3.

The Case Study

The case studies reported below focus on three aspects indicative of the
comparative strength of the LPD. The first aspect pertains to the crucial importance of
good governance and the role played by the board of supervisors, first in the fall of an
LPD due to neglect by the board, and then in the rise of an LPD revitalized by a
resuscitated board. The second aspect relates to the comparative advantage of well-
governed LPDs in the face of strong banking competition. The third aspect pertains to
the economic and social impact of the LPD on the desa pakraman.
3.1 If governance fails: the role of the board in the fall and rise of an LPD
The importance of good governance is most evident in those cases where
cooperation between board, management and customary village has broken down; and
where the re-establishment of good cooperation has subsequently revitalized the LPD.
Three of the case studies presented below deal with past experience and the successful
turnaround of an LPD; the fourth presents the ongoing experience of an LPD yet to be
rescued:
LPD Kayu Kapas in Bangli district is a tiny LPD which broke down early in its
history and could easily have been given up for lack of feasibility. The village, located
in a remote area, consists of a single banjar, with 138 families. The manager of the LPD
reports that it was established in 2002, even though it is listed by PLPDK as having
been licensed in 1997. Bookkeeping is done manually; and there is no telephone
connection. The LPD worked reasonably well during the first year, 2003. But the board,
comprising three farmers, one of them also a small entrepreneur, was inexperienced
and unaware of its responsibilities. Bookkeeping was manual; there was no internal
control; nor was external oversight effective. Problems started in 2004, when savers
could not withdraw their money, and no new loans were issued. It turned out that the
manager of the LPD had used a substantial amount of the funds for his own purposes.
As he did not repay, the borrowers also refused to repay. The guidance agency,
PLDPK Kintamani, kept visiting the LPD, but was unable to revive the LPD, which
became dormant for two years. No records were kept during that period. The turn-
around came in May 2007 when the PLPDK invited LPD Batur, a wellfunctioning
neighboring LPD, to instruct the board about its responsibilities and motivate everyone
to revitalize the LPD. The bendesa and the manager of the LPD also visited several
other LPDs. Without any changes in its composition, the board succeeded convincing
the LPD manager and the borrowers to repay their old debts in full. With the help of a
six-month loan of Rp3m from LPD Batur, which was repaid on time, it resumed
operations. By December 2007 the LPD had 110 savings and 81 loan accounts from
among the 138 families of Kayu Kapas. Total assets amounted to Rp 42.1m, loans
outstanding to Rp35.1m (averaging Rp 433,000 per loan), savings to Rp20.0m and net
profit to Rp 2.4m. The LPD adjusted its risk management to its human and financial
capacities, limiting loan sizes to a maximum of Rp5m and loan periods to 10 months3
. As a result there were no arrears. The LPD was classified as healthy (sehat). By
August 2008 total assets had increased by 85% to Rp77.8m, loans outstanding had
declined to Rp31.1m. Savings had soared to Rp52.0m an increase of 160% and a
strong indication of restored confidence. Rp20.1m of surplus funds were deposited in
BPD. Again, there were no arrears, and the LPD was classified as healthy. Interest
income (including income from penalties and fees) amounted to Rp9.4m during the
first eight months of the year; salaries of Rp3.35m were the biggest expense item,
constituting 74% of expenditure; and net profit amounted to Rp4.6m. Return on
average assets was an impressive 7.7%. However, the large share of salary expenditure
raises the issue of adjusting the size of employment to its business volume. According
to regulation an LPD has a minimum staff of three, which is beyond the requirements
of a small village. A small LPD may do very well with a single staff member, ie, the
manager, and still adhere to the four-eye principle4 . More accurately, one should say
it adheres to an eight-eye principle, as it includes three board members watching over
it. At the same time the opening days and hours of very small LPDs may be reduced.
This would increase their profits substantially, including the size of its development
and social funds. Differentiation of regulation by size of LPD is a policy issue that
needs further attention. The case of LPD Kayu Kapas district shows first how a young
LPD breaks down if the board is not made aware of its responsibilities. But in a second
phase it also shows that, with proper guidance, a non-functioning board can be turned
around, revitalizing a non-performing LPD, restoring confidence, achieving full
repayment of arrears despite an extended period during which the LPD was practically
closed, and returning to profitability all this in a very small and remote village
normally considered unsuitable for a financial institution of its own. The initiative to
revitalize the LPD had come from the PLPDK, but only after a delay of three years.
The key instrument used by the PLPDK was the mobilization of both technical and
financial assistance by a wellfunctioning neighboring LPD.
The LPD is regularly monitored by PLPDK, which also prepares its monthly
reports. Yet the PLPDK has not taken action to bring the board and the management
together to at least discuss the situation and the steps to be taken; nor have the other
support agencies, BPLKDP and BPD, taken action to stop and reverse a situation which
has been deteriorating for years. Nor has a neighboring LPD been called in for help.
Governance has broken down; and external guidance and supervision have remained
inactive. A thorough investigation by the guidance and supervision agencies would be
in order as a first step, followed by a closely monitored action plan. Yet, some
fundamental questions remain: why has no one taken action, who guides the guiding
agencies, and who supervises the supervisors?
3.2 The comparative advantage of the LPD in a competitive environment
Bali has a differentiated financial landscape, comprising a variety of formal, semiformal and
informal financial institutions. Commercial and rural banks are the main competitors of the
LPDs. In all the villages visited we found one or several formal financial institutions in the
vicinity, most often a rural bank (BPR) and a BRI microbanking unit, but also commercial bank
branches or cash offices. Among the banks is the provincial development bank BPD with its
branches, where all government employees hold accounts and receive their salaries.
Downstream the LPD competes with many semiformal financial institutions, such as savings
and credit cooperatives (KSP) and for informal institutions, such as rotating savings and credit
associations (arisan, or selisian, and arisan PKK) and the formerly ubiquitous seka simpan
pinjam, or pecingkreman, which has now been largely replaced by the LPD. For many of these
the LPD acts as a local banker, accepting their deposits and providing loans. How does the
LPD fare in the face of such competition? Here are six case studies which describe the
competitive situation of LPDs:

