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Chinese nuclear forces, 2016

Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72:4, 205-211, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2016.1194054

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BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 2016
VOL. 72, NO. 4, 205211
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2016.1194054

NUCLEAR NOTEBOOK

Chinese nuclear forces, 2016

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The modernization of Chinas land-based nuclear-capable missile force has progressed signifi- China; defense; ICBM;
cantly over the past year, with Beijing fielding a new version of an existing nuclear missile and a nuclear weapon; SLBM;
new dual-capable missile. The country has also reorganized its nuclear missile command struc- SSBN; United States
ture. The authors estimate that, in total, China has a stockpile of approximately 260 nuclear
warheads for delivery by nearly 150 land-based ballistic missiles, 48 sea-based ballistic missiles,
and bombers. The Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force will probably continue to
grow slowly, such that the number of ICBM warheads primarily targeted against the United States
may exceed 100 a decade from now. Although there is no sign that the Chinese government has
officially diverted from its no-first-use nuclear policy, its modernization program is adding
significant new capabilities. These qualitative improvements may in turn alter Chinese nuclear
policy and strategy.

During the past decade, China has fielded a more
diverse and capable nuclear arsenal than it did pre-
viously. Since our Nuclear Notebook on China in July
2015 (Kristensen and Norris 2015), the trend has con-
tinued: Chinas nuclear modernization efforts have
resulted in a new version of an existing nuclear med-
ium-range mobile ballistic missile, as well as a new
dual-capable intermediate-range mobile ballistic mis-
sile. The country has also test-flown a new follow-on
mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, and reorga-
nized its nuclear missile command structure.
Although there is no sign that the Chinese govern-
ment has officially diverted from its nuclear policy
which includes a pledge not to use nuclear weapons
first, not to use them against non-nuclear countries or
in nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to maintain a mini-
mum deterrent designed only to ensure a survivable
second-strike capability its modernization program is
adding significant new capabilities. These qualitative
improvements may in turn alter Chinese nuclear policy
and strategy.
We estimate that China has a stockpile of approxi-
mately 260 nuclear warheads for delivery by nearly 150
land-based ballistic missiles, 48 sea-based ballistic mis-
siles, and bombers. This stockpile is likely to grow
further over the next decade as new nuclear-capable
missiles become operational. Moreover, in response to
the US deployment of missile defense systems in the
Pacific, China has now begun to equip its silo-based
missiles with the capability to carry multiple warheads
(Table 1). This development could potentially further
increase the size of the Chinese nuclear warhead
inventory.
We continue to observe that China does not nor-
mally deploy nuclear warheads on its missiles, but
stores them separately in central storage facilities.1
There are new and disturbing reports, however, that
Chinese military officials are advocating increasing the
readiness of Chinas nuclear missiles (Kulacki 2016).
Thus far, we have not seen evidence that the govern-
ment has decided to follow their advice.
In December 2015, the Chinese government reorga-
nized its nuclear forces by replacing the Second
Artillery with the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA)
Rocket Force and PLA Strategic Support Force. This
reorganization elevates the status of the strategic forces
to an equal level with the army, navy, and air force.
Chinese President Xi Jinping said that the PLA Rocket
Force is a core force of strategic deterrence, a strategic
buttress to the countrys position as a major power, and
an important building block in upholding national
security. The Rocket Force is responsible for main-
taining conventional and nuclear weapons and the
ability to deter and strike across the entire defense
area. Xi also called on the Rocket Force to enhance
nuclear deterrence and counter-strike capacity with
medium- and long-range precision strike ability
(Xinhua 2016). Importantly, the PLA Rocket Force
will be responsible for all strategic missiles, including
those on navy submarines. The Chinese defense

CONTACT Hans M. Kristensen hkristensen@fas.org

2016 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
206 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND R. S. NORRIS

Table 1. Chinese nuclear forces, 2016.

