HELD:
G.R. No. L-42088 May 7, 1976
ALFREDO G. BALUYUT vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO,
ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE BALUYUT, JOSE ESPINO and
CORAZON ESPINO
AQUINO, J.:
Sotero Baluyut died in Manila on January 6, 1975, leaving an estate
allegedly valued at not less than two million pesos.
A few weeks later, his nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed in the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City a verified petition for letters of
administration, alleging that the deceased was survived by his
widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting
as administratrix of the decedent's estate.
The lower court appointed Alfredo G. Baluyut as special
administrator with a bond of P100,000.
Mrs. Baluyut, in her verified opposition, alleged that she was
unaware that her deceased husband executed a will and
characterized as libelous the allegation as to her mental incapacity.
She prayed that she be named administratrix and that the
appointment of Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator be set
aside.
The lower court cancelled Baluyut's appointment as special
administrator and found Mrs. Baluyut to be healthy and mentally
qualified.
Acting on that motion for the reconsideration filed by Alfredo, the
lower court appointed Baluyut and Jose Espino as special
administrators.
Mrs. Baluyut in her verified amended opposition, asked that
Espino, former governor of Nueva Vizcaya and an alleged
acknowledged natural child of Sotero Baluyut, be appointed
administrator should she not be named administratrix.
Mrs. Baluyut filed an urgent motion praying that she be appointed
administratrix.
At the hearing of Mrs. Baluyut's urgent motion, no oral and
documentary evidence was presented. The lower court merely
examined Mrs. Baluyut.
The probate court terminated the appointments of Espino and
Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrators and appointed Mrs.
Baluyut as regular administratrix based on the fact that as surviving
spouse she has a preferential right to be appointed as
administratrix of her deceased husband's estate and that she is
entitled to three-fourths of the conjugal estate. The lower court
said it was convinced of the widow's capacity and that her
"sufficient understanding" justified her appointment.
Alfredo G. Baluyut filed against respondent Judge, Mrs. Baluyut and
the Espino spouses this special civil action of certiorari in order to
set aside its order appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.
This court issued a restraining order enjoining the respondents
from enforcing the order and from disposing of the funds or assets
of the estate in their possession or deposited in certain banks.
Mrs. Baluyut's main contention is that it is the probate court and
not the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court that should decide
the issue as to her competency to act as administratrix.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.
We hold that while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs.
Baluyut as surviving spouse enjoys preference in the granting of
letters of administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78, Rules of Court), it does
not follow that she should be named administratrix without
conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to discharge that
trust.
Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain
person should act as executor is not binding on the probate court and
does not automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters
testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness
to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the
will was executed but supervening circumstances might have
rendered him unfit for that position.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the
suitability of the person to be appointed administrator by giving him
the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors a
chance to contest the petition (Matute vs. Court of Appeals, L-26106,
January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 768, 791).
In this case the probate court briefly and perfunctorily interrogated
Mrs. Baluyut in order to satisfy itself on her mental capacity. The court
did not give Alfredo G. Baluyut a chance to contest her qualifications.
He had squarely raised the issue as to her competency. The probate
court assumed that
Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court
into a testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be
dispensed with and is a matter of public policy (Art. 838, Civil Code;
See. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and
98 Phil. 249).
After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should
be revoked and proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary
or of administration under the will should be conducted (Sec. 1, Rule
82, Rules of Court; Cartajena vs. Lijauco and Zaballa, 38 Phil. 620;
Rodriguez vs. De Borja, L-21993, 64 O.G. 754, 17 SCRA 418).
Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in
the interest of the orderly administration of justice that a hearing be
held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's fitness to act as executrix or
administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity should be given an
adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure
in summarily appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix on the
assumption that Alfredo G. Baluyut was not an interested party. That
irregularity became more pronounced after Alfredo G. Baluyut's
revelation that the decedent had executed a will. He anticipated that
development when he articulated in his petition his belief that Sotero
Baluyut executed wills which should be delivered to the court for
probate.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of November 27, 1975
appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix is set aside. The letters of
administration granted to her are cancelled. The probate court is
directed to conduct further proceedings in consonance with the
guidelines delineated in this decision.