Near Padang Luwih are two commercial bank branches, which lend larger amounts for longer
periods than the LPD; there is a BPD branch, with simple procedures for government
employees; there is a rural bank branch at a distance, with more cumbersome procedures
and no payment services; there are four savings and credit cooperatives in the village, with
the added attraction of profit-sharing; and there are six arisan PKK. LPD Padang Luwih
estimates that it holds about 60% of the deposit and loan accounts of its residents; its market
share of the amount of deposits is estimated at 20%, and its share of credit at 40%.

Overall, the LPD has a number of core strengths: it is self-financed, self-managed and self-
governed; it is an integral part of the desa pakraman as the center of life; and it is able to bank
on karma as an effective collateral substitute. From the experience of its board members and
management, the LPD has a number of competitive advantages:

Proximity, direct and easy access for everyone

Personal contact and a sense of belonging
Convenient services, doorstep collection of savings & repayments
Simple procedures
Rapid service
Payment services for electricity, water and phone billings (only by larger
LPDs)
Tax-free deposits
Low borrower and saver transaction costs
Profit benefits the community
Desa pakraman, banjar and banjar associations have savings and credit
accounts at LPD.
But compared to other financial institutions it also has competitive disadvantages: There
is no feasibility examination when establishing a new LPD; the LPD is restricted to one village,
which limits staff selection and business growth; it is restricted to investments of surplus
liquidity in BPD, with negative net interest margins of deposits; and external controls are
weak.

3.3 The economic and social impact of the LPD

There are three main avenues of impact of the LPD: (a) self- and debt-financing of
start-up and expansion of micro and small enterprises (MSEs), from accumulated savings and
loans; (b) a development fund amounting to 20% of the profit of an LPD; and (c) a social fund
of 5% of profit, both allocated to the desa pakraman. Here are some examples of the impact
of LPD on MSEs:

In Pecatu the development fund, amounting to Rp2.3bn over the period 2005-07, has
been used for the renovation of the village temples and the banjar assembly halls, a village
market, a kindergarten, a security guard for the cemetery, and incentive payments for the 35
members of the administrative staff of the desa pakraman. The social fund, amounting to
Rp575m, has been been used for various purposes, including the financing of a free health
check in each banjar every galungan, one of the principal Balinese festivals.

4. The relationship between desa pakraman and LPD in practice

Owner of the LPD is the customary village. In most villages this means that the original
indigenous residents, krama ngarep, are the ultimate owners. Users include several
categories: the original indigenous residents, krama ngarep; other residents, krama tamiyu;
the customary village and the banjar as non-formal corporate entities; the various banjar
associations; and registered local savings & credit cooperatives (KSP). LPDs may strictly follow
the regulation and categorically exclude non-residents; but some accept deposits from
outsiders, particularly in villages which function as economic centers. Lending to outsiders is
much rarer, and normally requires a personal guarantee from a resident of the village where
the LPD is located. The management team comprises three members: the manager of the
LPD, the secretary and the treasurer, who are appointed by the board. Larger LPDs may have
functional divisions, a middle management of division heads and a larger number of staff,
totaling more than 50 in the largest LPD. According to LPD regulation, management and staff
are required to come from the customary village. This can impose serious constraints on an
LPD, both in small villages with an overall shortage of qualified personnel and in large villages
where banking qualifications are required. In some cases such positions are filled by bank
retirees originating from the village. The management team receives training from LPD
training and guidance agencies and, in recent years, from Certif, a national bankers training
and certification agency for rural banks (BPR) and non-banks including LPDs. LPD staff is
trained by the management team and sometimes by LPD training agencies. Governance is the
responsibility of the customary village, which elects a board of supervisors, pengawas. The
minimum number of board members is three. The maximum rarely exceeds seven. This it not
necessarily related to the size of a village or an LPD; there are many large LPDs with the
minimum number of three board members only. The board is chaired by the head of the
customary village, the bendesa. Elections are held every three to five years, depending on the
village. Normally board members are elected by the assembly of the customary village; in
some villages, every banjar elects a board member. Confidence and reputation are usually
the decisive criteria of selection. In some villages retired bankers, university lecturers and
other highly skilled residents of the village are found on the board; but finding competent
board members can be a problem, particularly in smaller villages. Training and guidance of
board members, estimated at around 6,000, represents a future challenge. The board
appoints the management, determines the operational terms and procedures of the LPD and
has full authority of internal supervision. The board routinely meets weekly or monthly as
well as in-between as need arises. In smaller LPDs all credit decisions require the approval of
the board; non-involvement of the board would be a danger signal. However, loans below a
certain limit may be approved by the manager and signed afterwards by the bendesa at the
next meeting. Large LPDs have a credit committee and a differentiated system of lending
authority.