Type NATO designation Number of launchers Year deployed Range (kilometers) Warhead x yield (kilotons) Number of warheads
Land-based ballistic missiles
DF-4 CSS-3 ~10 1980 5500+ 1 3300 ~10
DF-5A CSS-4 Mod 2 ~10 1981 13,000+ 1 40005000 ~10
DF-5B CSS-4 Mod 3 ~10 2015 ~12,000 3 200300 ~30
DF-15 CSS-6 ? 1990 600 1? ?a
DF-21 CSS-5 Mods 1, 2, 6 ~80 1991, 2000, 2016 2150 1 200300 ~80b
DF-26 ? ? (2017) 4000+ 1 200300 ?
DF-31 CSS-10 Mod 1 ~8 2006 7000+ 1 200300 ~8
DF-31A CSS-10 Mod 2 ~25 2007 11,000+ 1 200300 ~25
DF-41 CSS-X-20 n.a. ? ? n.a. n.a.
Subtotal: ~143 ~163c
d
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles
JL-1 CSS-NX-3 n.a. 1986 1000+ 1 200300 n.a.
JL-2 CSS-NX-14 (48) (2015) 7000+ 1 200300 (48)
Subtotal: (48) (48)
Aircraft
H-6e B-6 ~20 1965 3100+ 1 bomb ~20
Fightersf ? ? ? n.a 1 bomb ?
Cruise Missilesg
DH-10 CJ-10 ~250 2006? 1500? 1? ?
DH-20? CJ-20? ? ? ? 1? ?
Total ~183 (260)h
a
The CIA concluded in 1993 that China almost certainly had developed a warhead for the DF-15, although it is unclear if the capability was fielded.
b
This table only counts nuclear versions DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1) and DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2), each of which has fewer than 50 launchers deployed. The
conventional DF-21C and DF-21D are not counted.
c
The missile and warhead inventory may be larger than the number of launchers, some of which can be reused to fire additional missiles.
d
The JL-1 is no longer thought to be operational, and the JL-2 may be close to becoming fully operational. Warheads for the JL-1 may have been retired by
now, and warheads for the JL-2 have been produced.
e
Bombers were used to conduct at least 12 of Chinas nuclear test explosions between 1965 and 1979. We believe that a small number of Chinas H-6
bombers may have a secondary nuclear mission. The aircraft range is equivalent to combat radius, which for some H-6 bombers can be extended with air
refueling.
f
A fighter-bomber was used in a nuclear test in 1972, but it is unknown whether a tactical bomb capability has been fielded.
g
US Air Force intelligence lists the ground-launched DH-10 land-attack cruise missile as conventional or nuclear. US Air Force Global Strike Command also
lists the air-launched cruise missile CJ-20 as nuclear-capable, but it is unclear whether that finding comes from a coordinated intelligence assessment.
h
The number in parentheses includes the 48 warheads produced for the four existing nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, as well as about 30
additional warheads (including warheads for the DF-26, those awaiting dismantlement, and a small inventory of spares), for a total stockpile of
approximately 260 warheads.

ministry said the reorganization did not mean a major
change in its nuclear policy, which would continue to
be based on its no-first-use pledge and defensive
nuclear strategy (Global Times 2016).
Land-based ballistic missiles
The modernization of Chinas land-based nuclear-cap-
able missile force has progressed significantly over the
past year, with the introduction of a new version of an
existing medium-range road-mobile ballistic missile
and the fielding of a new intermediate-range road-
mobile ballistic missile. There are reports that some
existing missiles are being re-equipped to carry multi-
ple warheads. China has also test-launched a new fol-
low-on intercontinental road-mobile ballistic missile,
which may carry multiple warheads.
The modernization, which began in the 1990s, is
part of a transition from older, transportable, liquid-
fuel, slow-launching missiles to longer-range, road-
mobile, solid-fuel, and quicker-launching missiles.
The modernization also involves the nuclear command
and control systems needed to operate the missiles. The
end result will be a land-based missile force that will be
better able to survive US (and to some extent Russian)
surprise attacks. The modernized force is more mobile,
responsive, and accurate, and can overwhelm a limited
US ballistic missile defense system.
The US Defense Intelligence Agency says that
China has the worlds largest and most comprehensive
missile force (Stewart 2016, 11). While technically that
may be true, most of the missile force is made up of
non-nuclear short-range missiles. The nuclear portion
of Chinas missile force is significantly smaller than the
nuclear missile arsenal of either Russia or the United
States. Most of Chinas nuclear missiles are medium-
and intermediate-range, with launchers for interconti-
nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) numbering between
50 and 75. The size of the ICBM force has remained
relatively stable over the past five years, following an
increase during the previous five years. The number of
missiles for the ICBM launchers is a little higher
because the oldest type (DF-4) has one or two extra
reloads per launcher (Kristensen 2016).
Fifteen years ago, the US intelligence community
estimated that by 2015, China would have 75100