G.R. No. 162934 November 11, 2005
HEIRS OF BELINDA DAHLIA A. CASTILLO, namely, BENA JEAN,
DANIEL, MELCHOR, MICHAEL and DANIBEL, all surnamed CASTILLO
vs. DOLORES LACUATA-GABRIEL
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS
Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B. Almoradie, died in
Malabon City, Metro Manila, leaving behind a sizable inheritance
consisting mostly of real estate and shares of stock.
A little over a month after Crisantas death, her mother, Crisanta
Santiago Vda. de Yanga, commenced an intestate proceeding
before the RTC of Malabon City. She alleged, that to her
knowledge, her daughter died intestate leaving an estate with an
estimated net value of 1,500,000.00 and that such estate was
being managed by her wastrel and incompetent son-in-law,
Lorenzo, and by two other equally incompetent persons. She
prayed that letters of administration be issued to her son, Mariano
Yanga, Jr. However, the RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator.
Meantime, the marriage between Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and
Lorenzo Almoradie was declared void for being bigamous. The RTC
then removed Lorenzo as administrator and appointed Mariano, Jr.
in his stead.
Belinda Dahlia Y. Almoradie Castillo, claiming to be the only
legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for
intervention, which motion was, however, held in abeyance
pending some incidents in the CA.
Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta Y. Gabriel,
filed before the RTC of Malabon City a petition for probate of an
alleged will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor.
He alleged that he discovered his mothers will on October 25, 1989
in which he was instituted as the sole heir of the testatrix, and
designated as alternate executor for the named executor therein,
Francisco S. Yanga, a brother of Crisanta, who had predeceased the
latter.
On June 2, 1990, Belinda Castillo died. The heirs of Belinda, namely,
Bena Jean, Daniel, Melchor, Michael, and Danibel, all surnamed
Castillo, filed a Motion praying that they be substituted as party-
litigants in lieu of their late mother Belinda.
The probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special
administrator of his mothers estate.
On April 16, 2001, Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L.
Gabriel, filed a "Manifestation and Motion"where she informed the
probate court of her husbands death and prayed that she be
admitted as substitute in place of her late husband, and be
appointed as administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as
well.
The heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores manifestation and motion.
They averred that Dolores was not Crisanta Gabriels next of kin, let
alone the lawful wife of the late Roberto.
Bena Jean filed a "Motion for Appointment as Administrator of the
Estate of Crisanta Y. Gabriel" praying that she be appointed
administratrix of the estate of her grandmother Crisanta.
Dolores opposed the motion of Bena Jean, claiming that the latter
has neither proven her kinship with Crisanta Gabriel nor shown any
particular qualification to act as administratrix of the estate.
The lower court appointed Dolores as special administratrix. The
probate court merely noted the motion for substitution filed by the
heirs of Belinda, stating that they were "mere strangers to the
case" and that their cause could better be ventilated in a separate
proceeding.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari, and ruled
that the probate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
appointing Dolores as special administratrix.
ISSUE
WON the appointment of respondent as special administratrix of the
estate left by Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel was proper.
HELD
The petition is without merit.
In ruling against the petitioners and dismissing their petition, the CA
ratiocinated as follows:
The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the
discretion of the court. The order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator under Section 6, Rule
78 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the selection of a
special administrator. In the issuance of such appointment,
which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, the court determines who is
entitled to the administration of the estate of the decedent. On
this point, We hold that the preference of private respondent
Dolores Gabriel is with sufficient reason.
The ruling of the CA is correct. The Court has repeatedly held that the
appointment of a special administrator lies in the sound discretion of
the probate court. A special administrator is a representative of a
decedent appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his
estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed. When
appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as a representative
of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as the
administrator in charge of the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the
court. As such officer, he is subject to the supervision and control of
the probate court and is expected to work for the best interests of the
entire estate, especially its smooth administration and earliest
settlement. The principal object of appointment of temporary
administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of
person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors
and heirs. In many instances, the appointment of administrators for
the estates of decedents frequently become involved in protracted
litigations, thereby exposing such estates to great waste and losses
unless an authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the
assets in the interim is appointed. The occasion for such an
appointment, likewise, arises where, for some cause, such as a
pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular
administration is delayed.
Section 1, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Appointment of Special Administrator. When there
is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by
any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed.