Internal control is the responsibility of the board. Large LPDs may establish a unit of internal
audit, which may comprise board members and staff of the LPD. Auditing is not compulsory;
but virtually all big LPDs are audited by a chartered accountant. PLPDK and BPD are involved
in monthly reporting of LPDs, but are not in auditing. It has been suggested that auditing
mandatory for LPDs with total assets above Rp5bn. Ultimate authority lies with the village
and banjar assemblies. Normally there is close communication between the board, the
customary village and the banjar. The bendesa regularly reports to the council (prajuru) of
the customary village; the heads of the banjar, who are members of the village council, report
to the monthly banjar assemblies. Alternatively, in villages where the board comprises
representatives of the banjar, these report directly to the banjar assemblies. In case of
defaulting, board members communicate directly with borrowers, together with the head of
the banjar if deemed necessary. The strength and the weakness of the LPD lies in its system
of governance. Good governance brings together all customary authorities in the village: the
bendesa as head of the village and of the board, the other board members, the customary
village administration and council, and the banjar heads and assemblies. Intimate knowledge
of all resident families with their past and present situations enables the board to arrive at
sound credit decisions and to enforce repayment. If necessary the board members involve
the other authorities, among them the heads of the banjar in particular, to induce loan
delinquents to repay. However, in the absence of effective external supervision, the LPD may
break down if the board members are not aware of their responsibilities and the krama do
not insist on good governance. In contrast to the sanctioning power of the krama, which
would so greatly shame the family of the defaulter if called upon that it is virtually never
invoked, there is another, even stronger sanctioning power, which represents the spiritual
dimension of governance and does not need to be invoked by any worldly authority: karma.
Good as well as bad deeds affect a persons karma, positively or negatively: in this world, in
the beyond and, through reincarnation, in the next life. Saving, investing ones savings or
loans to the benefit of the family, and repaying ones loans positively impacts ones karma.
Wasting ones resources and failing to settle ones debts has a negative impact. As one of the
board members put it: If you die as a defaulter, you will enter the beyond as a defaulter. It
is these two factors, social control by the krama and spiritual control by ones karma, which
explain why the board can be so successful in inducing defaulters to repay their loans and
why there are so few LPDs in which physical collateral is ever seized.

4.1.2 In support of good governance: the need for effective supervision

While any LPD risks falling into disarray, a motivated and committed board, whether
newly elected or reoriented, can revitalize an LPD within a short period of time, regain
the trust of the customary village, apply a soft approach by convincing the defaulters
to fully repay their overdues, and lead the LPD to continual growth and profitability.
The unequivocal conclusion is that good governance, with effective control over
management, is absolutely crucial.
While all LPDs were closely monitored and their poor performance was well known
to all agencies involved in guidance and supervision, in none of the cases has
instantaneous information been followed by instantaneous action. Adherence, or
lack of adherence, to regulation was well documented by monthly reports, but no
steps were taken to enforce standards. In two cases the guidance agency PLPDK has
played a decisive role in reviving the LPD, but only after considerable delays. In two
cases, a strong LPD in the area has given a helping hand; this is an instrument that
could be used far more systematically. Province-level agencies have not been
involved in the process of revitalization.
 Background
Lembaga Perkreditan Desa (LPD) is a financial institution with two unique
characteristics: (a) as an institution owned and governed by the customary village (desa adat,
desa pakraman), it is fully integrated into Balinese culture; (b) like no other financial
institution, it is inclusive in outreach, covering almost all customary villages of Bali and the
vast majority of its population. Based on an analysis of case studies and secondary data, this
study aims to deepen our understanding of the relationship between governance by the
customary village, institutional performance and economic development as a basis for
designing strategies to strengthen smaller and weaker institutions and manage the risks of
larger ones.