warheads on ICBMs, primarily targeted at the United
States (CIA 2001, 3). This prediction did not come to
pass. Of Chinas 5075 ICBMs, an estimated 4050
capable of carrying 6070 warheads in total can
target the continental United States.2 Nonetheless, the
Chinese ICBM force will probably continue to grow
slowly, and with the addition of multiple warheads on
the DF-5B and possibly the DF-41 in the future, the
number of ICBM warheads primarily targeted against
the United States may exceed 100 a decade from now.
Overall, we estimate that China possesses approxi-
mately 143 nuclear-capable land-based missiles that
can carry 163 nuclear warheads. The force is slowly
increasing in both number and variety.
The 2016 edition of the Pentagons annual report on
Chinese military developments no longer lists the old
DF-3A (CSS-2) (US Defense Department 2016). A
liquid-fueled, single-stage, intermediate-range ballistic
missile, the DF-3A was first deployed in 1971 and
could deliver a 3.3-megaton warhead up to 3000 kilo-
meters (km). The last remaining DF-3A brigade at
Dengshahe in northeast China has now been upgraded
to the DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile
(Kristensen 2014b).
China continues to maintain one brigade of the DF-
4 (CSS-3) ICBM. This two-stage, liquid-fueled missile
was first deployed in 1980 and can deliver a 3.3 mega-
ton warhead more than 5500 km, a sufficient range to
target India, part of Russia, and Guam. The brigade has
approximately 10 transportable launchers, some or all
of which may be based in caves with a roll-out-to-
launch capability. Each launcher has one or two reloads
of additional missiles. The remaining DF-4s will prob-
ably be replaced by the DF-31 in the near future.
Chinas DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2) a liquid-fueled,
two-stage, silo-based ICBM has a range that exceeds
13,000 km and has been targeted at the United States
and Russia since the early 1980s. The DF-5A is an
upgraded version of the original DF-5 (CSS-4 Mod
1), which was first deployed in 1981. Apparently,
some of the DF-5As have been upgraded to carry
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
(MIRVs). The MIRVed version is known as DF-5B
(CSS-4 Mod 3) (US Defense Department 2015, 8).
China had the ability to deploy multiple warheads on
the DF-5 (and later the DF-5A) for decades but did
not; it appears to have started doing so in response to
the US deployment of a ballistic-missile defense system
(Sanger and Broad 2015; Kristensen 2015; US Defense
Department 2015, 8, 31). We estimate that China has a
total of approximately 20 DF-5s of both versions, of
which perhaps half have been equipped with MIRVs.
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 207
Chinas primary regional nuclear missile is the two-
stage, solid-fuel, road-mobile DF-21 (CSS-5), a med-
ium-range ballistic missile. The DF-21 has existed in
two nuclear versions for the past decade and a half: the
DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1) and the newer DF-21A (CSS-5
Mod 2). The Mod 1 version has a range of at least
1750 km, but the new version probably has a longer
range of about 2150 km. The Defense Department
recently reported the existence of a third nuclear ver-
sion of the DF-21, known as the CSS-5 Mod 6 (US
Defense Department 2016, 58). We estimate that China
has approximately 80 launchers for the nuclear DF-21.
China has also deployed two conventional versions of
the DF-21: the DF-21C (CSS-4 Mod 4) land-attack
missile, and the DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5) anti-ship
missile.
For the past decade, the focus of Chinas ICBM
modernization has been the DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1)
and a longer-range version known as DF-31A (CSS-
10 Mod 2). The DF-31, which was first deployed in
2006 but now appears to have been terminated with
fewer than 10 launchers, is a three-stage, road-mobile
missile that is transported in a 15-meter-long canister
on a six-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). The
DF-31 has a range of more than 7000 km, but cannot
reach the continental United States. It is presumed to
have taken over much of the regional targeting of
Russia, India, and Guam previously done by the DF-
4. The reasons for the slow introduction of the DF-31
are unclear.
The DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) a solid-fueled, three-
stage, road-mobile ICBM is an extended-range ver-
sion of the DF-31, designed to reach targets in most of
the continental United States. We estimate that China
deploys about 25 DF-31A ICBMs in four brigades.
Perhaps the biggest missile event in 2015 was
Chinas public unveiling of the new DF-26 intermedi-
ate-range road-mobile missile during a military parade
in Beijing in September. A total of 16 DF-26 launchers
took part in the parade. Like the existing DF-4 and DF-
31 ICBMs, the 4000-km range DF-26 is capable of
targeting important US bases in Guam. Unlike the
DF-4 and DF-31, however, the DF-26 is thought to be
dual-capable, and so could also be used to target the
island with conventional warheads.
The Pentagon has reported for more than two dec-
ades that China is developing a new follow-on road-
mobile ICBM known as the DF-41. After considerable
delay, the program appears to have made progress with
several flight tests over the past few years, some of
