Case Name: DOMINGO VERGARA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE T.

By: ANJ
SUELTO, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Davao City, Branch IV, Topic: Summary Judgments
MANOLITO GUINOO, ROMEO MONTEBON and PORFERIO CABASE,
respondents.
GR No. L-74766
Date: December 21, 1987
Facts
Two issues are involved in the instant special civil action of mandamus.
Petitioner Vergara commenced in the Municipal Trial Court of Davao City an action for illegal detainer against private
respondents. His complaint alleged that he is the owner of a commercial building consisting of three (3) sections, each
of which is separately occupied by the defendants as lessees. Because the defendants all defaulted in the payment of
their rentals for many months, Vergaras lawyer sent each of them a letter demanding payment of rentals, terminating
their lease contracts and demanding that defendants vacate the leased premises not later than the end of the month of
December 1985.
Defendants sent Vergara a joint reply stating to confirm their verbal commitment with the petitioner to leave the
premises as soon as needed. However, defendants request for an extension of three (3) months for them to find new
space so they can continue their sole livelihood.
Later however, defendants wrote Vergara another letter this time, while acknowledging the latters ownership of the
building, they refuse to vacate the premises on the ground that the lot on which the building stands, though titled in
Vergaras name, was part of a tract of land Identified as Lot 508 which has been ordered reverted to the public domain
by the RTC (Branch XIV) in a decision rendered in Civil Case No. 16192 for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion
entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Kwong Tai Lung y Cia et al.;
Vergara reirerated his demand to vacate
In their answer to the complaint, defendants Guinoo, Montebon and Cabase -
o Denied the averments of the complaint
o Denied Vergaras ownership of the building
o Claimed that their lease contract was null and void;
o Denied having initially paid rentals, claiming that they had been occupying the premises in the concept of an
owner
o Denied knowledge to form a belief regarding their joint letter to Vergara
o Claimed that in virtue of the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 16192 declaring null and void the title
issued over Lot 508- of which Vergaras was formerly a part they were claiming Vergaras land as their
share as member of Salandanan et al landless Association, which was a recognized intervenor in the case.
Under date of March 7, 1986 Vergara filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. It asserted that the 3 defendants were
lessees of Vergaras Commercial Building, there are 2 written contracts of lease of Guinoo and Cabase, the demand
letters sent by Vergaras lawyer to each 3 defendants, Neither Vergara nor the defendants were parties in Civil Case No.
16192, etc
Defendants filed an Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss they argued that A
genuine issue exists which cannot be resolved by mere resort to Summary Judgment that issue having arisen from
defendants controversion of Vergaras claim of possession and ownership over the commercial building and the land
on which the same is constructed, and that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case because the real issue involved
is title and or ownership of the property and not physical possession, and this case should not be by accion interdictal
but accion de reivendicacion.
Vergara submitted a reply dated April 9, 1986, adverting to the distinction between a summary judgment under Rule 34
and a Judgment on the Pleading under Rule 19, and reiterating arguments set out in his motion for summary judgment.
The incidents were resolved by the respondent Judge in two separate order. The first order denied the defendants
motion to dismiss and the second order denied Vergaras motion for summary Judgment.

Issue/s

1. Whether or not the appropriateness of a summary judgment may ever be so self- evident in a case as to make it well
nigh a duty on the part of the Trial Judge to grant the plaintiff's motion therefor.
2. Propriety of the filing directly with this Court an application for a writ of mandamus against a municipal trial court,
considering that jurisdiction to issue this extraordinary writ is also possessed by the Court of Appeals as well as the
Regional Trial Court of the district.
Ruling

1. YES.

Even if the answer does tender issues, summary judgment may still be rendered if the issues rendered are not genuine,
are sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, patently unsubstantial. A summary Judgment may still be rendered on
the plaintiffs motion if he can show to the Court;s satisfaction that except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, that is to say, the issues thus tendered are not genuine, are in words sham,
fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, patently substantial. The determination may be made by the Court on the basis
of the pleadings, and the depositions, admissions and affidavits that the movant may submit, as well as those which the
defendant may present in his turn.

In this case, the defendants answer appears on its face to tender issues. It purports to deal with each of the material
allegations of the complaintm and either specificallt denies, or professes lack of knowledge or information to form a
belief as to them.

Defendants denial of their own personal circumstances, as these are stated in the complaint, is obviously a sham. They
are in truth all residents of Davao City, doing business at Cabaguio Avenue, where the plaintiffs building is located,
and in which they have rented space and where they have been maintaining their commercial establishments under one
trade name or another. Also, their disavowal of the plaintiffs ownership of the building occupied by them. They had
each been occupying those 3 sections for years and been paying rentals therefor to the plaintiff. There are two written
contracts showing the lease by two of them of the building from the plaintiff, and a receipt evidencing payment by
another of rentals to the plaintiff, documents which they have made no serious or effective effort to controvert, but
which, on the contrary, they have impliedly admitted.

It is apparent that defendants' claim of title to the particular lot of the plaintiff is so tenuous and conjectural as to be
practically inexistent. In any event, the claim is utterly irrelevant to the ejectment suit at bar, which involves merely the
question of whether or not their possession of the plaintiff's premises had become illegal in virtue of their extended
failure to pay rentals and their refusal to vacate the premises and pay those arrears despite due demand

2. NO.

Writ of Certiorari and not Writ of Mandamus is the proper remedy available to petitioner. The remedy properly
available to the petitioner in the premises, however, is not the writ of mandamus. Well known is the rule that mandamus
issues only to compel performance of a mandatory ministerial duty. The determination that under the facts and
circumstances obtaining in a case, a summary judgment is proper and the motion therefor should be granted and
summary judgment consequently rendered, rests in the sound discretion of a trial court and can not be regarded as a duty
or ministerial function compellable by the extraordinary writ of mandamus. In this case, the respondent Judge had
discretion to make that determination. What happened was that his Honor made that determination with grave abuse of
discretion despite the plain and patent propriety of a summary judgment, he declined to render such a verdict. The writ
of certiorari will be to correct that grave abuse of discretion.

Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a regional Trial
Court, it is either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be presented. This is and should
continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.

Wherefore, the Order of the respondent Judge dated April 15, 1986 denying the petitioners motion for summary
judgment, and that dated April 30, 1986 declining to reconsider the same, are hereby annulled and set aside.
Said respondent Judge is hereby commanded forthwith to render a summary Judgment in favor of the petitioner
(plaintiff) againt the private respondents (defendants)

Doctrine Notes

Even if the answer does tender issues, summary judgment may till be rendered
if the issues rendered are not genuine, are sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in
bad faith, patently unsubstantial;