the lack of certainty in the choice of
one of the three models. These three types of distributions are the only possible limits for the
distributions of the normalized maxima regardless of the distribution F for the population.
Figure E.1 - Probability density of GEV distributions: Gumbel, Frechet, Weibull
The three limit types have different forms of tail behaviour. The density of Gumbel distribution decays
exponentially and the density of Frchet distribution decays polynomially. The Gumbel type is the
domain of attraction for many common distributions, like normal, lognormal, exponential and gamma
(see Figure D.1).
Practical implementation
Example on how to process data is given in DNV-RP-G103 (Ref. /13/), Appendix B. Main steps of the
analysis are listed here below.
Scope of the analysis is to model the extreme values of a series of independent and identically
distributed observations . The first step consists in blocking the data into sequences of
observations, being sufficiently large. Then the maxima of each block is considered. Finally
the GEV distribution is fitted to this series of block maxima . Once the GEV distribution
has been fitted, we can calculate the quintile function, , for the maximum distribution observing
that .
If the maxima are taken in a time interval space, for example every year, then represent the
annual maxima. In such case is called the return level associated with the return period .
That is, is the level that is expected to be exceeded, in average, once every years.
Equivalently, is the level that is exceeded by the annual maximum in any particular year with
probability .
When data are taken in spatial interval represents simply the level of corrosion that is expected to
be exceeded with as associated probability of .
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Inference
The choice of the length of blocks implies a trade-off between bias and variance. When the length of
the blocks is small, then the approximation of the distributions by the limit is not so good and this lead
to bias in estimation. Long blocks on the other hand generate only few extreme data leading to large
estimation variance.
The method most commonly used to estimate the parameters is the likelihood method. One difficulty
of this approach is that the regularity conditions for its application are not always satisfied by the GEV
distributions. They depend on the shape parameter values (Smith, 1985):
when the maximum likelihood estimators have the usual asymptotic properties;
when the maximum likelihood estimators can be obtained in general but they
do not have the standard asymptotic properties;
when the maximum likelihood estimators are unlikely to be obtainable.
The case with corresponds to distributions with a very short bounded upper tail, which is
rarely the case in real applications of extreme value modelling.
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters are obtained maximizing the log-likelihood
functions trough numerical optimization algorithms.
The classical theory of maximum likelihood estimation establishes that the distribution of the
estimated parameter is approximately normal with mean and variance covariance
matrix equal to the inverse of the observed information matrix evaluated at the maximum likelihood
estimate. Confidence intervals are obtained from this approximate normality of the estimator.
Graphical model checking
Though it is impossible to check the validity of an extrapolation based on the GEV model,
assessment can be done with reference to the observed data. The most used graphical method of
validation are the probability and the quintile plot. The probability plot (Figure D.2) is a comparison of
the empirical (derived from data) and fitted distribution functions (theoretical). In practise points
should lie close to the first diagonal if data fit well the model.
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Figure E.2 - Example of graphical diagnostic.
The quintile plot compares the model quintiles against the data (empirical) quintiles. A quintile plot
that deviates greatly from a straight line suggests that the model assumptions may be invalid for the
data plotted. The quintile plot is much more sensitive to slight departures from model accuracy in the
upper tail then the probability plot.
The return level plot is the graph of empirical estimates of the return level function, that is plotted
against . The plot is linear in the case of ; the plot is convex in the case of and
the plot is concave for and has not finite bound. This graph is useful as validation tool as well
as a way of presenting the fitted model. This plot also includes 95% confidence intervals. The
importance of return periods in engineering is due to the fact that the return period is used as a
design criterion.
References
1. Coles, Stuart. Extreme Value Theory and Application. Stuart Coles University of Lancaster. 1999.
2. Omey, E., Mallor, F., Nualart, E. An introduction to statistical modelling of extreme values. Application to
calculate extreme wind speeds. HU Brussel Research Paper 2009/36. 2009.
3. R Development Core Team (2008). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation
for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. URL http://www.R-project.org.

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Eni S.p.A.

Exploration & Production Division

GUIDELINES FOR RISK BASED INSPECTIONS

0 First issue TEMM TEMM TEMM 03/2011

ENGINEERING COMPANY STANDARD

Rev. 0 First issue March 2011

The Document does not cover:

1.3.1 Codes and Standards

Ref. /1/ API RP 580 Risk-Based Inspection.

1.3.2 Eni Company Standards

Ref. /18/ 20602.VAR.COR.SDS Corrosion Integrity Management.

1.3.3 Eni E&P Company Documents

1.4 Definitions of terms

Asset All physical facilities required for operations (Ref. /30/).

asset and to the company reputation.

Damage rate The development of damage over time (Ref. /6/).

Defect A defect is an incompliance with project specifications.

CO2 content in a process stream in relation to CO2 corrosion.

1.5 Acronyms and abbreviations

Symbol or Unit Definition

PED (-) Pressure Equipment Directive

2.1 RBI targets and project phases

2.1.1 Base case

2.1.2 Asset integrity of existing facilities

2.2 Limitations and exclusions

Table 2.1 Applicability and limitations of this Guideline.

2.3 RBI and Asset Integrity Management

2.4 Benefits of RBI

RBI is intended to provide beneficial effects in the following area:

2.5 RBI overview

2.5.1 The RBI process

risk and criticality assessment;

RISK AND CRITICALITY

UPDATE OF DATABASE INSPECTION PLANNING

Figure 2.2 Sub-tasks of the RBI process.

2.5.2 The RBI flow chart

The detailed flowchart of the RBI process is illustrated in Figure 2.3.

RBI extent and targets

Define the Asset and Establish the targets

Item Identification. Data collection. Database

Perform Inspections Review and Check

Inspection results evaluation

Evaluate Inspection Perform Statistical Evaluate Defects Perform Re-

Fitness for Service Accept, Repair, De-rate

Figure 2.3 RBI process flowchart.

2.5.3 The RBI team

The RBI is a complex process which involves several parties, including:

HSE Manager He contributes to the identification of the consequences in case of failure of

2.5.4 Supports to RBI

3. RBI TARGETS AND EXTENT. DATABASE

3.1 RBI Targets

3.2 RBI Extent. Item identification

Each selected item shall be univocally identified by a code, or TAG.

3.3.1 Data collection and review

3.3.2 Database creation and management

In APPENDIX B an example is reported of FORM for data collection.

4. DEGRADATION MECHANISMS AND RISK ANALYSIS

4.1 RBI and degradation mechanisms

A further category of degradation mechanism is classified as high temperature corrosion, as for

4.2 Corrosion degradation mechanisms

4.2.1 Corrosion types

4.2.2 Corrosion rate and predictive models

Corrosion in general is a time dependent phenomenon. However, depending on the specific