which have included multiple payloads. Reporting in
the Washington Free Beacon, Bill Gertz reported that
208 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND R. S. NORRIS
the DF-41 is assessed by U.S. intelligence agencies to
be powerful enough to deliver between six and 10
warheads up to 7456 miles far enough to reach
every corner of the United States from launch areas
in eastern China (Gertz 2016). However, Gertz did not
provide a specific source for the assessment, which may
be an exaggeration. To reach every corner of the
United States, a missile with a range of 7456 miles
(about 12,000 km) would have to launch from the most
northeastern provinces of China, at least 400 km north-
east of Beijing. But Chinese ICBMs tend to be based
much further inside China to protect them against
preemptive attacks.
Moreover, given Chinas limited nuclear testing pro-
gram, it seems reasonable to assume that the warhead
intended for the DF-41 may be similar in size to the
warhead used on the DF-31A and DF-5B. If so, a pay-
load of six to 10 warheads would weigh more than
twice as much as the payload on the DF-5B, which
probably has a range of some 12,000 km with three
warheads. The DF-5B is a liquid-fuel missile, but the
DF-41, according to one expert, appears to be a mod-
ified variant of the post-boost stage of the DF-5B that
has been placed on a larger solid rocket motor (Gertz
2016).
Gertz cited unidentified Pentagon officials who say
that the DF-41 flight-tested on 19 April 2015, carried
two warheads, closer to the three warheads thought to
be carried by the DF-5B (Gertz 2016). The US Defense
Department says the DF-41 is capable of carrying
MIRVs (US Defense Department 2016, 25). In this
case, the DF-41 is probably intended to replace the
DF-5 and be equipped with a few warheads and pene-
tration aids to ensure that it can penetrate the US
missile defense system.
Land-based short-range ballistic missiles
Most of Chinas short-range ballistic missiles are con-
ventional with one exception: the nuclear capable
DF-15 (CSS-6). After reporting that the nuclear test
China conducted on 16 August 1990 may have been
related to development of a warhead for a Chinese
short-range ballistic missile (CIA 1990, 1), a CIA
memorandum concluded in September 1993 that
China will begin to field nuclear-armed CSS-X-6s
next year. The memorandum went on, China
almost certainly has already developed the warhead
for this system. Testing might be needed for formal
weaponization or for additional warhead options
(CIA 1993, 5). Despite the apparent nuclear capabil-
ity developed at the time, it is unclear whether China
ever completed and fielded a nuclear warhead for the
DF-15. Instead, it might have developed the capabil-
ity as a possible option for future warhead miniatur-
ization efforts.
Submarines and sea-based ballistic missiles
China currently operates a fleet of four Jin-class (Type
094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs). All are based at the Longposan naval base
near Yulin on Hainan Island.
It is not known with certainty in the West how many
SSBNs China plans to build. The US Office of Naval
Intelligence predicted nearly a decade ago that China
might build five Jin SSBNs (Kristensen 2007). A 2015
Pentagon report agreed with that projection, saying up
to five may enter service before China begins work on a
next-generation SSBN (US Defense Department 2015, 9).
Yet in early 2015, other US government sources suggested
that China might build more. In his prepared testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February
2015, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said
that China might produce additional JIN-class nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines (Clapper 2015, 7).
He repeated the assessment in 2016 (Clapper 2016, 7).
Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, commander of the US
Pacific Command, said in 2015 that up to five more [Jin
SSBNs] may enter service by the end of the decade
(Locklear 2015, 9), although that projection seems
unrealistic.
The 2016 Pentagon report seems to clear up the
confusion, saying that four Jin-class SSBNs are in ser-
vice and a fifth is being built. Although the Jin-class is
more advanced than Chinas first experimental SSBN
the single and now inoperable Xia (Type 092) it is
still a very noisy design (Kristensen 2009b). It seems
likely that China will end production after five boats
and develop and produce a third-generation (Type
096) SSBN over the next decade. The next SSBN is
expected to carry a new missile, the JL-3.
The Jin SSBNs are designed to carry the new JL-2
(CSS-NX-14), a submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) that is a modified version of the DF-31. Each
JL-2 is equipped with a single warhead (and, possibly,
penetration aids). The JL-2 has not been tested to its
full range of 7000-plus km. The 2015 Pentagon report
estimated its range is 7400 km (US Defense
Department 2015, 9), but the 2016 Pentagon report
estimates a range of 7200 km (US Defense
Department 2016, 26). That would be sufficient to
target Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Russia, and India from
waters near China but unless the submarine carrying
the weapon sailed significantly eastward, it could not
target the continental United States. We estimate that