The new Rules have broadened the basis for the appointment of an
administrator, and such appointment is allowed when there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause, e.g.,
parties cannot agree among themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion
to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is
broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the
will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there
is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an
executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree
among themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general
administration cannot be immediately granted, a special
administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property
of the deceased.
It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents
which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a
delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters
testamentary will consequently be prolonged necessitating the
immediate appointment of a special administrator.
The petitioners strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court is misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment of
regular administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the other
hand, applies to the appointment of a special administrator. It has
long been settled that the appointment of special administrators is
not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular
administrators. Thus, in Roxas v. Pecson, this Court ruled:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or
preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of
administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory
provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator
under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply
to the selection or removal of special administrator. ... As the law does
not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the
qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has
discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion
which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason,
justice or equity.
G.R. No. 167979 March 15, 2006
WILSON S. UY, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
the Deceased JOSE K. C. UY vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ANASTACIO C. RUFON and JOHNNY K. H. UY
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS
Jose K.C. Uy died intestate on August 20, 1996 and is survived by
his spouse, Sy Iok Ing Uy, and his five children, namely, Lilian S. Uy,
Lilly S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-Garcia , Lilen S. Uy and Wilson S. Uy
(Petitioner).
Special Proceedings was instituted and Lilia Hofilea was appointed
as special administrator of the estate of the deceased.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the order appointing Lilia Hofilea
as special administrator with prayer that letters of administration
be issued to him instead.
Judge Ramon B. Posadas revoked Lilia Hofileas appointment as
special administrator and denied her petition to be appointed as
regular administrator. Meanwhile, letters of administration were
granted to petitioner.
Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) filed a motion to intervene,
praying that he be appointed as administrator of the estate in lieu
of petitioner. He alleged that he is the brother and a creditor of the
deceased, and has knowledge of the properties that should be
included in the estate.
The trial court initially denied private respondents motion to
intervene, but reconsidered its earlier order and appointed private
respondent as co-administrator of the estate.
Petitioner then moved that private respondent bring into the
estate properties belonging to the deceased, which motion was
granted by the trial court.
Not satisfied with the compliance of private respondent, petitioner
reiterated his motion for removal of the former as co-
administrator, but the same was denied.
The trial court found that private respondent substantially
complied with the order directing him to bring into the estate
properties owned by or registered in the name of the deceased not
subject of any adverse claim or controversy when he listed the
alleged properties suspected to be concealed, embezzled or
conveyed away by the persons named therein. Thus, it found no
cogent reason to remove private respondent as co-administrator.
The Court of Appeals, on appeal, held that the refusal of the trial
court to remove private respondent as co-administrator of the
estate is neither an error of jurisdiction nor a grave abuse of
discretion; that the appointment of private respondent was
justified; that the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court does not rule out the appointment of co-
administrators; that the institution of a case for annulment of title
and reconveyance against respondent does not justify private
respondents removal as co-administrator.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
appointing private respondent as co-administrator to the estate of
the deceased
HELD
The petition is without merit.
The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the
estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process
of administration. In the case at bar, the trial court granted letters of
administration to petitioner and thereafter to private respondent as
co-administrator.
The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator
depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In Sioca v. Garcia,
this Court set aside the order of preference, to wit:
It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and
without sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of
the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the
deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential
rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person.
The determination of a persons suitability for the office of
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of
the court exercising the power of appointment and such
judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it
appears affirmatively that the court below was in error.
x x x Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by
the trial court. Instead of removing petitioner, it appointed private
respondent, a creditor, as co-administrator since the estate was
sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time attending to it
alone.
A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and
exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not
alone in the administration. The practice of appointing co-
administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited. In Gabriel v.
Court of Appeals, this Court reaffirmed that jurisprudence allows the
appointment of co-administrators under certain circumstances, to
wit:
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the
appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various
reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2)
where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the
deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an
intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested
persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony
for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person
entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have
another competent person associated with him in the office.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, petitioners argument that the trial court cannot re-open the
issue of the appointment of an administrator without removing the
incumbent administrator is erroneous. In probate proceedings,
considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in modifying or
revoking its own orders as long as the proceedings are pending in the
same court and timely applications or motions for such modifications
or revocations are made by the interested parties. In the instant case,
the estate of the deceased has not yet been settled and the case is
still within the jurisdiction of the court.