Figure 1. The JL-2 has insufficient range to target the continental United States from Chinese waters.
warheads have already been produced for the 48 JL-2s
that the four existing SSBNs can carry.
Confusion continues about whether the JIN submar-
ines have sailed on deterrent patrols with nuclear
weapons on board. US Chief of Naval Operations
Vice Adm. Joseph Mulloy said in early 2015 that one
Chinese SSBN had gone on a 95-day patrol (Osborn
2015). In late 2015, STRATCOM Commander Adm.
Cecil Haney said Chinese SSBNs had been at sea, and
that while he didnt know if they had nuclear weapons
on board, he had to assume they did (Gertz 2015). In
early 2016, the head of the US Defense Intelligence
Agency said that the Chinese navy deployed the JIN-
class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine in
2015 on an extended patrol far from Chinese waters
(Stewart 2016, 12).
These statements indicate that although one of the
JIN submarines apparently sailed on an extended voy-
age in 2015, it is not clear that Chinese SSBNs have
ever conducted a deterrent patrol with nuclear-armed
JL-2 SLBMs onboard. The 2016 Pentagon report says
that China will probably conduct its first SSBN
nuclear deterrent patrol in 2016 (US Defense
Department 2016, 26).
The Chinese SSBN fleet faces several doctrinal, tech-
nical, and operational constraints. Our analysis sug-
gests that Chinas Central Military Commission
currently does not allow the military services to have
warheads deployed on missiles under normal circum-
stances. Handing over custody of nuclear warheads to
deployed submarines in peacetime would constitute a
significant change of Chinese policy.
Moreover, Chinas navy and the Central Military
Commission will have to build up experience operating
an SSBN force during realistic military operations. This
will require development of new command-and-con-
trol technologies and procedures. The submarines will
also need a destination. Even if China deployed
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 209
nuclear-armed SSBNs to sea in a crisis, where would
they sail? For a JL-2 to be able to strike targets in the
continental United States, a Jin SSBN would have to
sail through the East China Sea and well into the
Pacific Ocean, through dangerous choke points where
it would be vulnerable to hostile antisubmarine
warfare3 (see Figure 1).
Chinas main concern is making sure that its minimum
nuclear deterrent would survive a first strike, and for that
reason it spends considerable resources on modernizing
and hiding its land-based missiles. This frankly makes its
submarine program puzzling, for it seems much riskier for
China to deploy nuclear weapons at sea, where submarines
can be sunk by unfriendly forces, than to hide the nuclear
weapons deep inside Chinas landmass (Kristensen 2014a).
Bombers
Aircraft were used to deliver the nuclear weapon in
at least 12 of Chinas nuclear test explosions con-
ducted between 1965 and 1979. Now, the 2016
Pentagon report includes for the first time a discus-
sion of a potential nuclear role for Chinas bombers.
It says the PLA air force was assigned a strategic
deterrence mission in 2012, although that could also
reflect the introduction of conventional land-attack
cruise missiles on the modified H-6K bomber. But
the Pentagon report states that Chinese media
reports and writings suggest China might eventually
develop a nuclear bomber capability. If it does,
China would develop a triad of nuclear delivery
systems dispersed across land, sea, and air a pos-
ture considered since the Cold War to improve sur-
vivability and strategic deterrence (US Defense
Department 2016, 38). It is also noteworthy that a
US Air Force Global Strike command briefing in
2013 listed the new CJ-20 air-launched land-attack
210 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND R. S. NORRIS
cruise missile carried by the H-6K as nuclear-capable
(Kristensen 2013).
We do not believe that Chinas bombers currently
have an active nuclear mission. But given the history of
Chinas nuclear testing program, we estimate that a
small portion of Chinas H-6 intermediate-range bom-
bers have a secondary nuclear mission not a fully
active mission but a capability that is available if
necessary.
Cruise missiles
China produces and fields a number of cruise missiles,
including land-attack cruise missiles that may have a
nuclear capability. The CIA concluded in 1995 that a
Chinese test scheduled for that year may include war-
head testing for . . . a cruise missile (CIA 1995), but the
evidence for Chinese nuclear cruise missiles is sketchy
and should be viewed with caution.
One potential nuclear-capable Chinese cruise missile
is the DH-10 (CJ-10) land-attack cruise missile,
thought to have a range of perhaps 1500 km. US Air
Force Intelligence lists the DH-10 as conventional or
nuclear, indicating that it is a dual-capable weapon
(US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence
Center 2013, 29). The DH-10 is launched from a
four-axle triple box launcher. The number of deployed
DH-10s is uncertain, in part because the Pentagon has
stopped releasing numbers for Chinese missiles. In
2011, the Pentagon estimated that China had 4055
launchers with 200500 missiles (US Defense
Department 2011, 78).
China is also developing an air-launched land-attack
cruise missile known as the CJ-20 for delivery by H-6K
bombers. An Air Force Global Strike Command brief-
ing in 2013 asserted that the CJ-20 is nuclear-capable
(Kristensen 2013), but the US Air Force does not list
the CJ-20 at all (US Air Force, National Air and Space
Intelligence Center 2013, 29).
Notes
1. Nuclear weapons are stored in central facilities under
the control of the Central Military Commission.
Should China come under nuclear threat, the weapons
would be released to the Second Artillery Corps to
enable missile brigades to go on alert and prepare to
retaliate. For a description of the Chinese alerting
concept, see Kristensen (2009a). For more on warhead
storage in China, see Stokes (2010).
2. The continental United States, as used here, includes
only the lower 48 states. US states and territories out-
side of the continental United States include Alaska,
Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, and many tiny
Pacific islands.
3. Chinese nuclear submarines are apparently very noisy
(Kristensen 2009b).
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This research was carried out with grants from the New
Lands Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund.
Notes on contributors
Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear
Information Project with the Federation of American
Scientists in Washington, DC. His work focuses on research-
ing and writing about the status of nuclear weapons and the
policies that direct them. Kristensen is a co-author of the
world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford
University Press) and a frequent adviser to the news media
on nuclear weapons policy and operations. He has co-
authored Nuclear Notebook since 2001. Inquiries should be
directed to FAS, 1725 DeSales Street NW, Sixth Floor,
Washington, DC, 20036 USA; +1 (202) 5463300.
Robert S. Norris is a senior fellow with the Federation of
American Scientists in Washington, DC. A former senior
research associate with the Natural Resources Defense
Council, his principal areas of expertise include writing and
research on all aspects of the nuclear weapons programs of
the United States, the Soviet Union and Russia, the United
Kingdom, France, and China, as well as India, Pakistan, and
Israel. He is the author of Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie
R. Groves, the Manhattan Projects Indispensible Man
(Steerforth) and co-author of Making the Russian Bomb:
From Stalin to Yeltsin (Westview). He co-authored or con-
tributed to the chapter on nuclear weapons in the 19852000
editions of the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press) and
has co-authored Nuclear Notebook since 1987.
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